ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE: A PARADIGM SHIFT IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA PhD DISSERTATION

This Dissertation is submitted to National Defence University, Islamabad in partial fulfilment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in STRATEGIC & NUCLEAR STUDIES

BY AHMAD KHAN NDU-SNS/PhD-13/F-013

SUPERVISOR PROF. DR. ZULFQAR KHAN

DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC STUDIES FACULTY OF CONTEMPORARY STUDIES NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD-PAKISTAN 2020

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction to Arms Race in Outer Space

The United States and the former Soviet Union were the pioneer states to send satellites into outer space for military purposes. The launch of Sputnik-I by the former Soviet Union in 1957 demarked the beginning of an intense space race between the United States and the Soviet

Union.1 The animosity of the strategic rivalry prompted the two states to exploit the final frontier for humanity.

The realization of space as the ‘fourth medium of warfare’2 compelled the United States and the Soviet Union to expedite their research and development (R&D) to surpass each other.

After the successful launch of Sputnik-1, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a space race by sending hundreds of satellites into different orbits around the Earth and beyond.

Space-based satellite systems are of vital importance for building military power of any country, as it provides necessary intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) of the opponent’s force development, both in peacetime as well as in crises situation. Primarily, satellites with military features were sent into outer space to get the ISR of the denied territories of the adversaries. In general, such early warning systems help to reduce the ‘fog of war’ and it helps the state in preparing a quick response before the adversary launches an attack. Sun Tzu famously said that “if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles.”3 Taking this realism into account, knowing your enemy’s ground and sea force

1 For further detail on the history of space race, see Paul Dickson, Sputnik: The Launch of Space Race (Toronto: Macfarlane Walter and Ross, 2001). 2 “Vision for 2020,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed May 30, 2014, www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/visbook.pdf 3 “Sun Tzu: Quotes,” Goodreads, accessed May 30, 2014, www.goodreads.com/17976-if-you-know-the- enemy-and-know-yourself-you-need (site discontinued)

1 formation before any crisis would increase the chances of survival in terms of giving a proportionate response to the adversary. This will not only increase a state’s survival but would also help in winning war, depending upon the level of understanding and knowing of capabilities of the adversary. Likewise, the deployment of ISR capabilities would reduce the chances of inadvertent, miscalculated, and unauthorized war between the two adversaries.

After the demise of Soviet Union, there was a pause in the arms race in outer space. The pause ended after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2007.4 This was a significant development toward space weaponization.

The militarization and weaponization of space are considered as a ‘transformation’ in international security. The Chinese ASAT test is one of the constructs that have brought this transformation.5 As proliferation is one of the constructs of international security, so fears are associated with the horizontal proliferation of ASAT capabilities. The ASATs are the spin-off of

International Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) technologies.6 States are frequently testing their ICBM capabilities; therefore, it has given a new breath to the development and proliferation of ASAT capabilities.

The development of Indian Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and proposed anti-ballistic missile system has resulted in an Indian ASAT test. This posits implications for security in South

Asia. South Asian security experts view the Indo-Pakistani strategic relationship through an action-reaction prism.7 Therefore, the global arms race in outer space, which was the product of

4 Steohanie Lieggi and Erik Quam, “China’s ASAT Test and the Strategic Implications of Beijing’s Military Space Policy,” Korean Journal of Defence Analysis 19, no.1 (2007). 5 “Concept of Security,” Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, 1986, May 30, 2014; ASAT test caused huge man-made space debris, which is indeed a construct of international security. 6 For Further detail about the ICBMs and ASATs, see William Gouveia Jr, “An Assessment of Anti- satellite Capabilities and their Strategic Implications,” Astropolitics 3, no.2 (2004): 163-184. 7 For further details see, Zafar Jaspal, “Ballistic Missile Defence: Implications for India-Pakistan Strategic Environment,” NDU Journal, 2011.

2 Cold War, has strongly impinged upon the security calculus of South Asia. Pakistan’s space program primarily focuses on the peaceful exploration of outer space; however, the space security trilemma between China, India, and Pakistan will prompt Pakistan to relook and revisit its policy of peaceful exploration of outer space.

On the other hand, the advocates of ‘Space Control’ or ‘Space Hegemons’ in the United

States view new actors in outer space as a threat to U.S. space assets.8 Likewise, the absence of an International Code of Conduct (ICoC) or “norms of responsible stewardship for this global commons,” to monitor the activities of states in the outer indeed a threat to the international security.9 This has its implications for South Asian security environment. India, U.S. and Israeli nexus in Conference on Disarmament (CD) has resulted in vetoing the United Nations (UN) initiative of bringing a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space in 2005, causing serious ramifications on the global security. Since the weaponization of outer space is a threat to the international security environment, it is also a major security challenge for South Asia’s security.

1.1.1 Militarization and Weaponization of the Outer Space

It is important to differentiate between space militarization and space weaponization. According to Ajey Lele, senior research fellow in IDSA, India, space militarization is “the use of space assets to enhance the state’s war-waging capability.”10 Space militarization has existed since the onset of the space age. Whereas, according to Karl P. Mueller, space weaponization is the subset

8 Karl P. Mueller, “Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate,” in Space Weapons: Are They Needed? ed. John M. Logsdon and Gordon Adams (Washington D.C: George Washington University, 2003), 10. 9 Michael Krepon, “Space Code of Conduct: Inadequate Mechanism,” in Decoding the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, ed. Ajey Lele (New Delhi: Pentagon Security Press, 2012), 10. 10 Ajey Lele, “The US Space Priorities under the Obama Administration,” Strategic Analysis 35, no.1 (2010):31.

3 of the militarization.11 However, there is less of a consensus by experts on the weaponization of space.

Satellites for intelligence gathering, photographic reconnaissance, ocean and terrestrial surveillance, navigation, communication, early warning, nuclear explosion detection, weather, meteorological and geodetic features are for passive defence purposes. These dual-use satellites at the same time enhance the state’s war-fighting capabilities. These space assets represent the militarization of outer space. The actual deployment of weapons in space is generally viewed as space weaponization. This includes the deployment of Direct Energy Weapons (DEWs), Kinetic

Kill Vehicles (KKVs), and Hypervelocity Rod Bundles in space. The differentiation between the militarization and weaponization of space helps to formulate an ICoC to check the activities of satellites. In 2010, the United States launched a highly secretive Space Test Bed (STB) X-37B, which can carry a whole constellation of KKVs in low Earth orbit (LEO).12 The launching of this

STB was also a crucial step in the direction of space weaponization. Despite trends in space weaponization, DEWs, microsatellites and other space weapons are still not a present reality.

1.2 Research Problem

The launch of Sputnik-I in 1957 by the former Soviet Union laid the foundation stone of militarization of outer space. However, Sputnik-I was only the beginning as the history of the

Cold War reveals that hundreds of satellites with military capabilities were sent into outer space.

After all, states, while living in this anarchical world, are seeking ways in which they tend to harden their military capabilities, leading toward possible weaponization of outer space. States are actively pursuing their national defences in a relatively new medium, and one of a global

11 Mueller, “Totem and Taboo,” 10. 12 “Atlas V launches with X-37B orbital Test Vehicle,” NASA Spaceflight, accessed May 30, 2014, www.nasaspaceflight.com/20130/04/live-atlas-v-lunch-x-37b-otv/ (site discontinued)

4 commons, with resources to conduct military operations in coordination with terrestrial warfare.

This has brought a paradigm shift in the global security environment.

The paradigm shift has exacerbated the strategic environment of South Asia. An academic investigation of this new phenomenon will disclose the importance of space as a medium of warfare in shaping the global political environment and its implications on the regional security complex in South Asia, more specifically because of a security trilemma between China, India, and Pakistan. This research endeavours to assimilate the strategic implications of an arms race in outer space in a more elaborated form so that the new medium of warfare can be better understood.

1.3 Hypothesis

The arms race in outer space impinges upon global security and brings a paradigm shift in the international political and strategic environments. In this regard, there exist implications for the strategic triangular relationship of the South Asian region.

Independent variable: Arms race in outer space and international security.

Intervening variables: Militarization and weaponization of outer space.

Dependent variable: Implications of the global strategic environment on the regional security complex in South Asia.

5 1.4 Research Questions

The following research questions are investigated during the research to examine the hypothesis of the research: -

a. What are the levels of analysis in security studies and the framework relevant to

conceptualize security in space?

b. Space doctrines, policies and capabilities of China, US, Pakistan and India? What

is the shape of the global space order?

c. What are the current trends in arms race in outer space at the global level and the

regional level? Does it impinge upon international security environment in the

twenty-first century? Does this bring about a shift in international security?

d. What are the strategic implications of the Sino-U.S. relationship in outer space for

the strategic triangular relations in South Asia?

e. Is there any model to study the regional space order in South Asia? What are the

necessary steps to develop a regional space security framework to enhance

cooperation rather than competition in South Asia?

f. What is the way forward to establish an arms control treaty to prohibit

militarization and weaponization of outer space?

1.5 Paradigm Shift in International Security and Theoretical Framework

Thomas Kuhn argues that “scientific advancement is not evolutionary,” in fact, steps towards the peaceful intervals interposed “by intellectually violent revolutions.”13 He stressed that in those revolutions “one conceptual world view is replaced by another.”14 The first ever man-made spacecraft sent by the former Soviet Union in 1957 brought revolutionary changes in the modern

13 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 10. 14 Ibid.

6 warfare tactics. The phenomenon of an arms race in outer space during the Cold War added the dimension of space warfare embodied with land, sea, and air warfare. Roger Handberg argues that paradigm shift is indeed a term much “used and abused in political-historical analyses.”15

However, he considers the U.S. reconsideration and re-evaluation of old realities culminating in the added dimension of space warfare.16 He opines that “one may not wish to label this process a paradigm shift, but radical change is coming regardless.”17 His analysis is pointing towards space weaponization.

The main themes of chapters two and three pivot around a theoretical understanding of paradigm shift in international security due to arms race in outer space and the changing nature and character of warfare. The central argument of chapter two is to understanding different schools-of-thought on space militarization and weaponization. The comparison of different advocates and doctrines of space weaponization tells about the theoretical nature of the discourse. Besides, chapter three highlights three levels of analysis of security and the relational nature of these levels of security. Likewise, it also highlights the impact of RMA on states’ behaviour toward space weaponization.

1.6 Literature Review

Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, in their joint work “Arms Races,” theoretically analysed the dynamics of arms races.18 After the end of the Cold War, the major arms races dramatically reduced. But, the legacy of the Cold War continued to exist and it strongly impinges upon international security. The recent strategic developments reflect the changing nature of arms races, as the “the scale in production and sophisticated projections of weapons systems” has

15 Ibid. 16 For further reference, see Roger Handberg, Seeking New World Vistas: The Militarization of Space (London: Praeger, Publishers, 2000), 7-8. 17 Ibid. 18 Michael D. Intriligator and D. L. Brito, “Arms Races,” Defence and Peace Economics 11, no.1 (2000): 45-55.

7 risen in the twenty-first century. The arms race in outer space is not a new phenomenon.19

Historically, the dominant arms race during the Cold War between the U.S. and the former

Soviet Union was to militarize outer space through sending military featured satellites into orbit to secure the ‘high ground’ of space. The significance of outer space for both strategic competitors was high. Many space security analysts believe that the lunch of Sputnik-I marked the beginning of the militarization of space. Later on, it became another medium of intense rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union. While analysing the history of arms races during the Cold War, it can be assumed that a “paradigm shift in the arms race” eventually happened.20

According to Intriligator et.al, the definition of arms race is “the competitive, resource constrained, dynamics process of interaction between two states or coalitions of states in their acquisition of weapons.”21 The “arms races, as exemplified by the accumulation of stocks of weapons, represents a very special case of weapons as an instrument of power.”22 The United

States and the former Soviet Union sent military featured satellites into outer space, which militarized space.23 The purpose of sending the military featured satellites into space was to get real-time ISR of the denied territories of each other.

The fear of war between the United States and former the Soviet Union during the Cold

War was always there. "Both superpowers continued to shift the balance of power in their favour." As such, they build their outer space capabilities to prepare for surprise attack. "To shift the balance of power in their favour, building military capabilities was the primary tool." In this

19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Outer space can be viewed as a commons in some ways, but is has not been defined as the common heritage of man.

8 regard, outer space paved both competitors to build and deploy military satellites.

Concomitantly, this led to the beginning of the “Space Age.” At present, one of the major challenges to international security is the “risks associated with the increased tempo of competition in the conventional arms and other types of military equipment build-up.”24

The arms race in outer space has strong ramifications on international peace and stability.

This race has brought a paradigm shift in international security. According to report “Concept of

Security” published by United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, “a special danger is posed by potential advances in anti-ballistic missile defence system.”25 The report highlights that development in ASATs has the potential to undermine international security.26

According to Handberg, RMA and revolution in ‘Art of War’ has prompted the United

States to think beyond developing its conventional and nuclear forces and to contemplate a comprehensive military force, which not only resides on the Earth but also integrates with space to fight the future war.27 A practical manifestation is an announcement from the President

Donald Trump Administration to establish Space Force. Now the question arises here, what is the paradigm shift in the international security due to an arms race in outer space? To illustrate this question, there is a need to understand the major threats and challenges to international security. Major threats and challenges to international security are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), arms control and disarmament and the overall development of military technologies. In this second nuclear age, the multifaceted and multidimensional threats are inter-playing with the national security of states and the international security environment.

24 “Concepts of Security,” Department of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, accessed July 5, 2014, http://www.un.org/disarmament/Homepage/ODAPublications/DisarmamentStudySeries/PDF/SS-14.pdf, 14-15. (site discontinued) 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 For further reference see, Handberg, Seeking New World Vistas.

9 The paradigm shift in international security can be understood in the strategic relationship among states. The medium of space has its dynamics just like air, sea and land mediums.

1.6.1 Space Security Trilemma

“The prominent feature of the Cold War history is the action-reaction model of arms race between the former Soviet Union and the United States at multiple levels, and also in different other mediums. Likewise, the prominent factor of the Cold War arms race was the insecurities generated by both states due to each other’s military build-ups both in the conventional and strategic domains. Both the states tried to shift the global balance of power to their advantage; however, that was a challenge to the global strategic stability. The action taken by one state had made the other state vulnerable and insecure thereby resulting in a massive conventional and strategic arms build-up. This whole phenomenon was tagged as the security dilemma during the

Cold War.”28

“The subject of security of the states in the post-Cold War world became more complex and it required more critical understanding of states’ behaviour and relations in the anarchic system.”29 In contrast, “in the pre-Cold War period the two states – the U.S. and the former

Soviet Union had competed with each other at land, sea, air, and space for hegemony, prestige and to preserve their security. However, while the post-1991 period presented a different picture altogether in which the security of the states required a deeper understanding of their friends/allies and adversaries.”30 “Major assertion about the security trilemma is that states respond to each other’s political, economic, and military provocations in a manner that create a ripple effect on their relations. The ripple effect consequently could lead to strained relations and

28 Zulfqar Khan and Ahmad Khan, “Space Security Trilemma in South Asia,” Astropolitics 17, no.1 (Feb-Apr 2019): 4. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.

10 then states would tend to adjust their political, economic and military responses to create a fine balance of power in an anarchic world.”31

“The theme of security trilemma is based on the bilateral relations between India and

Pakistan, China and India, China and Pakistan, and China and the United States.”32

India’s space program has evolved over three areas of development. First, Indian Earth observation programs, and India’s navigation and telecommunication satellite systems. This includes Indian Remote Sensing (IRS), Indian National Satellite (INSAT) series (communication satellite system), and Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNNS).33 The second area of development includes BMD and ASAT capability.34 And, the third area involves scientific and technology development to project India as a major space power at the global level.35 India’s space program is a top political priority.36 The focus of the program encompasses commercial, social, economic and military purposes. Many Indian experts view India’s space program as not supporting space militarization and weaponization. However, recent India’s ASAT test marked its space program supporting the very notion of space weaponization.

“Einhorn and Sidhu’s observation highlights a fact that security trilemma is a prominent feature of security calculus of contemporary South Asia. All three countries are significant

31 Ibid. 32 Robert Einhorn and W.P.S. Sidhu (eds.), “The Strategic Chain: Linking Pakistan, India, China and the United States,” The Bookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series, No. 14, March 2017, 1-59. 33 Sobia Paracha, “Military Dimensions of the Indian Space Program,” Astropolitics 11, no.3 (2013): 156- 186. 34 Ibid., 156-186. 35 During Cold War United States space program was developed at three different levels—white, Black and Blue. The white program was for scientific developments or explorations in the outer Space. Blue program was to manage dual-use activities of satellites in the outer space. Whereas the black program was purely for military purposes under which highly secretive National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was established. India has followed United States’ suit to build its space program. 36 Zulfqar Khan and Ahmad Khan. “Chinese Capabilities as a Global Space Power,” Astropolitics 13, no. 2- 3 (2015): 185-204.

11 military and nuclear weapon states. However, the role and political, economic, and strategic interests of the U.S. in South Asia had always persisted since 1945”.37

India’s remote sensing system entails “progress in terms of resolution of its satellite imagery.”38 Currently, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) has 16 active military dedicated satellites in outer space.39 Cartographic Satellite (CartoSAT) 1, 2 and 2A are the imagery satellites with military features40; and Radar Imaging Satellite (RISAT) 2 and RISAT-IB can make day/night and all-weather surveillance. India also has 10 satellites to constitute its

INSAT system. Recently, India orbited a communication satellite, Geostationary Satellite

(GSAT) 7, which will help with Indian naval communications.41 Indian has also sent GSAT-2 satellites to achieve military purposes in outer space. In addition to this, Defence Research and

Development Organization (DRDO) Chief V. K. Saraswat in 2010 and 2012 has also "hinted at the need for India to build killer satellites, laser beam weapons and a range of military satellites to support Indian defence forces in the battlefield."42 India has all the indigenous resources to build its ASAT capability. Most critically, this includes launch capability with the Polar Satellite

Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and the Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicles (GSLV). Further, India tested Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDS) as an ASAT weapon.43 India’s BMD is based on Prithvi

37 Einhorn and Sidhu, “Strategic Chain.” and also see Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma,” 7. 38 Paracha, “Indian Space Program,” 164. 39 Ibid. 40 CartoSAT satellite series consists of advance remote sensing satellites with Panchromatic Camera (PAN). CartoSAT-1, 2 and 2A can provide images/maps of borders for analysis. 41 The GSAT-7 satellite has helped India to bolster its C4I2SR system. See Paracha, “Indian Space Program,” 166. 42 See Paracha, “Indian Space Program,” 166. 43 For further details, see the statement of Uzi Rubin, a defense consultant and former head of Israel's missile defense organization. “India Ballistic Missile Defense News.”

12 and Akash missiles. The Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) is capable of “intercepting missiles at the height of 150 kilometers (km) in the domain of outer space.”44

The continuous strategic orientation in South Asia has engendered changes in Indian threat perceptions. The Chinese ASAT test in 2007 changed Indian preferences towards space militarization and weaponization. Indian space assertiveness is primarily a reaction to Chinese

ASATs. Nevertheless, Ali Ahmad asserts that Pakistan remains the primary level of threat to

India.45 Pakistan’s overt nuclearization has impelled India to modify its military strategy to neutralize any threat emanating from Pakistani territory. For example, Indian Army Doctrine

(2004) significantly underlined building its space program to augment its C4I2SR system, which facilitates dominant battle-space awareness, and therefore, constitute a major thrust area.46

At the same time, India has demonstrated space power capabilities by recently sending a space mission to Mars.47 Likewise, India has sent spacecraft to the Moon—Chandrayaan-1& 2.

This reflects sophisticated technological and scientific advancements in India’s space program projecting India as a space power. Further, in 2005, India and the United States agreed to the

Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) primarily focused on civil nuclear and space

44 Michael Listner, “India’s ABM test: A validated ASAT capability or a paper tiger?” The Space Review, March 28, 2011, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1807/ (site discontinued); and also see DRDO Chief V.K. Saraswat’s statement on March 21, 2010, on the development and deployment of two-tier BMD system in South Asia. “India Ballistic Missile Defense news and discussions thread,” Indian Defence, February 3, 2011, http://indiandefence.com/threads/india-ballistic-missile-defense-news-and-discussions- thread.4121/ (site discontinued); 45 For further details, see Ali Ahmed, India’s limited war doctrine: The Structural factors (New Delhi: Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, December 2012). 46 “Indian Army Doctrine,” Headquarters Army Training Command¸ India, October 2004. 47 “Indian GSLV successfully lofts GSAT-7 Satellites,” NASA Spaceflight, January 4, 2014, www.nasaspaceflight.com/2014/01/indian-gslv-launch-gast-communications-satellite/ (site discontinued).

13 cooperation. As a follow-on, the U.S. Obama Administration in 2011 removed ISRO and DRDO from its export control “Entity List.”48

Technological developments in India’s space program illustrate a trend towards space militarization and weaponization.49 This is clear with India’s BMD system and in this area, India seeks space-based sensors to bolster and solidify the effectiveness of its system.

India’s BMD has ramifications on South Asian security. The conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan is growing, which also accounts for the asymmetry in space-based military assets. The conventional and space asymmetries have further increased Pakistan’s dependence/reliance on its nuclear weapons for its survival against India. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal argued that developments in India’s BMD “necessitate Islamabad to improve qualitatively and quantitatively its missile inventories.”50 This implies that the India’s BMD system impinges upon Pakistan’s security. Besides, Indian BMD developments and its military space endeavours have fostered a security dilemma for Pakistan, intentionally indulging it in an expensive conventional arms race.

"The on-going space competition between the United States and China has created a space security trilemma for Pakistan and India." It is primarily due to multiple interconnected factors, both international and regional geostrategic transformations; most prominently the Indo-

United States’ space and strategic partnership, which would continue to impact the security dynamics of the entire South Asia particularly for Pakistan, which in space, technological and

48 “US removes ISRO and DRDO from entities list,” Indian Express, January 25, 2011. “The other entities trimmed from the entity list are: Bharat Dynamics Ltd, DRDO subsidiaries; Armament Research and Development Establishment, Defence Research and Development Lab, Missile Research and Development Complex and Solid State Physics Laboratory Liquid Propulsion Systems Center, Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant, Sriharikota Space Center, and Vikram Sarabhai Space Center are the four ISRO subsidiaries.” 49 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal (Director, School of Politics and International Relations, QAU) in discussion with the author, June 3, 2014. 50 Jaspal, “Ballistic Missile Defence.”

14 military terms “is at a clear disadvantage in comparison to India.”51 "The utilization of space power for national defence has become an integral part of the national security strategy of states, especially for India and Pakistan." "India in addition to geo-economic, military, and geopolitical advantages is also enthusiastically focusing on expanding its space program for the national defence and power projection goals. This is likely to prompt Pakistan to follow suit." "The primary factor behind India’s growing space progress is partly due to its perceived fear from swiftly expanding space program of China."52 “On the other hand, China’s primary concern is

United States’ burgeoning space weaponization capabilities.” “The concerns, vulnerabilities, and challenges in space have further triggered, rather it has magnified, the security trilemma for the

South Asian rivals.”53 It is visibly interconnecting all the three states – China, India, and

Pakistan, which furthermore is linking it to the international security and thereby causing a geopolitical dynamics/predicaments like China versus US, India versus China, and Pakistan versus India. “On top of that, India has accelerated its space cooperation mechanism with the

United States and many other countries that will complement its ballistic missile defence system, which in Pakistani perception is a potent security threat and a highly destabilizing development that would undermine the future strategic stability of South Asia. This could put Pakistan under the sway of India’s increasing military and space capabilities dominance. In sum, the ambitious space and technological programs of the US, China, and India would magnify the security trilemma between the regional states chiefly for Pakistan.”54

51 Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma,” 19. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid.

15 1.6.2 Challenges and Prospects for Pakistan

The space program is not a high priority in the military and civilian establishment in Pakistan.

According to one expert, the definition of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) is “the survivable, sufficient number of nuclear forces with effective early warning system, reconnaissance and surveillance system.”55 From this definition of CMD, a space-based component of nuclear command and control (NC2) will raise the effectiveness and survivability of NC2 in an adversary’ strike. However, Pakistan’s C4I2SR system lacks a space-based component, depending heavily on its terrestrial infrastructure, whose survivability is questionable in case of a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Hence, the question arises: what would be the efficacy of Pakistan’s C4I2SR in the absence of an effective space-based ISR system and early warning system? Needless to state, the lack of space-based assets is a challenge for

Pakistan C4I2SR. Pakistan’s civil space program was established in the 1960s. Since then,

Pakistan’s progress in exploring space has developed at a slow pace. The slow pace was primarily because of space technological denial from high-end technology states and changing geostrategic landscape of South Asia.

At the 68th United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) first committee (Disarmament and International Security) meeting, the Pakistani representative criticized the major powers for developing “anti-ballistic missile systems and their integration into space assets.” He stressed that:

55 For further details, see Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan’s Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence,” Margalla Papers, 2008.

16 “These systems have worrying dimensions and the resultant arms race in the space would aggravate the intensity of conflicts on Earth, with potentially disastrous consequence.”56

He further stated that the monopoly of major spacefaring states could not last long. He emphasized that those who want to achieve full spectrum dominance have caused destabilizing effects on international and regional security. He also criticized international space arms control agreements as “inherently destabilizing and of dubious effectiveness.”57

India has yet to determine the cost-effectiveness of its BMD system since the life cycle costs of the system need to be considered by decision makers. Moreover, India’s BMD system is facing problems of immature technology coupled with lack of clearly defined goals. These capital costs of building a BMD system and technological challenges provide an opportunity for

Pakistan to expedite its R&D toward countermeasures. The countermeasures to an Indian BMD system are the development of its land and space-based assets. The development of land-based lasers to blind Indian communication satellites is one likely countermeasure. Similarly, Pakistan can build Miniature Homing Vehicles (MHV), which can be launched from an F-16 aircraft as an air-launched missile. Since Pakistan is indigenously building missiles with a range up to 1500 km, an anti-satellite missile can also be built with a range of 400 km58, which can destroy Indian military satellites in LEO.

One significant achievement in the history of Pakistan space program is the deployment of ground capability to make use of the Chinese based positioning, navigating and timing (PNT) system (Beidou). The initial phase of the ground installation in Pakistan provides a geographic

56 United Nations, “Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defence ‘Very Worrying Dimension’, with Potentially Devastating Consequences on Earth, Speaker Tells First Committee,” news press release no. GA/DIS/3488, October 28, 2013, http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/gadis3488.doc.htm 57 Ibid. 58 Zulfqar Khan (Head of Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad) in discussion with the author, 3 November 2016.

17 positioning network mostly covering Karachi. The second stage will provide coverage for the whole area of Pakistan. The network will help Pakistan in “urban planning, surveying and mapping environmental supervision, disaster relief efforts, traffic monitoring.”

Furthermore, Pakistan’s space cooperation with China is noteworthy. It helped Pakistan to launch its first communication satellite (PakSAT-1R). Space cooperation with China provides an opportunity for Pakistan to build its space launch facility (SLF) and to develop Space Launch

Vehicle (SLV). At the very least, Pakistan could expedite its coordination and collaboration with

China in the field of space R&D. Pakistan is the member of Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation

Organization (APSCO), where Pakistan can also cooperate with other countries, like Bangladesh,

Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey in the field of space R&D.

The 19th National Command Authority (NCA) of Pakistan announced a Space Vision

2047 in July of 2011. "Space Vision 2047 intends to bring the full spectrum benefits of space technology to the people of Pakistan."59 "Pakistan is planning to build its Earth observation satellites (remote sensing) constellation in future as well as communication satellites in order to get the benefits of space technologies." Pakistan could also increase its space cooperation with

Russia and the European Space Agency (ESA). Even though National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) helped Pakistan to establish its space agency, Space Upper Atmosphere

Research Commission (SUPARCO), in the 1960s, space cooperation with the United States has stalemated due to strategic issues. Therefore, Pakistan’s efforts in international space cooperation with China, Russia and ESA are linked to the realization of the objectives of the Space Vision

2047.

59“NCA Okays Nuclear Power Program 2050, Space Program 2040,” Defence.pk, accessed June 6, 2014, http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistan-strategic-forces/120262-nca-okays-nuclear-power-prog-2050- space-prog-2040-a.html.

18 1.6.3 Arms Control in Outer Space

In order to deal with the contemporary space security issues, including space weaponization, in

South Asia and the strategic trilemma there, it is important to understand the international arms control measures in outer space. Figure 1.1 shows the details of UN forums and treaties dealing with arms control and disarmament affairs in outer space.

Figure 1.1: UN Architecture to Address Space-Related Issue60

The UNGA adopted an initiative in 1981 to prohibit the weaponization of outer space.

Later on, it was added to the Conference of Disarmament (CD) agenda. Subsequently, in March

1985 an ad-hoc committee on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) was established after an agreement in the CD. Since then, a stalemate has been observed in the CD on

PAROS stalling any possible international mitigation of space weaponization. PAROS is the fourth core issue in CD’s permanent agenda. Russian and Chinese are making efforts to initiate negotiations on a PAROS related treaty. However, the United States has opposed these efforts in

CD. In this context, the United States argued that since there is no overt arms race in outer space,

60 Munish Sharma, “Space Treaty Mechanism,” in Decoding the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, ed. Ajey Lele (New Delhi: Pentagon Security Press, 2012), 53.

19 the existing multilateral and bilateral agreements are adequate. India also opposes a PAROS based treaty. Even proposals of ‘No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space’ and the

Prevention of Placement of Weapon (PPWT) Treaty in 2008 were presented by Russia and China have been stalled as a result of U.S. (and Indian) opposition. Furthermore, the PPWT still lacks clarity on prohibiting an arms race and further it would require an international consensus in the

CD.61

1.7 Research Methodology

Deductive reasoning is the main method to prove the hypothesis. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were employed to understand the research problem. First, qualitative methods were used to understand the phenomenon of an arms race in outer space and to study the implications for South Asia. The paradigm shift in international security was analysed in the preview of scientific and technological revolutions, which encompassed RMA and the modern art of war. Quantitative methods were used to collect relevant data without bias in order the get an understanding of the space budget including civil and military spending. The methodology herein combines theoretical analysis with historical illustration through an examination of official documents and statements. "The thesis offers an analytical approach to regional and international dimensions of the arms race in outer space, paradigm shift in international security and the implications (positive and negative) of the arms race in outer space for South Asia.""The study would rely on both available primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include the official documents of government departments of the major spacefaring states, as well as statements and interviews of policymakers and experts; and secondary sources are comprised of

61 For further detail, see Sharma, “Space Treaty Mechanism,” 53-59; and also see “Outer space Multilateral Mechanism,” in Decoding the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, ed. Ajey Lele (New Delhi: Pentagon Security Press, 2012), 62-71.

20 books, academic journals and internet based documents." Additional sources reviewed include newspaper articles, blogs and other website opinions with a focus on expert-based views.

1.8 Organization of Study

The contention herein is that space weaponization is a key issue to address in the context of space militarization. The global trends in space militarization and weaponization posit a threat to international security. The current non-existence of any international treaty or international code of conduct prohibiting space weaponization is a challenge for the international community to maintain space as a commons based on free use and access by all states. Concerning South Asia, the Indian approach towards the space militarization and weaponization is a challenge for the security of South Asia. This challenge is magnified by the Indian-Pakistani relationship that is predominantly viewed through an action-reaction prism.

In chapter one, the structure of the research work, research problem, research questions, hypothesis, the organization of study and methods of the research were explained. The second chapter established a broader understanding of the theoretical debate on the space doctrines and policies narrated in the present literature. Following this, the third chapter provides a theoretical understanding of international security to develop a framework to conceptualize space security at three levels. Likewise, chapter three highlights the concepts of an arms race in general and an arms race in space in particular. In the fourth chapter, the nature of space policies, strategies and doctrines of United States, China, India, and Pakistan were investigated. The fifth chapter is an analytical study of space capabilities of the abovementioned states. The sixth chapter focuses on the global and regional space order. The global space order constitutes the United States, China and India. The seventh chapter is a comprehensive study of U.S-China relations in space and

21 security trilemma in South Asia. Lastly, the final chapter provides conclusions and answers to the research questions framed in the first chapter.

22 CHAPTER 2

Schools-of-Thought: Advocates, Doctrines and Policy Perspectives

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses and highlights schools-of-thought, advocates, doctrines and policy perspectives published in the existing literature that is relevant to the domain of outer space. The research in this chapter focuses on the strategic importance of space, differences among the schools-of-thought and policy perspectives, the advocacy for the weaponization of space, and on the behaviour of major spacefaring states.

2.2 War and Anarchy

First, it is important to understand why states opt for military solutions (war) to achieve political goals. After the First World War (1914-1919), the subject of International Relations (IR) was introduced to understand the behaviour of states in the international political system. Primarily, the subject was largely based on the key assertions

1 of existing political science. However, “why war?” has become an important question for scholars and experts in the respective field.

The term ‘anarchy’ is one of the fundamental features of the international political system. States act like organisms in the international political system, hence, when they [states] interact, they tend to preserve their vital national interests. So, while preserving their national interests, states do not follow any internationally or universally accepted order. This results in anarchy.2

1 The realists’ view is so far best explained by a prominent realists, like Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 6, 29 and 64; also see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans, J.J. Graham (London: N. Trubner, 1873), XV. 2 On anarchy, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), 102-129.

23 Table 2.1 highlights the different dimensions of anarchy according to multiple theoretical approaches including, realist schools-of-thought, institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism.

Table 2.1: Anarchy according to major theories of IR.

Theory of IR Key perspective on Anarchy

Realism (Structural 1. Anarchy is an inherited feature of the international Realism and system. Neorealism) 2. Primarily referred to the absence of a central authority in the international system, this may regulate the behaviour of states. 3. The military and economic power of a state permits it to defend itself in “hope to survive.”3 Institutionalism 1. Like the realist perspective, the international political system is inheritably anarchic in its very nature, but, cooperation among states is very much possible. 2. Anarchy does not hold back states to cooperate, rather than states can act like rational actors “seeking to survive while increasing their material conditions.” 3. Importantly, if institutions are built, they can provide information about the behaviour of the state.4 Liberalism 1. States essentially share the same goals and behaviour in the international political system thus causing less anarchy. Liberalists believe in more cooperation between states in sharing objectives and common goals.5 Constructivism 1. Basically, “constructivism is not a theory,” rather is “a set of assumptions about human motivation.” Alexander Wendt believes that interests are socially constructed.6 2. Many argue that although the international political system is very much anarchic, this anarchy is certainly not

3 John J. Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” University of Chicago, accessed September 10, 2016, http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/StructuralRealism.pdf, 1-18. 4 Scott Burchill, “Liberalism,” in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill et al., (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 66. 5 Ibid., 55-83. 6 Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill et al., (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 188-200; Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425; Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1885); and also see “On the Via Media: A Response to the Critics,” Review of International Studies 26, no.1 (2000): 165-180.

24 Table 2.1 (continued) restricting the states to act upon their strategic cultures and belief system. What is the relationship between anarchy and war? Is this anarchical international system the cause of war? Such questions often arise after discussing the term anarchy. Kenneth Waltz, a prominent scholar who advocated structural realism at length, opined that:

“with many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire—conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur.”7

This assertion from a preeminent realist suggests that occurrence of war among states is a prominent feature of this anarchic global system. War becomes inevitable when political, ideological, geographical, social differences between the organisms of this anarchical system leading toward a point of no return, where states often exercise their military capabilities to preserve their supreme national interests.8 Traditionally, the preservation of any state’s national interest in this anarchic world is the baseline of interstate conflict given that the interest of any state may differ from another and is thus measured in relative terms. Hence, in the absence of a supreme body that could regulate or mould state behaviour in a conflict situation, anarchy prevails. Therefore, anarchy in the international political system becomes “a permissive or underlying cause of war,”9 writes Waltz. Essentially, realist perspectives germinate this key assumption that anarchy allows any two states or a group of states to wage war.

Why states fight war? Realists believe that states essentially try to maximize their strategic power, which may allow them to influence the behaviour of the other states according to their interests. In doing so, morality becomes a mere ethic to be followed by the state. Here, another issue arises on the significance of morality in international relations. Realists regard

7 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 159. 8 Joseph Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007). 9 Waltz, Man, the State, and War, 232-234.

25 morality of the state as a controversial issue.10 According to them, morality has no place in the international political system because of its non-universally accepted definitions. Moreover, realists thought that since states always pursue power (military and economic) in order to maximize their security and power, they tend to forego morality. States adopt aggressive behaviour in pursuit of power and security.11 But at what cost? It is generally believed that the maximization of power and security of a state causes security dilemma for its rival state(s).12 The cost of gaining power in this anarchic political system is not only measured in economic terms, but also in terms of relative damage caused to the security of the rival state(s). If such power gains by one actor are viewed to cause significant damage to the security of the rival(s), they can go for countermeasures and increase own military capabilities. This would cause an arms race between the adversaries. The action-reaction syndrome germinating security trilemma, because of the theory of balance of power (BoP), is one of the many causes of war among states.

2.3 Nature and Character of War

The dynamics of the war have changed significantly over time. A documented history of 5,000 years of warfare tells how the nature and character of war have changed. Humans have fought in the three mediums of land, sea, and air, but not in space yet.13 However, war in space is no longer an idea out of science fiction, but rather states are aggressively pursuing modern technologies to weaponize this fourth medium. The phenomenon of war for 5,000 years of recorded history of human civilization has evolved five generations of warfare. History of

10 Sarah McGrath, “Moral Realism with Convergence,” Philosophical Topics 38, no, 2 (Fall 2010): 65; and also see, “Moral Realism,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, revised February 3, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu65. entries/moral-realism/. 11 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 284. 12 David A Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies 23, no.1 (1997): 5-26; and also see Buzan, People, States and Fear, 3-5. 13 Antulio J. Echevarria II, Globalization and the Nature of War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003); and Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005).

26 warfare narrates that at first humans adopted guerrilla tactics to fight as it required the least amount of training and skills. From the early recorded history of warfare, guerrilla skirmishes or battles were fought between small organized armies. In this regard, the Roman army developed exceptional fighting skills with a very organized and well-structured military with proper ranks that engaged adversaries in well thought out and executed war formations. This first generation of warfare arguably laid the foundation of the present-day army culture. This first generation of warfare is also documented between the timeline of 1648 to 1860 keeping in mind improvements in weapons, equipment, and logistics.14 Battles were formal and the battlefield was orderly because of the column tactics.

In the second generation of warfare, manpower was supplanted or consolidated with firepower and war became mechanized due to the industrial revolution fuelling a growing assembly line of naval vessels, military fighting vehicles for both land, as well as air as seen in first-half of the 20th Century. Firepower was centrally controlled and carefully organized such that infantry and artillery allowed war to be fought as a “conducted battle.”15 These first two generations of warfare were linear.

At the end of the Second World War, the nature and character of war drastically changed, completely revolutionizing the art of war. As discussed earlier, in the first and second generation of warfare, the armies were organized as well as the battlefield.16 The armies now, whilst still raised in an organized manner, have had to adapt to a war now conducted beyond the battlefield.

It is generally believed that this third generation of war was not based on the firepower; rather it was all about speed, surprise and mental as well as physical dislocation. Moreover, the third

14 Christopher J. Papaj, Clausewitz and 21st Century Warfare (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 2. 15 Willian S. Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” Antiwar, January 15, 2004, http://www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=1702. 16 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter.

27 generation has completely revolutionized war tactics. Now, the enemy chooses to attack from the rear.17 The third generation of war was principally a contest of ideas, rather than technology.

Then, the fourth generation of war became a mixture of both ideas and technology, and it is still emerging. The third and fourth generation of war saw a pattern of non-linearity on the battlefield throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century's.

Clausewitz defined war as “an act of violence intended to compel an adversary to fulfil our will.” In view of this definition, the further explanation of the phenomenon tells that war is a legitimate instrument of violence of the state. However, at this fourth generation level, the state has lost its monopoly over war. The rising phenomenon of non-state actors (NSA) has further complicated warfare. Any act of violence in the modern world first creates confusion about attribution of the attack. 9/11 incident in United States is an example of state-level confusion.

Primarily, Al-Qaeda was blamed for carrying out 9/11 terrorist attacks. After the terrorist attacks, while the identity of the terrorists was mostly from Arab countries, the war against terror by the United States was itself fought in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Hence, the changing character of the war has resulted in the loosening of state’s monopoly over organized violence in the contemporary world.18 Table 2.2 briefly shows the changing nature of all four generations of war over the documented history of human civilization.

Table 2.2: Changing Nature and Character of War

Time Generation Basis Mode Period First 1648 to Technology Guerrilla Warfare present Second 1815 to Technology Conventional Warfare

17 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter. 18 “Legitimate State Monopoly over the Means of Violence,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed October 2, 2016, http://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction-the-web- version/6-safe-and-secure-environment/le. (site discontinued);

28 Table 2.2 (continued) present Third 1918 to Ideas Conventional (Kinetic means of present Warfare) and Nuclear Warfare Fourth Emerging Technology + Non-Kinetic means of warfare; Ideas terrorism, presence of NSA “Source: The group study highlights the theoretical understanding of the changing nature and character of war. See, Javed Saeed et al., National Strategy Paper: Non-Kinetic Challenges to the States of Pakistan (Islamabad: National Defence University, February 2012).” 2.4 Mediums of War

Many argue that space’s strategic importance lies in connection with other three mediums.

General John Jay Raymond, Commander, U.S. Air Force Space Command, speaking at thirty- third Space and Missile Defence Symposium stated that “space is a warfighting domain just like air, land and sea.”19 The policy statement from a high-ranking military official of today’s space superpower highlights the importance of this emerging medium of warfare. Not surprisingly, the

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Congress have established a Space Force, the sixth branch of U.S. military, to more effectively provide security and fight wars in outer space.

U.S. policymakers view both Russia and China as threats to U.S. space assets.20 Accordingly, the Sino-Russia nexus in space is now considered a serious existential threat to American national security. Table 2.3 shows a comparison between all different mediums of war on the following parameters, which include the influence of history, geography, technology and periods of evolution.

Table 2.3: Comparative Analysis of Mediums of Warfare

Medium History Geographic Technology Period of influence Evolution Land Oldest High Few skills were from the beginning

19 Mike Fabey, “U.S. Space Command develops operational concepts for waging war in orbit,” Space News, August 8, 2017. 20 Christian Davenport, “Some in Congress are pushing for a ‘Space Corps,’ dedicated to fighting wars in the cosmos,” The Washington Post, September 15, 2017.

29 Table 2.3 (continued) medium of required to fight on of the human warfare land civilization Sea Long history High Highly trained four to five of warfare personnel needed Centuries old Air A century- Less dependent on High skills and Aerial dogfights to old territory technology necessary strategic bombing Space Emerging Common human Hi-tech sophistication Sputnik 1957 heritage; no state has is required for combat began space declared sovereignty forces in space militarisation “Source: Kiran Krishan Nair, Space: The Frontiers of Modern Defence (New Delhi: Center for Air Power Studies and Knowledge World, 2006), 63.”

The first Gulf War 1991 highlights the strategic importance of space power and the military applications of space assets. In Operation Desert Storm, the coalition forces utilized space and “introduced yet another Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).”21 Desert Storm is sometimes called the “first Space War,” in which the “United States and allied forces excessively used Global Positioning System (GPS) and Satellite Communications (SatCom) for combat operations on Land,” writes Kenneth Bergman.22 He also quoted Michael Krause that

“space has been part of today’s evolving RMA since the launch of the first satellite in 1957.”23

Krause states that the evolving RMA pivots around four areas, which are “space, information warfare, precision strike and dominant manoeuvre.”24 This is shown in Figure 2.1 below.

Figure 2.1: The Intersection of Four Areas with Evolving RMA

21 AK Tiwary, “Aerospace Power: The Need for Unity of Command and Control,” Indian Defence Review 18, no. 2 (April-June 2003): 63. 22 Kenneth R. Bergman, “Space and Revolution in Military Affairs,” Marine Corps Gazette 79, no.5 (May 1995): 58. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid.

30 A.K. Tiwary opines that “the uncertainty of own position and its relation with other’s position, especially over the featureless desert terrain was eliminated for the first time.”25 The coalition forces successfully used military satellites and it proved a quantum leap in modern war- fighting techniques.26 The U.S. space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) global enterprise has further revolutionized the old-age techniques of war-fighting on Earth.

The former Soviet Union and the United States competed during the Cold War to exploit all the spectrums of outer space, thus laying the foundation of the Space Age. This made it a new medium of warfare with strategic importance. After the emergence of China as a major spacefaring state in the early 1990s and rise of other states with space power capabilities,27 space has become congested, crowded, and contested.28

The first school of thought advocates the weaponization of space. On the contrary, the second school-of-thought propagates that since space is a global commons, it should remain conflict-free. The proponents of conflict-free space believe that fighting a war in space would have devastating effects on the entire globe. It also opposes the prospects of the militarization of space and argues that any effort to weaponize space would have ramifications on global security.

However, the opposing camp states that space militarization provides enormous military benefits to states and increases the chances of winning any terrestrial armed conflict. This school-of- thought also supports the idea of placing weapons in Earth orbit. Hence, a debate between these two prominent schools of thought generates multifaceted and complex policy directions for

25 Ibid. 26 Lance W. Lord, “Commanding the Future: The Transformation of Air Force Space Command,” Air and Space Power Journal 18, no.2 (Summer 2004). 27 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter. 28 Many space security experts state that space is now contested. Since the research highlight China as arising global space power, space has become contested. A detail research work was carried out to study the growing number of new actor in space, see James Moltz, Crowded Orbits: Conflicts and Cooperation in Space (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).

31 policy-makers; as for whether to explore space for peaceful purposes or to militarize and weaponize it to achieve national security objectives. A detailed survey of the existing literature briefly highlights these different schools’ diverging arguments on the use of space for various purposes. This chapter is an effort to gather all the converging and diverging ideas, arguments and opinions in one place.

2.5 Space Schools-of-Thought

The subsequent sections analyse the existing schools-of-thought on space militarization and weaponization, possible cooperation in space and its peaceful exploration. James Moltz, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California is known for his views and analyses on the issues related to space security.29 Moltz analysed the space security issues at both theoretical and policy-making levels and presented a comprehensive breakdown of the existing schools of thought on space security. Broadly speaking, space security primarily revolves around two main ideas; space defences and space sanctuary.30 However, Moltz believes that the discourse on space security can be better understood if the aforementioned schools of thought are studied under space nationalism, global institutionalism, technological determinism and social interactionism.31

2.5.1 Space Nationalism

The primary factor which contributed toward the formation of space nationalism was the study of the space rivalry between the former Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War.

Moltz argues that the rivalry between two Cold War competitors was based on three sources/factors: (1) the political theory of realism; (2) the strategic competition on multiple frontiers (land, sea, air and space); and (3) the Cold War hostility and belligerence between the

29 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter. 30 Ibid., 24. 31 Ibid.

32 arch-rivals. Primarily, the course of limited cooperation between the former Soviet Union and

United States during the Cold War informs on how the aforementioned perspective of space nationalism came into being.32 The advocates of space nationalism believe that this narrow cooperation in the era was essential because of the divergent space doctrines and approaches. It is generally thought that both states only cooperated where they were assured that none of them would be able to create hurdles for each other. Moltz gave the example of U.S-Soviet cooperation on the prohibition of deployment of nuclear weapons on celestial bodies in outer space.33 However, when it came to deploying new technologies or weapons there, both states cooperated reluctantly. Moltz argued that international arms control agreements in space do not show an impressive record of mutual or any sort of cooperation.34 This assertion clarifies that states predominantly behaved under the realist framework. This realist behaviour is the baseline for the strong space nationalism. Moltz opines that space nationalists reject the notion of transnational cooperation and are more inclined toward competition in space. Furthermore, space nationalists argued in favour of more “militaristic drive by the leading space powers to secure geostrategic advantages over their rivals, as during the age of sea power.”35

2.5.2 Global Institutionalism

Global institutionalism shares most of the values of idealism. The advocates of global institutionalism see space as a medium in which state interactions are beneficial for all of humankind (absolute versus relative benefits/gains). They support building global institutions, which would regulate state activities in space, and they starkly oppose the approach of space nationalism. The focus is on cooperation rather than competition among states for the peaceful

32 Ibid., 24 and 25. 33 Ibid., 25. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., 27.

33 use and exploration of space. Clearly, the advocates of this idealist approach oppose the militaristic views of states that desire to wage war in space.36 Moltz explains that although the space nationalists do not promote the utopian ideas regarding space cooperation between the states, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) can be exemplified as a utopian thought that materialised into an actual cooperation mechanism.37 At present, the growing competition between the major spacefaring states and the continuous threat of future space weaponization may negate the core objectives of the space idealism.

2.5.3 Technological Determinism

Technological determinism is focused on the technological advancements of the states in space, rather than merely paying attention to the politics among them regarding space security. Moltz argued that the foundations of this school were laid during the early 1950s in the United States.

At that time, it was thought that nuclear technology would give enormous benefits as it would be harnessed to produce energy. Likewise, space explorations would also provide benefits by yielding its spin-off effects for the improvement of human lives on Earth.38 But, the national interests of the states facilitated the use of nuclear and space technologies for military purposes.

The superpowers indulged in an intense competition to exploit both technologies to serve their national security objectives.

Even though both strategic competitors were in an arms race to gain nuclear superiority over each other, the possession of nuclear weapons reduced the chances of nuclear war during the Cold War period. At that critical junction of time, space technologists drew an analogy between nuclear and space technologies, which was largely based on the experience of Cold

War. Further explanation of this school suggests that “technological determinists predicted the

36 Ibid., 28. 37 Ibid., 29. 38 Ibid., 31.

34 cooperation among the states in space, which would rise out of the objective of advance scientific research and development.”39 This eventually prompted states to cooperate since the massive space exploration programs would force the states to share technology, leading to eventual enforcement of “international stability and create new forms of social engagement by urging caution on their possessors.”40 In this school-of-thought, political conflict may not necessarily restrict states to cooperate during “technologically oriented tasks.”41 In conclusion, the technological determinists believe in states’ cooperation in space and do not take it as a rare possibility; however, this possibility “will rely on favourable structural conditions, communications, and political bargaining.”42

2.5.4 Social Interactionism

The premise of social interactionism is based on the rejection of the notion of the weaponization of space. The foundation of this school was established just before the end of the Cold War rivalry. Essentially, after the demise of the former Soviet Union and the subsequent U.S. failure to complete the planned Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in 1980s, the advocates of social interactionism thought that cooperation in space can take place even among fiercest enemies.

Moltz writes:

“Social interactionism rejected the notion of the inevitability of space weapons, given the availability of policy tools among space-faring states to interact with one another, bargain, and prevent the deployment of harmful weapons, which could damage other priorities they have in space.”43 Primarily, social interactionism propagates the prohibition of deployment and employment of space weapons. To promote this cause, arms control agreements in space are seemingly the only measure to prevent the militarization and weaponization of space. However,

39 Ibid., 32. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 36. 43 Ibid., 37.

35 Moltz stressed that “social interactionism requires knowing what will work in existing political and military conditions.”44

2.6 Space Doctrines

David Lupton, a former United States Air Force officer, discussed four types of space doctrines in this book titled On Space Warfare, published in 1998.45 He explicitly discussed the different contours of space doctrine, space force and space weapons in his research. The study primarily is the generalization of debate in a theoretical manner mostly aimed at the U.S. policy-makers. His work also provides theoretical understanding regarding the issue of space weaponization. Lupton compared and contrasted multiple perspectives in his research on the definition of doctrine. But,

“it is often defined by using four very different operative words—principles, rules, beliefs and ideas.”46 On basis of these four operative words used to define doctrine, Lupton understood space doctrine.

2.6.1 Sanctuary Doctrine

The first type of space doctrine is known as sanctuary.47 Sanctuary doctrine emphasizes the development of space-based assets to allow a state to gather all the information about the unfriendly states’ space capabilities, doctrines, policies and strategies. This implies that states

44 Ibid., 38 and 59. 45 David E. Lupton, On Space Warfare (Alabama: Air University Press, 1998). 46 Ibid., 2. A brief definition of doctrine is given as “a doctrine is a formal political-military consensus of the external threats facing the state, the ways by which these threats are countered, and the resources and organization needed by the arms forces to eliminate them.” In addition, the doctrine in more particular terms is viewed as contract between the government and the military which “defines a state-approved system of views on the essence, goals, and character of a future war; on the preparation of the armed forces and the country of war; and on the means of conducting war. Ultimately, if reflects the political goals of the state, as well as, the military, economic, social and legal means of achieving these goals during a future war.” For details see, Benjamin Wolkov and Galya Balatsky, “Changes in Russia’s Military and Nuclear Doctrine,” Los Alamos National Laboratory, July 25, 2012, http://permalink.lanl.gov/object/tr?what=info:lanl-repo/lareport/LA-UR-12-23486, 1. 47 Eligar Sadeh refers to the term sanctuary as “free use and access to space without the interference of other states.”

36 should develop both offensive and defensive military space forces, and “capabilities to see within the boundaries of the sovereign states.”48 This doctrine promulgates that the United States should develop a space-based system, which could strengthen and enhance its nuclear deterrence from assured destruction to assured survival. The proponents of this school of thought view space systems as useful for treaty verification process with stabilizing effects on international peace and stability.

2.6.2 Survivability Doctrine

The second type of space doctrine, survivability, differs from the sanctuary doctrine. The proponents of this doctrine understand that the threats to military space assets, and also space forces (referred to as space weapons), are more vulnerable than weapons placed on land, sea and air. They believe that space weapons are not cost effective nor are they sustainable and survivable. Furthermore, forces in space can easily be countered mostly from the terrestrial forces of rival states. Although they do recognize the reality of military space assets, their survivability remains under constant threat. Therefore, survivability advocates tend to view military space assets as more suitable for the peace-time situations rather than during conflicts.49

2.6.3 High-Ground Doctrine

The proponents of the high-ground doctrine view the space domain as the ultimate high ground; domination of ultimate high ground will “ensure domination of the lower lying areas.”50 They support the development and subsequent deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems to ensure the survival of strategic forces on the ground. For that, they argue in favour of development of direct-energy weapons (DEWs) as well as kinetic-kill vehicles (KKVs) to intercept rival state’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in outer space during any

48 Ibid., 20. 49 Ibid., 38-49. 50 Ibid., 21.

37 conflict situation. “In their view, space-based defensive forces can reverse the current stalemate caused by the pre-eminence of the offence and create either an offensive-defensive balance or a preferred defensive stalemate,” writes Lupton.

2.6.4 Control Doctrine

The premise of control doctrine is laid on the argument that states should build such space assets through which they can control all the spectrums of space. This strategy is very much analogous to the sea and air power strategies. The advocates of this school-of-thought state that if states conquer air and build indisputable air power, then terrestrial conflicts can be won. For the proponents of the control doctrine, space assets provide states complete dominance over all physical mediums of war, such as land, air and water. Space-based ISR capabilities allow military commanders to have a holistic picture of the various battlefields. The real-time image generation capability, combined with Global Positioning System (GPS) coordination, may give any military commanders a better ground position to more effectively conduct both defensive and offensive operations.51

2.7 Policy Perspectives on Space Power

Karl P. Mueller, who worked as a senior analyst for RAND Cooperation, has divided the debate in the field of space security into six intellectual perspectives.52 The previous discussion on the various schools-of-thought was primarily covered by James Moltz and David Lupton. In this context, Moltz’s intellectual construct was largely based on Mueller’s division of work on space weaponization. Mueller, like Moltz, made his arguments based on two major positions in space security: Space Hawks and Space Doves. Both scholarly approaches focus on Lupton’s Space

51 Ibid., 60-69. 52 Karl P. Mueller, “Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate,” in Space Weapons: Are They Needed? ed. John M. Logdon and Gordon Adams (Washington DC: Space Policy Institute, The George Washington University, 2003), 1-51.

38 Sanctuary and Space Defence doctrines respectively. The following discussion compares

Mueller’s intellectual and academic work on space security with that proffered, and discussed herein earlier, by Moltz.

2.7.1 Space Sanctuary Perspectives

Idealists. Mueller states that space idealists oppose the idea of space weaponization, which is similar to social interactionism. Both schools share similar fundamentals and principles. Mueller labelled the advocates of this school as sanctuary idealists; therefore, it is tagged as sanctuary idealism. He argued that the policy-makers in the United States were more inclined toward technological determinism and were also motivated toward space nationalism during and after the end of the Cold War. The advocates oppose the deployment of weapons in outer space and also the development of new space weapons. Mueller argued that:

“Sanctuary idealism is based on two central political premises. First is that weapons are necessary for—and tend, through arms races, to be a cause of—war, so the absence of space weapons prevents space warfare, while their presence would not make war in and from space possible, but would in fact, encourage it. The second principle is that minimizing the extent of warfare is intrinsically desirable.”53

The debate on the causes of war is centuries old; in fact, it has its roots deeply entrenched in the history of human civilization. Are weapons the cause of war or not? Idealism, an old school-of-thought in the discipline of political science and international relations, shares most of its values with sanctuary idealism.

Internationalists. Mueller writes that sanctuary internationalists oppose development of new weapons and deployment of weapons in new domains because of their strategic implications for international security and stability; Mueller argues that “the nature of space weapons make them

53 Ibid., 11.

39 far better suited to offensive than to defensive warfare.”54 The development of orbital weapons places the possessor of the weapons in an advantageous position as it allows for a first-strike capability. In this scenario, the development of orbital space weapons is harmful to international security.

Mueller posits that “sanctuary internationalism also warms of potential coupling between space weaponization and nuclear instability, on several levels.”55 These include the development of BMD systems with destabilizing effects on the global security; likewise, the real-time testing of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) by major spacefaring states also contributes to nuclear instability; and lastly, orbital space weapons allow its possessor to strike first, which has with it links to nuclear weapons instability if the first-strike is directed at a nuclear weapon state.

Essentially, sanctuary internationalists “are inclined to oppose space weaponization in general, although they would tend strongly to embrace other stabilizing means of reducing vulnerability to attack in or from space.”56

Nationalists. The sanctuary nationalists present their arguments based on realism. For them, the development of space weapons does not necessarily damage or weaken the global security, but it does cast dangerous impacts on military space assets. Their assertion is based on the argument that there are new spacefaring states, and if they can develop space weapons, then it would not make sense for existing space powers, like the United States, China and Russia to stay out of the competition. This would make it dangerous not just for space powers, but for all spacefaring states as well. At the moment, the United States is an undisputable space power and an existential threat to its civil and military space assets would break the present status quo in space.

The advocates also imply that if the United States. led any alliance in space and sought

54 Ibid., 14. 55 Ibid., 15. 56 Ibid.

40 deployment of space weapons, then it would certainly antagonize other space powers, namely

Russia and China, to act to challenge such U.S. dominance in space. “Sanctuary nationalists do not think that U.S. space weapons would be intrinsically bad, but instead their eventual cost would greatly outweigh their benefits, particularly insofar as U.S. space weaponization would lead to other states building their space weapons,” writes Karl Mueller.57

2.7.2 Space Weaponization Perspectives

Space Racers. Even though space racers have some converging interests on space sanctuary, they emphasize the inevitability of space weaponization. They are not extremists in their views as far as space weaponization is concerned. Space racers are reluctant to be recognized as pro- weaponization because space also offers cooperation among rival space powers. At the same time, they argue that the United States should not allow other rival states to compete and surpass its military space capabilities. Interestingly, the space racers posit a broader sense that space weaponization depends on the intentions and capabilities of the spacefaring states. This implies that any measure to place arms by other states should be closely monitored.

Controllers. Space controllers assert that space weapons are inevitable and the development of space weapons provides a space power ultimate superiority over its rival states, not only on the land, air and sea but also in space. “Space controllers may accept the proposition that weaponizing space will be politically costly,” but its strategic benefits for a space power are enormous as far as further shifting the BoP in space is concerned.58 They advocate that a space power like the United States should continue to work on building space weapons irrespective of the time, intentions and capabilities of the other states.

57 Ibid., 18. 58 Ibid., 22.

41 Hegemonists. The most extremist point of view regarding space weaponization emanates from the space hegemonists. They propagate that space is the ultimate frontier and now the fourth medium of warfare. States have fought wars with each other on land, sea and air throughout human history. However, space is becoming a new medium of conflict among the major powers.

Hence, hegemonists argue differently from space controllers in that the deployment of weapons in space should be a top priority. Mueller differentiates the arguments presented by the space controllers and space hegemonists as:

“Space controllers tend to envision space weapons complementing terrestrial weapons, as well as offering unique capabilities that would be impossible or difficult provide without them; space Hegemonists are more inclined to envision space weapons as supplanting most terrestrial weapons, and becoming the queen of the traditional battlefields as well as the new ones in space, in a genuinely transformational revolution in military affairs.”59

The actual argument by space hegemonists informs that space powers should realize existing space capabilities and pursue all means to control space. It should seize the control of the final frontier and “deny its use by unfriendly States.”60 At the present, space powers lack critical technologies to control all spectrums and spheres of space, and cannot fully deny unfriendly states from exploring it. Therefore, the United States as the exemplar of space power

“needs to quash any challenges” posed by Russia and China that attempt to “launch vehicles attempting to enter space without U.S. authorization and any terrestrial ASAT weapons that unfriendly state might build.”61

2.8 Space Weaponization Camps

Peter L. Hays authored a book titled Space and Security: A Reference Handbook, in which he discussed various camps on space weaponization. He raised some important questions which he

59 Ibid., 24. 60 Ibid., 25. 61 Ibid.

42 also amply answered in his book. He asked whether space will be weaponized or not?

Furthermore, when and how that might happen? And, whether the United States is interested in placing its weapons in outer space or would it be compelled to do so? The answers to these questions helped him to divide the debate on space into four major camps of space weaponization.62

2.8.1 Space Hawks

The thought process of space hawks is similar to the prepositions of realists. Space hawks support the deployment of weapons in outer space. Likewise, they see space as having all the characteristics and potential to be the next medium of war. Hence, it would be necessary for space powers to develop space weapons and deploy them without delay. By the strategic importance of space, the proponents of this school-of-thought support the development of space- based BMD systems “as a potentially decisive weapon capable of fundamentally reordering the strategic balance.”63 Space hawks do not support any kind of arms control agreement in space and support the full control of space to deny rival states to reach space.

2.8.2 Inevitable Weaponizers

A closer look at the views shared by space hawks and inevitable weaponizers suggests that the latter disagree with the former on the strategic importance of space. The history of war on land, sea and air tells that space is the next medium of war, but inevitable weaponizers do not believe that space would be the ultimate combat zone for states. They do view space weaponization as inevitable, but that would not necessarily be the “decisive theatre of combat operations.”64

Inevitable weaponizers do not entirely support arms control agreements regarding the prohibition of an arms race in space, but they value transparency and confidence-building measures

62 Peter L. Hays, Space and Security: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 86, 87 and 88. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid.

43 (TCBMs) to ensure an environment for safe space operations. According to inevitable weaponization, efforts to cease the arms race in outer space may go “futile” and states, due to inherited security challenges in the international system, continue to see space weaponization a real possibility.65

2.8.3 Militarization Realists

Advocates of this school oppose space weaponization because it may lead to a space weapons’ arms race; they think that if the United States deployed space weapons, then it would face in- kind deployments by other states that work against the military and economic superiority over major powers in different mediums of war (land, sea, and air) that the United States currently possesses. Further, space has different physics, which differentiates it from other mediums of war. If a war is fought in space, then it is likely to be dangerous as the collateral damage of space debris threatens critical military space assets for all space powers. According to Hays, “fighting into space looks feasible and U.S. should plan for this eventuality.”66 However, “fighting in space currently has little utility; while fighting from space looks impractical for the foreseeable future, with or without arms control.”67 For militarization realists, states should emphasize negotiated arms control treaties and agreements for space security.

2.8.4 Space Doves

Space doves oppose the concept and deployment of space weapons, and support arms control measures to regulate the utilization of space for non-military purposes. They further argue that any deployment other than “national technical means (NTM), early warning and hotline communications” would be highly provocative for international security and stability and would

65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid.

44 make other states pursue space weaponization.68 This is a “slippery slope” toward a space weaponization arms race. To prevent this scenario, arms control agreements with effective measures are highly necessary at present according to space doves.69

Table 2.4 shows the compilation of all the school-of-thoughts on the issues of space militarization and weaponization, including the development and placement of space weapons, multilateral arms control agreements and treaties, TCBMs.

Table 2.4. Schools-of-Thought on Space Militarization and Weaponization.

Space Schools of Space Multilateral arms Confidence thought: Weaponization; control agreements Building Measures Advocates, development and and treaties (CBMs) Doctrines and placement of space Policy weapons perspectives Space nationalism Support competition Oppose Oppose Global Oppose Support treaties Support institutionalism Technological Support cooperation Strongly support Unclear determinism Social Strongly Oppose Strongly support Strongly support interactionism Sanctuary doctrine Support Limited support Not clear Survivability Limited support Support Non clear doctrine High-ground Strongly support Oppose Oppose doctrine Control doctrine Strongly support Strongly oppose Strongly oppose Sanctuary Idealist Strongly oppose Strongly support Strongly support Sanctuary Limited opposition Limited support Limited support Internationalists Sanctuary Reluctantly oppose Limited support Limited support Nationalists Space Racers Weak opposition Weak support Weak support

68 Ibid. 69 Ibid.

45 Table 2.4 (continued) Space Controllers Strongly support Oppose Oppose Space Hegemonists Strongly support Strongly oppose Strongly oppose Space hawks Strongly support Strongly oppose Strongly oppose Inevitable Weak opposition Limited support Limited support Weaponizers Militarization Weak opposition Limited support Limited support realists Space doves Strongly oppose Strong Support Strong Support 2.9 Conclusion

The discourse on space security, particularly on space militarization and weaponization, is multifaceted, multidimensional, multi-layered and complex. Multiple perspectives germinate multiple arguments on whether space should be weaponized or not. Besides, can states cooperate with each in space or continue to deny in the establishment of multilateral arms control treaties and agreements to make space competition-free? It is a fact that states have a variety of conflicts that can result in wars on land, sea, and air. States have built military capabilities to fight each other in these mediums, but the world has yet to witness war in space, even though states do have conflictual relations there. However, the advocates, proponents, supporters and major camps related to space hawks continue to emphasize the development and placement of space weapons.

On the other hand, those related to space doves oppose space weaponization and stress upon the major spacefaring states to negotiate arms control agreements and treaties to seek cooperation among them to make space a weapon-free medium. Other schools-of-thought recognize the security interests of states, but they also advocate space cooperation and TCBMs in space. The basic aim of the literature review herein on the different schools-of-thoughts is to draw a theoretical framework to understand the behaviour of the states to support further research in the dissertation.

46 CHAPTER 3

Conceptualizing Space Security at Three-Levels of Security

3.1 Introduction

The primary objective of the chapter is to provide a context for the framework in which security in space will be understood. First, this chapter reviews space security at three-levels of analysis.

The categorization of security largely took place after the end of the Cold War. Before that, most research on security studies focused on understanding the behaviour of the state as the referent object in the preview of its military power. After the end of the Cold War, academics debated on widening the scope of security studies to include societal security in which the individuals or citizens of a state are the referent object in the first level the state’s national security is the second level, and the third level is international security.

1

Scholars of space security demark the successful launch of Sputnik-I as the first step toward the militarization of outer space. This militarization took hold as the two strategic superpower competitors sent hundreds of satellites, which were used for military purposes. With this development in mind, the chapter offers theoretical aspects of an arms race among states in general and especially aims to collect different academic accounts on an arms race in outer space. Third, the chapter also discusses the evolution of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) during the space age. The effort is to understand that the shift in the international security due to the militarization of space and the evolution of RMA. It is evident that “space has become increasingly crowded, contested and competitive since the end of the Cold War, with new

1 Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global-Security in the Twenty-First Century,” International Affairs 67, no.3 (July 1991): 431-451.

47 countries, companies and even private citizen operating satellites.”2 As a result, the fear of potential military conflict may arise among developed, emerging and aspiring space-faring states because of the development and possible deployment of space weapons. The chapter concludes that there has been a paradigm shift in international security since the launch of Sputnik-I, and states are moving toward the weaponization of outer space in the twenty-first century.

The policies, doctrines and capabilities of major spacefaring states in the twenty-first century are promulgating dual-uses of space. The history of the Cold War highlights competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Now, with Chinese space capabilities are growing and India is also making efforts to become a space power. The arms race in outer space between the United States and China would have possible implications for Regional

Security Complex (RSC) in South Asia.

3.2 Understanding Security

There is no universally accepted definition of ‘security, and practitioners and academics are constantly debating this contested concept.3 Barry Buzan believes that instead of defining security, there is a need to lay down a framework in which it can be understood and studied in different scenarios, conflicts, and contexts.4 The rationale behind it is that security is affected by multiple factors in different scenarios, conflicts, and contexts, which can be of socioeconomic, military, political, cultural and now ecological nature. Nevertheless, there are several definitions, which are widely accepted in the field of noteworthy security studies.

2 For further details, see James Moltz, Crowded Orbits: Conflicts and Cooperation in Space (Columbia University Press; New York, 2014). 3 Bertel Heurlin and Kristensen, “International Security,” in International Relations, ed. Jarrod Weiner and Robert A Schrire (Oxford, UK: EOLSS Publishers, 2009), 172. 4 For further details, see Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 8.

48 3.2.1 The Traditional Concept of Security

Traditionally, security during the Cold War was attributed to the state’s military power, with the practitioners and academics understanding security as the “derivative of power.”5 Security of the states was gauged by their ability to develop their militaries to fight war. The modern aspects of the theory were studied during the height of the Cold War when the two strategic competitors were locked in a deadly arms race of building conventional and nuclear weapons to shift the balance of power (BoP) in their favour. The competition led to building arms to fight a war on land, sea, and air, and both superpowers tried to offset the threat emanating from each other; they also competed in space by sending hundreds of satellites of military nature to augment their military power.

The security of the states during the Cold War was succinctly analysed by studying the

BoP theory. The theory is based on the assumption that states in the anarchical international system tend to accumulate military power “as a mean to security”6 and struggle to maximize it.7

In classical realism, the core assumption is that there is not a great deal of difference in human nature and state behaviour in the international political system. A state’s behaviour according to classical realism pivots around its self-interest, and the theory further suggests that states always pursue their narrow self-interests within the hierarchy of the states.

Randall L. Schweller, professor of political science at Ohio State University, states that

“BoP is a theory about studying international security and preparations by states for a possible

5 Ibid. 6 William C. Wohlforth, Stuart Kaufman and Richard Little, “Introduction: Balance and Hierarchy in International Systems,” in The Balance of Power in World History, eds. Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and William Wohlforth (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 19. 7 One of the main proponents of the structural realism was Hans Morgenthau. See, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978). Likewise, John Mearsheimer’s scholarly work is primarily based on criticizing the traditional concept of security and giving alternative concepts of security in the 21st century. For details, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

49 war.” In the same manner, Schweller succinctly defined the theory as the balancing behaviour of the state(s), which means the “creation or aggregation of military power through either internal mobilization or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter the occupation and domination of the state by a foreign power or a coalition.”8 Schweller further discusses the theory that the state(s) balances “to prevent the loss of territory, either one’s homeland or vital interests abroad (e.g., sea lanes, colonies, or other territory considered of vital strategic interest).” The main presumption of the theory is to preserve the integrity of an international political system in which significant military power(s) are not incentivized to subjugate a weak state (politically and militarily). The theory argues that states always try to maximize their political, economic and military goals at the cost of other state’s interests and states cannot be trusted with “inordinate power.” The real antidote to power is power.9

Primarily, the theory of the balance of power argues in building military capabilities to get maximum security against an adversary’s military capabilities. A state builds its military capability as the countervailing power. In doing this, state(s) tend to stimulate both internal and external balancing. The internal balancing is in the form of arms build-up and the theory further suggests that external balancing encourages the state to go to a military alliance. BoP is a means to fight a war and an end in itself. In case of an armed conflict between two significant military powers, the capability to fight a war is the actual military power to be gauged.10

However, to gauge the power of the state, understanding the context of conflict is necessary. This means that in realpolitik, the power of the state is measured through a) its military capabilities; b) political stability and will to fight the war (internal balancing); c)

8 Randall L. Schweller, “The Balance of Power in World Politics,” Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics, May 2016, http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore- 9780190228637-e-119. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid.

50 reliability of commitments of the allies; and d) the geographical location of the state.

Furthermore, in this changing political and strategic landscape, economic balancing has emerged as the most power counterbalancing tool. The relation between power, security and economy was merely discussed during the Cold War. The states made efforts to mobilize their internal resources to build maximum military power to neutralize the threat emanating from the rival states or alliances. In the middle of the twentieth century, the economic context made a profound impact on the balance of power politics. Paul Papayoanou, who has been using game theory in political science and business studies for more than two decades, argues that balancing policies between rival states or alliances cannot be successful unless the states prone to the status quo are not embedded in economic ties or interdependency.11 This shows the importance of the economy in the twenty-first century and informs on the proper contextualization of having a comprehensive security strategy for any state.

3.2.2 Security After the End of Cold War

The scholarly discourse on the security studies during the Cold War era discusses the centrality of the state, which indeed is the central point of the classical and neorealism. Furthermore, the modern concept of state suggests its two central characteristics of sovereignty and territory. The concept of sovereignty and territory of the state has primarily evolved in the twentieth century.

Scholars in the field of political science and international relations have further divided the central character—sovereignty —at two levels: internal sovereignty and external sovereignty.

The internal level is referred to as the power of the state to hold its authority within its territory and over its inhabitants. On the other hand, external sovereignty deals with maintaining state’s

11 Paul A. Papayoanou, “Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 113-140.

51 autonomy and independence, while interacting with other actors (states) in the international political system.12

Power is the fundamental feature of realism and a prominent theme in the subject of international relations. One of the many fundamentals of security studies is how to study the behaviour of the state. Likewise, another core aspect is the state’s ambition to seek power to securitize its sovereignty and territory against any threat, challenge, and vulnerability. In this regard, the classical literature on security suggests that state seeks military power. The proponents of realism linked the preservation of the sovereignty and territory of the state with its lust for power.

The traditional school-of-thought on security studies argues that the military capabilities of a state are the only measure to repel attacks; therefore, the state should build military power to ensure its security against the belligerence of its adversary. On the contrary, non-traditionalists believe that the traditionalists do not fully comprehend the other contexts of security, namely societal security, environmental security, economic security and political security. In the Cold

War time, security was mostly linked with military power and resultantly invited criticism on the classical and neorealist schools. The criticism of realism has germinated other perspectives; in fact, it contextualized the security in a new dimension. By the end of the Cold War, the discipline of security studies was forced to widen its scope.13

12 The scholar has developed a general framework of security, which may be applied to study the space security as well. The initial thoughts on the overall structure of security were studied by the scholar in a chapter focusing on the three-levels of security, particularly focusing the systematic level of security in the international relations. The systematic level of security is mostly discussed by Bary Buzan and the scholar has aptly discussed and laid a framework for security to study the interplay of relations between international security and regional security. For further details, see Mehrdad Hadji Mirarab, “The Role of the United States in the New System of Power Relations in the Persian Gulf Region, with Particular Reference to the Security and Stability,” (PhD. Diss., Newcastle University, 1996), 85-130. 13 Sarah Tarry, “Deepening and Widening: An Analysis of Security Definitions in 1990s,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 2, no.1 (1999): 15-27.

52 The subject of security studies in the early 1990s took new forms. The threats to sovereignty and territory of the state are not only emanating from the rival state, but also another form. The new forms of threats are not only challenging the security of a single state, but also the hierarchy of the states in the international political system. In the past, the discourse of security largely professed the military competition among the states and encouraged the states to build military capabilities as the only tool to repel the attack from the adversary. States were focused to preserve their sovereignty and territory from other states, not only threatened by the military build-up of the adversary states but from the changing global environment (climate change), rising economic disparities and growing world’s population as well. Similarly, there are other threats, which are impacting on the individual (human), state and global security levels besides climate change, economic disparity, and population growth. These threats include transnational and global terrorism, global epidemics, food shortages, poverty, economic mismanagement, refugees and the destruction of ecology and nature.

The end of the Cold War resulted at the end of the bipolar world.14 Richard Spielman, assistant professor of international affairs, argues that “Cold War world has given way to unipolarity, with the U.S. as the only pole left.”15 The Soviet Union retreat from Afghanistan and first Gulf War were the two major events that helped the United States to emerge as the sole global power. Furthermore, Operation Desert Storm enabled the world to witness the military power of the United States, including the active use of space assets for war fighting. At that critical juncture, the world also witnessed the emergence of a new political order with a new security agenda, as the debate of security issues divided into two schools of thought of deepeners

14 Heurlin and Kristensen, “International Security.” 15 Richard Spielman, “The emerging Unipolar World,” The New York Times, August 21, 1990.

53 and wideners.16 A security discourse with a large canvass to draw the multifaceted security threats posed to the human, the state and the world.

The subject of security studies also saw a shift in the overall discourse after the end of the

Cold War. The experts and academics disseminated the discourse on three different levels; human security (societal security), the security of the state and international security or global security. At these particular levels, the subject has conveyed a better understanding of the linkage between the state and society (humans).17

3.2.3 Individual Level

The Copenhagen school-of-thought, a mix of neorealist and social constructivist concepts, offers a better understanding of the security of the human.18 Primarily, human security is referred to as societal security. Buzan writes that “the individual represents the irreducible basic unit to which the concept of security can be applied.”19 The referent object in societal security is the human being. Ole Wæver, professor of international relations at the University of Copenhagen, defined the social security as “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats.”20 Wæver argued that societal security is linked with the “sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and customs.” But, the sustainability of the aforementioned factors is linked to the acceptable conditions of evolution. Also, the concept of social security is essentially meant to

16 Tarry, “Deepening and Widening,” 15-27. 17 David J. Brooks, “What is Security: Defining through knowledge categorization,” Security Journal 23, no.3 (2010): 225-239; and also see Marianne Stone, “Security Approach to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis,” School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, 2009, 2-11. 18 Bill McSweeney, “Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen school,” Review of International Studies 22, no.1 (1996): 81-93; and also see Ali Diskaya, “Towards a Critical Securitization Theory: The Copenhagen and Aberystwyth Schools of Security Studies,” (MSc. diss., Aberystwyth University, 2012). 19 Buzan, People, States and Fear, 35. 20 Ole Wæver, “Societal Security: the Concept,” in Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, ed. Ole Wæver et al., (London: Pinter, 1993), 23.

54 study the threats, challenges, and vulnerabilities to the language, culture, association, religion, and identity of the human, and how to securitize the society from these threats.21 Buzan further argues that there are several forms of threats to individual security encompassing physical, political, economic and environmental factors. Buzan aptly states about the relationship between individual and the state as:

“The state of nature image postulates primal anarchy in which the living conditions for the individuals involved are marked by an unacceptably high level of societal threat, in a word, chaos. Unacceptable chaos becomes the motive for sacrificing some freedom to improve levels of security, and in this process, the government and the state are born.”22

To further augment his argument on the interplay of the security between the state and the individual, Buzan concludes his thought as “state power grows the state also becomes a source of threat against the individual.”23 He terms this chemistry as of a paradoxical nature.

This argument suggests that society is dependent on the state as a “lynchpin for social and economic structures.”24 Therefore, Buzan also believes that “state is irreversible,” and the “the security of the individuals is inseparably entangled with that of the state.”25 The whole argument suggests the importance of societal security in the modern-day security studies discourse.

Without understanding the security needs of the individual, the state’s security will be incomplete and remain weak against the mounting strategic, socioeconomic, political and environmental threats to its society.

21 See, Rens van Munster, “Logics of Security: The Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War on Terror,” University of Southern Denmark, October 2005, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.472.8628&rep=rep1&type=pdf, 2-4; and also see Lulian Chifu, “Societal security: An agenda for the Eastern Europe,” Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning, accessed October 22, 2017, http://www.cpc-ew.ro/pdfs/societal_security.pdf, 1-18. (site discontinued) 22 See Buzan, People, State and Fear. 23 Ibid., 38; and “New Patterns of Global-Security,” 431-451. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid., 39.

55 One of the threats to overall international security is the weak or failed/failing state.

Robert I. Rotberg, director of the Kennedy School’s Program on Intrastate Conflict and

President of the World Peace Foundation, believes that the strong states “control their territories and deliver a high order of political goods to their citizens.”26 On the other hand, the weak or failing state does the opposite. In his view, “state’s failure threatens global stability because national governments have become the primary building block of international order.”27 The debate on the relationship between the individual—the referent object in societal security—and the state suggests that state’s survival is inheritably linked with the security of the individual, and Buzan further argues that it is the promise which has been made by the state to its inhabitants to provide security against political, socioeconomic and political threats.28

International security deeply relies on this state promise to “protect against chaos at home and limit the cancerous spread of anarchy beyond their borders and throughout the world.”29 A state can be referred to as strong if it can provide “political good of security” to its citizens.30 In modern security studies, state survival is linked with its promise to provide societal security to its components (government and citizens); in fact, according to scholars and experts, a state’s survival is primarily based on the fulfilment of its promise to the inhabitants of the state.31

26 Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 81, no.4 (July-August 2002): 132. 27 Ibid., 130. 28 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 35; Brooks, “What is Security.” 225-239; Stone, “Security Approach to Buzan,” 2- 11; and also see, Buzan, “New Patterns of Global-Security,” 431-451. 29 Rotberg, “Failed States,” 130. And also see, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no.3 (summer 2002): 85-96. 30 Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington DC: Brookings, 2003), 1-3. 31 Bailey Jessica Harris, “Thinking About Security,” (MSc. diss., The University of Manitoba, 2008), 25; Buzan, “New Patterns of Global-Security,” 431-451.

56 3.2.4 State Level

The security of the state is usually referred to as national security. The major referent object in the state or national security is the state. There are several thought-provoking definitions of national security. Defining national security of any state in its general form is challenging for academics, practitioners, and policy-makers. However, it is still possible to define the national security of a state in this changing contemporary world, where threats, challenges and risks are multidimensional and multifaceted. Kim Homles, a distinguished fellow at the Heritage

Foundation, describes national security as the “safekeeping and protection of the nation and its society from attacks and other external dangers by maintaining armed forces and guarding state secrets.”32 Toby Mendel, executive director of Centre for Law and Democracy, gives a simple definition of national security as “it is referred especially to the maintenance of foreign relations, to the extent that this is linked to the protection of national security, per se.”33 Mortan Berkowitz and P.G. Bock describe it as “the ability of the nation to protect its internal values from external threats.”34 Albeit all these scholars give different definitions of national security, their definitions do suggest a commonality between them that is rooted in the external threats from the other state

(s).

David Baldwin argues that security is a contested concept, as there are varying concepts to give the answers to the questions; security for whom, which values, how much security, from what threats and challenges, by what means, at what cost and in what period.35 These questions

32 Kim R. Holmes, “What is National Security?” in 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defence, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2015), 23-24. 33 Toby Mendel, “Defining the Scope of National Security: Issues Paper for the National Security Principles Project,” Center for Law and Democracy, updated March 2013, http://www.right2info.org/resources/publications/mendel-on-defining-national-security, 4. 34 Mortan Berkowitz and P.G. Bock, eds., American National Security (New York: Free Press, 1965), X. 35 David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies 23, no.1 (Jan 1997): 5-26.

57 need answers to understand the security of the state, society, civilization and the individual.

Understanding national security of a state in the hierarchy of states is necessary for the survival of the referent object. In doing so, the referent object [state] rationalizes its security dangers and concerns known as security threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks emanating/coming from other states.36 To augment the national security, the state rationalizes, organizes and develops a framework to structure the national objectives in form of a national security policy to deal with the emerging threats, vulnerabilities, challenges and risks to its survival, especially to its sovereignty and territory, from its adversary state(s).37

Foremost, the objective of the state is to identify its national objectives to rationalize its national security policy in the modern world. States usually try to identify all their core vital interests and then develop a security policy to achieve their core national security objectives. The core interests of any state could be as follows38:

a. survival of the state and its society [population];39

b. protecting the territorial integrity and maintaining its physical, economic and

political sovereignty, which is the basic right of the state;

c. fulfilling the promise of providing security to its citizens from societal threats;

d. “embedding the vital interest of the state in the national security policy.”40

36 Hans Günter Brauch, “Concepts of Security threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks,” in Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security, ed. Hans Günter Brauch et al., (Verlag, Berlin: Springer, 2001), 62. 37 Anton Grizold, “The Concept of National Security in the Contemporary World,” International Journal of World Peace 11, no.3 (September 1994): 37-53. 38 Quoted Vojin Dimitrijevic, professor of international relations. Ibid., 40. 39 Realists believe that the state develops its national security policy on three centerpieces of the theory of realism, which are statism, survival and self-help. For details, see Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism,” in The Globalization of World Politics, ed. John Baylis, Steven Smith and Patrica Owens (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, Seventh Edition 2017), 101-116. 40 Grizold, “Concept of National Security,” 40.

58 After defining the core national objectives, the referent objects measure the relative threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks to its security in the international political system or structure. To deal with the subjective form of the dangers and concerns, the state formulates and develops its foreign, defence, economic, social, environmental, health, food, energy, educational and cultural policies to ensure that it can meet its national security objectives. Furthermore, the state develops a structure of organizations and institutions to formulate its national security policy. The baseline of this policy is developed by chalking out the defence and internal policy options to deal with the internal and external threats. In the modern world, the external threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks may be regional and global rivalries between states, territorial disputes, serious economic disparities, ethnic and religious conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Likewise, there exist internal risks, challenges, threats and vulnerabilities that impinge upon the security of a state, such as organized crime, political instability, poverty, poor governance, corruption, terrorism, and lack of education.41 To deal with the external threats, in the defence elements of the national security, regular army, police, and specialized military-police or paramilitary forces are raised to solidify the defence of the state against the threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks posed to its territorial sovereignty and integrity. To further augment the policy, the state identifies internal threats, vulnerabilities, challenges and risks posed to its society. All these forms of dangers and concerns to societal security are dealt with by establishing a police force and a justice system so that the citizens of the state have every right to be benefited from the promise made by the states to provide societal security.42

41 “Threat to National Security,” De La Salle University, Philippines, accessed October 23, 2017, http://www.dlsu.edu.ph/offices/sps/rotc/pdf/ms1/threat-NatlSecurity.pdf, 1-3, (site discontinued). 42 Grizold, “Concept of National Security,” 46.

59 3.2.5 International Security

Barry Buzan, a renowned intellect and academic in security studies, believes that there is a shift in the pattern of international security, commonly known as global security. Before going to further analysis, there is a need to understand the difference between the agendas of international security during and after the end of Cold War. Buzan believes that during the Cold War,

“international security was dominated by the highly militarized and highly polarized ideological confrontation between the superpowers.”43 He stresses that Cold War world was polarized and, the threat of war, political and military confrontation between the two superpowers was imminent. He further argues the rivalry was further intensified when both states supplied arms to their allies, the periphery states. The supplying of arms to their periphery states not only raised the level of already existing hostilities among them but also the two superpowers pursued their rivalry in that way.44 However, the fall of Berlin Wall completely changed the pattern of the global security agenda.45 This also brought a shift in the pattern of international security as the debate tilted toward studying the new kind of threats to the society, states and the international system. The states are still focusing on their national defence against any kind of military threat to their sovereignty and territory; however, the non-kinetic threats, e.g., economic, societal and environmental threats, “are pushing their way into the top ranks of the international security agenda.”46 The shift in the international security agenda is largely linked with the emergence of

43 Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security,” 433. 44 Ibid. 45 In this research, he pointed out several factors which have made impacts on the new security agenda after the end of Cold War. He commented on the rise of multipolar power structure in the place of the Cold War’s bipolar one; a much lower degree of ideological division of rivalry; the global dominance of security community; and the strengthening of international society. See Buzan, “New Patterns in Global Security,” 431-451. 46 Ibid., 433.

60 non-military/kinetic threats to the individual, the state and the “international community”.47 The threats increasingly with high importance in the twenty-first century security agenda include international terrorism, criminality, dangers and risks to the economy, global environment, information systems (cybersecurity), natural and manmade disasters and poverty.48

The analysis of the debate on international security suggests that states are still facing military threats from other states; in fact, the threats are inevitable.49 Several academic efforts thoroughly deliberated on the emergence of new challenges to international security and their relative implications for the security of the individual, the state and the international system. But, the states are still involved in the arms race and military build-up to counter the military threats emanating from their adversaries. Sean Lynn-Jones, the editor of International Security Journal, states that:

“The field of international security studies should not abandon its traditional approaches or divert its attention wholly to emerging global problems such as environmental degradation, but it should broaden its focus to include more analysis of the political causes of conflict (particularly nationalism), the

47 The definition of international community is important to highlight as it will give a necessary understanding of the role of international community in contextualizing the space security. While defining International community, Michel Rocard, former Prime Minister of France, believes that international community can be defined as “any country whose identity and sovereignty is recognized, and that chooses to participate in global discussions and decision-making.” See, Michel Records, “What is the International Community,” Project Syndicate, May 30, 2013, https://www.project- syndicate.org/commentary/defining-the-international-community-s-role-and-responsibility-by-michel- rocard; Barry Buzan quoted Hedley Bull and Adam Watson that the international community can be defined as “a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.” Ibid., 438. 48 “Contemporary Threats to National and International Security, and Appropriate Security Measures,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Defence, Slovenia and NATO, Government of Slovenia, accessed October 24, 2017, http://nato.gov.si/eng/topic/threats-to-security/. 49 The Westphalian school of thought is considered the international security as the mixture of alliance politics, collective security, multilateralism and national security policies. See for details, Bastien Irondelle, “The New Parameters of International Security: Conceptual Introduction,” in New and Evolving Trends in International Security, ed, Anne-Marie Le Gloannec (Rome, Italy: Transworld, April 2013), 13.

61 conditions for peace and cooperation, linkages between economics and security, and the security problems of the developing world.”50

It is a fact that the modern concept of security is incomplete without the traditional concept of security. In addition, there is a need to widen the scope of security studies, but the traditionalist view on security has not displaced from its original presumptions about predicting the behaviour of the states in an anarchical international system. In the twenty-first century, the core dangers to the international security is the evolving nature of the nuclear doctrines and postures, the grand strategies of the states, arms and disarmament affairs, asymmetrical nature of conventional weapons, “the determinants of the defence policies of states,” civil-military relations, strategic stability and military history.51

The traditional and non-traditional thinking on the security has its own significance in studying the security calculus at regional and global level. Besides that, in the overall scope of international security studies, a relatively new concept has emerged; the Global Commons.

According to United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), it is “referred to resource domain or areas that lie outside of the political reach of any one nation-state.”52 These commons areas are the high seas, air (atmosphere), Antarctica and outer space.53 Interestingly, some experts also

50 See for further details, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “International Security Studies after the Cold War: An Agenda for the Future,” Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, CSIA Discussion Paper 91-11, December 1991. 51 The reason behind Lynn-Jones assertion is that war is not obsolete as many believe that after the Cold War, war will be a relatively less discussed issue in the future. But, war is not yet obsolete; in fact, it has taken new forms and dimensions, e.g. space War, and cyberspace war. States are building both physical capabilities to fight war at all mediums of warfare; air, sea, land and space. In the cyberspace or at the informational front, many believe that a war is on-going, which has its implications for the national security and individual security. In this case, the traditional concept still remains largely valid. Ibid. 52 “IEG of the Global Commons,” The United Nations Environment Program, United Nations, accessed October 24, 2017, http://staging.unep.org/delc/GlobalCommons/tabid/54404/Default.aspx. 53 Ibid.

62 argue that cyberspace is another global commons.54 The identification of these areas can lead to the extraction of vital resources, which could be used for the welfare of the community of states.

A broader understanding of the global commons highlights that it is governed by the common heritage of mankind (CHM) according to international law.55 The extraction of resources in these areas is a difficult task, but the advancement in technology in recent has made these areas more accessible then they were in the middle of the twentieth century. Space is one of the important areas of global commons and its security is of high importance for humans living on the globe.

Importantly, the CHM establishes that all humanity can use the resources freely, and every state has free access to these areas. But, the changing nature of international security has forced the states to extend the securitization process to even the CHM. The national defence of any state in this contemporary world is not limited to secure its physical sovereignty and territory; in fact, it has extended its scope to deal with the emerging threats from global commons. Murphy opines that global commons enable “militaries to protect national territory and interests, as well as facilitate the passage of goods, people, communication, and data upon which every member of the international community depends.”56 Many argue that the regional economic and military alliances are particularly looking to their access to the global commons as a result of their growing national interests in these areas.57 Space is a global commons is rich in resources, especially its ability to provide easy communication on the Earth. Clay Moltz writes that it has been crowded with new countries, companies and even private citizen operating satellites to

54 Tara Murphy, “Security Challenges in the 21st Century Global Commons,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 5, no. 2(2010): 29-43. 55 CHM is a very specific legal construct. A global commons can exist without a CHM designation. This is the case for space. For details, see “Global Governance and Governance of the Global Commons in the Global Partnership for Development beyond 2015,” United Nations, January 2013, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/thinkpieces/24_thinkpiece_global_gov ernance.pdf, 5-7. 56 Murphy, “Security Challenges,” 28. 57 “Governance of the Global Commons,” 7.

63 utilize the resources of the area. However, it has some cost to pay, as the increasing activities have created threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks to the use of space.58 The actions of major spacefarers resemble with concept of tragedy of commons. Their actions refer to a particular environment in outer space in which the vast resources of this global commons have become a restricted area for others. The major spacefarers are continued to send more and more satellites to fulfil their national needs and deny the space for other states, which refers to the tragedy of the global commons.

The states in the international system always protect their interests and security.

However, the compelling thing is that they have to interact with an international structure where nearly 200 states reside. Some of them neither have any political will nor any military strength to threaten the interests of the majority of the states. However, in many parts of the world, neighbourly states and major political and military powers do feel threatened by other states and their rising military and political powers. Likewise, in this contemporary world, threats and dangers are also emanating from the rising economic disparities, environmental changes and transnational terrorism. All these threats, challenges, risks and vulnerabilities cast their combined effects on the individual, the state and the international security. To securitize from these threats, measures have been taken at all these three levels. Security has been structured to neutralize these threats to all three referent objects.

More precisely, the threats to international security have been securitized by structuring an international system of institutions, organizations, and alliances.59 The United Nations (UN) was established after the Second World War in 1945 to maintain international security and

58 For details on the subject, see Moltz, Crowded Orbits. 59 Many experts of international politics believe that international institutes are established to promote international peace. Some of these institutes are, e.g. European Community, the NATO, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the European Union. The aim to establish these international institutions is to achieve durable peace and international security.

64 promote basic human rights. The UN has the authority to use force; however, since its inception, it has failed to prevent major wars and armed conflicts. Likewise, North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) is another multilateral military alliance, headed by the United States.

Moreover, to protect the people and the states from international security threats, the states have developed international norms, treaties and principles, which operate under international law.

Although these are of mere ethical, states have agreed to regulate their behaviour under international law. At the same time, they continue to violate international law. Besides, there are forums, bodies and committees, which work under the UN to look at the matters of arms control and disarmament issues. John Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of

Chicago, has assessed the role of the institutions in maintaining international peace and stability by applying two different theoretical frameworks: liberal institutionalism and realism. Primarily, realism contradicts institutionalism in a way that global institutions have not “markedly affect the prospects for international stability,” and are a symbol of global power distribution.60 On the contrary, liberal institutionalists argue in totally a different way than international institutions work to alter state’s behaviour. In this tug of arguments, Mearsheimer concluded that institutions have minimal influence on state’s behaviour and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world.61

The realist perspective can be used to analyse the role of international institutions to study the framework of space security. The reason is that space is now largely attributed as one of the global commons, and is also the fourth medium of warfare. Now, the question arises as to what are the prospects of maintaining peace and stability in space in the absence of a global authority that can regulate the behaviour of the states in the space? Is it possible for states to

60 John J Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no.3 (Winter 1994-95): 7. 61 Ibid.

65 have a universally accepted framework to establish peace and stability in the space? This study presumes that international institutions regulate the behaviour of the states, and that the national security policies of states represent the state’s actual positions.

3.2.6 Security Complexes

“Security is a relational phenomenon. Because security is relational, one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded.”62 —Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver

Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver describe security as a relational phenomenon between all three levels of security. The argument substantiates that a state’s national security cannot be seen in isolation; the security of its citizens and national security is seemingly interconnected with the international security in the form of a “seamless web.”63 The overall debate on this relational aspect of security yields sublevels of security, where states’ security mostly interacts, writes

Buzan and Wæver. The sublevels of security are referred by Buzan and Wæver as regional RSC.

The regional security is “a level between national and international security with a certain degree of interaction.”64 Buzan and Wæver’s argument is primarily based on the assumption of Stephen

Walt thinking about state’s relations with its neighbours. He believes that “simple physical adjacency tends to generate more security interaction among neighbours than among states located in different areas.”65 In this middle level, “one finds only the hazy notions of regional balances of power and subsystems,” where the interplay of national security and the international

62 Buzan, People, State and Fear, 187. 63 Mirarab, “Power Relations in the Persian Gulf Region,” 85. 64 Ibid. 65 Quoted by Barry Buzan and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and also see Stephen Waltz, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no.110 (1987): 29–46.

66 system suggests a location which “contains a new worthy level of political turbulence.”66 This level of interaction adds more complexity to the security of the states as it could not be viewed in isolation; rather, it needs a comprehensive understanding of the prevailing regional and international environment.67

“Buzan and Wæver articulate that the interactions between national and international security propagate at the regional level, which is theorized as RSC. In the research, they identify several regional structures/complexes.”68 These include Latin (South) America, Middle East,

Southern Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. There are some buffer states between the security complexes. However, every region has its power, political and economic problems and a single framework of regional security cannot be adopted to study the type of behaviour of the states. Every region has its security distinction.69

The RSC “hinges on patterns of amity [friendship] and enmity among the units [actors] in the system.” This well-articulated theory on regional security further suggests the impact of

“geographical proximity on security interactions is strongest and most obvious in the military, political, societal and environmental sectors.”70 “Further investigation of the theory highlights that superpowers have a wide range of interests interconnected both within and outside the region they reside in.” Buzan and Wæver suggest several categorizations in RSC; the standard, centred and great power levels.71 The RSC suggests a pattern of rivalry, alliance patterns and

66 Buzan, People, State and Fear, 187. 67 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 40. 68 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter. 69 Ibid., 37-67; and also see Buzan, People, State and Fear, 226. 70 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 45. 71 Ibid., 65.

67 BoP within the region.72 In the centred RCS, “Buzan and Wæver argue the role of a centred power is important as it defines the standard complex.”73 For details see, table 3.174

The rationale behind this study on regional security complexes “is to understand the security dynamics in South Asia. Space developments could greatly influence the power structure in the region.”75 India and China are pursuing space capabilities to foster their national power. Likewise, Pakistan as a regional actor cannot be separated from their relations. In fact, the role of the United States as a superpower has continued to exert its influence in the region.

So, this makes the South Asian RSC a super complex region. Further research will be focused on the triangular relationship in South Asia and the United States as a superpower influencing on the security dynamics of the region as well as on the globe.

Table 3.1: Regional Security Complexes.

Levels Characteristics Security Issue (s) Example (s) Standard Dominated by regional Security Interdependence Middle East, South power Amity/enmity America, Southeast Polarity Asia, Southern Africa Civilization area Domestic spill over Centred Superpower as central North America state South Asia? Great power as central Security Interdependence None state Amity/enmity Regional power as central Polarity EU state Civilization area Region requires actors Domestic spill over quality through institutions Supercomplexes Strong interregional level Security Interdependence East/South of security dynamics Amity/enmity Asia

72 Ibid., 47. 73 Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma,” 4-22. 74 Ibid., 62. 75 Ibid., 4-22

68 Table 3.1 (continued) arising from great power Polarity spill over into adjacent regions “Source: Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Power, 62; and also see, Buzan, People, State and Fear, 226.” The framework of three levels of security and their relational aspect resulting in a relatively new concept of RSCs is applied in this study to assess the security relationship between India, Pakistan, China and the United States. There is a need to understand the hostilities and belligerence between India, Pakistan and China at the regional level. It is also important to understand the adversarial relationship between China and the United States.76 A thorough academic investigation is conducted to analyse the security relationship between the regional powers in South Asia and the implications of Sino-U.S. rivalry for the region. “South

Asia is largely categorized by security analysts as a RSC where the two regional powers, India and Pakistan, are competing in an arms race.”77 This suggests an enmity between the two states.

Likewise, many “Indian security analysts also suggest an adversarial relation between India and

China.”78 So, in the super RSC of interest here, the sublevel of security is dominated by a great power in the region.

The RSC context of security is used to analyse the applications of space programs of

India, China, Pakistan and the United States. Key questions addressed are how global security is impacted due to Sino-U.S. relations in space and how it impacts regional security in South Asia?

The answers to these questions are discussed after studying the space doctrines and policies of

76 For over Sino-U.S. security relations see, Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” The Brookings, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series, Number 4, March 2012, 1-49; Eric Heginbotham et al., "Introduction." In The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 1-22; and also see Philip C. Saunders, “U.S.-China Military Relations: Competition and Cooperation,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no.5-6 (2016): 662-684. 77 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter.. 78 Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma in South Asia,” 4-22.

69 India, China, Pakistan and the United States. Furthermore, there are other challenges, risks and vulnerabilities to the entire globe due to space race between the three major space powers of the

Russia, China, and United States, and the space activities of new space actors that are considered herein.79

3.3 Theoretical Aspects of Arms Race

“An arms race is defined as a progressive, competitive peacetime increase in armament by two states or coalition of states resulting from conflictual purposes or mutual fears.”80

—Samuel Huntington, Famous American Political Scientist

Huntington’s definition of an arms race between any two states or coalitions of states still has its relevance in contemporary times. A more familiar definition of Huntington’s definition of arms race is given by Michael Intriljgator and Dagobert Brito as “the competitive, resource constrained, dynamic process of interaction between two states or coalitions of states in their acquisition of weapons.”81 Colin S. Gray, professor of international relations and strategic studies at the University of Reading, defined arms race as “two or more parties [states] perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armament at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attention to the past, present, and anticipated military and political behaviour of the other parties.”82 The definition suggests several aspects of adversarial relations between two states or a coalition of states. The most important theoretical understanding of the definition is how states perceive each other. Importantly, this factor is still playing a crucial role in defining the rules of engagement between the adversarial states in the modern world. Robert Jervis, professor of international affairs at Columbia University, argues that security-related perception between state

79 See Moltz, Crowded Orbits. 80 Samuel Huntington. "Arm s Races: Prerequisites and Results," Public Policy 8, no.1 (1958): 41-86. 81 Michael Intriljgator and Dagobert Brito, “Arms Race,” Defence and Peace Economics 11, no.1 (2000): 45-54. 82 Colin Gray, "The Arms Race Phenomenon," World Politics 24, no. l (1971): 39-79.

70 A and B as, “the effect of initiatives and threats depends to a large extent on the other’s intentions and its perceptions of the first state.”83 Likewise, the adversarial relations between any two states pivot around the perception of each other, especially when they are significant military powers. When states could not gauge each other’s aggression, it causes a security dilemma. The security dilemma indulges states to acquire as many as weapons they can “afford.”84

A survey of Sino-U.S. security-related perceptions conducted by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggests that “international cooperation and conflict in the twenty-first century hinge upon whether Chinese and Americans view each other, and foreign countries more generally, as trustworthy or not.”85 Besides, Sino-U.S. competition is not limited to land, sea and air; in fact, it has gone into space as well. As far as misperception is concerned, Eligar Sadeh, a prominent space scholar, writes in a report on U.S.-China Space Dialogue Project that:

“Military and security space dialogue is blocked due to a dynamic of misunderstanding and misperception. The misunderstanding-misperception dynamic is a result of a lack of clarity-of-intent in the space domain between the two states. The lack of clarity inhibits the development of common terms of reference on the uses of space, behaviour in space, and governance of the space domain.”86

Sadeh’s views from his participation in the dialogue process suggest that security challenges perceived by both China and the United States to their national security are because of the misunderstanding and lack of clarity on the threats and dangers to each other’s security.

83 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 112. 84 Ibid. 85 Alastair Iain Johnston and Mingming Shen (eds.), “Perception and Misperception in American and Chinese Views of the other,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/email/SecurityPerceptions_final.pdf, 43. 86 Eligar Sadeh, “Report: United States-China Space Dialogue Project,” Astropolitics 8, no. 2-3 (2010): 7-18.

71 There is a consensus in the academic literature that an arm racing between two states does not necessarily create sufficient conditions for war.87 However, Julian Schofield argues that there is a causal link between arms races and war. He asserts that if two rival states are engaged in arms build-ups then war is possible. Adding more complexity to the equation, if relations between the two rival states have misunderstanding-misperception dynamics, then the possibility of war cannot be excluded from the equation. See Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: The Casual Link between Arms Race and War88

A case study of India and Pakistan suggests that the arms race between the arch-rivals applies to an action-reaction model. Schofield argues that “action-reaction process is an intense and continuous interaction between two states.”89 Buzan and Eric Herring stressed that “the action-reaction process could still be the mechanism by which states compete militarily in purely quantitative terms.”90 They also referred to another perspective on arms racing that “arms racing

87 Julian Schofield, “Arms Races: Militarization and War,” (PhD. diss., Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Columbia, 2002), 21. 88 Ibid., 11. 89 Quoted by Schofied, Colin Gray. "The Arms Race Phenomenon," World Politics 24, no. l (1971): 39-79; "The Urge to Compete," World Politics 36, no.2 (1974): 207-233; and also see "Social Science and the Arms Race," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist 29, no.6 (1973): 25. 90 Buzan has extensively worked on the issue of arms racing between rival states. He argues that there are three different models of arms racing, which are: - 1) the action-reaction model; 2) the domestic model; and 3) the technological imperatives. The central point in rationalizing the arms racing debate according to three different models is force build-up against the rival state. The force build-up or arms production may be because of the anarchic international system or the internal pressure exerted by the Defence and security institutions or by the rapid technological innovations or developments in the world. See for

72 has only become a distinctive international phenomenon since the industrial revolution unleashed the force of mass production and institutionalized innovation into the international system.”91

Both further argue that the phenomenon of arms racing become a distinctive part of relations between any two arch rivals (India and Pakistan)92 or between two coalitions (only during the

Cold War) when the states realize that war is the likely outcome of their aggressive accumulation of weapons.93 In the Indian-Pakistan case, as earlier discussed, a declassified U.S. document written in 1959 suggests that arms race was a visible part of the relations between the two countries.94 In this regard, the arms racing between the two states can be exemplified as an action-reaction syndrome.95

A space arms race is also a distinctive phenomenon in the international political system.

However, there is a need to understand the trends in the present arms race through the models studied earlier. The trends in the present arms race in outer space can be studied by applying the abovementioned arms race models; for example, the action-reaction model can be applied to study the pattern of Sino-U.S. relations in space. Similarly, Indian-Pakistan relations could be another case study of relevance to the action-reaction syndrome in the space domain. The impacts of the arms race, no matter in which domain, are devastating not only at the regional but also at the global levels.96

further details, Zafar Khan, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence (London: Routledge, 2015), 73-75. Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 84. 91 Buzan and Herring, Arms Dynamic in World Politics, 84. 92 For details on the Indo-Pak case study see, Feroz Hassan Khan, “Prospects of Indian and Pakistani Arms Control,” in The Next Arms Race, ed. Henry D Sokolski (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 357-380. 93 Ibid. 94 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter. 95 Khan, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy, 73 & 74. 96 Intriljgator and Brito, “Arms Race,” 45-54.

73 3.4 Evolution of RMA

“Operation Desert Storm represents a Revolution in Warfare.”97 — Gen Charles A. Horner, USAF (Ret.) This profound statement reflects the significance of the evolving nature of warfare in the twenty- first century. General John Raymond, Commander US Air Force Space Command, stated that “it was the first time that we took strategic space information and integrated it into a theatre of operations.”98 However, how has space evolved as RMA? There are many factors involved in the evolution of warfare, but certainly one cannot exclude that Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) would be the primary factor in making this evolution happened.99 RMA primarily “emphasized the greater use and better communication of information among commanders, analysts and combatants.”100 Operation Desert Storm showed the modern nature of war and evolution of

RMA through “the importance of firepower over manoeuvre and marvelled at the associated impact of new technologies in changing the face of battle.”101 Peter Hays and Roger Cavazos study the “increasingly complex problem of the threat posed by nuclear weapons of mass

97 George Horner and Lawrence Grinter, Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, revised edition (Washington, DC: George C. Marshall Institute, 1998). 98 Jay Bennett, “Space War: How the Air Force Plans to Defend the Final Frontier,” Popular Mechanics, 6 November 2017, http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/news/a28851/us-air-force-gears-up-for- expanded-role-in-space/. 99 Gary Chapman, “An Introduction to Revolution in Military Affairs,” XV Amaldi Conference on Problems in Global Security, Helsinki, Finland, September 2003, http://www.lincei.it/rapporti/amaldi/papers/XV- Chapman.pdf, 1-21. 100 See for further details, James Andrew Lewis, “Neither Mahan nor Mitchell: National Security Space and Space power, 1945-2000,” in Space Power, ed. Charles Lutes et al., (Washington DC: National Defence University Press, 2004), http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/spacepower.pdf; and also see Götz Neuneck Christian Alwardt, “The Revolution in Military Affairs, its driving forces, elements and complexity,” Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg, Working Paper no. 13, May 2008. 101 Quoted by Steven E. Sloan, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Politics of Innovation in the U.S. Navy,” (MSc. diss., Naval Postgraduate School, Monetary, 1994); and also see Benjamin S. Lambeth, Desert Storm and Its Meaning: The View from Moscow (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1992), 69.

74 destruction in Northeast Asia.”102 They argue the presence and significance of nuclear weapons in the global system. Hays and Cavazos write that the post-Cold War global system has become more complex, multi-dimensional and multi-layered. The complexity of the global system is because of the “four tributaries feed into this river of turbulent change,” and one of the streams is the RMA.103 They further argue that RMA has made the complexity of the global system easier for the great powers to “extend deterrence without relying on nuclear WMDs.” The great powers are trying to make their capabilities “stealthier, smarter, faster, smaller, and therefore, much harder to target by local conventional or nuclear weapons.”104 Hence, the effects of these efforts are visible and profound. In this regard, the most profound is the development of medium and long-range missiles by smaller nuclear weapons states in the global nuclear order, e.g., India,

Pakistan and North Korea. Furthermore, the United States, China and Russia are investing in their nuclear force structure and rapid innovation in their defence-dominant strategy and technologies.105

Many stress that “space has become part of the evolving RMA since the launch of the first satellite in 1957.”106 Ronald Deibert, professor of political science at the University of

Toronto, believes that space technologies are also an integral part of the present RMA.107 Similar views about space technologies and RMA were expressed by Merrick E. Krause, retired U.S. Air

Force officer and security scholar. He opines that the present RMA is the intersection of four

102 For further details, see Peter Hays and Roger Cavazos, “Complexity and Weapons of Mass Destruction in Northeast Asia,” in Complexity, Security and Civil Society in East Asia, eds. Peter Hays and Kiho Yi (Cambridge, Unit/ed Kingdom: Open Book Publishers, 2015). 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Kenneth Bergman, “Space and Revolution in Military Affairs,” Marine Corps Gazette 79, no.5 (May 1995): 58. 107 Ronald Deibert, “Unfettered Observation,” in Space Policy in the 21st Century, ed. W. Henry Lambright (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 108.

75 areas: space, information warfare, precision strike, and dominant manoeuvre. See Figure 2.1108

Deibert’s argument primarily focuses on the evolving nature of space technologies. If Deibert’s and Hays’ arguments are viewed from the same angle, then they suggest that space technologies are indeed an integral part of the RMA. Space technologies are smarter, not very cheap, but are stealthier, give more precision and accuracy, and enhanced target acquisition and striking on the battlefield. Desert Storm is exemplified for this reason.109 Given fighting a war, Kenneth R.

Bergman emphasizes that Operation Desert Storm gave “the U.S. force to dominate manoeuvre” during the first Gulf War. It established the fact that space technologies can play a decisive role in war fighting. Deibert stresses that “outer space technologies provide the high ground essential to communicating information around the world, coordinating force movements, rehearsing simulated interventions and targeting attacks.”110

Hays also recognizes other critical issues that may play an important role in shaping the space power of the major spacefarers, especially U.S. space power. These issues are similar to what Bergman, Deibert and Krause have identified. These are information operation (IO), transformation and the organizational structures of the space power, which help in bringing the evolution in RMA, writes Hays. He also exemplifies the Operation Desert Storm, which enabled

U.S. forces in crafting “space-enabled operational integrated reconnaissance complex capable of tailoring military strikes for precise effects in unprecedented ways.”111 Hays highlights that experts within the U.S. space policy-making sphere have argued in establishing a “system of

108 Ibid. 109 Gregory Billman, “The inherent Limitations of Space Power: Fact or Fiction?” in Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence of Space Power Thought, ed. Bruce DeBlois (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1999), 510. 110 Ibid. 111 Peter Hays, “Space and the Military,” in Space Politics and Policy: An Evolutionary Perspective, ed. Eligar Sadeh (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 366.

76 systems.”112 Some analysts also believe that net-centric warfare capabilities are also required in this regard. In this system-of-systems, the United States should build a global enterprise of “IO and technologies”113 to radically improve U.S. combat and warfighting effectiveness.114

Nevertheless, space-based global enterprise of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

(ISR) system enables space power to establish that system-of-systems.

Other scholars, most notably Colin Gray and John Sheldon share views that space power is RMA.115 Gray and Sheldon state:

“What has traditionally been perceived as space power is, in fact, only the beginning of how we will use space strategically. It challenges contemporary thinking on what many have regarded the present RMA to be—namely, it is proposed that space power will be the RMA. For space power to reach its full potential, however, space must be recognized as a geographical environment for conflict that is, in a strategic sense, no different from land, sea, air and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS).”116

Concomitantly, they agree that if space power becomes analogous to land, sea and air power, then “it will show that space power is on the threshold of something much more prominent.”117 They further stress that “it is this emergence of space power that will mark it out as an RMA.”118

As far as the characteristics of space power are concerned, there is a need to understand to what extent the characteristics of space power are similar to other power domains, i.e., air, land and sea. As Gray and Sheldon highlight, it will be geography that is

112 Ibid. 113 Ibid.; on the role of information technology in evolution of RMA, see Jeremy Black, “The Revolution in Military Affairs: The Historian’s Perspective,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 9, no.2 (Winter 2006/7): 1-42. 114 Ibid. 115 Colin Gray and John Sheldon, “Space Power and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” Airpower Journal 13, no.3 (Fall 1999): 23-38. 116 Ibid., 25. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid.

77 the most important factor in making any medium as part of evolution in RMA and it is geography, which influences the “policy makers, planners and experts to prepare strategies, tactics, logistics and force postures.”119 Therefore, it is important to understand the characteristics of space, and how far these are familiar with the land, air and sea power. It is undeniable fact that space is a vast area and it has no limit to its exploration. Rather, space is a unique medium, unlike land, sea and air, having no north, south, east or west.

Gregory Billman, member board of directors USAF Space & Missile Museum

Foundation, compared the characteristics of space and other mediums of warfare by taking multiple factors. He points out the characteristics of military forces as “strategic agility, ability to demonstrate commitment and credibility, economic consideration, military consideration and political consideration.”120 He believes that political flexibility, which pivots around the realpolitik, carries the day regardless of any difference between the force structure and doctrines. He further argues that “at the end of the day, it is the political applicability of a force, not operational dissimilarities from another, which is most meaningful.”121 This suggests that the political applicability of force on land, sea and air is similar to space.

In conclusion, space is considered as the fourth medium of warfare and since Desert

Storm there exists the realization of space power as RMA.122 For example, the U.S. military has a global enterprise of intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, early warning system, navigation and communication, providing strategic agility, commitment and credibility to its military forces not only on land (terrestrial) but also sea and air from its

119 Billman, “Inherent Limitations of Space Power,” 516. 120 Ibid., 522. 121 Ibid., 523. 122 Prof Dr Eligar Sadeh (Editor-in-chief Astropolitics) in discussion with the author, 3 November 2017.

78 space power. Moreover, Billman stresses that “it seems space power can be more politically useful in most situations;” however, the sea, land and air powers still have their unique advantages and applications.123

The impacts of space on RMA and vice versa are enormous. In today’s world, the research and development (R&D) in space technologies, e.g. development of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) and ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems, are some of the manifestations of space technologies giving a “real basis for the vision of current RMA.”124

Space has become a strategic domain and states are competing to maximize their power in it.

Major spacefaring states are developing new space technologies for dual-use purposes, and in addition to this, the digital revolution is a new manifestation of RMA. States, especially the United States, are looking to further develop and exploit communication and navigation satellites. The space power revolution linked to RMA serves to further militarize space.125

3.5 Conceptualizing Space Security

As one of the global commons and as a strategic asset, the security of space for humans, the state, and the international system is very important. Humans have been thinking to exploit the skies and outer space for centuries. Since the rise of the space age, an unending process of exploiting and exploring space began. Space has also gained political, economic and military importance in the last seven decades (1950s to the present) as a strategic asset and global commons.

The importance of space power cannot be ruled out in the twenty-first century. Many military historians argue that Great Britain became a superpower in the nineteenth century due to

123 Billman, “Inherent Limitations of Space Power,” 546 & 547. 124 Jakub Fučík, “Revolution in Military Affairs and Outer Space,” International Conference Knowledge-Based Organization 23, no.1 (2017): 106-111. 125 Peter R. Mansoor, “The Next Revolution in Military Affairs,” Hoover Institute, March 15, 2017, https://www.hoover.org/research/next-revolution-military-affairs.

79 its navy. The British Empire controlled the seas through its naval power and extended its grip beyond the European continent to eventually rule the Indian subcontinent, Middle East, many parts of Africa, and Oceania. In The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Alfred T. Mahan reviewed the emergence of the British Empire due to its super navy.126 Mahan concludes that sea power resulted in the establishment of the British Empire in the nineteenth century. Now, many space analysts argue in a similar fashion that Operation Desert Storm showed the emergence of the United States as a superpower in the last decade of the twentieth century thanks to its space power. This, combined with its already conventional and nuclear superiority, allowed it to become the only truly global power in the history of mankind. Likewise, Eligar Sadeh views

Israel as an example of a super-regional power in the 1990s when it realized the importance of space power; Israel understood that without space it cannot influence the behaviour of its neighbours.127

A profound understanding of space security for the common readership is provided by the annual space security index report. Space security is usually defined as: “the secure and sustainable access to, and use of, space and the freedom from space-based threats.”128 To draw a holistic picture of space security, there is a need to understand the space policies, doctrines, capabilities of the major and emerging spacefaring states. Further, the picture will be incomplete if there is no analysis of the international and regional space programs of the states because of

126 Alfred T Mahan, The Influence of Sear Power Upon History: 1660-1783 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Francis P. Sempa, “The Geopolitics Vision of Alfer Thayar Mahan,” The Diplomat, December 30, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-geopolitical-vision-of-alfred-thayer-mahan/; “Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History: Securing International Markets in the 1890s,” Office of the Historian, The Department of State, United States, accessed November 6, 2017, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/mahan; Ronald Carpenter, “Alfred Thayer Mahan's style on sea power: A Para message conducing to ethos,” Speech Monographs 42, no.3 (1975): 190-202; 127 Eligar, discussion. 128 “Space Security: Fact Sheet,” Space Security Index, accessed November 8, 2017, http://spacesecurityindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/SpaceSecurityFactSheet.pdf.

80 their multilateral and bilateral space relations. This constitutes a global space environment in which space security can be better understood. Moreover, there is a need to understand the space activities of the new actors that include state and non-state. Important as well to understand space security are the military space programs of the spacefaring states. These are the military space capabilities of the states which have profound implications for international security. Lastly, space systems protection and negation, along with space-based strike weapons are important areas of space security. By assessing states’ capabilities to build space systems protection and negation, a more complete picture of global space security is drawn.129

Of note are the threats to space assets. The threats can cause physical damage as well as hamper the normal abilities of satellite systems. These threats are of both kinetic and non-kinetic means, which states are developing. The kinetic measures include the development of kinetic-kill vehicles (KKVs), which are usually tagged as anti-satellite missiles (ASATs). The non-kinetic measures include means of electronic warfare (EW). These are jamming capabilities against dedicated military satellites communications, imaging satellites and global positioning system; this includes hacking operational software, dazzling sensors, spoofing and cyber-attacks.

Furthermore, space debris is another threat to operational satellite systems.130

There have been hundreds of reported incidents of jamming, spoofing and dazzling by states.131 China, Russia and the United States have tested ASAT capability in the recent past. In

129 Space Security Index is the first and only annual, comprehensive and integrated assessment of space security. Some of the world’s renowned space experts assessed the security in space by using the aforementioned variables. For further details visit the website of Space Security Index to access their annual reports since 2003. 130 From the Kessler syndrome, if the current trajectory of testing ASAT missile is continued, then it will create “a self-sustained cascading collision of space debris in low earth orbit (LEO).” For details, see “The Kessler Syndrome: 10 Interesting and Disturbing Facts,” Space Safety Magazine, accessed November 8, 2017, http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-debris/kessler-syndrome/. 131 For further details, see Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment (Washington, DC.: Secure World Foundation, April 2018).

81 this regard, it cannot be predicted that there would not be any further ASAT tests by other space powers in the future. India has shown its ambitions to develop its ASATs in the future. The threat of proliferation of ASAT has increased due to the Chinese and American tests in the recent past. To add, both “Russia and China are conducting sophisticated on-orbit satellite activities, such as rendezvous and proximity functions, at least some of which are likely intended to test dual-use technologies with inherent counterspace functionality.”132 It is quite understandable that states are seeking access to space due to the proliferation of new technologies. The reliance on satellites and the absence of a universally accepted code of conduct in space and regulation have made space weaponization inevitable. Space militarisation began with Sputnik-I, and while states have yet to place weapons in outer space, they are building capabilities on the ground to weaponized there. Sadeh argues that the U.S. can weaponize outer space as well as China and

Russia. All of these states are just waiting for each other to place their weapons first. At the same time, Sadeh asserts that states are more inclined toward space sanctuary, rather than controlling space and denying free access for other states. He also acknowledges that while U.S. space doctrine is predominantly pivoted around the high-ground and space control doctrine, it has yet to operationalize its capabilities to weaponize space. 133

The global trends in space industry expansion suggest that states are extending space- enabled capabilities and space situational awareness to public and privates actors in the near future. This will provide necessary imagery, communications, weather, positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) capabilities134 of the states for the intelligence gathering, early warning,

132 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Before Select Comm. on Intelligence (May 11, 2017) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence), 8. 133 Eligar, discussion. 134 China is expanding its PNT capabilities is likely to become a global leader as it complete its navigation satellite system by 2020.

82 scientific and commercial uses of outer space.135 In the proceeding chapters, the space doctrines and policies of the major and emerging spacefaring states are assessed to understand the present security environment in space at international as well as regional levels.

The three space powers of note as indicated earlier are the United States, China and

Russia. Their relationship may be better understood through the lens of a BoP in space. Space security can be analysed at the international level in the context of political, military, and economic environments. All three states have given tremendous importance to their space power in past decades with the United States the undisputable space power of the three.136 Russia is a significant space power137 likely to triple the number of its satellites in space by 2025. It aims to improve its ISR satellite system to solidify its space situational awareness and tactical weapons targeting satellites. China is an emerging global space power and in the last decades it has surpassed Russia in terms of numbers of operational space assets.138 It is increasing its space power by developing space capabilities for dual-use purposes. On the other hand, India has emerged a regional space power with global ambitions.139 Japan also has a significant space program.140 Pakistan is a regional power and it has the capabilities to further augment its aspiring

135 Statement of Coats, Director of National Intelligence, 8. 136 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), VII. 137 Pavel Luzin, “Space Power: What is Russia’s Military Strategy in Outer Space?” Intersection, October 25, 2017. 138 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter. 139 “India has emerged as a key player in global space race: foreign media,” The Hindu, February 16, 2017; Shounak Set, “India’s Regional Diplomacy Reaches Outer Space,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: India, March 7, 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/7-3- 2017_Set_IndiaRegionalDiplomacy_Web.pdf, 1-5; Manjeet S Pardesi, “India: the emerging Asian super power,” Business Line, April 20, 2015; RS Thakur, “India’s Rise as a Global Space Power in 2020,” CLAWS Journal 6, no.2 (Winter 2012): 67-74; Neeta Lal, “India's Soaring Space Ambitions,” The Diplomat, August 9, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/indias-soaring-space-ambitions/; and also see David Scott, “The Great Power Great Game between India and China: The Logic of Geography,” Geopolitics 13, no.1 (2008): 1-26; 140 Elizabeth Howell, “JAXA: Japan’s Aerospace Exploration Agency,” Space.com, May 19, 2016, https://www.space.com/22672-japan-aerospace-exploration-agency.html.

83 regional space power status.141 There are as well emerging space users in the Middle East e.g.

United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, and in the Asia-Pacific e.g. Australia. As discussed earlier, there is also the presence of private entities in space. This has made space not only crowded but also congested which may eventually lead to conflict.

Overall, space security is comprehensively understood if the relations of major and emerging spacefaring states are analysed in the preview of their space policies, which reflect upon the intentions and visions of their space programs and capabilities. Currently, space assets, i.e. satellites, are the fastest, most reliable and sustainable source of communication on Earth. As a result, in this globalized world, the reliance on satellites for communication, navigation and broadcasting makes space indispensable. Hence, any military conflict in space would be detrimental to human and economic security.

Figure 3.2: Framework of Space Security at International and Regional Level

141 Prof Dr Ram Jakhu (Associate Professor Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University) in discussion with the author, 6 November 2017. Prof Ram believes that Pakistan is a regional space power. Pakistan has space capabilities and its building its space launch station and it’s a matter of political well and intention that Pakistan will have its own space launch vehicles and space launch stations. However, Clay Moltz argues that Pakistan is an emerging regional space power. For details see, / Moltz, Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries and International Risks (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 158-190. Likewise, Randall R. Correll also highlights Pakistan as an emerging space power, for details see, “Emerging Actors,” in Space Power, ed. Charles Lutes et al., (Washington DC: National Defence University Press, 2004), http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/spacepower.pdf.

84 The BoP theory is useful to predict the behaviour of the three major spacefaring states playing a dominant role in global space activities. All three have advanced space technologies, capabilities and significant operational satellite systems for both military and peaceful purposes.

However, as it was highlighted earlier, “the political applicability of a force, not operational dissimilarities from another, is most meaningful.”142 All of them are competing with other each to shift the balance of power in their favour by building space weapons and advancing assertive space policies and doctrines. U.S. policymakers assessed that both Russia and China perceive “a need to offset any U.S. military advantage derived from military, civil or commercial space systems and are increasingly considering attacks against satellite system as part of their future warfare doctrine.”143 Both states, Russia and China, are actively pursuing ASATs to reduce U.S. military effectiveness.

“U.S. is currently the preeminent global space power,”144 because of its military and civilian space capabilities. It plays a dominant hegemonic role. On the other hand, China stands at the second position in the global space order and Russia comes third.145 China is more inclined toward making an alliance with Russia to counter U.S. space hegemony as well as building its space capabilities and increasing its international cooperation with other space actors. U.S space policy and doctrine are dominated by the high-ground and space control schools-of-thought.

Primarily, the space control school suggests that,

“Offensive Counterspace Strategy (OCS) are measures taken to prevent an adversary’s hostile use of US/third-party space capabilities or offensive operations to negate an adversary’s space capabilities used to interfere with or attack US/allied space systems. OCS entails the negation of adversary space

142 Billman, “Inherent Limitations of Space Power,” 523. 143 Statement of Coats, Director of National Intelligence, 8. 144 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, VII. 145 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter.

85 capabilities through deception, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction actions.”146 The operational parts of the U.S. space control doctrine are offensive to the Chinese and

Russian space programs. It also suggests that U.S. space intentions are meant to control the high- ground and only let the friendly countries operate in outer space. This is likely to shape the global space order in the U.S. favour as it is developing space capabilities to negate the adversary through deception, disruption, denial, degradation or destruction actions. Hays stresses that U.S

“assets designed for the OCS mission may be used to conduct or support counterair, countersea, counterland, counterinformation, or strategic attack missions by performing offensive counterspace actions where the adversary's vulnerable node is a space system.”147 In this scenario, it is easy to assess that the United State is still vulnerable to China and Russia because of their counterspace capability development in the past two decades.148 However, “Five Ds: deception, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction actions” which represent the continuum of options, are not only meant to China and Russia only but also meant to persuade other states149 as well as the non-state actors from committing any course of action against the U.S. space assets.150 The activities of the private actors and states’ are increasing and space itself is now

146 Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-14 (Washington DC: Joint Chief of Staff, May 29, 2013), GL-8, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf.; and also see, “Offensive Space Control,” Curtis E. Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, updated June 19, 2012, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/3-14-annex-osc.pdf. 147 Peter Hays, “United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-First Century,” USAF Institute for National Security Studies, INSS Occasional Paper No. 42, 2002, 36. 148 Aaron Bateman, “In outer space, the US is vulnerable to China and Russia,” The Hill, July 20, 2017, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/defense/342992-in-outer-space-the-us-is-vulnerable-to-china-and- russia. 149 “There are more than 130 countries possessed sophisticated space programs or were developing them, using information form space assets for their own Defence, the representative of Kazakhstan.” See for further details, United Nations, “Full-Spectrum Dominance of Outer Space Can Turn Frontier into ‘Military Theatre’, Build Walls of Suspicion, Breach Global Security, First Committee Told,” press release no. GA/DIS/3464, October 23, 2012, https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/gadis3464.doc.htm. 150 Counterspace Operations (Maxwell AFB, AL: Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, 2004)

86 crowded and congested. In this regard, it is important to follow how the United State will manage to control it. Will the balance of power work when other states with less number of space assets are also reaching the final frontier? The answers are difficult to find, but it is quite plausible that impacts of the Sino-U.S. space rivalry are likely to affect international security.

Moreover, Russia is making significant international cooperation with China and others in space, which is of concern to U.S. control doctrine and capabilities.

As discussed earlier, BoP from a traditionalist lens is about developing military capabilities to prepare for a possible war. Furthermore, the military capabilities are meant to create or aggregate “military power through either internal mobilization or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter the occupation and domination of the state by a foreign power or a coalition.”151 The theory suggests the states try to balance to target the adversary’s military hardware in preparation for a possible war. Hence, the core assumption is that states always try to maximize their political, economic and military goals at the cost of other state’s interests, and states cannot be trusted with “inordinate power.” Simply put, the real antidote to power is power.152 By applying these core assumptions on the power relations in space, the new actors in space are “capable of challenging the hierarchical situation in space.”153 The newcomers are developing space capabilities with aiming to acquire any status there. Anna Burzykowska analyses the balance of power in space as:

“[New space comers’] power is measured here through the lenses of their ability to deconstruct the existing (traditional) balance of power in space, characterized by the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, confidence in alliance politics, status quo in terms of Weaponization of outer space, and bilateral arms control negotiations.”

151 Schweller, “Balance of Power.” 152 Ibid. 153 Anna Burzykowska, “Smaller states and the new balance of power in space,” Space Policy 25, no.2 (2009): 188.

87 It is quite evident that a crowded, congested, and contested space is a threat to U.S. space supremacy. Likewise, the newcomers and other two major space powers, Russia and China, are also having challenges and vulnerabilities to their space assets from the offensive space control components of U.S. space power and the newcomers as well. In this case, states are not only making alliances in space, but also indigenously developing military space assets. On the other hand, the Sino-U.S. rivalry in space has its dimension. China often views U.S. space power and capabilities as offensive to its space power and capabilities. In turn, the U.S. sees Chinese space development, especially after the Chinese ASAT test in 2007, as an emerging challenge to its space supremacy.154 This suggests Sino-U.S. space relations are involved in a security dilemma.

However, Brian Weeden, Director of Program Planning for the Secure World Foundation, suggests that China-U.S. competition does not have many similarities of what the space history tells about the U.S.-Soviet space race.155 Nevertheless, there are significant developments from each side, which are detrimental to international security. The asymmetrical space power structure between both spacefaring states (United States and China) posit destabilizing effects on global strategic stability. At the same time, both countries are economically interdependent.

There are three significant military powers in the South Asian region: China, India and

Pakistan. Although there are good relations between Pakistan and China, India has strained relations with them both. This suggests the type of relations as a mix of amity and enmity. Buzan and Weaver's theory of RSC is most suitable to analyse relations at the regional level. The

United States also has a strong presence and influence in South Asia. Many analysts believe that

154 Brian Weeden and Xiao He, “Use Outer Space to Strengthen U.S.-China Ties,” War on the Rocks, April 26, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties/; Brian Weeden, “Insight - Building Stronger U.S.-China Relations in Space,” Secure World Foundation, February 1, 2017, https://swfound.org/news/all-news/2017/02/insight-building-stronger-us-china-relations-in-space; 155 For further details, see Brian Weeden and Xiao He, “U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space,” in U.S.- China Relations in Strategic Domains, ed. Christopher Youn et al., (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Affairs, April 2016).

88 China, India and Pakistan have a strategic triangular relationship between them.156 Also, the

Sino-U.S. relationship has likely impacts on this triangle, making it quadrilateral relations. The scope of the study is limited to their relationship in outer space as it may have implications for the strategic stability in the region. Space power, doctrines, policies and capabilities will be analysed in strategic triangular relations in South Asia. However, the United States is a preeminent space power with a dominant role in not only shaping the global space order, but it can also exert its influence in shaping the regional space regime in South Asia. The reason behind U.S. playing a prominent role in space is because of its adversarial relations with China.

U.S. once collaborated with both India and Pakistan in the past. India continues to enjoy friendly relations with the U.S., however, Pakistan is not space cooperation with the U.S. at the moment.

However, U.S. does not consider Pakistan its foe in space. Therefore, its relations with China “is the triggering point of space security trilemma in South Asia,” whereas, its status in the trilemma is just the tip of the iceberg.

At the regional level, India is a space power and its space program is a top political priority in the country. However, in South Asia, Sino-India relations are adversarial. Both countries have fought a war with each other in 1962. China is perceived as a strategic adversary by India. David Malone and Rohan Mukerjee opine that “China is a more fraught subject in

Indian national debates,” and “India displays tremendous insecurities in the face of Chinese economic and military expansion.”157 Gurmeet Kanwal, a retired Indian Army Brigadier and scholar, emphasizes that “the security relationship has the potential to act as a spoiler in the larger relationship, and will ultimately determine whether the two Asian giants will clash or

156 Ashok Kapur, India and South Asian Strategic Triangle (London: Routledge, 2011). 157 David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, “India and China: Conflict and Cooperation,” Survival 52, no.1 (February-March 2010): 137-158.

89 cooperate for mutual gains.”158 Dipankar Banerjee, retired Indian Army Major General, argues that both countries have very little contact and understanding in the past. However, it is a profound bilateral relationship in the twenty-first century.159 Sino-India relations have been strained overall in past decades due to territorial disputes. China is a significant military and economic power. It has the potential to grow at a global level. India is also a leading power with significant military and economic strength in the region. It has all the resources to change the regional balance of power.160 Both countries are nuclear powers. But there is an asymmetrical nature of space power structure in between India and China. Both countries are also seeing each other as potential adversaries in space just like in other realms of power.161 C. Raja Mohan, the non-resident senior research fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accepts that

“both countries are expanding their strategic reach from the open seas to outer space,” but, he argues that “India’s relations with China will not necessarily turn adversarial,” in space. 162 The dynamics of Sino-India space relations suggests that there is enmity between them.

Indo-Pakistani relations suffered from the historical legacy of the 1947 partition of the subcontinent. A brief history of both countries’ relations highlights three major wars, the

158 Gurmeet Kanwal, “India-China Strategic Relations Further Improvement is Contingent on Resolution of the Territorial Dispute,” CLAWS Journal 5, no.1 (Summer 2010). 159 Dipankar Banerjee, “India-China Relations: Negotiating a Balance,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, IPCS Issue Brief No. 160, December 2016, http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/IB160-Banerjee- India-China.pdf. 160 Ashelly Tellis, “India as a Leading Power,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 4, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/04/04/india-as-leading-power-pub-63185. 161 The authors believe that the nuclear gap between India and China has been narrowed over the past decades and India has done significant developments in its missile and space program. India’s long-range ballistic missile cann now can reach the heartland of China. Likewise, India is develop Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle, submarine launch ballistic missiles, ballistic missile defence (BMD), and much advance outer space, which is causing concerns in China. Einhorn and Sidhu (eds.), “Strategic Chain,” 22. 162 Raja C Mohan, “Poised for Power: The Domestic Roots of India’s Slow Rice,” in South Asia 2007-08: Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy, eds. Ashelly Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2007), 203.

90 nuclearization of the subcontinent and unresolved territorial disputes in the region. From the space security point of view, India is a significant space power and it is expanding. However,

Pakistan is regarded as an aspiring space power with an expanding missile capability. Both countries possess conventional and nuclear power to change the polarity of power in the region.

However, space is a domain, where the bilateral relations are yet to be analysed. In the proceeding chapters, their space programs and capabilities will be analysed to explore the dynamic of space competition and to assess implications for regional strategic stability. The trajectory of India’s space program has had a peaceful orientation, but it has, nevertheless, developed space military capabilities in navigation, remote sensing, communication and reconnaissance. This presents implications for the national security of Pakistan and China.

The primary objective of analysing space security is to study the possible outcome of the relations between major and emerging space powers. Any armed conflict in space would have devastating impacts on regional and international levels of security. Likewise, securing space for free access and use necessitates the avoidance war in space. “A war in space would be devastating to all, and preventing it, rather than finding ways to fight it, will likely remain the goal” of the study.163 The current trajectory of activities of newcomers and major spacefaring states affects strategic stability and deconstructs the present status quo in space. This can lead to the weaponization of space. Omar Lamrani, senior military analyst at Stratfor, believes that an

“increased competition in space is reviving fears of war there, one with devastating consequences.”164 To avoid any armed conflict in space, the need to pursue international and regional cooperation is required. Also, the misperception-misunderstanding dynamic should not be part of any multilateral or bilateral engagement to secure the space for free access and use.

163 Omar Lamrani, “Avoiding a War in Space,” Startfor, May 17, 2016, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/avoiding-war-space. 164 Ibid.

91 3.6 Conclusion

Understanding space security at international and regional levels is difficult as space is now more crowded, congested and competitive. It is quite understandable that the United States is the sole superpower in space and China is following its footsteps. The BoP theory is applicable to assess the bilateral space relations between the two major powers. Even though China is still lagging behind the U.S. in terms of operational satellite systems, its current path of space activities will be challenging to U.S. space supremacy. Russia is a significant space power. It is also developing space capabilities (kinetic and non-kinetic) to offset threats from the United States.

At policy and doctrine, the United States has highlighted and assessed all the necessary measures to remain dominant in space. On the other hand, China and Russia are also making progress in developing counterspace capabilities. Hence, it is important to know why states are pursuing these capabilities and what will be the likely outcome of having not only space militarization but potentially space weaponization.

The power of the state is always attributed to its military power. In the past, states developed conventional and nuclear power to bolster their military muscles. In the international political system, states always gauged their military strength as a force to offset risks, challenges, and vulnerabilities to their national security with military defence forces repelling any kind of physical attack on their territory. However, the introduction of RMA in the early 1950s, its evolution during the Cold War and its applicability during the later 1990s since first Gulf War has completely revolutionized warfare. Space is genuinely referred to as the product of the evolution of RMA. It has enhanced the agility, communication and credibility of the terrestrial, air, and sea forces in the battlefield. Space is now considered a strategic asset with enormous resources for both peaceful and military uses. However, its security is as important as the

92 security of states on land, sea and air. States’ self-centric approach to maximize their security and power can lead to armed conflict in space. They are expanding their space capability for dual-use purposes, which may inflict damage to the security of other states and in the domain of space itself. All this likely leads to interstate conflict with implications not only for international security but also for regional peace and stability.

Sino-U.S. relations are an important aspect of the global strategic environment. The

United States has enormous military, political, and economic strength and influence to shape the global strategic environment. All components of its national power make it an undisputed global power as its enormous strength has allowed the United States to exert its influence in shaping the global political and strategic landscape. Concomitantly, U.S. power is facing risks, vulnerabilities and challenges on land, sea, air, and space. China is also solidifying its national power through military and economic means. There are likely chances of Sino-U.S. conflict in all mediums of warfare; however, both also have economic interdependency, as well as strategic competition, with each other. This complex interdependency suggests that they will continue to compete without involving in a struggle to shift the balance of power in their favour and their fortunes are inextricably tied together. It is analysed whether it will be the complex interdependency that prevents both to weaponize space or will there be a rigorous competition involving an arms race in space.

In conclusion, Sino-U.S. relations posit implications for South Asia. India and China both have adversarial relations. In a similar fashion, India and Pakistani relations are suffering from the action-reaction syndrome and are involved in a conventional and nuclear arms race. Hence in

South Asia, a complicated regional security complex exists in which all three states (China, India and Pakistan) can change the polarity of power balances through their military power. There

93 exists as well the influence of the United States on China, India and Pakistan; this can be viewed as strategic triangular relations with a core state (the United States). This study analyses space security dynamics at this level of a super-regional security complex.

94 CHAPTER 4

Space Policy, Strategy, and Doctrine: United States, China, India and Pakistan 4.1 Introduction

The research in the previous two chapters focused on explaining and understanding frameworks for space security at both international and regional levels. This is useful to analyse the actual space policies of the global and emerging space powers. This chapter focuses on studying the theory of space power and then researching the relevant states’ space doctrines and policies.

Many prominent space experts have defined what space power is. Moreover, they have included space power as one of the elements of a state’s national power. Besides, they have discussed the requirements for a state to build it. It is an undeniable fact that space power has significance for the modern military; however, it has also grown in the private and commercial sectors. To substantiate the academic arguments on space powers, definitional and conceptual frameworks discussed in the existing literature are discussed.

This chapter also highlights the fundamental contours of space doctrines and policies of the United States, China, India and Pakistan. The research provides a fundamental understanding of the space doctrines and policies in the context of space militarization and weaponization.

Additionally, this chapter addresses several questions of concern in light of officially declared space policies and white papers. What is the nature of space policies? Do the space policies and doctrines support space militarization and weaponization? And, what are the space policies of the emerging space powers? Of note, is that this research has some limitations. There are only a few states which have officially declared space doctrines and policies so far. The documents tell little about the said states’ actual space operations and development of capabilities. On the other hand, while some countries do not have officially declared documents, they do have space policies.

95 After analysing the doctrines and policies of the global and emerging space power, the next chapter will focus on the space capabilities of the states.

Why is it important to assess intentions, doctrines and policies of the global and emerging space powers? The title of this thesis suggests that a space arms race brings a shift in international and regional security. The United States maintains its preeminance in the global space order. China has emerged as a global space power. Russia is still a significant space power at a global level and is likely to improve its space capabilities in the near future. It is evident that these three space powers significantly shape global and regional space orders. It is a general understanding that there is a global environment of competition between these space actors.

Also, there are emerging actors in space with growing space capabilities. This is likely to create conflict in space due to congestion and competition. In this regard, the chapter assesses the doctrines and policies of global and emerging space powers to study their thinking and perceptions about space arms.

4.2 Theory of Space Power

This section probes the theory of space power. What are its elements and applications in the modern world? What are the advantages and disadvantages of space power? The answers are important for better understanding the doctrines, policies and capabilities of the relevant state actors.

In political science, especially in the strategic studies subfield, the intentions and capabilities of a state are the two things rigorously assessed by scholars. Both intentions and capabilities of states are interwoven in an equation, which predicts the behaviour of the state.

The intentions of the state cast impact on its overall behaviour when interacting with other states

96 in the international political system. Capabilities are the actual manifestation of the power of a state to take action on its intentions.

Ken Booth, a British International Relations theorist, makes an interesting argument that pivots around the intentions and capabilities of a state. He argues that assessing the capabilities of a state is an imperfect art. It entails capabilities (military) and intentions (aggressive or offensive) as two major causes of war as per the understanding of the idealist school-of-thought.

1 Booth also stresses that intentions are important in predicting the behaviour of the state during peacetime as well as in conflict situations. He concludes his thoughts by stating, “Capabilities do represent a standing threat, by providing options, but it is important to make as rigorous an examination of intentions as possible if an effective and efficient policy is to emerge.”2 From

Booth’s perspective on the capabilities and intentions of the state, it is evident that military planners and policy-makers should assess the doctrine, policy and capabilities of an adversary. In this way, a comprehensive policy can be formulated.

A more comprehensive framework is given by Sun Tzu, the Chinese general, philosopher and military strategist, to understand the capabilities and intentions of the enemy. He said that “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”3

Tzu’s saying tells about why it is important to assess the capabilities and intentions of the adversary. This also highlights how this factor impinges upon the national security policy of the state. Furthermore, policy making process will be imperfect without a holistic review of the global and regional security environments. Sun Tzu signalled this factor in his writings and how it impacts on the policy making process.

1 See for details, Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Routledge, 1979). 2 Ibid. 3 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans., Lionel Giles (El Paso: El Paso Norte Press, 2005).

97 Currently, there is no comprehensive or universally accepted definition of space power.

However, there are certain elements when combined that frame a definition of space power.

From a historical point-of-view, space power was largely attributed to sea and air power. Peter

Hays states,

“It is a cosmic concept that is complex, indeterminate, and intangible…Confusion swirls on the semantic level because there is no commonly accepted definition or accepted wording for this concept.”4

Space experts agree with Hays in this regard. They think space power is a confusing term. In an alternative argument, United States Air Force (USAF) officer Samuel McNiel thinks that the use of the term ‘space power’ is accurate, appropriate and precise with no ambiguity in it.5 Another argument by another USAF officer Martin France suggests that space power lacks definitive work. However, the early writings on space power suggest that “U.S. has centred on space as a logical extension of air power theory.”6 As space power lacks a comprehensive, agreed upon definition, it is obvious that it will be compared to the other powers, like sea and air.

In this regard, Colin S. Gray argues that space power is akin to land, sea and air power, in all strategic essentials.7 This gives a more logical way to define space power. However, it is also worth mentioning that space is a unique medium and it has its significance for military and peaceful purposes other than land, sea and air.

There are similarities between the characteristics of sea and space power. Alfred T.

Mahan, an American naval officer and historian who was an exponent of sea power in the late

19th and early 20th centuries, said that six different elements constitute the state’s sea power.

4 Peter Hays, United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-First Century (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2002), 5. 5 Samuel McNiel, “Proposed Tenets of Space power: Six Enduring Truths,” (MSc. diss., Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 2003-04), 3. 6 Martin France, “Mahan’s Elements of Sea Power Applied to the Development of Space Power,” (MSc. diss., National Defence University National War College Washington DC, 2000), 1. 7 Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 258.

98 These elements include geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, number of population, the character of people and character of the government of a state.8

Likewise, there are characteristics of air power, which also resemble space power.

Characteristics of air power include flexibility, responsiveness, survivability and surveillance.9

The fundamental characteristic of air power is the operation of its basic item, aircraft, in the medium of air.10 Similarly, the fundamental characteristic of space is the operation of satellite, spacecraft and missiles. Due to these similarities, air and space forces have the potential to dominate the conduct of enemy operations in all mediums.11 Both air and naval power characteristics facilitate in developing a definition of space power.

4.2.1 Elements of Space Power

Scholars have advanced studies to understand various elements of space power. One important scholarly study on space power was carried out by James E. Oberg in Space Power Theory.12

Oberg penned down some basic elements of space power of the state. These elements primarily include hardware and human resources. The hardware includes launching sites, space launch vehicles (SLVs) and satellite building capabilities. On the other hand, human resources are primarily about “people whose intelligence and dedication drive the innovation, and a parent society which understands and values space activities, and considers the payoff worth the major

8 Alfred T Mahan, The Influence of Sear Power Upon History: 1660-1783 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and also see Ian Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare (London: Routledge, 2014), 42. 9 Michael Mazarr et al., Strategic Planning and U.S. Air Force: Characteristics of Success (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017). 10 Woodford Agee Heflin ed., The United States Air Force Dictionary (Washington, D.C.: Air University Press, 1956), 74. 11 Glenn Kent and David Ochmanek, Defining the Role of Airpower in Joint Missions (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Cooperation, 1998), 11. 12 For further details, see James Oberg, Space Power Theory (Colorado Springs, CO: United States Air Force Academy, 1999).

99 effort.”13 Based on these core elements and their synergy, the Oberg defines space power.

Moreover, based on hardware and human resources, states can be categorized as global, regional and emerging space powers.

According to Oberg, the basic elements of space power stated below.14

a. Facilities. This is a fundamental part of space power, which includes

manufacturing, launch, telemetry tracking and command and control facilities of

the state. Other facilities include SLV manufacturing and payload manufacturing.

b. Technology. Technology plays a vital role in building space power. Institutions

and organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, are the main drivers

of the technology to build the capabilities.

c. Industry. Non-governmental organizations/non-profitable organizations are the

main tenants of the industry. Private actors can be instrumental in “designing,

manufacturing, deploying and operating of space systems.”15

d. Economy. The economy is the backbone of any power. In this regard, space power

is associated with achieving economic, strategic and political goals. These goals

are meant to generate economic and social advantages. Space power is an

expensive adventure and it requires investments of the state economy.

e. Populace. Oberg argues that there should be adequate numbers of engineers and

scientists, which can significantly contribute to building a state’s space power.

Likewise, the masses should also be awarded of the expenditure of the states on

13 Ibid., 44. 14 Ibid., 44-47. 15 Ibid., 45.

100 its space activities. In this way, both human resources and an awarded society can

play their crucial parts in building space power.

f. Research and Development (R&D). The state should have adequate R&D

capabilities, which include universities with space-related departments,

institutions, and centres; government-run organizations focusing on preserving

national security and for intelligence purposes; and public and private

laboratories. All these are tentacles of a space-based education system that

generates knowledge and produces a pool of engineers and scientists to “support

and grow a vibrant and vigorous space industry.”16

g. Geography. It is a common understanding of political science that when states fail

in politics, their geography works. Robert Rotberg stresses that “the extent of a

state’s failure can be measured by how much of its geographical expense is

genuinely controlled by the government.”17 In this regard, Oberg argues that for a

state to become a space power, its location is important, as it provides “launch site

with ample downrange safety zones.” Likewise, it’s the geographical location that

helps states to establish good diplomatic relations with host nations to launch their

satellites, e.g. Pakistan has friendly relations with China and received Chinse help

to launch its PakSat-IR satellite into orbit.

h. Tradition and Intellectual Climate. To bolster space power, the state should

spread as much information it can in its population to gain public support to

achieve its short-term and long-term space exploration objectives.

16 Ibid., 46. 17 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter.

101 i. Leadership. Leadership also plays an instrumental role in building space power.

Visionary leadership always looks beyond the horizons. Space is a vast horizon

and it allows for leadership to link its political goals with the development of

space power of the state.

Within the context of the abovementioned elements, Michael Moran defines space power of a state is defined as the combination of several factors which including demography, economy, industry, military, technology and national will of a state. Also, the space power includes other factors that constitute the space power of a space e.g. diplomacy. The diplomatic ability of the state, coercive and persusasive power to politically influence the actions of the other states to achieve its national goals through space activity also become reflect the space power of the states.18

A more concise definition of space power is given by the Defence Technical Information

Center’s document on Space Operations as “the total strength of a nations' capabilities to conduct and influence activities to, in, through, and from space to achieve its objectives.”19 This refers to space capabilities to conduct space activities to influence the activities in space.20 USAF gives a simple but military-oriented definition as “the capability to employ space forces to achieve national security objectives.”21 From a general understanding of security studies, the national

18 Michael Moran, “An Evolving Doctrine: Force Application from Space,” (MSc. diss., Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 2000-04), 2. 19 Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-14 (Washington DC: Joint Chief of Staff, May 29, 2013), GL-8, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf. 20 Tyler Evans, “Space Coordinating Authority: Information Service from Space,” in Space Power Integration: Perspectives from Space Weapons Officers, ed. Kendall Brown (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2006), 4. 21 Space Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, August 23, 1998), 1, http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/4240529/FID2862/pdfdocs/jel/service/afdd 2_2.pdf.

102 security objectives are security, economic and political. Nicolas Peter of the European Space

Policy Institute (ESPI) further elaborates as these national security objectives are meant “to affect desired outcomes in the presence of other actors in the world stage and if necessary to change the behaviour of others by exploiting the space systems and associated ground- infrastructure as well as political leverage it has garnered.”22 Peter adequately summarised the definition of space power lucidly. All the definitions provide multiple perspectives on space power and how states can build it. Building capabilities are not only meant to construct space power. Visionary leadership and political will are what is required to orchestrate space power. It is the state’s political will that develops the national security strategy and policy to exploit the elements of space power.23 Moreover, based on elements, it can be understood what are the states’ space doctrines and policies and what kind of strategic, political and security objectives are highlighted in their officially and unofficially declared statements.

4.2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Space Power

In the changing geopolitical environment, "space power is a vital instrument of national power" of a state to exert its strategic, political and economic influence at regional and international levels. Space power solidifies the national power of a state and improves its international standing.24 It conveys a variety of benefits to space actors form prestige, to internal and external security, military power, economic growth and scientific prowess. Space programs are the source of hard military power, economic power and also project the state through soft power. Gray

22 Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe, in the Need for a Conceptual Framework,” (paper, 59th International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, United Kingdom, 2008); and also “Space Power and Europe in the 21st Century,” European Space Policy Institute, ESPI Perspective No. 21, April 2009, https://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf. 23 Ibid. 24 Randall R. Correll, “Emerging Actors,” in Space Power, ed. Charles Lutes et al., (Washington DC: National Defence University Press, 2004), http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/spacepower.pdf.

103 describes the military advantages of space as the latest variant of the high ground. Space systems provide necessary advantages over the adversary's force on the battlefield. Space power has infinite military depth and provides a constant overhead presence not only in peacetime but also in the battlefield.25 The United States exemplifies a space program that has contributed toward its military power, economic growth and soft power projection.

There are also other advantages of space power. Space power provides global perspectives, exploration, a free-fall environment for microgravity applications and vast natural resources.26 Space power helps a state to ascertain its global position to exert its influence at international and regional levels. It helps the state to build a technical and innovative workforce of engineers and scientists. Space power is a vital instrument of shortening the communication gaps between citizens and “can promote the awareness of a common identity among citizens and demonstrate increased confidence in the future.”27

At the same time, there are disadvantages and limitations associated with space power. It is indeed an expensive venture. The capital cost of building the hardware part of space power is beyond the economies of most states; the building cost of launching capabilities, especially transportation capability, is very high. Gray argues the cost almost “limits the pace of advance of military, scientific and commercial space systems.”28 Hence, emerging spacefaring states tend to launch their satellites from other states. Besides financial cost, Gray further argues that “it is like

25 Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 260. 26 Martin France and Jerry Jon Sellers, “Real Constraints on Space Power,” in Space Power, ed. Charles Lutes et al., (Washington DC: National Defence University Press, 2004), http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/spacepower.pdf. 27 Peter, “Space Power and Europe,” 3. 28 Gray, Modern Strategy, 263 & 264.

104 space power to be distant from terrestrial events. Although it is the distance overhead that is militarily beneficial, still a distance from Earth is an important limitation.”29

Based on space power theory, the strength of a space power encompasses global, expanding, emerging (regional) space power and emerging users.

Global. A global space power can be defined as a state that:

a. Officially declared military, economic and political objectives in the form of

doctrine, policy and domestic laws to explore space;

b. Have necessary indigenous manufacturing, building capabilities to construct

mission architecture;

c. Adhere to international space treaties, principles, and declarations;

d. Have Strong international cooperation to share space technologies with other

states;

e. Have mission architecture with state-of-the-art command, control and

communication structure;

f. Have the capability to build spacecraft and abundant launching facilities to send

both military and civilian payloads in the orbits to build a global constellation of

satellites in outer space;

g. Have ground stations to receive data to process and analyse it for ISR, early

warning, communication, and navigation purposes;

h. Have strong R&D infrastructure with global education focusing on space

technologies;

i. And enjoys complete freedom of access and freedom of use in space.30

29 Gray, Modern Strategy, 263 & 264.

105 Expanding. Expanding space power is the subset of global space power with enough capabilities to achieve its space exploration objectives, but its capabilities are expanding to become a global power.

Emerging Regional. An emerging, regional space power lacks sufficient manufacturing and building capabilities, though with ambitions to develop these capabilities. The following attributes characterize an emerging, regional type:

a. clear space objectives, both officially declared and/or undeclared policies;

b. developing educational and R&D infrastructure;

c. signatory of space treaties and adherence to international norms, principles and

declarations;

d. and political, economic and military objectives to use its space power to wield

regional influence.

Emerging Users. Emerging users are defined as those states which are using the space capabilities of other states or subscribing to the services provided under a multinational or bilateral agreement for their domestic purposes for political, economic and military uses. These states do not have indigenous capabilities to manufacture and launch spacecraft in outer space.

4.2.3 What is Space Policy?

Policy for a state is a framework in which decisions are made to achieve the goals and objectives of national governments. The process of policy-making has three levels at which it is conceived, shaped and implemented. The process involves a) setting of national goals and objectives because of the state’s national security; b) finding means and ways by the government to achieve

30 In the U.S. space doctrine, the phrase “freedom of action” has profound understanding. U.S. wants to enjoy complete freedom of action in space in order to exploit to achieve its national security objectives and commercial activities without any kind of international overhead.

106 the goals and c) implementation of the policy by allocating resources.31 Besides, the primary focus of space policy is to develop a framework to conduct an in-depth analysis of a) space activities for the needs of the citizens; b) industrial space development for technical and scientific purposes; and c) dual-use applications.32 Figure 3.1 is a general model applicable to study the overall process of any state’s policy-making process.

Figure 4.1: Policy-Making Process

4.3 United States’ Space Policy

Space policy has always been on the priority list of any U.S. administrations. During the Cold

War, space policy was included in the top priorities because of an intense space race with the former Soviet Union. After the end of Cold War, space gained tremendous significance and it was termed as a strategic asset in the U.S. Space policymaking in the U.S. has been institutionalized because of its military uses and more importantly due to advanced commercial space industry.

31 Eligar Sadeh, “Politics of Space,” in The Politics of Space: A Survey, ed. Eligar Sadeh (London: Routledge, 2011), 3. 32 Graham Gibbs, “An Analysis of the Space Policies of the Major Space Faring Nations and Selected Emerging Space Faring Nations,” Annals of Air and Space Law 37, no.1 (2012): 282-331.

107 Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration drafted and passed the National Aeronautics and

Space Act in 1958.33 Eisenhower’s space policy was more focused on building space capabilities to achieve political and economic goals. The main emphasis of the policy was to establish the

U.S. space program for the welfare of the citizens in the fields of science, technology, education, industry, tracking and prevention of space assets from near-earth objects.34

On May 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy’s delivered his famous speech on “Urgent

National Needs” at a joint session of U.S. Congress. Kennedy highlighted U.S. space exploration achievements, emphasizing “time for this nation to take a leading role in space.”35 The three main parts of the speech cum policy statement were; a) Human landing on Moon; b) development of the Rover nuclear rocket; and d) accelerating the use of satellites for global communications.36

Jimmy Carter’s space policy highlighted U.S. goals to explore space for military and intelligence functions in pursuit of national security. The policy was not a departure from the previously announced policy, and it emphasized on maintaining U.S. leadership role in space.”37

Ronald Regan announced his administration’s space policy through National Security

Decision Directive 42 on July 4, 1982.38 The policy significantly focused on the role of the

33 “National Aeronautics and Space Act (Unamended),” NASA, accessed November 16, 2017, https://history.nasa.gov/spaceact.html. 34 Richard Hand et al., Space Handbook: A War Fighter’s Guide to Space (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1993), Chap 1. 35 John Kennedy, “Urgent National Needs,” (speech, Washington DC, May 1, 1961), NASA, https://history.nasa.gov/Apollomon/apollo5.pdf. 36 Jane Gibson, “Current Space Law and Policy,” in AU-18: Space Primer (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2009), 47, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/space/au-18-2009/au-18_cover.pdf. 37 “Presidential Directive/NSC-37: National Space Policy,” (official memorandum, Washington DC: Director of Central Intelligence, June 13, 1978), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia- rdp80m00772a000300010027-8. 38 “Unclassified Version of NSDD-42: National Space Policy,” (official memorandum, Washington DC: The White House, July 12, 1982), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA- RDP84B00148R000100320009-2.pdf.

108 private sector in space activities, and space arms control measures. Nevertheless, Reagan’s policy re-emphasized “U.S. preeminence in critical major space activities.”39 The policy also discussed measures to negate hostile space systems and establish deterrence in space.40

President Bill Clinton announced his national space policy through National Science and

Technology Council Directive-8 on September 19, 1996.41 The main emphasis of the policy was on enhancing scientific knowledge, strengthening national security, increasing economic competitiveness and technical capabilities, and promoting international cooperation to solidify

U.S. internal and national and foreign policies.42

George W. Bush announced his space policy on August 31, 2006, during a time when the

U.S. and its allies were fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The wars were initiated after the

9/11 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in 2001. Hence, there was a spillover effect over U.S. space policy, as a result, it shifted its gear from civil and cooperative activities towards strengthening national security. The policy was focused on deploying U.S. space assets for intelligence, interagency cooperations, photoreconnaissance, overhead measurements and signature intelligence collection.43 It was drawn from the 2001 Rumsfield Commission report which talked about a ‘Space Pearl Harbour’ threat.44

39 Ibid. 40 Gibson, “Current Space Law and Policy,” 49. 41 “Fact Sheet: National Space Policy,” George C. Marshall Institute, September 19, 1996, http://marshall.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/PDD-NSC-49-PDD-NSTC-8-National-Space- Policy-19-Sep-1996.pdf. 42 Ibid. 43 “U.S. National Space Policy (Unclassified),” Federation of American Scientists, NSPD-49, August 31, 2006, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/. 44 Jean-Michel Stoullig, “Rumsfeld Commission Warns Against Space Pearl Harbour,” Space Daily, January 11, 2001, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-01b.html; Alan Burke, “Space Threat Warning: Foundation for Space Superiority, Avoiding A Space Pearl Harbour,” (MSc. Diss., Air War College, Air University, 2005); and also see Rebecca Kheel, “Backers of Space-based Military Branch: We Will not allow a Space Pearl Harbour,” The Hill, August 11, 2017, http://thehill.com/policy/defense/359438-space- corps-backers-we-will-not-allow-a-space-pearl-harbor.

109 On June 28, 2010, Barack Obama’s administration released its space policy which was a departure from his predecessor’s space policy. The 2010 policy talked about adopting a responsible behaviour in space “to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust.”45 The policy pivots around three Cs: congestion, crowdedness, and competition. Obama administration was more focused on maintaining a strategic restraint in space through its space policy.46 In terms of goals, the 2010 policy is more about boosting the domestic industry, enhancing international cooperation, and strengthening strategic stability in space. Moreover, the policy was focused on preserving space environment and responsible use of space, fostering effective export policies, commercial, civil and national security space guidelines for the U.S.

4.3.1 Analysis of Previous Space Policies

According to James Moltz, it is a strong belief in the United States that it is the only space power that regularly releases its space policy document.47 From Moltz’s point of view, Eisenhower’s policy did not mention the Soviet Union. The policy was not a “true strategy.”48 Kennedy’s policy “failed to provide a broader place for pace space and a clear reason for seeking to stay on the Moon,” and also the rationale for planetary exploration.49 He criticised Carter’s policy of not declaring specific goals and making any “clear statement of why the U.S. was there and how it should organize its priorities over the long term.”50 From his point of view, Clinton’s policy fell short of a space strategy. Likewise, Bush’s policy also lacked long-term national goals as it

45 “National Space Policy of the United States of America,” The White House, June 28, 2010, =https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf. 46 Malcolm Davis (Senior Fellow, Australian Strategic Policy Institute) in discussion with the author, November 20, 2017. 47 James Moltz, “Space and Strategy,” in Space Strategy in the 21st Century, ed. Eligar Sadeh (London: Routledge, 2013), 16. 48 Ibid., 23. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid., 24.

110 failed to give a clear vision for space. On Obama’s policy, he writes that it was a more comprehensive space policy than previous ones and gives a better sense of a space strategy.51

Moltz termed previous U.S. space policies full of “laundry-list” qualities and contain bureaucratic languages. The policies were more focused on achieving the near-term objectives and falling short of seeing beyond horizons. The previous policies were less form of a true national space strategy.52 There were flaws in civil space policy, including export control, which has its ramifications for competitiveness in space commerce and industry. Likewise, the ongoing export controls are negatively impacting scientific space research. Moreover, the U.S. civil space program is declining. From Eligar Sadeh’s point of view, U.S. should not abandon its space shuttle program.53 He believes it was a serious setback to U.S. civil space program, whereas,

Russia and China are running their space shuttle programs and have capabilities to reach space.

On the other hand, U.S. scrapped its space shuttle program in 2011. This is a serious policy lag in

U.S. space policy.

United States’ space policies have all those characteristics which are necessary to make it a global space power. However, at present, U.S. civil space program is suffering from serious bureaucratic and administrative issues. At the moment, NASA is a weeping boil.54 President

Trump administration is in serious disarray of running space issues by taking ad-hoc measures.

Importantly, “U.S. is no more like the U.S. as it was in the 1980s. U.S. power is declining and it is not in a great position to bring any kind of change in the global power structure,” according to

51 Ibid., 25 & 26. 52 Ibid., 27. 53 Eligar Sadeh (Editor-in-Chief, Astropolitics) in discussion with the author, November 18, 2017. 54 Dr Michael Simpson (Executive Director, Secure World Foundation) in discussion with the author, November 27, 2017.

111 Michael Simpson.55 U.S. was a dominant power in the 1980s but now its space and global pre- eminence are in danger.

In the past, the U.S. space policies were mostly devised under the umbrella of space nationalism. It was because U.S. was competing with the former Soviet Union in an intense space race. All the space policies made during the Cold War were following the principles of realism and predisposed to space nationalism. However, a few guiding principles were focused on global institutionalism. U.S. space policies never meant to follow the guidelines provided by global institutionalism. On the other hand, a comprehensive study of U.S. space policies, strategy and doctrine suggest that its predominant theme of freedom of action in space is against social interactionism. However, it is quite understandable that social interactionism is inevitable in the future.

4.3.2 Trump’s Space Policy

In 2017, President Donald J. Trump came into power after winning the 2016 election; however, he has yet to announce a space policy. It is quite possible that the Trump administration will go for a space policy based on the recollection of principles, goals and guidelines of previous administrations’ space policies or he may devise some new steps to achieve the next policy goals. It is quite probable that new policy would be a mixture of old rhetorics with some new directions. James Vedda, senior policy analyst at Center for Space Policy and Strategy in

Aerospace Cooperation, recommends that “the President can promulgate revised rhetoric and, more importantly, budgets request.”56 The next policy should encompass a comprehensive review of the changes happened over the past seven years, he writes.

55 Ibid. 56 James Vedda, “Consideration for the Next National Space Policy,” Center for Space Policy and Strategy, Aerospace Cooperation, Policy Paper, March 2017, 3.

112 President Trump has recently announced the establishment of Space Corps with a directive to create a sixth branch of military. Space has now become more contested and congested leading toward more competition between major space faring nations. It is argued that the competition has jeopardized the security of thousands of satellites that enables the Pentagon for force enhancement. President Trump believes that space is a strategic domain in which U.S. must try to maintain its dominance. Given this, President Trump established the sixth branch of military comprising a force of 35,000 to 40,000 military personnel. The establishment of Space

Force by President Trump suggests that United States wants complete freedom of action in space intending to deny the space for others. Likewise, United States does not consider China and

Russia its adversaries with superior space technology. This may trigger a misperception- misconception-misunderstanding dynamics between U.S-China and U.S-Russia in space. The dynamics may accelerate arms race between U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia.

President Trump’s policy would like “to do more than just catch up today—it should look ahead to tomorrow as well.”57 Besides, the Trump policy could focus on maintaining U.S. leadership role in space. U.S. policymakers take other states' increasing space capabilities a looming threat to U.S. leadership.58 So, the next policy may also consider a policy based on strengthening its commercial space industry and expanding its space capabilities at a gradual pace.

4.4 United State’s Space Strategy

Obama administration paid considerable attention to developing national space policy as well as successfully crafted National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) for release in 2011. The NSSS

57 Ibid., 6. 58 Jerry Hendrix and Adam Routh, “U.S. Space Policy Should Aim to Preserve Advantage on the New Frontier,” Defence One, November 9, 2017, http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/10/us-should-act- preserve-americas-advantages-space/142028/.

113 primarily discussed the strategic environment in space, highlighting United States’. strategic objectives and approaches to addressing the challenges to its space supremacy. The NSSS mentions the emerging opportunities for United States to strengthen its “national security space posture while maintaining and enhancing the advantages gained from space.”59 The NSSS highlights that “space is becoming increasingly, congested, contested and competitive.” Because of these three-Cs, it states that there may be armed conflict in space in future. To deal with these challenges, it highlights the strategic objectives of United States in space. U.S. wants to strengthen the safety and security of its space assets to maintain stability in space. Likewise, U.S. wants to maintain its leadership role in space, and for this purpose, it will promote the responsible, peaceful and safe use of space under a defined set of rules and strategic approaches.

United States also wants to address lingering challenges to space security at the global level. In this regard, United States wants to enhance collaboration with its allies to “establish norms and transparency and confidence-building measures (CBMs); enhance space situational awareness (SSA); and foster greater transparency, and sharing space-derived information.”60

However, Moltz has criticised United States’ policies for not including U.S. civil space policy.

The strategy remained “vague on the kinds of diplomatic efforts that it will pursue in space.”61

4.5 United States’s Space Doctrine

U.S has a joint space doctrine titled Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Space Operations linked to Air

Force and Army Service space doctrines.62 Christopher King and Edward Byrne discuss the fundamentals of military space operations, including a) military space contributions to joint

59 National security space strategy: unclassified summary (Washington, DC: Dept. of Defence, 2011). 60 “Fact Sheet: National Security Space Strategy,” Department of Defence, January 19, 2011, http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/2011_01_19_NSSS_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf. 61 Moltz, “Space and Strategy,” 27. 62 Christopher King and Edward Byrne, “Space Doctrine,” in AU-18: Space Primer (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2009), 61, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/space/au-18-2009/au-18_cover.pdf.

114 operations, b) operational consideration for space, c) space mission areas, d) command and control of space forces, role and responsibilities of military leadership, and e) planning.63

The Space Operations document identifies U.S. military space operations, including SSA, space force enhancement, space support, space control, and space force applications.64 The mission areas talk about counterspace operations, both offensive and defensive. The space control doctrine suggests these operations as offensive space control (OSC) and defensive space control (DSC). The OSC entails 5Ds: deception, disruption, denial, degradation or destruction of adversary’s capabilities. DSC is meant to “preserve U.S. access to, and use of, space and space capabilities using active and passive means, while protecting friendly space capabilities from attacks, interference, or unintentional hazards.”65 Many space experts believe that the X-37B space plane is a practical manifestation of the U.S. space control doctrine.66 Likewise, this doctrine may employ many more missiles.67 Importantly, space control doctrine stresses and supports freedom of action in space. Interestingly, Gen Ralph Eberhart, former Commander of the old U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), highlighted that “the importance of space control and space superiority will continue to grow as our [U.S.] economy becomes more reliant

63 Ibid., 61-68. 64 Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-14 (Washington DC: Joint Chief of Staff, May 29, 2013), GL-8, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf. 65 Peter Hays, “United States Military Uses of Space: Issues and Challenges,” (paper, International Symposium on Security Affairs 2015, Tokyo), 1-20, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2015/E-01.pdf. 66 Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Space Law and currently teaching at the Beijing institute of Technology School of Law, believes that X-37B is a not a space weapon. She argues that X-37B is not a weapon as perceived by many space experts. Irene Gabrynowics (Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Space Law) in discussion with the author, November 17, 2017. On the other hand, Malcolm Davis, (Senior Fellow ASPI) argues that Russia and China fears that X-37B can use a space weapon; in discussion with the author, November 22, 2017. Also see, “Why Russia and China Should Fear the X-37B Space Plane,” The National Interest, October 19, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-russia- china-should-fear-the-x-37b-space-plane-18099?page=2; Austin Jameson, “X-37 Space Vehicle: Starting A New Age in Space Control?” (MSc. diss., Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 2001-04), IX. 67 Michael Waller, “Militarizing Space,” Insight, March 19, 2001.

115 on space.” He also argued that United States must pay more attention to the critical issues of space control and superiority as space is linked with critical military land, sea and air operations.68 Bruce DeBlois summarized the debate on space control and argues that it supports space weaponization both at moderate and high levels.69 Wesley Hallman, a retired USAF

Colonel, argues that “weaponization of space by some state in the foreseeable future is a foregone conclusion.”70 Hallman states that the U.S. cannot afford to be second to the weaponization of space. Furthermore, United States already has advanced capabilities to weaponize space before any states like China or Russia can do. United States would not wait for it to happen. That is because of the operational part of its doctrine which is primarily based on space control. United States can employ anti-satellite missiles in a short time; however, it has only remained in the testing phase. Another important aspect of space control doctrine is SSA.

Both OSC and DSC are heavily dependent on robust SSA. “SSA involves characterizing the space capabilities operating within the terrestrial environment and space domain.”71

John Klein, senior fellow and strategist at Falcon Research, Inc., identifies discrepancies between U.S. space doctrine and theory of space power. Klein argues that these discrepancies are due to the operational focus of the joint publication document. These discrepancies are linked with freedom of action, SSA and space superiority, “which the derived space strategy does not include.”72 However, these discrepancies are minor when compared to the strategic space environment and the context of these terms.

68 Ibid, quoted in Jameson, “X-37 Space Vehicle,” 12; and Hays, “Space and the Military,” 352. 69 Bruce DeBlois, “The Advent of Space Weapons,” Astropolitics 1, no.1 (2003): 29-53; Also quoted by Peter Hays, “Space and the Military,” in Space Politics and Policy: An Evolutionary Perspective, ed. Eligar Sadeh (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 343. 70 Wesley Hallman, “A Fast-following Space Control Strategy,” Astropolitics 3, no.1 (2005): 35-42. 71 King and Byrne, “Space Doctrine,” 63. 72 John Klein, “Space Warfare: A Maritime-Inspired Space Strategy,” Astropolitics 2, no.1, (2004): 53.

116 4.6 China’s Space Policy

China does have an official declared space policy documents and the White Papers covering its space activities, defining goals, principles and aims for the future space endeavours. These space policy cum White Papers were published in 2000, 2006, 2011 and 2016 respectively for released by the State Council. The White Papers has mapped Chinese activities in space in the past five years and aim to spread awareness on Chinese progress and plans for the next five years. The papers also tell about development in the space industry in China and underline its cooperation in space.

China considers space power as a vital element of its national power. It has built

“impressive” indigenous space capabilities with the development of remote sensing, telecommunication and broadcasting, and regional navigation satellite systems with the ambition to expand for global use.73 China has surpassed Russia in terms of many operational satellites in space by 2015. All these space achievements are made under the guiding principles declared in the White Papers.

The purposes of Chinese space activities are74:

a. to explore outer space and enhance understanding of the earth and the cosmos;

b. to utilize space for the benefits of human civilization and social progress;

c. to strengthen economy, scientific and technological development because of

achieving national security objectives; and

d. to foster scientific and cultural knowledge, protect national rights and build up

overall national power

73 Gibbs, “Space Policies of the Major Space Faring Nations,” 310. 74 China National Space Administration, “China’s Space Activities in 2016,” (presentation, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Vienna, Austria, February 2017)

117 Likewise, China’s space activities pivot around four guiding principles; a) innovative development, b) coordinated development, c) peaceful development and d) open development.

These four guiding steps are “subject to and serve the national overall development strategy.”75

The main purpose of these White Papers is to show transparency in China’s space activities. China’s space strides were largely focused on space transportation, launching earth observation, communication and broadcasting, navigation and positioning satellites, development on manned spaceflight, deep space exploration, developments in launch sites, space telemetry, tracking, command and communication, and space science and applications.76

The 2016 White Paper suggests that China will “launch non-toxic and pollution-free medium-lift launch vehicles with low-cost,” expand its existing space infrastructure and industry, start budling assembly and operation of the space station, conduct deep-space exploration and to perform experiments on new space technologies.77

The 2016 White Paper focuses on increasing international exchanges and cooperation. It suggests that the Chinese government is eager towards increasing cooperation with developing countries based on mutual commercial benefits through the peaceful exploration of space. A key element of Chinese space activities for the next five years is to build a space silk route. In this regard, Chinese space program can play a significant role in the construction of the Belt and

Road Initiative. Malcolm Davis, senior analyst at Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), writes that China is looking “to add a Space Silk Road to its proposed land-based Silk Road

75 Ibid. 76 “Full Text of White Paper on China’s Space Activities in 2016,” The State Council, updated December 28, 2016, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/content_281475527159496.htm; “China’s Space Activities in 2011,” December 2011, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043142.htm; “White Paper on China’s Space Activities Published,” China.org.cn, 2006, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Oct/183588.htm; and also see “China’s Space Activities in 2006,” 2006, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/183672.htm. 77 “China’s Space Activities in 2016.”

118 Economic Belt.”78 In this regard, China is expanding its Asia-Pacific navigation satellite system to a global navigation system. China is likely to add more satellites in its Beidou satellite constellation by 2020 to enhance its precision, navigation and timing (PNT) capability. The 2016

White Paper suggests that China will form a global navigation satellite system consisting of 35 satellites, and will provide all its clients with more accurate and reliable services.79

Importantly, China has criticised the weaponization of space. The 2016 White Paper highlights that China adheres to peaceful uses of space and does not want weapons in space.80

Ajay Lele, senior fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), writes that

China ASAT tests negate its policy of adherence to peaceful uses of space. He states China’s

ASAT tests had generated a significant amount of artificial space debris, which is a potential threat to the orbiting satellites of other states.81

China has not released any space strategy document, however, Gregory Kulacki of Union of Concerned Scientists has published a paper highlighting some key aspects of China’s military space strategy.82 He states that Chinese language is a barrier to understand the essence of

Chinese space activities and intentions due to “non-authoritative, poorly chosen or poorly translated Chinese-language sources into its space program.”83 This barrier has greatly influenced the debate on China’s military space endeavours in the United States. Kulacki argues that China is building space capabilities in which United States. has already developed decades

78 Malcolm Davis, “The Coming of China’s Space Silk Road,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, August 11, 2017, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/coming-chinas-space-silk-road/. 79 “China’s Space Activities in 2016.” 80 Gabrynowicz, discussion. 81 Ajay Lele, “China’s 2016 Space White Paper: An Appraisal,” Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, issue brief, January 6, 2017, https://idsa.in/system/files/issuebrief/ib_china-2016-space-white- paper_060117.pdf. 82 Gregory Kulacki, “An Authoritative Source on China’s Military Space Strategy,” Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2014, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/China-s- Military-Space-Strategy.pdf. 83 Ibid., 1.

119 ago. These include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), navigation, communication and weather satellites. Kulacki’s assessment is based on a Chinese military textbook published in 2003 by the General Command of China’s People’s Liberation Army

(PLA) titled The Science of Second Artillery Operation. The documents highlight that Chinese

ASAT capability is not meant to attack U.S. satellites.84 He thinks that China is also concerned about its satellite systems. This is an effort to increase the effectiveness of China’s missile forces. A major emphasis in Chinese military space strategy is to protect its “missile forces from surveillance,” however, it is through camouflage, concealment, and deception rather than attacking satellites. Moreover, Chinese military space strategy “emphasized the importance of its space systems and missile forces, and of operating in ways that protect its missile forces by fooling foreign satellites, rather than attacking them.”85 Many space experts from the United

States disagree with this notion and argue that China could target U.S. satellites. Geoffery

Forden, a former research associate in the Program in Science, Technology and Society in the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), disagrees with what Kulachi has so far assessed.86

He thinks in case of an armed conflict between China and U.S., China can attack U.S.’s navigation, communication, early warning and low altitude satellites. However, he concludes that “China could destroy a large fraction of strategic intelligence gathering capabilities but not all of it.” In this worst-case scenario, United States would still retain enough deep space capabilities to monitor “Chinese troop movements, harbours, and strategic forces, although at a reduced level.”87

84 Ibid. 85 Ibid., 11. 86 Geoffrey Forden, “Viewpoint: China and Space War,” Astropolitics 6, no. 2 (2008): 139. 87 Ibid., 151.

120 China would not like to have space weapons without a strategy. Chinese ASAT system may not be a symbolic weapon and its military strategy may consider it a weapon of use in a worst-case scenario. However, it would be interesting to know how far the complex- interdependency between China and U.S. will play its role to establish a strategic deterrence in space.

Likewise, Chinese space policy and strategy is close to the survivability doctrine and shows little similarity with space control doctrine. An overall assessment of China’s past and present space policy, strategy and doctrine suggests that it is a global space power with a significant influence in the global space order. Although, Chinese space program is not as advanced as its competitor, the United States, its space policy provides all the necessary principles, guidelines and objectives to eatablish it a global space power.

China’s space policy is predominantly focused on technological determinism to broaden

Chinese space vision ranges from scientific exploration to technological development.88 In the past, Chinese space policy was motivated to bring technological innovations and associated economic development of the country. However, China realized this after the 1991 Gulf War as it needs to invest in such space assets and capabilities to create a multiplier effect in other domains of warfare.89 This suggests a shift in Chinese policy from technological determinism to space nationalism. China continues to invest in its research and development (R & D) facilities to build its space assets for dual-use purposes. In this regard, it has tested it ASAT capability in

2007 to showcase its expertise in building space weapons.90 Space experts believe that China is

88 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter. 89 James Moltz (Professor at NPS, U.S.) email message to author, November 28, 2017. 90 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter.

121 involved in a competition with the United States at the global level and it sees India’s space capability as a threat to its regional space supremacy.91

4.7 India’s Space Policy

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru first visualized Indian space policy during the Sputnik era when Cold War competition between two superpowers was at its peak. Nehru’s vision was about using space for India’s economic and social development. In 1962, the Indian Committee for

Space Research (INCOSPAR) and the Department of Space were established. Indian Space

Research Organization (ISRO) was a part of India’s nuclear program in the beginning. Later on,

Vikram Sarabhai, the father of the Indian space program, convinced Indian political and military leadership to separate Indian space agency from its nuclear program. He played a leading role in this regard. Right from the beginning, the entire focus was on achieving socioeconomic objectives.

India does not have any officially declared national space policy.92 However, India’s motivations, objectives and goals can be understood through its space development and activities. India’s space program has a strong political motivation and is an integral part of its foreign and defence policies.93 At the moment, it is among the top political priorities in India.

The regional rivalries with Pakistan and China have influenced the Indian space policy. India has realized that its space program can contribute toward its economic, political and strategic power build-up.94 Moreover, India’s space program includes gaining international prestige and soft

91 Ibid. 92 Ajay Lele, “India’s Policy for Outer Space,” Space Policy 39-40, no.1 (2017): 26-32. 93 Deganit Paikowsky and Isaac Ben-Israel, “India’s Space Program: An Israeli Perspective on Regional Security,” India Review 10, no.4 (2011): 394-405. 94 Stephen F.von Welck, “India’s Space Policy: A Developing Country in the Space,” Space Policy 4, no.1 (1987): 326-334.

122 power. The political ambition of India’s space program is to achieve self-reliance to build and manufacture its launching vehicles without any foreign technical assistance.95

Indian space policy objectives emphasize on “space for national development.” In this regard, ISRO and the Department of Space play an important role in chalking out some of the specific features of India’s space policy.96

India aims to develop a space program as a “core national capability.” Its space policy talks about achieving: a) high-end technology capability; b) autonomous access to space; c) fostering commercial space industry in India; and d) bolstering international cooperation in space.97 Also, India’s goals in space are to harness the capability to manage its resources on

Earth. Likewise, its policy is about monitoring natural disasters, expanding and strengthening the broadcasting and telecommunication services nationwide, promote earth sciences, positioning and navigation, technological development, and most importantly to build a space capability for its national security and defence.98

India has officially released several policy documents in the past. India’s Satcom policy provides a framework for satellite communication approved by the government in 1997.99

Likewise, the Indian government also formulated the norms, guidelines and procedures for implementation of Satcom Policy.100 In addition to Satcom, India has also released a document for registering Indian satellites and there is an official policy guideline for INSAT/GSAT

95 Dinshaw Mistry, “India’s Emerging Space Program,” Pacific Affairs 71, no.2 (1998): 151-174. 96 Mukund Rao, “Indian Space Policy for Technological and Social Development,” (presentation, Space Policy and Law for Social Development in Asia, Tokyo, Japan, December 3, 2014) 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 “A Policy Framework for Satellite Communication in India,” ISRO, 1997, https://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/article-files/indias-space-policy-0/satcom-policy.pdf. 100 “The norms, guidelines and procedures for implementation of the policy frame-work for satellite communications in India,” ISRO, 2000, https://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/article-files/indias- space-policy-0/satcom-ngp.pdf.

123 capability. 101 India also released its Remote Sensing Data Policy (RSDP) in 2011. The RSDP-

2011 document suggests two primary guidelines to recognize remote sensing data and national interests.102

ISRO, India’s premier space agency, coordinates and collaborates with the Prime

Minister office and the Department of Space for India’s space policy formulation. The Prime

Minister office oversees the Department of Space under which ISRO comes.103 ISRO’s vision is:

“harness space technology for national development while pursuing space science research and planetary exploration.”104 In this regard, current Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that “no space should be left between the common man and space technology.”105 He was addressing a conference held in 2015, aimed to project Indian space activities for harnessing space technologies for communication, navigation, preserving the ecosystem, better managing and conversing India’s natural resources.

India’s space policy is also focusing on planetary exploration. Tts space program focuses beyond the Earth orbits, sending spacecraft for exploring celestial bodies including the Moon and

101 “Guidelines for Registration of INSAT/GSAT Capacity Requirement,” Department of Space, Government of India, SCNP/F.ICRF, accessed November 21, 2017, https://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/dos_guidelines_for_insat-gsat_capacity_reservation_- _release_2.pdf. 102 “Remote Sensing Data Policy (RSDp-2011),” ISRO, accessed November 21, 2017, https://www.isro.gov.in/indias-space-policy-0. 103 Rao, “Indian Space Policy.” 104 “Vision and Mission Statements,” ISRO, accessed November 21, 2017, https://www.isro.gov.in/about- isro/vision-and-mission-statements. 105 “No space should be left between the common man and space technology, says Modi,” India Info News Service, September 8, 2015, https://www.indiainfoline.com/article/news-top-story/no-space-should-be-left- between-the-common-man-and-space-technology-says-modi-115090800008_1.html.

124 Mars. Planetary exploration in India has become a symbol of excellence and the quest for prestige.106

Another dimension of the Indian space program is its military component. India’s present space policy is a clear shift from Nehru’s space vision of socioeconomic development and is increasingly militarized in the past two decades. The “Indian space program has significantly grown and it has also become a vital element of its national security strategy. Recently released

Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces-2017 document recognizes the importance of space for military purposes, highlighting relevance of space power for national security as”107:

“India's space capabilities are mostly driven by civil and commercial requirements, steps for exploitation of space for military applications are being undertaken. Leveraging space power would include protection of our National space assets and exploitation of space to enable defence capabilities across the conflict spectrum.”108

Indian space policymakers are paying significant attention toward developing C4I2SR capability and BMD, It has tested and develop an ASAT capability.109 IDSA’s Ajay Lele assumes that "India’s space security policy is looking toward establishing a tri-service space command." India’s space program may build capabilities to enhance SSA and develop strategic technologies to increase its reliance on space assets “for purpose of intelligence gathering, communications, navigation and operating various weapon systems.”110

India has advanced long-range ballistic missiles (LRBM) and has tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), Agni-V with an undeclared range of 8000 kms. After the Chinese

106 Gaurav Bhola, “India and China Space Programs: Form Genesis of Space Technologies to Major Space Program and What That Means for the International Community,” (MSc. diss., Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida, 2009), 62-66. 107 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter. 108 Joint Indian Armed Force 2017 (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, India, April 2017), 25-26. 109 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter. 110 Ajay Lele, “India’s Space Security Policy: A Proposal,” IDSA, policy brief, April 28, 2016.

125 ASAT test in 2007, India has shown a keen interest in building its ASAT capability. Many space techies believe that ASATs are a spin-off effect of ICBMs. Taking this technological reality into account, India can build an ASAT system in a short time, depending on the state’s political will.

India takes Chinese ASAT capability as a threat to its space assets. Rajeswari Rajagopalan,

Senior Fellow in Security Studies in the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi, argues that “even if the Chinese ASAT test has not yet changed Indian policy on space militarization, it is safe to assume that it has increased Indian concerns with ensuring space security.”111 Former Indian Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) chief

V.K. Saraswat had announced that India will make an ASAT system in future.112 Gene

Milowicki and Joan Johnson-Freese of United States Naval War College argue that India’s intentions to build ASAT in response to Chinese test as:

“All countries essentially protested the test… However, at least one country took the opportunity to justify its own intent to assess the need for and pursue as necessary its own ASAT capabilities. Most Notably, India declared its intent to explore such development, thereby raising the risks of an eventual space arms race with Pakistan, Indonesia and other Asian nations.”113

This is quite evident that if India builds counterspace capability, then the potential of

ASAT proliferation across Asia may increase. Bhupendra Jasani, visiting professor at the King’s

College London, also argued similarly and writes that before any kind of National Missile

Defence (NMD) was developed, the state will attempt to acquire considerable ASAT

111 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagoplan, “India’s Changing Policy on Space Militarization: The Impact of China’s ASAT Test,” India Review 10, no.4 (2011): 354-378. 112 “India Readying Weapon to Destroy Enemy Satellites: Saraswat,” Indian Express, January 3, 2010, quoted in Ajay Lele, “Indian Armed Forces and Space Technology,” India Review 10, no.4 (2011): 379-393. 113 Gene Milowicki and Joan Johnson-Freese, “Strategic Choices: Examining the United States Military Response to the Chinese Anti-Satellite Test,” Astropolitics 6, no.1 (2008): 1-21.

126 capabilities.114 As India develops its BMD system, it would be naïve not to talk about India’s ambitions to developed an ASAT capability. Taking these arguments into consideration, it can be assumed that India’s space doctrine is showing resemblance with survivability doctrine.

However, if India goes to build ASAT as per its future plans, then it would like to have a space doctrine similar to space control doctrine.

An assessment of India’s space policy, strategy and doctrine suggest that India is expanding its space program to become a global space power, however, it is currently a regional space power due to its location or geography. India can be termed as a regional space power with global ambitions.

India’s space policy was focused on the scientific and socio-economic development of the country. It has been a top political priority in India to consider its space program as a symbol of prestige and to improve its international standing. India has been successfully achieved its policy of technological determinism in the past and it continues to gain more from it. However, the recent publication of Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces-2017 document clarifies India’s position on space militarization and weaponization. India is taking steps to utilize space to achieve its national security objectives. In an email correspondence, Clay Moltz argued that

“India realized after the 1999 Kargil conflict that it too was unable to draw effectively on space assets for reconnaissance and targeting information. It has recently made significant investments to overcome these gaps.”115 Likewise, India has made significant capacity building and possesses enough missile and space technologies to build its ASAT capability in a matter of few months depending upon the political will of the political and military leadership. But its policy has

114 Bhupendra Jasani, “New Approaches to Achieving Space Security,” in Collective Security in Space: European Perspectives, eds. Johan Logsdon, James Moltz and Emma Hinds (Washington DC: Space Policy Institute, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, January 2007), 34. 115 Moltz, email message.

127 suffered a major transformation from technological determinism to space nationalism at the regional level as it sees Chinese development as a threat to its space and national objectives.

4.8 Pakistan’s Space Policy

Pakistan is an aspiring space power in Asia. The history of Pakistani space program goes back to

1960s when Pakistan collaborated with NASA to launch its first sounding rocket Rahber-1 in outer space to become the third country in Asia to launch a rocket in outer space. Pakistan’s national space agency, Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), was established in 1961. At the beginning, SUPARCO was part of ]PAEC. Dr Abdus Salam was the first director of SUPARCO. Later on, it became an independent space commission in 1981.

Prof Salam showed a keen interest in taking space science in Pakistan to the highest level.

However, he left SUPARCO in 1974 and the commission lost a visionary leader. From onward,

SUPARCO did not make any progress and suffered the neglect of the government. Zafar Nawaz

Jaspal, Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations at Quaid-e-Azam

University Islamabad, believes that space program has not been a top priority for military brass in Pakistan.116 Jaspal’s critical observation suggests that the security situation in the 1970s and

80s compelled Pakistan’s civil and military leadership to pay all attention and divert resources to build Pakistan’s nuclear program to make a deterrence capability against arch-rival India.

As a result, Pakistan’s space program made slow progress. At the moment, there is no declared space policy, regulatory regime, or space law existing in Pakistan.117 In the absence of any kind of legislation related to space activities in Pakistan, law and acts belonging to different

116 See details, Zafar Jaspal, Militarization and Weaponization: A critical Analysis, (Islamabad: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, 2008). 117 Shah Murad, “Regulation of Space Activities: Emerging Issues and Regulatory Challenges for Pakistan’s Space Program-2040,” (presentation, National Space Conference 2012, Islamabad, September 17-19, 2012).

128 areas, are providing temporary legal coverage to space activities. Likewise, SUPARCO also

“lacks constitutional and legal mandate to regulate and control national space activities and to implement space policies.”118

In 2011, National Command Authority (NCA) under the chairmanship of former Prime

Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani approved Pakistan’s Space Vision 2047. In 2012, Chairman

SUPARCO at National Space Conference 2012 held in Islamabad, highlighted some of the key characteristics of Space Vision 2047. In his speech, the SUPARCO chairman highlighted the mission statement as “space as a strategic sector, exploit all aspects of space science, technology and its application for national well-being and national security.” SUPARCO mission statement tells that Pakistan aims to build, launch and operate its satellite to perform a variety of functions in outer space which including communication, remote sensing, navigation, meteorology to achieve socioeconomic and national security goals.119

In the absence of space law, policy and undeclared constitutional status of SUPARCO, it is a difficult job to run Pakistan’s space program. However, these hindrances are still not restricting Pakistan to continue its space activities. SUPARCO has prepared a draft space policy, which is submitted to the approval of the government of Pakistan. Some of the salient of the draft space policy are: -

a. Supervision of space activities through a statutory framework,

b. Implementation and coordination of space activities carried out by natural and

juridical persons from and within the territorial jurisdiction of Pakistan;

c. Establishing a legal framework in Pakistan to see the designing, manufacturing,

launching, licensing, and registering space activities;

118 Ibid. 119 Ahmed Bilal, “National Space Program: Past, Present and Future,” (presentation, National Space Conference 2012, September 17-19, 2012, Islamabad).

129 d. Enhancing space cooperation at the international and regional level;

e. Formulation and establishment of comprehensive guidelines for public and

private space industry in Pakistan to explore space for peaceful purposes;

f. Fostering civilian space technologies in collaboration with private space industry;

g. Developing a space program for the needs of national security; and

h. Creation of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), Frequency Allocation

Board (FAB) and National Telecommunication Corporation (NTC).

Pakistan's space program is still underdeveloped and largely dependent on the goodwill of China. China launched Pakistan’s first communication satellite PAKSAT-IR in 2011.

However, Pakistan’s international space cooperation is also increasing which will bolster its space program. Despite international cooperation and Chinese support, there are certain opportunities and challenges for Pakistan to explore its space program.120

Pakistan has not declared a space strategy or doctrine. Pakistan recognizes space as a strategic domain vital for its national security just like its nuclear and conventional military power. Pakistan will eventually aim to develop its satellite launch vehicles (SLV) and manufacture satellites. It has also been formulating space law and legislation to conduct space activities in Pakistan. This suggests that Pakistan is an aspiring space power as its space policy characteristics resemble with the characteristics of emerging space power.

Pakistan’s space policy and Space Vision 2047 suggest that its policy is predominantly devised on technological determinism. Pakistan sees its space program for peaceful purposes and the socioeconomic development of its country through its space power. Space Vision 2047 highlights that Pakistan will build, manufacture, build and launch satellites; however, Clay Moltz

120 Arshad Siraj, “Pakistan’s Space Program,” (presentation, Conference on Security and Cooperation in South Asia, October 8-10, 2007, Berlin).

130 believes that Pakistan's economic condition is a major obstacle in achieving its Space Vision

2047 objectives of indigenously manufacturing, building and launching satellites.121 However, the changing power dynamic in South Asia and rising conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan will give impetus to Pakistan to formulate its space policy based on space nationalism.

4.9 Conclusion

In this changing world, human reliance on space is inevitable. It is difficult for humanity to communicate and navigate on Earth in the absence of satellites. Now, satellites have revolutionized these fields with communication, navigation and other satellite applications being more reliable, accurate and precise than ever before. Although there is no single theoretical framework to study space power in the literature except some academic endeavour nearest to develop a framework for space power, but states are continuing to bring more advancement in their space programs. Some states have brought advancement in their space program at a level where they can be recognized as a global space power. Likewise, some are in a process to enter into the club of global space powers.

Importantly, understanding the intent of a state and its national security objectives gives a taste of their thinking that how they will behave in this international political system. One of the steps to understand the state intends to study declared policies, strategy and doctrine. However, states don't need to release their policies, strategies and doctrines in a document form. It is because states do not want to be clear about their strategic programs. It is quite understandable that space activities of most states are for peaceful purposes. However, the importance of space has increased manifold with time, hence, some states consider their space programs as a key

121 Motz, email message.

131 element of their national power. A general overview of the space policies of India, Pakistan,

China, and the United States suggests that space is now an important part of their national security policy and strategy. Space is considered as a strategic domain and space technologies are for dual-use purposes; military purposes to achieve national security objectives.

Space policies of global space powers have paid considerable attention to achieving national security objectives. It is an undeniable fact that states are building such capabilities which will lead to the weaponization of space. It is a general understanding that a state’s intention can change overnight; however, it will be a matter of choice and political will of the states to weaponize space.

The space strategy of the United States pivots around the notion of freedom of action. It talks about counterspace measures under its space control strategy. China’s military space strategy argues in favour of building ASAT and electronic measures for counterspace operations.

However, no state has explicitly declared for building such capabilities in their official documents so far. But all global space powers are building capabilities to weaponize space. SO far very little has been discussed in their declared policies about discussing arms control and disarmament measures. Although their space policies explicitly talk about the peaceful exploration of space, it is hardly mentioned in their policies regarding the prohibition of weaponization of space. China’s white papers talked it about in a diplomatic manner but it still contradicts to its capability development process. Likewise, United States’ endeavours to get freedom of action in space are not supportive to prevent the weaponization of space. All the capability development suggests that there is a space arms race.

India’s declared space policy is about peaceful as well military uses. Joint Doctrine

Indian Armed Forces(JDIAF)-2017 stresses that steps are being taken to use space technologies

132 for national security purposes. This suggests a shift in India’s space policy from Nehru’s space vision to a policy of achieving national security objectives. This policy change can lead to an intense space rivalry in South Asia. China’s ASAT test gained considerable attention in India.

Indian space experts argue that India has credible space capability to build its ASATs; however, there is no declared policy on it. India’s space intentions are clear; however, these intentions are yet to be released in the form of a document. Pakistan’s space policy is under revision process. It talks about peaceful uses of space, however, its Space Vision 2047’s vision statement emphasized on using space for national security purposes.

In conclusion, while many states do not publish their official space policy. That does not mean states don’t have a space policy. However, the United States as a global space power has always released its space policy, strategy and doctrine to remain clear about its global leadership.

133 CHAPTER 5

Space Militarization and Weaponization Capabilities

5.1 Introduction

In previous chapters, the research studied different schools-of-thought on space policies, doctrines and strategies of major, regional, and aspiring space powers. Likewise, it primarily focused on the general framework of security at three levels of analysis: individual security, state’s security and international security. In between these three levels, there exists a “seamless web” of sublevels. The interplay of state’s security and international security yields a sublevel, which is known as regional security. The previous chapter studied this interplay of state’s security and international security through the lens of space security.

It is a known fact that there are three global space powers: United States, China and

Russia. These states have shown their intent and demonstrated their space militarization and weaponization capabilities to be recognized as global space powers. India has global space intentions but is still on the path of acquiring capabilities. India’s space capabilities are advancing and increasing following a path from a regional space power to becoming a global space power. At the lower level of the continuum, there are states which are aspirants of space technologies for their national development and meeting their national security challenges. These states are emerging space powers. The scope of study has remained limited to major spacefaring states, United States, China,, India and Pakistan. This chapter studies the space militarization and weaponization capabilities of the United States, China, India and Pakistan.

It is important to understand the strategic triangular relations between China, India and

Pakistan from a space power lens. Many believe that at present there is no arms race in outer space. But the analysis of the current development of space weapon capabilities and from the views and writing of experts tells that the opposite is true. The analysis of space capability

134 developments of the major, regional and emerging space powers, envisages the dynamic of a space arms race. The discord over whether or not a space race exists is primarily because it is difficult to understand the exact nature of payloads sent on space rockets. In other dimensions of power, like nuclear and conventional arms, it is easier to determine rival military power developments. For example, missile developments can be understood by observing their launching and testing. Another important factor in gauging nuclear arms race between two competitors by analysing the development and production of delivery vehicles; ballistic missiles

(short-range to intercontinental), cruise missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and the air leg of a nuclear triad. Likewise in the nuclear realm, developments are measured in terms of number of nuclear weapons. Developments in building nuclear weapon facilities, testing of nuclear devices and launching of nuclear-capable missiles reflect the military power of a country. If these developments are in response to an adversary’s developments, then this constitutes a phenomenon of a nuclear arms race between two competitors.

The history of Cold War suggests an intense nuclear arms race between former Soviet

Union and the United States as both powers were trying to achieve nuclear superiority over each other. Both were also involved in an intense space race as their intentions and capabilities were in response to each other’s space capability developments. Another example of nuclear arms race is the Indo-Pakistani competition. India unveiled its ‘Smiling Buddha’ in the form of its first nuclear detonation in 1974, prompting Pakistan to initiate its nuclear program. Likewise, India detonated five nuclear weapons at Pokhran in May 1999, and in response, Pakistan detonated six devices at Chagai just two weeks later. Afterward, both countries continued to test their missiles and are changing their doctrines and postures in response to each other’s capability development.

135 Hence, the overall understanding of the power dynamics in South Asia suggests the presence of a continuous and intense nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan.

The aim of highlighting the nuclear arms race is to make an analogy for space arms race at present. In an arms race, the numbers do matter. In a nuclear arms race, the most important part of the equation is the number of nuclear weapons possessed by each state

1

The major, regional and emerging space powers have a variety of space assets. Space assets can also be used for dual-use purposes making it difficult to understand whether a space asset is specially designed for military purposes or peaceful uses only. At present, there are 1957 operational satellites are orbiting around the Earth performing a variety of functions. Figure 5.1 shows that the United States has maintained pre-eminence in space by possessing the world’s largest fleet of space assets. China has surpassed Russia in recent years in terms of many active space assets. India’s space program is progressing and it is not very far away from changing its regional status into a global space power. Other actors in space, e.g., European Space Agency

(ESA), France, Israel and international companies, are consistently making progress in space sciences and technologies.

At the global level, a salient competition between China and the United States is in progress. At the regional level, India is following a path to become a global space power.

However, what states are developing in space technologies is an important factor.

1 Dean Cheng (Senior Fellow, The Heritage Foundation) in discussion with the author, November 6, 2017.

136

Figure 5.1: Global Operational Satellites2

Satellites are developed primarily for communications, navigation, remote sensing and meteorology with dual-use purposes. The militarization of space began with the launch of

Sputnik-I in 1957.3 It is quite evident from RAND’s feasibility report titled Preliminary Design of An Experimental World-Circling Spaceship on developing spacecraft for military purposes.4

RAND’s report was about building a spacecraft for space exploration, but the dual-use nature of satellites was also highlighted. According to Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) database, a total of 1957 satellites are in operation owned by many countries. However, what is more, important is the function of these satellites, as shown in Figure 5.2.

2 “UCS Satellite Database,” Union of Concerned Scientists, updated January 7, 2019, https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database#.WjrKF1WnHIU. 3 For details see Paul Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945–1984 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985). 4 Chronology: U.S. Military Uses of Space, 1945-1991, accessed January 5, 2018, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1679154046?accountid=12084; and also see Francis Clauser, Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship (Santa Monica, California: RAND, SM-11827, 1946).

137

Figure 5.2: Global Satellites by Operation/Function5

The number of active space satellites is significant, but it is not the decisive one to change the nature of space conflict. Numbers play an important part in defining the nature and context of the competition between two adversaries or two blocs (Cold War term) or in a multipolar world (post-Cold War term). A general assessment of any adversarial relations starts with a comparison of number of military weapons, vehicles, and personnel (active and reserve) possessed by each side. On the other hand, space is a unique medium, where number of satellites can change the entire nature of the conflict or relations and context. But, a path to become a global space power involves other crucial variables. Besides the number of space assets by each country, their quality and designated functions and operations directly affect competition among major spacefaring states.

5 Union of Concerned Scientists, “UCS Satellite Database.”

138 It is quite evident that “nobody knows what nature of the payload is,” when a rocket is sent to space.6 From this assertion, it is evident that the space race phenomenon is difficult to understand in the post-Cold War era. Adding more complexity to it, assessing military space capabilities would be the world’s most imperfect art. However, this imperfect art needs attention to clear the dust from the phenomenon of a space arms race. From Eligar Sadeh’s point of view, the phenomenon of a present space arms race is hard to understand as he thinks there is none.

However, he suggests that there is a path followed by states from space militarization to space weaponization.7 States are rigorously following this path and time is near when major spacefaring states will reach a defining moment to place their weapons in space.

This chapter aims to find the answers to the following questions: what are the military uses of outer space; and what are the different space capabilities of major, regional and aspiring space powers? This chapter aims to find the answers to the abovementioned questions to make a comparison of global, regional and emerging space powers. Mapping of space militarization and weaponization capabilities of these global, regional and aspiring powers will provide a holistic picture of the states’ intent whether they want to weaponize space or not.

5.2 Military Uses of Space

Michio Kaku, a renowned theoretical physicist and author of Physics of the Impossible, criticised

United States’ policies to weaponise outer space.8 In his view, the probability of fighting a nuclear war between the former Soviet Union and the United States has receded after the end of

6 Michael Krepon (Co-Founder, Stimson Center) in discussion with the author, October 18, 2017. Krepon’s argument is endorsed by Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz (Professor Emerita and Editor-in-Chief Journal of Space Law Editor-in-Chief) in discussion with the author, November 20, 2017; Malcolm Davis (Senior Fellow, Australian Strategic Policy Institute) in discussion with the author, November 20, 2017; and Damon Coletta (professor of political science at the US Air Force Academy) in discussion with the author, November 27, 2017. 7 Eligar Sadeh (Editor-in-Chief, Astropolitics) in discussion with the author, November 26, 2017. 8 Michio Kaku, foreword to Weapons in Space, Karl Grossman (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001), 9.

139 the Cold War. However, he stressed that if “one danger is fading, another one is rising ominously.”9 Kaku refers to another danger, which has emerged drastically post-Cold War, this is a path followed by states from space militarization to weaponization. Clay Moltz thinks that space weaponization has already happened. Likewise, Kaku argues that “space weaponization is a reality that to the security of everyone on earth.”10 The pursuit of building weapons to weaponize outer space will accelerate a new arms race.11 United States, China and Russia are building space weapons on the ground and are waiting for the other to weaponize space first so they can flex their military muscles in space in response.12 Kaku believes that if this “madness is not stopped, and then a whole new round of the arms race in outer space could begin.”13

9 Ibid. 10 Kaku, foreword to Weapon in Space. 10. 11 To understand the social construct of space weaponization, there is a need admit the “bomb in the basement” approach where global space powers exhibit self-restraint and seem to adhere to a policy of “no first use.” The global space powers possess space weapon capabilities, but this is not the same as deployed and active systems- implementation is restrained. 12Lee Billing writes that “China, Russia and the U.S. are developing and testing controversial new capabilities to wage war in space despite their denial of such work.” See, “War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever,” Scientific America, August 10, 2015, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space- may-be-closer-than-ever/. Harsh Vasani argues that China is weaponizing outer space to counter U.S. military advantages. See, “How China is Weaponizing Space,” The Diplomat, January 19, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/how-china-is-weaponizing-outer-space/. Stratfor writes in its assessment that space militarization is in its advance stages and it will eventually lead toward space Weaponization. See, “The Battle to Militarize Space Has Begun,” Stratfor, November 11, 2015, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/battle-militarize-space-has-begun. Jim Sciutto, chief national security correspondent of CNN, writes that as the threat in space is increasing, U.S. prepares for possible space war. See, “US military prepares for the next frontier: Space war,” CNN, November 29, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/28/politics/space-war-us-military-preparations/index.html. Thomas Bell, USAF personnel, argued that space Weaponization is inevitable and “equally likely that Weaponization will occur with maturing of specific technologies over the next thirty years.” The existing literature survey suggests that space technologies have been matured and U.S. and China has demonstrated these capabilities in last ten years. See, “Weaponization of Space: Understanding Strategic and Technological Inevitabilities,” Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, Occasional Paper No.6, January 1999. 13 Ibid.

140 5.2.1 Difference between Space Militarization and Weaponization

A comprehensive study on space security is incomplete without highlighting the difference between space militarization and weaponization. From a definitional point, both have different frameworks and characteristics. Militarization and weaponization of space are fundamentally different from each other, not only in their physical manifestation but also from a legal point of view. The militarization of space begun after the first communication satellites Sputnik-I was launched by the former Soviet Union in 1957. Space militarization is the first step in the entire continuum with space weaponization at its end. In between space militarization and weaponization, there is an intervening factor of arms race between major spacefaring states (see

Table 5.1).

Table 5.1: Space Militarization and Weaponization

Space Doctrine Perceived level of Threat Type of Activity/Weapons and Posture threat to foreign Level countries due to space posture

10 Permanently Orbiting Space-to- Terrestrial Weapons (Unilateral)

9 Temporary, or “pop-up” Space- to-Terrestrial Weapons (Unilateral)

High Ground High 8 Space-to-Terrestrial Weapons (Multilateral)

7 Permanently Orbiting Space-to- Space (Unilateral)

6 Temporary, or “pop-up” Space- to-Space Weapons (Unilateral)

5 Space-to-Space Weapons

Moderate (Multilateral) Space Control 4 Terrestrial-to-Space Weapons

141 Table 5.1 (continued) (Unilateral)

3 Terrestrial-to-Space Weapons (Multilateral)

Space 2 Space-to-Terrestrial ISR, MCS, Low Survivability Communications

1 Space-to-Space ISR, MCG, Communications,

Space 0 Terrestrial-to-Space ISR, MCG None Sanctuary Communications

Source: Bruce Deblois, “The Advent of Space Weapons,” Astropolitics 1, no.1 (2003): 30.

The use of space for passive defence (non-destructive) is referred as the militarization of space.14 In a more elaborative way, the launch and orbital placement of passive space systems is known as space militarization. Likewise, the use of these passive space military systems to enhance the military effectiveness of forces is also part of space militarization.15 Passive systems include reconnaissance, communications, weather, navigation, geodesy, and early warning satellites among others. Importantly, passive space systems do not function as weapons themselves.16 These passive defence means create a network of satellites to support terrestrial military operations to increase the effectiveness of military operations.

In 2001, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution calling for the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) Treaty. The resolution called for

“recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for

14 Irmgard Marboe, “Militarization of Outer Space: Present and Future Challenges from International Legal Perspective,” Academic Council on the United Nations System, accessed November 22, 2017, http://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Militarization-Outer-Space-Irmgard-Marboe-AM-2010.pdf, 1-10. 15 Maz Mutschler, Arms Control in Space: Exploring Conditions for Preventive Arms Control (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 106. 16 Ibid.

142 peaceful purposes.”17 Likewise, the text of the Outer Space Treaty (OST), adopted by UNGA in its 1963 resolution and a binding international treaty supported by all space powers, tells about the peaceful exploration of space, the Moon and other celestial bodies.18 From a legal point of view, the word “peaceful” doesn’t restrict the deployment of passive military space systems.19

Though peaceful is interpreted differently by different countries, e.g., the United States considers peaceful purposes inclusive of non-destructive means of defence, which endorses militarization of space. Many western analysts also view “peaceful purposes” including non- aggressive military uses of space. On the other hand, Japan interpreted the word peaceful as non- military uses of space. In the past, “peaceful purposes” carried a different interpretation for the former Soviet Union. Its jurists considered “peaceful purposes” as non-military uses of space.

This interpretation is still a part of Russia’s space policy. However, the former Soviet Union and the United States rigorously competed with each other to militarize outer space. This inherited contradictory interpretations and ambiguous language of the OST has let other states to also militarize space. Another interpretation of Article IV of the treaty suggests that it does not prohibit all military activities. Even today, the passive military defence systems are used for

“direct bombing raids or to orchestrate a prompt global strike, which is the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations.”20 At present, it is difficult to identify the “peaceful purposes” of space as space objects (satellites) have dual-use

17 UN General Assembly, Resolution 55/32, Prevention of an arms race in outer space, A/RES/55/32 ( January 3, 2001), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_55_32E.pdf. 18 UN General Assembly, Resolution 18/1962, Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, A/RES/18/1962 (December 3, 1963), http://www.un- documents.net/a18r1962.htm. 19 For details on legal perspectives especially from the international law’s point of view on the word “peaceful purposes,” see Allan Rosas, “The Militarization of Space and International Law,” Journal of Peace Research 20, no. 4 (1983), 357-364. 20 “Outer Space: Militarization, weaponization and the prevention of an arm race,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed December 12, 2017, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical- issues/5448-outer-space.

143 functions. There are two prominent military uses of satellites which include communications and remote sensing.21 Bruce Hurwitz argues that “communication satellites…do not provide any unique legal problems.”22 On the other hand, remote sensing is an issue among nations because of their right to “disseminate the data and information derived from satellites.”23

Karl Mueller defines weaponization of space as a subset of the militarization of space.24

Space weaponization is about the employment of space weapons. Moreover, in simple terms, it means the placement of military space systems that can be used for active defence for destroying the adversary’s space and terrestrial assets.25 At the moment, there is no legal regime or universally accepted treaty prohibiting a space arms race and space weaponization. States are developing and testing space weapons and in recent years some systems were temporarily employed in space, which opened a backdoor space weaponization.26

5.2.2 Passive space system

Satellites for reconnaissance, communications, weather, navigation, geodesy, early warning and

Global Positioning System (GPS) purposes act as “force multiplier,”27 “force enabler”28 and

21 Eilene Galloway, review of The Legality of Space Militarization, by Bruce Hurwitz, The American Journal of International Law 83, no.2 (April 1989):431-435. 22 For further details on the legality of space militarization, see, Bruce Hurwitz, The Legality of Space Militarization (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1986). 23 Galloway, review of Legality of Space Militarization. 24 Karl Mueller, “Totem and taboo: depolarizing the space weaponization debate,” Astropolitics 1, no. 1(2003): 4-28. 25 See Marbo, “Militarization of Outer Space.” 26 On space Weaponization, James Moltz firmly believes that space Weaponization has already happened and now states are taking next steps to build more space weapons and finally permanently place them in the orbits. The point is extracted from Moltz’s correspondence with the author. 27 According to Jessie Canaday, “space capabilities can be used a force multiplier if these technologies are integrated into all military operations and exercises, develop space doctrine to drive requirements for technology, educate out people on space systems, develop a coherent space control strategy and win technology race and assess the future military requirements.” See, for further details, “Space Technology: Force Multiplier or False Sense of Security,” Naval War College, Department of the Navy, United States, February 7, 1994, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a279726.pdf, II.

144 “force enhancement capabilities.”29 These force multiplier, enabler and enhancement capabilities represent space militarization capabilities. They are not necessary for the hard killing of adversary’s space and terrestrial capabilities. However, space militarization capabilities can be used for soft killing of adversary satellites, like orbital jamming and interference with radio- frequency signals, though they are also categorised as anti-satellite weapon systems.

In past decades, satellites have significantly improved the “performance, lethality and effectiveness of ground, air, and naval forces and weapons, both during peace and war.”30 Paul

Stares, writer of numerous articles and books on space security and militarization, highlights importance of passive military space system enhancing the precision, accuracy, lethality, survivability, and agility of all terrestrial, sea and air military operations. The space assets not only contribute to overall aerospace superiority but also support the “full spectrum of military actions in theatres of operations.”31 Table 5.1 shows details of non-aggressive/non-destructive military space systems. Primarily, space force enhancement includes ISR capabilities, tracking/detection of missile, communications, monitoring, positioning, navigation and timing

(PNT), and Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) satellite capabilities.

28 “Space-An Enabler,” Army Space and Missile Defence Command, Army Forces Strategic Command, United States, 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a525767.pdf. (site discontinued) 29 According to Space Operation: Joint Publication (JP 3-14), space force enhancement is “to increase joint force effectiveness by increasing the combat potential of that force, enhancing operational awareness, and providing critical joint force support.” See Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-14 (Washington DC: Joint Chief of Staff, May 29, 2013), XI & II-4, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf. 30 Elizabeth Seebode Waldrop, “Integration of Military and Civilian Space Assets: Legal and National Security Implications,” (MSc. diss., Faculty of Law, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, 2003), 5. 31 Paul Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy 1945-1984 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 13; and also see “Space and U.S. National Security,” in National Interests and The Military Use of Space, ed. William Durch (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1984), 35.

145 Table 5.2: Passive Military Space Systems: Space Force Enhancement

Orbits Distance from Earth Passive Defence Use (Km)

Telecommunications

Imaging

Low-Earth Orbit 180-2,000 Navigation

Radio Intelligence

Meteorology

Navigation Medium Earth 19,000-20,000 Imaging Orbit Telecommunications

Missile Warning Systems Geostationary 35,780 Radio Intelligence Orbit/ Telecommunications

Navigation

Missile Warning Systems High-Earth Orbit 35,780-384,000 Radio Intelligence

Telecommunications

“Source: Paul Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1985);Barry Watts, The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment (Washington DC: Centre of Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2001);Bhupendra Jasani and Christopher Lee, Countdown to Space War (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1984);and Petr Topychkanov, “Features of the Outer Space Environment,” in Outer Space: Weapons, Diplomacy and Security, eds. Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin (Washington DC: United Book Press, 2010).” 5.2.3 Active space defence: space weapons

First, there is a need to comprehensively define space weapons. A space weapon is defined as

“any device or system that is designed to cause damage within outer space or targeted from space

146 to cause damage; or any device or system which, when fully developed, would eventually thoroughly accomplish either of those objectives.”32 The definition of space weapon also identifies different types of weapons and their characteristics, especially their level of damage.

Bhupendra Jasani, Visiting Professor at Department of War Studies King’s College, defines space weapons as “which can damage, destroy, permanently disrupt the functioning of, or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other states.”33 Another definition suggests:

“space weapons and offensive space warfare initiatives as terrestrially based devices specifically designed and flight-tested to physically attack, impair, or destroy objects in space, or space-based devices designed and flight-tested to attack, impair, or destroy objects in space or on earth.”34

Michael Krepon and Michael Katz-Hyman argue that this definition is not comprehensively written. Primarily, this definition and previous ones do not talk about the soft killing of satellites through non-kinetic means.35 The definitions of space weapon do not include those systems and methods through which someone can interfere with uplinks and downlinks of satellites and hamper their function.36 This can seriously damage the functioning of the satellite though not necessarily destroy it. These systems disrupt or permanently damage the satellites’ command, control and communications, which are necessary for their smooth and efficient function. Jasani terms these systems as non-dedicated space weapons.37 States are rigorously developing hard-kill capabilities like ASATs. However, soft-kill capabilities are simpler to develop and require a little industrial base. In this case, states are looking to build hard- and soft-

32 Julie Dahlitz, “Preventing Space Weapons,” Journal of Peace Research 25, no. 2 (1988): 109-114. 33 Bhupendra Jasani, “Space Assets and Emerging Threats,” (presentation, Contribution of Space Law and Policy to Space Governance and Space Security in the 21st Century, Vienna, Austria, September 6, 2016). 34 Michael Krepon and Michael Katz-Hyman, “Space Weapons and Proliferation,” The Nonproliferation Review 12, no.2 (2005): 323-341. 35 Steven Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 135. 36 Ibid. 37 Jasani, “Space Assets and Emerging Threats.”

147 kill capabilities at the same time. Mostly, soft-kill capabilities are included in modern Electronic

Warfare (EW).

Defining space weapons is a difficult job as “what constitutes a space weapon means we cannot know with confidence whether a satellite launched by a potential enemy is on a peaceful mission.”38 More importantly, there is a linkage between capability and intention. General James

Cartwright Former Commander U.S. Strategic Command argues about Earth-based space weapons that if a state intends to launch an interceptor in space and has created desired aftereffects, then an interceptor will be considered as a space weapon. He believes that every state has its perspective about space weapons.39 Some experts believe that if a missile intercepts an incoming missile (mostly ICBM) in its mid-course flight (in space) then the interception capability is likely to be considered as an earth-based space weapon.40 Brian Weeden divides space weapons into two general categories: Earth-based weapons and space-based weapons.

From his view, medium to long-range ballistic missiles, ASATs, LASERs and direct energy weapons are Earth-to-space weapons.41 Medium to long-range ballistic missiles can be used for the Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD).42 The GMD system is used to detect a missile in its mid-course flight stage to intercept and destroy it before the missile re-enters earth’s

38 Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth, 135. 39 General (retired) James Cartwright (Commander (retired) United States Marine Corps, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander USSTRATCOM) in discussion with the author, December 14, 2017. 40 Weeden, “Space Weapons from a Technical Perspective.” 41 Ibid. 42 For to a comprehensive analysis of Ballistic Missile Defence and Space Weapons, see Richard Garwin, “Ballistic Missile Defence and Space Weapons,” (presentation, The 11th PIIC Beijing Seminar on International Security: Building a Harmonious World of Stability and Win-Win, Qingdao, China, October 26-30, 2008); and also see, “Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD) System,” Missile Threat Initiative: CSIS Missile Defence Project, accessed December 15, 2017, https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/gmd/.

148 atmosphere and hits its designated target on the ground.43 However, George Lewis and Theodore

Postol of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in analysing the efficacy of GMD and

Standard Missile (SM)-3 interceptors state, “both the GMD and SM-3 systems are highly susceptible to the massive confusion that leads to complete performance breakdowns when they encounter objects that have characteristics that are unexpected.”44 Krepon and Katz-Hayman argue that MRBMs and LRBMs are adaptable for use as space weapons.45 However, they criticise those who think that space is weaponized through employing these capabilities. They think that these residual or latent space warfare capabilities are more served as “insurance policy and deterrent against the initiation of dedicated space warfare programs by potential adversaries.”46

Malcolm Davis, senior fellow at ASPI, supports the need to redefine space weapons.47 In this regard, Xavier Pasco, Senior Research Fellow at FRS, Paris, argues that a comprehensive definition of space weapons requires the inclusion of both “orbital and ground-based equipment intended to have any effect on targeted space systems.”48 At the moment, there are other non- kinetic means to damage the space assets of the adversary; the soft killing of satellites. The damage to space and terrestrial assets from space is not limited through physical means only rather there are new means and methods through which space and terrestrial assets can be

43 Calla Cofield, “Missile-Intercept System Performed Flawlessly During Test, Boeing Says,” Space.com, June 1, 2017, https://www.space.com/37048-missile-intercept-system-test-boeing-success.html. 44 George Lewis and Theodore Postol, “A Technically Detailed Description of Flaws in the SM-3 and GMD Missile Defense Systems Revealed by the Defence Department’s Ballistic Missile Test Data,” MIT, 2010, http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/White_Paper_Associated_With_May_2010_Arms_Control_Today_Article.p df. 45 Krepon and Katz-Hyman, “Space Weapons and Proliferation,” 325. 46 Ibid. 47 Davis, discussion. 48 Xavier Pasco, “A Preliminary Assessment of the Space Weapon Issue,” (presentation, UNIDIR, March 29, 2011), https://swfound.org/media/39984/xavierpasco-assessmentspaceweapon-unidir-2011.pdf.

149 damaged. From this discussion of defining space weapons, there are kinetic space weapons and non-kinetic space weapons.

Generally, space weapons are divided into three major categories. First, Earth-to-space weapons are for attacking targets in space and also those weapons that move through space to get targets on the ground. Second, space-to-Earth weapons are for the acquisition of targets in air, sea or on the ground. Third, space-to-space weapons that move through space to attack targets in space.49 The second and third category can be combined in a single category of space-based weapons, which achieve their targets in space, air, land and sea. Importantly, all three types of space weapons exhibit different physical characteristics, work differently, and achieve a variety of targets for attack with different scales of destruction. Another description of space weapons is given by Bruce Deblois on basis of development and employment in space. Deblois categories space weapons on their unilateral or multilateral deployment, as well as their temporary or permanent employment in space (see Table 5.1). For weapons that come under the category of different types of space weapons, see Table 5.2.

States are developing their space weapons and will continue to develop more if they remain vulnerable to each other and feel less secure.50 The dangers of the employment of space weapons are frightening.51 War is inevitable but is there any possibility that war will be fought in space?52 This possibility cannot be ruled out in this contemporary world. States have fought a

49 Brian Weeden, “Space Weapons from a Technical Perspective,” (presentation, Space Security Conference 2010, Geneva, Switzerland, March 29-30, 2010). 50 Alan Steinberg, “Weapons in Space: The Need to Protect Space Assets,” Astropolitics 10, no.3 (2012): 248- 267. 51 Sterling Michael Pavelec, “The Inevitability of the Weaponization of Space: Technological Constructivism Versus Determinism,” Astropolitics 10, no.1 (2012): 39-48. 52 See for details, Jasani and Lee, Countdown to Space; Jim Sciutto, “US Military Prepares for the Next Frontier: Space War,” CNN, November 29, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/28/politics/space-war-us- military-preparations/index.html; Chris Bowlby, “Could a War in Space Really Happen?” BBC, November 19, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35130478; also read the analysis on the

150 war in land, sea and air. Space is now the fourth medium of warfare, and space policies, doctrines and strategies in the past and present of major spacefaring nations have recognized space warfare as a possible reality. It is no more a novelistic idea given that states are building space weapons. The development of space weapons has now moved toward the tail of the continuum, which ends at space weaponization. This trend posits implications not only for global security but also for regional and state’s security. In previous decades, states have tested and demonstrated their space weapon capabilities on numerous occasions.53

Many are arguing that in a potential conflict over Taiwan, China can attack U.S. satellites in space and vice versa. This could initiate a space war between the two states.54 It is also quite understandable that further development of space weapons and their subsequent deployment in outer space will prompt other countries, with advanced missile capabilities, to “resort to several low-cost and relatively low-technology anti-satellite devices to counter critical and vulnerable” space assets of global and regional space powers.55 James Oberg, an American space historian, argues that space powers were investing their time and skills to develop technical means for countermeasures in space. He thinks that states, which are emerging space powers and still at

possibility of U.S.-China armed conflict in space, Jonathan Broder “Why the Next Pearl Harbour Could Happen in Space,” Newsweek, April 5, 2016. 53 Clayton Chun, “Viewpoint: Expanding the high frontier: Space Weapons in History,” Astropolitics 2, no.1 (2004): 63-78; for U.S. space weapons, see Theresa Hitchens, Michael Katz-Hyman and Jeffrey Lewis, “U.S. Space Weapons: Big Intentions, Little Focus,” The Nonproliferation Review 13, no.1 (2006): 35-57; For details on China’s space capabilities, see Department of Defence, Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017 (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defence, May 15, 2017). 54 For details, see Bruce MacDonald, China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008); and also see, Geoffrey Forden, “Viewpoint: China and Space War,” Astropolitics 6, no.2 (2008): 138-153. 55 Hui Zhang, “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China,” Arms Control Today 35, no.10 (December 2005): 6-11

151 entry level, have “rudimentary space weaponry within grasp.”56 Krepon and Katz-Hayman believe that if space weapons are deployed than there could be negative effects of this placement on the nuclear non-proliferation regime as it may further degrade and states are then incentivized to build more nuclear weapons.57

Bhupendra Jasani also stresses the possible vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons after the deployment of space weapons. He believes that space weaponization can prompt vertical proliferation in South Asia. Jasani thinks that in case of National Missile Defence (NMD) system is employed with effective space assets, then it states are more vulnerable and insecure about

NMD deployment. Jasani opines that if the United States deployed its NMD and Theatre Missile

Defence (TMD), then China is vulnerable and likely to enhance its nuclear arsenal with more lethality and yield.58 To illustrate, the United States deployed its Terminal High Altitude Area

Defence (THAAD) in South Korea in wake of North Korea’s nuclear tests, which China criticised.

There is disagreement on the definition of space weapons and their types, as well as the weaponization of space. The disagreement is mostly on the technical and political understanding of the space weapons. Likewise, their deployment has created a lot of differences of opinion on space weaponization and militarization. For example, the difference is mostly on Earth-based space weapons. Brian Weeden considers long-range and ICBMs as part of any missile defence system, which can intercept missiles in their mid-course as a space weapon. From this perspective, the United States has tested SM-3 and SM-6 as part of its GMD system as a space

56 James Oberg, “Are We Setting Ourselves up for a Space Pearl Harbour?” Jamesoberg.com, June 12, 2001, http://www.jamesoberg.com/06122001pearlharbor_pol.html. 57 For details, see, Krepon and Katz-Hayman, “Space Weapons and Proliferation.” 58 Bhupendra Jasani, “New Approaches to Achieving Space Security,” in Collective Security in Space: European Perspectives, eds. Johan Logsdon, James Moltz and Emma Hinds (Washington DC: Space Policy Institute, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, January 2007), 38.

152 weapon and its tests in the past have weaponized space. So far, the GMD system has more than

“25 successful space interceptions, and more than 240 interceptors have been delivered to U.S and Japan navies,” according to its manufacturer Raytheon.59 Lewis and Postol have challenged the effective target acquisition of SM-3 and 6 and raised serious questions regarding the GMD’s effectiveness. Therefore, the discourse is difficult to understand on space weaponization as there are many technical and politically divergent points on which a convergence of opinion is difficult to achieve. As far as space weaponization and development in GMD are concerned, Krepon and

Katz-Hyman emphasized that:

“Although some assert that space is already weaponized because ocean-spanning missiles pass through this domain during testing, this argument is akin to claiming that world subways have been weaponized because the Aum Shinrikyo cult used sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system in 1995.”60

This is a strong argument by the authors about space weaponization. Other experts also think that there is no current deployment of space weapons and space is not weaponized.61 In contrast to the above argument on space weaponization, many experts believe that space has been weaponized. Eligar Sadeh thinks that space is already militarized, but not yet weaponized as space weapons are not deployed for operational purposes.

Krepon and Katz-Hyman argue that those who think GMD system has weaponized space are mixing “residual or latent” capabilities with dedicated space weapon capabilities. Both view that ground-based medium and long-range missile interceptors may be considered as space weapons, but these residual capabilities are not dedicated space weapon capabilities. In response

59 “Standard Missile-3: Beating ballistic missiles on land and at sea,” Raytheon, accessed December 20, 2017, https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/sm- 3/?WT.mc_id=TWITTER_socialmedia_N/A&utm_source=TWITTER&utm_medium=paid&utm_campaign =N/A&linkId=45816805. 60 Krepon and Katz-Hyman, “Space Weapons and Proliferation,” 325; and also see Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth, 260. 61 Eligar Sadeh (Editor-in-Chief, Astropolitics) in discussion with the author, December 20, 2017. Likewise, Gabrynowicz and Coletta also expressed similar views on space weaponization.

153 to those who think space is not weaponized, Clay Moltz of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) argues that space is weaponized. The reason behind his comprehension of space weapons and weaponization is the intent of the state. It is believed that if the states test ground-based missile interceptors with intent to hit the incoming target in its mid-course then it is considered as a space weapon and it will eventually lead toward the weaponization of space. The intent to intercept the missile in its mid-course is more related to the after-effects of the test or launch.

The intentions of the states, motivated to weaponize outer space, are the true path leading toward inevitable space weaponization.

Krepon argues that it is difficult to verify the payload aboard a rocket launched into space. This makes it difficult for independent experts and researchers, especially the adversary, to know about the actual intent of the launch and what is inside it and for what purpose it is going to be launched. Space powers are quietly unveiling their space capabilities, especially with the major spacefaring states of the United States, China and Russia deploying “new and more sophisticated weaponry in space.”62 Axe’s argument is understandable in a sense that it is difficult to monitor and verify the nature of the payload. It is a fact that space technologies are essentially of dual-use. Given the militarization of space, states are thinking about space weaponization and developing such capabilities? Although, space weaponization is a costly and expensive venture, a state’s reliance on space assets is directly proportional to the increasing risks, vulnerabilities and challenges to its operational space assets. The more the numbers of space assets are operationalized, the more vulnerable they are to attacks in space from the state adversary that also includes non-state actors. Axe opines that “the growing number of inspection satellites lurk in orbit, possibly awaiting commands to sneak up on disabling or destroying other

62 David Axe, “When it Comes to War in Space, U.S. has the edge,” Reuters, August 10, 2015.

154 satellites.”63 Advancements in the ground-based missile systems are also likely to change the debate on space weaponization as with increasing level of accuracy and guidance, ground-based missiles “could reach into orbit to destroy enemy spacecraft.”64

Space weaponization is largely pivoted around conventional or traditional thought on weapon deployment in which a weapon is developed and deployed in response to enemy’s weapon development and deployment. From a non-traditional perspective, which is largely about the employment of non-kinetic means of warfare, the weaponization of space has offered different understanding. Sun Tzu argued “to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”65 Sun Tzu believed that the supreme method of fighting the war is without fighting a war. His argument of winning and fighting the war points toward non-kinetic means. In the contemporary world, these are largely attributed to electronic means of warfare. In this regard, the jamming, spoofing, dazzling, blinding and hijacking are the best methods as modern space weapons-ASAT. From a non-traditionalist’s perspective, these EW means do fall within the scope of space weapons. It means capabilities on the ground or in space if they can damage, impair, hamper, or disrupt

(permanently) or change the trajectory of satellites, then they will be considered as space weapons. The reason behind the acceptance of these Earth and space-based capabilities as space weapons is that satellites are dedicated systems with almost no self-correct or self-repairing mechanisms; however, U.S. is developing Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) capabilities to

63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, tans., Samuel Griffith (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 77, https://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/1.1/Sun%20Tzu.pdf.

155 quickly repair and replace damaged satellites that enable the delivery of timely warfighting effects.66

Today, non-kinetic means are more lethal, dangerous and effective weapons of warfare than kinetic means. The major spacefaring states like United States, China and Russia have demonstrated their kinetic kill space weapons capabilities in the form of ASATs. The states with non-kinetic space weapon capabilities have outnumbered the states with kinetic space weapon capabilities. There are incidents of jamming, spoofing, and hacking of terrestrial and space assets by those states which are emerging space powers. These capabilities are largely possessed by non-state actors (NSAs), i.e., commercial actors. This suggests that in case of an eventuality in space, i.e., a space asset of any state is hacked or blinded or jammed by a commercial actor, then it will be difficult to find it as space is congested, crowded and contested. In this regard, there is a need to widen the scope of the definition of space weapons. Likewise, there is a need to understand that non-kinetic means of warfare are as lethal and dangerous as kinetic means of warfare. Furthermore, if there is room to widen the definition of space weapons, then it will have a spillover effect on the discourse on space weaponization. The political, economic, strategic and environmental effects of space weaponisation through kinetic means are enormous; perhaps, this is the reason that traditional thought on the deployment of a dedicated space weapon system is not ready to accept that space has been weaponized. However, if there is an acceptance of non- kinetic means of warfare as dangerous and lethal as kinetic means, then from this perspective space is weaponized as these capabilities are effectively employed by states against each other’s assets.67

66 “Operationally Responsive Space,” Kirtland Air Force Base, accessed December 20, 2017, http://www.kirtland.af.mil/Units/ORS/. 67 One particular incident of blinding of U.S.’s spy satellite in low earth orbit by Chinese ground-based LASER took place in 2006. U.S. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) confirmed the illumination of U.S.

156 Table 5.3: Kinds of Space Weapons

Types Kinetic Non-Kinetic (Electronic Interference)

Weapon Systems

Medium to long-range ballistic missiles Hijacking, Spoofing Earth-to-space (earth-based Direct ascent ASATs weapons) Lasers and directed energy Scanning, dazzling, weapons (DEWs) blinding

Hypervelocity rods (kinetic Space- bombardment “Rods from to-earth God” Terrestrial and Orbital Space-based weapons Space-based lasers Jamming Space- to-space Co-orbital ASATs, dual use satellites (micro satellites)

“Source: For Electronic interference methods see, Space Security Index, 2017 Space Security Index, September 2017, http://spacesecurityindex.org/2017/10/space-security-2017/;For details on categories of space weapons, see Weeden, “Space Weapons from a Technical Perspective,” and “China’s BX-1 Microsatellites: A Litmus Test for Space Weaponization,” The Space Review, October 20, 2008, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1235/1;For details on targets, characteristics, physics and types of space weapons, see, Bob Preston et al., Space Weapons Earth Wars (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2002), 23-45. For details on microsatellites as dual-use satellites as a threat to space, security see, Natália Archinard, “Space satellite in 2006. However, there are several views on this kind of offense in space. Glenn Kessler believes that “in the context of satellites, “blinding” specifically refers to causing permanent damage to an imaging satellite’s detector. Laura Grego of Union of Concerned Scientists was quoted by Kessler that blinding usually implied lasting damage to a remote sensing satellite’s sensor, which is offensive in nature. However, nuclear physicist Yousaf Butt of Federation of American Scientists argues that LASERS are “ineffective anti-satellite weapons,” not producing desired results, but still can blind the satellite for short period of time. However, with the advancement in direct energy weapons (DEWs), a permanent damage can be caused to a satellite operating in different orbits depending on the range and power of the LASER light thrown on its sensors. For details, see, “Bachmann’s claim that China Blinded U.S. satellites,” The Washington Post, October 4, 2011. On this incident, Eligar Sadeh argues that U.S. deliberately remains silent and showed strategic restraint on this act of offence by China in space. For details on Butt’s arguments, see “Effects of Chinese Laser Ranging on Imaging Satellites,” Science and Global Security 17, no.1 (2009): 20-35.

157 Security and Governance-The Role of Space Middle Powers,” (presentation, Contribution of Space Law and Policy to Space Governance and Space Security in the 21st Century, September 5-8, 2016, Vienna, Austria).”

5.2.4 Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)

A BMD system technology is developed, tested and deployed to intercept or counter incoming ballistic missiles of all ranges; short, medium, intermediate and long. At the moment, the United

States has developed, tested and deployed the world’s most sophisticated BMD technology.68

India is also developing a two-layered BMD shield in South Asia to intercept ballistic missiles launched from Pakistan; however, India also considers its BMD shield aims to intercept Chinese missiles.69 China has been critical of U.S. BMD development, but it has demonstrated its BMD capability with a successful test of the high-altitude anti-ballistic missile in 2010. Many defence experts outside China consider it a BMD test, but little details of the test were provided by

China. On February 5, 2018, China has demonstrated an anti-missile test. According to Chinese

Ministry of Defence, it was a demonstration of “ground-based midcourse anti-missile intercept technology” without aiming any country.70 The latest Chinese anti-missile test reflects that

China has been conducting BMD tests for last one decade and it is to counter U.S. missile

68 “Fact Sheet: The Ballistic Missile Defence System,” Missile Defence Agency, United States, accessed December 21, 2017, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/bmds.pdf. (site discontinued) 69 For details on Indian BMD and its implications for South Asia, see Zafar Jaspal, “The Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defence in South Asia: Implications for Strategic Stability,” in Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Decade, eds., Feroz Hassan Khan et al., (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), https://www.nps.edu/documents/104111744/106151936/Nuclear+Learning+in+South+Asia_June2014.pdf/ db169d3c-6; Moeed Yusuf, “Indian Missile Defence: A View from Islamabad,” (presentation, Conference On Security And Cooperation In South Asia: A Global Perspective, Berlin, Germany, October 8-10, 2007); Shane Mason, “India’s Ballistic Missile Defence Program: Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia,” (presentation, Project on Nuclear Issues Fall 2013, Washington DC, December 17, 2013); and also see an Indian perspective on its BMD development, Summit Ganguly, “India’s pursuit of Ballistic Missile Defence,” The Nonproliferation Review 21, no.3-4 (2014): 373-382. 70 “China Says Carries Out another anti-missile test,” Reuters, February 5, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence/china-says-carries-out-another-anti-missile-test- idUSKBN1FQ08X.

158 defence shield in Southeast Asia, especially the latest deployment of U.S. THAAD system in

South Korea.

A ballistic missile’s flight from starting point to its target on the ground is normally divided into three phases. The first phase is called the boost phase, second is known as mid- course in which a missile travels in space, and the last phase is known as the terminal phase or the re-entry phase in which a missile re-enter into the Earth’s atmosphere and falling with tremendous speed under the influence of gravity to reach its target. The United States has proposed a BMD system that follows a four-phased trajectory: boost, ascent, midcourse and terminal. However, the current developments are only limited to intercept an incoming missile in its mid-course and terminal phases. But, the United States is preparing to develop a BMD with the space-based components to hit a ballistic missile in its boost-phase. The thinking is not new, rather it dates back to President Reagan’s concept of Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) conceived to build an “iron-shield” to intercept the incoming Soviet ballistic missiles and simultaneously launch American missiles to hit targets on enemy territory. In the beginning, ground-based and the space-based systems were proposed to build SDI with a variety of interceptors and sensor systems. However, due to the high cost of space-based sensors and interception,71 SDI ideas were never fully hatched and only a few components were developed.72

Another reason behind SDI failure is the easy countermeasures, which prompted the next administrations after Reagan to discard it with plans to build other programs, like Brilliant

71 Stephen Walt criticized low development on BMD system as he thinks missile defence systems have cost more than twice as much as the Manhattan Project. See, “Rush to Failure: The Flawed Politics and Policies of Missile Defence, Harvard Magazine, (May-June 2000). 72 Christopher Campbell, Star Wars: Delusions and Danger (Moscow: Military Publishing Press, 1985), 36.

159 Pebbles (BP), Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), National Missile Defence

(NMD) and BMD.73

GMD Interceptors as ASAT: An important aspect of space weaponization is Earth and space- based BMD. As discussed in detail about the components of Earth-based BMD systems, which are medium and long-range interceptors, they are generally considered as Earth-based space weapons. One particular reason given by experts about these interceptors is that they are of dual- use nature. Laura Grego, senior scientist in Union of Concerned Scientists, analysed U.S. hitting its defunct satellite USA-193 in 2008 with its modified missile interceptor SM-3. Before this event, former USSTRATCOM commander General Cartwright announced that the United States would destroy low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite using Aegis sea-based BMD system.74 It was the first time an Earth-based missile interceptor was modified into an anti-satellite missile and successfully achieved its target. The test showed that SM-3 missile interceptor was modified through Phase-Adaptive Approach (PAA) with a divert capability.75 Grego assessed the characteristics of missile interceptors of GMD system and suggests that missile defences have embedded capabilities to target a missile in its mid-course, as well as a satellite moving in an orbit around the Earth if equipped with sensors that can locate a target other than a moving missile.76 Codenamed Operation Burnt, the test of SM-3 to hit a defunct satellite in 2008 saw

73 For details on countermeasures, see Katie Schwarz, “Day-Long Symposium Examines SDI,” The Tech 105, no.52 (November 26, 1985); and also see, Kevin Lewis, Possible Soviet Responses to the Strategic Defence Initiative: A Functionally Organized Taxonomy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Cooperation, 1986). 74 Laura Grego, “The Anti-satellite Capability of the Phased Adaptive Missile Defence System,” Union of Concerned Scientists, 2011, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/2011- winter-anti-satellite.pdf. 75 Ibid. 76 The technologies for ASAT and missile interceptors are closely interrelated. A missile interceptor designed to intercept a coming missile in its mid-course flight will almost “necessarily have an ASAT capability at some altitudes and regions in space, since the task of locating, tracking and destroying a single satellite in orbit is much less demanding than defending against multiple missiles.” For details and

160 both Aegis BMD and THAAD considered for at the first point.77 The reason behind THAAD consideration is that it can effectively hit a target in LEO. Grego further explained about BMD interceptors as ASATs given they can achieve their targets in LEO, where most of the reconnaissance, Earth observing, Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) and meteorological satellites are stationed. Hence, it is easy to infer that these interceptors can be considered as space weapons, and thus, creating vulnerability to the survival of the adversary satellites in LEO. Likewise,

Russia’s S-500 missile system is also equipped with the same kind of capability as SM-3.78

5.2.5 Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defence

A space-based BMD system is mainly conceived as to intercept adversary’s ballistic missiles in its boost phase. Likewise, a ground-based launch is located inside the adversary’s territory in case of land-based ICBM; however, major powers, U.S., Russia, China, France, India and United

Kingdom (UK), have submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Recently, Pakistan also tested fired a cruise missile Babur-2 from a submerged platform, opening its entry into the elite group of nations having such capabilities. So, from this aspect, two factors largely account to develop a space-based BMD system: the launching site and time required to complete the boost phase of the ballistic missile. The idea of a space-based BMD deployment is to hit a ballistic missile in its boost phase and deny it to enter its mid-course and intercepted it before escaping the Earth’s gravitational field. Therefore, a space-based BMD system is like hitting a ballistic missile just after it takes off. However, for space-based BMD system, a full range of space and understanding the legality of the ABM and ASAT, see Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes and Eliot Spitzer, “Space Weapons: The Legal Context,” Daedalus 114, no. 3 (1985): 193-218. 77 A BMD system can also be modified into an ASAT capability. On Aegis, Laura Grego argues that “the current Aegis interceptors SM-3 Block IA/IB can reach only the relatively few satellites in orbits with perigees at or below 600 km altitude.” For details, see Laura Grego, “Aegis as ASAT,” Union of Concerned Scientists, April 26, 2012, http://allthingsnuclear.org/lgrego/aegis-as-asat. 78 Brian Wang, “USA SM-3 and Russia S500 Deployment of Continental Range Anti-ICBM Systems,” Next Big Future, January 28, 2015, https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2015/01/usa-sm-3-and-russia-s500- deployment-of.html.

161 Earth-based early warning and detection satellites are required with deployment during peace- time as well as in a potential crisis. For an effective space-based BMD, a network of satellites with advanced multipurpose sensors and detection is required to achieve the primary objectives of a directing a missile interceptor launched from space to hit its target as it launches from ground. Likewise, in case a missile escapes from Earth gravitational field and early warning satellites did not detect or a missile interceptor fails to interceptor in its boost-phase, then the second layer of the space-based BMD system will hit the target in its mid-course. These are the two-layered space-based BMD system. In this system, Direct Energy Weapons (DEWs) in the form of high-energy lasers along with Kinetic Kill Vehicles (KKVs) will be used to intercept the missile in its boost phase and mid-course.79 However, a space-based BMD system has yet to come out of its infant stage and yet to be realized in its true operational form or deployment. In future, if states build space-based BMD system, then there be will no disagreement on land that space has not been weaponized.80

A space-based BMD system has suffered from numerous constraints and it has its ramification for international strategic stability. Likewise, analysts believe that it has some easy countermeasures and states, instead of developing own space-based BMD in response, would instead develop countermeasures that are cost-effective and technologically less advanced.

79 On DEWs, see Ashton Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space–A Background Paper (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, April 1984), https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1984/8410/8410.PDF. 80 For details on space-based BMD, see Howard Frost, Space-based BMD: A Multidimensional Analysis (Cambridge: Massachusetts: Center for International Studies, MIT, 1985), https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/83072/15001760.pdf?sequence=1; Richard Garwin, “Space- based Defences Against Ballistic Missiles,” in The Future of Smart Weapons, eds., Eric Arnett et al (Washington DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992); Robert Erlandson et al., “Development of Kill Assessment Technology for Space-Based Applications,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 29, no.3 (2010): 289-29; “Fact Sheet: Space Based Missile Defence,” Union of Concerned Scientists, May 2011, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/space-based-md- factsheet-5-6-11.pdf.

162 Alwyn Young, professor of economics at the London School of Economics (LSE), writes about three major factors blocking the path toward achieving a space-based BMD: “a space-based

BMD must deal with: a) defending the target set and successfully coping with penetration aids and countermeasures; b) defending the BMD components themselves to prevent a total collapse of the system; and c) gaining favourable cost-exchange ratios about offensive.”81 However, cost- effective countermeasures have not stopped the states from thinking about developing such systems.

5.2.6 Anti-satellite Weapons

The definition of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon is very similar to the overall definition of space weapon. Primarily, ASAT weapons are developed to hamper or disrupt (temporary or permanent) or physically damage the activities or functions of adversary’s satellite in space.

Moreover, the destruction or damaging of enemy’s satellites is for “strategic military purposes and to protect home satellites as well.”82 Based on their ability to cause damage to a target,

ASAT can be divided into different categories; isotropic nuclear weapons (INW), Kinetic-energy weapons (KEWs) and DEWs. See Table 5.4 for details.

81 Alwyn Young has discussed the countermeasures to different BMD (Land, Sea and Space) capabilities. For details on countermeasures and soft killing of the BMD capabilities by the adversary see, “Ballistic Missile Defence: Capabilities and Constraints,” The Fletcher Forum 8, no.1 (1984): 153. 82 S Paneerselvam and P Soma, “Anti Satellite Weapons (ASAT): A Status Review and perception for an Indian ASAT,” (presentation, Space, Science and Security: The Role of Regional Expert Discussions Conference, New Delhi, January 19-21, 2011).

163 Table 5.4: Types of ASAT Weapons

Target Types Position Weapon Lethality/Function/Damage Orbit

Co-Orbital interceptor The explosion cause radiation and electromagnetic pulse (EMP), physical damage, Ground- hamper, disrupt and destroy based Direct-Ascent the function of the satellite. Isotropic interceptor Nuclear 1967 Outer Space Treaty Weapons prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons in the orbits.

Nuclear explosive direct Space- Co-Orbital interceptor Low and energy weapons (NDEW) are based (space mines) high earth not available. Orbit

Co-Orbital interceptor Ground- based Direct-ascent Kinetic- interceptor Direct impact with low and energy high speed resulted into Weapons Co-Orbital interceptor Physically destroy the target Space- (space mine) based Non-Orbital interceptor

HPRF: overload and damage High-power radio- satellite electronic equipment frequency (HPRF) and Low-PRF: merely to active electronic temporarily overload satellite countermeasures (ECM) electronic systems (i.e., for “jamming“).

Direct- Ground- HPRF: Permanently All levels of energy based Damaging the satellite conflict High-energy Laser Weapons Low-PRF: (HEL) and active electro-optical Jamming, countermeasures (E- spoofing (deceive), OCM) dazzling (temporarily blinding)

Space- High-power radio- Same as ground-based HPRF All levels of

164 Table 5.4 (continued) based frequency (HPRF) and and HEL conflict active electronic countermeasures (ECM)

High-energy laser (HEL) and active electro-optical countermeasures (E- OCM)

Neutral-particle beam Physical damage to electronic Low-earth (NPB) parts of the satellite Orbit

Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons: Countermeasures and Arms Control (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), chap 4; Laura Grego, “A history of Anti-Satellite Programs,” Union of Concerned Scientists, January 2012, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/a- history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf.

The debate on the definition and utility of space weapons suggests that major space powers have developed them as a matter of political, strategic and economic choice for them to deploy these weapons in space. One important question regarding space weaponization is that: is there a need to deploy space weapons or it would be best possible for states to develop these lethal capabilities only for deterrence purposes? Before finding the answer to this question, it is important to understand the space militarization and weaponization capabilities of major and emerging space powers. One limitation of the research is that there is very little information available about the exact number of capabilities possessed by the major spacefaring states, as well as nature of the assets, whether it is for military uses or peaceful purposes. As a result, it would be difficult to make a head-on count of military space assets of even selected states like the United States, China, Russia, India and Pakistan. The research has adopted simple qualitative and quantitative tools to measures the military space capabilities of these space powers. For this purpose, space budgets, number of space launches, space militarization and weaponization

165 capabilities and future weapons programs of the United States, China, India and Pakistan are discussed.

5.3 The United States

The United States. is undoubtedly leading the global space order with the world’s largest space fleet that is still expanding since the dawn of the Space Age. It has 802 operational satellites in outer space orbiting around the earth with dual-use purposes. United States reliance on space assets has increased since the end of the Cold War. It has effectively utilized its space power in

First Gulf War and it was a mini space war as it decimated the Iraqi military with its Airpower in collaboration with space capabilities.

Space Militarization Capabilities: The Joint Publication 3-14 titled Space Operations highlights that the U.S military space program aims to develop the majority of its capabilities to build a space situational awareness (SSA) network, space force enhancement, space support, space control and space force application.83 The United States has been building these capabilities since the beginning of the space age. It has sent thousands of satellites in space to build its current space militarization capabilities. Table 5.5 gives a bird’s eye view of U.S. force enhancement, application, support and enabling capabilities which include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), early warning, metrological, communication, navigation,

PNT, geodesy and oceanography satellite capabilities.

Table 5.5: U.S. Space Militarization Capabilities: Force Multiplier/Enhancement Capabilities

Space Militarization Capabilities Current Systems

Intelligence, Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)- high and low Surveillance, Defence Support Program (DSP)

83 For complete details, see Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-14 (Washington DC: Joint Chief of Staff, May 29, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf.

166 Table 5.5 (continued) Reconnaissance (ISR) For reconnaissance major satellite series (Onyx and Topaz)

IMINT (Key Hole (KH) and Lacrosse Series) ELINT (Magnum, Orion, Trumpet, Mentor Series) MASINT (Nuclear Detonation System)

Missile launch (early warning) & Space Situational Network (SSN): Defence Support Tracking Program, GPS, Space-based infrared system, space tracking and surveillance system

Environmental Monitoring Defence Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) (space weather)

Satellite Communications Defence Satellite Communications System (DSCS) II & III Military Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) Commercial Satellites Advance Wideband System Gap-filler Leased Services Satellite: Global Broadcast Service Ultrahigh Frequency Follow-on (UFO) Satellites, Polar Satellite Communications

Positioning, Navigation and Global Positioning System (GPS) II, IIR, IIR-M, IIF, Timing (PNT) III

Navigation and NAVWAR Global Positioning System (GPS-1, 2 & 3) Major satellite series (Transit and Navstar)

Nuclear Detonation detection Integrated Operational Nuclear Detection System (Vela Satellite Series)

Geodesy and Oceanography GEOSAT, GFO, SECOR, TOPO, LIDOS, SALT

“Source: Union of Concerned Scientists, “UCS Satellite Database;” “Military Spacecraft-USA,” Gunter’s Space Page, http://space.skyrocket.de/directories/sat_mil_usa.htm; Tyler Evans,

167 “Space Coordinating Authority: Information Service from Space,” in Space Power Integration: Perspectives from Space Weapons Officers, ed. Kendall Brown (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2006), 5-6; Eligar Sadeh,“Space Programs of the United States of America,” Astroconsulting International LLC, November 5, 2009.”

U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is an important organ of its overall military space program. NOAA systems are mostly used for geodesy which is a force multiplier enhancing military dominance. NOAA systems continuously monitor the changing electromagnetic field of Earth and provide data for military readiness and mostly used to monitor space weather.

The Digital National Security Archive has published a detailed document titled

Chronology: U.S. Military Uses of Space, 1945-1991, to highlight United States’ efforts to militarize space in the past. The document highlights United States military uses of space is useful in identifying past United States military space activities.84 Likewise, a more elaborative work is done by Jeffery Richelson in books on United States space satellites for spying purposes.

In America’s Space Sentinels: A History of the DSP and SBIRS Satellite Systems, Richelson gave a brief account of United States’ military space activities especially focusing on creation and evolution of MIDAS/Defence Support Program (DSP). These programs were developed for analysis of the data collected through sensors and surveillance.85

Space Situational Network (SSA): The increasing United States reliance on space assets has increased the number of its operational space assets. However, it has also increased the perceived security challenges to the United States’ space assets. With the advancement of space technology, the pool of emerging space powers and aspiring nations is increasing. However, the worrisome development for United States is the increasing space capabilities of Russia and

84 See, U.S. Military Uses of Space. 85 For complete details, see Jeffery Richelson, Space Sentinels: A History of the DSP and SBIRS Satellite Systems (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2012).

168 China, especially their military space developments. A newly released National Security Strategy under President Donald Trump’s administration emphasized that United States wants “unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space to a vital interest.”86 The document also suggests that

United States is closely monitoring all those states which are pursuing a range of anti-satellite weapons and in case of any activity of interfering or affecting United States’ interest in space

“will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner and domain of our choosing.”87

In this scenario, there are two major challenges which are being faced to the United States’ space assets: 1) emerging and aspiring space powers are developing their space capabilities to achieve their national security objectives as well as economic goals; and 2) states are developing such capabilities which “can defeat or destroy American space assets.”88 According to Gene McCall and John Darrah, Russia and China are developing anti-satellite missiles, high-power laser and microwave technology to counter United States’ space assets. From the United States point of view, these devices and technology developments are its mission-defeat assets.89

There is a need to secure space assets while maintaining a database of comprehensive awareness about the activities of other nations and space weather and environment, especially the movement of asteroids and meteoroids in space. The United States has raised a modern and technologically advanced SSA structure to do the above. SSA is designed to track the position of space objects, monitor communications in space, monitor activities in geosynchronous or geostationary orbits, determining passive threats to United States space assets, and provide

86 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The White House, December 2017), 31, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 87 Ibid. 88 Gene McCall and John Darrah, “Space Situational Awareness: Difficult, Expensive—and Necessary,” Air and Space Power Journal 28, no.6 (2014): 7. 89 Ibid.

169 facilities to control space assets and sensors.90 Besides, “it is a broad and fundamental set of activities that provide essential knowledge to improve the effectiveness of activities in the other space mission areas.”91

Figure 5.3: SSA Capabilities92 Figure 5.4: SSA Network93

90 In presentation given by representatives of U.S. government accountability office to the Senate Armed Service Committee, there are four major functions of SSA network. First, SSA will detect, track and identify the different space objects, and distinguish between objects and their type and use. The second function is to characterize the temporary and permanent threats to U.S space assets from natural objects and from the space capabilities of hostile nations. The third important function is to create threat warning and assess the space weather and space system anomalies and their potential impact. The fourth function is integrating data and provides decision-level SSA information to the combatant commands. For details see U.S Government Accountability Office, Space Situational Awareness: Status of Efforts and Planned Budgets, GAO-16-6R (Washington DC, 2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672987.pdf; and also see Ibid., 8-14. 91 Hays, “United States Military Uses of Space,” 1-20; For an overview on SSA function and capabilities see, John Kennewell and Ba-Ngu Vo, “An overview of space situational awareness,” (paper, 16th International Conference on Information Fusion 2013, Istanbul, Turkey), 1029-1036. 92 Peter Hays, “United States Military Uses of Space: Issues and Challenges,” (paper, International Symposium on Security Affairs 2015, Tokyo), 1-20.

170 In a bid to further augment SSA capabilities and foster the surveillance network, the

United States government is planning to spend some US$ 6 billion through 2020. The figure is not “comprehensive, nonetheless represents one of the most detailed accounting of SSA programs and funding released to date.” Importantly, the lion’s share of the funding went to the

Pentagon, and NASA “accounting for 10 percent of the total.”94 Figure 5.5: Five Lagrange In the future, United States is looking to park its dual-use assets Points associated with the Sun-Earth system in Lagrange Points (see Figure 5.6).95

United States is exploring these points in space for deep space exploration and for building an advanced SSA network to monitor the activities of hostile forces in space. These dual- use parking lots in space will allow United States to build a platform to launch future deep space exploration missions as well as carrying out military space activities.

93 Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-14, annex. 94 Mike Gruss, “U.S Plans $ 6 Billion investment in Space Situational Awareness,” Space News, October 19, 2015; and also see for complete breakdown of the funding, Space Acquisitions: Some Programs Have Overcome Past Problems, but Challenges and Uncertainty Remain for the Future, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Cristine Chaplain, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management). 95 There are five Lagrange points in space. A Lagrange point is a location in space where the gravitational fields of the Earth and the Moon or the Earth and the Sun intersect each other. The intersection of the gravitational field will create a point of equilibrium where a spacecraft may be parked to perform a dual- use function. Elizabeth Howell highlights that three out of five points; L1, L2, L3; are unstable points with precarious equilibrium. On the contrary, the L4 and L5 are stable as compared to L1, L2 and L3. The L4 and L5 may be used to build space colony; however, these are the points which can be best used to build a more advanced SSA network and well-placing communication satellites. If U.S or China, which is currently developing capabilities to explore these point, able to place their space assets then it will be making these assets physically untouchable for the adversary states in space. For stability of Lagrange points see, “Lagrange Points: Parking Places in Space,” Space.com, August 21, 2017, https://www.space.com/30302-lagrange-points.html; and for military uses of these points see, John Thomas Didymus, “Is growing Chinese Space Power a threat to the U.S?” Digital Journal, October 25, 2011, http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/313327; and see commentary on Chinese efforts to explore Lagrange Points, Dean Cheng, “China’s Move to CIS-Lunar Space,” Space News Magazine, November 21, 2016.

171 An important point is that since these points or parking places will be explored under

NASA; however, most of the payload will be carried under the supervision of United States defence forces. Hence, it can infer that if the payload is carried by United States army or air force then it will be an effort to further militarize outer space.96

Space Test Bed (STB) X-37B: The development, testing, demonstrating and launching of X-

37B has been shrouded in secrecy. The X-37B program was originally conceived, developed and demonstrated by the United States Air Force. According to the official USAF description, X-37B is an Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV) designed to test as a “technology demonstrator and experimental vehicle” to develop new technologies to build reusable space launch vehicle

(SLV).97 The official understanding of the program is about building reusable-SLVs; however, the vehicle can also be used for “orbital inspection, repair and retrieval.”98 The program has some specific military space uses which are directly proportional to space weaponization.

Experts see the development and successful stay of X-37B give the United States a backdoor channel to space weaponization and its secrecy has created fears and doubts in states like China and Russia about the actual beginning of space weaponization. It is widely believed that X-37B can carry a constellation of KKVs in the LEO and can station there and hit or intercept an incoming missile in its mid-course flight. After completing its four tests99 in outer space and passing the experimental phase, the USAF has inducted and operationalized two X-37Bs.100

96 Cartwright, discussion with the author. 97 Brian Weeden, “Fact Sheet: X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle,” Secure World Foundation, updated June 1, 2017, https://swfound.org/media/205879/swf_x-37b_otv_fact_sheet.pdf. 98 Ibid. 99 For complete details on X-37B test and number of days spent in space. See, Ibid. 100 See, Malcolm Davis, “Why Russia and China Should Fear the X-37B Space Plane,” The National Interest, October 19, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-russia-china-should-fear-the-x-37b-space- plane-18099.

172 Subrata Ghoshory, research affiliate in MIT’s Program in Science, Technology, and

Society (STAS), argues that the United States is the principal driver of space weaponization and its space test bed (STB) “X-37B is indeed being used to help develop critical technologies that lead down the path to the eventual weaponization of space.”101 The development and subsequent induction of X-37B is an integral part of United States efforts to follow a path from space militarization to space weaponization. Like many others, he has assessed the technologies used in building X-37B and finds that the plane can be used to carry missiles and can launch these missiles from space or can re-enter into the earth’s atmosphere to hit targets in anti-access/area- denial environment.102 The operationalization of X-37B is another step toward space weaponization and it is a significant space weaponization capability. Although many experts don’t think in the same manner as explained by Ghoshory, but here a question germinates over why USAF has still not shared the details of the mission and its flight parameters. X-37B is believed as a countermeasure to Russia and China’s increasing ASAT capabilities. General John

Hyten, Commander USSTRATCOM, told CBS on present-day competition between the United

States, China and Russia that “It’s a competition that I wish wasn’t occurring, but it is.”103

Likewise, Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson and General Hyten told CBS correspondent David

Martin that “United States is prepared to fight a war in space today, but not in the future.”104 An analysis of their argument suggests that United States possesses ample space weaponization capability that it can fight a war in space and the operationalization and induction of X-37B is a

101 For further details see, Subrata Ghoshory, “The X-37B: Backdoor Weaponization of Space,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 71, no.3 (2015): 19-29. 102 Earle Rice, Rockets and Satellites: Surveillance from Space (New York: Enslow Publishing, 2017), 4-8; and also Ibid., 20. 103 John Hyten, interview by David Martin, 60 Minutes, April 26, 2017, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/rare-look-at-space-command-satellite-defense-60-minutes/. 104 Jim Garamone, “U.S. Must Move Faster or Risk Losing Lead in Space,” U.S. Department of Defence, December 2, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1386361/us-must-move-faster-or-risk- losing-lead-in-space/.

173 significant step toward fostering its capabilities. Another key question on the X-37B is why the

USAF has never shared the technologies used in building these re-usable spacecraft and why it has over-stayed in space? These questions still need answers to these question related to the secrecy of X-37B, which can be used as a space weapon.

Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office: ORS is built and modelled on the foundations of USAF’s old Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO). The main purpose of ORS is to build redundant capabilities and, in case of physical damage or permanent blindness of a satellite, replace it promptly. The idea is to build such capabilities to replace any defunct or physically destroyed satellites in case of an enemy’s ASAT hit United States satellites in any orbit. Since its establishment in 2007, the ORS has shown progress and according to 2017 Space Security Index,

United States has remained focused on space mission assurance, emphasizing space resilience.105

Future Development: It is indeed a difficult task to determine a state’s exact course of action in space for future. For United States, the future is congested, crowded and contested in space.

There will be more actors in space and further expansion of space capabilities of its adversaries,

Russia and China. Due to its immense reliance on its space assets for dual-uses, any conflict in space would lead to an eventual further development and multilateral deployment of space weapons. At the moment, the current Trump administration is looking towards developing a full- scale strategic review of space warfare. Four major objectives are driving a strategic framework, which include a) strengthen and safety of the U.S. space assets and activities, b) establishing space deterrence and building necessary and sufficient space capabilities to defeat adversaries, c)

105 Marcus Weisgerber, “As the U.S. Air Force Turns Its Focus to Space, This Small Team Could Lead the Way,” Defence One, November 19, 2017, http://www.defenseone.com/business/2017/11/us-air-force-turns- its-focus-space-small-team-could-lead-way/142656/.

174 rapidly establish public-private partnership (PPP) within the U.S. commercial sector, and d) maintaining United States pre-eminence in space science and defence.106

Recently, Heather Wilson spoke at a conference titled Escalation and Deterrence in the

Second Space Age organized by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She notes the U.S. needs offensive space weapons and “we [U.S.] need the ability to create effects, defence ourselves and deter actions.”107 The statement from present U.S. Air Force Secretary is like putting new wine into old bottles. Likewise, the new strategic framework objectives are also similar to previous space posture reviews and policies. However, what is more, interesting is that

United States is the principal follower of the path lead from space militarization to weaponization. The new administration is looking forward with keen interest to augment United

States militarization and weaponization capability. The future development will continue as

United States may not look back until the near future to shun its space weapon development capabilities. The current trajectory of United States space activities for dual-use purposes is to strengthen its commercial industry as well as develop more space resilience capabilities. From the basic manifestation of deterrence, building capabilities are one of the three basic manifestations of any type of deterrence. For space deterrence, United States wants to build offensive counter-space capabilities in future to persuade its adversaries not to commit any course of action against it.108 However, United States is also committed to its primary objectives

106 Colin Clark, “SecAF Wilson Touts ‘Offensive’ Space Weapons; McMaster Details Framework,” Breaking Defence, October 6, 2017. 107 Quoted in Malcolm Davis, “The U.S. Thinks about Space Warfare,” Real Clear Defence, October 18, 2017, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/10/18/the_us_thinks_about_space_warfare_112491.html. 108 For details on space deterrence, Todd Harrison et al., Escalation and Deterrence in the Second Space Age (Washington DC: Center for International Strategic Studies, 2017); On multiple aspects of space deterrence and U.S. adversarial relations with China in Space, see an edited work of Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (eds.), Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations (Washington DC: Stimson Center, 2013); Demon Coletta, “Space and Deterrence,” Astropolitics 7, no. 3 (2009): 171-192; James Rendleman, “A Strategy for Space Assurance,” Astropolitics 8, no.2-3 (2010): 220-255; A detail work

175 of freedom of action in space under the umbrella of its space control doctrine. For both objectives, United States needs abundance and redundant space capabilities to ensure that it maintains a status quo in global space order and maintains its pre-eminence in future.

In a report launch ceremony organized by CSIS, Commander of United States Army

Space and Missile Defence Command, General James Dickinson highlighted some of the key threats to U.S. national security. One of them is the technological advancement of United States adversaries in the field of EW, counterspace, hypersonic missiles and cyber. He suggested that the United States should expand its kinetic capabilities with a cost-effective approach. In recent years, United States has demonstrated Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD) capability and expanded its capacity. In May 2017, Homeland Missile Defence (HMD) System successfully intercepted a ballistic missile target during FTG-15 flight test and has increased the number of ground-based interceptor from 14 by 2016 to a total of 44 in 2017. HMD also plans to conduct

GMD salvo flight test of FTG-19 and United States army anticipates long-range discrimination radar induction by 2020, which will be added to the U.S. BMD architecture. In addition to these capabilities, United States is also developing and testing new capabilities like high-energy lasers,

EW capabilities, and high powered microwave among other cost-effective solutions. United

States Army Space and Missile Defence Command as an enterprise is investing to develop, acquire, and integrate some of the emerging technologies that provide a technical edge against the emerging threats in all mediums of warfare including space. Army Space and Missile

Defence Command is investing in Dews and it has the potential to be a low-cost and effective complement to kinetic-energy options. The Command is experimenting on mobile high energy system which is a striker equipped with a 50KW laser with a fire manoeuvre. This has can be see, Rip Bulkeley and Graham Spinardi, Space Weapons: Deterrence or Delusion (Totowa, N.J: Barnes and Noble Books, 1986); and also see the views on deterrence in twenty-first century, Colin Gray, “Deterrence in the 21st Century,” Comparative Strategy 19, no.3 (2000):255-261.

176 successfully engaged in achieving its wide targets and the Command is developing and operationalizing more high power lasers up to 150 KW in future. The U.S Army is actively pursuing a “left-of-launch” strategy for many different threat sets. The term refers to any capability that affects the enemy’s ability to employ ballistic missiles to include cyber, space and air capabilities before they have missiles in flight. However, to build these capabilities sustainable financial resources are required as a missile interceptor may cost millions of dollars to develop. Likewise, it would not be cost-effective if a single missile worth millions of dollars would be launched to intercept a missile worth of few hundred thousand dollars. United States army is also actively engaged in developing a concept about multi-domain battles as a joint services concept for the twenty-first century. This includes developing war-fighting capabilities for the physical domain and placing greater emphasis on space and information environment to include cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum.

United States army is also developing multi-domain task forces initiatives that may change it in the future. The intent is to integrate organic and joint Counterair, Counterfire, cyberspace and space capabilities to ensure joint force freedom of action at the earliest of deterrence and conflict. The initial concept was approved in 2017 with a U.S. Pacific Command- led pilot program is being conducted in coming years. United States army is deriving a new strategy to address the emerging threats and capability development to fight multi-domain battles from land to space.109

109 The author attended the report launching ceremony at CSIS. For reference, General James Dickinson, “Distributed Defence: New Operational Concepts for Integrated Air and Missile Defence,” (speech, Report Launching Ceremony of Distributed Defence: New Operational Concepts for Integrated Air and Missile Defence, CSIS, Washington DC, January 25, 2018).

177 5.4 China

In the first twenty years of China’s space program, the rate of Chinese space launches remained low. China continued to follow the path of increasing them through the development of its indigenous manufacturing of SLVs and simultaneously showing significant progress in its satellite manufacturing industry through rigorous research and development (R&D). As a result of the linear but steady progress of its space program, China eventually surpassed Russia in 2015 to become second global space power after United States in terms of active (operational) satellites in outer space (see figure 5.1). Although, the combined number of space launches

(successful and failed) of former Soviet Union and modern-day Russia is more than the total space launches by United States, but number of dead Russian satellites has increased over the years. On the other hand, China continuously made progress in its space program and in the year

2016 Chinese space launches industry showed a “strong performance.”110

China considers space as one of the organs of its national security and an important factor in its overall national growth.111 Likewise, its space program has significantly contributed to its national economy over the years. China has increased its cooperation not only at the regional level but also at the global level, providing comparatively less space launch costs to the developing country than United States and Russia. China has significantly increased its military space activities over the years and in this regard, it has increased its space budget to meet the demand of its national security.112 However, an important aspect of Chinese space activities

110 Satellite Industry Association, 2017 State of the Satellite Industry Report, June 2017, http://www.sia.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/SIA-SSIR-2017.pdf 111 Ashley Tellis, “China’s Military Space Strategy,” Survival 49, no.3 (2007): 41-72. 112 Historically, China remained committed to explore outer space for peaceful purposes, but in its first White Paper on space activities published in 2000, China considered its space program vital for its national security. See, Marcia Smith, China’s Space Program: An Overview, CRS Report No. RS21641 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/space/RS21641.pdf.

178 budget is that it does not mention how much has been spent on its civilian space program and how much of its military space program.

Brian Harvey, a European space writer, argues that twenty-first century has witnessed the emergence of a great space power after the U.S. and the former Soviet Union.113 China has achieved a global space power status.114 In the last decade, it had made tremendous development in its space program.115 China has sent hundreds of payloads into space and successfully placed them for dual-use purposes.

China has developed various space militarization and weaponization capabilities and has been following the path from space militarization to space weaponization. In doing so, it has developed and showed its intent to further bolster its existing space technologies to expand its military space capabilities contributing to the militarization and weaponization of space. It has invested in building Large phased–array radar (LPAR) that supports both offensive and defensive capabilities, supporting Chinese ASATs or Ballistic Missile Early Warning (BMEW).

China has built SLVs which can carry equipment for communication, data relay, SSA and airborne imaging systems and can travel in near space. China is vigorously investing in imagery, navigation, communication, data relay, and ISR system satellites. Table 5.6 shows Chinese military space capabilities, which are used as a force multiplier or force enhancement. Its space program is expanding and has managed to improve its capabilities in space-based ISR, satellite communication, navigation, meteorology, human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.

113 For more details and analysis on Chinese advancement in space see, Brian Harvey, China in Space: The Great Leap Forward (New York: Springer, 2013). 114 Ajay Lele, “China: A Growing Military Space Power,” Astropolitics 3, no.1 (2005): 67-75; and also see Sanjay Poduval, “China’s Military Space Capabilities,” Maritime Affairs 7, no. 1 (2011): 85-201. 115 Anthony Cordesman and Joseph Kendall, Chinese Space Strategy and Development (Washington DC: Center for International Strategic Studies, 2016).

179 In 2016, China successfully launched the world’s first quantum communication satellite, which shows a notable advancement in cryptography science in China and will further secure its existing communication network as Quantum satellites are hack-proof.116 Likewise, China is heavily investing in building its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.117 These capabilities are the manifestation of Chinese A2/AD strategy “based around restricting enemy access to a certain strategic location.”118 Primarily, A2/AD is designed to “deter, dissuade or defeat” the involvement of a third party in an armed conflict over a territorial dispute.119 The several salients of Chinese A2/AD strategy include developing long-range precision strike, BMD system, offensive and defensive capabilities for surface and undersea operations and space and counterspace capabilities. In implementing A2/AD, China is rapidly developing space and counterspace capabilities with a focus on “ISR as well as advanced targeting, communications, naval, air, missile defence, and cyber capabilities.”120 Figure 5.1 shows that China has now more satellites in space than Russia, however, it is still far behind the U.S. China’s space program is expanding and is likely to complete its constellation of navigation satellites and launch more meteorological satellites which can be used for amphibious military strikes.

116 Sherisse Pham, “China Hits Milestone in Race to Create Hack-Proof Communications,” CNN, June 16, 2017, http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/16/technology/china-quantum-satellite-success/index.html; Tom Philips, “China launches quantum satellite for hack-proof communications,” The Guardian, August 16, 2016; and also see, “Chinese Satellite Sends Hack-Proof Message,” BBC, August 10, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40885723. 117 For further understanding on China’s military space strategy see, Tellis, “China’s Military Space Strategy,” 41-72. 118 Anthony Cordesman and Joseph Kendall, “How China Plans to Utilize Space for A2/AD in the Pacific,” The National Interest, August 17, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-china-plans- utilize-space-a2-ad-the-pacific-17383. 119 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, Annual Report to Congress (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defence, May 5, 2017), 49. 120 Cordesman and Kendall, “Space for A2/AD.”

180 Table 5.6: Chinese Space Militarization Capabilities

Space Militarization Capabilities Current Systems

Communication Major Satellite Series (FH, ST)

Early Warning TJS

Imaging Ziyuan-2, Yaogan-21 (Yoagan Series also used for Ocean Surveillance), Tiantuo-2,

Navigation Beidou-1, 2 and 3

Ocean Surveillance Yoagan Series, Haiyang-1A (HY-1A, HY-1B, HY-1C, HY-1D, HY-2A, HY-2B, HY-3)

Reconnaissance (optical, radar) FSW series, Yoagan Series and ZY series

SIGINT, COMINT, ELINT JSSW Series and Yoagan Series

FH = Feng Huo, TJS = Tongxin Jishu Shiyan, FSH = Fanhui Shi Weixing, JSSW = Ji Shu Shiyan Weixing

“Source: Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996-2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), chap 7 & 8; “Military Spacecraft-China,” Gunter’s Space Page, accessed January 1, 2018, http://space.skyrocket.de/directories/sat_mil_china.htm; and also see, 2017 Space Security Index, 99-100.”

China has released four White Papers since 2000 describing the principles, aims, objectives, goals and future plans of its space activities. The 2016 White Paper tells that China is planning to send more high-resolution land observation satellites in space for the environment and land surveying purposes. Also, it is also planning to send marine observation satellites in near future along with atmospheric observation satellites. Nonetheless, the near future goal of

Chinese space activities is to transfer its Asia-Pacific oriented BeiDou navigation system into a dual-use global enterprise by 2020 with an expansion of its PNT capabilities.121 For this purpose,

121 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Before Select Comm. on Intelligence (May 11, 2017) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence), 8; and also see, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Before Select Comm. on Intelligence (February 13, 2018) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence), 13.

181 it will add the remaining satellites into its BeiDou constellation by 2020, improving its positioning accuracy about four times.122 BeiDou can provide “low-rate data transmission for

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces.”123 One of the main reasons behind Chinese investment in building its global navigation enterprise was the denial of GPS during the Taiwan Strait crisis.

China decided to place its satellites in space in the early 1980s to reduce its military reliance on the U.S. GPS system. Initially, China had only been able to develop a small navigation system named Compass, however, it started building a larger constellation of navigation satellites in early 2004. Onwards, China’s ability to stretch the scope of its BeiDou system and is offering services to several of its regional partners like Pakistan and Iran. China is trying to extend its navigation system from a larger regional level to global navigation system which is officially named as Compass Navigation Satellite System (CNSS). A careful assessment suggests that

China will have 35 satellites in its global navigation system by 2020. These satellites will increase the PLA reliance on the system as it will give passive guidance for military applications and improving the precision and accuracy of its strategic strike weapons. As a result of CNSS,

Chinese reliance on GPS will be diminished.124

One of the global trends in space militarization is the improvement of SSA capabilities of the U.S., China and Russia, according to 2017 Space Security Index annual report. The U.S. is the leading spacefaring state with expending SSA capabilities, however, China is also following

122 Teruhisa Tsujino, “Chinese Space Policy and Space-Related Activities (Especially SSA),” (presentation, International Symposium on Ensuring Stable Use of Outer Space, Tokyo, Japan, March 4, 2016); and also read a detail assessment on the Chinese military space capabilities with a focus on its indigenous BeiDou system, Geoffrey Forden, “The Military Capabilities and Implications of China’s Indigenous Satellite- Based Navigation System,” Science and Global Security 12, no.3 (2004): 219-250. 123 On China space weapons, see IHS Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: China and Northeast Asia (Coulsdon, Surrey, UK: IHS Jane’s, IHS Global Limited, 2017), https://janes.ihs.com/ChinaNorthAsia/Display/1303170. 124 Ibid.

182 suit.125 China is developing capabilities to monitor space environment with a special focus on risks of debris collision, mitigation, early warning and protection of its space assets. China is assumed to have SSA sensors and a network of phased array radar, “each likely to have 3,000 km range and 120 degrees of azimuth coverage,”126 and is likely to further improve this capability in near future.127 Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director South Asia Center in Atlantic

Council, believes that China is still lagging behind the U.S. and Russia when it comes to global

SSA network. He thinks that China still needs to develop more capabilities to make its own global SSA network.128

Chinese Counterspace and ASAT Capabilities: Some assessments about Chinese counterspace and ASAT capabilities development suggest that China has rapidly expanded them in recent years. Observers believe in a possible Sino-U.S. armed conflict in the future. According to Daniel Coats, Director of National Intelligence:

“We [U.S intelligence agencies] assess that, if a future conflict were to occur involving Russia or China, either country would justify attacks against US and allied satellites as necessary to offset any perceived US military advantage derived from military, civil, or commercial space systems.”129 U.S. intelligence agencies believe that if Chinese space capabilities continue to grow at this pace then Chinese counterspace capabilities “could endanger assets that are critical to

Washington's launch-on-warning nuclear posture.”130 In 2015, China established its Strategic

Support Force (SSF) which is reportedly guiding PLA’s space, cyber and EW missions. China is

125 See, Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, (statement by Coast). 126 Brian Weeden, Paul Cefola and Jaganath Sankaran, “Global Space Situational Awareness Sensors,” (paper, 11th annual AMOS Conference, Hawaii, September 14-17, 2011). 127 Tsujino, “Chinese Space Policy.” 128 Bharath Gopalaswamy (Atlantic Council) in discussion with the author, January 5, 2018. 129 See, Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, (statement by Coast), 13. 130 Bharath Gopalaswamy, “Much ado about Nothing,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 27, 2015, https://thebulletin.org/space-weapons-and-risk-nuclear-exchanges8346.

183 also developing counterspace capabilities that aim to “degrade and deny the use of space-based assets by adversaries during a crisis or conflict.”131

One of the most widely discussed space incidents since the beginning of the twenty-first century is the Chinese ASAT missile test in 2007. It was first successful ASAT missile test by any state after the end of the Cold War. Before this test which knocked out Chinese defunct weather satellites, only the U.S. and the former Soviet Union were able to test such capabilities.

The 2007 ASAT test allowed China to demonstrate its capability of hitting a satellite in space.

Geoffery Forden of MIT in discussion with Noah Shachtman argues that Chinese test “threw the international community into a panic.”132 Forden argues that “U.S. forces have worried about an attack on U.S. satellites,” and these worries are stemmed from the increasing pool of actors in space.133 Likewise, Forden published his assessment on a possible Chinese space assault on

American satellites in case of armed conflict. He thinks that Chinese capabilities are not sufficient to withstand U.S. space capabilities, but are enough to create unbearable damage to

U.S. intelligence-gathering satellites. But he concludes that in a worst-case scenario if China can destroy half of U.S. navigation satellites and ISR capability, even then the U.S. continues to survive and provide data to its ground army to launch an attack on the Chinese military.134

China is developing high-tech microsatellites with proximity functions. China has made significant advancements in establishing a domestic industrial base to expand its satellite manufacturing industry. On January 9, 2018, a congressional hearing was held to assess China’s pursuit of emerging and exponential technologies. During the hearing, Congressman Austin

131 Ibid. 132 Noah Shachtman, “How China Loses the Coming Space War-Part 1,” The Wired, October 1, 2008, https://www.wired.com/2008/01/inside-the-chin/. 133 Ensuring America’s Space Security (Washington DC: Federation of American Scientists, 2004), https://fas.org/pubs/_docs/10072004163650.pdf; and for further details, see James Moltz, Crowded Orbits: Conflicts and Cooperation in Space (Columbia University Press; New York, 2014). 134 Forden, “China and Space War,” 138-153.

184 Scott asked a particular question about expanding the satellite industry in China and the witnesses testified that China’s satellite industry is rapidly expanding and is attracting worldwide costumers.135 Besides this observation, it is believed that China “envisions using microsatellites for numerous civil and military missions, using formations of smaller satellites to reduce vulnerability to attack.”136 Importantly, China has launched numerous microsatellites over the years and is planning to send them in GEO and Polar orbits. Likewise, China has built mobile

SLVs to launch microsatellites and nanosatellites for military purposes.

China’s manned space program is a significant source of its electronic intelligence as it is widely believed that the Shenzhou spacecraft provides substantial Electronic Intelligence

(ELINT) and image-gathering capability.137 Previously launched Shenzhou-6, 1 and 2 contained

ELINT capability. Moving toward further advancement, the Shenzhou spacecraft have successfully docked in space. Shenzhou-8 docked with Tiangong-1, 340 km above sea level.

Likewise, Shenzhou-9 also successfully docked with Tiangong-1 in 2012, and Shenzhou-10 docked with Tiangong-1 in 2013. The successfully docking of China Shenzhou spacecraft highlighted some key dual-use purposes. In 2008, China partially blinded one of U.S. many reconnaissance satellites in LEO with its ground-based lasers. The targeting has shown that

China has some advanced high-power laser systems. China has developed laser with a capability ranges from 50-100Kw and it is believed that it will reach 1 MW in future. A one MW laser can hit a target 5000 km away.138

U.S. space experts believe that Chinese counterspace capabilities are a serious threat to

U.S. activities in space. Ashely Tellis, senior fellow in Carnegie Endowment for International

135China’s Pursuit of Emerging and Exponential Technologies, 115th Cong. (2018), https://youtu.be/KnGTma- npvU. 136 See, Country Risk Assessments: China. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid.

185 Peace (CEIP), in a congressional hearing of the subcommittee of U.S. Senate Armed Committee, argued that the current trajectory and evolving Chinese counterspace capabilities pose a serious threat to U.S. military operations in Asia-Pacific.139 Tellis further stated that Chinese rapid development and diversity in its counterspace program, especially the development of direct- ascent and co-orbital ASATs threatening to U.S. space operations. China is also increasing and fostering its EW capabilities and has shown a keen interest in developing its DEWs and radio frequency weapons and computer network attack capabilities. These capabilities are used for the soft killing of the satellites and are very difficult to respond as there are challenges of attribution.140

Ashley Tellis also thinks that it is difficult for the U.S. to dissuade China not to invest in counterspace capabilities. Tellis argues that the only plausible reason behind it is the Chinese thinking of having a geopolitical competition with the U.S. and this thinking has driven its military planners to prepare an aggressive military space strategy and accordingly develop capabilities to neutralize U.S. space assets in case of any future armed conflict.141 Tellis describes Chinese counterspace capabilities as diversified, remarkable, and comprehensive.

China’s major emphasis for developing counterspace capabilities is to build surveillance and identification systems, DEWs for dazzling and blinding satellites, developing capabilities for EW to launch “attacks against space platforms and their associated links as well as against

139 People’s Republic of China’s Counterspace Program and the Implications for U.S. National Security, Senate, 113th Cong., (January 28, 2014) (statement of Ashley Tellis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). 140 Gopalaswamy, discussion with author. 141 Tellis, testimony on China’s Counterspace Program.

186 conventional forces and their warfighting operation,” and “improving kinetic and non-kinetic forms of ground attack aimed at the control segments of an adversary’s space infrastructure.”142

China also has an incentive to target LEO satellites. These satellites are used for photographic reconnaissance and surveillance purposes. Chinese ccounterspace capabilities can interfere with their function through laser dazzling. Likewise, Chinese counterspace arsenal also includes both terrestrial and orbital jamming of communication satellites. Michael Krepon, co- founder of Stimson Center, argues that Chinese counterspace capabilities are not new, and these capabilities were present during Cold War. At that time the U.S. was focusing on the Soviet threat, now Chinese counterspace capabilities are a new threat for the U.S. space programs.

Krepon argues that the U.S. does not need further development of its counterspace capability

“that messes space up for us as well as for the other guy.”143

China’s space strategy is primarily focused on building A2/AD capabilities in the region.

A particular reason behind building such capabilities is to deny the U.S. any strategic orientation to counter rising Chinese military and economic power in and around its mainland, especially in

Southeast Asia. It is also building artificial islands in Southeast Asia with most built to provide military support to PLA operations in the region.144 China is building its space program to augment its A2/AD capabilities for this particular purpose. Tellis believes that post-Cold War, the geopolitical realities have been changed and shifted Eastward because of the rising Chinese

142 Ashley Tellis, “China’s Space Capabilities and U.S. Security Interests,” Carnegie Endowment for International Pace, October 1, 2008, http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/10/01/china-s-space-capabilities- and-u.s.-security-interests-pub-22595. 143 People’s Republic of China’s Counterspace Program and the Implications for U.S. National Security, Senate, 113th Cong., (January 28, 2014) (statement of Michael Krepon, Co-founded Stimson Center) 144 “A Constructive Year For Chinese Base Building,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed January 3, 2018, https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-chinese- building/.

187 power.145 Since 1950, U.S. has protected and preserved its interests in the Eurasian region. To further consolidate its interests after Cold War, U.S is making efforts under its rebalancing strategy to preserve the Eurasian space and not letting any local power emerge as a regional hegemon. At the moment, AS rising Chinese power may pose a potential threat to the rebalancing efforts of the U.S. and the security of U.S. allies in South East Asia. There are four underpinning elements to the rebalance strategy. First, China’s rise is an enduring reality;

Second, China will have to be managed in ways other than war. Although, the U.S. has all military means to coerce China but the luxury of war as an instrument to contain China would not be cost-effective. The reason for such an assertion is that both Chinese and U.S. economies are interdependent. Whereas, it was not the case during the Cold War, as the U.S. and USSR did not share any interdependence and therefore it was easier to contain the Soviet Union. Third,

China has risen so dramatically that an in-equilibrium has occurred in the East, increasing demands by the U.S. allies for an increased U.S. presence in the region. Now, the U.S. has to deal with China not only at bilateral level but at multilateral levels too to prevent its allies from bandwagoning with China, thereby enhancing Beijing’s regional power. The rebalance is a way to sustain U.S. credibility as a security provider in the region. For that purpose, the U.S. strategy is based on three core elements; military; economic and diplomatic. Rebalance has involved an expansion of spatial component of U.S. strategy. This means that the rebalance is not towards

East Asia, but rather towards the whole Indo-Pacific region.

Tellis argues that militarily the U.S. has significantly increased its presence throughout the region. Presently Guam, Australia and the Philippines have seen U.S. military reinforcement.

U.S. is finding ways of defeating China’s A2/AD strategy. If China can employ A2/AD strategy

145 Ashley Tellis, “United States’ Asia Rebalance Strategy,” (lecture, South Asia Strategic Stability Institute University, Islamabad, May 4, 2016).

188 and deny U.S. military reinforcement to reach the periphery of Asia, it will be the end of U.S.-

Asian alliance system. This is an important and serious development as U.S sees Chinese counterspace capabilities with a pinch of salt. U.S. experts, including Tellis, believe that if the

U.S. failed to counter Chinese A2/AD and its rising space power in the region and then there will be serious setbacks to U.S. rebalancing and its core national interests in the Asian region.

Gopalaswamy also thinks that China has developed kinetic energy ASATs and has taken space “as a theatre to counter U.S. military space assets.” Gopalaswamy regards China military program to have made significant development in ASAT capabilities. China considers its kinetic energy space weaponry as an essential tool to deter any aggression on its space assets. Likewise,

China is also developing non-kinetic ability and Gopalaswamy assesses that it has capabilities since at least 2006. He believes that Chinese advancement in developing its kinetic and non- kinetic elements of space weaponry is troubling, creating vulnerabilities to U.S. space assets.146

5.5 India

On April 30, 1970, the U.S embassy in New Delhi sent a telegram with subject Indian Rocket and Satellite Launching Capabilities to the State Department back in Washington DC highlighting a growing confusion in the Indian space scientist community regarding “the size, range, payload and status of development of launching vehicles and necessary propellants, guidance systems, etc.”147 The telegram also highlights that thirty American scientists were to help Indian scientists in conducting scientific experiments at Thumba to get accurate information on the abovementioned issues.148 The observations on India’s space program activities in the past and their present status suggest that India has come a long way to achieve excellence in its space

146 Gopalaswamy, discussion with author. 147 United States Embassy India, Indian Rocket and Satellite Launching Capabilities, April 30, 1970, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1679140201?accountid=12084. 148 Ibid.

189 program. The long journey started in 1975 when India launched its first satellite in space and in

1980 India became the sixth country to achieve its indigenous satellite launch capability.149 A comparison between last ten years for space launches by India and the time between 1975 and

2009 show a drastic improvement in India’s space launches. Figure 5.9 shows that India space launches in last ten years. Interestingly, India’s space program got help from the former Soviet

Union and continues to collaborate with Russia. Likewise, India got help from the U.S. at the beginning of its space program and both countries are still collaborating in multiple areas.150 On

January 12, 2018, India launched its 100th satellite in space.151 Likewise, Indian scientists also claimed that Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) can manufacture mini-PSLV in just three days. The scientific achievement was revealed by Director of Thiruvananthapuram-based

Vikram Sarabhai Space Center (VSSC) Dr K Sivan while speaking to the journalists on the sidelines of a seminar titled Indian Space Program held in November 2017.152 If India can manufacture and launch its mini-PSLV in near future then it would be another feather in its space cap. India’s civilian and controlled program is progressing with a balanced and focused agenda.

Likewise, according to U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency’s assessment, “India is using a building block approach to develop its space program.”153

149 United States Embassy India, Office of the Defence Attaché, Indian Space Program, January 6, 1988, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1679139279?accountid=12084. 150 At the beginning of India’s space program, US helped India in the SITE project to design and build a TV system for India. Likewise, former Soviet Union helped India in building Indian Scientific Satellite Project (ISSP), which was the first step towards Indian Satellites. For details see, United States Embassy India, Status of Indian Space Program, July 6, 1974, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1679140176?accountid=12084. 151 “With 31 Satellites Abroad PSLV, ISRO launches its 100th Satellite,” DD News, January 12, 2018, http://ddinews.gov.in/ISRO-satellites-single%20mission-31. 152 Surendra Singhi, “ISRO’s Plan: A Rocket that Can be Made in 3 Days,” The Times of India, updated November 22, 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/isros-plan-a-rocket-that-can-be-made-in-3- days/articleshow/61746668.cms. 153 United States Defence Intelligence Agency, India's Civilian Space Program, November 1986, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1679111547?accountid=12084.

190 Moreover, India is just small steps away from making its first space shuttle. On 23 May

2016, Indian scientists announced that Indian will begin its mission to launch its first indigenous space shuttle.154 The Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) is India’s first reusable space vehicle which will help ISRO to reduce its satellite launch costs. It will be mounted on a top of a rocket to form two-stages-to-orbit (TSTO). The Indian government invested around $15 million in this project. ISRO says that if the project is a success, it could revolutionize Indian endeavours to space travel, by reducing costs by as much as 10 times through the use of reusable technology.

This could see the cost of transporting materials into space cut to around $2,000 per kilogram.

The main objective is to access space with minimum cost possible.155 Its space shuttle launch will put India in the pool of space-faring nations that successfully tested the launch of space shuttles. It is not just a technology demonstration but proof that how much far India has progressed in the field of space exploration. The test aims at a larger plan to build a fully functional two stages of orbit vehicle. It will make India more attractive in the launcher market for developing nations. ISRO showed the maturing of its expertise in different spheres of space technology, inter-planetary journeys, flight testing of the critical cryogenic engines, testing its heaviest rockets for their stability during the flight and taking baby steps towards manned space missions.

Right from the beginning of its space program, India is developing satellites for three major purposes, a) space-based communication, b) space-based remote sensing, and c) space-

154 “India’s Reusable Launch Vehicle-Technology Demonstrator (RLV-TD), Successfully Flight Tested,” ISRO, May 23, 2016, https://www.isro.gov.in/update/23-may-2016/india%E2%80%99s-reusable-launch- vehicle-technology-demonstrator-rlv-td-successfully. 155

191 based meteorology.156 Other areas of interest in space for India are navigation and geodesy.

Besides, India has successfully built and launched its sounding rockets, Space Launch Vehicle

(SLV)-3, Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). Initially, PSLV production suffered major setbacks in India because of non-availability of parts and materials to build PSLV and the inclusion of the procurement of vital parts to PSLV in the Missile Technology Control Regime

(MTCR) in 1986. However, the MTCR restriction did not cause major damage to India’s PSLV fabrication and India continued to invest in its domestic industrial base to indigenize PSLV manufacturing. As a result, there are more than three hundred private small and large companies that can help the country to manufacture its PSLV without any foreign help.157

India’s space policy was initially pivoted around the socioeconomic development of the country. However, with time, especially after the Kargil conflict in 1999, there were growing concerns about lack of a military space program. Jacob Chriqui, who worked at Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) India, writes that the Kargil conflict, when Pakistani troops entered the Indian-held Kashmir without the notice of Indian armed forces, pushed Indian policymakers to rigorously pursue its space program, especially for independent indigenous reconnaissance satellite capability. As earlier discussed, India has thirteen plus dedicated military satellites in space. The recent CartoSat series launch will further increase Indian imagery reconnaissance in

156 United States Embassy India, Space Research and Development in India Government of India, Department of Space Report for 1972-1973 Included, July 17, 1973, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1679111553?accountid=12084. 157 For details on development of SLV in India see, Rajaram Nagappa, “Development of Space Launch Vehicles in India,” Astropolitics 14, no.2-3 (2016): 158-176; On private sector involvement in India’s space program, see Narayan Prasad, “Industry Participation in India’s Space Program: Current Trends and Perspective for the Future,” Astropolitics 14, no.2-3 (2016): 237-255; “Traditional Space and New Space Industry in India: Current Outlook and Perspectives for the Future,” in Space India 2.0: Commerce, Policy, Security and Governance Perspectives, eds. Rajeswari Rajagopalan and Narayan Prasad (New Delhi: Mohit Enterprises, 2017).

192 space. ISRO scientists believe that the 2018 Cartosat launch is like placing an “eye in the skies,” as the satellite will provide imagery data to Indian security agencies to track military activities in

South Asia covering Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Nepal and Sri Lanka.158

Recently launched Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces-2017 suggests that India will make sure that it has enough counterspace capability. India’s change of policy from purely a socioeconomic and non-military approach to an increased military space policy dates back to

Kargil conflict. During then, U.S. shut down GPS links to Indian Air Force (IAF) as a conflict management tool to stop the escalation of Indian and Pakistani armies fighting with each other.159 Benjamin Lambeth quoted Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail of PAF that IAF flew during the Kargil crisis without GPS and suffered initial losses. The IAF adopted some makeshift solutions without GPS to fly their MiG-21, MiG-23BN, and MiG-27.

After Kargil, the Subrahmanyam Committee on Kargil report recommended Indian govt to fasten its belt to develop India’s navigation satellite system for military uses.160 That was the time when India decided to accelerate its space program not only for civil purposes but also for military purposes.161 Table 5.8 shows Indian space militarization capabilities. India has around thirteen and recently launched Cartosat-2 satellites in space on 12 January 2018, in space for the

158 Rupam Jain, “India sends its 100th satellite into space to watch borders,” Reuters, January 12, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-launch-india/india-sends-its-100th-satellite-into-space-to- watch-borders-idUSKBN1F10HR. 159 Secretary SUPARCO/Executive Director ISNET Haider Ali Khan, “Space Programs in South Asia,” (lecture, 15th Senior Officers Management Course-2016, Pakistan Institute of Applied Engineering (PIEAS), Islamabad, April 22, 2016); Ishan Srivastava, “How Kargil Spurred India to Design Own GPS,” The Times of India, April 5, 2014; and also see Ajay Lele answer to a question asked on IDSA website, see, “Bhumish Khudkhudia asked: Is it true that the United States had denied GPS to India during the Kargil War? Did the denial lead to the development of IRNSS by ISRO?” IDSA, accessed January 16, 2018, https://idsa.in/askanexpert/united-states-had-denied-gps-during-the-kargil-war. 160 From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000). 161 “How Kargil War with Pak propelled India to Elite Space Club,” Deccan Chronicle, April 29, 2016, https://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/290416/how-kargil-war-with-pak-propelled- india-to-elite-space-club.html.

193 military space program.162 Primarily, the satellites are remote-sensing satellites and their function is to keep an eye on India’s borders on land and sea. The Cartosat series and other satellites in space are used by the Indian military for surveillance purposes.163 On Cartosat-2 launch,

Pakistan’s foreign office spokesperson Dr Muhammad Faisal responded to a query asked by Essa

Naqvi of Dunya News about Cartosat-2 launch for surveillance capability and India’s increasing investment in space defence and surveillance. Dr Faisal replied that

“all space technologies, including earth observation satellites, are inherently dual- use and can be employed for both civilian and military purposes. All states have a legitimate right to pursue peaceful uses of space technologies. However, given the dual-use nature of such technologies, such pursuits mustn't be directed towards a buildup of destabilizing military capabilities, which can negatively impact the regional strategic stability.”164 India’s space militarization capability is growing. India is likely to expand its regional navigation satellite system into a global enterprise in the coming years. Likewise, it is also investing in its remote sensing satellite network.

Table 5.7: India’s Space Militarization Capabilities165

Space Militarization Capabilities Current Systems (Satellites)

Communication INSAT-series GSAT-series (7, 11, 14)

Table 5.7 (continued)

Early Warning Rudimentary Early Warning capabilities

Geodesy None

Positioning, Navigation, Timing IRNSS-IA, IB, IC, ID, IE, IF and IH

162 On CartoSat-2 launch, see “PSLV-C40/Cartosat-2 Series Satellite Mission,” ISRO, January 12, 2018, https://www.isro.gov.in/launcher/pslv-c40-cartosat-2-series-satellite-mission. 163 Surendra Singh, “Military using 13 satellites to keep eye on foes,” The Times of India, June 26, 2017. 164 Zaman Mehdi, Political Counsellor in Pakistan’s Embassy Washington DC, WhatsApp direct message to author, January 11, 2018. 165 Quoted in Benjamin Lambeth, “Airpower in India’s 1999 Kargil War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no.3 (2012): 289-316.

194 Table 5.7 (continued) (PNT)

Nuclear Detection None

Remote Sensing (ISR) INSAT 3D, Kalpana and INSAT 3A RESOURCESAT -series CARTOSAT-series (2C, ,) RISAT-1, 2 (reconnaissance satellites) TES Oceansat-1/2

SIGINT/COMINT/ELINT India has SIGINT capability. DRDO is developing an ELINT cluster. Limited COMINT (GSAT-7 & 6).

Meteorology INSAT-series and METSAT-1

Source: “Satellites of India,” Gunter’s Space Page, accessed December 21, 2017, http://space.skyrocket.de/directories/sat_c_india.htm."

India has also shown a keen interest in building its ASAT capability. Statements in the past of India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), IAF and ISRO chiefs have made it clear that India has the capability to build a ground-based kinetic energy ASAT weapon to hit a target satellite in LEO.166 Bharath Gopalaswamy and Gaurav Kampani believe that Indian political leadership has still not endorsed the statements of DRDO, IAF and ISRO chiefs.167 However, Harsh Vasani, a research scholar at the Department of Geopolitics and

International Relations of Manipal University, India, believes that Indian capability of building an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile is real. India’s main concern was the Chinese ASAT test and like lessons learned from Kargil War, Indian scientists and the military community began to talk

166 During the discussion with Dr Ashley Tellis tells the author that India has achieved the capability to launch an ASAT missile to hit a target in LEO. He further argued that if India conducts its ASAT in future then it will be hit a target in LEO so that no space debris will be created. Ashley Tellis (Senior Fellow, CEIP) in discussion with the author, February 13, 2018. 167 Bharath Gopalaswamy and Gaurav Kampani, “Piggybacking Anti-Satellite Technologies on Ballistic Missile Defence: India’s Hedge and Demonstrate Approach,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 19, 2011, www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=43655.

195 about the building and neutralizing enemy’s satellites. Former DRDO chief and then Scientific

Advisor to the Defence Minister Dr V K Saraswat stated that “India has all the technologies and building blocks which can be used for ASAT missions in LEO and polar orbits.”168 Saraswat’s statement came after India’s Agni-V long-range ballistic missile test in 2011.169 Gopalaswamy and Kampani argue that DRDO testing of a short-range ballistic missile interceptor in 2011, a radio-frequency seeker, and a fibre-optic gyroscope are some key instruments in building a ground-based ASAT missile.170 In another profound statement, Saraswat stated that Agni-V successful missile launch test has provided India with an opportunity to build its ASAT capability. He stated that “an ASAT weapon would require reaching about 800km altitude. Agni-

V gives you the boosting capability and the 'kill vehicle', with advanced seekers, will be able to home into the target satellite.”171 Before Saraswat’s statement, IAF Chief PV Naik spoke in a lecture that "our satellites are vulnerable to ASAT weapon systems because our neighbourhood possesses one."172 Rajeswari Rajagopalan of ORF believes that Indian military space program got attention in Indian armed forces after the successful test of Chinese ASAT test in 2007. It was a wake-up call for India. After Chinese ASAT test, the scientific and technical communities and IAF started thinking about India’s response and India’s potential to build and test its own

ASAT in future. Rajagopalan believes that “India has a missile defence system under development, and the potential for India to acquire an ASAT capability is linked to missile

168 T Subramanian and Y Mallikarjun, “Capability to neutralize enemy satellites proved,” The Hindu, March 7, 2011. 169 On January 18, 2018, India tested Agni-V missile, see Joshua Berlinger and Nikhil Kumar, “India tests- fires Agni-V, a Nuclear-Capable ICBM,” CNN, updated January 18, 2018, http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/18/asia/india-icbm-tests/index.html. 170 Gopalaswamy and Kampani, “Anti-satellite technologies.” 171 Rajat Pandit, “After Agni-V launch, DRDO’s New Target is Anti-Satellite Weapons,” The Times of India, April 21, 2012. 172 Quoted in Bharath Gopalaswamy and Harsh Pant, “Does India Need Anti-Satellite Capability?” Rediff.com, February 9, 2010, http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/feb/09/does-india-need-anti-satellite- capability.htm.

196 defence capabilities.”173 From IAF and DRDO chiefs’ statements and with the technological advancement in frequency seeker and fibre-optic gyroscope, India can build an ASAT capability with little modifications in its currently developed Agni-V ballistic missile. It is a fact that ASAT is a spin-off of ICBM, therefore, it can be assumed that Agni-V which has 5000 plus km range can be modified into a ground-based ASAT missile and can target satellites in LEO.174 The statements from the chiefs of India’s strategic organizations show a significant development toward building an ASAT capability. On the other hand, many Indian space experts believe that

Indian scientific community is open to an ASAT test with extreme caution. Likewise, a space security expert Rajeswari Rajagopalan believes that India might do an ASAT test in the next five to 10 years. For building ASAT capability, advanced space associated technologies like space- based sensors, synthetic aperture radars, electronics and navigation/guidance systems in space are required by a state. At present, India has made considerable capability development in aforementioned areas. In contrast, there is a difference of opinion on India’s ability to build an

ASAT capability. Experts believe that to develop an ASAT capability requires a real-time test or demonstration of the capability by India. In case, India does not demonstrate a capability then it will be considered as a “paper tiger.”175 On the contrary, Indian intelligence and strategic affairs pundits do not endorse a test of ASAT capability by India as it may propel China to declare India as an existential threat to its space assets. Seemingly, a consensus has emerged in India not to test its ASAT capability as long as China remains engaged with the U.S. and both major space powers continue to engage in a space competition. In case, India desire to test its ASAT

173 Rajeswari Rajagopalan, “India’s Space Program Challenges, Opportunities, and Strategic Concerns,” interview by Xiaodon Liang, The National Bureau of Asian Research, February 2016, http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/outreach/NBR_IndiaCaucus_Feb2016.pdf. 174 Harsh Vasani, “India’s Anti-Satellite Weapons,” The Diplomat, June 14, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/indias-anti-satellite-weapons/. 175 Ibid.

197 capability, then it has to assess the after-effects of the test first and if feasible then can go for demonstrating its ASAT capability.

The assessment of India’s missile and SLV capabilities suggests that India has sufficient missile and SLV capability to develop an ASAT missile for LEO. A modified Agni-V with advance frequency seekers and gyroscope can hit a target in LEO. DRDO claims that Agni-V has a range equal to 5000 km and it is a Long-Range Ballistic Missile (LRBM). This range does not put Agni-V in the ICBM missile club. DRDO’s claim is usually countered by Chinese and

Pakistani experts who think DRDO has downplayed the range of the missile so that its range does not bring many European capitals under its radar. Chinese and Pakistani experts assessed

Agni-V range more than 5000 km and likely to 8000 km.176 From this point of view, a modified

Agni-V missile can be converted into an ASAT missile to hit its target in LEO. To hit a target in other orbits, India has Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) rockets in its inventory. It is a three-stage rocket developed by ISRO to carry a payload of more than 4 tons.177

On GSLV MK III’s potential to hit a satellite in geostationary orbits, a difference of opinion has emerged in Indian strategic thinking. A group of Indian space experts believes that GSLV Mk III can be modified with advance seekers, navigational techniques, and equipment to target a satellite in the geostationary orbit. A counter argument by other strategic thinkers on GSLV Mk

III that it may not hit a satellite in geostationary orbit as India may not has some advance thermal imagery seekers which can locate and hit a target with pinpoint accuracy. In doing so, India needs to augment these techniques first and it can develop and operationalize this capability only through demonstration or test in LEO. Any demonstration by India’s ASAT capability would

176 “The Mystery Surrounding Agni 5’s Range,” One India, January 18, 2018, https://www.oneindia.com/india/the-mystery-surrounding-agni-5-s-range-2622954.html. 177 For details see, “GLSV Mk III: About the Launch Vehicle,” ISRO, accessed January 18, 2018, https://www.isro.gov.in/launchers/gslv-mk-iii.

198 create hazardous space debris in LEO. In 2017, India has made a world recording by sending 104 satellites in LEO, however, space just experts believe that the powerful rocket created hazardous space debris in LEO, which ISRO experts denied and it was stated by one ISRO scientist to

Hindustan Times that:

“ISRO has developed the models and software for statistical analysis of risk due to space debris and close approach of debris to the functional satellites and to prevent in-orbit break-up by designing spacecraft to be not susceptible to on-orbit explosion.”178 India is cautious about space debris problem as it also annoys major spacefarers. India is an expanding regional space power and likely to attain global status in near future. However, space is a unique environment, crowded and congested domain is likely to challenge the U.S. superiority. In the meanwhile, U.S. policy toward India’s space program is not publically stated.

India and the U.S. have signed Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in 2004 which spelled out nuclear and space cooperation. However, it would be interesting to see the U.S. response on

India’s growing military space program and in case what would be its response to an Indian

ASAT test, if conducted in future.

Besides that, India space program has tremendously contributed to developing its ballistic missile program. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) declassified document, assessing ballistic missile capabilities of India and Pakistan, that India’s Agni missile program was likely to be scraped and Indian scientists were not certain about its future. Indian officials claimed that Agni was just a “technology demonstrater not intended for production and deployment.”179 India’s scientific community argued that Agni missile program was tested and it will cease after its four

178 Sanchita Sharma, “Space Junk is a Problem but Don’t blame it on ISRO,” Hindustan Times, February 16, 2017. 179 “Ballistic Missiles in India and Pakistan,” (official document, Washington DC: Directorate of Intelligence, copy date Jun 15, 1998), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000822286.pdf.

199 test flights. India recently tested Agni-V with an officially declared range of 5000 plus. India first tested Agni-V in 2011, rebuffing all past U.S. assessments about the Agni missile program.

The reason behind India’s extension of Agni is its space program. ISRO and DRDO have separate mandates and expertise but Agni-V missile is seemingly the joint product of India’s

SLV and ballistic missile programs as the possibility of interexchange components and technologies to build LRBMs and ICBMs cannot be ruled out. Ajay Lele argues that Medium

Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) and SLV capabilities are essentially used in developing

ICBM capability. As discussed earlier, India is developing is GSLV MK III capability which can carry 5500 lbs weight in space, and it is assessed that if GSLV technologies are used to develop an ICBM than “it would be a major ICBM, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 14,000 km.”180

India and Israel are rigorously collaborating in developing India’s military space program. Israel has helped India in developing Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) which serves

India’s tri-service Defence Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) Defense Imagery Processing and

Analysis Center (DIPAC) at Gwalior.181 The remote sensing satellites being used by DIPAC for reconnaissance purposes can give an imagery resolution from 25 metres to 1 metre. However,

India’s older reconnaissance satellites are unable to see in cloudy or pitch dark environments.

But, India has placed its RISAT series satellites with submetre resolution power and can see in

180 Jim Hackett, “The Ballistic Missile Threat: India and Pakistan,” Center for Defence and International Security studies, August 1996, quoted in Ajay Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality? (London & New York: Springer, 2013), 134 and Andrew Feickert and Alan Konstadt, Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia, CRS report no. RL32115 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, October 17, 2003), CRS-25. 181 Jaganath Sankaran, “China-India Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?” (presentation, Science, Technology and Energy Seminar, Belfer Center’s South Asia Center, February 26, 2014).

200 cloudy or pitch dark environments.182 To improve its C4I2SR capability, India has made substantial advancements in building its navigational system. The development of Indian

Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) is considered to be an alternative or replacement of U.S. GPS in the country. ISRO considers the establishment of IRNSS as a quantum leap in

Indian space program as India rigorously pursuing its space navigation enterprise. “India’s missiles are GPS reliant for accurate targeting.”183 Learning from India’s Kargil experience when it was denied with GPS by the U.S. as a conflict management tool, India is likely to complete its own regional navigation satellite constellation, GAGAN. The IRNSS is now operationally called

Navigation with Indian Constellation (NavIC). The system will give two types of services. For multiple uses Standard is available, and Restricted Service (RS), “an encrypted service provided to specific (strategic) users.”184 The encrypted services are for tri-services. To make NavIC fully functional, fifteen ground stations across India are built to transmit the signals. “IRNSS is expected to provide a position accuracy of better than 20m in the primary service area.”185 ISRO is developing satellites to complete the enterprise but due to technical failures and glitches, the network is still incomplete. It is expected that IRNSS will be fully operational in 2018.

India is likely to increase its military space capabilities to support its tri-services, especially IAF. This will also include modernizing its C4I2SR capabilities. IAF is fourth largest airforce in the world and is largely dependent on navigation services provided by satellites.

Besides this, India is likely to build space capabilities for real-time SSA through space

182 Ranjit Rai, “Indian Navy: A C4ISR Nuclear Force,” India Strategic Monthly, August 2010, http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories717.htm. 183 Ibid. 184 “ISRO’s inroads in Regional Navigation,” India Strategic Monthly, May 2016, http://www.indiastrategic.in/ISROs_inroads_in_Regional_Navigation.htm; “Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System: All You Need to Know,” The Times of India, August 31, 2017. 185 See, IHS Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: South Asia (Coulsdon, Surrey, UK: IHS Jane’s, IHS Global Limited, 2017), https://janes.ihs.com/SouthAsia/Display/1304918.

201 communication and also likely to build space sensor especially to monitor space weather.186

India is likely to enhance its SAR capabilities with the assistance of Israel and other communications networks to cover the length and breadth of the country.187 It is developing a two-layered BMD system to counter the rising missile capability of Pakistan and to achieve targets in China. However, a comprehensive network of nuclear detection satellites and advanced space-based ISR capabilities are required to operationalize a BMD system with an accurate and precise interception and targetting. India is also looking at developing space assets to prevent the jamming of its satellites by hostile forces. Lele believes to overcome this challenge of assisting

Indian BMD system, it will send one to two satellites every year with dual-use purposes to foster its military space program. These dual-use satellites will provide critical data and commands through these satellites to its cruise missiles.188 India is also developing ELINT satellite clusters through its Defence Electronics Research Laboratory (DRDL), which is a dedicated DRDO facility. DRDL is primarily responsible for developing and providing electronic support to

India’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMP). However, DRDL is also developing ELINT capability of India for its military space program.189 India is also investing in building its “soft-kill” capability or non-destructive methods to neutralize enemy satellites and is developing laser technologies for this purpose. However, little has been reported or documented on India’s ambitions to explore laser technologies for blinding or jamming of adversary satellite systems. Shoghi Communications Ltd. India has successfully developed an SCL-3411 system which is a satellite jamming system to interfere with communication and television signals of an

186 Ajay Lele (Senior Fellow, IDSA) in discussion with the author, November 22, 2017. Also see, “Indian Armed Forces and Space Technology,” India Review 10, no. 4 (2011): 379-393. 187 Ibid. 188 Lele, discussion with author. 189 Lele, “Indian Armed Forces and Space Technology,” 385; and also see “Defence Electronics Research Laboratory,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), updated July 1, 2003, http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/24/.

202 enemy country. The jamming system can jam the signals up to 12 frequencies at a time in the C- and Ku-bands. Likewise, the system is mobile and specially developed for covert operations.190

Private industry is making significant developments in Indian EW. Shoghi

Communications Ltd. has designed a GPS-based navigational jamming system, SCL-300, which can jam or cut-off links between GPS receivers and satellite stations. The powerful system of 25

W strength is designed to cut-off signals in “the GPS frequency bands, and does not interfere with any communication other than GPS within the defined zone of operations.” The system, on activation, can turn off the GPS services in the tactical battlefield environment within a radius of

1.5 to 50 km or more. India is likely to induct and operationalize advance jamming systems in its armed forces and is best used in a short battlefield or a surgical strike.191 From India’s perspective, an important step toward solidifying its military space program is the establishment of an Aerospace command or a possible establishment/creation of a Defence Space Agency

(DSA). To further consolidate the assumptions of the creation of DSA, then IAF Chief Arup

Raha in 2016 sent an email response to an Indian journalist N C Bipindra in which he revealed that “the development of a space command stretching across the military needs to be expedited.”192 Rajeswari Rajagopalan of Observer Research Foundation (ORF) believes that the announcement of the creation of DSA “is an interim arrangement until a full-fledged Aerospace

Command is in place.”193 India has an Integrated Space Cell (ISC) under the aegis of the

190 “SCL-3411 C-/Ku-band DTH/VSAT jamming system,” IHS Jane’s, January 11, 2018, https://janes.ihs.com/C4iJoint/Display/1826566. 191 “SCL-300 GPS jammer,” IHS Jane’s, March 13, 2016, https://janes.ihs.com/C4iJoint/Display/1499039. 192 N C Bipindra, “Space the Final Frontier for India Military Modernization Push,” Live Mint, October 7, 2016, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/Mqe3HKnhRTUOGraAWzQKoN/Space-the-final-frontier-for- India-military-modernization-pu.html. 193 Narayan Prasad and Rejeswari Rajagopalan, “Creation of a Defence Space Agency: A New Chapter in Exploring India’s Space Security,” in Defence Primer 2017: Today’s Capabilities, Tomorrow’s Conflict, eds. Sushant Singh and Pushan Das (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2017), 97, http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Defence-Primer-2017.pdf.

203 Integrated Defence Services (IDS) HQ, which was established back in 2008.194 However, the establishment of a full-fledged Aerospace Command is necessary as India needs to protect its regional and territorial interests as well as its space assets, she writes.195

India’s space capabilities are expanding and India’s military space program is progressing and its policy is now more tilted toward securing its space asset as well as developing counterspace capabilities. India is likely to achieve soft-killing capabilities of jamming, spoofing, hacking, and blinding of its adversary's satellites. Any testing of its ASAT missile will be a test of its leadership’s political will. Likewise, interim steps toward establishing an Aerospace Command and transforming a rudimentary ISR, ELINT and Communication

Intelligence (COMINT) capability into effective and operational capabilities are some of the challenges faced by India’s military space program. However, the trajectory of India’s space program is suggesting that it will likely overcome these odd in near future.

5.6 Pakistan

Pakistan has no SLV and but it is constructing a satellite launching pad for which SUPARCO requires huge financial assistance. In Pakistan, there is an industrial base along with the scientific expertise that can potentially start manufacturing the country’s indigenous SLVs. Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state and it has deterrence relations with its adversary, India. A credible nuclear deterrent capability requires delivery means for either counterforce or countervalue targeting.

Pakistan has delivery means in form of a missile inventory with a range of 60 km to 2750 km.

This includes Short SRBM; NASR; to MRBM: Shaheen-III. The missile inventory also has

194 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Special Cell Set up to Counter Growing Threat to Space Assets,” press release no. 39503, June 10, 2008, http://www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=39503. 195 Ibid.

204 Ababeel MRBM with multiple independent re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.196 Figure 5.14 shows the tested range and area covered by Pakistan’s missiles. It is widely believed that

Pakistan’s development of its missile capability has been in response to India’s missile program.

Pakistan’s missile and nuclear weapons constitute a deterrent capability against “numerically superior conventional forces” of India.197

Figure 5.6: Pakistan’s Missiles198

An important assessment about Pakistan’s missile was made in a U.S. commission chaired by

Donald Rumsfeld. The commission’s report was presented to the U.S. Congress in 1998 and it has made some profound statements on Pakistan’s missile capabilities. The report suggests that

“Pakistan’s ballistic missile infrastructure is now advanced than that of North Korea.”199 A particular section of the report predicted that Pakistan will develop a 2,500 km MRBM.

196 On Ababeel, see Inter-Services Public Relations, news press release no. PR-34/2017-ISPR, January 2, 2017, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=3705 197 Andrew Feicket, Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries, CRS report no. RL30427 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, updated July 26, 2005), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30427.pdf, 23. 198 “Missiles of Pakistan,” Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defence Project, accessed January 23, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/pakistan/; Also see table 3 for list of Pakistani missiles’ names, warhead weight, range, propellant and status, Ahmad Khan and Ali Ahsan, “Deterrence in Indo-Pak Context A Critical Appraisal,” Policy Perspective 13, no.1 (2016): 53-76. 199 Donald Rumsfeld et al., Commission to Assess The Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Washington DC: 104th United States Congress, July 15, 1998), https://fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm.

205 Likewise, it was assessed that if Pakistan can develop an MRBM than it will give Pakistan a

“technical base for developing a much longer range missile system.” However, it was argued that

Pakistan “is not hostile to the U.S.” Rumsfeld’s commission report assessed that the growing hostilities between India and Pakistan may force both countries…

“…additional technical assistance through cooperation with their current major suppliers-India from North Korea, Iran and Russia; Pakistan from North Korea and China because of India’s anxieties about China…” The Rumsfeld commission report made some relevant assessments about the strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan but its prediction about Pakistan seeking technical assistance after 1998 from North Korea still lacks evidence. The commission’s report did prove correct in assessing Pakistan’s behaviour to develop MRBMs and Pakistan testing of MRBM Shaheen-III with a 2700+ km range.200 However, Pakistan has shown no interest in developing ICBMs or

LRBMs as Pakistan’s force posture and doctrinal statements pronounced its nuclear doctrine

India centric with no objectives to move beyond South Asia.201 It is important to discuss that

Pakistan has made significant advancement in the recent past as it has launched submarine- launched cruise missile (SLCM), Babur-3 having a range of 450 km.202 Pakistan’s missile capabilities are advancing at a gradual pace given maintaining a strategic balance with India.

Pakistan’s missile experts also believe that its missile technologies are superior to India. Samar

Mubarakmand, former Chairman National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) and member PAEC, stated that “the calibre of Pakistan missile scientists, engineers and

200 Ahmad Khan, “Pakistan’s Missile Conscription and Essence of War,” Russian International Affairs Council. March 12, 2015, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/columns/digest/ahmad- khan-pakistan-s-missile-conscription-and-essence-of-wa/. 201 On Pakistan’s strategic weapon systems, see IHS Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: South Asia (Coulsdon, Surrey, UK: IHS Jane’s, IHS Global Limited, 2017), https://janes.ihs.com/SouthAsia/Display/1304920. 202 On Babur-3 (SLCM), Intern-Services Public Relations, news press release no. PR-10/2017-ISPR, January 9, 2017.

206 technicians is world class, and far more superior than their counterparts in India.”203 He also compared Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capabilities with India and stated that “Pakistan’s missile technology and nuclear weapons are far better than India.”204 The purpose of assessing

Pakistan’s missile capability to assess whether there are possibilities that its SLV program germinates from its missile program or not. Will Pakistan develop its SLV in the future or will it continue to seek foreign help to launch its satellites? Has Pakistan enough industrial and technical base to develop its SLV? Has Pakistan enough strength to develop an ASAT missile?

What are the possibilities of developing it? These are some of the important questions, which need substantial investigation. In an important academic piece, Dinshaw Mistry of the University of Cincinnati and Bharath Gopalaswamy of Atlantic Council have tested a hypothesis on possibilities of developing ballistic missiles that can be reversed engineered to make SLV and they conclude that this possibility cannot be ignored.205 Both scholars tested their hypothesis on

“fourteen regional powers were involved in some thirty missile a space launch program.”

Interestingly, the findings suggest that only a few regional powers were able to acquire missiles from SLVs. Likewise, in a reverse manner, some powers were also able to develop their SLVs from ballistic missiles. In a more elaborated way, the findings suggest that HATF-1 was a sounding rocket and it was converted into a ballistic missile in the early 1980s with the collaboration and help of SUPARCO. In the second scenario, Mistry and Gopalaswamy think that Shaheen-2 which is an MRBM can be converted into an SLV. However, Pakistan has more recently tested Shaheen-3 MRBM with 2700 plus km range and if Mistry and Gopalaswamy’s hypothesis is applied on Shaheen-3 then it can be converted into a future Pakistan’s SLV.

203 Hanif Khalid, “Pak Missile More Superior than India’s: Dr Samar,” The News, October 21, 2015. 204 “Pak Missile Tech better than India’s,” The Nation, May 27, 2017. 205 Dinshaw Mistry and Bharath Gopalaswamy, “Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles in Regional Powers,” Astropolitics 10, no.1 (2012): 126-151.

207 However, HATF-3, 4, 5, and 6 cannot be used as SLV. More recently, Pakistan demonstrated a test of a MIRV-capable Ababeel missile with a 2000+ km range. In a bid to further understand the possibilities of developing an SLV from a ballistic missile, experts have compared technologies which are used to develop ballistic missiles and SLVs. Some experts argue that there are significant physical differences between ballistic missiles and SLVs. As of this understanding, the possibility of building an SLV from a ballistic missile is bleak. On the contrary, some experts believe that technologies used in building SLV and ballistic missiles are

“virtually interchangeable.”206 These interchangeable components, technology and expertise include, launching multiple satellites from SLV and ballistic missile with MIRV capability. It is not difficult to understand that technologies used in building SLV and ballistic missiles are identical and interchangeable.207 Likewise, stage control systems, satellite dispensers, coupling load analysis, upper state solid-fule engines and kick motors are also some of the interchangeable components, technology, expertise used in R&D and manufacturing of SLVs. From the scientific and engineering point of view, it is quite possible to “shift focus from space to missiles to missile to space.”208Applying this understanding of Pakistan’s ballistic missile developments, a simple inference of the hypothesis will suggest that Pakistan can develop its SLV in future. However, it also necessary to mention that a multiple launching satellite capability does not mean that the country has MIRV capability, however, having a MIRV capability does refer to the capability of a state to develop its SLV. A detailed comparison of the technologies suggests that there are a lot of similarities between SLV and ballistic missile as both have similar reentry vehicle, payload separation, inertial guidance and control systems, and strap-on boosters. However, this similarity

206 Shirley A. Kan, China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers from U.S. Satellites Export Policy—Actions and Chronology, CRS Report No. 98-485F (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated September 5, 2001), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/space/RS21641.pdf. 207 Lele, Asian Space Race, 128. 208 Ibid.

208 is based on a case-by-case analysis comparison. Besides, staging mechanisms, propellants, airframe, motor cases, liners and insulation are some of the components, equipment and technology, which show many similarities.209 Primarily, SLVs are ballistic missiles used on the surface to space, and satellites are like payload delivered by the SLV. Ballistic missiles and SLV both covered with a path using navigation and both have similar propellents with little modifications, but the difference is, one delivers satellites in the orbits and the other one is meant to deliver warheads.210From the above analysis of technologies used in ballistic missiles and

SLV, it is safe to say that Pakistan has enough technologies to build its SLV. Over the past two decades, Pakistan has established an industrial base to develop its missiles. However, a contradictory argument is presented by A.H. Nayyar, a renowned Pakistani physicist, nuclear activist and member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), who believes that

Pakistan has a very weak industrial base in the country and it has not progressed so far in building its rocketry. Pakistan lacks educational institutes and forums which are related to modern technologies used in building space rocketry. He further states that Pakistan requires building its rockets in the future to explore the vast horizons of space. Nayyar thinks that space rocket development did not get the attention of Pakistan’s policymakers. The discourse inside

Pakistan on its space program is not healthy and suffers from total neglect of the military and political leadership. Few educational institutes and universities are teaching the basic knowledge of civilian space exploration.211 Therefore, Pakistan has to seek Chinese help to develop its dying space program.212 Can Pakistan build an ASAT missile? Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow

209 Kan, China, CRS-14. 210 Lele, Asian Space Race, 128. 211 Raja Mansoor, “Pakistan is Losing the Space Race,” The Diplomat, February 1, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/pakistan-is-losing-the-space-race/. 212 Abdul Hameed Nayyar (Physicist, Nuclear Activist and member IPFM) in discussion with the author, January 24, 2018.

209 and head of the nuclear and space policy initiative at ORF, opines that China is a principal source of Pakistan emerging space program and it has raised two major challenges to India’s space program. Rajagopalan thinks that an independent Pakistani ASAT capability and expansion of

Pakistan missile program from MRBM to LRBM are two major threats posed to India. However, she also thinks that it is not easy to develop an ASAT missile as it requires advance navigation, frequency seekers and guidance system. But, she still argues that “it would not be the hardest thing for Pakistan to achieve either.”213 Another renowned Indian space security expert Ajay

Lele, a senior fellow at IDSA, assessed that “Pakistan being a missile capable state is in position to develop an ASAT system if need be.”214 On the other hand, Raja Mansoor, a freelance columnist, believes that the current situation of Pakistan’s space program will not allow it to build ASAT capability and will take decades.215 Although Pakistan has the missile capability to transfer into an SLV capability as well as into an ASAT missile conversion, Pakistan’s space ambitions are clear. From Pakistan’s space objective and activities, Pakistan has so far not made any statement unlike India’s DRDO chief’s statement to develop an ASAT, and has not declared the development of its ASAT capability. Pakistan does want to develop its SLV capability, but it will be a test of its nerves if it goes to develop and test any ASAT system.

Pakistan has not developed and does not possess any space weapon capability. However,

Pakistan is likely to make progress in its space program to launch and develop more satellites.

Pakistan is likely to send another remote sensing PRSS-1 satellite to monitor the infrastructure development on the land routes on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).216 Likewise,

Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Sohail Aman announced that Pakistan will send its first

213 Rajagopalan, interview by Liang. 214 Lele, Asian Space Race, 57. 215 Mansoor, “Pakistan is Losing the Space Race.” 216 “Pakistan, China Sign Contract to Launch PRSS-1 System,” The News, April 21, 2016.

210 astronaut in space from China in 2020.217 Pakistan has also become the fifth user of China’s

BeiDou navigation satellite system (BDS) in the world and is now actively using BDS services.218 This is a significant step toward exploring space technologies in Pakistan as the applications of the system will provide Pakistani scientists to learn about techniques related to satellite navigation. In groundbreaking cooperation, Pakistan and China signed Memorandum of

Understanding (MoU) during the visit of Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang in May 2013.219

Details of the MoU reported in the media tell that a Chinese company will build five ground stations and necessary infrastructure including a processing centre in Pakistan to put the country’s navigation services on the system. Now, the system is fully operational according to

UniStrong Science and Technology Co. According to Chinese media reports, BeiDou will provide 2-centimetre accuracy to a foreign nation and its services will be used for both civilian as well as for military purposes. On March 25, 2016, former Director General Strategic Plans

Division (SPD) Lt General (R) Khalid Kidwai and now Advisor to National Command Authority

(NCA) was invited as a keynote speaker at Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) to speak on Pakistan’s role in Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process. During an interactive session, Raza Khan, correspondent of Pakistan Television (PTV) asked General Kidwai a question about Pakistan’s missiles using GPS. Khan argued that Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise missiles are GPS-based and in case of a conflict with India, there is a possibility that U.S. may deny GPS services to Pakistan and its missiles may not be able to get proper guidance during their flight. Kidwai responded saying that Pakistan’s missile can hit their target without using

GPS. He told the audience that Pakistan is not dependent on U.S. GPS system as far as its

217 “Pakistan to Send Astronauts into Space in Two Years,” Express Tribune, December 7, 2017. 218 “Pakistan becomes first foreign nation to benefit from China’s BeiDou System,” The News, May 18, 2017. 219 “Pakistan adopts Chinese GPS satellite System,” DAWN, May 18, 2013.

211 missiles are concerned.220 In a similar fashion, former DG Arms Control and Disarmament

Affairs (ACDA) SPD, Air Commodore (retd) Khalid Banuri was asked a question by the author on Pakistan’s delivery means achieving targets in a GPS-denied environment. Banuri replied that

Pakistan will go for alternative methods and did not specifically mention whether Pakistan will adopt BeiDou as an alternative to GPS or the missile will use rudimentary navigation tools to achieve their target.221 However, it is quite evident that the Pakistan Army is keen and interested to use BDS as an alternative to GPS. Sharing similar kinds of thought on Pakistan using BeiDou for military purposes, Air Commodore (retd) Kaiser Tufail told Agence France-Presse (AFP) that

“Pakistan’s armed forces cannot rely on US GPS because of its questionable availability during a conflict that has overtones of nuclear escalation.”222 IHS Jane’s in its annual assessment on strategic weapons of Pakistan reported that country’s cruise missiles Hatf-8 (Ra’ad) and Hatf-7

(Babur) require GPS services. Hatf-7 (Babur) is equipped with inertial Terrain Contour Matching

(TERCOM) and Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) guidance systems. IHS

Jane’s assessed that “an alternative to U.S. GPS guidance has been sought and access to the

Chinese BeiDou regional system may have been agreed.”223 Mansoor Ahmed of Belfer Center believes that cruise missiles can achieve their target with high precision and accuracy than ballistic missiles.224 However, cruise missile requires advance navigation and positioning

220 General (R) Khalid Kidwai, “Pakistan’s Role in Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Process,” (speech, Pakistan’s Role in Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), Islamabad, March 25, 2016). 221 Air Commodore (Retd.) Khalid Banuri was chairing a session of the workshop when the author asked him the question. See the press release of the event, “Big powers’ Pressure May Win India NSG Entry, Fear Pakistani Officials,” DAWN, December 14, 2016. 222 Kaiser’s comments were reported by AFP Pakistan and the story was rehashed by several newspaper. See, “Pakistan Adopts Chinese GPS Satellite System,” Express Tribune, May 18, 2013. 223 See, Pakistan’s strategic Weapons system in, IHS Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: South Asia. 224 Mansoor Ahmed (Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow, International Security Program and Project o Managing the Atom, Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs) in discussion with the author, February 1, 2018.

212 services to hit their counterforce targets. The primary reason behind Ahmed’s understanding is the minimum Circular Error Probability (CEP). Hatf-8 (Ra’ad) has minimum CEP of 20m (66ft) and maximum 50m (164ft).225 Likewise, Hatf-7 has an expected CEP 20-50m and reported CEP

3-10m.226 From Ahmed’s assessment, Pakistan does not have an indigenous GPS, therefore, it is likely to use commercial services for navigation of the cruise missiles. But in case of a crisis, those services can be turned off. Possibly, Pakistan will seek Chinese BDS-II system for its cruise missile navigation, however, it is still uncertain that China continues to provide navigation services during a high time crisis.227

Mansoor Ahmed and Feroz Hassan Khan write that BDS-II is expected to increase the accuracy and precision of Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise missile. Pakistan does not have its indigenous navigation system and since BDS-II covers all parts of India, therefore, its services are essential for minimizing the CEP of its cruise and ballistic missiles. They argue that inertial navigation system in Pakistan’s cruise and ballistic missile is likely to increase the CEP, therefore, Pakistan will shift from its cruise and ballistic missile from inertial navigation system to Chinese BDS-II navigation system, however, like HIS Jane’s assessment they also believe that it is will not clear whether the services will be guaranteed in all situations.228

Usman Ansari of U.S.-based Defence News authored a report titled China Provides Key to Pakistani Bandwidth Requirements, in which he interviewed several experts on Pakistan-

225 “Ra’ad (Hatf-8),” IHS Jane’s, updated March 2, 2017, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/DisplayFile/JALWA049. 226 “Hatf-7 (Babur),” IHS Jane’s, updated January 15, 2018, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jswsa305- jsws. 227 Ahmed, discussion with author. 228 Feroz Hassan Khan (Former DG ACDA SPD and writer of Eating Grass: The Making of Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb) in discussion with the author, February 12, 2018; Feroz Hassan Khan and Mansoor Ahmed, “Pakistan, MIRVs, and Counterforce Targeting,” in The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age, eds. Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler and Shane Mason (Washington DC: Stimson Center, May 2016), 160.

213 China cooperation in getting navigation services to Pakistan’s military.229 Ansari reported that

Pakistani army officials are in favour of acquiring navigation services for their missile program from their “strategic partner” China.230 Ansari quoted Elizebeth Quintana, a senior research fellow in Airpower technology at RUSI that “Pakistan satellite capabilities are at the very early stage,” therefore, Pakistan would not be able to develop its GPS or indigenous SATCOM capability for its military.231 Pakistan may likely to get BeiDou services for military purposes as well. Quintana also says that in a conflict situation Pakistan may be able to get Chinese support in terms of providing navigation services and “Pakistani system may utilize multiple PNT systems—BeiDou, GLONASS, GALILEO, GPS—which enhances resilience in the event of service failure or jamming.”232Pakistan does not have any space weapons and according to IHS

Jane’s 2017 assessment on Pakistan’s strategic weapons, the country is not unlikely to make any effort to initiate any kind of project.233 However, Pakistan may accelerate its efforts to utilize space for military purposes as it requires advanced ISR capability for its nuclear command and control infrastructure and also for maintaining the credibility of its nuclear deterrent capability.

In 2011, NCA approved Pakistan Space Vision 2047. The vision talks about manufacturing, building, and launching SLVs and satellites for national security purposes. Therefore, it is likely that Pakistan will accelerate its efforts—not only to catch India in the ongoing space race in

Asia—to send satellites for military navigation and communication satellites in space. In doing so, Pakistan will like to reduce the existing asymmetry in the ISR capability in the region. During

23rd meeting of National Command Authority (NCA), under which all the strategic organizations

229 Usman Ansari, “China Provides Key Pakistani Bandwidth Requirements,” Defence News 28, no.10 (2013): 12. 230 “Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO),” IHS Jane’s, updated September 9, 2016, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jsd_0712-jsd_. 231 Ansari, “Pakistani Bandwidth Requirements,” 12. 232 Ibid. 233 See, IHS Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: South Asia.

214 are currently working, chaired by then Prime Minister of Pakistan laid a special focus on

Pakistan’s space program. The press release of the meetings stressed that the members of the

NCA were briefed on space program-2047, which was previously announced in another meeting held in 2010. NCA members endorsed the objectives of the Space Vision 2047 as it is “essential for future socio-economic prosperity and growth.” During the meeting, the participants especially discussed the current status of Pakistan’s space program and agreed to provide resources to it. 234

5.7 Conclusion

The study of space militarization and weaponization capabilities of the United States, Russia,

China, India and Pakistan shows that space is militarized and that some of these states intensified efforts to follow the path towards weaponization. The United States is a leading actor in this path towards space weaponization. China has demonstrated its capabilities that it can also possess enough capabilities to weaponize space; and the former Soviet Union has been part of the space race in the Cold War and it has also developed space weapons. Currently, Russia has those technologies to augment space weaponization capabilities. India has emerged as a regional space power with significant space militarization capabilities. It has shown intent to develop space weapons, especially ASAT capability. Pakistan is at the last among these selected states with no tangible space militarization and weaponization capabilities. Though, Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state with an intense rivalry with India. Independent security analysts and current nuclear weapons development in South Asia refer to an arms race between the two arch-rivals in

South Asia and this could spill over to the space domain.

234 Inter Service Public Relations, “23rd National Command Authority (NCA),” press release no. PR- 615/2017-ISPR, December 21, 2017, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t- press_release&id=4459#pr_link4459.

215 At the global level, the United States considers growing Chinese and Russian counterspace capabilities a source of threat to its space assets. The United States has state-of-the- art space assets with all ingredients and components to weaponize space. This includes advanced

ISR, communication, navigation, nuclear detection and geodetic satellites, which have been proved to be vital instruments for force enhancement. Likewise, the United States has also developed, demonstrated, tested and temporarily deployed space weapons in outer space. Its intra-state strategic engagement with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, now with China and

Russia has yielded into the augmentation of its space weapons. U.S. reliance on its space assets has resulted in the insecurity of its space assets from the expansion of counterspace capability development in China and Russia.

In conclusion, the United States has followed the path from space militarization to weaponization. Its space doctrine, policy and strategy highlight its objectives to play a leadership role and attain freedom of action in space. In this regard, the United States has developed counterspace capabilities, which keeps the United States aware of activities in space. A gradually expansion of U.S defensive counterspace capability is hitting alarm bells in Russia and China. In response to U.S. continuous developments, fear of a similar kind of response from China and

Russia has been germinated. In reality, both countries have followed an action-reaction model to develop similar space weapons. China has been very active in this regard. Besides that, the re- emergence of geopolitical and military rivalries between the U.S.-China, and U.S.-Russia has given them a chance to reinvigorate the chances a more intense following of path by them toward space weaponization.

A major finding of the chapter is the discussion on the definition of space weapons. The views of the experts, technical assessment reports and existing literature depict a twisted and not

216 a universally accepted definition of space weapon. Most of the definitions are politically oriented; however, some are entirely technical. Besides, there is a complete lack of consensus among major, emerging and aspiring space power on the definition of space weapons. Some states do want to ban the actual deployment of kinetic or destruction means of warfare, but the same group or alliance of states are not ready to accept non-destructive means or electronic warfare capabilities under the umbrella of space weapons. The lack of consensus at different arms control and disarmament forum on space weaponization has given more time and space for the global space powers to develop offensive and defensive space capabilities. The states are becoming more aspirant of such technologies which can give them a non-destructive means to destroy space assets of their adversaries. A major take away from this chapter is the development of EW capabilities by the states. Taking this reality into account, the future of space weaponization will involve the future development of EW capabilities as a tool to fight a war in space.

Another takeaway from the study on space capability is the large-scale vertical proliferation of ground-based ASAT missiles. The United States has a large inventory of ground- based kinetic-energy ASATs. It has tested these missiles during the Cold War in response to the former Soviet Union and in 2008 another test was conducted to answer Chinese ASAT. On the other hand, China is vertically proliferating its ASAT capability and it will likely conduct future tests of its kinetic-energy ASATs to bolster its space weapon arsenal. Russia has not tested its

ASAT capability since the end of Cold War due to its unilateral moratorium. However, Russia has not declared anything such restrict it to develop ASATs. India would be the fourth country in the world to test kinetic-energy ASAT. India’s IAF, ISRO and DRDO chiefs have stated that

India can build and launch at ASAT missile if required. However, its political leadership as

217 always been is on the driving seat, therefore, a political go-ahead is necessary for the country to test such capability. A concluding thought on India’s ASAT capability is that India has possessed that capability to conduct such a test, but it is a tough choice for India to do so. Pakistan is the final country on the path lead from militarization to weaponization. Pakistan has advanced missile technology and it is kept on improving. Pakistan has missiles that can reach sub-orbit of the space. It will be interesting to know when Pakistan able to develop such a capability.

Pakistan can transform its missile technology to build its SLV. Future development of ICBM in

Pakistan will eventually help Pakistan to develop its own ASAT capability.

An important aspect of space weaponization is the current phase of the development of

BMD system in different countries. The United States is actively pursuing its BMD system capability. It has developed ground-based BMD system. It has conducted a number of exoatmospheric and endoatmospheric tests of missile interception as well as in the mid-course of the missile. Policy makers in the United States are now planning to give a go-ahead to U.S. military to develop a space-based BMD system to intercept an incoming missile toward the mainland. China has recently conducted an anti-missile test which shows that China is actively engaged in developing its BMD system to counter the United States or maybe India. At the regional level, India is actively pursuing a two-layered BMD system to simultaneously counter

Pakistan and Chinese missiles. On the other hand, Pakistan has not shown any sign of BMD system development. The mapping of BMD capabilities of the U.S., China and India tells that space weaponization is not a distance reality for them. BMD capabilities, especially the mid- course interception of the missile are what many visualize as the actual weaponization of space.

218 CHAPTER 6

Global and Regional Space Order

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter highlights the space militarization and weaponization capabilities of global

(U.S., China, Russia) and regional (India, Pakistan) space powers. Likewise, the initial and middle part of the study builds a conceptual framework of three levels of security, particularly the theory of regional security complex. To make the study more comprehensive, space doctrines, policies, and strategies of major and regional space powers were also discussed.

Importantly, the research is incomplete without studying the capabilities of abovementioned states and their respective paths from space militarization to weaponization.

In this chapter, the focus is on finding answers to the following questions: what was the

Cold War space order and what were the main actors which constituted it; and what is the present space order and what are its dynamics? Studying the past and present global space orders provide a closer look at the nature of relations between the United States and China at the global level, and between China, India, and Pakistan at the regional level. This effort will highlight the nature of relations and their subsequent effects or implications for global and regional security.

The chapter will provide necessary answers to the research question highlighted in the beginning of the research to prove that states are following the path from space militarization to weaponization. While following the path and studying the past and present trajectories of space capabilities development in global and some regional powers, an arms race between the powers discussed herein is evident.

219 1

6.2 The Concept of International Order

The word ‘order’ is a contested term in the subject of Political Science, International Relations and Strategic Studies. Esteemed scholars in above-mentioned fields have been unable to provide a conclusive, comprehensive, universally agreeable, and well-structured definition of the word.

Interestingly, the discourse analysis on “order” has generated a debate highlighting multiple factors contributing to formulating an international or world order. In this debate, the dominant schools-of-thought belong to realism, idealism, and liberalism. Scholars from these schools of thought have given their perspectives on the nature, features, and characteristics of past, present and future international/world order. However, the debate is not finished and still continues on defining and finding the answers to the questions: what is the exact nature of existing international/world order and how it will transform in future? However, diverging thoughts on world order have only generated more confusion among scholars and policymakers.

What is an order? The Oxford English Dictionary defines order as “regular, methodical or harmonious arrangement in the position of the things, contained in any space or area, or composing any group or body.”2 According to this definition, the order forms an arrangement of its entities through a methodological approach. The order is an arrangement of entities at their proper place and allows them to perform their proper functions in a particular manner. An order of entities also allows them to form relations with a degree of conformity with standards of method or conduct. The order has several interpretations in across many fields. Scholars in the

1 The author has evaluated the spending on the space technologies development for defence purposes in major, emerging and aspiring states using scientific methods involving statistical modelling and analysis and concluded that “To the best of my knowledge, such strong general evidence of arms racing and security dilemma dynamics for military spending has not been presented before. Arms racing among proximate states are not just an intuitive theory; it also seems to be an underlying fact of international relations.” See, Benjamin Goldsmith, “Arms Racing in Space: Spatial Modeling of Military Spending around the World,” Australian Journal of Political Science 42, no.3 (2007): 419-440. 2 Quoted in R.J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 328.

220 fields of Political Sciences and International Relations have tried to define order by using their political understanding. The entities in a political or social order are the states, groups or the people who live close to each other in a certain arrangement. In such subjects, states are usually referred to as the entities of the order. It is generally believed that arrangement or the regularity in the order is made according to relative power structure through military power. During the

Cold War, the world was divided into two poles lead by the U.S. and former Soviet Union. The politics among nations were focused on maintaining a balance of power through their relative military build-up. That formed an arrangement of a bipolar world order. Over time and due to certain events in the last four decades the world has been reshaped and transformed.

A prominent factor in shaping or transforming international order is the changing nature of inter-state relations. Any study on discussing past, present or future world order would start with a question: “who are the entities that make up any given order?”3 States are considered the living organism in the international or world order. These organisms interact with each other and form relations in different mediums. Friedrich Ratzel, who gave the Organic Theory, explains the state is a “fragment of humanity on a piece of soil.”4 He thinks the fragment of humanity is organized and lives on it. Ratzel believes that many fragments of humanity form a political community in which the fragments interact with each other and continue to grow and expand.

The expansion of the states depends on the political and economic environment, or it may take place by war.5 The expansion of the state is also dependent on its military strength. And it was the military build-up or military strength of the states which reshaped the post Second World

War order.

3 Georg Sorensen, A Liberal World Order in Crisis: Choosing Between Imposition and Restraint (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 11. 4 Quoted in Charles Hagan, “Geopolitics,” The Journal of Politics 4, no.4 (1942): 478-490. 5 Ibid.

221 6.2.1 Examples of International ‘Orders’

The debate on world order has nonetheless created more confusion among scholars and policymakers alike. One of the many reasons behind such confusion seems to be the volatile nature of state relations as well as different political understandings of major scholars in the respected subjects. Kenneth Waltz, who belongs to the realist school of thought, discussed the balance of power as the fundamental characteristic of world order.6 Francis Fukuyama, professor at Stanford University, argues in favour of liberal democracy as the prominent feature of world order.7 On the other hand, Samuel Huntington, who wrote the famous book The Clash of

Civilizations, took Fukuyama’s argument at The End of History on liberal democracy a step head and talked about the clash of civilization as a feature of future world order.8 Robert Kaplan highlights the coming anarchy in the world due to overpopulation, ethnic and tribal rifts, crime, and disease. Kaplan argues that these are some of the factors which are rapidly destroying the social fabric of societies all around the world. He thinks these factors will reshape the future world order.9 Jennifer Welsh, the author of The Return of History, argues in returning of world toward autocratic nationalism and illiberalism. She makes some really interesting arguments in the book. According to Welsh, the world order is reshaping and it is departing from western styled liberal democracy toward illiberalism.10 On the other hand, Anne-Marie Slaughter of

Princeton University forces the reader of her book titled The New World Order to rethink about

6 Kenneth Waltz has authored pioneer work on structural realism and balance of power as one the characteristics of world order. See, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison- Wesley, 1979); “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no.2 (1993): 44- 79; “Structural Realism after Cold War,” in America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. John Ikenberry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002). 7 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest, no.16 (Summer1989): 3-18; The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992). 8 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilization,” Foreign Affairs 72, no.3 (1993): 22-49; The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 9 Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic Monthly 273, no.2 (1994): 44-76; The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War (New York: Random House, 2000). 10 Jennifer Welsh, The Return of History: Conflict, Migration, and Geopolitics in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2016)

222 the political structure of the world and argues that the world is now witnessing an order with multiple ideas from the past and present.

A fundamental characteristic of any given political order is the relative military strength of the entities. The Cold War era suggests a rigorous competition between the two arch-rivals to foster their military capabilities, including nuclear, missile and space capabilities, to shift the balance of power in their favour. However, the end of the Cold War completely reshaped the world order, its characteristics and features also. Military strength remains a fundamental characteristic but the economy now plays a crucial role in reshaping the world order. Both factors are interlinked and intertwined to reshape. Military strength alone is not a measure or characteristic of a world order as it was during the Cold War. At present, a state’s role in the world order is measured by its relative military and economic strength. Likewise, as discussed earlier they are other factors well as which can cast their impacts on a given order. It can be viewed as a political and economic order but the importance of military strength remains present.

6.2.2 International Nuclear Order

The nuclear order may be exemplified to understand the importance of military power in the contemporary world that how it still can impact global politics. Primarily, a so-called nuclear order is based on the distribution of relative nuclear forces. The nuclear order began to emerge after the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970 and the world was divided into nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots.’ Disputes emerged on the issues of the transfer of nuclear technology to nuclear aspirant states. This nuclear order was primarily due to geopolitical changes occurring in the international system during the 1970s had “important effects on the nuclear order, creating a North-South axis alongside the existing East-West axis.”11 There are five declared nuclear weapon states under Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

These states are also permanent members of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with veto

11 David Holloway, “Conclusion: Reflections on the Nuclear Order,” The International History Review 40, no.2 (Special Issue 2018): 1-9.

223 powers. However, the order has been gradually expanded. India detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1974 and then later on in 1998 which also gave Pakistan a chance to respond with its nuclear detonations. Israel and North Korea are also nuclear weapons states. But NPT only recognizes the U.S., Russia, China, Britain and France as the legitimate nuclear weapons states.

On the other hand, the remaining states are de-facto nuclear weapons states. All these states formed a nuclear order, which is, in fact, a disorder in itself. Ashok Kapur criticized the core understanding of Beltway scholars’ on nuclear order.12 In Kapur’s understanding, world order or nuclear order are just political slogans and “more imagination and rhetoric than reality.” The international order is a disorder in itself as is the nuclear order. It is not a regime as it is not governed by a set of rules, rather manipulated by the core interests of powerful states. It operates or remains under the influence of rules set by major powers and their allies, which remain a stumbling block toward establishing a formal political world order. This order is not regular, nor is it a classification scheme, methodological, or systematic and it is not peaceable either. It is full of anarchy, characterised by the changing nature of state interests, especially the interests of significant military and economic powers. Interestingly, the word anarchy means a world

“without a ruler.”13 Likewise, the anarchists primarily believe that “rule is unnecessary for the preservation of order.” It is generally believed that “anarchy is Order.”14

World order is primarily based on the distribution of power of the states related to their military, economic and political influence. Likewise, the power relationship, especially the military and economic competition among states, is a real ingredient to shape the world order.

Kapur argues that “order is often shorthand for manageable instability.”15 On nuclear order,

12 Ashok Kapur, “Rogue States and the International Nuclear Order,” International Journal 51, no.3 (1996): 420-439. 13 J. Shantz, “Anarchy Is Order: Creating the New World in the Shell of the Old,” The Journal of Media and Culture 7, no.6 (2005). 14 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Selected Writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1969), quoted in Shantz, “Anarchy Is Order.” 15 Kapur, “International Nuclear Order,” 421.

224 William Walker authored comprehensive academic literature to understand the normative basis and functionality of it. Walker divides nuclear order into two categories, one established during the Cold War and another one after end of the Cold War.16 Walker’s division of nuclear order also lays a strong base to study the space order. The studies on nuclear order during and after the

Cold War highlight factors which can be implied or used to study the space order. Walker believes the establishment of a nuclear order during the Cold War was primarily the role nuclear weapons could play to achieve political and military objectives of the states. Walker summaries the Cold War era role as “instead of nuclear weapons losing value, they gained value, and dramatically so in some contexts.” He refers to these contexts into two levels: international and regional. At international level, the major power tried to maintain monopoly on nuclear technology, know-how and materials used to build such weapons. In that way, major powers also tried to infuse their interests in the nuclear order. The continuous denial of technology and access to information forced some states to become aspirant of nuclear weapons at regional level. This suggests that “instead of strengthening order, there was an enveloping sense of disorder.”17

The purpose of literature survey is to understand the dynamics of space order during and after the Cold War. Space is a strategic domain and remained an area of contest and competition

"between the two superpowers during the Cold War. After the demise of Soviet Union, the"

United States gained the advantage to expand its power without any significant competition. It has reshaped the global space order after the end of the Cold War, but now U.S. interests are challenged by China’s expanding space power. Likewise, the present space order is now more complex than it was during Cold War. The pool of space power aspirants is increasing and it is

16 William Walker, “Nuclear Order and Disorder,” International Affairs 76, no.4 (2000): 703-724; Also see other publications of Walker on nuclear order, “International Nuclear Order: A Rejoinder,” International Affairs 83, no.4 (2007): 747-756; “Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment,” International Affairs 83, no.3 (2007): 431-54; “The Quest for International Nuclear Order,” Die Friedens-Warte 83, no. 2-3 (2008): 35-55. 17 Walker, “Nuclear Order and Disorder,” 712.

225 now a crowded and contested domain with a significant element of competition between major space powers.

6.3 Cold War Space Order

The story of Cold War has many dimensions and one keyaspect was the space race.18 History tells the story of how the United States and the former Soviet Union competed with each for maintaining their prestige in the field of science and technology, defence and soft power. This opening chapter of space was primarily about these two major powers, however, other powers also started their space program during the Cold War.

The relations between the two strategic competitors were primarily based on action- reaction syndrome that also drove most technological developments. At the same time, both states developed space technologies for their own needs. A key aspect of space rivalry was the role of science and technology as a key element of national diplomacy. The Cold War witnessed science and technology playing a catalytic role or as an “engine of progress,” as well as the “a direct index of national power.” The contribution of science and technology during the Cold War in space helped both states “in maintaining a strong geopolitical position during the Cold War.”19

It is also a fact that space technologies are applicable for dual-use purposes. Space technologies were used for both scientific development in space exploration and defence purposes.20 Hence, any Cold War technological development in space was seen through the lens of scepticism by

18 The authors has highlighted the emerging technologies used in the space exploration and the narrative built during the space race to used that technologies to reach the Moon and conquer the outer space. See, Asif Siddiqui, “Competing Technologies, National (ist) Narratives, and Universal Claims: Toward a Global History of Space Exploration,” Technology and Culture 51, no. 2 (2010): 425-443. 19 Teasel Muir-Harmony, “The Role of Space Exploration in Cold War Diplomacy,” Physics Today, May 6, 2015, http://physicstoday.scitation.org/do/10.1063/PT.5.2027/full/. 20 The dual-use item is defined as “an item (knowledge, technology, artefact) is dual-use if there is a (sufficiently high) risk that it can be used to design or produce a weapon, or if there is a (sufficiently great) threat that it can be used in an improvised weapon, where is neither case is weapons development the intended or primary purposes.” The definition can also be applied on space technology and the history of Cold War space race suggests that space technologies for peaceful exploration were also used for defence purpose. See, John Forge, “Responsible Dual-Use,” in On the Dual Uses of Sciences and Ethics: Principles, Practices, and Prospects, eds. Brian Rappert and Michael Selgelid (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2013), 121.

226 both states. It was the development of technologies that further fuelled Cold War. Likewise, both countries had adversarial relations so anything which was built for their domestic purposes was considered a response to other’s technology development. From political and strategic views, any state’s technological advancement to fulfil own needs was taken as a challenge to other’s security, creating a security dilemma as a consequence. The Cold War space order witnessed the

“elements” of security dilemma between the two powers. Both countries were more technologically advanced space powers compared to other developing states. Robert Jervis, professor of politics at Princeton University, analysed the U.S.-Soviet security dilemma during the Cold War with an interesting conclusion on the type of relations:

“Although, the Cold war contained elements of the security dilemma and included episodes in which tensions and arms increased as each side defensively reacted to the other, the root of the conflict at best was a clash of social system.”21

Although both states defensively developed space technologies, these developments were taken as a threat to the other’s national security. Both wanted to reflect advancement in space as the success story of their scientific and social culture, but the nature of conflict portrayed the advancement as a threat to each other’s existence. Figure 6.1 highlights the dynamics of the global space order during the Cold War. As a consequence, aspiring national space programs were made to choose which bloc or camp they had to align with.

21 Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?” Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no.1 (2001): 58.

227

Figure 6.1: Global Space Order during Cold War

The Cold War space order highlights the United States and former Soviet Union as the core states. These core states worked according to the baselines of structural realism as to self- help.22 In self-help manner, they continued to balance each other through arms races and forming alliances. This alliance formation was a key factor in Cold War history. The Cold War space order also witnessed realpolitik in space order.23

The Cold War space order also suggests the emergence of new space technology aspirants: Brazil, South Korea and Pakistan. China was the third country in the world, which became part of the Cold War space order to explore space for dual-use purposes.24 The United

States and Soviets were also helping their allies to build space power and transferred technological skills and helped to establish their space system. China was also the beneficiary of such technology transfers from Soviet Union.25 Pakistan’s space program got critical space technology transfer from NASA; in fact, it helped Pakistan to launch its first sounding rocket in

22 James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era,” International Organization 46, no.2 (1992): 467-491. 23 On realpolitik in space, see, Dolman, Astropolitik, 1, 2, 60, and 78. 24 “China Joins the Space Age,” Science 97, no. 18 (May 2, 1970): 427-428. 25 James Moltz, Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), chap 3.

228 the 1960s.26 In India’s case, NASA also facilitated technology transfer and helped Indian space scientific community to solve some scientific glitches in their sounding rockets. Likewise, India also remained aligned with the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. That led India to indigenization of space technology in the countery.

6.4 Dynamics Cold War’s Space Order

The beginning of modern history is demarked with the invention of aircraft as the human quest to conquer different mediums; land, sea and air; reached its ultimate level when the first aircraft flew in air. The invention of aeroplanes was a living embodiment of the revolution brought by science and technology in all fields of life with its impacts not only on world politics but also on economy and military of the states.27 The invention of aeroplanes revolutionized modern warfare and the human courtesy to fly in air to travel across all corners of the earth came into a reality.28

With the beginning of twentieth century, the doorway to scientific inventions and discoveries also opened. The dream of flying came true after the Wright Brothers made it possible.29 Physicists discovered the structure of the atom and also the process to unleash the energy contained in the atom through nuclear fission. This also resulted in the development of nuclear weapons; the most lethal and destructive weapon in the history of mankind. Humans always wanted to travel beyond the skies and saw space as the gateway to heaven. The quantum leap in the history of mankind was the successful sending of an artificial satellite in outer

26 The technical report highlighting technical cooperation between NASA and SUPARCO was written by director science and research, SUPARCO in March 1972. Rehmatullah, Upper Atmosphere Wind and Temperature Structure at Sonmiami Derived from the Rocket-Grenade Experiments Conducted During 1965-67 (Karachi: SUPARCO, 1972). 27 On the role of science and technology in the early twentieth century, see, George Wise, “Science and Technology,” Osiris 1, no.1 (1985): 229-246. 28 On airplane invention and its demand in different fields, see, G.R. Simonson, “The Demand for Aircraft and the Aircraft Industry, 1907-1958,” The Journal of Economic History 20, no.3 (1960): 361-382. 29 Read details, Edward Roach, The Wright Company: From Invention to Industry (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014).

229 space.30 That was made possible when the first satellite was successfully launched by the former

Soviet Union, heralding an unending story of space exploration. States wanted the technology to explore space as it became a matter of national pride and prestige.31 Space technology was seen as prime loci of any state’s standing in the field of science and technology. The progress in space technology and subsequent development in space exploration, especially manned missions to celestial bodies, was a primary indicator of a state’s international standing and progress. The

U.S. and the former Soviet Union were the primary actors with all progress going on in space technologies.32 Besides that, many other states like China, India, European Union and Pakistan also became aspirants of space technologies to build their own programs.

6.4.1 Launch of Sputnik and the physiological Shock to U.S.

The Soviets gave a “physiological shock” to American public and policymakers with the successful launch of Sputnik-I on October 4, 1957.33 In November of same year, the Soviets gave another shock to Eisenhower’s administration with launch of Sputnik-II in space. The New York

Tribune published a story on Sputnik-II telling American people that now the Soviet Union “will step out into space to reach the moon, the planets or even stars.”34 The interesting part of the story was about Soviets’ development of “rocket capability of dropping a hydrogen-bomb warhead on any spot on the earth and may even be in the process of stockpiling many such

30 See, Irving Siegel, “Scientific Discovery and the Rate of Invention,” in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 441-458, http://papers.nber.org/books/univ62-1. 31 On space as a matter of world’s prestige, see, Yanek Mieczkowski, Eisenhower’s Sputnik Moment: The Race for Space and World Prestige (Cornell University Press, 2013), chap 12. 32 Everett Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 85-86; “Geostrategy in the Space Age: An Astropolitical Analysis,” Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no.2-3 (1999): 83-106. 33 Amy Ryan and Gary Keeley, “Sputnik and U.S. Intelligence: The Warning Record,” Studies in Intelligence 61, no. 3 (2017): 1-17; “Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age,” NASA, accessed February 23, 2018, https://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/. 34 Earl Ubell, “Sputnik II Opens Era of Travel into Space,” New York Tribune, November 4, 1957, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

230 rockets.”35 The launch of Sputnik I and II changed American public opinion and created public doubts on American scientific knowledge on its space program. It was a major setback to

Eisenhower’s administration and American prestige.36 The pressure was mounting on to place an

American satellite into space. Several programs were initiated before the launch of Sputnik to send satellites into space but they failed to be successful in escaping Earth’s gravity. Finally, on

January 31, 1958, U.S. Army successfully launched its space rocket Explorer I in space to send its satellites.37 From onward, an intense race was started between two strategic competitors and

“Sputnik would seem to qualify as a historical catalyst” of space race of First Space Age.38

Walter McDougall writes about the post-Sputnik world witnessing “scientific and technological revolution” as “capitalism itself altered its law and Leninist doctrine was modified to include science as a direct productive force.”39 McDougall opines that

“The four realms most often cited as the loci of revolutionary change in the Space Age are; 1) international politics, 2) the political role of science and scientists, 3) the relationship of the state to technological change, and 4) political culture and values in nations of technology.”40

McDougall aptly points out the main drivers behind the first Space Age. Besides, prestige and national security were also the intervening drivers which set the pace of U.S.-Soviet space rivalry. As space rivalry intensified, both states then shifted gears to achieve nuclear superiority.

Missiles are vital delivery means of nuclear weapons. Mutual fears of a widening missile gap were also germinated in both states. As a result, space race and development of Intercontinental

Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to reach each other’s heartland intensified in the 1960s.

35 Ibid. 36 Donald Michael, “The Beginning of the Space Age and American Public Opinion,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 24, no.4 (1960): 573-582. 37 “Explorer I Overview,” NASA, February 23, 2018, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/explorer/explorer-overview.html. 38 Walter McDougall, “Technocracy and Statecraft in the Space Age—Toward the History of a Saltation,” The American Historical Review 87, no.4 (1982): 1010-1040. 39 Ibid., 1011. 40 Ibid.

231 6.4.2 Perceived Missile Gap Threat

The chronicles of post-Sputnik era suggest growing American perception about the Soviet

Union’s keen interest in developing ICBMs. Declassified top-secret CIA documents highlight

U.S. anxiety over Soviet Union’s desire to achieve an ICBM capability.41 However, with the advancement in U.S. satellite reconnaissance and aerial photographic capability and subsequent assessment of once-denied territories and Soviet missile capabilities disapproved the missile gap perception in the U.S. The shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane and the capture of pilot

Gary Powers gave much attention about U.S. aerial reconnaissance of Soviet territories. For this,

U.S. built a facility named Badaber Peshawar Air Station 10 miles away from Pakistani city of

Peshawar and President Eisenhower had authorized the flight of Gray Power, an experienced pilot, to carry out Operation GRAND SLAM but was later caught by the Soviets after his U-2 was shot down by Soviet air defences.42 Cold War estimates of U.S. intelligence agencies revealed that the Soviet space program had played a significant role in developing and fostering its ICBMs due to the success of Sputnik I & II.43 The U.S. assessed that Soviet’s space program was actually "an off-shoot of its efforts to develop a nuclear-tipped ICBM.”44 That forced the

U.S. to shift gears to increase its space and aerial reconnaissance of Soviet’s missile facilities.

41 See CIA’s declassified documents with assessments on Soviet’s missile developments pre-and post- Sputnik edra, “What was the Missile Gap?” Central Intelligence Agency, February 23, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/what-was-missile-gap?page=2; On Soviet’s ambition to develop its Long-range Ballistic Missile, see “Creation of a Long-Range Missile with a Nuclear Warhead,” (official memorandum, Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, November 25, 1953), http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/165389. 42 For history of U-2 flights, see section “over flights” in, Jeffrey Richelson, The Wizards of Langley: Inside CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001). 43 "Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, 'On a New Test Range for the USSR Ministry of Defense'," History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, February 12, 1955, Published in Baturin (2008), 46-47, selected, edited, and annotated by Asif Siddiqi, and trans., Gary Goldberg, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/165390. 44 “The Dawn of the Space Age,” Central Intelligence Agency, updated February 5, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2007-featured-story-archive/the-dawn-of- the-space-age.html.

232 6.4.3 Achieving Nuclear Superiority

Another aspect of Soviet-U.S. space race was achieving nuclear superiority by both sides over each other and was sending rockets with military payloads. Bradley Shreve argued that:

“Historiographically, the role of the greater good in space exploration has not been recognized. Instead, nearly all of the literature on the U.S. and USSR’s endeavours into outer space has focused on the space race as an extension of Cold War, virtually ignoring all the cooperative efforts and conciliatory words.”45

Shreve’s argument about first space age suggests that the primary focus of both powers was to achieve their military objectives through the amalgamation of all their powers, including nuclear and space. Both were trying to maximize their nuclear numbers to shift the balance of power in their favour, thinking about victory in case of armed conflict. U.S. intelligence agencies assessed Soviet intentions and capabilities as it would seek victory in case of a nuclear crisis.46

Likewise, the Soviets accused the U.S. of massively developing nuclear weapons to seek superiority.47 Mathew Kroening investigated several past armed events between Cold War competitors and argues that “states that enjoy nuclear superiority over their opponents are more likely to win nuclear crises.”48 However, none of the past armed conflicts escalated to a level where both countries tried to nuke each other. Likewise, the two strategic powers continued to augment their space powers for military purposes and continued to militarize outer space.

The successful launch of Sputnik I and II temporarily shifted the balance of power in

Soviet Union’s favour had profound implications for the geopolitical order. As highlighted earlier, the primary fear in the U.S. was the development of ICBMs as an associated product of space technology development in the Soviet Union. The perceived threats from Soviet’s

45 Bradley Shreve, “The U.S., the USSR, and Space Exploration, 1957-1963,” International Journal on World Peace 20, no.3 (2003): 68. 46 Bernard Gwertzman, “Russians Debate Nuclear Victory,” The Washington Star, February 21, 1967, CIA’s Electronic Reading Room. 47 Steven Erlanger, “U.S. Seeks Nuclear Superiority, Soviet Officer Says,” Boston Globe, October 23, 1985, CIA’s Electronic Reading Room. 48 Mathew Kroening, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve,” International Organization 67, no.1 (2013): 141-171.

233 continuous development of its space program caused a political and technological stir in the U.S.

As a result of that U.S. also accelerated its efforts to compete with the Soviet to reach space. In doing so, the U.S. space program became the top political priority and a must-win battleground to maintain U.S. prestige in the world politics.

6.4.4 Militarization of Space

The interesting part of the space race is from 1957 till 1983. In between these years, the two states focused on launching satellites for military purposes, exploring the Moon with manned missions, and development of missile programs as an associated product of their space programs.

The militarization of space is not a new concept rather it dates back to end of the Second

World War.49 Henry Arnold Former Commander General of U.S Army Air Force (USAAF) and

Theodore von Karman sensed the importance of a U.S. military space program. The concept of space as a strategic domain was presented at that time and efforts were initiated to acquire and develop U.S missile and space programs.50 USAAF’s initiatives to augment space and missile technologies was intended to develop long-range ballistic missile and heavy lifting rockets to send artificial satellites in space.

Initial efforts to materialize the reality of space militarization were begun in the

Eisenhower era,51 but it was the Soviets who brought the novelty into reality by sending Sputnik

I and II. In that time, "American policymakers felt the danger of a surprise attack from the

Soviets." To securitize, policymakers in the Eisenhower Administration proposed the construction of an enterprise of reconnaissance satellites to take the imagery of the Soviet

Union’s denied territories where they feared the presence of missile launching pads and military

49 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 83. 50 David Spires, Beyond Horizon: A Half Century of Air Force Leadership (Washington DC: Air University Press, 2002), 15; Paul Stares, Space Weapons and U.S. Strategy: Origin and Development (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 24-25. 51 Read the historical debate on U.S.’ reconnaissance satellite programs during Eisenhower era, Robert Dienesch, Eyeing the Red Storm: Eisenhower and the First Attempt to Build a Spy Satellite (London: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), chap 3.

234 airports, troop movements, their extent and direction with a 10-15 percent error.52 Likewise, both powers developed satellites for passive military purposes, including intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), communication, navigation, geodesy, ocean surveillance, and meteorology etc.53

In less than five years since the launch of Sputnik-I, President Kennedy in his speech at the height of the Cold War announced U.S. plans to land Americans on the Moon. It was that time when U.S. was making rigorous efforts to surpass the tactical advantage gained by the

Soviets from Sputnik. The most pressing issues were to get the images of denied Soviet territories and in doing so, the United States had created an “extraordinary series of reconnaissance satellites,” and CORONA series played an important role in it.54 Likewise, on the other side, the Soviets’ Zenit series of reconnaissance satellites was the countermeasure to

CORONA. The most significant part of the history of space race came after Kennedy. The space race was so intense that it resulted in the establishment of several key research and development

(R&D) agencies in the U.S. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was established at that particular time. New agencies were established within the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD), e.g. Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), now Defence Advanced Research Projects

Agency (DARPA). The space race started to take over the government machinery of both powers. Similar efforts were also started by the Soviets to develop spy satellites. Loring Wirbel notes the dual-use space technology development then as:

“The civilian space satellite program served as cover for a wide-ranging spy satellite program. That came as little surprise to an academic community already accustomed to the idea that the civilian race to the Moon has been little more than a Cold War stunt.”55

52 Raimo Väyrynen, “Military Uses of Satellite Communication,” Instant Research on Peace and Violence 3, no.1 (1973): 44-49 53 Ibid. 54 John Cloud, “Imaging the World in a Barrel: CORONA and the Clandestine Convergence of the Earth Sciences,” Social Studies of Science 31, no.2 (2001): 231-251. 55 Loring Wirbel, Star Wars: U.S. Tools of Space Supremacy (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 19.

235 Wirbel and Väyrynen’s observations about the development of space technologies during the Cold War was primarily to address the issue of getting real-time information about enemy military developments. The space technologies used for civilian purposes were the by-product of the space race. Jeffery Richelson noted the U.S. desire during the Cold War to outnumber the

Soviet Union in reconnaissance satellites. The United States was looking toward detecting other hotspots beyond Soviet territory and for that purpose, it continued to send more reconnaissance satellites.56 Also, the United States and Soviets also developed military communication satellite systems, as well as position-navigation-timing (PNT) systems (U.S. developed its Global

Positioning System (GPS) and Soviets developed GLONASS). The primary reason behind developing reconnaissance and communication satellite systems was to expand the space spy network, “gauging threat accurately and this possibly circumvents potential hostilities.”57

A significant analytical assessment was given by Paul Stares on Soviet-U.S. space competition to expand their space militarization capabilities. Stares assessed the development of spy satellites for a variety of purposes by both sides during the peak of Cold War. He argued that space was usually seen as the “new high ground or a new dimension of the arms race” by academics and experts. The primary reason behind this assertion was because of the intense development and subsequent launching of a satellite in space indicated a new trend in space militarization. Stares analysed the post-Sputnik era as a period of uncertainty for a short duration.

In that era, both sides came to realize the profound implications of any conflict in space. Stares argue that both sides developed military satellites to fulfil their domestic requirement, “rather than in response to the activities of the other.”58 Likewise, the other key variants of any kind of military competition between two adversaries were absent from Soviet-U.S. space race.

However, as their reliance on satellites for military purposes or ancillary activities to military

56 Jeffery Richelson, “The Future of Space Reconnaissance,” Scientific American 264, no.1 (19991): 38-45. 57 Ibid. 58 Paul Stares, “U.S. and Soviet Military Space Programs: A Comparative Assessment,” Deadalus 114, no.2 (1985): 127.

236 increased over the decades, “space has remained, in effect, an adjunct to the overall arms race,” between the two Cold war competitors.59

6.4.5 The ABM Shield

In the mid-1950s, the United States started development of ICBMs. The Soviets were aware of the threats emanating from across the Atlantic Ocean with an incoming ICBM from the U.S. mainland and also advance their ICBM capability. To counter a nuclear-tipped incoming Soviet missile, the U.S. Army proposed an idea to build an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) shield. Bell

Telephone Laboratories was tasked to prepare a feasibility report about the possibility of hitting a missile with another missile. This report assessed American capability to build an ABM shield and also assessed Soviet’s capabilities to do the same. Importantly, the report suggested that U.S. had achieved significant “technological advancement in radar, electronic computing, nuclear explosives, and rocketry,” that “it was indeed feasible to build an ABM with a simple objective.”60 To build ABM shield, the policymakers in U.S. agreed to the Nike Zeus Project in

1956.

The definition of ABM system according to ABM Treaty is “a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.” The elements include ABM interceptors,

ABM launchers, and ABM radars. The ABM shield includes sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based assets. Importantly, the space-based ABM components were the most alarming development. However, a prominent part of ABM history during the Cold War was the

U.S.-Soviet action-reaction syndrome.61 Hence, both states agreed to limit ABM development altogether. Both agreed to end that action-reaction syndrome to expand a thin layer of ABM to an Iron shield, because an ABM shield was extremely destabilizing and less a confidence- building measure. The primary reasons behind this agreement on signing the ABM Treaty were

59 Ibid., 128. 60 Herbert York, “ABM, MIRV, and the Arms Race,” Science 169, no.3942 (July 17, 1970): 257-260. 61 Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, May 1984), 33.

237 its “advantages outweighed by the disadvantages. Under the best of circumstances, the ABM seemed prone to obsolescence (as new offensive missiles appeared), uncertainly effective, enormously expensive and politically inexpedient.”62

6.4.6 The Weaponization of Space

A key aspect of the Cold War space order was the technological revolution coupled with the

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).63 This factor had fueled the political feud between the two powers as it became a matter of prestige. A detailed history of that period will highlight the role played by technological advancement in setting up the pace of the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition. Both sides continued to build expensive defence systems for military purposes. This technological advancement overlapped during the Cold War. As a consequence, the development of one defence system resulted in the making of another system a major development in BMD system and ABM shield resulted in the making of anti-satellite system and all these were interconnected technologies.

The first technological breakthrough in space exploration was the launch of Sputnik-1.

The Sputnik-I launch was just the tip of the iceberg as it was the beginning of the space race, an expensive race to send satellites into space. As it is highlighted earlier that the competition between the two strategic rivals was so intense that the peaceful exploration of space was never the top priority neither in the U.S. nor in the Soviet Union. A primary example could be the establishment of NASA was just to avoid the complexity created due to lack of information about the peaceful exploration of space. Both countries wanted to know each other’s military developments. Thus, half of the entire Cold War space race was about sending spy satellites into space to help them see the “enemy’s backyard.” Spy satellites changed the course of Cold War

62 Robert Rothstein, “The ABM, Proliferation and International Stability,” Foreign Affairs 46, no.3 (1968): 487-502. 63 See, Jeffery Cooper, “Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs,” in In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, eds. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Cooperation, 1997); W.A. Owens and S.J. Deitchman, “The Revolution in Military Technology,” Issues in Science and Technology 11, no. 1(1994): 5-6

238 history as they introduced methods of intelligence collection, surveillance, and imaging gather which made nations less “fearful and, thus, less prone to pre-emptive aggression.”64

The intense space race also lured both countries to think about methods to hamper, disrupt or destroy enemy eyes in the sky. To do so, anti-satellite missiles were developed. The designed mission of ASAT missiles was to destroy enemy’s network of eyes and ears in the sky, including the command and control of its forces. The objective of developing kinetic-energy

ASATs was to blind the enemy in case of a crisis by his satellites in space. Most of the spy satellites are low Earth orbit (LEO) and are there to give images of the territory through photo- reconnaissance. Likewise, LEO satellites can also be used for Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), meteorology and geodesy. The ASAT developments in the U.S. and the Soviet Union were to target these LEO satellites. Both states also placed satellites for strategic early warning and military and civil communication in Highly Elliptical Orbits (HEO). Both countries developed

ASAT missiles to target each other’s LEO/HEO satellites. Soviet once again shocked U.S. policymakers and public by hitting a satellite with an ASAT in 1968. As a consequence, the

Carter Administration authorized development of advanced U.S. ASAT missile program under the command of USAF in 1977. The primary objectives of U.S. ASAT were to deter the Soviets not to commit any course of action in space, “to protect U.S. military united from observation by

Soviet satellites, and to induce the Soviet Union to reach an ASAT arms control agreement.”65

ASAT development was the result of either “dedicated systems and as residual capabilities of systems development for other purposes, notably defence against ballistic missiles.”66 Both the U.S. and Soviet Union developed their ASAT capability due to the

64 Eric Motschiedler, review of Spy Satellites and other Intelligence Technologies that Changes History, by Thomas Graham and Keith Hansen, International Affairs 84, no.1 (2008):171. 65 Kurt Gottfried and Richard Ned Lebow, “Anti-Satellite Weapons: Weighing the Risks,” Daedalus 114, no.2 (1985): 147-170. 66 Laura Grego, “The History of Anti-Satellite Programs,” Union of Concerned Scientists, January 2012, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/a-history-of-ASAT- programs_lo-res.pdf, 2.

239 significant overlapping of technologies used for developing BMD and ABM systems.

Technologically, an ASAT is a residual or the by-product of missile interception technology. An

ASAT missile can be developed by looking at BMD system hitting an incoming ballistic missile at three different stages in its time of flight: boost-phase, mid-course, and terminal or re-entry phase. Any boost phase BMD system has great ASAT potential. Likewise, the mid-course BMD systems have great ASAT tendencies. However, a terminal BMD system may not be an ASAT.67

The noticeable point in the Cold War space race was the development of ASAT missile as a designated or residual product of many other associated defence systems with certain political, military and economic implications68. Both powers continued to develop their BMD system as a result more lethal by-product or designated missiles were also developed. The spy satellites launched by both sides during the Cold War rekindled Soviet-U.S. interest in developing ASAT missiles. The more they continued to rely on the satellite systems for military purposes, the more they became prone to develop ASAT weapons to threaten each other more.

6.4.7 The Star Wars

Another aspect of the weaponization of space during the Cold War was inception of the concept of Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) during President Ronal Reagan era. The announcement of

SDI in 1983 marked the death of the space sanctuary narrative. Space sanctuary doctrine promotes the exploration of the space for peaceful purposes, as well as maintaining space for military uses, except not weaponizing space. Reagan era’s pursuit of technologies to build an iron shield around the homeland was the departure of previous administrations’ narrative of space sanctuary.

Before Reagan, the Carter and Ford administrations were having points of view of preserving space as a sanctuary. But the announcement of SDI and subsequent establishment of

67 See, Arms Control in Space, 35. 68 Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms (Washington DC: Office of Technology Assessment, Government Pressing Office, September 1, 1985), 49-50.

240 Strategic Defence Initiative Organization (SDIO) to oversee the development of technologies marked the actual beginning of the path followed by the states towards the weaponization of space. On March 23, 1983, President Reagan asked the people in his speech about saving lives than to avenge them.69 His message was to develop a shield to protect the homeland from

Soviet’s ballistic missiles. The speech also marked a change in the U.S. strategy from Mutual

Assured Destruction (MAD) to Mutual Assured Survival (MAS).70 The American perspective about taking such revolutionary step was because of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. The

Reagan administration assessed that the Soviets were investing far greater resources in building their strategic defence by expanding their ASAT missile, BMD, and conventional capabilities.71

The primary objectives of the SDI were to deter any Soviet’s aggression, increase strategic stability and the security of U.S. homeland and its allies. For that purpose, a concept of three-layered missile defence shield orchestrating multiple technologies including space-based director energy weapons and kinetic kill vehicles, and ground-based missile interception.72 The whole SDI architecture was based on multiple technologies as mentioned earlier. Besides direct and kinetic energy technologies, there were technologies for “detection of ballistic missile launch, surveillance, acquisition, and tracking of attacking missiles and with battlefield assessment.”73 Also, SDI also conceived increasing the lethality of the weapons as well as made that era’s weapons more survivable. Likewise, attention was paid to assess the battle management and control techniques and developing countermeasures to defeat future defences.74

The SDI program marked the doorway toward space weaponization. Although, the system was

69 See, Carnes Lord, “A Strategic Defence Initiative: Building A Better Shield,” The National Interest 76, no. 7 (Summer 2004): 84-92. 70 “MAD, the theatre threat and ABM,” The Adelphi Papers 27, no. 225 (1987): 15-18. 71 Gerold Yonas, “The Strategic Defense Initiative,” Daedalus 114, no.2 (1985): 73-90. 72 See, Strategic Defense Initiative: Survivability and Software (Princeton, NJ: Office of Technology Assessment, 1988), chap 2; Bhupendra Jasani and Christopher Lee, Countdown to Space War (London: Routledge, 1984). 73 Gerold Yonas, “Research and the Strategic Defense Initiative,” International Security 11, no.2 (1986): 185- 189. 74 Ibid.

241 never installed in a manner that it could counter an incoming missile but the residual technologies or the by-product of research and development (R&D) in the SDI were politically helpful in deterring the Soviets as well as pushing their defence spending to breaking point.

6.4.8 Arms Control Treaties

Another key aspect of space exploration during the Cold War was the formulation of bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties to prevent the deployment and detonation of Weapons of

Mass Destruction (WMD) in outer space and placement of WMDs on celestial bodies. The treaties to prevent such deployment were the result of the enormous strategic capabilities produced by two powers. To avoid any catastrophe in space, a common human heritage, the

Soviets and U.S. were the principal parties in any kind of arms control and disarmament treaties either in nuclear, conventional or in space fields. The treaties and bilateral agreement negotiated and later on formulated are, Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), Outer Space Treaty (OST), The

Moon Agreement, the ABM Treaty and Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)

Treaty. All these treaties, bilateral and multilateral, were meant to prevention of the weaponization of space, but, all these treaties except PAROS Treaty do not talk about the fine aspects of weaponization of space and have many loopholes in them.75 Unfortunately, PAROS, the fourth core agenda item in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), was initially talked at the forum in 1985 but remains not negotiated because it would take the rest of the measures under its prohibition umbrella. This stalemate in CD shows the lack of political will of the major powers towards any negotiations prohibiting the true weaponization of space.76

75 See, Peter Van Ness, “The Time Has Come For A Treaty to Ban Weapons in Space,” Asian Perspective 34, no.3 (2010): 215-225. 76 Hui Zhang, “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China,” Arms Control Today 35, no.10 (2005): 6-11.; James Moltz, Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), chap 7.; and also see, Stephen Rademaker, “The Conference on Disarmament: Time is Running Out,” Arms Control Today 36, no.10 (2006): 13-15; Theresa Hitchens, “Rushing to Weaponize the Final Frontier,” Arms Control Today 31, no.7 (2001): 16-21.

242 6.4.9 Scientific Exploration in First Space Age

Humans always remained curious to explore and travel in outer space. The curiousness to climb as first step of ladder was when human flight in air became possible with aircraft. The next step toward the achieving excellence became possible when German military scientists explore a new kind of technology to send objects from one place to another place with much more speed, the V series rocketry. After the end of the Second World War, human curiosity became an important part of the state’s ambitions and national security objectives. That was not indeed peaceful as it was all about developing delivery means of nuclear weapons. However, most of the technologies are dual-use and it is always the matter of time, choice and setting up priorities when the peaceful side of the technology is explored for much larger benefits of humanity. The launch of

Sputnik-I made the world realize that there was another side of the space technology which needs attention; the exploration of deep space and other planets and stars. Sputnik was the pre- eminent milestone in the history of space race,77 and it provided an opportunity to test human scientific understanding about the stars, planets and the Universe. Sputnik wasn’t the only step in that direction as it also motivated the U.S. to go beyond the Earth’s atmosphere after multiple initial failures to send an artificial satellite.78

Onward the Sputnik and Explorer mission, a race was in full swing between the Soviet

Union and U.S. to reach the Moon and other planets. It was noted earlier by some authors about the dual-use technology used for space exploration was primarily meant for defence and peaceful exploration was the residual product of the overall efforts. But Peter Hays disagrees with this notion, believing that both states made significant steps toward space cooperation during Cold

77 Fraser Mcdonald, “Space and the Atom: On the Popular Geopolitics of Cold War Rocketry,” Geopolitics 12, no.4 (2008): 611-634. 78 See, Alexander MacDonald, The Long Space Age: The Economic Origins of Space Exploration from Colonial America to the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), chap 4.

243 War.79 The establishment of International Space Station (ISS) is an example of space cooperation between the two powers even during the height of the Cold War.80 Space has proved to be an exclusive medium where competition and cooperation between the two superpowers have taken place.81 The voices raised in the U.S. policymaking corners, by public, space experts, media, and

NASA personnel “reveal how early space exploration is a prime example of the blurring lines between military and civilian activities in the Cold War.”82 Both states have realized the importance of space exploration for the collective good of humanity. The race to conquer space

“lifted Soviet-American conflict out of military sphere into peaceful competition, with astronauts fighting a symbolic battle, an alternative to nuclear war,” writes Werth.83 Space exploration had helped both states to clear a lot of misperception, and misunderstanding about each other. Even today, U.S. is dependent on Russia’s rockets for launching its big satellites into high orbits.84

6.5 Second Space Age and Present Space Order

6.5.1 End of Cold War

Some said it was the end of history and beginning of a unipolar world with a single dominant force with all military and economic might along with a strong and undoubted political will to enforce its own “New World Order.”85 The Soviet collapse cleared all the stumbling blocks from

American way to achieve its global military, economic and political pre-eminence. This marked the end of a great competition in which two powers never directly engaged in a war but

79 Peter Hays (writer and visiting professor, George Washington University) in discussion with the author, February 26, 2018. 80 See, Valerie Neal, Spaceflight in the Shuttle Era and Beyond: Redefining Humanity’s Purpose in Space (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), chap 5. 81 A detail assessment suggests the history of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation during Cold War, see U.S.- Soviet Cooperation in Space (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, July 1985). 82 Karsten Werth, “A Surrogate for War—The U.S. Space Program in the 1960s,” Amerikastudien/American Studies 49, no. 4 (2004): 563-587. 83 Ibid. 84 “Why Washington Cannot Ban Russia’s RD-180 Rocket Engines,” Space Daily May 3, 2016, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Why_Washington_cannot_why_Russias_RD_180_rocket_engines_99 9.html. 85 See, Joseph Nye, “What New World Order?” Foreign Affairs 71, no. 2 (1992): 83-86; Robert Oakley, “The New World Order: Myth and Reality?” Pakistan Horizon 44, no.3 (1991): 9-18.

244 continued to build all means of military power to shift what was believed to be a balance of power in their favour.86 The chronicles of Cold War tells a rigorous and intense arms race at nuclear and conventional level.87 Concerning overall competition, a new dimension had emerged at that and it was the medium of space, in which they competed with all available national resources to maintain their prestige and create hegemony. The space race had many ups and downs as for a small period a party was leading in scientific and technological advancement creating a national embarrass for other party failing to respond similarly. A time came when one actor left no stone unearthed to show its scientific and technological advancement by sending its manned mission to the Moon, which was indeed a setback for another party.88 Similarly, both actors also were having parity in terms of nuclear weapons and other dimensions of military competition, known as a détente.89 At that time both realized that now it was time to negotiate bilaterally and also participate in multilateral arms control negotiations. The time moved on and space age also witnessed efforts from both sides to build space weapons and BMD systems. The whole space race witnessed intense scientific and technological advancement for military purposes and international prestige. But, at the end of the Cold War, there remained only a single power that was ready to shape the entire space order.

6.5.2 U.S. Space Power and Operation Desert Storm

Both states tried to achieve nuclear superiority over each other during the Cold War, but the real game-changer was space power. Just like Britain became a mighty empire because of its super navy, space power made the United States a superpower after the end of the Cold War. The

86 The research article gives a skeptical view of events happened just before and after the end of the Cold War. See, Denise Artaud, “The End of the Cold War: A Skeptical View,” Diplomatic History 16, no. 2 (1992): 256-261. 87 An interesting piece telling the morality of nuclear arms race in the Cold War, see, James Wood, “The Nuclear Arms Race and the Churches,” Journal of Church and State 25, no. 2 (1983): 219-229. 88 Yanek Mieczkowski, Eisenhower’s Sputnik Moment: The Race for Space and World Prestige (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), chap 15; Bart Hendrickx, review of The Soviet Space Race with Apollo, by Asif Siddiqui, Russian History 31, no.3 (Fall 2004): 361-362; 89 On détente, see the views of, Robert Schulzinger, “The End of the Cold War, 1961-1991,” OAH Magazine of History 8, no.2 (1994): 13-18.

245 United States demonstrated military space power during Operation Desert Storm in the 1991

Gulf War. The analysis of the operation suggests that the U.S. armed forces “came to the desert battlefield with a near-total dominance of Earth orbits and marshalled unprecedented space- dependent military capabilities to help it achieve a decisive victory.”90 The unprecedented space power used by the United States during the Operation Desert Storm and its open declaration and employment of space control have made it the “undisputed leader in space-assisted warfare.”91

6.5.3 Russian Space Program in Post-Cold War Era and Emergence of China in Global

Space Order

Russia’s space program came under severe budget cuts and suffered lack of attention to the leadership because of the deteriorated economic, military, and political infrastructure of the country. That gave a comfort zone for the U.S. to maintain its dominance in the space arena.

Besides that, there were new actors in space, such as China, India, Japan and European Space

Agency (ESA). The end of the Cold War also ended the space race between the two powers. It marked the beginning of the second space age and reshaped the space order. (See Figure 6.2)

Figure 6.2: Post Cold War Space Order

90 Steven Lambakis, “Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond,” Orbis 39, no.3 (1995): 418. 91 Ibid.

246 China observed U.S. space power during the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars, which helped it to reinvigorate its space program.92 According to Ashley Tellis, China’s space program has been a key characteristic of its overall national power and China is continued to expand this as it has become a symbol of its soft power.93 China tagged its space program as an element of its soft power in setting up its relations with the world. China launched “cooperative measures,” declaring its aims and objectives to explore space for scientific and peaceful purposes “as part of a larger strategy to increase its soft power and enhance its international reputation and influence within Asia and across the globe.”94 China took a quantum leap in its space program in 2003 when its first taikonaut, a Chinese astronaut, reached orbit and returned safely to Earth. The next step which shocked the entire world was the successful test of a Chinese ASAT missile in 2007.

It reignited chances of ASAT proliferation.95 Chinese space power continues to grow and it has surpassed Russia in terms of many active satellites in outer space.96 At present, China is disinclined to accept U.S. space supremacy or dominance and is engaged in posing asymmetric military challenges to the United States.97

After the ASAT missile test, another ASAT weapon test by China was the blinding of a

U.S. reconnaissance satellite in LEO. There is a difference of opinion on the technological capabilities of laser used in that particular incident, but there is a consensus that China partially

92 Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 91-92. 93 Ashley Tellis (Senior Fellow, CEIP) in discussion with the author, February 13, 2018; Also see his article, “China’s Space Capabilities and their Impact on U.S. National Security,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 20, 2008, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/AshleyJTellisUSCCTestimonyMay2020082.pdf. 94 Rob Chambers, “China’s Space Program: A New Tool for PRC “Soft Power” in International Relations?” (M.Sc. diss., Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey: CA, March 2009), 1. 95 An edited book published by Stimson Center gives a detail study on the proliferation of ASAT and its likely impacts, see, Michael Krepon, “Space and Nuclear Deterrence,” in Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, eds. Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (Washington DC: Stimson Center, 2013), chap 1. 96 The source is quoted in 28 reference of the First Chapter. 97 James Lewis, “Reconsidering Deterrence or Space and Cyberspace,” in Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, eds. Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (Washington DC: Stimson Center, 2013), 77.

247 blinded the satellite and implies that China has paced up its effort to achieve destructive and non- destructive means to hit satellites in space. The U.S. response on the partial blinding was non- reactive and a strategic silence was observed in space by the U.S. One particular reason behind

U.S strategic salience over the partial blinding was that U.S. wishes to maintain freedom of action in the space domain. U.S. protest with China could potentially mitigate U.S. counterspace programs. Onward, a new chapter in space security has begun the space rivalry between the U.S. and China. The dynamics of this adversarial relation has reshaped the global order and is studied as the chapter proceeds.98

China has footprints of Soviet space technologies and launched its missile program by testing its first Dongfeng (DF)-1 missile in 1960. The cooperation between the two Communist states in space is historical and it remained complex in terms of technology transfer. However, both countries did not react to each other’s space capabilities’ development. The Sino-Soviet space cooperation in the Cold War remained focused on achieving economic, scientific, and social objectives.99 However, in the past three decades after the Soviet demise, Sino-Russian space relations have transformed in developing a platform to counter U.S. space capabilities, especially on diplomatic forums, like in presenting proposals to prohibit the placement of weapons in outer space and other initiatives. A research article by De Leon Petta Gomes da

Costa on Sino-Russia space cooperation suggests both countries must cooperate in space otherwise they will be restricted in case they create a rivalry. He thinks Sino-Russia cooperation

98 A details study draws a holistic picture of U.S.-China space rivalry including, doctrines, policies, capabilities and future programs. See, Erik Seedhouse, Space Race: China Vs. the United States (Chichester, UK: Praxis Publishing, 2010). 99 Charlotte Mathieu, “Assessing Russia’s Space Cooperation with China and India,” European Space Policy Institute, report 12, June 2008.

248 can play a “decisive role in the future of this planet,” if they wish to collaborate.100 Recently, both sides signed 20 deals in energy and space technology transfer and exploration.101

6.5.4 India an Emerging Global Space Power

India’s first successful space venture was testing the sounding rocket Rohini-560 in 1972-73. In subsequent years, India sent its first artificial satellite, codenamed Aryabhatta, for scientific purposes from a Soviet Cosmodrome. The history of India’s space program tells that India was cooperating with both superpowers in the Cold War to get space technology for socio-economic development. However, Onkar Marwah wrote:

“Like the nuclear program, Indian policymakers will inherit military-launch capabilities, where at least intermediate-range missiles should become available to the country by the early 1980s. It would not be a difficult proposition, if the circumstances required, matching the weight of nuclear warheads with those of scientific satellites.”102 India learned lessons from the Kargil conflict with Pakistan in 1999 and understood the importance of space power especially the importance of military capabilities in space. After

Kargil, India began to invest in its space program and it gained momentum. Bharath

Gopalaswamy, Director South Asia Center at Atlantic Council writes that the initial phase of

India space program was the development of technologies for scientific, agricultural, information technology purposes between the 1960s to 2000s. But in 2001, India began to explore space for military purposes and send its first military satellites in 2001.103 Now, according to Annual

Publication of Institute of International Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance 2018, India has

100 De Leon Petta Gomes da Costa, “Chinese Geopolitics: Space Program Cooperation among China, Brazil, and Russia,” Astropolitics 14, no.1 (2016): 96. 101 “China, Russia agree to Further Cooperation,” China Daily, updated November 2, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-11/02/content_34000566.htm. 102 Onkar Marwah, “India’s Nuclear and Space Programs: Intent and Policy,” International Security 2, no. 2 (1977): 104; also see Raju Thomas, “India’s Nuclear and Space Programs: Defence or Development?” World Politics 38, no.2 (1986): 315-342. 103 Bharath Gopalaswamy, “Space Security: India’s Perspective,” in Crux of Asia: China, India, and the Emerging Global Order, eds. Ashley Tellis and Sean Mirski (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), 173-185.

249 13 military satellites in space. Also, India is likely to develop counterspace capabilities and also enhance the scope of its military space program.

India is a regional space power with global space ambitions. Its space cooperation is increasing not only with regional partners but also globally, like with Japan and Brazil. India is an important member of Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) alongside

Japan. It is believed that to counter rising Chinese commercial space ventures in Asia, India and

Japan are likely to cooperate at APRSAF. Recently, both countries signed various agreements to boost cooperation in space technology and space exploration.104 Renata Ribeiro’s analysis of

India’s space program, in a comparative study with Brazil, notes that right from the beginning

India’s strategy to establish international cooperation in acquiring space technology and expertise from other countries has been successful. He writes that “India realized that international embargoes impeded its satisfactory progress within the sector, which continuing to buy foreign technology.”105 The launch of 104 satellites of different countries and making a world record in space launches reflects India’s successful space cooperation and diplomacy.106

India’s position in the Cold War and post-Cold War space orders has remained non-reactive and its space objectives largely motivated to achieve technological achievement in planetary exploration and other associated fields. But after 2007, Indian political, military and scientific community started thinking about building ASAT missiles and other counterspace capabilities to counter China’s emerging space threat to India’s space program.

104 “India, Japan Set to Boost Space Cooperation,” Sputnik News, September 9, 2017, https://sputniknews.com/asia/201709121057319030-india-japan-cooperation-/. 105 Renata Ribeiro, “Comparative Perspective of the Brazilian and Indian Space Programs,” Astropolitics 15, no.3 (2017): 231; also see, K. Kasturirangan, “India’s Space Enterprise—A Case Study in Strategic Thinking and Planning,” in The First Ten K R Narayanan Orations: Essays by Eminent Persons on the Rapidly Transforming Indian Economy, eds. Raghbendra Jha (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2006). 106 Mihchael Safi, “India launches record-breaking 104 satellites from single rocket,” The Guardian, February 15, 2017.

250 6.5.5 Current Space Order

The current space order has multiple layers. At global level, the space order is witnessing the

“rise of China,” “resurgence of Russia,” and “to a lesser extent India.” The expanding capabilities of these three countries and the significant devotion of national resources to foster their respective space programs for various reasons including prestige and national security has made the current space order multipolar. Furthermore, ESA, Japan, and Israel also developing critical space technologies and enhancing their cooperation with other developing countries has made orbits more congested, crowded and lead towards competition in military and economic dimensions. Moltz, on the characteristics of present order, said that:

“U.S. has certain military, commercial, and civil space advantages over other players that make it most powerful actor among other countries in space today. U.S. will likely narrow over time, but that it will remain the leading space power for the foreseeable future, particularly due to the likely expansion of its commercial sector.”107

Moltz aptly characterizes the features of the current space order. Besides, there is a misunderstanding-misperception dynamics between three major space powers regarding the developing of their space weapons and increasing military space capabilities. States have covered significant distance while following a path toward the weaponization of space. This also a strong argument that the weaponization of space has already done and states are just waiting to wave each other off in a weaponized space environment.108

Furthermore, the complexity, uncertainty, and dynamic environment of international security have shaped space environment. The states are lost in space toward a “misguided drive toward building anti-satellite weapons,” exploring kinetic and non-kinetic means to disrepair, permanently or temporarily damage the functioning of adversary’s satellite.109 “Conflict remains a prominent feature of international relations,” becoming more complex because of many

107 James Moltz (Professor at NPS) email correspondence to the author, November 28, 2017. 108 Wesley Hallman, “A Fast-following Space Control Strategy,” Astropolitics 3, no.1 (2005): 35-42. 109 Michael Krepon, “Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive toward Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Foreign Affairs 80, no.3 (2001): 2-8.

251 ungoverned areas of technology transfer and regional powers gaining modern technologies in the fields of nuclear, conventional, and space.110 The more states develop military capabilities by self-help for their survival, the more they are likely to establish a deterrent relation with their adversaries. Likewise, in the rise of illiberal world order,111 the more states economically become interdependent, the more they solidify their deterrent relations. Nicolas Peter of European Space

Policy Institute (ESPI) categorised the history of space exploration into three different orders;

“proto-space age” (pre-World War II); “Space 1.0” (Cold War); and “Space 2.0 (post-Cold

War).”112 Space 2.0 has witnessed multipolar characteristics and increasing commercialization of space as well as for various national reasons including national economy, public services, and ensuring national security. However, the more the misunderstanding-misperception dynamic grows in any bilateral or trilateral relation, the more there are chances of escalation and conflict, making a complex space deterrent relations.113

A dominant narrative in current literature, policy statements and experts’ view on space security is about the increasing activities in space. The debate is largely U.S. based. Space is now more congested and crowded domain. The Cold War space was all about two powers relations, but the advancement in space technologies has increased the pool of states aspiring to become space power. As a result, several states other than three major space powers; U.S., China and

Russia; and international companies now own a significant number of satellites orbiting the

Earth. These international companies are also actively collaborating and major spacefarers are

110 Marc Berkowitz, “Shaping the Outer Space and Cyberspace Environments,” in Conflict and Cooperation in Global Commons: A Comprehensive Approach for International Security, ed. Scott Jasper (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 111 See detail analysis on rise of illiberal world, Michael Boyle, “The Coming Illiberal Order,” Survival 58, no.2 (2016): 335-66. 112 Nicolas Peter, “The New Space Order: Why Space Power Matters for Europe,” Space and Defence 4, no.1 (2010): 56. 113 See a detail study on space deterrence published by United States Air Force Academy’s (USAFA) Eisenhower Center for Space and Defence Studies, Roger Harrison, Deron Jackson, and Collins Shackelford, “Space Deterrence: The Delicate Balance of Risk,” Space and Defence 3, no.1 (2009): 1-22; Michael Krepon, “Space and Nuclear Deterrence,” Chap 1.

252 stakeholders in their investment as part of their commercialization of space. Roger Harrison believes that

“Some ‘‘golden’’ orbits are more desirable than others, and these are becoming crowded, with some jostling apparent. ‘‘Cheap launch,’’ if it becomes a reality, will worsen the problem: the business plan for the new commercial launch companies depends on slim margins and high volumes, and this portends a large increase in the number of satellites encumbering a fixed number of useful orbits and crowding available spectrum.”114 This has made space crowded and congested.115 But from a space security view, the more the reliance on satellites grows, the more they are vulnerable to attacks, especially hacking and physical destruction, because of increasing fear of states moving towards a tipping point where they regard weaponization as inevitable.116 Those at the helm of affairs in U.S. military space organizations are having a view that with the increasing number of nation-states in space owning a significant number of satellites with space launch capabilities, they are likely to increase hostile

IRS and intelligence capabilities to U.S. national security. U.S. military space commanders believe that there is a need to re-evaluate their space strategy to counter the emerging challenges to U.S. space supremacy and freedom of action in space.117

Space is a strategic domain and major and emerging space powers want to have their place in it. States are shifting their gear to maintain their position in space in twenty-first century primarily because of both military and economic benefits. Now, India, China, Japan have declared planetary exploration missions, which were only part of the Soviet Union and U.S. policies in the Cold War. After its end, the world is witnessing a gradual increase in the military

114 Roger Harrison, “Unpacking the Three C’s: Congested, Competitive, and Contested Space,” Astropolitics 11, no.3 (2013): 123-131. 115 Representatives of United States, Bahrain, Indonesia, EU, Egypt, France, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Kuwait, Canada, and Brazil in the UN First Committee expressed their nations’ concerns about the increasing activities in outer space and space race in their statements. See, United Nations, “Outer Space Increasingly ‘Congested, Contested and Competitive’, First Committee Told, As Speakers Urge Legally Binding Document to Prevent its Militarization,” press release no. GA/DIS/3464, October 23, 2012, https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/gadis3487.doc.htm. 116 Theresa Hitchens, “War in Space in Increasingly Possible. That Would be Terrible for Everyone,” National Post, November 17, 2017, http://nationalpost.com/opinion/war-in-space-is-increasingly-possible- that-would-be-terrible-for-everyone. 117 James Kitfield, “Crowded, Congested Space,” Air Force Magazine 93, no.8 (2010): 24-29.

253 and peaceful space assets and technologies of states other than U.S. and Russia. States like India,

China, Japan, South Korea etc., are expanding their international partnership to send other states’ satellites in outer space. This has broken the monopoly of U.S. and Russia over only the two powers to send satellites of other states; in fact, China and India have sent provided alternative platforms for developing countries to send their satellites more cheaply than from U.S. and

Russian launching pads. Also, North Korea, South Korea; and soon Pakistan, Turkey, Brazil,

Argentina will also enter the club; to advance their space-launch proficiency. The expansion of space-faring nations’ pool has made the skies and space more competitive.

However, there is a need to understand that the present day is not like a Cold War competition. Although there is an element of prestige in the present space order as it was in the

Cold War order, it does not mean that it will shape the present day order in the same way. Cold

War was all about the bipolar world and the space order was also bipolar, but now today’s space order is very much multipolar. China has emerged as a global space power, India is also following suit, and Japan is not lagging behind either. European states have also jointly developed indigenous technologies to explore space. Russian space program is coming out of two decades’ long hibernation. Likewise, there are increasing numbers of space users. In sum, the contemporary space order is more complex, may be reactive, may see more efforts from states to weaponize outer space, and competition to shift the space economic balance in their favour by giving cheap space launches. The end of Cold War marked the beginning of an era of space commercialization. Advanced space powers are deregulating their space launch industry to grasp the opportunity of sending private satellites owned by non-state actors. “The space industry is thriving and highly competitive, attracting both emerging established technological and industrial powers” according to Stratfor’s space assessments.118

118 “Space: The Increasingly Crowded Frontier,” Stratfor, March 25, 2016, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/space-increasingly-crowded-frontier.

254 Likewise, other than states’ vital interest in space, a common human life in an interconnected world is much dependent on space-based infrastructure e.g. internet, communication, navigation etc., that it would be extremely difficult to live in the absence of these facilities largely dependent on satellites. World Wide Web (WWW) is a by-product of space race in the Cold War and after Soviet demise, “internet profoundly subverted the ability of power institutions (governments, newspapers) or economic/geographic factors (distance, costs of publishing and mailing) to control and shape the flow of information.”119 Internet services after the end of Cold War were just like “the invention of the printing press, which Martin Luther used to erode the power of the clergy by printing the Bible in German so that ordinary fold could read the word of God.”120 So, it is evident that living without internet in this modern day world, which is very much interconnected that was never before in the history of mankind, would be extremely difficult. In this regard, satellites undoubtedly are the basic building blocks of this interconnected world, and from commercializing point of view, the more satellites are in space, the more the world will be interconnected and people will have more freedom of action on social media. But satellites providing these services are also under, if not at all but, a constant threat of being knocked out through electronic and destructive means.

The recent tensions between U.S. and North Korea have renewed the catastrophic consequences of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack on U.S. satellites by the latter.121 Peter

Vincent Pry, executive director of the task force on National and Homeland Security and

Director of U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, appeared as a witness in the joint hearing before the subcommittee on national security, explaining the disastrous effects of a North Korean EMP attack on U.S. satellites. He testified that a North Korean EMP attack will knock out U.S.

119 Holt Ruffin et al., The Post-Soviet Handbook: A Guide to Grassroots Organizations and Internet Resources, revised edition (London: University of Washington Press, 1999), 319. 120 Ibid. 121 Bruce Dorminey, “North Korean EMP Attack Would Cause Mass U.S. Starvation, Says Congressional Report,” Forbes, October 23, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucedorminey/2017/10/23/north-korea- emp-attack-would-cause-mass-u-s-starvation-says-congressional-report/#19ad76dd740a.

255 navigation and communication satellite systems, ground and air traffic control systems, thus blinding surviving aircraft. Furthermore, “cars, trucks, trains, and traffic control systems would be damaged.” As a consequence, the life in the U.S. will be a living dead as cities will suffer from gigantic traffic jams, all kinds of vehicles would be rendered inoperable, massive blackouts in major cities, bringing all fields of life to a halt.122 Interestingly, the renewed threat from North

Korea has meant recommendations from experts to strengthening U.S. BMD system, land and space-based systems, as well as reconsidering old SDI to avert the chances of EMP attack by

North Korea.123 Besides these eminent threats due to multilateral adversarial relations in the international system, there is also an environment of competition in the subject of space science and technologies as states are rigorously competing to project their scientific achievements, which has given space-related institutions “interest in space science studies as well as general earth studies.”124 However, the one good side of this competition despite some negativity is the progress of science and technology for good of society. Technology is always dual-use, but it always payback for good despite negatively used for destruction and in case of space technology is has paid back in the past and will continue to pay back in future.

The present space order is multipolar with multi-dimensional characteristics primarily focused on economic and military avenues for the states to explore in parallel. The security challenges are tremendous and states are competing for both at global and regional level. The importance of space power for military purposes as force enabling capability has increased twice than what was in the Cold War. Likewise, commercialization of space has grown exponentially over the past two decades creating new horizons of space tourism, deep space exploration and set space station with as many as states participating in building it. Besides that, there are many

122 The EMP Threat: The State of Preparedness Against the Threat of a Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Event, 114th Cong., (May 13, 2015) (statement of Peter Vincent Pry, executive director of the task force on National and Homeland Security); and also see North Korea Nuclear EMP Attack: An Existential Threat, 115th Congress, (statements of William Graham and Peter Vincent Pry). 123 Ibid. 124 See, “Increasingly Crowded Frontier.”

256 similarities between post and pre-Cold War space order. Both orders lack international governance or code of conduct to explore space.125 There is no universally accepted treaty to prohibit all kinds of space weaponization. States still feel vulnerable in space. Space military capabilities are increasing to counter each other. However, unlike Cold War space order, the present day space order may involve an assured deterrent relation between states or may the states complete the path toward space weaponization and bring the doomsday clock more seconds closer to space Armageddon.

In the present space order, the states are rapidly increasing their space weaponization capabilities and there is an increasing sense of space as a warfighting domain.126 Likewise, there is also a sense in the major space powers that space weaponization is inevitable and there is a need to take steps ahead of space militarization. There are growing concerns in the U.S. that

Russia and China can attack U.S satellites, and if it happens, the U.S. should prepare for war in space.127 U.S. policymakers believe that U.S. dependence on their space assets is critical for their national security and if attacked then U.S. will have no option than to respond similarly. The

U.S. military has prepared strategies like National Security Strategy and National Defence

Strategy explicitly to talk about counterspace capabilities and space as a warfighting domain. On the other hand, China and Russia are also aware of the U.S. intention to add more lethality in its space weapons and are likely to follow suit. The current space order is becoming complex because of the geostrategic and geopolitical competition between these three powers, thus reshaping the current global space order. There are chances of U.S. increasing its space fleet, as

125 On challenges facing in establishing international space governance and Code of Conduct see “U.S Space Policy and the Challenges of Integrating Emerging Powers,” (proceedings, Conference on U.S. Space Policy under International Institutions and Global Governance Program, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, United States, June 30, 2011). 126 See the statement of USSTRATCOM Commander General Hyten, United Senate, “Opening Remarks of Chairman Rogers,” press release, March 7, 2018, https://armedservices.house.gov/news/press- releases/opening-remarks-chairman-rogers-22. 127 HASC-SF Hearing on the President’s Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request for Strategic Forces: Nuclear, Space, and Missile Defence, 117th Cong., (March 7, 2018) (statement of John Rood, Under Secretary of Defence for Policy)

257 there are chances of Sino-Russia bilateral response to U.S. space capabilities. China’s PLA is increasing its anti-missile defence capabilities128 and Kremlin’s announced building “an invincible intercontinental cruise missile and a nuclear torpedo that could outsmart all American defences.”129 Chinese and Russia investments in their missile defence systems will have a spin- off effect on their counterspace capabilities and will likely affect their lethality, precision, accuracy and targeting in space, and give them a push to rigorously follow a path toward space weaponization, increasing chances of a space arms race.

6.5.6 Asian Space Race

Within the layers of global space order, a layer tells about space race between Asian space powers, China, India and Japan. In Asia, China, India and Japan are three major space powers with regional and international cooperation and collaborations. Space power is considered as a vital organ of these states’ national power, international prestige, and soft power. All these states have announced plans to explore deep space and other planets of the solar system. Likewise, all are providing opportunities for other states to jointly manufacture/build and launch satellites to increase commercial activities in space.

At regional level cooperation, China took lead from other Asian space powers and established Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP-

MCSTA) in November 1992. The idea of establishing AP-MCSTA was presented by China,

Pakistan and Thailand and later on became Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization

(APSCO). Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Iran, Mongolia, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey are Member

States of APSCO dominated by China as a core state.130 Interestingly, China asked South Korea

128 Gabriel Dominguez, “China Conducts mid-course anti-missile test,” IHS Jane’s, February 8, 2018, http://www.janes.com/article/77752/china-conducts-mid-course-anti-missile-test. 129 Neil MacFarquhar and David Sanger, “Putin’s Invincible Missile is Aimed at U.S. Vulnerabilities,” New York Times, March 1, 2018. 130 “Welcome to APSCO: APSCO Member States,” Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, accessed March 9, 2018, http://www.apsco.int/AboutApsco.asp?LinkNameW1=APSCO_Member_States&LinkCodeN=11.

258 to become Member States but it did not sign the document nor did Japan and India. APSCO was modelled on the ESA format, and its goals were to achieve space technologies for peaceful purposes. James Moltz sees China’s help in the establishment of APSCO space platform to crowd in the aspiring space powers in the region but with “the perspective of regional leadership and has apparent aims of integrating the space economics of the members, although most the membership has only rudimentary space technology.”131 Besides, APSCO Member States sees

China as the principal innovator of space technology and they see APSCO as a platform to seek

Chinese space technology how-know and transfer to build their space program infrastructure.

Under APSCO, China is “providing the data, ground stations, and scientific training, as well as practical experience in helping to construct spacecraft, which they would not otherwise be able to gain.” One prime example of Chinese efforts is the BeiDou navigation satellite system.

Pakistan has ended its reliance on U.S. GPS as Chinese BeiDou system started providing services in entire Pakistan.132 China is also cooperating with other countries to help them build their space program. However, China has not been successful in convincing other space powers like India, Japan, and South Korea to enter the organization because of Chinese cold relations with said states in space. Likewise, these states are unlikely to accept Chinese monopoly in

Asian region, “making China difficult to see the organization emerging as a basis for region-wise institutionalized cooperation anytime soon.”133

Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) is another regional space cooperation forum led by Japan and India to counter Chinese-led APSCO in Asia. China is also a member of APRSAF but its main regional cooperation is through APSCO. APRSAF is mainly funded by Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). APRSAF has different mandate and

131 Ibid. 132 “Pakistan’s Reliance on US GPS Ends as China’s Beidou Navigation Satellite Systems has started to Cover Entire Pakistan,” Times of Islamabad, February 13, 2018, https://timesofislamabad.com/13-Feb- 2018/pakistan-s-reliance-on-us-gps-ends-as-china-s-beidou-navigation-satellite-system-has-started-to- cover-entire-pakistan. 133 Moltz, “Asian Space Rivalry,” 130.

259 objectives than APSCO as it is more related to scientific knowledge sharing and space relation information sharing. Japan is primarily leading the organization in active collaboration with

India. During Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to New Delhi in 2017, both countries signed

MoUs to increase cooperation in sharing space technologies and expertise in launching lunar and planetary exploration missions in future at the platform of APRSAF.134

The existence of parallel space forums reflects the existence of a space race in Asia. The two poles in Asia are attracting the periphery states to become part of either APSCO or

APRSAF. Rong Du of the University of Hong Kong argues that space cooperation in Asia is suffering from a status quo and space order in Asia presents a bifurcation structure, largely driven by three distinctive space powers; China, India and Japan.135 Likewise, the structural difference between the two organizations has reduced institutional interactions between the two space platforms. Instead, the core states in these two organizations are using the platforms to project their soft power in and outside Asia, inviting for competition.136 Furthermore, the difference between the two organizations has made “unfeasible for initiatives to carry out substantial cooperation with each other. The sub-regionalization and fragmentation of space cooperation in Asia is likely to be magnified if no cooperation agreement is reached among

China, India and Japan.”137 However, Asif Siddiqi believes that APSCO is providing a much bigger platform for Asia states to cooperation and globalization of space technology. China is

134 Ministry of External Affairs, “India-Japan Joint Statement During Visit of Prime Minister to India,” press release, September 14, 2017, http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral- documents.htm?dtl/28946/IndiaJapan+Joint+Statement+during+visit+of+Prime+Minister+of+Japan+to+Ind ia+September+14+2017. 135 Rong Du, “Space Cooperation in Asia: A Mystery,” (paper, 65th International Astronautical Congress, Paris, France, October 3, 2014). 136 Joan Johnson-Freese, review of Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risk, by James Moltz, The Nonproliferation Review 19, no.2 (2012): 337-340. 137 Ibid.

260 well-prepared to counter Indo-Japan led APRSAF as APSCO provides strategic consideration for

China with “larger issues of political and economic influence in Asia.”138

China, India and Japan are rapidly increasing their space capabilities and sub-regional, regional and international cooperation.139 However, this rapid expansion has “accompanied by rapid growth in leadership competition among these states.”140 Likewise, most of the space capabilities development in China, India and now Japan are due to regional strategic environment are for military purposes. There are proposals in the past to integrate these two organizations into a single forum where all Member States of both organizations discuss issues related to space cooperation in Asia, but all ended in vain because neither of the states wants to share a single stage.141 Neither state wants to be subordinate to others although all three have mostly developed technologies indigenously and sharing their own experience about space technology could help in establishing Pan-Asian cohesion in the space technology experience.142

Thus, the core states in this regional and sub-regional space order are China, Japan and

India. China is leading APSCO, whereas India and Japan are core states in APRSAF. See figure

6.3. These two organizations are shaping the regional and sub-regional space order.143 India as a principal of space technology and increasing its regional diplomacy in South Asia has tried to create a sub-regional space order under the initiative of South Asian Association for Regional

138 Asif Siddiqi, “Asia in Orbit: Asian Cooperation in Space,” Georgetown Journal 11, no.1 (2010): 138. 139 Michael Sheehan, “Rising Powers: Competition and Cooperation in the New Asia Space Race,” The RUSI Journal 155, no.6 (2010): 55-50. 140 Marco Aliberti, “Regionalization of Space Activities in Asia?” European Space Policy Institute, ESPI Perspective no.66, February 2013, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/163952/ESPI_Perspective_66.pdf, 6. 141 James Moltz, “Asia’s Space Race,” Nature 480, no.7378 (2011): 171-173. 142 Elizabeth Quintana, “The Asian Space Race,” in Raisina Files: Debating the World in the Asian Century, eds. Harsh Pant and Ritika Passi (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2017). 143 Saadia Pekkanen, “China and Japan Vie to Shape Asia’s Approach to Outer Space,” Forbes, October 31, 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/saadiampekkanen/2016/10/31/china-and-japan-vie-to-shape-asias- approach-to-outer-space/#1f3249a52606.

261 Cooperation (SAARC) Satellite.144 Prime Minister Modi during 2014 SAARC Summit in Nepal announced the launching of SAARC satellite for the mutual benefit of SAARC countries to provide a full range of space applications and services to India’s neighbouring states including

Pakistan. But, Pakistan refused to become part of the sub-regional space order created by India.

India launched the satellite without the participation of Pakistan, whereas the remaining SAARC countries are part of SAARC satellite program.145 India considers it a gesture of goodwill to its neighbouring countries and saw it as a sign of cooperation between regional countries and India.

However, Sri Lanka and Pakistan continue to cooperate with China to manufacture and launch their satellites in space, which is likely to be a blow to India’s initiative to increase sub-regional space cooperation and influence.146

Figure 6.3: Asian Space Order

However, the Asian space order is also influenced by the United States as an external force. The U.S. has significant space cooperation with India, Japan, Indonesia and South Korea.

On the other hand, U.S. perceives China as its adversary in space and feels vulnerable to its

144 Shounak Set, “India’s Regional Diplomacy Reaches Outer Space,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 7, 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/7-3- 2017_Set_IndiaRegionalDiplomacy_Web.pdf. 145 Medhavi Arora, “India Launches Satellite for South Asia Countries, Pakistan Says No Thanks,” CNN, May 5, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/04/asia/india-pakistan-satellite/index.html. 146 The Hindu, “Editorial—Space For All: South Asia Satellite Launch A Positive Signal to the Neighbourhood,” May 8, 2017.

262 counterspace capabilities. Hence, it is a fact that global, regional and sub-regional space orders have a complex interaction and likely to be more security-driven than focusing on increasing cooperation to explore space. Interestingly, the desire to achieve space supremacy in Asia is increasing and space race between core and periphery states in getting pace.147

6.6 Conclusion

The purpose of writing this chapter is to understand the combined effect of space capabilities and intentions of the major and emerging space powers. This combined effect of the global and regional space capabilities and intentions is the formation of the global, regional and sub- regional space order. States’ space capabilities growing in line with their political, military and economic intentions help them to secure a prominent place in global space order. States at prominent places tend to exert their influence on the behaviour of other states as well as projects and maintain their soft power and prestige. States’ having significant space militarization and weaponization capabilities possess the power to reshape the global, regional and sub-regional space order. It is also evident that capabilities are instrumental in shaping strategic environment in space. Likewise, intention-driven policies are also important but a real game changer is an industrial base and subsequent development of national infrastructure helping a state to develop its capability to exert its influence on other states.

It is evident that at present, the United States is the dominant space power in the global space order with a historical tendency to influence the behaviour of other states. It is also evident that any capability developed in the United States is a threat or challenge for the national security of other states. Russia with a history of engaging the United States in a space race is also resurging in the space domain and China has also emerged as a global space power. The present space order is capability based, not intention driven. States with expanding space capabilities are likely to dominate the present global space power.

147 Alan Boyd, “Asia’s Space Race Gathers Pace,” Asia Times, January 6, 2018.

263 At regional level, states are dependent on the principal innovator in the region to provide them the how-know, expertise, knowledge, and information related to space technology to build their own. However, there is also complexity involved in it as in Asia two parallel space forums are competing with each other for different strategic purposes. This competition has given birth to a regional space race known as the Asian space race.

In conclusion, the current global space order is complex, crowded, congested, and competitive. The global space order in the coming years is likely to see more congestion and competition.

264 CHAPTER 7

United States-China Bilateral Relations and Space Security Trilemma in South Asia 1 7.1 Introduction

The research problem of the study is to analyse the implications of an arms race in outer space for south Asia. A prudent academic answer to the research problem is the hypothesis. The hypothesis is general guesswork of the research problem of the thesis. Likewise, a hypothesis also defines a way to describe and explore the title of the study. The title of the study is Arms

Race in Outer Space: A Paradigm Shift in International Security and Implications for South

Asia, and it seems that a major chunk of the thesis will be focusing on studying China, India and

Pakistan. However, without studying the United States’ space program it would be impossible to understand the dynamics of global and regional space orders and Astropolitics. Likewise, the study also focuses on a key important feature of the geopolitical and geostrategic environment in

South Asia and that is security trilemma. Moreover, the study will be incomplete if the implications of space power and the security trilemma for South Asia are not adequately studied.

A more comprehensive study will study the role of United States as a core state, which has political, economic and military power, resource, and influence to shape global, regional and sub-regional space order. United States possesses enough power in space to exert its influence on other states to change their behaviour in space. However, there are certain challenges faced by

United States from other global space power, China and Russia. China has ascertained second position in global space order and has built sufficient space capabilities and showed its Astro- intentions to Asia to be recognized as an Asian Space power. However, China has also become a global space power which has created challenges and vulnerabilities for United States’ space supremacy.

1 A part of this chapter is published in the special issue of Astropolitics in Feb-April 2019. The international journal is ranked as X-category according to HEC.

265 The U.S.-China power dynamics in missile and space dimension has spillover effects on

South Asian security calculus. The Sino-U.S. competition in missile and space has both positive and negative implications for South Asia. Now, several questions germinate here, how can Sino-

U.S. competition cause implications for South Asia? What is the nature of Sino-U.S. relations in space? What is space security trilemma? What are possible political, military, economic, and environmental implications of Sino-U.S. competition in missile and space for South Asia? In general, will competition in space at global, regional and sub-regional level bring a paradigm shift in international security or not? These are some of the important questions to be investigated to prove the hypothesis of the dissertation as well as drawing conclusions and recommendations. Likewise, the questions answered in the previous chapters are the backbone of this research. Analysing the answers to questions asked in the previous chapters combined with answers of this chapter will provide a base to prove the hypothesis of the research.

First, the chapter will explain the nature of Sino-U.S. political, military, economic relations. It will further explain the nature of Sino-U.S. relations in medium of space. While studying Sino-U.S. relations it will be studied that how much their relations are similar to Soviet-

U.S. relations during Cold War? Is there are kind of action-reaction model between two space powers or they have complex interdependence which will engage them in an assured space deterrence relations? A prominent part of their competitive relations is the implications for South

Asia. This will be the second part of the chapter. In this part, China, India, and Pakistan’s brief military, political, and economic relations will be highlighted to under their relations in space. It is a fact that space power cannot be seen in complete insolation as space capabilities work a force enabler and space power military, political, and economic benefits as well as create security challenges for adversaries. Hence, the focus of the chapter will be on space security trilemma and its military, political, diplomatic, economic, and environmental implications for

South Asia.

266 7.2 United States—China Dynamics

“The United States and China are both indispensable pillars of world order.”2 —Henry Kissinger, Famous U.S strategist and diplomat

The origin of “Yangtze Civilization” dated back five thousand years when people living near to

Yangtze River started knitting a “complex of great cultures.”3 Chinese civilization represents the existence of other civilizations e.g. Yellow River Valley, but Yangtze River has deep footprints on China’s five thousand old civilization.4 A brief study of Chinese civilization suggests that gaining political power to rule China was through winning wars to obtain legitimacy. The history of tradition goes back to four thousand years back. Dean Cheng of Heritage Foundation believes that five thousand years old Chinese Civilization suggests that war begun by China or inflicted upon it was by choice.5 The five thousand years old Chinese history highlights fighting war a prominent feature of its history. As a result, some of the finest military thinking and strategy was authored by Chinese thinkers and military generals, e.g. Sun Tzu.6

Other finest perspectives of Chinese civilization are Chinese intellectualism and meritocracy, self-governance in civil society, and unified language and cohesive culture, which has helped China over five thousand years to move toward modernity.7 Likewise, among many profound characteristics of ancient Chinese civilization are its relations with its neighbouring and far-reaching states. During different Chinese dynasties, its civilization had “played as the

2 See, Henry Kissinger, World Order (London: Penguin Press, 2014). 3 See details, Chaolong Xu, “Viewing the Reconstruction of the framework of the Chinese Civilization,” Japan Review, no.9 (1997): 205-222. 4 Charles Greer and Aleksandra Pavlovich Muranov, “Yangtze River,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, updated January 1, 2018, https://www.britannica.com/place/Yangtze-River. 5 Dean Cheng, “Space,” (talk, Waging War in the 21st Century, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, December 5, 2017). 6 Richard Rousseau, “Strategic Perspectives: Clausewitz, Sun-Tzu and Thucydides,” Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 15, no.2 (2012): 74-83. 7 Guang Xia, “China as a Civilization-State: A Historical and Comparative Interpretation,” Procedia— Social and Behavioral Sciences 140, no.1 (2014): 43-47.

267 foundation head of the oriental cultural rim became increasingly prominent.”8 It evident from the history books that ancient China had cast profound impacts on world culture. In reciprocity,

Chinese people also learned from the civilization of its neighbouring and other countries. The western writings on Chinese civilization suggest that it has an “order, stability, symmetry, rationality,” unlike “divided, uneasy, strike-ridden world of the West.”9 China civilization was complex but it was ordered, and it showed how to interact with other civilization in ancient times.

The purpose of highlighting some core features of Chinese civilization is to understand its impact on China’s foreign relations with major powers. China has five thousand years old history and it has its deep reflection on modern China and its relations with the world. It is important to understand the core values of Chinese civilization before understanding its relations with the United States. Fighting war and winning it, and establishing cordial relations with its neighbours are paramount of Chinese foreign relations. China is a rising global power and it is has been so far a responsible power after the End of the Cold War.10

The post-Cold War order witnessed the rise of China at regional and global level. China emerged as a global economy in the last three decades of the twentieth century, and it the next upcoming three decades of the twenty-first century will “bring them the completion of that rise.”11 From data gathered on world economies by the Economist’s Intelligence Unit, China is likely to retain second position in the global economic order with a projected growth of 5.8 percent in 2018.12 The dominant paradigm in the time when the Cold War was on the verge of

8 Zang Rong, “The Treatment of Foreign Relations in Ancient China in the New History Textbook,” Chinese Education and Society 36, no.6 (1999): 83. 9 Arthur Wright, “The Study of Chinese Civilization,” Journal of the History of Ideas 21, no.2 (1960): 233. 10 For further reading, see Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin, “China and Responsibility of Power,” in Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yongjin and Greg Austin (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2013), chap 1. 11 Jane Golley and Ligang Song, “China’s Rise in the Changing World,” in Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities, eds. Jane Golley and Ligang Song (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2011), chap 1. 12 “The Fastest-growing and Shrinking Economies in 2018,” The Economist, January 5, 2018.

268 the ending was the emergence of the interplay of geopolitics and economy.13 The interplay of these dominant themes in world politics gave birth to a new era of geo-economics, and China had realized the importance of being an economic power after the Cold War ended.14 Another aspect of Chinese rise is its active role in geopolitics at regional and global level. Chinese leaders have “refashioning their country’s foreign policy,” to meet challenges to China’s foreign policy, economic and national security in the changing regional and global geopolitical landscape.15 In the past three, China has adopted a proactive approach to meet the challenges present in regional and global changing economic affairs, and active strategy to engage with cultural, technological and educational affairs at regional and international levels.16

Rising China in changing world order riddled with the realities of geopolitics and geo- economics has many obstacles and daunting challenges. Among many of these knee-jerk challenges is sustaining economic growth in a very competitive regional and global environment.

Likewise, other challenges to Chinese defence and foreign policies are peacefully engagement with major powers, especially with the United States without involving in political, military and economic competition, and highlighting its ambitions and power to change the existing political and economic power.17 A substantial part of China’s foreign, economic and defence policies embark upon its effort to engage with United States and other major powers.18 China-U.S. bilateral relations are undoubtedly the jewel of the crown of the twenty-first century political and economic order. As highlighted at the beginning of this section, both countries are two prominent

13 Sanjaya Baru, “Geo-economics and Strategy,” Survival 54, no.3 (2012): 47-58. 14 Robert Ross and Tunsjø Øystein “Introduction,” In Strategic Adjustment and the Rise of China: Power and Politics in East Asia, eds. Robert Ross and Tunsjø Øystein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017), chap 1. 15 Avery Goldstein, “A Rising China’s Growing Presence: The Challenges of Global Engagement,” in China’s Global Engagement: Cooperation, Competition, and Influence in the 21st Century, eds. Jacques Delisle and Avery Goldstein (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017), 1. 16 On China’s economic strategy see, Matt Ferchen, China, Economic Development, and Global Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie-Tsnghua, Center for Global Policy, December 2016). 17 Oded Shenkar, “China’s Economic Rise and the new Geopolitics,” International Journal 61, no.2 2006): 313-319. 18 See, Evan Medeiros and Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” The New York Times, October 22, 2003.

269 pillars of present international order. Both countries have massive economic, military, and political capacities.19 It is important to understand how China sees that world. The answer to this question is deeply interlinked with its bilateral relations with the United States China sees a multipolar world without U.S. primacy.20 The world has been turning upside down since the events of 9/11 in United States. After the terrorist events, United States launched war against

Global War on Terror (GWOT) and in the subsequent years, it also waged war on Iraq. Onward, discussion about a “unipolar versus multipolar” world became a prominent part of the global political discourse.21 Likewise, the discussion was also started in China as an emerging political, economic and military player on the world stage. The gradual rise of China in the post-9/11 world has germinated fears that it will eventually surpass the United States’ military and economy power in near future.22 But that is only one side of the picture. Many Chinese political and strategic analysts disagree with this revisionist thought and argue that China does not harbour any grand revisionist ambition and will be happy to “play a larger role in the existing system and is prepared to attempt to achieve this goal” by bringing more political independence, economic reforms and smoothing foreign relations with its neighbouring countries and with major powers including the United States. 23

Likewise, how China sees its neighbouring countries. The answers to the question will be subsequently given in the section discussing security trilemma in South Asia. Likewise, China-

19 John Ikenberry, “Introduction,” in America, China, and the Struggle for World Order: Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies, and Global Visions, eds. John Ikenberry, Zhu Feng, and Wang Jisi (New York: Palgrave, 2015), chap 1. 20 Minxin Pei, review of Debating China: The U.S.-China Relationship in Ten Conversations, by Nine Hachingian, Foreign Affairs 93, no.2 (2014):143-147. 21 Jenny Clegg, China’s Global Strategy: Towards a Multipolar World (London: Pluto Press, 2009), chap 1. 22 Kenneth Rapoza, “The Future: China’s Rise, America’s Decline,” Forbes, March 26, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/03/26/the-future-chinas-rise-americas- decline/#6d1b0eab3b2f. 23 Mingjiang Li, “Rising from Within: China’s Search for a Multilateral World and Its Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations,” Global Governance 17, no.3 (2011): 346.

270 U.S. relations in political, economic, and military contexts will also be highlighted to understand how two powers interact with each other in outer space.

7.2.1 Political Relation

A general political thought about U.S.-China relations in the early years of the post-Cold War that both were neither friends nor foe.24 Even though both countries were not engaged in a rivalry fashioned in a Cold War manner, a central or core feature of U.S.-China relations is

“mutual distrust of long-term intentions, termed as strategic distrust.”25 The perception and image of any state in the international political system matters, and when it comes as a central theme of two pillars of the global order than it becomes lethal for normal relations. Although,

China and United States have a different history, language, culture, civilization, social norms, institutions, and political thoughts about present world order, but still engaged in a vicious cycle of misperception and misunderstanding.26 The issue of misperception and misunderstanding in the international system is arguably best studied by Robert Jervis. He summarized the dynamic between two actors:

“In determining how he will behave, an actor must try to predict how others will act and how their actions will affect his values. The actor must, therefore, develop an image of others and their intentions. The image may, however, turn out to be an inaccurate one; the actor may, for many reasons, misperceive both others’ actions and their intentions.”27

The misperception-misunderstanding dynamic is prevalent in U.S.-China bilateral relations. The current relations can be framed by what Jervis has hypothesized. Jervis’s argument was about the presence of an element of misperception in the policy and decision making spheres

24 David Decker, “The People’s Republic of China and the Clinton Administration,” in China in Transition, eds. Phylis Lan Lin and David Decker (Indianapolis, Indiana: University of Indianapolis Press, 1997), 11. 25 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, March 2012), 1-49. 26 Damien Ma, “Friend/Foe: The Contradictions in How Americans and Chinese See Each Other,” The Atlantic, July 13, 2012. 27 Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics 20, no.3 (1968): 454; For further details on misperception in the international relations see, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); and The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

271 on two states, but in U.S.-China relations, this element of misperception is now trickled down to general public, making the relationship more complex in last one decade. The dynamic of strategic distrust between the two countries is now the combination of misperception at decision making and public level.

Due to a different culture, civilization, governance, economy etc., the impact of public opinion on the overall policy-making process in both countries is unlike. American public opinion has a profound impact on policy making, whereas, in China, public opinion seems to have less impact on policy making but still it cannot be discounted in current urban China.28

Mathew Hirshberg has analysed the history of American public opinion on China during and after the end of Cold War. In his research, Hirshberg developed a framework titled American

Patriotic Schema, to describe the American public opinion on Soviet Union and People’s

Republic of China (PRC).29 He analysed that during the Cold War, most of American public opinion was negative toward China as it was perceived “Red China.” PRC was perceived as

Soviet puppet, communist, evil and oppressive to its people.30 During many ups and down in

Sino-U.S. relations, a time came when “Sino-Soviet confrontation led to Sino-American accommodation,” resulted in a wave of positivity in American public opinion toward China. But this positivity did not remain consistent, “China remained as communist and undemocratic.”31

During the height of Cold War, China was a communist and oppressor because of American

28 On the impacts of public opinion in the American policy making, see, Robert Shapiro, “Public Opinion and American Democracy,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 75, no. 5 (2011): 982-1017; and on China, the book review suggests that the author “rightfully distinguishes the authoritarian political system in current China from totalitarianism and pluralism.” Chunping Han, review of Public Opinion and Political Change in China, by Wenfang Tang, Journal of East Asian Studies 7, no.1 (2007): 170-172. 29 “The framework consists of five conceptual elements and the positive relationships among them; United States, Freedom, Good, Self, and Democracy.” For further details, see Matthew Hirshberg, “Consistency and Change in American Perceptions of China,” Political Behaviour 15, no.3 (1993): 247-263. 30 Ibid., 251. 31 Ibid., 252.

272 public. Change in public opinion is a gradual and slow process, but near to the end of Cold War,

American public opinion surveys gave China “favourable ratings.” 32

The post-Cold War era has some major trends including, the collapse of communism, trade replaced territorial expansion and economic and political reforms in many countries.33 In post-Cold War China’s image drastically changed in the American public opinion. Although, reforms begun China in 1979 when the government decided to bring Market Reforms, the real reforms were the political reforms that came after Tiananmen Square.34 During the Cold War, there was a continuous struggle in China to liberalize the economy and bring political reforms.

That seems to change Chinese image in the American public of being an oppressor and a communist country. Now, after all these efforts, China has become second largest economy in the world surpassing Japan in 2010. But, the American public opinion about China is more or less similar to Cold War image of China. Many American believe that Chinese government does not respect the political rights of its citizens, and around 55 percent American still have negative views about China. However, American seemingly little impressed with a factor which is mostly driving U.S.-China relations in the twenty-first century, the economy. Around 49 percent

American view China’s economy from a positive angle.35 China’s economy is rising at a consistent growth rate and their many predictions about it taking over the American economic might in the coming decades.36 This is the biggest concern in United States’ policymakers and

32 Ibid., 261. 33 Donald Zagoria, “The End of the Cold War in Asia: Its Impact on China,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 38, no. 2 (1991): 1-11. 34 On the success of people’s moment forcing Chinese government to bring political reforms in the country, see, Andrew Brick, Reform in China After Tiananmen Square (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, August 5, 1989), 1-6. 35 “China’s Image,” in Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, But Limited Harms to America’s Image (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, July 14, 2014), chap 2, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-2-chinas-image/. 36 See, Zuliu Hu and Mohsin Khan, Why Is China Growing So Fast? (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, April 1997), 1-9.

273 the general public. This fears or concern, if not wrong to say has become a challenge for the

United States to deal with it to maintain its global supremacy.

7.2.2 Economic Relations

It is written on the wall that United States is undoubtedly a military and economic might, but it is also a hard fact that “America’s economic and military edge relative to the world’s other great powers, will inevitably diminish over the next several decades.”37 United States has fought two major wars at the beginning of the twenty-first century, one in Afghanistan and others in Iraq.

The economic and political cast of these two wars has created a dent in American economic, political and military power. It has paid a huge economic cost of these two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the political context, the American ability to attract to other is in decline because of rising anti-Americanism in recent years.38 More recently, its soft power has further declined under the present administration.39 The decline in United States’ soft power primarily because of two wars it fought and a subsequent economic spillover effect on its economy. However, a prominent aspect of decline in its soft power and economic crunch it faced is the rising economic competition with China.

China is the contemporary world that is “a dynamic factor in the world economy.”40

China’s trade partnership with its neighbours, Central Asian Republics (CARs), Western

Industrial powers especially with the United States.

The political nature of Sino-U.S. relations is well defined by Zi Zhongyun. He concludes the political context of Sino-U.S. economic relations as the present economic relations will be

37 Robert Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul,” Political Science Quarterly 125, no.3 (2010): 359. 38 Joseph Nye, “The Decline of America’s Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs 83, no.3 (2004): 16-20. 39 Joseph Nye, “Donald Trump and the Decline of U.S. Soft Power,” Project Syndicate: The World’s Opinion Page, February 6, 2018, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-american-soft-power- decline-by-joseph-s--nye-2018-02. 40 Henry Kissinger, “The Future of U.S-Chinese Relations: Conflict Is a Choice, Not a Necessity,” Foreign Affairs 91, no.2 (2012): 47.

274 “probably be governed more by economic laws than by political development.”41 Here are some facts about bilateral trade between United States and China.42

a. A total volume of trade and services between United States and China was US $

648.5 billion in 2016.

b. China was the United States’ third largest receiver of goods in 2016.

c. China was number no country in the world to export its goods to the United States

in 2016 worth US $ 462.6 billion.

The numbers represent that United States’ economy is largely dependent on Chinese exports. The United States’ dependence has grown over the years as Chinese export of goods and services to it has a significant increase.43 Likewise, China’s dependency on United States as a major importer of its good has tremendously increased in the past several years. This has made

China a global engine of the economy.44 As a result, not only American but the rest of the world’s appetite to import low-priced Chinese products has increased.

7.2.3 Deterrent Relations

A core aspect of U.S.-China relations is strategic relations in terms of nuclear deterrence. The central figure or referent state in Chinese deterrent calculus is United States 45 Chinese development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), the scope and capabilities of its nuclear forces, nuclear strategy and force posturing is by and large influenced and shaped by the changing global environment, and United States has played significant role in shaping nuclear

41 Zi Zhongyun, “A Multidimensional Approach to Sino-U.S. Relations,” in U.S.-China Economic Relations: Present and Future¸ eds. Richard Holton and Wang Xi (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1989), 19. 42 “U.S.-China Trade Facts,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed March 15, 2018, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china. 43 Chinese export to U.S. has surged 15 percent in 2017, see, Daniel Shane, “China’s Surging Exports Widen Trade Surplus with U.S.,” CNN Money, January 12, 2018, http://money.cnn.com/2018/01/12/news/economy/china-us-trade-surplus/index.html. 44 See for details, Ross Garnaut, “China: New Engine of World Growth,” in China: New Engine of World Growth, eds. Ross Garnaut and Ligang Song (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2012), chap 1. 45 Eric Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Cooperation, 2017), 17.

275 force and missile capability development during and after the end of Cold War.46 It is a fact that changing geopolitical and geostrategic environment has played a significant role in shaping the nuclear strategy, force posturing and missile development of a nuclear weapon state. China’s deterrent relations are directed to assess and counter United States’ military build-up around

Chinese territories.

George Friedman argues that the greatest military threat to China from United States’

Navy in South and East China seas.47 China sees the presence of U.S. forces around Chinese seas as an existential threat. The five thousand old history of China suggests that it has considered any military force presence to its borders an existential threat to its national security. It is a fact that the overall Chinese military, economic and political approach, doctrine, policy and strategy is deeply intertwined, linked and connected with basic geographical parts connected with its borders. Likewise, China has also felt threatened when there is military presence on its seas, especially, when its export routes come under military surveillance.48

To counter the presence of United States’ military in the East and South China seas,

China has developed advanced missiles and launch platforms. The missile development in China is akin to the U.S. military presence in Chinese seas, and it is also shaping Chinese nuclear posturing and strategy.49

The primary aim of Chinese nuclear capability acquisition was to establish an effective military capability to deter United States. Likewise, another significant objective of acquiring nuclear weapons was to achieve a “status of world power and increase its influence both within

46 “A Chinese Nuclear Deterrent Aimed at the U.S.,” Stratfor, January 25, 2017, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/chinese-nuclear-deterrent-aimed-us. 47 George Friedman, “The Geopolitics of China: A Great Power Enclosed,” Stratfor, June 15, 2008, 8. 48 George Friedman, “In China, a Strategy Born of Weakness,” Stratfor, October 18, 2017, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/in-china-a-strategy-born-of-weakness/. 49 For details on Chinese response to U.S. presence in its waters, see, Michael Beckley, “Balancing China: How the United States and Its Partners Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion,” War on the Rocks, November 15, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/balancing-china-united-states-partners-can- check-chinese-naval-expansion/.

276 the international throughout the world.”50 Besides, China's aim to acquire nuclear weapons was also to seek “additional means for establishing Chinese hegemony in Asia.”51 China has been feeling vulnerable and fearful of growing United States’ nuclear primacy and its reaction is

“conditioned by the broader strategic context.”52

As far United States’ position is concerned, Jeffery Lewis has summarized its response or reaction to Chinese nuclear force development as he thinks that United States’ policymakers still debating about whether the U.S. should recognize or accept its so-called mutual vulnerability with China.53 China has a relatively small nuclear weapon arsenal. According to SIPRI Yearbook

2017, China has an estimated fissile material of 270 nuclear warheads, and it gradually increasing its nuclear arsenal. At present, China has about 220 nuclear weapons in its arsenal.54

However, U.S. is still not recognizing that it is vulnerable to the Chinese nuclear strike, and continues to rely on its Cold War-era strategy to accepting mutual vulnerability in response to

Chinese nuclear force development.55 The U.S. policymakers are not willing to accept mutual vulnerability as they think that it will be established U.S-China relations in a peer competition and give China an incentive to proliferate vertically. However, this mutual vulnerability has become a reality for the U.S.56 It seems that U.S. is inching toward accepting reality. The global

50 Morton Halperin, “Chinese Nuclear Strategy: The Early Post-Detonation Period,” Asian Survey 5, no.6 (1965): 273. 51 Morton Halperin, “Chinese Nuclear Strategy,” The China Quarterly 21, no.1 (1965): 76. 52 Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, “U.S. Nuclear Primacy and the Future of the Chinese Deterrent,” China Security, no. 5 (2007): 71. 53 Jeffery Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posturing (London: Institute of International Strategic Studies (IISS), 2014), chap 1, 33. 54 SIPRI Yearbook 2017 (Stockholm: SIRPI, 2017), chap 11, World Nuclear Forces. 55 Ben Rimland, “The U.S. Should Admit its Vulnerability to Chinese Nuclear Attacks,” The Diplomat, May 3, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/the-us-should-admit-its-vulnerability-to-chinese-nuclear- attacks/. 56 Gregory Kulacki, “Mutual Vulnerability with China a Reality, Not a Choice,” Union of Concerned Scientists, October 11, 2013, https://allthingsnuclear.org/gkulacki/mutual-vulnerability-with-china-a- reality-not-a-choice.

277 strategic stability depends upon U.S.-China competition, and U.S-China strategic stability is a pivot to it based on mutual vulnerability.57

The 2017 NSS of the US clearly defined its policy toward countering rising Chinese military might, and from their perspective a revisionist state. The document suggests that China wants to shape the world order and seek to displace United States in the Indo-Pacific region.

China pursues a policy to expand its state-driven economic model, and realign the region according to its choice.58 A prominent aspect of U.S.-China deterrence relations is a complex security dilemma.59 One particular example is the recently released U.S. Nuclear Posture Review

(NPR) under President Trump administration and the Chinese response to it. Under 2018 NPR, the Trump administration seeks to develop low-yield nuclear weapons “for the preservation” of

U.S. credible deterrence against regional aggression.60 Analysts fear that U.S. will likely add more weapons in its nuclear arsenal after 2018 NPR. China condemned US NPR and called it representing U.S. Cold War mentality.61 In response, China also likely to increase its nuclear arsenal, but it is unlikely to fill the present gap between China and the U.S.62 China pursues either limited or minimum nuclear deterrence with limited investment in its force structure, institutional capacity, expertise, and lack of resources is likely to limit nuclear modernization

57 Christopher Twomey, “The U.S-China Strategic Dialogue: Phase IX Report,” PASCC, Naval Postgraduate School, report no. 2017-001, December 2016. 58 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017), 25. 59 Teng Jianqun, “The Sino-U.S. Security Dilemma: The Root Cause and Way Out,” Observer Research Foundation (ORF), February 8, 2017, http://www.orfonline.org/research/the-sino-us-security-dilemma-the- root-cause-and-way-out/. 60 Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defence, February 2, 2018), Executive summary. 61 “China Accuses U.S. of Cold War Mentality Over Nuclear Policy,” BBC, February 4, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42935758. 62 Gregory Kulacki, “China’s Nuclear Force: Modernizing from Behind,” Union of Concerned Scientists, January 2018, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/01/modernizing-from- behind.pdf?_ga=2.82376593.645215538.1521151248-2061194595.1521151248.

278 program.63 Perhaps, that is the reason that U.S. does not explicitly recognize China as its peer competitor but still, a China enough nuclear weapons with its advancement in ICBM, cyber, space technologies to deter U.S. However, China is interested in mutual strategic reassurance and strategic restraint between both countries, without any confrontation, with mutual respect, cooperation and benefits.64 On the other hand, the recently launched National Security Strategy indicates that U.S. sees China as a competitor with a reluctance to accept U.S. nuclear primacy.

7.2.4 Complex Interdependence

The post-Cold War world witnessed a mixture of competition and cooperation between states and non-states actors. There is a tremendous influence of International Organizations (IO) and

Multilateral or Multinational Companies (MCs) on the foreign policies of states. States have moved beyond the traditional concept of preserving their security and meeting challenges to their national security. The world has become more globalized in which a state’s survival is not only measured by its military power; rather it has now become a combination of realist and liberal perspective of having military might and a strong economy. In the Cold War era, a state’s survival or its vital security was linked with its relative military power to its adversary. States’ foreign and defence policy were predominantly labelled and studied from a neorealist paradigm, especially maintaining or shift the balance of power linked with the distribution of power.

However, the end of Cold War ended bipolar world. In the bipolar world, the military dependence of the states was on the other state. A core state like had built a bloc and a periphery state was dependent on the core states for arms build-up. But, the end of bloc politics marked the beginning of more complex relations as state’s economy became a parallel factor to military

63 Taylor Fravel and Evan Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security 35, no.2 (2010): 48-87. 64 On strategic reassurance see research article publication under a project titled regional voices on the challenges of nuclear deterrence stability in Southern Asia published by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. See, Liping Xia, “China’s Nuclear Doctrine: Debates and Evolution,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/china-s- nuclear-doctrine-debates-and-evolution-pub-63967.

279 might and became instrumental to state’s sovereignty and integrity. The economy of the state, according to the liberal perspective, is the core of state’s survival in this anarchic world. From this perspective and living in a globalized world, a mutual dependence between states even they are adversaries is required and they need to cooperate instead to compete with each other in order to solidify each other’s economies.65

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were not satisfied with the core assumptions of the neorealist perspective of international relations.66 Koehane and Nye laid the foundation stone of the theory of Complex Interdependence in their work titled Power and Interdependence: World

Politics in Transition in which they briefly discussed the increasing economic interdependence between states, nongovernmental organization and their networks.67 The phenomenon of complex interdependence is now frequently observed in the age of information revolution and globalization.68

Studying the details of the concept is beyond the scope of the study. The question arises here whether is it observable between China and the U.S. in the age of information and globalization or not? Are these two having a complex interdependence with each other?

A baseline of liberal perspective is that all roads to peace lead from economic interdependence. Scholars of international relations believe that global commerce germinates

65 Waheeda Rana, “Theory of Complex Interdependence: A Comparative Analysis of Realist and Neoliberal Thoughts,” International Journal of Business and Social Science 6, no.2 (2015): 290-297. 66 Robert Keohane, “Institutional Theory in International Relations,” in Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies, eds. Michael Brecher and Frank Harvey (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 67 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977) 68 On information interdependence see, Kenneth Rogerson, “Information Interdependence: Keohane and Nye’s Complex Interdependence in the Information Age,” Information, Communication and Society 3, no.3 (2000): 415-436; On interdependence and globalization see, Helen Milner, “Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics: Research Frontiers,” in Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics, eds. Helen Milner and Andrew Moravcsik (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), chap 1.

280 peace and economic relations between states solidify peace.69 On the contrary, there are strong arguments and hard-core economic and political assessments of the facts prevalent in intra-state relations because of historical analysis combined in a study widely cited authored by Katherine

Barbieri talked about no links between economic interdependence and occurrence of armed conflict. The abstract of the study concludes that economic cooperation or interdependence between two states has a dramatic influence on the occurrence of wars primarily due to the confounding influence of contiguity, military capabilities, alliance commitments, and type of regimes. The study also concludes that extensive economic interdependence increases the likelihood that dyads will engage in militarized interstate disputes. Also, the study highlights that the chances of peace are possible through bilateral trade between two adversaries but extreme economic interdependence could be a cause of armed conflict.70

From the about perspective, it quite evident that the “capitalist peace” between two states dependent on the regime type, military capabilities, and regional and their global relations with other states of respected states. Likewise, the notion of “power money is probably the most reliable”71 as the primary source of complex interdependence is a mere existence between those states which have different regional and global ambitions. Likewise, there is also strong evidence that public opinion is an important variable that likely to influence states’ foreign and defence

69 See, Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer, “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict,” International Organization 55, no.2 (2001): 391-438; Derek Braddon, “The Role of Economic Interdependence in the Origins and Resolution of Conflict,” Revue D'économie Politique 122, no.2 (2012): 299-319; Likewise, there are hard core economic realities that prevent inter-state military conflict. See, Ju Hyun Pyun and Jong-Wha Lee, “Globalization Promotes Peace,” VOX: CERP’s Policy Portal, March 21, 2009. 70 Katherrine Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research 33, no.1 (1996): 29. 71 See, Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, trans, Campbell Smith (London: Swan Sonnenschien & Co., 1903).

281 policies. If public remains ignorant about state’s trade and service relations with its adversary than it can provide greater representation to protectionist interests.72

As far as U.S.-China relations are concerned, the policymakers of both countries have realized growing interdependence between both countries. Both countries’ political leadership has realized the importance of developing a new framework for mutual economic cooperation to decrease the chance of belligerence.73 The capitalist peace between the two countries is growing.

The facts and figures between two states’ annual trade suggest that both countries are moving fast to solidifying the capitalist peace between them. Likewise, this also suggests that despite asymmetrical trade and service relations, both countries are heavily interdependent, which has bolstered the capitalist peace between them. However, capitalist peace is mere evidence without any theoretical framework as it still unable to guarantee the non-occurrence of conflict.74

A primary factor in complex interdependence between U.S.-China is the changing global economy. China has conceived and trying to implement its idea of restructuring the old Silk

Road and has come with One-Belt-One-Road (OBOR) project, and is now actively participating in BRICS, ASEAN, SCO, AIIB, CPEC, and other regional forums to capitalize on the growing global economy. Likewise, U.S. is also signing economic and trade agreements with India and other Asian powers to contain Chinese regional economic rise. But, the prominent part of the

U.S-China complex interdependence is their mutual trade. A substantial part of their economic growth depends on their mutual trade and services, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).75

72 Seiki Tanaka, Atsushi Tago and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Seeing the Lexus for the Olive Trees? Public Opinion, Economic Interdependence, and Interstate Conflict,” International Interactions 43, no.3 (2017): 337-396. 73 Jianwei Wang, “Building Conceptual Framework for U.S.-China Relations,” in Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the Next World Power, eds. Yufan Hao, George Wei, and Lowell Dittmer (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2009), chap 2. 74 Erich Weede, “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence,” International Interactions 36, no.2 (2010): 206-213. 75 John Echeverri-Gent, April Herlevi, and Kim Ganczak, “Economic Interdependence and Strategic Interest: China, India, and the United States in the New Global Order,” (paper, ISA Asia-Pacific Conference, Hong Kong, June 25, 2016).

282 On Barbieri’s lines, the conflict between two countries cannot be entirely ruled out even though both have bilateral relation framed in the model of complex interdependence due to their economic interdependence. However, there are unlikely thoughts on the inevitability of conflict between both states. Zhiqun Zhu assesses U.S.-China relations since 1990 and tentatively concludes that “a potential power transition from the U.S. to China is most likely to be peaceful.”76 On the implications of U.S.-China conflict for regional and international peace and stability, Aaron Friedberg argues that if U.S.-China engaged in a turf war then it could divide the whole of European Eurasia in a new Cold War and it will fuel the fire between two countries.

Likewise, if the economic interdependence prevails between both countries and it may raise chances of increased possibilities of resolving many regional and international disputes but also strengthen the sustained worldwide economic growth.77

From a war and political studies point of view, confrontation is inevitable between a rising power and old hegemon are not accommodating each other78, unless they make some

“concessions” to each other. There are some strong assessments and arguments in favour of present complex interdependence phenomenon between both countries due to economic interdependence as a token to avoid war. But it is a strong and rising feeling in Washington that

China wants to supersede United States in economic field and the current asymmetry or imbalance in bilateral trade and services is playing a catalyst role in driving American policymaker thinking and intentions. Likewise, American policymakers also see China has

76 Zhinqun Zhu, “Power Transition and U.S.-China Relations: Is War Inevitable?” Journal of International and Area Studies 12, no.1 (2005): 1. 77 Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 7-45. 78 See for further analysis, John Ikenberry, “From Hegemony to the Balance of Power: The Rise of China and American Grand Strategy in East Asia,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 23, no.2 (2014): 41-63; Kori Schake and Anja Manuel, “How to Manage a Rising Power—or Two,” The Atlantic, May 24, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/05/china-india-rising- powers/484106/; Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states- china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/.

283 become a regional hegemon with an “aggressive and expansionist” attitude in the South China

Sea. China is militarily and economically bullying its neighbours, “including U.S. allies.”79 On the contrary, China always feels vulnerable to U.S. military presence to its borders, threatening to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. China is particularly fearful of President Obama’s Asia

Rebalance Strategy to contain China’s economic and military rise.80

Hardcore facts and figures encompassing military, economic and political realities help in proving theories. Facts and figures are the backbones of the theory because they provide a path for a theory to prove itself. Academics and experts have tried to understand U.S.-China relations through different theories of international relations, like theory of complex interdependence, capitalist peace, power transition theory, structural realism etc. A brief literature survey of previously work done on U.S.-China relations and understanding their culture, history, civilization, distribution of economic, military and political power in and outside their region of influence, geography, doctrines, policies, strategies, relative capabilities, and alliance commitments, provide multiple perspective on their present relations and varying thoughts on whether peace is inevitable between the power or not. Within the layers of varying thoughts, perspectives, and analyses, a dominant theme has emerged that peace between two powers is a choice, not a necessity. It is also evident that their bilateral military, economic and political relations have profound implications for their political, economic, and military allies and partners. War between U.S. and China is more likely. China as a rising power is challenging a hegemonic power and bloodshed between both they is likely than recognized at the moment.81

79 Amitai Etzioni, Avoiding War with China: Two Nations, One World (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2017), 151. 80 See, Zulfqar Khan and Fouzia Amin, “Pivot and Rebalancing: Implications for Asia-Pacific,” Policy Perspectives 12, no.2 (2015): 3-28; Philip Saunders, “China’s Rising Power, the U.S. Rebalance to Asia, and Implications for U.S.-China Relations,” Issues and Studies 50, no.3 (2014): 19-55. 81 See, Allison, “Thucydides Trap.”

284 7.2.5 United States and China in Space

An important understanding of space is its uniqueness. “Space is a strategic domain, but it is also one of the important global commons. Strategically, space has now become the fourth medium of warfare. Space is akin to land, sea and air medium.” “It is a fact that states have accepted that war in space is now a reality. The evolutionary process of warfare suggests that humans have prepared first-generation war fighting tools to fight with each other. The thousands of years old history of warfare has now entered into a four-generation of warfare and in a relatively new medium of warfare, space.” “Space’s strategic importance for major powers has increased since the launch of first satellite in outer space. The reliance on space capabilities and applications for communications, navigation, intelligence gathering, photographic reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning purposes have increased for the major powers.”82 Likewise, space for peaceful purposes especially the economic benefits of manufacturing and launching satellites for states and non-state actors has increased the significance of commercialization of space. Space has become a new venture for states and international companies to earn revenues. The military and economic aspects of space have made it an area of intra-state competition. But it is also important to understand that space is a unique medium and intra-state competition has profound implications for international and regional peace and stability. “Space had been militarized when first satellite was launched in outer space, and in the subsequent years, states have conceived ideas to weaponize space and have successfully built space weapons.”83 This has started the countdown to space warfare. There are three major space powers, United States, China and

Russia, which are standing at the doorstep of space weaponization. They have the capability and have shown their intentions by launching and testing various space weapons. Now, they are following a path from militarization to weaponization of space and looking at each other that who will blink eye first. They are looking at each other that who will first put their weapons in

82 Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma,” 4-22. 83 Ibid.

285 space. In this regard, “U.S.-China relations have some profound implications for global and regional stability, especially for South Asia. In general, both considered each other strategic competitors in space and see each other capabilities with”84 a pinch of salt and high scepticism.

The scepticism which “is largely due to lack of dialogue and disagreement on the code of conduct in space, which has given birth to strategic distrust between two space power. This is akin to their overall misunderstanding-misperception dynamic.”85

China is ranked third as the most powerful military in the world.86 It is the world’s second-largest economy surpassing Japan in 2010.87 China is at second nation as per active number of satellites.88 China has great political, economic and military influence over its neighbouring and far-reaching nations.89 “All this economic, military and political accumulation of power show China as a rising global power,”90 and it is akin to its rising power in space.

Chinese space thinking is akin to its land, air and sea power thinking, and it has become part of its overall national power.91 Its military space strategy seems to be coloured with “space nationalism, largely driven by the political realism, strategic competition and dealing with hostility and belligerence”92 from the first ever space hegemon, the United States, augmenting

“its space power to secure geostrategic advantage” over the U.S. The current rate of space capabilities development reflects that China is looking to dominate this medium as well.93 John

Logsdon, Director Space Policy Institute of George Washington University described growing

84 See for reference, Zulfqar Khan and Ahmad Khan, “Space Security Trilemma in South Asia,” Astropolitics 17, no. 1 (Special Issue on Space Security Trilemma in South Asia, 2019):4-22. 85 Ibid. 86 See, “2017 China Military Strength,” Global Fire Power, accessed March 17, 2018, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=china. 87 “Overview: The World Bank in China,” World Bank, accessed March 17, 2018, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview. 88 Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma,” 4-22. 89 See Alex Fernandez and Barbara Hogenboom, “China’s Growing Economic and Political Power: Effects on the Global South,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 5, no.12 (2007): 1-15. 90 Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma,” 4-22. 91 See, Bert Chapman, “Chinese Military Space Power: U.S. Department of Defence Annual Reports,” Astropolitics 14, no.1 (2016): 71-89. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid.

286 Chinese space ambitions as an indication of attaining global-leadership status. He also argued that Chinese space leadership role is to achieve legitimacy in space akin to land, sea and air powers which are associated with great power status.94 However, it is also a fact that Chinese civilian space policy is based on technology determinism. China is actively engaged with its neighbouring and countries outside Asia in sharing its space technology with them and building, manufacturing, and subsequent launching their space satellites. China sees its space program instrumental in projecting its soft power.95 Overall, space “power for China now becomes a necessity to solidifying its political, economic and military influence and power.”96 China has shown consistent progress in its space program in past two decades.97 It adopted a building block approach to orchestrating its space power. Chinese space program in public diplomacy is playing an instrumental role. Over the years, China has successfully projected its image of a technologically advanced country, especially it has convinced many of its neighbouring countries as well as from Africa and Latin America that China has achieved significant achievements in space technology and it has the potential to help them to in their space programs. Likewise,

Chinese space program has also made it’s a prominent play in the world order as a responsible nuclear and space power. China along with Russia in Conference on Disarmament (CD), a UN arms control and disarmament forum with Member States having significant military power, to propose arms control proposal and initiative in space. China projected itself as a responsible space power respecting global norms, initiatives and rights for the safe conduct of activities in

94 Quoted in, Clary Dillow, Jeffery Lin, and P.W. Singer, “China’s Race to Space Domination,” Popular Science, September 20, 2016, https://www.popsci.com/chinas-race-to-space-domination. 95 Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma,” 4-22. 96 Ibid. 97 Matt Williams, “The Surprising Scale of China’s Space Program,” Phys.org, January 11, 2018, https://phys.org/news/2018-01-scale-china-space.html.

287 space. Its space program also helped in projecting its image across the world that China is “a partner instead of an enemy.”98

“Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis analyse the aims, objectives, and history of Chinese space program, and write that China’s space ambitions revolve around finding an equitable position in global space order. China’s actions are to find a place for one’s mat,”99 which “means

China is looking toward developing its program as a necessary tool to achieve a prominent position in space along with other space actors.” In this regard, Chinese leadership sees space as a domain to achieve scientific and technological advancement as a means not only to project its soft power but also to increase its industrial and economic cooperation with other states. Chinese technological determinism means “having a space program proves to others and, more importantly, to themselves that the Chinese deserve a seat at the table.”100 It is now evident “over the years that China has made a lot of efforts to achieve a seat at the global space table,”101 and it is aiming to become a world-leading space power by 2045.102 However, it is also important to understand that at what cost and what are the benefits.

There is a competition between United States and China in space and there are several factors behind it.103 China's “space capabilities are a real and growing threat to U.S. hegemony”104 in space.

At the political level, there is little cooperation. China along with Russia has placed two draft proposals of Prevention of Placement of Weapons in outer space (PPWT) in Conference on

98 Lysan Kuipers, “A Space Oddity? The Use of the Chinese Space Program in Public Diplomacy Strategies,” (M.Sc. Diss., Leiden University, 2017); A thesis was supervised by Clay Moltz on Soft Power project in international relations by China using its space power, see Rob Chambers, “China’s Space Program: A New Tool for PRC Soft Power in International Relations?” (MSc. Diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 2009) 99 Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma,” 4-22. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Ma Chi, “China Aims to be World-Leading Space Power by 2045,” China Daily, updated November 17, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-11/17/content_34653486.htm. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid.

288 Disarmament. But, neither of the proposals has able to get United States’ endorsement or support to prohibit the weaponization of outer space. Likewise, China and Russia worked together on an initiative “No First Placement of Weapons in Space” but once again it received little attention in the U.S. and it has not agreed to negotiate the proposals and initiatives drafted by China and

Russia. One particular reason explained by many space security experts on U.S. behaviour toward Chinese and Russia proposals and initiatives is that U.S. believes that as both countries cannot compete in terms of space technology and capabilities so they want to fight a diplomatic fight with the U.S. to restrict its military space program. “The Chinese White papers on its space program have repeatedly favoured a treaty prohibiting the weaponization of space.”105 But, U.S. considers Chinese position as dubious on space weaponization. U.S. believes that China is itself involves in making space weapons but simultaneously talking prohibiting the weaponization of space. Politically, U.S. takes Chinese steps in UN arms control and disarmament forum a threat to its freedom of action in space. Likewise, U.S. thinks in this way that China wants to achieve high moral grounds by advocating prohibition of arms placement in space, projection of its soft power, and maintaining its prestige in diplomatic community.

On the other hand, China considers the blocking of negotiation on Prevention of Arms

Race in Outer Space (PAROS) Treaty, PPWT 1 and II draft proposal as United States’ efforts to maintain its space primacy. “China thinks U.S. does not want to have a conclusive negotiation on

PAROS Treaty as it will bring its mid-course and terminal phase BMD systems”106 and ABM shield under space weapons. China fears that U.S. wants vague and politically driven definitions of space weapons recognized by “UN forums so that its BMD system may not fall under the category of banned space weapons. Strategically, U.S. BMD systems are very offensive to

China's military”107 as China’s vulnerabilities from U.S. BMD have increased. The divergent

105 Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma,” 4-22. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid.

289 priorities have caused stained cooperation in space issues at the political and diplomatic level, which has resulted in a mere possibility of future cooperation.108

China is not a Member State of ITAR, which deals with dual-use sensitive space technology transfer. Interestingly, it is important to mention that it did not caste significant impacts on “China’s space program. However, it reflects the divergence of interests between the

U.S. and China as far as the transfer of space technology is concerned. In the contemporary world, the transfer of technology is a necessary tool to establish sustainable and long-term economic cooperation.”109 Both MTCR and ITAR are dominated by U.S. By and large, the rules and regulations of both these forums are cognizant of U.S. export control laws.

Space commercialization is crucial for United States’ economy and national security.

Space activities around the world are rapidly commercialized with a sharp decrease in government footprints. U.S. is a key actor in global space commercialization. But to maintain its primacy in this field, it has played an important role in establishing aforementioned space export control regimes to regularize the export and import of space technology for launching vehicles and manufacturing of satellites. Space industry is an emerging market and U.S. wants to be centre of gravity of space commerce.110 So far, both countries have taken baby steps in civil space cooperation, because of the stringent U.S. export control laws.111 U.S. is well-aware of

“China’s burgeoning space program” and its commercialization with new space powers. This has created significant challenges for the U.S. to maintain its level of dominance over other space actors.112 To prevent this happening U.S. has put Chinese government and private companies in its export control “Entity List.” The U.S. Congress has passed a bill P.L. 105-261, Section 1512

108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 See, Joshua Hampson, The Future of Space Commercialization (Washington, DC: The Niskanen Center, January 25, 2017). 111 Jeff Foust, “One Small Step for U.S.-China Space Cooperation,” Space News, July 10, 2017. 112 Mark Hilborne, “China’s Rise in the Space and U.S. Policy Responses: A Collision Course?” Space Policy 29, no. 2 (2013): 121.

290 in 1999, which give the President an authority to “certify to U.S. Congress before any export to

China of missile equipment or technology that the specifically proposed export is not detrimental to U.S. space launch industry and the equipment or technology to be exported, including any indirect technical benefits, will not measurably improve China’s missile or space launch capabilities.”113 Now, the authority is delegated to the Secretary of Commerce. At the moment, there is little cooperation between China and U.S. in space commercialization, due to competing attitudes. U.S. and Soviet Union competed with each other during the Cold War for various reasons, including prestige, hegemony, soft power, but the economic benefits of the space were the last priority of the respected governments. The end of the Cold War gave the economic benefits from space power a new strengthen.114 At the moment, China is barging with ambitions to be a space superpower. In 2016, China first time launched more rockets than Russia and just as many as the U.S. It placed robotic landers on the Moon and Mars and is looking to send astronauts there as well. It is not just Chinese government is exploring outer space, it’s private companies in China too launching rockets in space with backing from universities and hedge funds. As a result, several space start-ups have emerged from China, increasing pressure on U.S space agency NASA and private U.S. space companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin. One

Space and Expace have arrived in the space commercial market to give a hard time to U.S. private space companies to loft small satellites into orbit. Likewise, LandSpace has also entered the club. China’s overall space budget is around US $ 4 bn comparable to NASA’ US $ 19 bn.

China’s push for space supremacy is an effort to bring national pride, but its economic implications are tremendous. China’s economy is making little progress for the last two to three years as its Global Domestic Product (GDP) is not growing as fast as other emerging economies like India is growing. China considers its space ambitions may boost its state and private

113 “China-U.S. Export Controls,” Export.gov, accessed March 19, 2018, https://www.export.gov/article?id=China-U-S-Export-Controls. 114 See Alexander MacDonald, The Long Space Age: The Economic Origins of Space Exploration from Colonial America to the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017).

291 enterprises. Any breakthrough in space commerce could free China from growth fuelled by cheap labour and low-end manufacturing. It is believed that China’s role in the new space race has forced NASA to pull back. At present, governments and private companies are shaping the future of space economy all together.115

“From a military point of view, there is negligible cooperation, in fact, a staunch competition.” “China’s ICBM and space launch capabilities are monitored by United States.”

Likewise, “U.S. is also critical of China space militarization capabilities. Moreover, the ASAT tests by China have raised the bar of concerns and vulnerabilities to U.S. space assets from a

Chinese ASAT attack in future.”116 In conclusion, “China is critical of U.S. space militarization and weaponization efforts and in return receives the same kind of critical bashing from the U.S. on its military space program.”117

From a political point of view, China is a rising global space power and U.S. is the first ever space hegemon, so a hegemonic power like the U.S. will not accommodate a rising space power like China. Likewise, U.S. space program is declining and there is a lack of coherence in space policy-making in the U.S to utilize the growing space industry in the world market. On the other hand, “China is increasing its regional space cooperation for economic benefits and also reaching to other regions as well. This has undermined U.S space dominance.” China is likely to take a lion’s share in space-based commerce in next three decades. “From a power-transition theoretical aspect, China may likely become a space superpower in next decade. Its growing space power” may give it enough power to shape world order. But, all this growth is slow and gradual. China is inching toward achieving such status with a slow and steady win the race approach. From the complex interdependence theoretical aspect, there is now economic

115 Clay Dillow, “China’s Secret Plan to Crush SpaceX and the U.S. Space Program,” CNBC¸ updated March 28, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/28/chinas-secret-plan-to-crush-spacex-and-the-us-space- program.html. 116 Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma,” 4-22. 117 Ibid.

292 interdependency between two states in space, which can avoid a collision between two states in space.

“A possibility of a conventional or nuclear war between two countries is very bleak and non-existent. But the chances of conflict cannot be ruled out.”118 “However, if a war is fought by both countries then” there are considerable factors that will be in cyber and space through non- destructive and Electronic Means. United States’ authorities “believe that a large number of persistent and unexplained cyber-attacks on U.S. critical and national security architecture” have been undeniably launched from China. Both countries are a new domain of warfare, and both countries see it differently from each other.119 “A growing number of states are developing the means with which not merely to access and exploit space, but to conduct space warfare as well.”120 In case, Chinese hackers hack U.S. satellites and jam only navigation, and communication services in the U.S. then the impacts will be devastating for not only for U.S. economy but also for national security. Likewise, if U.S. hackers hack Chinese satellites then it will be a setback for Chinese rising power. Also, “the recently launched National Security

Strategy in 2018, the importance of cyber and space attacks was understood” in a manner that

Trump administration pledges to respond in a nuclear manner.

Brett Biddington authored a report on the above subject, which was published by the

National Interest, in which he argued that Chinese endeavour is to achieve space parity with the

U.S.121 According to Union of Concerned Scientist database on active space assets of all space- faring nations, China has surpassed Russia in terms of a number of space assets. The BDS covering all the global will provide sufficient accuracy to Chinese MIRVed ICBMs, which is a source of concern for U.S. policy makers. Sino-U.S. space race for hegemony in space is focused

118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 Howard Kleinberg, “On War in Space,” Astropolitics 5, no.1 (2007): 1. 121 Brett Biggington, “Parity in Beginning to Emerge between America and China in Space,” The National Interest, July 5, 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/parity-beginning-emerge-between- america-china-space-16844.

293 on seeking space dominance militarily. The new space race has the potential to destabilize the relationship between Washington and Beijing. The U.S. plans to spend $2 billion on space- control measures in 2016 to augment its space defence systems to protect its satellites that deal with sensitive national security issues. Increasing China's civilian space activities now present a further threat to U.S. space dominance. The fear is that at some point in the foreseeable future, the Chinese could overtake U.S. space industry.

In conclusion, “there is a Thucydides Trap for United States and China in space.”122 U.S. is first space hegemon with enormous military and civil space capabilities to maintain its space primacy and dominance. China has emerged as a challenger to this primacy. There are all incentives for China to be the next space superpower as it may able to shape the global space order for a power transition in the next few decades. It depends on whether these two space powers don’t get in a Thucydides Trap in space. Both countries now the uniqueness and importance of space power and the subsequent economic benefits but if the old and first space hegemon don’t accommodate the rising space super than the chance of a collision may likely increase. There aren’t any sufficient and necessary conditions for space activities that can

“prevent conflict in space largely because of the absence of a universally accepted treaty to prohibit the weaponization of space especially the non-destructive means of destruction.” There isn’t “any global space governance system in which states follow a code of conduct and adopt confidence building measures to prevent the weaponization of space.” Hence, “the present conditions may likely to give incentives for major space powers to use their lethal force in space against each other in case a conflict emerges on land.”123

122 Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma,” 4-22. 123 Ibid.

294 7.3 Security Trilemma in South Asia

7.3.1 China-India

Dinshaw Mistry observes that India’s space motives and objectives were “influenced by prevailing political circumstances and economic philosophies, socioeconomic development, political objectives, military spin-offs and commercial applications.”124 Also, “India’s space program is backed by strong political support from the country’s policymakers, and it remained its top strategic and political priority.” “The objective is to project India’s soft power and to show India’s high-technology achievements to further enhance its prestige internationally.”125

“Another significant dimension to India’s space program continued to be associated with its future military and plans to elevate its relative power and geostrategic role in international politics. This is ostensibly a clear shift from India’s traditional space policy that was envisioned by its first premier Nehru - to focus on the imperatives of socioeconomic development through space technology, which for the past two decades is tilting toward utilization of space assets for military objectives. The Indian space program has significantly grown and has now become a vital element of its national security strategy policy. Recently released Joint Doctrine Indian

Armed Forces-2017 document emphasized the importance of space for military purposesand highlighted growing relevance of space power for national security policy” 126:

“India's space capabilities are mostly driven by civil and commercial requirements, steps for exploitation of space for military applications are being undertaken. Leveraging space power would include protection of our National space assets and exploitation of space to enable defence capabilities across the conflict spectrum.”127

The Indian policymakers are paying significant attention to develop space-based command and control, and communication assets with advanced C4ISR capabilities. India has been developing a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system by paying more attention to develop

124 Ibid. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. 127 Joint Indian Armed Force 2017 (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, India, April 2017), 25-26, http://ids.nic.in/dot/JointDoctrineIndianArmedForces2017.pdf.

295 an ASAT capability.128 “One Indian analyst - Ajay Lele observes that India’s space security policy is looking toward establishing a tri-service space command for obvious strategic military purposes. India’s space program may build capabilities to enhance space situational awareness cpabilities and develop strategic technologies to increase its reliance on space assets for purpose of intelligence gathering, communications, navigation and operating various weapon systems,”129

Writes Ajay Lele. The author also suggested “establishment of National Authority for Space

Security under the ministry of defence to supervise its space security-related issues and to develop ISR capacity.” He further elaborates that “reportedly the Indian Space Research

Organization (ISRO) is drafting a Space Act, which may lay down a solid basis for the future development of legal frameworks, structures, and strategy as to how to respond to any hostile outer space activity that may be imping upon its vital security interests.”130

“India’s growing space capabilities will furthermore effectively counter China-Pakistan strategic balance versus India in South Asia.”131 Moreover, India’s pronouncement “to acquire an

ASAT capability will put tremendous pressure on China to preserve its space assets from rivals

ASAT capability. In case, India manages to build a strong military space program based on satellite reconnaissance and communication-backed conventional capabilities then it will help

India to change the entire strategic equation of South Asia.”132 “India seems to be fast emerging as a strong challenger to China’s dominance in Asia in exploration, the commercial space sector and in the use of space for military purposes.”133

At the moment, Indian space program has the world largest commercial space customers.

This domain of space exploration offers tremendous incentives for India as well as to create an environment of competition between India and China. However, there is negligible bilateral

128 Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma,” 4-22. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid.

296 cooperation between India and China in diplomatic, political, and economic domains. Sudha

Ramachandran states that India and Pakistan “are competing for (regional and global) markets, resources and influences on land, sea, and Indian Ocean.”134 He argues that “this competition is spilling over into outer space.”135 “Both countries are currently engaged in a competition to take their share in the commercial satellite building and launching business. As far as military space competition is concern, India’s military space program will largely depend on its space collaboration with the U.S. The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal of 2005 and the formalization of strategic partnership as a countervailing power to China’s economic and military rise this resulting in

India’s siding with U.S. by vetoing the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)

Treaty in 2005 in Conference on Disarmament (CD).”136 “India does not endorse China’s initiatives of PPWT and No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space in CD.” Likewise, both share opposite views in First Committee of the UN regarding the peaceful uses of outer space.

7.3.2 China-Pakistan

“The history of Pakistan-China friendly diplomatic and bilateral relations, and strategic cooperation” is over six decades old. Likewise, reportedly China will also take a Pakistani astronaut into space in 2022. The “expanding orbit of Pakistan-China space cooperation demonstrates their flourishing space technological cooperation as a benchmark of their friendship in all spheres of technology.” “To further strengthen their twenty-year old space cooperation agreement, Pakistan’s first communication satellite geostationary, PakSAT-1R was launched into space from the Xichang Satellites Centre from Sichuan province, which shows much-developed space cooperation between the two countries.”137

“The Indo-U.S. space cooperation, in Pakistani perspective, is further fracturing and creating trouble spots in South Asia, and is undermining the strategic stability, peace and security

134 Ibid. 135 Ibid. 136 Khan and Khan, “Space Security Trilemma,” 4-22. 137 Ibid.

297 of the region. The challenges to the security of the region are mostly due to the arms build-up by

India. Pakistan and China are cognizant of Indo-U.S. partnership’s challenging impact over region’s security architecture.”138 “China’s assistance to enhance Pakistan’s defence, security, and space potentials has become a hallmark of their longstanding strategic and technological cooperation” and friendship framework in the fast transforming world that is clearing “laying down new foundations of regional realignments/alliances, which are presently shaping the geostrategic trajectory, not only of South Asia, but also of the entire Asia.”139

7.3.3 India-Pakistan

“The bilateral relations between India and Pakistan is a typical case of action-reaction type syndrome. Since 1947, Pakistan and India had fought three major wars - 1948, 1965, and 1971 and also, they had a localized war of Kargil in 1999, and 2001-2002 military standoff/twin peak crises in parallel with a frequent eruption of skirmishes along the Line of Control.”140 At the moment, “the biggest source of tension between India and Pakistan is the acquisition of destabilizing military technologies by India and the expanding orbit of India-US technological, and strategic partnership. Indian acquisition/development of ballistic missile defence (BMD) system is challenging Pakistan’s credible minimum deterrence strategy. Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons is aimed to deter India from committing any aggression against it. However,

Pakistan has developed adequate delivery systems, for instance, from the Short Range Low Yield

Ballistic Missile (SRLYBM), NASR, to Medium Range Ballistic Missile, Shaheen III, to counter

India’s apparent aggressive military doctrinal restructuring and tilting toward pre-emptive policy.

In the 1980s, India had started a program to develop the Integrated Guided Missile Development

Program (IGMDP) under which India had developed different missile systems with a minimum range of 60 km - up to 8000 km.”141 According to Zahid Hussain and Raja Qaiser, “India claims

138 Ibid. 139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid.

298 to have a strategic need to develop a missile weapon more than 4000 km range. Although China and Pakistan, both can be deterred with Agni-IV inducted into the military after successfully tests.”142 “The primary objective of India’s missile development is to counter any incoming missile from Pakistan and also to from the Chinese. However, there is a major stumbling block to achieve this strategic objective. This stumbling block is the lack of an adequate number of remote sensing satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) by India. It is generally believed that India’s

BMD system cannot work effectively without having a constellation of remote sensing satellites in LEO. The primary reason is the geographical proximity between India and Pakistan. The travel distance or time of flight of a Pakistani Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) is considered to be less than 10 minutes. Therefore, to effectively intercept any incoming Pakistani

IRBM by the Indian BMD system, the latter would require an effective early warning, detection, photographic reconnaissance, and surveillance systems based on remote sensing satellites operating in LEO.”143 Hussain and Qaiser stress that:

“India's TES, RISAT-1, and RISAT-2 can provide proper surveillance with less than 1- m resolution camera, but these satellites, being in LEO cannot offer a reliable remote sensing system. LEO satellites cannot map wide area due to small swath. For continuous and complete coverage of sectors between Karachi and Islamabad, more than 100 satellites would be required to monitor 1100 km. TES and RISAT series have only five to seven-year in-orbit lifespan so India would have to send satellites continuously to replace the retired satellites. Even the in- orbit positioned satellites deceive camouflaging and use window opportunities and other means.”144

India is consistently developing its ballistic missiles and BMD programs to enhance its

“nuclear capability and strategic outreach.” At the moment, “the growing conventional forces’ asymmetry between India and Pakistan is in India’s advantage that has further stalemated their relations and intensified tension along the LoC that seems to have motivated New Delhi to strategize imposition of a swift limited war under its Cold Start Doctrine, which has created a

142 Ibid. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid.

299 security dilemma for both the nuclear powers.” “India is also massively investing in space program for strategic military and civilian objectives, including economic, communication, and meteorological.” “The Indo-US space cooperation architecture is raising eyebrows in China and

Pakistan. India-US cooperation is further negatively undermining the security environment of

South Asia.”145

The Indo-US space cooperation dates back to 1963 when India for the first time had launched U.S. manufactured sounding rocket from its Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching

State (TERLS). In addition to the U.S. space collaboration, “India had also received assistance from the then Soviet Union, France, the UK, and then West Germany. U. R. Rao, the Indian

Space Research Organization writes in his book – India’s Rise as a Space Power, that: The sounding rocket program at TERLS was initiated through a unique international co-operative arrangement with NASA of US, CNES of France and Hydro Meteorological Service” of the

Soviet Union. 146 In the subsequent decades, U.S. and “other countries assisted India in producing and launching of over 350 sounding rockets. This Indian launch site emerged as meteorology and atmospheric research centre. Incidentally, in 2013 India launched Mars Orbiter

Mission (MOM) program”147 with the assistance of the US National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA). Incidentally, Indian launching of MOM, elevated it into the space club. “Reportedly, India is furthermore planning to launch a first manned mission into space by

2022,” which is likely to cost $1.3 billion. However, its total space budget is $4 billion.148

NASA and the Indian Space Research Organization “(ISRO) have also established a close space cooperative initiative by signing different agreements, including setting up of Joint

Working Groups to enhance India’s space program. Incidentally, in 2012 both countries signed more agreements for the US-led Global Precipitation Measurement project, the Megha-

145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148 Ibid.

300 Tropiques, and the OceanSat-2 satellites.” Moreover, both countries expressed resolve to channelize data sharing mechanism. To furthermore “expand the orbit of their space cooperation, in September 2018” during ‘2+2’ Dialogue in New Delhi, both India and US reportedly reached consensus to earmark "long-term space goals in consonance with their on- going strategic partnership framework."

7.4 Strategic Implications

The strategic implications for space militarization and weaponization are profound for South

Asia. India's military doctrines have envisioned space as a vital instrument to bolster its national power in the region and beyond. Pakistan, another aspiring space power, considers India’s conventional, nuclear and space developments as attempts to establish regional hegemony and subdue Pakistan and other South Asian countries. While China, an increasingly established space power, competes with the United States, India sees China as its main Asian rival in space.

China’s position about Indian space ambitions may not be public, but it is very much cognizant in this regard. All these development in space are interlinked with India’s, China’s, and

Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence and conventional forces as space capabilities can be force multiplier and enhancer. Satellites offer cutting-edge command and control mechanisms to nuclear forces and delivery means. Likewise, space assets offer crucial infrastructure of BMD capabilities. However, there are dangers of proliferation of ASAT capabilities in South Asia.

Both India and Pakistan are adding nuclear weapons to their arsenal and the military and political leadership of both nuclear-armed forces continue to flaunt their nukes for deterrence purposes.

All these issues combined make South Asia a complex region with numerous security challenges mostly emanating from immediate neighbours.

Because of the above discussion, the strategic implications of space militarization and weaponization are proffered as: -

301 Ballistic Missile Defence System. India has invested heavily in building its BMD capabilities.

Experts on South Asian security believe that the primary rationale behind India’s development of

BMD system is to counter any incoming missiles from Pakistan. However, India has increased the scope, range and firepower of its BMD capabilities and now China has come under its radars too. It is still unknown whether India will be able to intercept any Chinese missile or not. On top of that, India continues to test-fire its different missiles including interceptors, SLBMs, and

ICBMs. In response, Pakistan also continues to test the range, accuracy and precision of its missiles. Thus, the BMD is inheritably destabilizing. Table 7.1 shows the ratio of missile testing by India and Pakistan from 1998 to date. The ratio suggests that India is moving faster than any other country in Asia to test, develop and induct nuclear-capable missiles in its arsenal.

It is also argued that India may not be able to achieve what it desires from its BMD capabilities with several reasons behind this assertion. First, India requires advanced ISR capabilities to extensively monitor the whole of Pakistan, requiring more than a hundred satellites to do so continuously. This will be a mammoth step to develop such remote sensing constellation in space. India still lacks considerable resources in doing so and will unlikely launch such number of satellites shortly. As a result, its BMD capabilities will continue to be under pressure from Pakistan’s missiles largely because of geographical proximity. Likewise, continued missile testing by both sides further destabilizes regional strategic stability and peace.

Another interesting aspect of India’s BMD development is the exaggerated statements made by its scientific community in the past. Indian scientists state they have achieved an over

90% target acquisition/interception rate. On the other hand, the U.S. BMD and GMD target acquisition/interception rates are less than 70%. All this scientific flaunting is primarily to project India’s BMD system and gain public support. But, it is fact that India’s BMD cannot be so accurate and precise without a large “constellation of remote sensing satellites in LEO.”

302 Table 7.1: Ratio of Missile Testing Between India and Pakistan (1998-to-Date)

India No. of Tests Pakistan No. of Tests Ballistic Missiles 1. Prithvi-I (150 kms) 23 Abdali (180 kms) 12 2. Prithvi-II (250 kms) 32 Ghaznavi (290 10 ``kms) 3. Prithvi-III (350 kms) 4 Shaheen-I (700- 11 750 kms) 4. Dhanush (350 kms) 11 Shaheen-II (2000- 7 2500 kms) 5. Prahaar (70-150 kms) 1 Shaheen-III (2750 2 kms) 6. Agni-I (700 kms) 18 Ghauri (1300-1800 12 kms) 7. Agni-II (2000 kms) 12 Nasr (60 – 70 kms) 6 8. Agni-III (3500 kms) 8 Ababeel (2200 1 kms) 9. Agni-IV (3500-4000 7 kms) 10. Agni-V (5000+ kms) 6 11. K-15 (750 kms - 6 Submarine Launched) 12. K-4 (3500 kms - 3 Submarine Launched) Cruise Missiles 13. Nirbhay (1000 kms - 5 Ra’ad (350 kms) 6 land, air, sea) 14. Brahmos (290 kms - 40 Babur (700 kms) 9 land, air and sea) Babur – II (700 1 kms) 3 Babur – III (450 kms) Total Number of Missile Tests India 176 Pakistan 80 (Ratio of missile testing between India and Pakistan is 2.3:1)

Source: This is the original work of Tanzeela Khalil, IRA, ACDA, SPD.

Anti-satellite Weapon Proliferation. China tested its ASAT capability in 2007 with India signaling its intentions to also go for this option in case its satellites come under fire from China and Pakistan. India has the scientific, industrial and military base to develop ASAT weapons. It has been developing technologies that may have spin-off effects to augment its ASAT capabilities. But India’s political and military leadership is reluctant to do so, mainly because of

303 several reasons. One is space debris. Space experts in India have realized that any Indian ASAT test may likely disturb its relations with both China and the United States, given that the U.S. would not like to see other states have such a capability. India’s space weaponization ambitions are not clear and remain ambiguous, though India may prefer ambiguity in this regard. But it is a fact that India does have all industrial and technological requirements to build a weapon/missile to target and hit a satellite, at least in LEO.

Pakistan also has an advanced missile inventory. Its Shaheen-III long-range ballistic missile (LRBM) has a range of more than 2700 km. Many Indian experts believe that Pakistan may likely convert its LRBMs into an ASAT missile with little modifications needed in future.

But it is indeed tall ask for Pakistan’s scientific community to do so, given the Pakistani political leadership has repeatedly opposed the weaponization of space. Therefore, it would be a hard nut to crack for Pakistan to build such destabilizing technologies.

Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia. From one perspective, credible minimum deterrence is primarily based on maintaining credible minimum nuclear forces with an effective early warning and command and control system. The credibility of deterrence comes from nuclear capability and communication. Both India and Pakistan follow credible minimum deterrence principles.

But both continue to develop conventional and non-conventional military capabilities to undermine each other’s deterrence credibility.

India has a large conventional army and its space program is in advanced stages with a growing number of military space assets. Pakistan, on the other hand, is conventionally a weak state with no military satellites in outer space. However, it is nuclear weapon states and according to independent think tanks which evaluate the nuclear arsenals worldwide, Pakistan is estimated to have more nuclear weapons than India. Hence, there is a conventional and space asset asymmetry between the two states. It is believed that conventional asymmetry is inversely proportional to nuclear thresholds, leading to lower nuclear thresholds in South Asia. On top of

304 that, space asymmetry will further exacerbate this on-going regional security environment. India has realized that without military space capabilities, it cannot have credible deterrence. Pakistan, on the other hand, has tried to compensate this conventional asymmetry by inducting Tactical

Nuclear Weapons (TNWs). Pakistan’s TNW development is to pour hot waters on Indian conventional forces to create a balance of power in the region. However, Pakistan still requires military space assets to maintain strategic balance with India and maintain deterrence credibility.

The possibility of the Inadvertent War? Jay Wise, currently employed at the U.S. Department of State, argues that nuclear-armed India and Pakistan are involved in a competition that can lead both states towards a nuclear exchange in an armed conflict. The perfect recipe for such catastrophic exchange is the development of TNWs by both sides; eventually, lower the nuclear thresholds in South Asia. While the actual chances of nuclear war fighting in South Asia are rare, they cannot be ruled out. Both countries have little trust with each other, only prescribing to limited conventional confidence-building measures (CBMs). These limited CBMs cannot promise to prevent future armed conflict, especially a nuclear exchange. The security situation is getting more complex because of technological advancement in defence sectors and military build-ups by both countries. In this case, the role of U.S. as a third party mediator may become conflictual as India and the U.S. are inching toward strategic partnership and the U.S.-Pakistan relations become more unstable due to Afghanistan situation.

However, there are certain proposals to chalk out CBMs beyond traditional wisdom to meet with the challenge of nuclear eventuality in South Asia. That is a possibility that requires unprecedented political will from both India and Pakistan’s political and military leaderships.

Wise proposes certain measures should be taken to reduce the chances of unauthorized and accidental use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. He thinks that it is possible through imagery collection of Indo-Pak borders. The remote sensing imagery could be a viable option to analyse the situation of borders to reduce the incentive for a nuclear option in a conflict situation. He

305 argues for a limited transparency regime during bilateral talks between India and Pakistan, enabled by remotely sensed commercial imagery employed by a third party, potentially reducing nuclear risks in the subcontinent.

Space Cooperative Threat Reduction in South Asia. Air Marshal Arshad Chaudhry and Air

Marshal K.C Cariappa have discussed cooperative monitoring in the South Asian context at length in their joint publication from Sandia Labs, United States, in 2001. Both agree that the introduction of a cooperative monitoring regime of conflict zones along the borders of India and

Pakistan would be transparent and without intrusive intelligence gathering. They emphasise that a future cooperative monitoring regime could emerge as part of conventional CBMs and become a perfect recipe to avoid military engagement on the borders. This venture can become reality with a joint remote sensing satellite launched by SUPARCO and ISRO. This satellite could be equipped with a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) having a range of less than one meter to acquire precise and accurate imagery in all-weather and varying light conditions. Also, a joint centre equipped with machines equipped with Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be established to interpret this data. This machine should analyse the imagery of the borders for the political leadership of the countries. After analysing the data, the political leadership should prevent their militaries before an armed collision. In this way, the chances of nuclear-armed conflict may be reduced and lay a foundational stone of future Indo-Pak cooperation in space.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter concludes that Sino-U.S. relations in outer space “is the triggering point of space security trilemma in South Asia.” For the U.S., space is a domain where it has to maintain its presence and primacy with complete freedom of action. For China, space power is an important component of its overall national power and it wants to play safe in a tricky space environment.

Overall, both countries have adversarial relations whilst having a complex interdependence.

China considers the U.S. as a key market for its manufactured goods, with almost half of Chinese

306 exports going there. The U.S. also has deep trade ties with China, but sees Beijing as an adversary. China has made considerable nuclear and missile build-up irking the U.S. In fact, both have uneasy, complex, and complicated relations not only on land, sea, and air, but also in space.

Their military space developments have germinated a space arms race, bringing a paradigm shift in outer space. But it is a fact that both countries have adopted a cautious approach toward each other’s military and space development and build-ups while embracing a strategic salience over any economic, political, and military provocations. However, the U.S. is an old hegemon with immense military power and is highly unlikely to accept Chinese rise in space as well. China continues to provoke the U.S. by challenging its interests in different regions and realms. China has proved itself extremely cautious in projecting its military power across its immediate region of influence, which is not in the case of the U.S. However, it is still valid reasoning that both countries are trapped in a dilemma where an old hegemon is making sure that the new power may not be able to replace it.

Sino-U.S. relations also have ramifications for South Asia. India is not a friendly state in

Chinese eyes while Pakistan enjoys deep ties with China. Pakistan and India have a history of armed conflict. India is a close ally of the United States and the U.S. wants to contain China with

India playing an instrumental role in U.S. Asia Rebalance Policy. All these bilateral relations are the source of insecurity and instability in South Asia. Three major nuclear powers reside here.

All three have a different type of relations with the U.S. As a matter of fact, U.S.-China relations plagues all three bilateral relations between India-Pakistan, Pakistan-U.S., and China-India to a level where misunderstanding, misperception and mutual distrust continues to halt regional economic and political progress. As a result, a strategic chain reaction based on military action- reaction dynamics gets accelerated. Eventually, it poses a grave threat to the peace and security of the region and may also create strategic instability in South Asia. This strategic chain reaction

307 involving the United States, India, China and Pakistan has profound implications for their bilateral relations and on their behaviour as states.

308 CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions of the research are based on deductive reasoning using top to the bottom approach. These are based on an analytical review of the existing literature on arms race in outer space. The conclusions are drawn using primary sources, including interviews of the former government officials, experts and academics from the United States, India, China and Pakistan.

Likewise, the declared and publically available resources largely the declassified documents and official documents are also instrumental in proofing the hypothesis of the research. The research methodology and design of the research consist of explanatory and exploratory methods.

The research problem amply highlights “that states are following a path from space militarization to weaponization. This indicates that states can weaponize outer space depending on the political, economic, and strategic circumstances.” 149 China and the United States are two major space powers. Both have adversarial relations in outer space; however, they have complex interdependence which may likely to prevent a conflict between them in outer space. But it is not likely to restrict or prohibit the misunderstanding-misperception dynamics between the two states overcome the little they have to prevent the conflict in outer space. All this explanation and analytical description of the “bilateral relations between China and the United States in outer space” is based on a framework build on a realist perspective. U.S and China are competing with others to share a lion’s share in the vast resources of a global commons. Both recognize the strategic importance of space and are trying to get whatever augments their military and national power.

The conclusions of the research are formulated by employing the qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection. Qualitative methods are extensively used to analyse the space doctrines, politics, strategies and capabilities of United States, China, India and Pakistan.

On the other hand, the quantitative methods are employed to collect the figures of space budgets

149 Ahmad Khan and Sufian Ullah, “Challenges to International Space Governance,” in Handbook of Space Security: Policies, Applications and Programs, eds. Kai-Uwe Schrogi et al (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2020), 1-14.

309 and capabilities of the abovementioned states. The qualitative methods involve explanatory and explanatory reasoning to draw the analytical analysis of the space doctrines, policies and strategies. The primary aim of the explanatory and descriptive analysis of the space doctrine, policies, strategies, and the advocates, schools-of-thoughts and perspectives on space weaponization was to understand how these factors contribute toward arms race in outer space.

Likewise, the quantitative methods were employed to understand the space budgets, the number of space launches and the total number of satellites in outer space to know how these figures encompass the descriptive analysis to evaluate the hypothesis of the study.

The hypothesis of the research focuses on the arms race in outer space and paradigm shift in international security. The hypothesis clarifies that major space power including the United

States and China have been “following a path from space militarization to space weaponization.”

The analysis of the primary sources suggests that there is an arms race in outer space. However, to quantify the analytical part of the discourse is quite difficult. The limitation in research continues to persist because of the concealed nature of the space programs of countries. It is quite plausible that a civil launch may contain a military grade payload. Independent analysis of the space launches of China and the United States often fail to identify what is the actual payload in the launch. Likewise, it widely observed that United States continues to deny the military nature of X-37B STB and never released the specifications and nature of operation of the STB.

This creates confusion in the mind of experts and analysts that whether space has been weaponized or not. The existing literature fails to clear the dust gathered on space weaponization programs of the United States and China. However, some glimpses about their space weaponization capabilities enable the independent space experts and analysts to connect the dots.

The study has briefly analysed all available resources to investigate a research problem and it concludes that space weaponization capabilities are possessed by United States, China, India and

Russia but they are waiting for each other than those who will start placing their weapons first.

310 The research concludes that once any of the major spacefarers initiate the weaponization of space, the others will follow the suit.

“With the growing number of states in the outer space, which has increased the space trafficking, has added more vulnerability for the survivability of defenceless space assets of U.S, has forced it to take offensive countermeasures in outer space. The U.S reliance on its space assets has been increased as well as its future requirements to conduct its combat mission.

Therefore, the outer space has become a strategic field for the major powers. Now, it is argued that there is a possibility of deployment of weapons in outer space, which could create a conflict of interest among the nations. Therefore, space as we know it is a strategic domain that could play a determining factor in future engagements.”150

“The U.S unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2001 and its initiation of BMD and NMD has prompted Russia and China to revisit their strategic force posture.” “Both countries are continuously increasing their military capabilities at a moderate level, because of the U.S offensive missile defence system in Europe and the Far- East.”

“In the absence of a multilateral international agreement to prohibit the weaponization of outer space, there is an urgent need for an international agreement or treaty, which could bar the proliferation of space weapons- both horizontally and vertically.”151

From the analysis of the existing literature, mostly from the primary sources, it is safe to say that the possibility of battle in space is growing. Besides, the militarization of space started long ago and now “states are rigorously following the path from space militarization to weaponization of the outer space.”152 Another important factor which is a source of concern for major space faring nations is that the pool of space faring nations is increasing. At the moment,

U.S. is an indisputable space power and its reliance on space is so enormous. Likewise, U.S. fears that its space assets are facing the potential threat of attack in orbit because of increasing

150 Khan and Ullah, “Challenges to Space Governance.” 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid.

311 numbers of states in space. Therefore, U.S. is creating new capabilities and systems to establish space deterrence against its adversaries. U.S. orbital assets are largely meant for providing global navigation, reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning, intelligence gathering, acquiring targets and several other crucial activities to bolster its integrated deterrence.

An important feature of space security is the kinetic and non-kinetic threat to the satellite constellations of major space faring nations. The non-kinetic threats which include jamming signals, hacking operational software, and dazzling are dangerous to create a conflict in space.

U.S. is investing in a second-generation surveillance system, known as Space Fence to establish its space deterrence. Also, U.S. has a large Self-Awareness Space Situational

Awareness (SSA) system aimed to collect data on space debris and activities of its adversaries.

Moreover, the Operationally Responsive Space Office (ORS) is funding the development of the Space borne Payload Assist Rocket-Kauai (SPARK) launch system, which will send the miniaturized satellite into LEO and sun-synchronous orbit. Taking all these space developments into account, it can be deduced that U.S., China, Russia and other major space faring nations are getting far more serious about the threat of space warfare. However, any war in space would be as devastating as a nuclear war on the Earth. The consequences of the space war would be severe for the entire human kind. “The world is facing a looming threat of space warfare. And this threat has emerged as reality due to non-agreement of major powers on framing any legal instrument/treaty which prohibits the weaponization of outer space. Russia and China have proposed several drafts to prevent the weaponization of space, like PPWT and No First

Placement of Weapons in Space, but U.S. and its allies are not agreeing on such draft proposals.

These efforts suggest that Russia and China are not willing to fight the war in space and more inclined towards framing legal instruments to avoid space war. On the other hand, it is the U.S. that is not interested in having any treaty which strict its freedom of action in space.”153

153 Ibid.

312 United States considers its space program as the jewel of the crown. No nation in the world allocates such a large budget in its fiscal year than the United States to its civil and military program. Likewise, the strategic importance of this domain has increased manifold for the U.S.. Space for decades has been an uncontested domain. Hundreds of miles from above the

Earth’s surface, the ultimate high-ground, United States Air Force (USAF) has owned this high- ground space for decades that the other nations and other air forces only dream of making such a claim. What if their dreams come into reality? United States’ military and political leaders believe that there are revisionist major powers, which want to achieve their dreams and they have a renewed focus on their aggression. The U.S. believes that its target is space. For that purposes, they don’t have to dominate the space, just disrupt it. The U.S. is so much dependent on the space that in case of any disruption in space may likely to cause huge economic, social, and in extreme case, military lose to the country and its prosperity would be a risk. United States is clear that its space capabilities fuel the American way of life and /the American way of war. The

U.S. believes that yesterday thinking will not defeat tomorrow’s challenges. The U.S. focuses on the time to evolve to change the way to protect and defend its vital space assets. United States’ policy makers stress increasing the country’s capacity and capabilities, like partnering with U.S.’ allies by collaborating, innovating, and integrating country’s space capabilities to make its capabilities resilient to combat a multi-domain war fighting network.

Pakistan’s space program is gaining momentum after suffering from a stalemate for decades. But, space is such a domain that every country wants to reach and mark its footprints.

Pakistan has also realized its dream to mark its presence in the world’s prime location.

“The research concludes that there is a real threat in space that could germinate the seed of armed conflict. United States and China don’t trust each other and there is strategic distrust between two adversaries, which could be the triggering point of armed conflict in outer space.

United States’ concerns are emanating from China’s military and economic rise and U.S. wants

313 to contain China in its region of influence. China considers space as a building block of its national power. This germinates a strategic distrust between two space powers, diminishing chances of cooperation between two states. This also provides incentives for both states to build their military space programs to counter each other’s space power. Both countries have developed kinetic and non-kinetic means to disrupt, disrepair, and damage each other’s space assets. All these efforts are a perfect recipe for competition in outer space. Space is one of the global commons providing crucial resources for humanity. But the environment of competition is what the world desire to progress on the Earth. Likewise, the competition is relatively new than what the world has observed in nuclear and conventional military build-up. The military build-up in outer space has brought a paradigm shift in international security as the fear of war in space would cause catastrophe on the Earth. The problem of space debris in the aftermath of a future space war may last for centuries to clear the debris in space. Therefore, the development of space weapons on the Earth by major spacefarers and these doctrines and strategy to fight a war in space has brought a paradigm shift in international security.”154

The research has comprehensively covered the theoretical understanding of the security complex in South Asia. Chapter three comprises the theoretical understanding of the security environment at international, regional and individual levels and how a framework of space security is devised by using the rational nature of the three levels of security. In the subsequent chapters, the literature on space militarization and weaponization capabilities of selected nations were analysed to understand the implications for the security complex in South Asia. The study concludes that the space for competition between United States and China is there in outer space with its ramifications for South Asia. Also, these bilateral relations are the triggering point of the space security trilemma in South Asia. This may likely to intensify because of the destabilizing technology development in South Asia, specifically, the Indian development of its BMD

154 Ibid.

314 capabilities is extremely offensive towards Pakistan’s national security. The India BMD capabilities are incomplete without the effective development and deployment of space-based assets by India. Hence, the space for competition in South Asia between China and India, and

India and Pakistan is looming, left little space for cooperation. However, space is a domain where inter-state cooperation is quite plausible creating space for cooperation. Therefore, there is also a space for cooperation depending upon the political will of the South Asian leadership.

Like nuclear deterrence, there is a healthy debate on deterrence in space as well. Conflict in space is as deadly as a nuclear war on Earth. A nuclear war may obstruct the functions of life in a particular area on the Earth in case of a nuclear exchange. But, a war in space could jeopardize the proper functioning of life on the entire globe. The life of people living on the planet earth may come to a near halt if the space assets providing communication, navigation and other services for basic functions of life are hit and damaged in an armed conflict. The catastrophic nature of fighting a war in space has created space deterrence between adversaries.

It becomes assured by the development of space weaponization capabilities by major spacefarers. The major space powers are cognizant of the fact that if they hit a target in space their assets will also come under attack and the chances of their survival are extremely bleak.

One particular example of space deterrence is the strategic patience shown by the U.S. when one of its Iridium satellite was blinded by a laser attack by China. The U.S. did not respond similarly and did not strike back as it was to maintain its freedom of action in space. Hence, the study concludes that space weaponization is inevitable but space deterrence is likely to prevail as well.

The study also concludes that there is the revival of space sanctuary school-of-thought in the major spacefarers’ doctrine, policies and strategies. It is quite observable that their actions entail high-ground perspectives but due to rising competition in space, the sanctuary school-of- thought is reviving its roots. The study briefly analysis the space policies of the selected states and it is found that there is a never-ending desire by the states to exploit outer space for civil and

315 military purposes. The states will never end their efforts to augment their military power and continue to see space power as a force multiplier. But the rising pool of states also restricts them to demark their territories in space.

The research concludes that conflict in space is quite plausible as the states are building military space capabilities to fulfil their national security goals. The conflict on the ground has also inevitable, and its nature and characteristics are transforming and changing. However, there is a continuous debate on how to resolve and transform the conflict and if it drastically transformed into an armed conflict then how to mitigate its effects. Likewise, states are also in rigorously debate to formulate a global framework to prevent the arms race in outer space. In this regard, there are several multilateral forums under the United Nations to discuss and establish treaties for arms control and disarmament affairs. The draft of PAROS Treaty has been under discussion in CD, Geneva for the last three decades, but the consensus has not emerged between the states at the forum. The negotiation process has been suffering from a perfect stalemate, as a result, an iota of progress not been be made in all these three decades to prevent space weaponization. The study also finds that there is a complete lack of consensus among the

Member States even on the definition of peaceful uses of outer space and the definition of space weapons. All these litigation of demarcation of definition require undying commitment from the

Member States to come across all the odds and discuss a verifiable arms control and disarmament mechanism to make space free of weapons. Many efforts were made in the past but the high scepticism by other space powers has not allowed the negotiation process to come from the embryonic state. Therefore, the study concludes that there is a desire need to negotiate a universally accepted arms control and disarmament treaty in space. In this regard, the on-going process of Transparency Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) and the opinions of Group of

Governmental Experts (GGE) in CD may be allowed to recommend a way forward to break the statement on PAROS Treaty.

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