A Critique of the House Republican Climate Policy Proposals

Home , John Christy, Richard Tol, Ronald Bailey

BENJAMIN ZYCHER MARCH 2020

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Executive Summary

he Republican leadership in the House of Republican policy proposals based on “alarmist” TRepresentatives released recently a set of pol- assumptions are unlikely to prove salutary. If anthro- icy proposals ostensibly designed to address the pogenic climate change represents an “existential potential dangers of anthropogenic climate change. threat,” then no cost is too large and no benefit is too These proposals appear to be driven by perceived small for given policy proposals, and proponents of political imperatives perhaps revealed by polling climate policies purportedly more “sensible” inexora- data, and at least in substantial part by many of the bly will be driven to negotiate with themselves over same assumptions about climate phenomena, both how far toward the alarmist view they are willing to current and prospective, underlying the “net-zero” move. Instead, an alternative policy stance supported emission proposals of the more-alarmist propo- by the actual climate evidence and straightforward nents of climate policies, one example of which is benefit/cost analysis is available. It comprises the fol- the Green New Deal. lowing central components. The House Republicans propose two sets of policy initiatives: (1) subsidies and other policy sup- • Any plausible policy to reduce greenhouse gas port for formal US participation in the international emissions, whether implemented by the US “trillion trees” initiative and (2) subsidies and other alone or all nations collectively, would yield by policy support for capturing and sequestering car- 2100 climate effects effectively equal to zero. bon dioxide from enhanced oil recovery, from natural gas power production, and through direct extraction • At the same time, the costs of such policies from the air. would be very large and inflicted disproportion- The US component of the trillion trees effort, ately on the world’s poor. based on the demonstrated absorption effect of trees on carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, would • Anthropogenic climate change is real, but nat- have a near-zero effect—a bit less than 1/100th of ural processes too affect climate phenomena. a degree C—on temperatures by 2100, based on The scientific literature suggests that mankind straightforward modeling with the climate model is responsible for about one-third of the approx- used by the Environmental Protection Agency. More- imate 1.5 degrees C of warming since 1850. over, because forest canopies are dark as a crude generalization, expansion of forests would be likely • There is substantial evidence that increasing to reduce global “albedo” (reflective) effects on carbon dioxide concentrations yield both risks solar radiation; the scientific literature suggests a and important benefits, and the unanticipated net warming effect for most regions. Even ignoring adverse effects of government policies should the albedo issue, the costs of this effort would not be not be discounted. trivial; it could not satisfy any plausible benefit/cost test in terms of its stated objectives. • The body of evidence on climate phenomena The same is true for an expanded effort to cap- does not support the “crisis” or “existential ture and sequester carbon dioxide. It would yield cli- threat” assertions commonly heard in the pub- mate effects effectively equal to zero and would be lic debate. Many of those arguments are based very expensive. Under conservative assumptions, the on model projections driven by implausible plant capital costs of such an effort for the electric underlying assumptions, while others are simply power sector alone would be $182 billion per year. assertions made ex nihilo.

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• There is no “consensus” among scientists about like—that add to human capital and so increase climate science, whether at the 97 percent level incomes and the demand for conventional commonly asserted or any other number. More- energy. Therefore, opposition to fossil fuels is over, scientific “truth” is not majoritarian, and fundamentally antihuman. scientists in any event are not entitled to deference with respect to their policy views. • The uncertainties about shifts in future climate phenomena, whether anthropogenic or natu- • Climate policies, whether explicitly or implic- ral, are large, and any plausible policy action to itly, are intended to reduce the use of fossil affect them by reducing greenhouse gas emis- fuels by increasing their relative perceived costs. sions would yield trivial effects while imposing The historical increase in the use of fossil fuels large costs. The most sensible policy approach has driven advances in human well-being, while moving forward comprises watchful waiting, increases in individual incomes have expanded adaptation over time, and ongoing investment the demand for fossil fuels significantly. Oppo- in resilience against the future effects of climac- sition to fossil fuels implies a reduction in pol- tic changes. Such an approach would be very dif- icies—education, training, health care, and the ferent from “doing nothing.”

2 A Critique of the House Republican Climate Policy Proposals

Benjamin Zycher

t is of no small interest that President Donald can be surprised that this last dynamic already I Trump—a man driven by instincts rather than has begun: Having released its proposals only on analytic insight, a man unimpressed with scientific February 12, Republicans have responded to the “truth” based on majoritarianism among experts, inevitable Democratic criticisms—the Republican and a man utterly unconcerned with the approval of proposals are vastly inadequate in the face of an elites and opinion makers—has an outlook on the “existential threat”—by saying they “have never said overall climate policy question that is correct in its we don’t have to reduce carbon emissions” and that essentials.1 That has not satisfied the perceived polit- the proposals are just a “first step.”5 ical needs of much of the Republican establishment Can it possibly be the case that Republican strat- in the House of Representatives, now proposing its egists did not foresee something so predictable? own set of climate policies, to which we turn below.2 Having endorsed the assumptions of those proposing This response is likely to have been driven by poll net-zero policies, however costly, authoritarian, and numbers among younger and suburban Republicans, unworkable, the principles that will support opposi- heavy criticism from editorial pages, and the old tion to those policies in favor of something that can Beltway adage “you can’t beat something with noth- be summarized as “yes, but less” are far from clear.6 ing,” that “something” being the various proposals For now, it is useful briefly to summarize the for immediate policy actions to achieve something essential contours of the public debate. It is sober- approximating zero net emissions of greenhouse ing to review even a small sample of the myriad pur- gases (GHG), typically by 2050.3 ported disasters looming large as sources of human In short, they seem to see promotion of a set of suffering and ecological disaster resulting from alternative climate policy responses as a political increasing atmospheric concentrations of GHG:7 imperative, but if those alternatives are based on floods, fires, sea level rise and coastal destruction, the same assumptions as those of the net-zero pro- disappearing arctic sea ice, the collapse of Antarctica, ponents, they can be predicted to engender envi- cyclones, droughts, torrential rainfall, mass extinc- ronmental effects, whether positive or negative, tions, large-scale contagion, wildfires, large migra- effectively equal to zero, combined with an inexo- tions of starving people, and wars over shrinking rable increase in the size, cost, and destructiveness supplies of resources and food. Mainstream news of government.4 Another outcome virtually cer- coverage does not spend much time or space on dis- tain to obtain is a process in which the proponents sent from such apocalyptic predictions. That there is of such policy alternatives gradually descend into little evidence of such effects to date has not damp- negotiations with themselves over how far toward ened the crisis rhetoric; indeed, it may have elevated the alarmist view they are willing to move. No one it if rhetorical volume is viewed as a substitute for A CRITIQUE OF THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN CLIMATE POLICY PROPOSALS BENJAMIN ZYCHER

the actual data on climate phenomena, which are concentrations of GHG and thus dampen the atten- summarized below. dant effects.14 Neither the US share of the additional The next section discusses the recent House Repub- trillion trees nor a timetable are specified in the draft lican climate proposals and their attendant problems. legislation, but a recent report argues that 60 billion Then I offer an alternative policy response to alarmist additional trees could be planted in the US over the climate assertions and net-zero emissions proposals. next two or so decades, using 330 million acres of Finally, I present some concluding observations. land, an area well over three times the land area of California.15 The Green New Deal—much derided by Republicans—would require “only” about 115 percent The House Republican Proposals of the land area of California.16 The same report estimates that such a US effort House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy and other by 2050 would remove about 540 million tons of senior House Republican members introduced carbon dioxide annually, about 8 percent of current recently their package of four bills on climate policy, US GHG emissions, and about 1 percent of current which emphasizes two central approaches: global emissions of GHG.17 The climate impact of that sequestering effect would be a bit less than 1/100th of • Planting more trees with the Trillion Trees Act8 a degree C by 2100—effectively zero—using any and mainstream climate model.18 Accordingly, it is difficult to see how the US component of a trillion tree • Capturing carbon dioxide with (1) a bill “to effort justified on “climate” grounds could satisfy any provide for an increased credit for carbon plausible benefit/cost test. oxide [sic] sequestration for direct air capture But the real problem with the trillion trees and car- facilities”; (2) the Carbon Capture, Utilization, bon dioxide absorption argument is discussed exten- and Storage Innovation Act; and (3) the New sively in the peer-reviewed literature: The proposal Energy Frontiers Through Carbon Innovation ignores the “albedo” (reflection) effect of forests. Act of 2020.9 Solar radiation at the top of the atmosphere perpendicular to the earth is 1,360 watts per square meter. Because half the earth is dark at any given moment, Planting More Trees. The Trillion Trees Act “estab- and because not all solar radiation is perpendicular lishes a commitment to a global effort to plant one tril- to the earth, effective solar irradiance at the top of lion trees” as part of the United Nations Trillion Tree the atmosphere is one-quarter of that, or 340 watts Campaign.10 (The World Economic Forum at Davos per square meter. Because of the albedo effects of also endorsed this program in early 2020.11) Some clouds, large ice formations, deserts, and other geo- of these trees would be planted in national forests, logical phenomena in reflecting solar radiation back already horribly mismanaged and the source of mas- into space, average solar radiation at the surface sive wildfire risk. Until the management of national is about 70 percent of that, or about 240 watts per forests is rationalized, expanding the number of trees square meter.19 is likely to prove perverse.12 Still more trees would be As a crude generalization, forest canopies are planted on private land under various incentives the dark; in other words, forests have low albedo effects. Agriculture Department would implement; this is yet Accordingly, expanding forests might increase another subsidy program for rural landowners.13 absorption of carbon dioxide but is likely also to The basic argument underlying the Trillion Tree reduce aggregate albedo effects, with a net impact Campaign in the climate context is straightforward: on surface temperatures vastly more complex than Trees absorb carbon dioxide, so significantly more of assumed by the proponents of the trillion trees legis- them purportedly would serve to reduce atmospheric lation. Bala et al. report the following finding:

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The prevention of deforestation and promotion of credit from 100,000 tons to 50,000, presumably afforestation have often been cited as strategies to annually. The credit would rise to $62.50 per ton, slow global warming. Deforestation releases CO₂ to or to $43.75 per ton when used for enhanced oil the atmosphere, which exerts a warming influence recovery. on Earth’s climate. However, biophysical effects of deforestation, which include changes in land sur- • Specifically include carbon capture, utilization, face albedo, evapotranspiration, and cloud cover also and storage projects for eligibility for loan guar- affect climate. antees from the Department of Energy (DOE), We find that global-scale deforestation has a streamline regulatory permitting for carbon net cooling influence on Earth’s climate, because dioxide pipeline projects, and establish research the warming carbon-cycle effects of deforesta- and development (R&D) programs at the Envi- tion are overwhelmed by the net cooling associ- ronmental Protection Agency and DOE. ated with changes in albedo and evapotranspiration. Latitude-specific deforestation experiments indicate • Establish another R&D program at the DOE for that afforestation projects in the tropics would be capturing carbon dioxide produced at power- clearly beneficial in mitigatingglobal-scale warming, plants using natural gas. but would be counterproductive if implemented at high latitudes and would offer only marginal benefits As with the trillion trees proposal discussed above, in temperate regions . . . these results question the it is impossible that CCS activities implemented on efficacy of mid- and high-latitude afforestation proj- any plausible scale would yield measurable climate ects for climate mitigation.20 effects. Even achievement of net-zero GHG emissions by the US would reduce global temperatures A recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate in 2100 by 0.173 degrees C, under the same favorable Change (IPCC) analysis and literature survey reports assumptions discussed above.23 findings consistent with those reported by Bala et al.: A given CCS project would cost hundreds of mil- a net warming effect from afforestation under not lions of dollars at a minimum for structures and all but a broad range of conditions, the magnitude of equipment, pipeline infrastructure, injection wells, which varies among the boreal, temperate, and trop- underground infrastructure, and other such capital ical zones.21 In short, the Trillion Trees Act would assets.24 Even if we assume average CCS project per- fail any plausible benefit/cost test, and the assumed formance of 500,000 tons of carbon dioxide annu- scientific underpinnings of the proposal are very far ally, and a total effect of only 10 percent of current from obviously correct. US GHG emissions (about 6.5 billion tons annually), the scale of the CCS effort would comprise 1,300 such Capturing Carbon Dioxide. The bill “to provide plants and associated infrastructure. At, say, “only” for an increased credit for carbon oxide [sic] seques- $500 million per plant, the total would be $650 bil- tration for direct air capture facilities”; the Carbon lion.25 Can anyone believe this to be serious? Capture, Utilization, and Storage Innovation Act; and With respect to the use of captured carbon diox- the New Energy Frontiers Through Carbon Innova- ide for enhanced oil recovery: This process has been tion Act would do the following: used for many years to force out of the ground oil that otherwise would be difficult or uneconomic to pro- • Extend permanently and increase by 25 percent duce. (The carbon dioxide increases pressures in the the current tax credit (section 45Q22) for car- oil field/reservoir and dissolves in the oil, reducing bon use and sequestration (CCS) derived from its viscosity.) This use of carbon dioxide earns a fed- direct air capture and reduce the minimum size eral tax credit of $35 per ton. But this long-standing of direct-capture air projects qualifying for the practice has nothing to do with GHG emissions or

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climate policy; the proposed increase in the tax credit alarmist assumptions but designed to address the (to $43.75) as a climate policy depends crucially on the possible serious adverse effects of anthropogenic cli- net effect of injecting the carbon dioxide into under- mate change. The central components of such a pub- ground oil reservoirs combined with the increase in lic policy stance can be summarized as follows: carbon dioxide emissions resulting from the use of the additional oil produced.26 • Any plausible policy to reduce GHG emissions, Several technical analyses of this question are whether implemented by the US alone or all available.27 In brief, the net effect is not clear, depend- nations collectively, would yield by 2100 climate ing on a number of such complexities as the engineer- effects effectively equal to zero. ing specifics of given reservoirs and the type of oil produced. At the same time, the technical analyses • At the same time, the costs of such policies uniformly ignore the effect of the enhanced oil recov- would be large and inflicted disproportionately ery on the world oil market; in the case in which the on the world’s poor. enhanced oil production displaces other oil production on a barrel-per-barrel basis, whether in or out- • Anthropogenic climate change is real, but nat- side the US, the net effect on GHG emissions is likely ural processes too affect climate phenomena. to be negative. But it remains the case that the climate The scientific literature suggests that mankind effect of such a reduction almost certainly would be is responsible for about one-third of the approx- unmeasurable, for the reasons discussed above. imate 1.5 degrees C of warming since 1850. The same general conclusion is unavoidable with respect to the proposals to subsidize CCS from nat- • There is substantial evidence that increasing ural gas powerplants and to capture carbon dioxide carbon dioxide concentrations yield both risks directly from the air. No plausible scale of such indus- and important benefits, and the unanticipated trial processes could yield climate impacts distin- adverse effects of government policies should guishable from zero, at costs that are uncertain but not be discounted. that incontrovertibly would be large.28 • The body of evidence on climate phenomena does not support the “crisis” or “existential An Alternative Response to threat” assertions commonly heard in the pub- Climate Alarmism and Net-Zero lic debate. Many of those arguments are based Emissions Proposals on model projections driven by implausible underlying assumptions, while others are simply Even as the actual evidence on climate phenom- assertions made ex nihilo. ena, summarized below, is far less worrisome than commonly asserted—a state of affairs that might • There is no “consensus” among scientists about change—the climate effects of the various policy climate science, whether at the 97 percent level proposals for sharp reductions in GHG emissions commonly asserted or any other number. More- would be close to unmeasurable, while the atten- over, scientific “truth” is not majoritarian, and dant costs would be large. These are the central real- scientists in any event are not entitled to defer- ities that largely have been ignored in the Republican ence with respect to their policy views. policy proposals offered as alternatives tonet-zero emissions and other “alarmist” prescriptions, them- • Climate policies, whether explicitly or implic- selves afflicted by those same realities. But they are itly, are intended to reduce the use of fossil sufficiently straightforward as to form the basis of a fuels by increasing their relative perceived costs. useful alternative policy prescription not based on The historical increase in the use of fossil fuels

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has driven advances in human well-being, while between the Obama administration and China: an increases in individual incomes have expanded additional 0.01 degrees C, if one were to take the the demand for fossil fuels significantly. Oppo- agreement seriously.34 The electricity component of sition to fossil fuels implies a reduction in pol- the Green New Deal: 0.17 degrees C.35 A net reduc- icies—education, training, health care, and the tion to zero of GHG emissions by the entire Organi- like—that add to human capital and so increase sation for Economic Co-operation and Development: incomes and the demand for conventional 0.35 degrees C.36 energy. Therefore, opposition to fossil fuels is The trivial effects of such policies are the central fundamentally antihuman. reason that the “insurance” argument for proposals to reduce GHG emissions—given the uncertainties, • The uncertainties about shifts in future climate we should hedge against the possibility that serious phenomena, whether anthropogenic or natu- climate impacts will emerge—fails analytically.37 ral, are large, and any plausible policy action to Assume a truly serious international effect to affect them by reducing GHG emissions would reduce GHG emissions: a 20 percent reduction by yield trivial effects while imposing large costs. China, a 30 percent reduction by the rest of the indus- The most sensible policy approach moving for- trialized world, and a 20 percent reduction by the ward comprises watchful waiting, adaptation rest of the developing world, all in addition to the over time, and ongoing investment in resilience US reductions as envisioned in the Obama Climate against the future effects of climactic changes. Action Plan, and all by 2030. The temperature effect Such an approach would be very different from by 2100: a bit more than 0.5 degrees C. Can anyone “doing nothing.” argue that policies yielding such reductions in emissions—or ones even greater—are even remotely plausible as a political matter? The Effects of Plausible Climate Policies. It is more than merely curious that proponents of vari- Beneficial Effects of Increasing GHG Concen- ous climate policies almost never specify the future trations. Let us assume that there is some non- effects of their proposals in terms of temperatures trivial likelihood that anthropogenic climate change and such other important climate phenomena as sea will prove serious or even catastrophic. This is the levels.29 The implicit assertion is that the given poli- so-called “fat tail” argument: The right-hand tail of cies upon implementation will yield significant bene- the statistical distribution of possible future climate ficial effects. As with the House Republican proposals damage might be “fat,” so that the likelihood of such discussed above, the reality is that even policies vastly serious damage is not trivial. The problem is that more aggressive in terms of reducing GHG emissions there are at least three potential fat tails. also would have effects effectively equal to zero by A second is the potential benefits from anthro- the end of the century.30 pogenic warming. Consider for example the NASA Full implementation of the Obama administration “greening” analysis of the earth: The peer-reviewed Climate Action Plan would have reduced tempera- literature estimates that about 70 percent of tures in 2100 by 0.015 degrees C.31 The most promi- that effect is from carbon dioxide fertilization.38 nent recent proposals for a US carbon tax are those A well-known study reports that far fewer people die promoted by the Alliance for Market Solutions and from heat than from cold.39 Perhaps more specula- the Climate Leadership Council; the temperature tively, the likelihood of a future glaciation, however reduction in 2100 yielded by each proposal would distant in time, approaches certainty, and anthropo- be 0.015 degrees C.32 The entire Paris agreement, genic warming under such conditions might prove if implemented immediately and enforced strictly: a significant benefit.40 And the third fat tail is the 0.17 degrees C.33 The contemporaneous agreement unanticipated adverse effects of government policies.

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Can anyone argue plausibly that such potential effects shows no trend since 1895.52 US flooding over the are unimportant? past century is uncorrelated with increasing GHG concentrations.53 The available data do not support The Evidence Does Not Support Alarmist the ubiquitous assertions about the dire impacts Assertions. To say that anthropogenic climate of declining pH levels in the oceans.54 Global food change is “real”—increasing GHG concentrations availability and production have increased more or are having detectable effects—does not tell us the less monotonically over the past two decades on a magnitude of its observable effects, which must be per capita basis.55 measured empirically. Temperatures are rising, but The IPCC in the Fifth Assessment Report is as the Little Ice Age ended around 1850, it is not deeply dubious about the various severe effects often easy to separate natural from anthropogenic effects hypothesized or asserted as future impacts of increas- on temperatures and other climate phenomena.41 ing GHG concentrations.56 The one exception is the The latest research in the peer-reviewed litera- disappearance of the summer arctic sea ice, which ture suggests that mankind is responsible for about IPCC views as “likely,” with “medium confidence,” half a degree of the global temperature increase of but only under the most extreme GHG concentra- about 1.5 degrees since 1850.42 tion path (RCP8.5).57 Under RCP8.5, GHG concen- There is little trend in the number of “hot” days trations through 2100 rise on average annually by for 1895 to 2017; 11 of the 12 years with the highest 11.9 parts per million (ppm), over six times faster number of such days occurred before 1960.43 The than the average (1.9 ppm) for 1985–2017, in a world National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in which natural gas use is growing relative to coal use has maintained since 2005 the US Climate Reference internationally, however slowly and unevenly.58 Network, comprising 114 meticulously maintained temperature stations spaced more or less uni- Many Alarmist Predictions Are Based on the formly across the lower 48 states, with 21 stations in Climate Models. Many of the alarmist predic- Alaska and two stations in Hawaii.44 They are sited tions shaping the public debate over climate pol- to avoid heat island effects and other such distor- icy are based on projections of climate phenomena tions as much as possible; the reported data show no made by various climate models under an assump- trend over the available 2005–20 reporting period.45 tion that RCP8.5 is realistic.59 Note that these mod- A reconstruction of global temperatures over the els—in particular the 102 CMIP5 models tracked by past one million years, using data from ice sheet for- the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory—as mations, shows there is nothing unusual about the a crude generalization have overpredicted warm- current warm period.46 ing since 1975 (roughly the beginning of the satellite Global mean sea level has been increasing for record) by a factor of about two.60 thousands of years at about 3.3 millimeters per year; That the models predict the actual temperature it may or may not be accelerating, and any such accel- record and other climate phenomena poorly raises eration might be the result of anthropogenic or natu- serious questions about the usefulness of their pro- ral causes.47 The Northern and Southern Hemisphere jections of future climate trends. Patrick Michaels sea ice changes tell very different stories.48 US tor- and Paul Knappenberger note that nado activity shows either no trend or a downward trend since 1954.49 Tropical storms, hurricanes, and During all periods from 10 years (2006–2015) to 65 accumulated cyclone energy show little trend since (1951–2015) years in length, the observed tempera- satellite measurements began in the early 1970s.50 ture trend lies in the lower half of the collection of The number of US wildfires shows no trend since climate model simulations, and for several periods 1985, and global acreage burned has declined over it lies very close (or even below) the 2.5th percen- past decades.51 The Palmer Drought Severity index tile of all the model runs. Over shorter periods, such

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as the last two decades, a plethora of mechanisms increase in the consumption of conventional energy. have been put forth to explain the observed/modeled Accordingly, the campaign in opposition to fossil divergence, but none do so completely and many of fuels has slipped into the antihuman trap that is the the explanations are inconsistent with each other.61 hidden but essential core of modern environmen- talism: Far from being a resource, ordinary people are a scourge on the planet. They prefer inexpensive Other Central Arguments. None of this seems to energy, but the moral imperative of reduced fossil-fuel matter in the context of much of the policy discus- consumption is diametrically opposed, and invest- sion of anthropogenic climate change. The debate has ments in people—education, training, health, and the been dominated by assertions that adverse effects like—make matters worse by increasing human cap- both massive and irreversible already are observable, ital and wealth and thus the demand for energy. In with worse to be experienced soon in the absence of short, opposition to fossil fuels—its very logic—leads radical changes in energy consumption, production, also to disinvestment in people, in particular in a third and a vast array of other economic processes. Such a world desperate to emerge from grinding poverty. transformation would impose massive costs inflicted It is not difficult to list severallow-probability disproportionately on the world’s poor.62 That is catastrophes: asteroid impacts, mass volcanic erup- why we now observe vociferous demands of the tions, powerful earthquakes, tsunamis, mass con- less-developed countries for compensation merely for tagion, terrorist use of bioweaponry, nuclear war, the costs of the Paris agreement, the climate impacts gamma ray storms, and massive crop failures. Do the of which would be either trivial or nonexistent.63 proponents of climate policies, whatever their effec- As discussed above, there is no “97 percent” con- tiveness, believe we should spend 1–2 percent of gross sensus, or anything remotely approximating it, among domestic product as insurance against each of them? climate scientists about climate phenomena.64 More- over, scientific “truth” is not majoritarian. It is one thing to argue that scientists’ views on science itself Concluding Observations should be given some degree of deference by non- specialists. It is quite another to argue that scientists’ Once opponents of alarmist policy prescriptions views on policy questions should be given dispropor- endorse alternative policies based on the same tionate weight. Scientists have no greater, or lesser, assumptions, they will leave themselves with no claim to expertise on policy questions, with all the principled approach for opposition to even the most subjective trade-offs and value judgments that pol- extreme proposals.67 After all, if anthropogenic cli- icy choices entail. Even as the decades-long stream of mate change is an “existential threat,” no cost is too apocalyptic warnings has failed to come to pass, only high and no benefit is too small; opponents of alarm- a few observers have noticed that the international ist policies will not be able to fall back on benefit/cost climate movement (or industry) is engaged in a bla- arguments in favor of their proposals as a substitute tant exercise of moving the goalposts: The purported for others more draconian. necessary safety limit on temperature increases As an aside, it is unlikely to be an accident that, as by 2100, 2 degrees C only a short time ago, now is a rough approximation, Republican states are dispro- 1.5 degrees C.65 portionate consumers of fossil fuels, particularly on Policy proposals that implicitly adopt alarmists’ a per capita basis, and policies to reduce GHG emis- assumptions inexorably will be driven to oppose the sions must increase the relative prices of fossil fuels, expanded use of fossil fuels, a profoundly antihu- whether directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly.68 man stance.66 The data show unambiguously that Such increases in the relative prices of fossil fuels greater consumption of conventional energy results thus would reduce the competitiveness of Republican in reduced poverty, and reduced poverty yields an states relative to that of Democratic states, as a crude

9 A CRITIQUE OF THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN CLIMATE POLICY PROPOSALS BENJAMIN ZYCHER

generalization, and thus would engender a wealth both the potential adverse effects and potential ben- transfer from the former to the latter. efits of increasing GHG concentrations and would Proposals purportedly more moderate, such as recognize, however implicitly, the potential unan- those offered by the House Republicans, are doomed ticipated adverse effects of government policies. to fail politically, in substantial part because it is dif- Such a policy approach is very different from “doing ficult to refute the need for net-zero policies if the nothing.” “existential threat” assumption is not refuted and because the predicted effects of themore-moderate policies on climate phenomena are trivial at most. Acknowledgments Instead, given the large uncertainties afflicting our understanding of anthropogenic climate change, The views presented here are the author’s and do and the massive costs and near-zero benefits of any not purport to represent those of AEI or any of its plausible policies, the most sensible policy approach officers or sponsors. I thank Ron Barone, Michael moving forward comprises a stance of watchful Canes, Kevin D. Dayaratna, Laurence A. Dougharty, waiting, adaptation over time, and ongoing invest- Myron Ebell, Rick Enthoven, Kenneth P. Green, ment in resilience against the future effects of David Kreutzer, Marlo Lewis, and Patrick J. Michaels climactic changes.69 for useful suggestions, but any remaining errors or One policy reform that would engender such omissions are my responsibility. investment would be directed at government flood insurance policies to reduce subsidies for construc- tion and location biases in areas more vulnerable About the Author to the potential effects of climate change. Another would be reform of pricing policies affecting invest- Benjamin Zycher is a resident scholar at the ment incentives for transport, water, and energy American Enterprise Institute, where he works on infrastructure. This approach would incorporate energy and environmental policy.

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Notes

1. Scientific “truth” is not majoritarian, and science is a process of testing hypotheses against evidence, whether derived from experimentation or empirical observations. For a discussion of the purported “97 percent” scientific consensus about anthropogenic climate change, see Frank Hobbs, “What Is There a 97% Consensus About?,” Climate Etc., December 20, 2015, https://judithcurry. com/2015/12/20/what-is-there-a-97-consensus-about/. See also Richard Tol, “Global Warming Consensus Claim Does Not Stand Up,” March 24, 2015, http://richardtol.blogspot.com/2015/03/now-almost-two-years-old-john-cooks-97.html. Note that in the original paper by John Cook et al., their claim was that 97 percent of the abstracts reviewed—not 97 percent of scientists—that took a position supported the anthropogenic climate hypothesis, a conclusion vastly less interesting than commonly asserted. See John Cook et al., “Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the Scientific Literature,”Environmental Research Letters 8, no. 2 (May 15, 2013), https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/8/2/024024/pdf. See also David R. Legates et al., “Climate Consen- sus and ‘Misinformation’: A Rejoinder to Agnotology, Scientific Consensus, and the Teaching and Learning of Climate Change,” Science & Education 24 (2015): 299–318, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11191-013-9647-9. On the analytically sound nature of Donald Trump’s views on climate policy, see Benjamin Zycher, “Trump Is Absolutely Correct to Withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement,” InsideSources, November 12, 2019, https://www.insidesources.com/trump-is-absolutely-correct-to-withdraw-from-the- paris-climate-agreement/. 2. See Kevin McCarthy, “House Republicans Unveil Carbon Capture Legislation,” press release, February 12, 2020, https:// www.republicanleader.gov/house-republicans-unveil-carbon-capture-legislation/. 3. On the poll numbers, see Karlyn Bowman, “Democrats and Republicans Divided on Climate Change,” Forbes, April 19, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bowmanmarsico/2019/04/19/democrats-and-republicans-divided-on-climate-change/#6f2e3d143198; Daniel A. Cox, “Toward a Climate Change Consensus?,” AEIdeas, October 9, 2019, https://www.aei.org/politics-and-public-opinion/ toward-a-climate-change-consensus/; Pew Research Center, “As Economic Concerns Recede, Environmental Protection Rises on the Public’s Policy Agenda,” February 13, 2020, https://www.people-press.org/2020/02/13/as-economic-concerns-recede-environmental- protection-rises-on-the-publics-policy-agenda/; and Steven Mufson, “Are Republicans Coming Out of ‘the Closet’ on Climate Change?,” Washington Post, February 4, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/can-republicans-turn-over-a-new-leaf-on- climate-change/2020/02/03/6a6a6bd8-4155-11ea-aa6a-083d01b3ed18_story.html. On criticism from editorial pages, see, for example, Editorial Board, “See It, Say It: Climate Change,” Washington Post, October 14, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/see-it-say-it-climate-change/2017/10/14/83c3c8e4-b049-11e7-be94-fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html. On immediate policy actions, see Benjamin Zycher, The Green New Deal: Economics and Policy Analytics, American Enterprise Institute, April 24, 2019, https:// www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-green-new-deal-economics-and-policy-analytics/. On the purported need for net-zero emissions by 2050, see, for example, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5 °C, 2019, https:// www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. 4. See Benjamin Zycher, “Once the GOP Rolls Out Climate Policies, It Endorses All the Assumptions of the Left,” RealClearMar- kets, May 6, 2019, https://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2019/05/06/once_the_gop_rolls_out_climate_policies_it_endorses_all_ the_assumptions_of_the_left_103725.html. 5. On the Republican responses to Democratic criticisms, see Josh Siegel and Abby Smith, “House Democrats Aren’t Ready to Go Along with 1 Trillion Trees Plan Unless GOP Touches Fossil Fuels,” Washington Examiner, February 26, 2020, https:// www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/energy/daily-on-energy-house-democrats-arent-ready-to-go-along-with-1-trillion-trees-plan- unless-gop-touches-fossil-fuels. On the Democratic criticisms, see Elvina Nawaguna, “A Trillion Trees Not Enough to Fix Climate Cri- sis, Critics Say,” Roll Call, February 26, 2020, https://www.rollcall.com/2020/02/26/a-trillion-trees-not-enough-to-fix-climate-crisis- critics-say/. On the “existential threat” assertions, see Mike Lillis, “Pelosi Warns of ‘Existential’ Climate Threat, Vows Bold Action,” Hill, December 6, 2019, https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/473382-pelosi-warns-of-existential-climate-threat-vows- bold-action.

11 A CRITIQUE OF THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN CLIMATE POLICY PROPOSALS BENJAMIN ZYCHER

6. On the costly, authoritarian, and unworkable nature of net-zero emissions proposals, see Zycher, The Green New Deal. 7. See, for example, National Climate Assessment, Fourth National Climate Assessment: Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States, 2018, https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/. See also Benjamin Zycher, “Observations on Volume 2 of the Fourth National Climate Assessment,” American Enterprise Institute, November 29, 2018, https://www.aei.org/articles/observations-on-volume-2-of-the- fourth-national-climate-assessment/. 8. Trillion Trees Act, H.R. 5859, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr5859/BILLS-116hr5859ih.pdf. 9. H.R. 5883, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr5883/BILLS-116hr5883ih.pdf; Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage Innovation Act, H.R. 5865, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr5865/BILLS-116hr5865ih.pdf; and New Energy Frontiers Through Carbon Innovation Act of 2020, H.R. 5864, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/ hr5864/BILLS-116hr5864ih.pdf. 10. Trillion Tree Campaign, https://www.trilliontreecampaign.org/. 11. See the endorsement discussion at 1t.org, “FAQ,” http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_1t_org_FAQ.pdf. 12. On the mismanagement of government forests, see, for example, Lawrence J. McQuillan et al., “California Wildfires: Key Recom- mendations to Prevent Future Disasters,” Independent Institute Briefing, June 25, 2019,https://www.independent.org/pdf/briefings/ 2019_06_25_cagf_summer_2019.pdf. 13. For a concise discussion of the proposed Trillion Trees Act, see Ronald Bailey, “Republican Lawmakers Introduce Trillion Trees Act to Combat Climate Change,” February 13, 2020, https://reason.com/2020/02/13/republican-lawmakers-introduce-trillion-trees- act-to-combat-climate-change/. 14. One study suggests that the current global tree count is three trillion, with available space for another 1.2 trillion “outside of exist- ing forests and agricultural and urban land.” See Jean-Francois Bastin et al., “The Global Tree Restoration Potential,” Science 365, no. 6448 (July 5, 2019): 76–79, https://science.sciencemag.org/content/365/6448/76. 15. See James Mulligan et al., “Carbonshot: Federal Policy Options for Carbon Removal in the United States,” World Resources Insti- tute Working Paper, January 2020, https://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/carbonshot-federal-policy-options-for-carbon- removal-in-the-united-states.pdf. On the land area of California, see US Census Bureau, American FactFinder, https://factfinder. census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk. 16. See Zycher, The Green New Deal; and Daniel Turner and Kent Lassman, “What the Green New Deal Could Cost a Typical House- hold,” Competitive Enterprise Institute and Power the Future, February 26, 2020, https://cei.org/sites/default/files/GND02262020.pdf. On Republican derision of the Green New Deal, see Sam Dorman, “House GOP Resolution Blasts ‘Green New Deal’ as Violating Nation’s ‘Bedrock Principles,’” Fox News, May 22, 2019, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/house-gop-resolution-blasts-green- new-deal-as-violating-nations-bedrock-principles. H.R. 398, 116th Cong., 1st sess., https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hres398/BILLS- 116hres398ih.pdf. 17. The US emissions data are reported in Environmental Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, 1990–2017—Main Text, April 2019, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-main-text. pdf. The data in the Environmental Protection Agency report are summarized in Environmental Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, 1990–2017—Executive Summary, April 2019, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-04/ documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-chapter-executive-summary.pdf. For a useful estimate of global emissions, see Jos G. J. Olivier and

Jeroen A. H. W. Peters, Trends in Global CO2 and Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions, PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, December 2018, Table B.1, https://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/downloads/pbl-2018-trends-in-global-co2-and-total- greenhouse-gas-emissons-2018-report_3125_0.pdf. This source reports the most recent global emissions estimates, with trends that can be compared in previous reports. It provides the data in carbon dioxide “equivalents” (CO2e), including the emissions of other greenhouse gases, controlling for the differing radiative (warming) properties of the various greenhouse gases, instead of only carbon dioxide itself. Other sources for global emissions could be used, but the data often are not as up-to-date. See, for example, M. Crippa et al., “Fossil CO2 and GHG Emissions of All World Countries,” Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, Emissions Data- base for Global Atmospheric Research, 2019, https://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=booklet2019&dst=GHGemi. The latest data in that report are for 2015, at about 49.1 billion metric tons. The latest data reported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

12 A CRITIQUE OF THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN CLIMATE POLICY PROPOSALS BENJAMIN ZYCHER

Change are for 2017, at 53.5 billion metric tons CO2e, including the estimated effects of land use changes. See United Nations Environ- ment, “Emissions Gap Report 2018,” December 5, 2018, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/12/UNEP-1.pdf. These differences in estimated emissions are too small to have any effect on the conclusions offered here. 18. The standard deviation of the surface (land-ocean) temperature record is about 0.11 degrees C. See J. Hansen et al., “GISS Analy- sis of Surface Temperature Change,” Journal of Geophysical Research 104, no. D24 (December 27, 1999): 30,997–31,022, https://agupubs. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1029/1999JD900835. The estimate reported above of 1/100th of a degree C by 2100 was generated with the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change/Scenario Generator (MAGICC/SCENGEN, version 5.3), developed at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, and available at Magicc.org, “The Climate System in a Nutshell,” http://www.magicc.org/. This is the model used by the Environmental Protection Agency and other government bureaus. This estimate uses an equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) assumption of 4.5 degrees C, the maximum of the range reported by the Intergovernmen- tal Panel on Climate Change in its fifth assessment report. See Lisa V. Alexander et al., “Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 6 and Table SPM.2, http:// www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf. The higher the assumed ECS, the greater the future tempera-� ture impact of reduced GHG emissions. 19. See the brief NASA discussions of incoming sunlight and clouds and radiation, respectively, at Earth Observatory, “Incoming Sunlight,” NASA, January 14, 2009, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/EnergyBalance/page2.php; and Earth Observatory, “Clouds & Radiation,” NASA, March 1, 1999, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/Clouds/clouds.php. 20. G. Bala et al., “Combined Climate and Carbon-Cycle Effects of Large-Scale Deforestation,”Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 16 (April 17, 2007): 6550–55, https://www.pnas.org/content/104/16/6550. 21. See Paulo Artaxo et al., “Chapter 2: Land-Climate Interactions,” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, April 27, 2019, Figure 2.17 and Table A2.2, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/08/2c.-Chapter-2_FINAL.pdf. Table A2.2 presents a concise review of the relevant literature. 22. For details of the section 45Q tax credit for carbon use and sequestration (CCS) investments, see Great Plains Institute, “Primer: 45Q Tax Credit for Carbon Capture Projects,” May 2019, https://www.betterenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/45Q_ Primer_May_2019.pdf. 23. See endnote 18. 24. See, for example, Jeffrey Rissman and Robbie Orvis, “Carbon Capture and Storage: An Expensive Option for Reducing U.S.

CO2 Emissions,” Forbes, May 3, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2017/05/03/carbon-capture-and-storage-an- expensive-option-for-reducing-u-s-co2-emissions/#31290e8f6482. 25. Jeffrey Rissman and Robbie Orvis estimate additional capital costs of about $2 billion for a given powerplant with CCS technology. Their computation of additional costs (levelized) per megawatt-hour (mWh) is about $60. If we assume a 25-year life for the capital assets and an interest rate of 5 percent, the additional amortization of $2 billion annually for the given CCS powerplant would be about $140 million per year. For 1,300 such plants, the annual capital costs would be $182 billion per year. Rissman and Orvis, “Carbon Capture and Storage.”

26. Vello A. Kuuskraa et al., “Improving Domestic Energy Security and Lowering CO2 Emissions with ‘Next Generation’

CO2-Enhanced Oil Recovery (CO2-EOR),” National Energy Technology Laboratory, June 20, 2011, https://www.osti.gov /biblio/1503260-improving-domestic-energy-security-lowering-co2-emissions-next-generation-co2-enhanced-oil-recovery; National Energy Technology Laboratory, “Carbon Dioxide Enhanced Oil Recovery: Untapped Domestic Energy Supply and Long-Term Carbon Storage Solution,” March 2010, https://www.netl.doe.gov/sites/default/files/netl-file/CO2_EOR_Primer.pdf; and Marlo Lewis, “Com- ments of the Competitive Enterprise Institute Re: Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0495, Review of Standards of Performance for Green- house Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units; 83 FR 65424,” March 18, 2019, https://cei.org/sites/default/files/MarloLewisComments03192019.pdf.

27. See, for example, Vanessa Nuñez-López et al., Final Report: Carbon Life Cycle Analysis of CO2-EOR for Net Carbon Negative Oil (NCNO) Classification, National Energy Technology Laboratory, April 1, 2019, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1525864. 28. See endnote 25.

13 A CRITIQUE OF THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN CLIMATE POLICY PROPOSALS BENJAMIN ZYCHER

29. However, the Obama administration, in its formal analyses of its climate regulatory proposals, was required to provide such estimates. An example: In the regulatory impact analysis of the “efficiency” rule for medium and heavy trucks, the estimated temperature effect by 2100 was between 23 and 65 ten-thousandths of a degree C, with additional impacts in terms of sea levels and the like also effectively equal to zero. See Benjamin Zycher, “The Social Cost of Carbon, Greenhouse Gas Policies, and Politicized Benefit/Cost Analysis,” Texas A&M Law Review 6 (Fall 2018): 59–76, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/SCC-TAMU-LR-Final- fall-2018.pdf. 30. See Benjamin Zycher, “The Climate Empire Strikes Out: The Perils of Policy Analysis in an Echo Chamber,” American Enterprise Institute, September 26, 2018, Table 3, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-climate-empire-strikes-out-the-perils-of- policy-analysis-in-an-echo-chamber/. The source for the temperature projections attendant on the respective policy proposals are author computations using the MAGICC/SCENGEN climate model, version 5.3, under an assumed ECS of 4.5 degrees C. See endnote 18. 31. See White House, Executive Office of the President, “The President’s Climate Action Plan,” June 2013,https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf; and Dan Utech, “Three Years of Action Under the Climate Action Plan,” White House, June 28, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/06/28/third-anniversary-climate- action-plan. 32. See Benjamin Zycher, “Observations on the Alliance for Market Solutions’ ‘Conservative’ Case for a Carbon Tax,” American Enterprise Institute, May 28, 2019, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/observations-on-the-alliance-for-market-solutions- conservative-case-for-a-carbon-tax/; and Benjamin Zycher, “The Deeply Flawed Conservative Case for a Carbon Tax,” American Enter- prise Institute, March 7, 2017, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-deeply-flawed-conservative-case-for-a-carbon- taxconservatives-endorse-the-broken-windows-fallacy-reject-evidence-and-rigor/. 33. The Paris emissions reductions—the “Nationally Determined Contributions”—are not to be taken seriously. See Benjamin Zycher, “The Absurdity That Is the Paris Climate Agreement,” American Enterprise Institute, May 25, 2017, https://www.aei.org/ articles/the-absurdity-that-is-the-paris-climate-agreement/. For the nationally determined contributions, see United Nations Frame- work Convention on Climate Change, “INDC,” https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx. 34. That agreement was meaningless. See Benjamin Zycher, “Observations on the U.S.-China Climate Announcement,” Hill, November 14, 2014, https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/224076-observations-on-the-us-china-climate- announcement; and Benjamin Zycher, “The U.S.-China Climate Agreement Hangover,” Hill, December 8, 2014, https://thehill.com/ blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/226272-the-us-china-climate-agreement-hangover. 35. See Zycher, The Green New Deal. 36. See endnote 18. 37. See Irwin Stelzer, “Asking the Right Question on Climate Change,” American Interest, September 16, 2019, https:// www.the-american-interest.com/2019/09/16/asking-the-right-question-on-climate-change/; and Benjamin Zycher, “Has Irwin Stelzer Asked the Right Question on Climate Change?,” American Enterprise Institute, October 1, 2019, https://www.aei.org/articles/ has-irwin-stelzer-asked-the-right-question-on-climate-change/. 38. See NASA, “Carbon Dioxide Fertilization Greening Earth, Study Finds,” April 26, 2016, https://www.nasa.gov/feature/ goddard/2016/carbon-dioxide-fertilization-greening-earth; and Zaichun Zhu et al., “Greening of the Earth and Its Drivers,” Nature Climate Change 6 (April 25, 2016): 791–95, https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate3004. See also Trevor F. Keenan et al., “Increase in Forest Water-Use Efficiency as Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Concentrations Rise,” Nature 499 (July 10, 2013): 324–27, https:// www.nature.com/articles/nature12291?page=4; Jonathan Barichivich et al., “Large-Scale Variations in the Vegetation Growing Season and Annual Cycle of Atmospheric CO2 at High Northern Latitudes from 1950 to 2011,” Global Change Biology 19, no. 10 (October 2013):

3167–83, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/gcb.12283; and Melissa Reyes-Fox et al., “Elevated CO2 Further Lengthens Growing Season Under Warming Conditions,” Nature 510 (April 23, 2014): 259–62, https://www.nature.com/articles/nature13207. See also Marlo Lewis Jr., “Climate Change, Fossil Fuels, and Human Well Being,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, July 11, 2018, https://cei.org/blog/climate-change-fossil-fuels-and-human-well-being; and Kevin D. Dayaratna, Ross McKitrick, and Patrick J. Michaels, “Climate Sensitivity, Agricultural Productivity and the Social Cost of Carbon in FUND,” Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, January 18, 2020, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10018-020-00263-w.pdf.

14 A CRITIQUE OF THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN CLIMATE POLICY PROPOSALS BENJAMIN ZYCHER

39. Antonio Gasparrini et al., “Mortality Risk Attributable to High and Low Ambient Temperature: A Multicountry Observational Study,” Lancet 386, no. 9991 (July 25, 2015): 369–75, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(14)62114-0/fulltext. 40. See R. Bintanja and R. S. W. van de Wal, “North American Ice-Sheet Dynamics and the Onset of 100,000-Year Glacial Cycles,” Nature 454, no. 7206 (August 14, 2008): 869–72, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23171740_Bintanja_R_van_de_Wal_R_S_W_ North_American_ice-sheet_dynamics_and_the_onset_of_100000-year_glacial_cycles_Nature_454_869-872. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) published the underlying data. See R. Bintanja and R. S. W. van de Wal, “Global 3Ma Temperature, Sea Level, and Ice Volume Reconstructions,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, August 14, 2008, https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo-search/study/11933. For a chart showing the temperature record over the one-million-year period, see Institute for Energy Research, “Temperature Fluctuations over the Past Million Years,” https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/ wp-content/uploads/2020/03/temperature-flucturations.png. 41. On the temperature record, see Hadley Climate Research Unit, https://crudata.uea.ac.uk/~timo/diag/tempdiag.htm. On the Little Ice Age, see Michael E. Mann, “Little Ice Age,” in Encyclopedia of Global Environmental Change, Volume 1, The Earth System: Physical and Chemical Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, ed. Michael C. MacCracken and John S. Perry (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), 504–09. 42. See, for example, Ross McKitrick and John Christy, “A Test of the Tropical 200- to 300 hPa Warming Rate in Climate Models,” Earth and Space Sciences 5 (September 21, 2018): 529–36, https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1029/2018EA000401; Nicholas Lewis and Judith Curry, “The Impact of Recent Forcing and Ocean Heat Uptake Data on Estimates of Climate Sensitivity,” Journal of Climate 31 (August 2018): 6051–71, https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/pdf/10.1175/JCLI-D-17-0667.1; and John R. Christy and Richard McNider, “Satellite Bulk Tropospheric Temperatures as a Metric for Climate Sensitivity,” Asia-Pacific Journal of Atmospheric Sciences 53 (2017): 511–18, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13143-017-0070-z. For a chart summarizing the recent empirical estimates of equilibrium climate sensitivity as reported in the peer-reviewed literature, see Patrick J. Michaels and Paul C. Knappen- berger, “The Collection of Evidence for a Low Climate Sensitivity Continues to Grow,” Cato Institute, September 25, 2014, https:// www.cato.org/blog/collection-evidence-low-climate-sensitivity-continues-grow. 43. See the reconstruction of the NASA data at John R. Christy, “Average per Station (1114 USHCN Stations) 1895–2017 Number of Days Daily Maximum Temperature Above 100˚ F and 105˚ F,” drroyspencer.com, http://www.drroyspencer.com/wp-content/uploads/ US-extreme-high-temperatures-1895-2017.jpg. 44. For the Climate Reference Network program description, see National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “U.S. Climate Reference Network,” https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/crn/. 45. A visualization of a prototypical station can be seen at Willis Eschenbach, “NOAA’s USCRN Revisited—No Significant Warming in the USA in 12 Years,” Watts up with That?, November 8, 2017, https://wattsupwiththat.com/2017/11/08/the-uscrn-revisited/. The monthly data and charts reported by NOAA are available at National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “National Temperature Index,” https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/national-temperature-index/time-series?datasets%5B%5D=uscrn ¶meter=anom-tavg&time_scale=p12&begyear=2005&endyear=2020&month=8. 46. See endnote 40. 47. See Judith Curry, “Sea Level and Climate Change,” Climate Forecast Applications Network, November 25, 2018, https:// curryja.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/special-report-sea-level-rise3.pdf. For an example of temporary rapid sea-level rise in the 18th century, see W. R. Gehrels et al., “A Preindustrial Sea-Level Rise Hotspot Along the Atlantic Coast of North America,” Geophysical Research Letters 47 (2020), https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1029/2019GL085814. 48. See Patrick J. Michaels, “Spinning Global Sea Ice,” Cato Institute, February 12, 2015, https://www.cato.org/blog/spinning- global-sea-ice. 49. National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration, “Historical Records and Trends,” https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/climate- information/extreme-events/us-tornado-climatology/trends. 50. For data on global tropical cyclone activity, see Ryan N. Maue, “2020 Accumulated Cyclone Energy,” http://climatlas.com/tropical/. 51. For US wildfire data, see National Interagency Fire Center, “Total Wildland Fires and Acres (1926–2019),”https://www.nifc.gov/ fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_totalFires.html. On the decline in global area burned over past decades, see Stefan H. Doerr and Cristina Santin,

15 A CRITIQUE OF THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN CLIMATE POLICY PROPOSALS BENJAMIN ZYCHER

“Global Trends in Wildfire and Its Impacts: Perceptions Versus Realities in a Changing World,”Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences 371, no. 1696 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4874420/pdf/ rstb20150345.pdf. 52. See US Environmental Protection Agency, “Climate Change Indicators: Drought,” https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/ climate-change-indicators-drought; and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “CDO Divisional Select,” https://www7. ncdc.noaa.gov/CDO/CDODivisionalSelect.jsp.

53. See R. M. Hirsch and K. R. Ryberg, “Has the Magnitude of Floods Across the USA Changed with Global CO2 Levels?,” Hydrological Sciences Journal 57, no. 1 (2012): 1–9, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02626667.2011.621895?scroll=top &needAccess=true&.

54. See CO2 Science, Ocean Acidification Database, http://www.co2science.org/data/acidification/results.php; and Alan Longhurst, Doubt and Certainty in Climate Science, 214–25, https://curryja.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/longhurst-print.pdf. 55. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, World Food and Agriculture Statistical Pocketbook 2018, Charts 28 and 46, http://www.fao.org/3/CA1796EN/ca1796en.pdf; and Dayaratna, McKitrick, and Michaels, “Climate Sensitivity, Agricultural Productivity and the Social Cost of Carbon in FUND.” 56. See Julie M. Arblaster et al., “Long-Term Climate Change: Projections, Commitments and Irreversibility—Final Draft Underlying Scientific-Technical Assessment,” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, September 23–26, 2013, Table 12.4,http:// www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/WGIAR5_WGI-12Doc2b_FinalDraft_Chapter12.pdf. 57. For a simple description of the four representative concentration pathways, see Graham Wayne, “The Beginner’s Guide to Rep- resentative Concentration Pathways,” Skeptical Science, August 2013, https://skepticalscience.com/docs/RCP_Guide.pdf. For a more detailed discussion of RCP8.5, see Keywan Riahi et al., “RCP8.5—a Scenario of Comparatively High Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” Cli- matic Change 109, no. 33 (2011), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-011-0149-y. For a discussion of greater and lesser plau- sibility among the scenarios, see Judith Curry, “Plausible Scenarios for Climate Change: 2020–2050,” Climate Etc., February 13, 2020, https://judithcurry.com/2020/02/13/plausible-scenarios-for-climate-change-2020-2050/. I discuss the policy implications of the four RCPs in Zycher, “The Climate Empire Strikes Out.” 58. On the historical path of carbon dioxide concentrations, see Earth System Research Laboratory, “Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/. On natural gas and coal consumption trends, see BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy,” June 2019, https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy- economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html. 59. See, for example, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Global Warming of 1.5 °C,” https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/; and NASA, “The Effects of Climate Change,”https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/ . 60. CMIP5 stands for Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, Phase 5. For a discussion of the CMIP5 climate models, see the Law- rence Livermore National Laboratory, https://esgf-node.llnl.gov/projects/cmip5/. On the overprediction of temperatures by these models, see John R. Christy, testimony before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, US House of Representatives, March 29, 2017, https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Christy%20Testimony_1.pdf?1; and McKitrick and Christy, “A Test of the Tropical 200- to 300 hPa Warming Rate in Climate Models.” Note that the Christy analysis is for the tropical troposphere and the McKitrick and Christy analysis is for the tropical 300-200mb layer, or roughly 30,000 to 40,000 feet. 61. Patrick J. Michaels and Paul C. Knappenberger, “Climate Models Versus Climate Reality,” Climate Etc., December 17, 2015, https:// judithcurry.com/2015/12/17/climate-models-versus-climate-reality/; and Patrick J. Michaels and Paul C. Knappenberger, “Quantifying the Lack of Consistency Between Climate Model Projections and Observations of the Evolution of the Earth’s Average Surface Tem- perature Since the Mid-20th Century,” American Geophysical Union, December 2014, https://agu.confex.com/agu/fm14/meetingapp. cgi/Paper/20121. 62. On the costs, see, for example, Solomone Fifita et al., “Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable Development,” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 12–78, https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_chapter2.pdf. My (conservative) estimate of the economic cost of only the electricity portion of the Green New Deal is close to $9 trillion per year. See Zycher, The Green New Deal.

16 A CRITIQUE OF THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN CLIMATE POLICY PROPOSALS BENJAMIN ZYCHER

63. See Green Climate Fund, https://www.greenclimate.fund/. On the demands for compensation by the less-developed economies, see Mike Ives, “Rich Nations Vowed Billions for Climate Change. Poor Countries Are Waiting.,” New York Times, September 9, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/09/world/asia/green-climate-fund-global-warming.html. 64. See endnote 1. 65. For a useful history of apocalyptic environmental warnings, see Myron Ebell and Steven J. Milloy, “Wrong Again: 50 Years of Failed Eco-pocalyptic Predictions,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, September 18, 2019, https://cei.org/blog/wrong-again-50-years- failed-eco-pocalyptic-predictions. For a partial discussion of the funding of mainstream climate science and policy analysis, see US Government Accountability Office, “Climate Change: Analysis of Reported Federal Spending,” April 2018, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/700/691572.pdf. On the shift from 2 degrees C to 1.5 degrees C as the maximum safe temperature increase this century, see Zycher, “The Climate Empire Strikes Out.” On the history of the 2 degree limit, see CarbonBrief, “Two Degrees: The History of Climate Change’s Speed Limit,” December 8, 2014, https://www.carbonbrief.org/two-degrees-the-history-of-climate-changes-speed-limit. On the shift to the 1.5 degree limit, see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Global Warming of 1.5°C: Summary for Policy- makers,” https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf. 66. See Zycher, The Green New Deal, 13–29; and Benjamin Zycher, “Springtime for the Rockefellers,” American Enterprise Institute, March 30, 2016, https://www.aei.org/articles/springtime-for-the-rockefellers/. 67. See Zycher, “Once the GOP Rolls Out Climate Policies, It Endorses All the Assumptions of the Left.” 68. See US Energy Information Administration, “Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions by State, 2005–2016,” February 27, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/analysis/. 69. For a useful early discussion of various “resilience” policy approaches, see Kenneth P. Green, “Climate Change: The Resilience Option,” American Enterprise Institute, October 13, 2009, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/climate-change-the- resilience-option/. See also A. C. Abeysinghe et al., “Climate-Resilient Pathways: Adaptation, Mitigation, and Sustainable Develop- ment,” in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1101–31, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-Chap20_FINAL.pdf.

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