Reappraising Wicked Problems: Wicked Policy vs. Simple

Allan McConnell

Paper Presented at Political Studies Association (PSA) 66th Annual International Conference 21-23 March 2016, Brighton

Prof. Allan McConnell Department of Government and International Relations School of Social and Political Sciences University of Sydney

Visiting Professor School of Government and Public Policy University of Strathclyde

Email: [email protected]

Introduction

The terminology of 'wicked problems' is now firmly entrenched in the language of policy researchers and policy practitioners (Roberts 2000; Australian Public Service Commission 2007; Head 2010). Although there are many definitions and disputes around issues of terminology, there is a general consensus that wicked problems are highly complex; there are no clear solutions available, and information about the likely impact of any interventions is limited. Typical examples cited would include , poverty, , child protection, people smuggling, indigenous disadvantage, urban congestion, drug abuse and gender inequality.

Herein lies a puzzle. Academics write of failure to address wicked problems but politicians often speak of success in addressing wicked problems. How can we account for such divergent narratives? We could attribute the difference to little more than the political rhetoric of leaders who seek to appear positive and emphasise progress (Hood and Alford 2015). Or we can explore the possibility that there is a clue here to a deeper understanding of how political systems respond to wicked problems. This paper seeks to reappraise our understanding of wicked problems by addressing the potential political goals that leaders may aspire to when confronted by wicked problems. It should be considered an initial attempt to explore a new and more holistic way of thinking about the challenges of policy problems that often seem irresolvable.

The paper is structured as follow. First it provides some background on the wicked problems literature, noting particularly that it is focused predominantly on the ‘on- the-ground’ problem while relegating to the margins, the corresponding political challenges faced by political elites. Second it seeks to redress this imbalance by unpacking the key political tests faced by key political leaders when confronted with wicked problems. Particularly important here, is encountering a series of risks and trade offs between managing the on-the-ground policy problem, and managing the potential political repercussions in terms of factors such as political reputation and maintaining control of policy agendas. I argue that given numerous potential barriers to tackling wicked policy problems – particularly in terms of deep causal factors - that relatively speaking, political responses are often simpler and less risky. Third and finally it considers the implications of this analysis and argument, particularly in terms of whether or not we should find hope in societal capacities to address wicked policy problems.

The Study of Wicked Problems: Much Done, More To Do

It is well-known among policy scholars that the seminal work on ‘wicked problems’ is that of Rittel and Webber (1973). They developed an earlier version of their paper in the late 1960s, at a time when social policy professionals were under attack for failing to deliver on post-war aspirations such as better education, improved welfare, more livable cities and general reductions in inequalities and social disadvantage. Despite the systems thinking that had emerged out of the RAND Corporation (Mitch 1960), developed in many respects from Lasswell (1956) and his attempts to

1 encourage a systematic harnessing of policy processes for the greater good, it seemed to Rittel and Webber (1973) that some policy problems were not amenable to being put into clearly defined boxes labeled ‘the problem’, ‘desired outcome’, ‘optimal solution’ and so on. Taking care not to attribute a meaning of ethical deplorability, they coined the term ‘wicked problems’ (as opposed to those which are ‘tame’) and identified at least ten characteristics of such problems:

1. No definitive formulation of a wicked problem i.e. no definitive understanding of the problem and the solution, based on all relevant evidence and questioning.

2. No stopping rule i.e. there is no end point where the solution is found and the problem comes to an end (as in a chess game).

3. Solutions to wicked problems are good-or-bad rather that true-or-false i.e. there are different value judgments and no party has the power to determine correctness.

4. There is no immediate and ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem i.e. the full consequences of an attempt at a solution cannot be known.

5. Every potential solution is a ‘one shot’ operation i.e. because it leaves traces which cannot be undone.

6. Wicked problems to do not have innumerable or exhaustive potential solutions i.e. there are no criteria allowing us to prove that no more solutions are possible.

7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique i.e. there are no classes of problems without variation in distinguishing properties.

8. Every wicked problem is a symptom of another problem i.e. there is no definitive level at which a problem is settled.

9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways i.e. rich modes of reasoning compared to those in scientific discourse, means that every associated phenomena can have multiple explanations

10. The planner has no right to be wrong i.e. policy planners can be held to account and blamed for the consequences of their reasoning.

Subsequent academic work on the topic has tended to focus on two sets of interrelated issues. The first involves attempting to locate wicked problems within a broader understanding of different types of policy problems and the degree to which solutions are possible. While the original ten conditions by Rittel and Webber (1973) were very close to encapsulating all policy problems (because of an undercurrent

2 that the process of policy analysis does not accord with scientific reasoning, falsifiability and so on), the literature on wicked problems has – to put it crudely – focused on differentiating between ‘exceptionally tough’ problems and various others which are much less so. Such finer-grained analyses has played out through arguments that problems are not simply tame or wicked (Heifetz 1994; Head and Alford 2015); there are degrees of wickedness (Koppemjan and Klijn 2004; Roberts 2000; Head and Alford 2015), and indeed there are super-wicked problems (Lazarus 2009) where time is running out (arguably climate change).

The second and by no means separate focus has been on how we can better address wicked problems. There have certainly been calls for ‘better leadership’ but much of the focus has been broadly in the areas of governance, communication and coordination. Suggestions include developing strategies for (Roberts 2000); better knowledge consultation and use of third parties (Head 2008); improved knowledge transmission and integration within networks (Webber and Khademian 2008); finding iterative and adaptive ways of continually reassessing and renegotiating rather than attempting to ‘solve’ (Head 2014); and governance strategies based on new ways of observing and enabling (Catrien et al. 2015).

Valuable as such analyses are, their scope is generally limited. In essence, they tend towards analyses that focuses overwhelmingly on the problem ‘on the ground’, such as global warming, inability to afford life's essentials, inability to have a roof over one's head, abuse of children, indigenous disadvantage in all spheres of life, gender discrimination in terms of pay, promotion etc. The ‘politics’ of responding to wicked problems are generally confined to the margins of analysis, in the sense that there is widespread assumption that politicians are also driven by the desire to ‘solve’ wicked problems and therefore the ‘politics’ of wicked problems are assumed to be equally wicked.

For example, the assumption is that tackling the wicked problem of poverty generates just as wicked a political challenge as it does a policy one. Yet this the case? We know from many different approaches to the study of public policy that there exists a range of potential policy drivers. Policy processes can be driven by the power of inherited institutional pathways and policies, powerful interest groups, powerful coalitions of actors, self-interest on the part of politicians and bureaucrats, and even by pre-established ‘garbage can’ solutions that help define what the ‘problem’ is in the first place. Once we factor in many cross-cutting issues that are the subject of much contemporary policy analysis, such as the role of risk, experts, evidence and deliberation, then it can be argued that the driving forces of public policy are much more complex that most of the existing wicked problems literature tends to suggest. To assume for example that policy responses to the wicked problem of poverty would be driven simply by quasi-rationalistic approaches to ending poverty, goes against the grain of meta-theories of political analysis which would look at a multitude of differing perspectives, such as powerful coalitions committed to rolling back the frontiers of state welfare, or entrenched institutional powers resistant to major welfare reform.

3 Few scholars of public policy would take serious issue with Dye (2012: 12) in his definition of public policy as ‘whatever governments choose to do or not to do’. We should take such a broad consensus seriously, because inter alia government’s ‘do’ politics. Logically, therefore, if we want to understand wicked problems and the capacities (or not) of governments to address these problems, then we need to engage with the political challenges faced by government in managing the on-the- ground wicked problems. Of course politics and policy are closely entwined in practice as Wildvasky (2007: 124) argues when he described policy as analysis as ‘two-thirds politics and one third planning’. For analytical purposes, however, we can separate them in order to address the puzzle of why seemingly intractable wicked problems are often managed quite simply and successfully from a political perspective.

Reappraisal: Examining The Politics of Wicked Problems

Confronting Wicked Problems? Potential Political Goals of Government

A useful starting point in thinking about how governments address the political problem of managing the on-the-ground policy problem, is to draw on the burgeoning literature on policy failure and policy success (Bovens and ‘t Hart 1996; 2016; Brändström and Kuipers 2003; Howlett, Ramesh and Wu; Marsh and McConnell 2010; McConnell 2010a, 2010b, 2015, 2016; Peters 2015). Despite the fact that the nature of success and failure can mean different things to different people, and the existence of multiple benchmarks against which success and failure can be assessed (from the goals of government, to whether a particular state of affairs is better/worse as a result of a policy intervention), it is instructive in terms of political challenges from the perspective of government. In essence, it allows us to think about ‘idealised’ political outcomes – from government’s perspective. In other words, it allows us to map out what political success looks like for a government that is faced with managing a wicked policy problem. There are three such indicators that can usefully be identified.

First, a response to a wicked policy problem would ‘ideally’ boost government’s reputation, its electability, the careers of the relevant ministers/officials and so on. Centre-right and right wing governments have often capitalised on the issue of immigration in order to garner populist appeal. Of course this is an ‘ideal’ (from government’s perspective rather than normatively ideal) and if politics is what Bismarck described as the ‘the art of the possible, the attainable - the art of the next best’, then a quite acceptable outcome from government’s perspective is that its response would at least do no damage to its reputation, standing in opinion polls and so on.

Second, a response to a wicked problem would allow government to retain control of its policy and political agendas, without the issue continually rebounding and consuming large amounts of time and space. Again, such an ideal agenda outcome from government’s perspective is often unattainable, and so an acceptable outcome is for its response and the ensuing outcomes and debates to reappear on agendas –

4 but in a sustainable and manageable way. In other words, the response does not backfire (Martin 2007) in a way that is exceptionally difficult to control. The introduction in 2003 of a congestion charge in central London was potentially a recipe for the agenda of Mayor Ken Livingstone to be consumed by relentless criticism, yet such criticisms (especially from some retailers) proved to be quite containable (Richards 2006).

Third, a response to a wicked problem would allow government to promote its broader governance agenda or . Cuts in welfare benefits to ‘get people into work’, for example could in principle reinforce a broad neo-liberal agenda. Again, wicked problems do not always present such opportunities or come without risks. Often, governments will accept a response that at least does no damage to its broad governance/ideological trajectory. President Obama’s health care reforms are arguably one such example. The opinion poll divide between a dominant opposition and lesser support (although growing in strength) remained relatively stable. Ultimately, however, ‘Obamacare’, helped enable the President promote the flagship values of social justice – regardless of whether we support or oppose the reforms.

All of these factors give an indication of what a government might ideally seek from a political perspective when faced with a wicked policy problem – as well as what it might also seek to avoid. Before analyzing the relationship between government’s managing the on-the-ground problem and the politics surrounding its addressing of the problem (or not), we need to consider the capacities of government in being able to address the political challenges of wicked problems.

The Capacities of Government to Address the ‘Political’ Challenges of Wicked Problems

Going beyond Head (2014) I would argue that politicians are generally well placed to address wicked problems, but only IF we factor in political challenges as well, not just policy ones.

The literature on wicked problems, by its very nature, is imbued with the (not unrealistic) assumption that some policy problems are exceptionally difficult to address successfully. From poverty and homelessness to drug abuse and gender inequality, it seems that complex and contested causes, as well as uncertainties about the impact of an endless array solutions leading to lack of agreement, mean that government often has low capacity to successfully address them. In Canada, for example, there are multiple problems of weak and uneven policy analytical capacity in climate change adaption, particularly in terms of finding ways to integrate and align multiple institutional agendas (Craft and Howlett 2013).

The situation is similar with regard to the capacity of governments and political systems to manage the political challenges of addressing wicked of problems. Relating the discussion here back to indicators of successful (or at least acceptable) political outcomes for government, the issue becomes – when faced with a wicked policy problems – does government have the capacity through its response, NOT to

5 damage its reputation, control of the policy agenda and governing/ideological trajectory? The answer is that all things being equal, it does have significant capacity. Schattschneider (1960), Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and Edelman (1977) recognized several decades ago, that a crucial feature of governments managing complex policy problems (and indeed injustices and inequalities) is their capacity to filter out critique through mobilizing existing systemic biases, and managing citizen views of the problem and perceptions that government is tackling them. Government does have capacity to filter out potential criticism, simply by virtue that it introduces measures to address policy problems on-the-ground, although this does not meet that it is guaranteed to succeed. Nevertheless the political problem is largely hidden from the public gaze, and government has de facto the (quasi) constitutional autonomy to take ‘ownership’ of the problem and reflect/act strategically on how to proceed with policy interventions/non-interventions. For example, governments have greater capacity to think and act on: (a) how to manage the relationship between public perceptions of crime and the impact of these on government competence, agendas and ideas, compared to (b) actually being able to address the multiple, complex and deep-rooted causes of crime.

Table 1 summarises the differences between what can be called the classic view of wicked problems, and a reappraisal of wicked problem. The former emphasises the policy problem, with less emphasis on the political challenges of managing the wicked problem. What consideration there is of the political challenges of managing the policy problems is marginal, and tends to assume that they more or less mirror the policy challenges. In other words, there is the assumption that the politics is just as complex and uncertain, and commensurately difficult in obtaining agreement on the way forward.

Table 1: Classic View of Wicked Problems vs. A Reappraisal of Wicked Problems Classic View Reappraisal Central Marginal Central Central assumptions assumptions assumptions assumptions about about the ‘on about the about the ‘on the ‘political’ the ground’ ‘political’ the ground’ problems posed by policy problems policy the wicked policy problem posed by the problem problem wicked policy problem

Complexity High High High Low Uncertainty High High High Low Agreement Low Low Low High

By contrast, a reappraisal of wicked problems retains the central understandings of the wicked policy problem as its classical counterpart, but also gives equal attention to ‘politics’. In doing so, it turns on its head the classic assumption that the political

6 challenges are equally wicked. Instead, political challenges are much simpler. Government’s have a reasonable degree of strategic and (quasi-)constitutional freedom to find ways of managing the political repercussions of a wicked policy issue (effect on government reputation, governmental agenda management, government ideological trajectory). Also, government has access to range and mix of policy instruments with a potential impact on public perceptions of a problem, its symptoms and government’s competence in being able to address at least some of these. All things being equal, the political challenges of dampening a wicked problem are much less complex and uncertain, and much more amenable to finding a solution, if even a pragmatic ‘feelgood’, or even ‘placebo’ one (Gustafson 1983; McConnell 2010a). In essence, therefore, I would argue that aptly-named wicked policy problems are difficult to manage in terms of the on-the-ground issue (such as poverty, drug abuse and gender inequality) but relatively speaking they are much simpler to manage in terms of the politics (such as protecting reputation, maintaining control of the policy agenda and continuing with the existing governance trajectory).

Risks and Trade-Offs: Tackling Wicked Problems vs. Political Success

The aforementioned reappraisal of wicked problems provides a crucial realpolitick context. Put crudely, wicked problems are actually two sets of interrelated problems i.e. the policy problem and the political problem. Managing wicked problems in the aggregate, therefore, involves thinking about potential risks and trade offs between each of them.

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Table 2: Potentially Competing Priorities – Tackling the Wicked Policy Problem vs. Protecting/Enhancing Political goals

Priority: Tackling the Wicked Policy Problem ‘ Priority: Protecting/Enhancing Political Goals

Potential Solutions Risks Example Potential Solutions Risks Example

Governance Strong, high profile Governance arrangements Creating of a Lower profile, working Criticisms of A traditionally top-down, arrangemen leadership steering and may be realigned joined-up ‘national within established government being bureaucratic form of ts realignment of rhetorically, but in practice security’ governance unambitious/not governance, addressing governance continue in path department from a arrangements, policy sincere in its attempt multiple issues of national arrangements (e.g. dependent ways. plethora of existing agendas and governing to tackle the wicked security in a consistently networks, hierarchy, Commitment to a wicked departments/agenc /ideological trajectory. policy problem. Risks strategic, top-down markets) to be problem may be impeded ies to address Steering a new course that the wicked manner. While critics may unimpeachably aligned by the very governance multiple internal is only viable if there is problem will persist. argue that there is and enabling of arrangements that are and external a very strong likelihood insufficient inclusiveness measures to address the intended to enable it. threats, may be of political and joined up thinking, as wicked policy problem. insufficient to alter enhancement e.g. well as an absence of prior bureaucratic boost in electoral measures that will actually pathways and fortunes, revitalized address the problem, a practices. governing/ideological key political value of this trajectory. approach is that government has not gone outside of its ‘comfort zone’ and exposed itself to the risks of a new governance regime that does not align with its mainstream approach.

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Policy Strong, high profile Strong, forceful steering of An executive Lower profile, more Criticisms that Government measures to formation leadership and policy making towards a rushing complex routine strategic government is not address aspects of processes marshaling of all key high priority commitment ‘war on poverty’ leadership of policy providing sufficient poverty, are produced aspects of policy making (either know in advance legislation through formation process, policy making through a routine, low processes (evidence, and/or developed in the the legislature, fails often with a leadership to address risk, more deliberative procedures, deliberative course of policy to build long-term commitment to ‘listen’ the wicked policy policy formation process, mechanisms, inputs formation) has the alliances that will to a range or views and problem. Risks that the that does not use from stakeholders etc) potential to backfire. The sustain into stakeholders. Typically policy making process ‘executive muscle to force towards producing an risks are of alienating implementation, a key political value of will not produce an through’. While critics authoritative and those with differing views and filters out such processes is initiative which is arguing that government sustainable policy on a typically ‘wicked dissent and helping manage capable of addressing should be more decision or decisions to issue’; producing policy criticism that the citizen/stakeholder the wicked problem. galvanizing and that the address the wicked making coalitions that are proposals face perceptions that measures are insufficient problem unlikely to last into serious difficulties government is in the to get to the roots of the implementation; and in being able ‘solve’ process of ‘doing wicked problem, the marginalizing counter- such a complex something’ about the political value to arguments/evidence that issue. wicked policy problem. government is that it is the proposals will not seen to be contemplative, work. measured in ‘doing something’ about the problem of poverty.

Policy Policy goals to address Lack of clarity and/or Measures to end Focusing on policy Criticisms that the Government measures Objectives, the wicked problem ambiguity in goals – indigenous health objectives and means policies are insufficient address some aspect of Mechanisms should be clear and particularly if such inequalities, lack that are more to tackle the deep- the symptoms of and unambiguous. The outcomes were previously clarity on achievable e.g. rooted causes of the indigenous health Instruments means of achieving them necessary to build a milestones and addressing symptoms wicked policy problem. qualities, accompanied by via a combination of coalition of diverse timescale. Other of a wicked problem Risks that the wicked a light tough narrative and policy instruments, interests at the policy sectors and levels rather than deep problem will persist. policy some initiatives should be ring-fenced formation stage. Risk that of government rooted, complex and addressing deeper causes. from goals/means of despite the rhetoric of which are a uncertain causes. The While critics argue that all

9 other policies which ‘ring-fencing’, the necessary part of political value of more this is ‘not enough to potentially may distract resource demands the solution (e.g. ‘realistic’ policies is tackle a chronic, wicked from or drain the (budgetary, agenda time education, housing, that can convey the problem, the political capacity to deliver. All etc) of other policy health, police, impression of value to government is aspects of policy , sectors/problems/crises federal/regional/lo government concerns that it cultivates the including the may undermine attempts cal) are unable to and competence; allow perception that it is configuration of policy to address the wicked provide sufficient government to retain ‘doing’ something instruments used and problem. The enthusiasm time and resources control of its policy the identification of and relentless drive to to the ‘wicked agendas, and prevents target groups, should be address the wicked problem’ without a backlash which might based on clear, robust problem, marginalises compromising their otherwise disrupt its and widely persuasive genuine technical and other policy goals. governing /ideological framing and logic practical concerns about Marginalisation of trajectory. the viability of configuring concerns that is not detailed policy possible to instruments capable of legislative out of matching grand visions. existence, deeper cultural and historical causes of poor health outcomes.

10 Table 2 identifies two very different extremes. If a government genuinely seeks to address a wicked policy problem with a very strong strategic approach to tackling the complex, deeper causes of wicked problems as well as their symptoms, doing so is an exceptionally tough task. There are major risks involved. Realigning governance systems and surrounding carries the risk that they will make little difference to established institutional pathways or policy sub-systems – as May, Sapotichne and Workman (2009) found in their study of the creation of the US Department of Homeland Security. Pushing through legislation carries the potential for backlash, based on the argument that innovative reforms need much greater deliberation and evidence-bases. Similarly, commitments to a detailed package of extensive and deep-rooted policy reforms, brings the risk that they simply will not work to ‘solve’ chronic, complex policy problems, with high levels of uncertainty and high levels of disagreement on the best way forward.

At the other extreme if a government is faced with a wicked policy problems but gives priority to its political goals (maintaining its reputation, retaining as much control as it can over policy agendas and continuing its governing/ideological trajectories) then the options are much simpler and less risky. It can work within its governance framework and core beliefs, produce policies through routine and non- controversial process, and adopt policies that do just enough to create the perception that it is addressing the issues, even if it is more focused on mitigating the symptoms and perhaps with some small initiatives addressing aspects of deeper ‘causes’. Of course that risks are that it faces political pressures for ‘not doing enough’, but there is always the defense that such issues are exceptionally difficult to address anyway. Furthermore, such critique can generally easily absorbed by governments who on a daily basis, face criticism across a multitude of issues.

These competing priorities are not mutually exclusive. Governments will at time opt for something in between. For example, developing collaborative understandings of the problem and negotiating a solution is a middle way forward (Schon and Rein 1994; Roberts 2000; Head and Alford 2015; Catrien et al. 2015), tilting marginally towards addressing aspects of the wicked policy problem (rather than the political problems of protecting reputation and so on).

Overall, tackling wicked problems is a balancing act, involving formal and instinctive assessments of the risks of serious attempts to address the wicked problems vs. the risk of addressing small aspects (some symptoms and perhaps some causal factors). Public policy making involves assessing risks, prioritizing and trade-offs, often leading to the sacrificing are relegating some goals in order to meet others (Althaus 2008). A commitment to full employment through Keynesian style public sector investment carries many risks (including the creation of inflationary pressures), in the same way that a commitment to sustainable economic growth by allowing the market to drive down wages to affordable levels also carries risks (particularly of social/political instability). Looking holistically at such matters, therefore, there are risks to be managed and potential trades offs to consider between the wicked policy problem on the ground, and the political problem in terms of potential impact on reputation, agenda control, maintain governing/ideological trajectory. A government seeking to address centuries of indigenous disadvantage needs to address not only the various

11 risks and trade offs involved in addressing the policy problem (complex as it is) but also the risks and trade offs involved in addressing the political problems of placing stage centre, issues of racism and arguments about ‘special treatment’ being given to marginalized individuals/groups.

Leaning towards are a response which protects political goals is often the most attractive, least risky option. It is certainly the safer one in political terms, and simpler to put into practice – precisely because wicked policy problems are indeed wicked. This is not to suggest that risk taking to address wicked problems cannot happen. As evidenced for example by President Obama on healthcare, London Mayor Ken Livingstone on London congestion charges, some leaders are ‘constraint challengers’ (Keller, 2005) who do not let complexity and controversy act as barriers to action. Nevertheless, all things being equal, addressing wicked problems head on (symptoms and causes) is a higher risk approach. It is the grey areas between these extremes and the factors that can tilt the balance either way (such as leadership, crises) that should be a key focus of future research in this field.

Where To From Here?

What can we infer from the aforementioned argument and analysis if we wish to find ways of tackling wicked policy problems yet political realities are such that the near default is safer, less riskier policies with a ‘placebo’ effect? For the purposes of generating debate, three approaches can be identified (following Bovens and ‘t Hart 1996). The boundaries between them can be blurred but nevertheless they reflect different strands of political discourse.

A pessimistic view is that there is little we can do about wicked problems in the absence of deeper structural changes in society. In a world dominated by entrenched institutions, political coalitions and policy pathways that are difficult to budge, the forces of inertia will always triumph over aspirations to tackle wicked problems. Indeed the forces of inertia may even filter out any such aspirations (as per the ‘mobilization of bias’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1970) and we are left at worst with placebo or tokenistic policies, and at best with policies that do little more than alleviate some of the symptoms of the problem. Unless there are some revolutionary reforms (for example in our core values or in breaking down powerful coalitions) we are destined to do little in tackling wicked policy problems. A pessimistic view from the ‘left’ might argue that poverty is an inevitable product of capitalist dynamics and is insuperable unless we have a revolution in the means of production and exchange. A pessimistic view from the ‘right’ might argue that poverty is an inevitable product of a ‘nanny state’ that impedes individual initiative, and that it is insuperable unless we have unregulated free markets with the role of the state limited to little more than the protection of private property rights.

An optimistic view is that strong, visionary leaders who are ‘constraint challengers’ (Keller 2005) can make a difference. ‘Agents’ can triumph over ‘structure’. They can act as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to champion structural change, articulate bold visions, build new coalitions and not settle for second best or the easy political option. Even if plans go awry (such as Bill Clinton’s healthcare reforms) we can reassemble and try again. Optimism is particularly the discourse of election platforms, but also the

12 language of lobby groups who seek traction for their ideas and policy proposals from visionary leaders.

A pragmatic view offers some hope without being overly optimistic. Progress can made through piecemeal reforms over the years (Lindblom 1977; Rose 2005), even if at times the reforms don’t quite live up to expectations. Powerful coalitions of policy monopolies can break down (Baumgartner and Jones 2009), institutions can transform (Mahoney and Thelen 2010) and we simply need more research and better understanding of the circumstances under which dominant interests break down. Crises and disasters can certainly be one such catalyst for reform, as evident in the post-Fukushima overturning of Japan’s reliance on nuclear energy. Crisis episodes notwithstanding, a pragmatic approach is grounded in the argument we need better knowledge, better consultation, better use of third parties (Head 2008), collaborative leadership (Head and Alford 2015), better steering strategies involving legitimate correction, incentives and enticements, appeals to community values (Head 2010), ore astute framing of the cognitive, communicative, organisational and political challenges (Head 2014).

Wherever we stand on the spectrum, it is clear that further case-study research is needed to ground our analysis, as well as prising open and shining a light on many of the political issues outlined here. Comparative case studies would be particularly useful. We need to explore why some broadly similar wicked problems in different jurisdictions, lead to different responses. Whether the issue is poverty or homelessness, why are some governments relatively more prepared to produce riskier policies that attempt to dig deeper into causal factors? Is that difference marked by strong leadership? Crisis-type circumstances? We also need to explore why different types of wicked problems in different sectors and in different jurisdictions, lead to very similar responses. Whether for example the issues are gender inequality, obesity or alcohol abuse, why are governments generally unprepared to take major risks? Is this convergence due electoral considerations? Or simply the knowledge that they do not wish attention to be drawn way from key reforms in other fields? Whatever, the ‘answer’, there is much still to explore in terms of the politics of wicked problems.

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