DOCSLIB.ORG

Security and Islam in Asia: Lessons from China’S Uyghur Minority

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Security and Islam in Asia: Lessons from China’S Uyghur Minority >> POLICY BRIEF ISSN: 1989-2667 Nº 87 - JULY 2011 Security and Islam in Asia: lessons from China’s Uyghur minority Sébastien Peyrouse The death of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011 has once again put >> the media spotlight on Al-Qaeda. The movement’s weakening due to the loss of its main leader does not amount to its elimination: Al- Qaeda has become a brand , mainly targeting the international HIGHLIGHTS community, and several scattered movements will continue to lay claim to it, whether situated in Europe, the Maghreb, Yemen and the Sudan, or Indonesia. Al-Qaeda’s weakening does not settle the political and • The international social conflicts which have served as its background. There is hoped community pays regular however that the erroneous prism constituted by the US-led ‘war on attention to the issue of terror’ waged after 11 September 2001 will be abandoned. This ‘war’ Islam in the Middle-East, contributed to the overlap of an internationalised Jihadi movement with but tends to forget its situations of local tension in which Islam was, to very diverse degrees, salience in Asia. claimed as a narrative by which to explain the conflict. The idea that every conflict affecting Muslim populations had a more or less direct link • Islam in Asia will partly to international terrorism distorted Western readings not only of the shape the security situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also of the conflict between Israelis development of the and Palestinians, of that between Tamils and government forces in Sri- continent in the decades to Lanka, as well as, the understanding of Pakistan’s domestic frailty due to come. the emergence of its own Taliban movements. • The Uyghur issue The international community pays regular attention to the Islam issue in highlights the economic the Middle-East. Today it is in a better position to understand the lack of and cultural unity that characterises radical Islam in the Maghreb, Mashrek and the marginalisation of China’s Persian Gulf, and has realised the importance of social and political questions (radical Islam is a response to social marginalisation and Muslims. political repression). ‘Counter-terrorism’ measures thus cannot remain limited to a military perspective, nor efface differences between insurgents in the name of their common ‘enemy’ status. However, the international community tends to forget the salience of the Islam issue in Asia. The SECURITY AND ISLAM IN ASIA: LESSONS FROM CHINA’S UYGHUR MINORITY 2 >>>>>> three largest Muslim countries in the world are in poverty and satisfy the demands of the middle Asia (Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh), and classes. Each year, the number of localised peasant India has larger Muslim minorities than the entire riots is in the hundreds. Added to this is the Bangladeshi population (130 million compared to discontent of the industrial workers, whose living 112 million). If the Pakistani situation is the most conditions have deteriorated; the arrival of troubling for the international community, other hundreds of millions of migrants to mush - Muslim countries in Asia have also been weakened: rooming cities; the disappointment of the Indonesia has entered a period of political turmoil educated youth unable to find good work in which Islamic movements are trying to increase opportunities; and the expectations of the new their influence; India’s Muslim minority remains Chinese bourgeoisie. politically and socially marginalised while the geopolitical situation in Kashmir is still tense; and The second concern is linked to the political Bangladesh has to confront immense internal system and managing the generational change of problems, with the impact of climate change the political elites. The fourth Hu Jintao’s adding to its endemic poverty. generation of leaders, which succeeded the first three of Mao, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, In the context of China’s rise to power, it is will yield its place to the fifth generation in 2012- important for Asia’s general stability to look at the 2013 during the next Communist Party Congress. Chinese experience of managing Islam, especially But the young generations of Chinese elites, fully the Islam extant among restive national minorities integrated into globalised mechanisms, tend such as the Uyghurs. The July 2009 ethnic riots in to push for China to have a more nationalistic Xinjiang – the largest ethnic riots between the voice in the world, which frightens the older Uyghurs and the Chinese Han majority since 1949 generations, who are partisans of a wait-and-see – demonstrated the gravity of the situation. policy towards the United States. The third Renewed violence in the region in late July 2011 concern is to reduce ethnic tensions in Xinjiang confirmed that the problem is far from resolved. and Tibet, and continue improvements in cross- China has successfully adopted the American Strait relations. discourse of the ‘war on terror’, and, like other authoritarian regimes, has set up an entire In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region ideological arsenal which equates any dissent (XUAR), Beijing’s strategy is a carrot-and-stick movement to international terrorism. A look at the policy. The carrot is the economic development Uyghur issue, however, enables us to grasp more of Xinjiang. US$300 billion of investments are precisely the mechanisms of transformation of planned up to 2015. The stick is the threat to Asia’s Muslim societies. Understanding the eliminate any elements considered to be evolution underway may help the international potentially subversive. The central government community avoid the errors of interpretation in its has officially undertaken to reduce the gap counter-terrorism strategies that it made in the between GDP per capita in Xinjiang and that of Middle-East, and put it in a better position to the coastal provinces. In 2010 the government shape security scenarios across Asia. decided to charge a new resource tax of 5 per cent on all oil and gas produced in Xinjiang to boost provincial revenues by 25 per cent. The THE CHINESE STRATEGY IN XINJIANG US$300 billion of investments will be used mainly for development projects in Southern Since the 1990s, and even more so today, the Xinjiang, focusing on strategic sectors such as Chinese authorities have been obsessed by the infrastructure, transport and fostering foreign country’s internal stability. Three concerns stand investments. One of the most important out. The first is to manage social tensions by measures foresees turning Kashgar into a special continuing to lift the Chinese peasantry out of economic zone based on the model of Shenzhen POLICY BRIEF - Nº 87 - JULY 2011 3 in the Guangdong region. The face of Kashgar, regulates social relations; the rites of passage of a Uyghur-dominated city with heavy national birth, marriage and death; gender relations; symbolism for the Uyghurs, is set to be relations within the family; the respect of youth transformed into a modern multi-ethnic city by toward their elders. Here too, religion is 2020. intrinsically linked to culture. However, the Tibetan riots of spring 2008, the But this old paradigm, in which religion and bomb attacks at Kashgar during the 2008 culture intersect, has been undermined by the Olympic Games and the July 2009 ethnic riots in arrival of Chinese modernity. This modernity is, Xinjiang have confirmed the inadequacy of the as with every modernity, disruptive in principle, Chinese strategy. Investing massively in the local but also because it is perceived as foreign, since it economy and infrastructure is not enough to basically favours the Han Chinese. Thus, the defuse secessionist tensions and identity conflicts. Uyghurs who wish to integrate into Chinese In the years to come, Beijing will have to avoid economic dynamism not only have to accept causing tension with cultural Sinicisation, but also find themselves in its preferential policy increased competition with Han migrants who Asian Muslims are of land attribution, arrive from the central regions of the country. a particularly sensi - Added to acculturation, then, is the sentiment of likely to have a hand tive issue given the foreign domination. Those who remain outside in shaping the process of Han of Chinese dynamics are marginalised both Chinese agricultural culturally and economically, and have even seen security environment colonisation. The their socio-economic situation deteriorate with success of Chinese the arrival of the Hans, who possess the fertile of the continent policy will depend lands and are given priority for employment in on its ability to industries and services. enable the Uyghur to benefit from these economic reforms and the The reactions to these social transformations are dividends they reap, and to stop them being multiple. Some Uyghur accept the Chinese marginalised in their own province. strategy and seek reconciliation, considering that they have no future other than to integrate into the Chinese system and therefore to acculturate ISLAM IN XINJIANG themselves partially to it. Others want to resist in cultural terms and consider that the two flagships There are multiple meanings to ‘being Muslim’. of Uyghur identity to be preserved are its language For an entire section of the Uyghur elite, most of and religion. In this perspective, the official Islam whom are based in Urumqi, Islam is above all a controlled by the Chinese authorities (theological central element of their national identity. Their training in state institutions, nomination of social promotion was made possible thanks to a imams, the monitoring of sermons before they are partial linguistic and cultural Sinicisation in the read in public, etc.) is partially accepted, on the Chinese administrative and university system, but condition that the imams are Uyghurs (and not, they wish to maintain specific identity elements, for example, Hui, i.e. Muslim Hans) and that the religion probably being the most important. pressures are not excessive. For the pauperised rural What is at stake is therefore not faith per se, but youth, who are marginalised from the Chinese individual and collective identity.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Salience of Ethnicity Among Burman Muslims: a Study in Identity Formation
    INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, 2005 VOL 13, N0 2, 161-179 Salience of Ethnicity among Burman Muslims: A Study in Identity Formation Khin Maung Yin∗ Abstract: Muslims, constituting about thirteen percent of the total population of Myanmar or Burma are not a monolithic group and are unable to provide a united front in their struggle to realize their just demands. They are divided into many groups and their relationship with each other is conflictual. As the cases of Indian and Bamar (Burman) Muslims show, they rely upon ethnicity, rather than religion, for identity formation and self-expression. Burma, known as Myanmar since 1989, is the second largest country in ASEAN or South East Asia.1 It stretches nearly 1500 miles from North to South. With an area of 678,500 square km and a population of about 48 million, it lies at the juncture of three regions of Southeast Asia, South Asia and East Asia. It is situated between two Asian giants, India and China, and shares borders with Bangladesh, Thailand and Laos. Burma is more significant than many other countries in the region as it is surrounded, in the southwest and south, by the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. It lies, in the words of Huntington, across the fault lines of the Hindu, Buddhist and Confucian civilisations.2 Burma or Myanmar is a nation with many races and there are about 135 ethnic groups. Its population is nearly 50 million. The majority are Bamar, but the Shan, Kachin, Kayin, Chin, Mon, Rakhine, Burmese Muslims, Indian Muslims, Chinese Muslims and others are prominent minority groups in Burma.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamic Education in Myanmar: a Case Study
    10: Islamic education in Myanmar: a case study Mohammed Mohiyuddin Mohammed Sulaiman Introduction `Islam', which literally means `peace' in Arabic, has been transformed into a faith interpreted loosely by one group and understood conservatively by another, making it seem as if Islam itself is not well comprehended by its followers. Today, it is the faith of 1.2 billion people across the world; Asia is a home for 60 per cent of these adherents, with Muslims forming an absolute majority in 11 countries (Selth 2003:5). Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, international scholars have become increasingly interested in Islam and in Muslims in South-East Asia, where more than 230 million Muslims live (Mutalib 2005:50). These South-East Asian Muslims originally received Islam from Arab traders. History reveals the Arabs as sea-loving people who voyaged around the Indian Ocean (IIAS 2005), including to South-East Asia. The arrival of Arabs has had different degrees of impact on different communities in the region. We find, however, that not much research has been done by today's Arabs on the Arab±South-East Asian connection, as they consider South-East Asia a part of the wider `East', which includes Iran, Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, the term `South-East Asia' is hardly used in modern Arab literature. For them, anything east of the Middle East and non-Arabic speaking world is considered to be `Asia' (Abaza 2002). According to Myanmar and non-Myanmar sources, Islam reached the shores of Myanmar's Arakan (Rakhine State) as early as 712 AD, via oceangoing merchants, and in the form of Sufism.
    [Show full text]
  • Islam in Asia: People, Practices, Traditions ABOUT the EXPLORING ASIA PROJECT and the “ISLAM in ASIA: PEOPLE, PRACTICES, TRADITIONS” SERIES
    NEWSPAPERS IN EDUCATION PRESENTS Islam In asIa: PeoPle, PractIces, tradItIons ABOUT THE EXPLORING ASIA PROJECT AND THE “ISLAM IN ASIA: PEOPLE, PRACTICES, TRADITIONS” SERIES Exploring Asia is a collaborative project between the Newspapers In Education program of The Seattle Times and the University of Washington’s Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies’ Asia and Global Studies outreach centers. The project consists of a five- article series, a teaching guide and a pre-series workshop for secondary teachers. Designed with young readers in mind, articles in this year’s Exploring Asia online newspaper series titled “Islam in Asia: People, Practices, Traditions” focus on social, political, educational, devotional and cultural practices in Islamic societies in Asia, where a majority of the world’s Muslims live. The five-part series includes articles on Indonesia, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and China, as well as an overview of Islam in Asia. This teaching guide provides a lesson plan for each article and activities to do with students before, during and after reading the featured weekly article. Together, the articles and accompanying lessons take students on an exploration of Islam in several Asian countries, asking students to look at the issues from multiple perspectives and to promote understanding. The points of view represented in the articles and the guide materials are a sampling of perspectives among many viewpoints on these issues. AUTHOR OF THE TEACHING GUIDE The author of the teaching guide for Exploring Asia’s “Islam in Asia: People, Practices, Traditions” series is Tese Wintz Neighbor. Tese Wintz Neighbor received a Master of Art degree in China Regional Studies from the Henry M.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Contemporary Ethnic Identity of Muslim Descendants Along The
    1 Contemporary Ethnic Identity Of Muslim Descendants Along the Chinese Maritime Silk Route Dru C Gladney Anthropology Department University of South Carolina U.S.A At the end of five day's journey, you arrive at the noble-and handsome city of Zaitun [Quanzhoui] which has a port on the sea-coast celebrated for the resort of shipping, loaded with merchandise, that is afterwards distributed through every part of the province .... It is indeed impossible to convey an idea of the concourse of merchants and the accumulation of goods, in this which is held to be one of the largest and most commodious ports in the world. Marco Polo In February 1940, representatives from the China Muslim National Salvation society in Beijing came to the fabled maritime Silk Road city of Quanzhou, Fujian, known to Marco Polo as Zaitun, in order to interview the members of a lineage surnamed "Ding" who resided then and now in Chendai Township, Jinjiang County. In response to a question on his ethnic background, Mr. Ding Deqian answered: "We are Muslims [Huijiao reo], our ancestors were Muslims" (Zhang 1940:1). It was not until 1979, however, that these Muslims became minzu, an ethnic nationality. After attempting to convince the State for years that they belonged to the Hui nationality, they were eventually accepted. The story of the late recognition of the members of the Ding lineage in Chendai Town and the resurgence of their ethnoreligious identity as Hui and as Muslims is a fascinating reminder that there still exist remnants of the ancient connections between Quanzhou and the Western Regions, the origin points of the Silk Road.
    [Show full text]
  • Islam in South and Southeast Asia
    Order Code RS21903 Updated February 8, 2005 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Islam in South and Southeast Asia Bruce Vaughn Analyst in Southeast and South Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Summary There exists much diversity within the Islamic world. This is particularly evident in Asia. This diversity is to be found in the different ethnic backgrounds and in the different practices of Islam. The Muslim world of Asia has been experiencing an Islamic revival. This has had an effect on moderate as well as radical Muslims. An understanding of the dynamics of Islam in Asia should help inform United States’ policy to develop respect between America and Muslim peoples, to foster economic policies to encourage development of open societies, to support education in Muslim states, and to identify and prioritize terrorist sanctuaries in order to pursue more effectively the war against terror. This report will be updated. By some estimates there are approximately 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, of which 60% live in Asia.1 Only 15% of Muslims are Arab, while almost one third live in South Asia.2 The four nations with the largest Muslim populations, Indonesia (194 million), India (150 million), Pakistan (145 million), and Bangladesh (130 million), are in Asia. China also has a population of 39 million Muslims.3 Despite this, the Muslims of Asia are perceived to be on the periphery of the Islamic core based in the Arab Middle East. Muslims are a majority in Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in South Asia and Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia in Southeast Asia.
    [Show full text]
  • RESEARCH of NOTE Telling the Story of Islam in Asia: Reflections on Teleologies and Timelessness Barbara D
    Telling the Story of Islam in Asia 9 RESEARCH OF NOTE Telling the Story of Islam in Asia: Reflections on Teleologies and Timelessness Barbara D. Metcalf University of Michigan Introduction: The importance of Islam in Asia Any of us who teaches about Muslims in Asia is likely to feel the need to insist on the importance of the subject and its neglect by people who reduce Islam and its adherents to the Middle East or conflate Muslim and Arab.1 The chart of population figures listed in the appendix shows why, in terms of the sheer numbers involved, one might want to assert Asia’s importance as the four largest Muslim populations in the world: Indonesia, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh are in Asia. The largest concentration of Muslims anywhere is in the area we demarcate “South Asia,” the old British India with close to half a billion population of Muslims. Approximately one in three of the world’s Muslims lives in the first set of countries listed in the appendix. The population statistics within countries that automatically click “Islam” in people’s minds just don’t compare. Saudi Arabia may have a population of twenty-eight million, all Muslim, but Uttar Pradesh, the state I primarily study in the Republic of India, with only an eighteen percent Muslim population, has about six million more, some thirty-four million. Numbers aside, sadly many of these areas have in fact come into popular purview in recent years because of war, violence, and strategic considerations. Afghanistan and Pakistan are widely considered as among the most dangerous places geopolitically in the world, and American troops are deeply Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • The Local Islamic Associations and the Party-State Consanguinity and Opportunities
    China Perspectives 2014/4 | 2014 Remembering the Mao Era The Local Islamic Associations and the Party-State Consanguinity and opportunities Jérôme Doyon Translator: Will Thornely Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6586 DOI: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.6586 ISSN: 1996-4617 Publisher Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine Printed version Date of publication: 25 November 2014 Number of pages: 37-44 ISSN: 2070-3449 Electronic reference Jérôme Doyon, « The Local Islamic Associations and the Party-State », China Perspectives [Online], 2014/4 | 2014, Online since 01 January 2017, connection on 28 October 2019. URL : http:// journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6586 ; DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.6586 © All rights reserved Article China perspectives The Local Islamic Associations and the Party-State Consanguinity and opportunities JÉRÔME DOYON ABSTRACT: In order to get to the heart of interactions between the state and Muslim communities and to understand local variants in the religious field, this article will focus on the role played by the Nanjing Islamic Association. This work breaks with top-down ap - proaches, which concentrate on religions from the point of view of the central state, as well as with studies centred on the communities themselves, which overlook links with the state. Shedding light on the historical legacies of the Association and the networks of people comprising it shows that the link between the Party-state and religious communities is not a straightforward relationship of control and repression. It involves complex negotiations that have allowed a depoliticised form of Islam to develop in coastal China. KEYWORDS: Islam, religious management, Nanjing, nationalities, United Front, Party-state.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 2: Jemaah Tarbiyah and Islamisation in Indonesia
    Chapter 2: Jemaah Tarbiyah and Islamisation in Indonesia The long process of Islamisation1 that planted its roots in the society of the Indonesian archipelago in the 14th century is by no means yet finished. It continues to bring about change and continuation, from conversion to re-islamisation.2 After Islam gained its roots in Indonesia until now, all efforts of Islamisation carried out by its agents mainly have aimed to bring the followers of Islam closer to practices of orthodox Islam (reform).3 Both traditionalists and modernist have been known for their role in carrying out the reform in different degree and approaches. This ongoing process has also manifested interesting and distinct phenomena through time, depending on the varying contexts of social and cultural change. Over the centuries, Islam has played a major role, not only in shaping society but also in directing the course of Indonesian politics. The fact that Muslims are the majority in Indonesia is considered clear evidence of the importance of Islam. However, to what extent Islam has been adopted at the contemporary structural level is still debatable. In order to gain sufficient knowledge about its role, two distinct approaches: cultural and political, in the Islamisation process need to be presented.4 While cultural approach tends to focus itself effort in Islamising the society, the political (structural) approach prefer to rely on structural and political power in carrying out its Islamisation agenda.5 Thus the emergence of Jemaah Tarbiyah in Indonesia is not an isolated phenomenon, but part of the general process of Islamisation. Through a detailed study of the model and approach of Jemaah Tarbiyah in furthering its dakwah or predication, we can discover the religious and political orientations of the movement, and in particular, the movement's view of the relationship between religion and the state in Indonesia.
    [Show full text]
  • Rohingya: the Foundational Years by Jacques P
    POLICY BRIEF SERIES Rohingya: The Foundational Years By Jacques P. Leider Policy Brief Series No. 123 (2020) Myanmar’s Rakhine State (‘Arakan’ until 1982) borders on Bangla- of Muslims in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships and pursued desh and the Bay of Bengal. Muslims of diverse origins and occupa- political lobbying at the centre of executive power throughout the tions were acculturated since the times of Buddhist kings, and their 1950s. The creation of the Mayu Frontier Administration (MFA) as descendants lived on near the old capital Mrauk U and along the an exclusive Muslim area in 1961 was considered an outstanding coast.1 The growth of a majority Muslim community in North Ara- success of the fledgling movement. kan down the border with Bengal’s Chittagong district, however, was The following sections of this policy brief contextualize the brought forth by the expansive agriculture under British rule. Com- foundational period of the Rohingyas between approximately 1947 plicated by geography, migratory backgrounds, and social stratifica- and 1964. They present political and cultural aims, mobilization, tion, much of the history of Muslim communities in these coastal achievements, and implications of the territorialization and self- borderlands remains to be explored. identification process. The brief does not aim at giving an exhaustive The Rohingyas, today the largest Muslim community in Myan- account, but puts forward a concatenation of contexts and events as a mar and estimated at one third of Rakhine State’s mixed population basis for further discussion.4 The entrenched contestation of the Ro- (census 2014), form a distinct chapter of the region’s post-indepen- hingya identity by the Myanmar state, heavily criticized internation- dence history.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    International Journal of Islam in Asia 1 (2020) 1–5 brill.com/ijia Introduction Nassef Manabilang Adiong, Deina Abdelkader, and Raffaele Mauriello Redefining Center and Periphery in Islam Nassef Manabilang Adiong The establishment of the International Journal of Islam in Asia (IJIA) aims to offer an academic platform for all aspects of research on Islam in Asia, particu- larly to shed light on understudied Muslim communities. The original intent of creating the journal was to promote scholarly endeavors and research works concentrating on the study of Islam and Muslim societies in Southeast Asia. The region was, and still is, sadly referred to as the periphery of the Muslim world even though it has one of the largest Muslim populations in the world. The Muslim Southeast Asian region manifests a sheer unparalleled diversity of cultures, traditions and mores which have survived for centuries despite the influence of Western modernity, coloniality, and the ascendance of the nation- state system. Through careful and long deliberation among us, the editors, and the publisher, it was decided to expand the regional scope of IJIA to cover the entire Asia and accommodate diverse epistemic backgrounds that could go beyond disciplinary boundaries. Aside from academic articles, the journal will aim to include policy research that comprises historical and contemporary Muslim communities in Asia and the Asian Muslim diaspora. The journal also aims to cover an eclectic group of articles that vary in their topics such as but not limited to, theoretical, method- ological, empirical, religious, spiritual, and critical studies of Islam, including mundane praxes and lived Islam.
    [Show full text]
  • Muslim Networks and Mobilities in Southeast Asia 1-2 March 2018
    NUS-USPC Collaborative Project Intersecting Mobilities: Southeast Asia from the Perspective of Religious Mobility Workshop on Muslim Networks and Mobilities in Southeast Asia 1-2 March 2018 Institute of Religion, Culture, and Peace Payap University Hotel Sugar Cane, Chiang Mai CONTACT DETAILS Convenors Dr Amelia Fauzia, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore E | [email protected] Dr Suchart Setthamalinee, Institute of Religion, Culture, and Peace, Payap University, Thailand E | [email protected] Dr Claire Thi Liên Tran, IRASEC – Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia, Thailand E | [email protected] INTERSECTING MOBILITIES: SOUTHEAST ASIA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF RELIGIOUS MOBILITY 1-2 March, Chiang Mai, Thailand This two-day workshop on the historical and contemporary dynamics of Muslim networks in Southeast Asia is part of the broader comparative exploration of religious networks in Asia supported by a collaborative grant awarded by NUS and Université Sorbonne Paris-Cité. It is hosted by Irasec (Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia, Bangkok), and Payap University Chiang Mai. The main objective of this workshop is to examine how the circulation of Muslim scholars (‘ulama), Islamic learnings (madrasah, pesantren), books (kitabs), mystical brotherhood (sufi/tarekat) teachers and other institutions established by Islamic communities in the region since the 16th century that played a fundamental role in shaping regional networks of education and da’wa (Islamic propagation). Studies on the networks of Islam in Southeast Asia remain heavily based on the intellectual history of Muslim scholars, printed culture and also hajj (pilgrimage), despite there are many other Islamic institutions, such as waqfs, and schools.
    [Show full text]
  • Ethnoreligious Nationalism and Majoritarianism in Asia Jeff Kingston
    Policy Forum Ethnoreligious Nationalism and Majoritarianism in Asia Jeff Kingston Revised and excerpted from the conclusion by permission of the publisher from The Politics of Religion, Nationalism, and Identity in Asia, by Jeff Kingston (Rowman & Littlefield, 2019). Majoritarianism is the scourge of Asia, as ethnic majorities are abandoning tolerance and accommodation of diversity in ways that threaten, inter alia, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities. This phenomenon is based on the precept that the numerically largest group in a society enjoys primacy and has the right to make policies that favor the majority, even at the expense of diversity and minorities. This is not entirely new in Asia as many nations have experienced previous paroxysms of majoritarian violence and pogroms, but in recent years this intolerance has become more institutionalized and sustained. This tyranny of the majority threatens the secular state model based on a commitment to pluralism, tolerance, and diversity.1 Authoritarian governance and democratic backsliding are an expression of, and reinforce, this tyranny, undermining secularism while amplifying risks for minorities. Majoritarianism posits that an ethnic or religious majority has the right to determine a nation’s destiny without regard for minority rights.2 The rise of Hindu nationalism in India, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka, and Bamar Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar are examples of ethnoreligious nationalism. Ethnoreligious nationalism is the conflation of national identity with the ethnic majority’s religious affiliation.3 In all these examples, only members of the majority are treated as full citizens while minorities are tolerated as long as they do not challenge the majority, are suitably deferential, and accept being marginalized – politically, economically, and culturally.
    [Show full text]