Texas National Security Review

Print: ISSN 2576-1021 Online: ISSN 2576-1153

CHANGING THE TOOLS OF POWER Volume 3 • Issue Summer 2020

VOLUME 3 ISSUE 3 SUMMER 2020

MASTHEAD TABLE OF CONTENTS

Staff: The Foundation Publisher: Executive Editor: Associate Editors: Ryan Evans Doyle Hodges, PhD Galen Jackson, PhD 04 Whither War? Van Jackson, PhD Francis J. Gavin Editor-in-Chief: Managing Editor: Stephen Tankel, PhD William Inboden, PhD Megan G. Oprea, PhD

Deputy Managing Editor: Gregory Brew, PhD

Editorial Board: The Scholar

Chair, Editorial Board: Editor-in-Chief: 12 The Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO’s Deterrence Strategy Francis J. Gavin, PhD William Inboden, PhD Luis Simón and Alexander Lanoszka 32 Taming the Lawless Void: Tracking the Evolution of International Law Rules Robert J. Art, PhD Kelly M. Greenhill, PhD John Owen, PhD for Cyberspace Richard Betts, PhD Beatrice Heuser, PhD Patrick Porter, PhD John Bew, PhD Michael C. Horowitz, PhD Thomas Rid, PhD Michael N. Schmitt Nigel Biggar, PhD Richard H. Immerman, PhD Joshua Rovner, PhD Philip Bobbitt, JD, PhD Robert Jervis, PhD Brent E. Sasley, PhD Hal Brands, PhD Colin Kahl, PhD Elizabeth N. Saunders, PhD Joshua W. Busby, PhD Jonathan Kirshner, PhD Kori Schake, PhD Robert Chesney, JD James Kraska, SJD Michael N. Schmitt, DLitt Eliot Cohen, PhD Stephen D. Krasner, PhD Jacob N. Shapiro, PhD Audrey Kurth Cronin, PhD Sarah Kreps, PhD Sandesh Sivakumaran, PhD Theo Farrell, PhD Melvyn P. Leffler, PhD Sarah Snyder, PhD The Strategist Peter D. Feaver, PhD Fredrik Logevall, PhD Bartholomew Sparrow, PhD Rosemary Foot, PhD, FBA Margaret MacMillan, CC, PhD Monica Duffy Toft, PhD 50 Economic Might, National Security, and the Future of American Statecraft Taylor Fravel, PhD Thomas G. Mahnken, PhD Marc Trachtenberg, PhD Sir Lawrence Freedman, PhD Rose McDermott, PhD René Värk, JD David H. McCormick, Charles E. Luftig, and James M. Cunningham James Goldgeier, PhD Paul D. Miller, PhD Steven Weber, PhD 76 Applying Method to Madness: A User’s Guide to Causal Inference in Policy Analysis Michael J. Green, PhD Vipin Narang, PhD Amy Zegart, PhD Jessica D. Blankshain and Andrew L. Stigler 90 Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age Rebecca Hersman Policy and Strategy Advisory Board:

Chair: Adm. William McRaven, Ret.

Hon. Elliott Abrams, JD Hon. James Jeffrey David Shedd Hon. Brad Carson Paul Lettow, JD, PhD Hon. Kristen Silverberg, JD Hon. Derek Chollet Hon. Michael Lumpkin Michael Singh, MBA Amb. Ryan Crocker Hon. William J. Lynn, JD Adm. James G. Stavridis, Ret., PhD The Roundtable Feature Hon. Eric Edelman, PhD Kelly Magsamen Hon. Christine E. Wormuth Hon. John Hamre, PhD Gen. David Petraeus, Ret. 112 Distilling the Essence of Strategy Hon. Kathleen Hicks, PhD Dan Runde Frank G. Hoffman

Designed by Cast From Clay, printed by Linemark The Foundation Whither War?

In the introductory essay to Volume 3 Issue 3, chair of the TNSR editorial board Francis J. Gavin explores whether the nature of war and interstate competition may have changed and how the articles in this issue illuminate the changes.

s the world sunk deeper into a deadly The outstanding articles in this issue have global conflagration in 1941, Princeton caused me to reflect upon what such a volume University professor Edward Meade might look like today (an important task my es- Earle gathered a group of eminent teemed Kissinger Center colleague Hal Brands is scholarsA to discuss the history and practice of mil- actually pursuing). Would these three themes — itary strategy. The seminar eventually produced a the role of individuals and leaders, the complete landmark collection of essays, Makers of Modern socio-economic mobilization by the nation-state Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hit- to prosecute war, and the place of kinetic, physical ler.1 The book, which was updated in 1986 by Peter conflict — serve as the organizing principles for a Paret, quickly became a classic. third edition of Makers of Modern Strategy? Or do Three things in particular are notable about the we need to focus on different factors and forces 1943 volume, which included some of the best mil- that better reflect the nature of contemporary and itary and political historians working in the middle future conflict? part of the 20th century. First is the focus on individ- In some ways, the issues today are quite similar uals: leaders such as Frederick the Great and think- — as a commentator on the original volume point- ers like naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan. The ed out, the goal of the book was to reflect upon the second is an understanding that conflict had become “art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a all-encompassing, dominating every aspect of society. nation or a coalition of nations, to promote and se- Given the total mobilization of World War II, when cure their interests against enemies, actual, poten- every element of the economy, political system, and tial, or presumed.”4 This is as good a definition of even information was tightly controlled and exploited grand strategy as any, and is as applicable today as by the state, this frightening perspective was under- it was in 1943. The interests of key states, however, standable: “When war comes it dominates our lives.”2 and the means of securing those interests, appear Third, the essays focus on the physical elements of quite different in 2020 than in 1943. Instead of re- war: the movement, clash, and material and human flections on the best ways to deploy battleships or destruction between massed groups of men and ma- tanks, the latest analyses of grand strategy focus chines fighting to destroy each other. Certain themes on new tools which are often non-kinetic, such as appear over and over again, across the centuries as cyber weapons and economic warfare. well as across national and ideological lines: The first big shift in the realities of war occurred only a few years after Makers of Modern Strategy Among these are the concept of lightning appeared, when the United States dropped atomic war and the battle of annihilation; the war bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. of maneuver vs. the war of position; the re- The ability to deliver unimaginable destruction in lationship between war and social institu- such a short period and from long distances trans- tions and between economic strength and formed the use of force. As Bernard Brodie pointed military power; psychology and morale as out, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military es- weapons of war; the role of discipline in the tablishment has been to win wars. From now on its army; the question of the professional army chief purpose must be to avert them.”5 For the next Francis J. Gavin vs. the militia.3 eight decades, the strategy of deterrence — using

1 Edward Meade Earle, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert. Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princ- eton: Princeton University Press, 1943). 2 Earle et al., Makers of Modern Strategy, vii. 3 Earle et al., Makers of Modern Strategy, ix. 4 Patrick Garrity, “Makers of Modern Strategy by Edward Mead Earle (1943),” Classics of Strategy and Diplomacy, August 4, 2008, https://www. classicsofstrategy.com/2008/08/makers-of-modern-strategy.html. 5 Bernard Brodie, ed, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New Haven, CT: Yale Institute of International Studies, February 15, 1946), 62, https://www.osti.gov/opennet/servlets/purl/16380564%20p.%2062. This pre-published version appears to have been a copy read and marked up by Dwight D. Eisenhower.

4 5 The Foundation Whither War?

weapons to prevent events like invasion, conquest, dangers of a nuclear crisis through strange, unchart- analytical tools to identify, measure, and evaluate 1945, the place that war plays in most modern coun- or coercion — became the key focus. While coun- ed paths. Asymmetric capabilities may encourage these changes. Jessica D. Blankshain and Andrew tries has decreased substantially. In 1960, 6 percent ter-intuitive and often terrifying, a renaissance in higher risk, or simply blur risk and increase the fog L. Stigler provide a very useful primer on the tools of global GDP went to military expenses. By 2017, it strategy emerged, centered upon sophisticated of war, potentially producing disastrous outcomes. available to social scientists, from game theory to was down to 2 percent.6 Beyond the economic side, analyses of what kinds of weapons, arrayed in what Hersman’s truly original analysis is precisely the statistical analysis to historical case studies. We the number of people involved in state-driven mili- strategies and deployments, would best ensure kind of chapter one would hope to find in a new will need these and other tools to make sense of tary enterprises has fallen as armies and navies have they were never used. This strategic revolution Makers of Modern Strategy. the complex, ever changing world of national and shrunk. Even the United States, which possesses far also generated the intellectual architecture and Similar challenges for strategists exist in the international security. and away the world’s most powerful military, in 2019 policy elements for another novel form of strategy: world of cyber conflict. Michael N. Schmitt argues Has war changed since Earle, Gordon Craig, Hajo only spent 3.4 percent of its GDP.7 Only 0.4 percent negotiated bilateral and multilateral arms control. that the portrayal of cyberspace as the new “Wild Halborn, Robert Roswell Palmer, and others offered of the total population is active duty military.8 The Such agreements sought to decrease the chance West,” a completely unregulated, anything-goes their reflections on the nature of military strategy, historians Paul Kennedy and William McNeill both for the kind of miscalculation and misperception domain, is untrue. The reality is more mixed, and if so, in what ways? The first question would argued that the so-called rise of the modern West that some believed could lead to an unwanted war. though promising. Cyberspace presents a dilem- involve who — or what — constitutes the “mak- was driven by fierce security competition and the These strategies appeared to play a key role in the ma: States and societies are relying on it more for ers” of modern strategy. While there are constant prevalence of war in Europe.9 War and ge- peaceful end of the Cold War and the absence of critical economic, political, and security functions, opolitical competition drove any number of other great-power war ever since. yet cyber attacks and malfeasance are on the rise. profound changes, such as the rise of the modern There are reasons to wonder whether our pe- International law, according to Schmitt, increasing- bureaucratic state, mass education, literacy, pub- riod of new technological transformation and ly provides an important if imperfect tool to help lic health, international finance, and technology. great-power rivalry is challenging the underpin- states establish and solidify norms, express their The connection between war and new techno- nings of the decades-long legacy of deterrence and interests and preferences, and regulate the most logical developments, or war and socio-economic arms control. Luis Simón and Alexander Lanoszka, harmful activities. change, seems far more tenuous today than in for example, highlight the consequences that new In the past, economics was largely seen as a the past. In 2020, Charles Tilly’s observation that precision-guided missiles have had on the strategic means to support a successful military strategy. “war made the state and the state made war” tells environment, particularly in northeastern Europe. The state with the largest industrial economy, that us less than it once did.10 These precision-strike weapons, deployed as part could produce the most steel, coal, and electricity, Does this mean the kind of great-power wars that of an anti-access/area denial strategy, often blur and that could convert those assets into weapons plagued the world in earlier centuries has abated the line between conventional and nuclear envi- that supported military forces, was the one that for good? Scholars such as Bear F. Braumoeller ronments. The collapse of the Intermediate-Range could best prevail in war. For David H. McCor- have cautioned against believing that either Nuclear Forces Treaty revealed how our legacy mick, Charles E. Luftig, and James M. Cunningham, human nature or fierce international compe- arms control concepts and institutions are poor- economics is no longer simply about the means to tition have fundamentally changed.11 As the ly adapted to this new world. Given how exposed support war. Economic dominance is the goal of growing rivalry between the United States and Baltic members in NATO are to Russian power, this great-power competition, and economic tools the certainly great China reveals, great-power competition has not confused environment could be dangerous. best means to achieve that end. In other words, strategic thinkers — and leaders ranging from sev- disappeared. Will these rivalries, however, take dif- It is important to recall that much of the post-1945 future great-power competition is as likely to oc- eral American presidents to China’s President Xi ferent forms? Will the age of kinetic, force-on-force, revolution in military strategy was based upon the cur over the development of new technologies, the Jinping have mattered enormously — one is struck army-on-army battles, highlighted by battleships clear distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear crafting of international economic institutions and by the importance of other variables shaping the and tanks, be replaced by economic statecraft, bat- forces. A considerable amount of intellectual ener- norms, and reserve currency status. This is differ- security environment. Technology, the role of ide- tles in space and in the cyber world, autonomous gy was expended trying to figure out whether and ent from the recent past, when global economic ology, demographics, the move to a post-industri- weapons, and robots? The digital revolution, com- in what ways conflict could still take place under exchange was seen purely through the lens of the al, globalized economy — the tectonic, intensify- bined with the decreasing value of land, shifting the nuclear shadow, and under what circumstances laws of comparative advantage and mutual gain. ing structural forces shaping world order in recent demographics, and changing socio-economics, all — either planned or inadvertent — a conventional The idea that when China sold cheap goods to the decades seem to have outpaced both our ability to under the nuclear shadow, does make the idea of war might escalate into a nuclear conflict. Rebecca United States, citizens in both countries benefited, conceptualize international security and to translate great-power war somewhat unthinkable. And yet… Hersman convincingly demonstrates that the linear is seen as increasingly suspect. McCormick et al. these ideas into policies. Scanning the globe, one sees any number of plac- model of escalation that shaped strategy throughout believe that at least some portions of economic ac- This leads to the second theme of the 1943 volume es where traditional, physical military force retains most of the nuclear age no longer captures the com- tivity need to be understood through the zero-sum — the total mobilization by the nation-state of socie- its threat, as the recent deadly clash between China plex and non-linear dynamics of an international approach of traditional security and geopolitical ty for war. As dangerous as the world has been since and India over the Line of Actual Control reveals. system marked by profound technological change, competition. In their view, China and Russia, with increased security competition, and a fraying global their strategic investments in key technologies and order. Hersman creatively deploys a metaphor from industries, are well ahead of the United States in 6 Max Roser and Mohamed Nagdy, “Military Spending,” Our World in Data, 2013, https://ourworldindata.org/military-spending. physics to highlight what she labels “wormhole the field of state-driven economic strategy. The 7 “The 15 Countries With the Highest Military Spending Worldwide in 2019,” Statista, 2020, https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/coun- tries-with-the-highest-military-spending/. escalation.” Her analysis captures a terrifying and article lays out a series of concrete measures the 8 Mona Chalabi, “What Percentage of Americans Have Served in the Military,” FiveThirtyEight, March 19, 2015, https://fivethirtyeight.com/ underappreciated irony — that the ability of states United States could take, ones that fall short of the features/what-percentage-of-americans-have-served-in-the-military/. (and non-state actors) to use novel, non-kinetic, kind of national economic planning that America 9 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, and sub-strategic tools such as information warfare, eschews but do coordinate and encourage targeted 1987); William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, Il.: University of Chicago Press, 1982). cyber attacks, and economic coercion to target an private sector activity in strategic industries. 10 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990). adversary’s strategic interests actually increases the Needless to say, we need rigorous scholarly and 11 Bear F. Braumoeller, Only the Dead: The Persistence of War in the Modern Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

6 7 The Foundation Whither War?

Can we really rule out a Russian invasion of Esto- nia, or a move by China to take Taiwan by force? And could we rule out a fierce military response by the United States and others? Such a scenario might make the three themes — leaders, total mo- bilization, and physical, material force — danger- ously relevant again. Obviously, these are scenarios we should work hard to prevent from occurring, and their dire potential consequences highlight the continuing importance that deterrence and state- craft play in the world. To that end, let us hope the third edition of Makers of Modern Strategy is written in conditions similar to what we find today, and not the terrifying world faced by Earle and his colleagues in 1943.

Francis J. Gavin is the chair of the editorial board of the Texas National Security Review. He is the Giovanni Agnelli Distinguished Professor and the inaugural director of the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at SAIS-Johns Hopkins University. His writings include Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Re- lations, 1958–1971 (University of North Carolina Press, 2004) and Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Cornell Univer- sity Press, 2012). His latest book is Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy (Brookings Institu- tion Press, 2020).

8 9 10 The Scholar 11

The Scholar

This section is dedicated to publishing the work of scholars. Our aim is for articles published in this journal to end up on university syllabi and policy desks from Washington to Tokyo, and to be cited as the foundational research and analysis on world affairs.

10 11 The Scholar The Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

The demise of the INF Treaty in 2019 raises questions about the future of deterrence in Europe. For more than a decade, Russia has sought to leverage the potential of precision-strike technologies to strengthen its missile arsenal, having developed systems that either violated INF range regulations or were just below the threshold. As the termination of the treaty removes any outstanding legal barriers to the deployment of ground- based, “theater-range” systems, questions related to the missile balance become central to European security. Of particular importance is the Baltic region, where Russia appears to have acquired a position of “local escalation dominance” that could drive a strategic wedge within NATO. In this essay, we assess what a post-INF Treaty context may mean in light of recent NATO efforts to deter Russia. We argue that the introduction of ground- based, theater-range missiles could help NATO restore the local strategic balance in the Baltic region, thereby strengthening deterrence and helping to create the necessary leverage to get Russia back into meaningful arms control talks in the future.

recision-guided technologies, once con- in Europe and East Asia. In Europe specifically, fined to the United States and its allies, ever since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, have become increasingly available to a debate has unfolded around Moscow’s short- other countries, including Russia and and medium-range missiles, and their potential to China.P Those specific countries have leveraged undermine regional deterrence.2 Russia has been such technologies to acquire military capabili- consistently investing in precision-strike systems ties like precision-guided anti-ship, anti-aircraft, since the mid-2000s. In so doing, it has added to its land-attack, and anti-satellite cruise and ballistic growing arsenal of advanced land-based missiles in missiles.1 Accordingly, many observers and analysts Kaliningrad and its Western Military District, as worry about the sustainability of U.S. deterrence well as several sea- and air-launched missiles as-

1 See, Thomas G. Mahnken, “Weapons: The Growth and Spread of the Precision Strike Regime,” Daedalus 140, no. 3 (Summer 2011): 45–57, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23047347. For another view regarding U.S. military superiority, see, Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “Why China Has not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage,” International Security 43, Luis Simón no. 3 (Winter 2018/19): 141–89, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00337. 2 Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge,” Survival 58, no. 2 (2016): 96, https://doi.org/10. 1080/00396338.2016.1161906; Luis Simón, “The ‘Third’ US Offset Strategy and Europe’s ‘Anti-access’ Challenge,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 3 (2016): 417–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1163260; Fabrice Pothier, “An Area-Access Strategy for NATO,” Survival 59, no. 3 (2017): 73–80, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1325600; Robert Dalsjö, Christofer Berglund, and Michael Jonsson,Bursting the Bubble: Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency [FOI], 2019); Alex- Alexander Lanoszka ander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, Conventional Deterrence and Landpower in Northeastern Europe (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2019); and Keir Giles and Mathieu Boulegue, “Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities: Real and Imagined,” Parameters 49, no. 1-2 (Spring/Summer 2019): 21–36.

13 The Scholar The Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

signed to the Kaliningrad-based Baltic Fleet and land demonstrates that older NATO members have Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has ruled out their strategic and technological autonomy should elsewhere. Complementing these capabilities are “skin” in the local deterrence game.8 Nevertheless, nuclear-tipped missiles, but has implicitly allowed think harder about developing ground-based, Russia’s efforts to modernize and expand its mis- bringing those combat aircraft and long-range for the possibility of conventional missiles being theater-range missile capabilities. sile defense system, aimed at both strengthening missiles to bear could be profoundly escalatory deployed.10 We specifically make the case for the This essay proceeds as follows. We begin with a Russian defenses in case of Western retaliation and because Russia will almost certainly reject NATO deployment of ground-based, land-attack, theat- discussion of how missiles matter for deterrence, securing a missile architecture that can perform of- precision-strikes in its territory. Moreover, that the er-range, road-mobile conventional missiles in arguing that their importance will grow in Europe fensive functions. Critically, the termination of the local missile balance favors Russia raises questions Europe.11 These missiles can hold at risk Russian (and, for that matter, East Asia) given the prolifer- Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in about NATO’s ability to bring airpower into the assets, whether in Kaliningrad or elsewhere, while ation of precision-strike technologies and the de- 2019 — which had prohibited land-based missiles theater. At worst, the evolving missile balance in pushing Russia to make costly investments aimed mise of the INF Treaty. We then examine the evolu- with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers — the Baltic region gives Russia local escalation dom- at trying to improve its own capabilities. Such a tion of the European missile balance since the end removes any possible barriers to Russia fully ex- inance, thereby undermining deterrence. At best, move would help restore the local strategic bal- of the Cold War, focusing mainly on NATO’s north- ploiting its technological advances to deploy more the perception of Russian local escalation domi- ance in a post-INF context, thus creating leverage eastern flank, and assess how the local missile theater-range missiles on land.3 nance — and Moscow’s sustained efforts to decou- to get Russia back into meaningful arms control balance affects NATO’s deterrence posture in that Theater-range missiles constitute the center- ple local, regional, and global levels of deterrence talks in the future. Moreover, as COVID-19 will region. We go on to propose several measures that piece of what many observers describe to be Rus- — will drive a wedge within the alliance, enabling likely take a toll on defense spending, NATO will are now available to NATO and the United States sia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy in the Russia to behave more aggressively even without be compelled to look for cost-efficient solutions to for addressing existing deterrence gaps in the new Baltic region.4 The purpose of Russia’s short- and engaging in traditional military operations.9 Simply deterrence. Ground-based, theater-range missiles post-INF environment. Specifically, we argue in medium-range missile architecture in this area put, Russia can leverage its improved missile capa- may be cheaper than existing alternatives such as favor of deploying ground-based, theater-range — and the broader A2/AD strategy it purportedly bilities not only to sever Europe from North Amer- additional F-35s or Rafales. missiles in Europe and discuss their advantages supports — is to interdict efforts by the United ica in security terms, but also European countries The fact that Washington has begun to think vis-à-vis other missiles and how they may relate States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization from each other. How should NATO respond? about the potential role of ground-based, theat- to other elements of NATO’s deterrence strategy. (NATO) allies to enter and to operate in the air and We make two claims in this essay. First, whatever er-range missiles in strengthening deterrence in We also address potential counterarguments to maritime space across the region. Put differently, our feelings regarding the A2/AD concept, Russian East Asia could lead to important synergies, in that their deployment. In the conclusion, we discuss if Russia were to try to take the Baltic countries, advances in deploying theater-range missiles mean some of the technologies and systems developed how the debate over ground-based, theater-range NATO would have to pay a prohibitively high price that the Baltic region is likely to remain a contest- could also be used in a European context. For ex- missiles may tie in to the debate over transatlantic in trying to burst the Russian A2/AD bubble.5 Rus- ed environment. NATO countries would pay dear- ample, upgrading U.S. Army programs like the Mul- burden-sharing and identify a number of relevant sia thus aims to undermine the credibility of the ly in defending against conventional aggression if tiple Launch Rocket System and the High Mobility questions going forward. deterrence guarantees that the United States and, deterrence were to fail. The three Baltic countries Artillery Rocket System with longer-range missiles to a lesser extent, Western Europe have extended of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania might receive re- such as the U.S. Army’s Tactical Missile Sys- to Eastern European allies, while shifting the local inforcements in the event of war, but they still have tem could offer relatively fast and cost-efficient Deterrence Theory, Missiles, strategic and political balance in its favor. incentives to prepare for contingencies lest those solutions to close the local missile gap in the Baltic and the INF Treaty Some experts have raised skepticism about Rus- reinforcements are slow to arrive or suffer high at- region. However, any NATO response to Russia’s sian capabilities and strategy, whereas the broad- trition rates. Second, and critically, NATO defense local missile advantage should be as collective and Because our argument centers on how ground- er utility of the A2/AD concept has been subject to planners should reconsider the missile balance, widely distributed as possible. In this regard, Po- based, theater-range missiles can enhance deter- mounting criticism in both Asia and Europe.6 To be which is likely to become the center of gravity of land’s plans to introduce the above systems means rence, it is helpful to review what is the theoretical sure, Russia’s A2/AD bubble is not impenetrable.7 deterrence and security in Europe in a post-INF that upgrades to them could pave the way for a motivation underpinning this mission. Put plainly, The promise of NATO — and, in particular, U.S., and maturing precision-strike context. Our main European contribution to NATO’s theater-range deterrence aims at preventing an adversary from British, and French — air-to-ground and ship- and contribution is to examine how theater-range mis- missile capabilities.12 Moreover, allies located with- using military force to revise the status quo. The submarine-launched missiles partly offsets any lo- siles could help strengthen deterrence in NATO’s in range of Russian missiles can also play an im- scholarly literature on deterrence can be broken cal advantages Russia may have in the Baltic re- northeastern flank — that is, Poland and the three portant role by hosting missiles in their territories, down into three waves.13 The first wave grappled gion. Moreover, NATO’s recent decision to deploy Baltic countries — by giving NATO more inter- ensuring their own security and, in the case of Ger- with the advent of nuclear weapons following the multinational battalions in the Baltic states and Po- mediate options on the deterrence ladder. NATO many and Poland at least, even taking part in the end of World War II. In this period of nuclear unipo- future development of theater-range missile sys- larity, deterrence theory was largely detached from 3 “Theater-range missiles” refer to those missiles that are based in the theater of operations in question — Europe in this case — and can reach tems. Beyond such measures, those more capable policy discussions. The second wave of deterrence different targets within that very theater. Theater-range missiles thus include short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles. The latter two were Western European allies that are eager to assert theory — its purported golden age — ran until the covered by the INF Treaty. 4 See, footnote 2. 10 “Secretary General: NATO Response to INF Treaty Demise Will Be Measured and Responsible,” NATO, Aug. 2, 2019, https://www.nato.int/ 5 Pothier, “An Area-Access Strategy for NATO.” cps/en/natohq/news_168177.htm. Other types of missiles, including anti-ship or anti-air missiles, could complement these missiles. However, we 6 See, e.g., Giles and Boulegue, “Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities”; Michael Kofman, “It’s Time to Talk About A2/AD: Rethinking the Russian Military confine our analysis to ground-based missiles, especially because the termination of the INF Treaty permits their possible deployment in Europe. Challenge,” War on the Rocks, Sept. 5, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/its-time-to-talk-about-a2-ad-rethinking-the-russian-military- 11 Given the unwieldiness of this phrase, we use “ground-based, theater-range missiles” as an imprecise shorthand in its place. challenge/; John Richardson, “Deconstructing A2/AD,” The National Interest, Oct. 3, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chief-naval-opera- tions-adm-john-richardson-deconstructing-17918; and B.J. Armstrong, “The Shadow of Air-Sea Battle and the Sinking of A2/AD,” War on the Rocks, 12 Allen Cone, “Lockheed Awarded $492.1M to Produce HIMARS for U.S., Poland, Romania,” UPI, July 16, 2019, https://www.upi.com/De- Oct. 5, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/the-shadow-of-air-sea-battle-and-the-sinking-of-a2ad/. fense-News/2019/07/16/Lockheed-awarded-4921M-to-produce-HIMARS-for-US-Poland-Romania/7991563279020/. 7 Dalsjö, Berglund, and Jonsson, “Bursting the Bubble.” 13 In recent years, a so-called fourth wave in deterrence theory has focused on non-traditional areas, addressing such questions as how to deter non-state actors or how to achieve deterrence in cyberspace. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” Contem- 8 “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence: Factsheet,” NATO, May 2017, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pd- porary Security Policy 31, no. 1 (2010): 1–33, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523261003640819; Uri Tor, “‘Cumulative Deterrence’ as a New Paradigm f_2017_05/1705-factsheet-efp.pdf. for Cyber Deterrence,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 1-2 (2017): 92–117, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115975. On the differ- 9 See, Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “Back to the Future? Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, Revolutions in Military Affairs, and Cold War Comparisons,” NATO ent waves in deterrence theory, see, Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289–324, https://doi. Defense College, Research Paper No. 120 (October 2015). org/10.2307/2009945; and Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment (London: Aldwych Press, 1982), 15–17.

14 15 The Scholar The Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

end of the 1960s. Building on the problems and as- dress the problem of extended deterrence — that regarding the status quo despite intentions being should be considered when examining their de- sumptions identified during the previous wave, the is, those situations aimed at deterring an adver- extremely difficult to divine.19 Just because noth- terrence relationship with Russia.23 And so, in as- second wave became inextricably tied to policy dis- sary from attacking one’s allies.14 Because the So- ing happened does not mean deterrence worked. sessing the missile balance in NATO’s northeast- cussions, as the Soviet Union’s development of nu- viet Union achieved nuclear parity with the United For example, some scholars argue that deterrence ern flank, we highlight its broader functional and clear weapons and delivery systems compelled U.S. States by the early 1970s, the association between was not operative in Europe during the Cold War geographical connections. decision-makers to think about deterrence in a bi- successful deterrence and having intermediate because the Soviet Union never contemplated Missiles and missile defense systems come in polar context characterized by parity or near pari- options between doing nothing and declaring all- launching a surprise invasion of Western Europe.20 many forms. Missiles vary on the basis of their ty. Scholars like Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, out war gained traction in U.S. strategic circles.15 Nevertheless, because we do not know whether means of propulsion, type of trajectory, range, or Hermann Kahn assumed a rational actor model This consideration produced the notion of limited the Soviet Union would not have attacked West- and payload. With respect to propulsion, three and applied game theory to nuclear strategy. With nuclear war and other warfighting doctrines, thus ern Europe in the absence of NATO and any for- different types of missiles exist. Ballistic missiles the focus mostly on the deterrence relationship be- heralding a shift in deterrence thinking toward ward-deployed military forces, we cannot dismiss are rocket-propelled before following a largely tween the two superpowers, deterrence revolved denial strategies that are based on the ability and the possibility that deterrence was psychologically unpowered, parabolic, and free-falling trajecto- around the threat of punishment, and — more spe- willingness to fight effectively against adversar- in effect. From a planning perspective, deterrence ry toward their target. Jet engines propel cruise cifically — that of mutual assured destruction. ies.16 Of course, punishment strategies remained theory thus remains a guide for thinking about missiles, which, although they are normally slow- in place as the ultimate threat at the top of crisis prevention and management under circum- er, are more maneuverable than ballistic missiles the escalation ladder. Yet, theorists paid more stances of profound uncertainty. because of their constant propulsion. Hypersonic attention to escalation at lower levels of con- The military balance factors into the cost-ben- boost-glide weapons are initially powered by a bal- flict that might arise from adversaries prob- efit analysis that underpins deterrence. In this listic missile or a rocket booster but largely glide ing extended deterrence commitments. De- essay, we address the missile balance in Europe, on a non-parabolic trajectory. They are also more terrence-by-punishment thus co-exists with focusing specifically on how it may affect deter- maneuverable than ballistic missiles, although deterrence-by-denial:17 The former threatens rence in NATO’s northeastern flank. The missile slower. Missiles can be ground-launched (deliv- to inflict unacceptable costs in one fell swoop, balance refers to the missile capabilities — both ered from a silo or mobile platform), air-launched whereas the latter implements measures that offensive and defensive — of two states or coali- (delivered from an aircraft), or sea-launched (de- would make a given action operationally difficult to tions. Since missiles pertain to the air domain, the livered from a submarine or destroyer). Regard- execute and prohibitively costly. Denial is often the missile balance is intimately linked to the airpow- ing range, there are four different categories of default option for the weaker party in a deterrence er balance, which, in turn, affects the broader mil- missiles: short range (less than 1,000 km), medi- relationship because the weaker party presumably itary balance that underpins deterrence relation- um range (1,000–3,000 km), intermediate range has fewer options for counter-escalation, encour- ships.21 Yet, the particularities of missiles warrant (3,000–5,500 km), and intercontinental (traveling aging it to use asymmetric means to raise the per- giving the missile balance a separate treatment. more than 5,500 km). Missiles can also vary in ceived costs of an attack. Likewise, the specificities of NATO’s northeastern their guidance systems, especially if they are di- To simplify the theory in light of these waves flank — buffered from the southeastern flank by rected at moving targets. A final, relevant category of scholarship, deterrence is operative when sev- Belarus and Ukraine and delimited in the north relates to payload and yield. Missiles are capable eral conditions hold.18 First, the deterring state by the Baltic Sea and non-NATO partners Sweden of delivering conventional or nuclear payloads, or communicates which actions involving military and Finland — makes it deserving of individual both. Warheads themselves can also vary by yield, force are unacceptable. Second, the deterring analytical treatment, especially given its proximi- with some new high-yield conventional missiles state indicates its ability and willingness to ty to Russia’s power base.22 However, the military now being developed in the United States.24 Mis- The third wave developed in reaction to the sec- impose prohibitively high costs only if the ad- balance, much less the missile balance, in NATO’s siles that have trouble overcoming enemy defens- ond by trying to remedy its perceived gaps. It chal- versary engages in those unacceptable actions. northeastern flank cannot be isolated from the es are less effective for deterrence, whereas those lenged the assumption of rationality and empha- Third, the adversary judges that the likely costs broader regional or even global balance of power that do not are more effective because they poten- sized the psychological, cultural, and other real-life for using force are unacceptable and so refrains between NATO and Russia. Ultimately, deterrence tially hold at risk assets that the adversary values. factors that make deterrence inherently complex. from the proscribed behavior. rests on the promise that any of the parties can Accordingly, missile defense systems themselves In doing so, it focused on empirical analysis rather Deterrence theory has been subject to intense engage in some form of escalation, which means feature different characteristics with regard to than abstract modeling. Importantly for our pur- criticism on analytical grounds, not least because it that all the capabilities possessed by the United the type and range of the missile it is intercept- poses, this wave of deterrence theory sought to ad- hinges on the adversary having certain intentions States and its allies (both in Europe and globally) ing (strategic, theater, or tactical), the trajectory

19 See, e.g., Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); and Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models,” World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 497–538, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010486; and David M. Edelstein, “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs About Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers,” Security Studies 12, no. 1 (Autumn 2002): 1–40. 14 Paul K. Huth, “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” American Political Science Review 82, no. 2 (June 1988): 423–43, https://doi. org/10.2307/1957394. 20 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 157–81, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2152358. 15 Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1987), 157. 21 Lebow and Stein, “Deterrence and the Cold War,” 13. 16 See, Colin S. Gray, “War-Fighting for Deterrence,” Journal of Strategic Studies 7, no. 1 (1984): 5–28, https://doi. org/10.1080/01402398408437174. 22 See, Luis Simón, “Assessing NATO’s Eastern European ‘Flank,’” Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn 2014): 67–79. 17 For a seminal discussion on denial and punishment, see, Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security 23 On NATO’s limited escalation options, see, Michael Fitzsimmons, “Horizontal Escalation: An Asymmetric Approach to Russian Aggression?” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961). Strategic Studies Quarterly 13, no. 1 (Spring 2019): 95–133, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26585376. 18 See, Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Deterrence 24 Bruce M. Sugden, “Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” International Security 34, no. 1 (Summer 2009): Theory: Where Do We Stand?” Review of International Studies 37, no. 2 (April 2011): 741–62, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000896. 121–23, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.34.1.113.

16 17 The Scholar The Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

phase where the interception occurs (boost, mid- ship feared that U.S. modernization efforts could The Evolving Missile Balance Iskander-M variant is mounted on ground-based course, or terminal phase), and whether the inter- lead to a first-strike capability.30 That NATO went in Northeastern Europe transporter erector launchers and has a range of up ception takes place inside or outside the Earth’s forward with its missile deployments despite do- to 500 km, thereby extending Russia’s missile reach atmosphere.25 mestic opposition demonstrated a strong polit- Despite the so-called peace dividend of the 1990s to cover the Baltic states in their entirety as well Throughout the Cold War, the missile bal- ical will on the part of the alliance’s leaders to that the INF Treaty helped bring about, concerns as much of Poland. Ground, air, and sea platforms ance was central to the East-West competition pursue deterrence.31 In the end, the pressure of about the missile balance slowly regained salience could launch Kalibr missiles to ranges up to 1,500 and to deterrence in Europe. Although missiles Western precision-strike capabilities on the So- in the early 2000s. Because that agreement was km, reaching almost as far as the United Kingdom if favor offense over defense, the notion that de- viets helped pave the way for the signing of the confined to the United States and Russia, China those platforms are based in Kaliningrad.37 The re- fending against them would be too costly and INF Treaty between the Soviet Union and the was able to develop the capabilities covered by cent deployment of the 9M729 Iskander-M variant difficult meant that they posed an effective de- United States in 1987, subsequently making the the INF Treaty in order to strengthen its strate- in brigades belonging to Russia’s Western Military terrent. Indeed, the Soviet Union decided ear- missile balance much less important in Europe- gic position in East Asia. And so, beginning in the District deepened concerns about the country’s ca- ly in the Cold War to develop ballistic missiles an security discussions. late 2000s, U.S. defense experts started to worry pabilities, partly because this nuclear-capable mis- rather than bombers for its nuclear deterrent.26 The INF Treaty prohibited the signatories from that China’s exemption from the INF Treaty and sile does not follow a ballistic flight path, instead Its deployment of the intermediate-range ballis- developing and fielding medium- and interme- its efforts to incorporate precision-strike systems pursuing an evasive flight path that could allow it to tic SS-20 missile caused tensions with NATO be- diate-range, land-based missiles regardless of into its military were allowing the country to de- defeat missile defense systems.38 cause the intermediate-range missile exclusively whether they were armed with a nuclear weapon. velop an A2/AD envelope in East Asia, thereby un- These developments have impacted European posed a risk to targets in Europe, thereby threat- Air- and sea-launched missiles, however, were still dermining America’s strategic position in the re- security in two ways. The first is that, according to ening to decouple NATO allies from the United permitted. Moreover, by excluding intercontinen- gion and eroding regional deterrence.34 In Europe, many observers, these new missiles have enabled States. Beseeched by allies like West Germany, tal missiles from its prohibitions, the INF Treaty relations between Russia and the West worsened Russia to erect an A2/AD bubble around Kaliningrad. which worried about the quality of U.S. extended preserved mutual deterrence while removing Eu- over the course of the 2000s, with each side blam- As Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias nuclear deterrence, and after much intense de- rope’s status as a key battleground or bargaining ing the other for causing tensions. Russian lead- note, “[b]y emplacing highly capable and long- bate within the alliance, the United States and chip in U.S.-Soviet relations. From Moscow’s per- ers protested NATO enlargement and decried the range anti-air, anti-shipping and surface-to-surface NATO adopted the Dual-Track Decision in 1979. spective, the INF Treaty made strategic sense.32 decision of the Bush administration to withdraw missiles in … the Kaliningrad enclave … Russia can The Dual-Track Decision called for deploying the The Soviet Union could not keep pace with the from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 — a deny NATO forces the use of large areas of the sea ground-based Pershing II ballistic missiles and U.S.-led precision-strike revolution given the eco- move that the United States said was necessary for and air surrounding, and even within, the Alliance’s the longer-range BGM-109G Gryphon cruise mis- nomic difficulties and bureaucratic paralysis it confronting new missile threats from countries like territory.”39 For the Baltic countries, this develop- siles while pushing for a mutual limit on such was experiencing in the 1980s. It became too vul- Iran. For their part, the United States and its NATO ment raises the prospect of a fait accompli much intermediate forces.27 This decision was hugely nerable to the precision-strike systems that would allies saw in Russia an increasingly authoritarian, like what Russia was able to achieve with its an- controversial among European publics at the allow the United States to “see deep” and “strike revisionist power willing to weaponize energy sup- nexation of Crimea in 2014. NATO reinforcements time. Nevertheless, thanks to the effective in- deep” into Eastern European territory.33 With the plies in neighborly disputes and perpetuate frozen would find defending the Baltic countries simply tegration of their technological advantages in INF Treaty, the United States would no longer be conflicts in territories that were once part of the too difficult of a proposition. The second is that by electronics, computing, the Global Positioning able to target Soviet (and later Russian) territo- Soviet Union.35 violating the INF Treaty and developing the 9M729 System, and stealth, the United States and its ry with missiles positioned on European soil. The Most alarmingly, at a time when European de- missile (NATO codename: SSC-8 “Screwdriver”), allies were able to develop precision-strike sys- extended nuclear deterrence mission never went fense budgets remained low, Russia used its natural Russia acquired an even greater missile advantage tems, thereby outpacing the Soviet Union in mil- away, even after the Soviet Union collapsed. Still, gas revenue to fund major increases in its military and pushed the United States to withdraw from itary-technological terms.28 These developments in subsequent years, thanks largely to advances spending in the 2000s. This uptick in defense ex- the treaty. Russia had already developed the 9M720 worried the Soviet Union: The progressive con- in precision-strike technologies and capabilities, penditures facilitated Russian advances in preci- missile (the SS-26 “Stone”) from the earlier OTR- solidation of precision-strike technologies un- the United States became so vastly superior to sion-guided missiles, including the 9K720 Iskander 23 (the SS-23 “Spider”) design — missiles which derscored the growing importance of conven- its potential adversaries in terms of conventional and the Kalibr cruise missile family. The land-based were just under the threshold of the INF Treaty.40 tional military power for deterrence and, more military power that deterrence could be assumed. Iskander was already being designed in the 1990s, The concern surrounding the SSC-8 is that it en- specifically, that of missiles.29 The Soviet leader- finally entering into service in 2007, and has since ables Russia to strike military reinforcement-re- featured prominently in military exercises.36 The lated infrastructure and European capitals at a

25 For a more comprehensive discussion on missile defense, see, Thomas Karako, ed., Missile Defense and Defeat: Considerations for the New Policy Review (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017). 34 See, e.g., Thomas G. Mahnken, “China’s Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 3 (2011): 299–323, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.574971; and Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s 26 Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 4–5. Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security 38, no. 4 (Spring 2014): 115–49. 27 Leopoldo Nuti, “The Origins of the 1979 Dual Track Decision – A Survey,” in The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 35 For a discussion on U.S. deterrence strategy in an era of great-power competition, see, Elbridge Colby, “Against the Great Powers: Reflections on 1975–1985, ed. Leopoldo Nuti (London: Routledge, 2009). Balancing Nuclear and Conventional Power,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 1 (November 2018): 144–52, http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/864. 28 See, e.g., Mahnken, “Weapons.” To be sure, Russia still had about 360 SS-20s opposite to NATO at the time, each with three nuclear war- 36 Some observers argue that Russia may aim to inflict “prescribed or ‘dosed’ … levels of damage” against opponents. See, Dave Johnson, “Russia’s heads. Thus, it was well above the number of NATO Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces warheads. Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds,” Livermore Papers on Global Security, no. 3 (February 2018): 46. 29 Mary C. FitzGerald, “Marshal Ogarkov on the Modern Theater Operation,” Naval War College Review 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1986): 6–25, https:// 37 Tor Bukkvol and Roger N. McDermott, Russia in the Precision-Strike Regime — Military Theory, Procurement, and Operational Impact (Oslo: digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol39/iss4/3/. See also, Amy Wilson, “Computer Gap: The Soviet Union’s Missed Revolution and Its Impli- Norwegian Defence Research Agency [FFI], 2017), 11–14. cations for Russian Technology Policy,” Problems of Post-Communism 56, no. 4 (2009): 41–51, https://doi.org/10.2753/PPC1075-8216560404. 38 For a discussion of Russia’s evolving missile capabilities as they relate to the INF Treaty, see, Douglas Barrie, “Allegation, Counter-Allegation 30 Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 18. and the INF Treaty,” Survival 59, no. 4 (2017): 35–43, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1349768. For an overview of how missile forces have 31 We thank Lt. Gen. (ret.) Ben Hodges, U.S. Army, for this point. evolved in the post-Cold War context, see, Ian Anthony, “European Security After the INF Treaty,” Survival 59, no. 6 (2017): 61–76, https://doi.org/10 .1080/00396338.2017.1399728. 32 See, e.g., Mahnken, “Weapons.” 39 Frühling and Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD, and the Kaliningrad Challenge,” 96. 33 Justin V. Anderson and Amy J. Nelson. “The INF Treaty: A Spectacular, Inflexible, Time-Bound Success,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (Summer 2019): 97–98, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13_Issue-2/Anderson.pdf. 40 We thank Diego Ruiz Palmer for this point.

18 19 The Scholar

greater distance, thereby increasing Russia’s ability Warsaw announced it would acquire eight Patriot to intimidate NATO members into accepting faits batteries by 2025, with two delivered within three accomplis on the alliance’s northeastern flank.41 years of a final deal.45 The Polish Ministry of De- Controversy over whether the SSC-8 could use the fense announced in March 2018 a $4.75 billion ground-based Iskander-M launcher in Europe has deal to purchase and co-produce a mix of air and thus stoked fears that Russia could threaten NATO missile defenses comprising two layers, known as allies with INF-prohibited weapons.42 Wisła and Narew. Currently in its first phase of de- To be sure, the United States and its European velopment, Wisła would include a version of Ray- allies do bring some missile and missile defense theon’s SkyCeptor missiles and several Patriot Ad- capabilities to bear in the Baltic region. In Sep- vanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement tember 2009, President Barack Obama announced interceptors. The exact system to be used for the Despite concerns about the European Phased Adaptive Approach — a plan Narew short-range air defense program is yet to designed to protect Europe against Iranian medi- be decided, but, if approved, it could involve low- um- and intermediate-range missiles.43 It consists er-cost interceptors that would replace Poland’s Russia’s theater-range of sea- and land-based configurations of the Aegis Soviet-era missile systems.46 Poland’s capabilities missile defense system, the centerpiece of which constitute an important foundation for NATO’s ef- is the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3).44 The Integrat- forts to respond to Russia’s theater-range missiles. missiles, scholars and ed Air and Missile Defense system can also help Still, missile defense is very costly and may have address the Russian missile threat more directly, limited effectiveness against the SSC-8. Non-NATO but it largely comprises radar facilities of varying member Finland has also invested in short-range analysts increasingly doubt quality that serve to augment military surveil- anti-ship missile capabilities, whereas Sweden has lance over NATO airspace. Because the European expanded its air missile defense system coverage Phased Adaptive Approach was not explicitly de- to extend over the island of Gotland in the Baltic whether the A2/AD bubble signed with Russia in mind, and the Integrated Air Sea.47 Finally, NATO also relies on U.S., British, and and Missile Defense system helps primarily with French conventional air-to-ground and ship- and detection and tracking, Poland has strengthened submarine-launched missiles in order to deter Rus- is as robust as often alleged. its own missile defense capabilities to contribute sia from using its theater-range missiles in north- to NATO missile defenses in theater. In April 2015, eastern Europe.

41 Heinrich Brauss and Christian Mölling, “Europas Sicherheit ohne INF-Vertrag: Politische und strategische Handlungs- optionen für Deutschland und die NATO,” DGAP Kompakt, no. 1 (2019): 2. 42 See, Alexander Lanoszka, “The INF Treaty: Pulling Out in Time,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (Summer 2019): 54, https://www.airuniver- sity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13_Issue-2/Lanoszka.pdf. See also, Jacob Cohn et al., Leveling the Playing Field: Reintroducing U.S. Theater-Range Missiles in a Post-INF World (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019); and Evan Braden Montgomery, Extended Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2016). Alarm over China’s grow- ing missile forces in the Asia-Pacific also played a role in President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the INF Treaty. Not being party to the treaty, China was able not only to close the missile gap with the United States and Russia, but also to field over 2,000 missiles that hold at risk both U.S. partners and U.S. military assets in Asia. See, Debalina Ghoshal, “China and the INF Treaty,” Comparative Strategy 35, no. 5 (2016): 364–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2016.1240982. On how the United States can address China’s missile threat in the Western Pa- cific, see, Thomas G. Mahnken, “Countering Missiles with Missiles: U.S. Military Posture After the INF Treaty,” War on the Rocks, July 16, 2019, https:// warontherocks.com/2019/07/countering-missiles-with-missiles-the-u-s-military-after-the-inf-treaty/. 43 Jaganath Sankaran, The United States’ European Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System: Defending Against Iranian Missile Threats Without Diluting the Russian Deterrent (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 4. 44 The European Phased Adaptive Approach comprises three phases. Phase 1 consists of a radar in Turkey, a command center at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, and four ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 interceptors that will patrol primarily in the Med- iterranean and be home ported in Rota, Spain. Phase 2 features a land-based SM-3 interceptor or Aegis Ashore site in Romania to protect against incoming medium-range missiles. Phase 3 will see the deployment of an SM-3 interceptor or Aegis Ashore site in Poland to intercept longer-range missiles. Phases 1 and 2 have been operational since 2012 and 2016 respectively, whereas Phase 3 is expected to be operational by 2020 instead of the original 2018 target. Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel cancelled a fourth phase given budgetary constraints and the mounting need to strengthen ballistic missile defense in Asia in light of North Korea’s advancements in missile technology. See, David M. Herszenhorn and Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Cancels Part of Missile Defense that Russia Opposed,” New York Times, March 16, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/ world/europe/with-eye-on-north-korea-us-cancels-missile-defense-russia-opposed.html. This phase would have entailed an advanced SM-3 Block IIB interceptor whose function would have been to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles. 45 “Poland,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, June 26, 2018, https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/intl_cooperation/poland/. 46 We thank Marek Świerczyński for this observation. Rafał Lesiecki, “Wisła i Patrioty za 4,75 mld dolarów. Kontrakt podpisany,” Defence24, March 28, 2018, https://www.defence24.pl/wisla-i-patrioty-za-475-mld-dolarow-kontrakt-podpisany; and Matthew Kroenig, “Poland’s Missile Defenses Are Critical for the Defense of Europe,” Defence24, Sept. 19, 2019, https://www.defence24.com/polands-missile-defenses-are-critical-for- the-defense-of-europe-opinion. 47 Corporal Frisk, “A Further Look at the Gabriel 5,” Corporal Frisk – Analysis and Consulting, July 16, 2018, https://corporalfrisk.com/2018/07/16/ a-further-look-at-the-gabriel-5/; and “The Swedish Defence Commission Presents Its White Book on Sweden’s Security Policy and the Development of Its Military Defence,” Swedish Ministry of Defence, May 14, 2019, https://www.government.se/articles/2019/05/the-swedish-defence-commis- sion-presents-its-white-book-on-swedens-security-policy-and-the-development-of-its-military-defence/. For a pre-2014 review of European missile defense capabilities, see, Keir Giles and Andrew Monaghan, European Missile Defense and Russia (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014).

20 The Scholar The Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

Despite concerns about Russia’s theater-range volving Russia or China,” but argues that Russia tial role of theater-range missiles in strengthening the potential and pitfalls of theater-range missiles missiles, scholars and analysts increasingly doubt faces a deeper naval challenge than NATO.54 If Kof- deterrence in key regions.57 East Asia has so far been in an East Asian context is likely to spill over to whether the A2/AD bubble is as robust as often al- man is right that Russia’s war plans involve theat- the main focus of this debate: China’s growing theat- Europe, not least because the development and leged. Indeed, whether analysts focus on Europe or er-strike weapons that could destroy critical nodes er-range missile arsenal and North Korea’s nuclear fielding of such systems might encourage their de- East Asia, an emerging consensus holds that the very in adversaries’ command-and-control structures, and missile programs have raised questions about ployment in multiple regions. concept of A2/AD is deeply problematic. With re- then war over the Baltics would still be ugly, howev- U.S. extended deterrence guarantees.58 Many U.S. Despite the lack of discussion about new ground- gard to Europe, a recent Swedish Defense Research er unlikely. The A2/AD concept certainly should not officials and experts contend that long-range strike based, theater-range missile deployments, Europe Agency report shows that Russian air defense sys- imply impenetrability and immobility — indeed, capabilities underscore Washington’s global esca- has not been idle since 2014. In the past six years, tems are limited in their ability to detect, track, and military competition has always been about deny- lation dominance, offsetting China’s theater-level NATO has adopted several measures to reassure its shoot down aircraft at high altitudes and long rang- ing access and movement to an adversary. Instead, advances and guaranteeing deterrence.59 Yet, others Central and Eastern European members in addition es.48 Alexander Lanoszka and Michael Hunzeker, as the A2/AD concept should denote that costs must worry that the lack of in-theater capabilities to bal- to enhancing deterrence in the Baltic region.62 Such well as Keir Giles and Mathieu Boulegue, argue that be paid in order to operate in a particular theater.55 ance Chinese (or North Korean) military power may measures have included the Very High Readiness Kaliningrad is more of a liability for Russia than an For a state implementing an A2/AD strategy, these lead some U.S. allies to fear decoupling and alliance Joint Task Force, an uptick in joint military exercis- asset precisely because the exclave can be isolated.49 costs serve to deter external aggression. Alterna- abandonment.60 Unsurprisingly, the debate over es, a bolstering of the Baltic Air Policing mission, and NATO could develop its own A2/AD capabilities to tively, if a state has offensive motives, systems theater-range missiles in East Asia is mixed up with the multinational battlegroups that make up the en- complicate Russia’s ability to reinforce Kaliningrad. that have A2/AD characteristics raise the costs for political considerations. Though some experts and hanced Forward Presence in Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Michael Kofman directly challenges the very notion states that are otherwise expected to defend allies policymakers in the region understand the strategic and Lithuania. More recently, NATO has revamped that the development of A2/AD capabilities is central that fall within the very range of those systems. logic of deploying these missiles, domestic politi- its command structure following the April 2019 to Russian military planning.50 From a force planning perspective, an improved cal opposition remains high, especially in Austral- adoption of its new military strategy (MC400/4).63 Nevertheless, even if NATO can burst the A2/AD understanding of Russia’s capabilities and approach ia, Japan, and South Korea.61 But as the European This military strategy emphasizes horizontal escala- bubble does not mean that the price of doing so to war does not fundamentally alter the strategic experience from NATO’s 1979 Dual-Track Decision tion and the imperatives of a theater-wide approach would be low or even politically acceptable. Giles needs and problems facing NATO and the Baltic suggests, these attitudes may yet change or prove to so as to further improve the alliance’s readiness, and Boulegue observe that Russian A2/AD systems countries. The same strategic dilemma remains: be surmountable. responsiveness, and reinforcement capacity for are vulnerable to saturation, but acknowledge NATO may have global escalation dominance, or In Europe, the debate over the possible deploy- addressing the challenge from Russia. In adopting that “casualty-averse Western forces must expose even regional escalation dominance if we consider ment of theater-range missiles is much less ad- such measures, NATO has sought to signal that it themselves to risk and the likelihood of losses.”51 Europe as a whole, but Russia still has local esca- vanced. This lack of serious discussion may be due will consider any attack on a single or a few of its Still, this scenario assumes that escalation will re- lation dominance in the Baltic region. Indeed, with to diverging European perceptions about the Rus- allies as an act of aggression against the entire al- main under control despite the possibility of nu- its missile strategy, Russia’s aim is to decouple local sian threat as well as the fact that Russia’s arsenal liance, and will respond to it with a wide variety of clear exchange. Amid concerns that Russia has an deterrence from regional and global deterrence. of theater-range missiles is more limited than Chi- actions across the entire Euro-Atlantic area. Not- escalate-to-de-escalate strategy, whereby it would na’s and that NATO enjoys much greater strategic withstanding these improvements, Russia’s widen- threaten limited nuclear use in order to deter mil- depth in Europe than the U.S.-led alliance system ing missile advantage creates major gaps in NATO’s itary intervention, NATO countries might become The Potential Role for Ground-Based, does in East Asia. Nevertheless, the worsening of deterrence posture and could foster the perception reluctant to get involved in a major crisis with Rus- Theater-Range Missiles in Current NATO-Russia relations, growing awareness about in the Kremlin that it can aggress with relative impu- sia.52 As such, the Baltic countries still have incen- NATO Strategy Russia’s newer military capabilities and their im- nity in the Baltic region. tives to invest in deterrence-by-denial capabilities pact on the Baltic region, and the termination of How can ground-based, theater-range missiles — specifically, insurgency tactics that can attrite Recognizing the growing strategic importance of the INF Treaty call for greater debate within NATO serve NATO’s deterrence strategy in the Baltic re- Russian forces over a protracted period — rath- missiles, the U.S. Army has set to rebuild its artillery on how theater-range missiles may enhance deter- gion? To begin with, relying on theater-range mis- er than assume that reinforcements would come arm for large-scale warfare after decades of neglect.56 rence. Additionally, the ongoing discussion about siles poses fewer problems than relying largely on quickly.53 Kofman admits that “the [A2/AD] concept Indeed, the demise of the INF Treaty has sparked has utility when looking at a maritime theater in- intense debate in the United States about the poten- 57 See, e.g., Jim Thomas, “Why the US Army Needs Missiles: A New Mission to Save the Service,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 3 (May/June 2013): 137–44, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-04-03/why-us-army-needs-missiles; David W. Kearn Jr. “The Future of US Deterrence in East Asia: Are Conventional Land-Based IRBMs a Silver Bullet?” Strategic Studies Quarterly 7, no. 4 (Winter 2013): 93–116, https:// 48 Dalsjö, Berglund, and Jonsson, “Bursting the Bubble,” 31. www.jstor.org/stable/26270779; Shahryar Pasandideh, “The End of the ‘INF Treaty’ and the US-China Military Balance,” The Nonproliferation Review 26, no. 3-4 (2019): 267–87, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2019.1646466. 49 Lanoszka and Hunzeker, Conventional Deterrence; and Giles and Boulegue, “Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities,” 26. 58 See, e.g., Lionel P. Fatton, “‘Japan Is Back’: Autonomy and Balancing Amidst an Unstable China-U.S.-Japan Triangle,” Asia & the Pacific Policy 50 Kofman, “It’s Time to Talk.” Studies 5, no. 2 (May 2018): 264–78, https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.240. 51 Giles and Boulegue, “Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities,” 25–26. 59 Inwook Kim and Soul Park, “Deterrence Under Nuclear Asymmetry: THAAD and the Prospects for Missile Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” 52 Analysts are divided as to whether Russia really has such a strategy. See, Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “The Myth of Russia’s Lowered Nuclear Contemporary Security Policy 40, no. 2 (2019): 165–92, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2018.1558750. Threshold,” War on the Rocks, Sept. 22, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-russias-lowered-nuclear-threshold/; and Katarzyna 60 See, e.g., Cohn et al., Leveling the Playing Field. For allied views on abandonment, see, e.g., Stephan Frühling, “Managing Escalation: Missile Zysk, “Escalation and Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Military Strategy,” The RUSI Journal 163, no. 2 (2018): 4–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.201 Defence, Strategy and US Alliances,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (January 2016): 81–95, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12501; and Benjamin 8.1469267. For a useful overview of post-Soviet Russian nuclear thinking, see, Michael Kofman, Anya Fink, and Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russian Strategy for Schreer, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and the Future of US Conventional Extended Deterrence in East Asia (Part I),” The Strategist (Australian Stra- Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts,” CNA, April 2020, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DRM-2019-U-022455-1Rev.pdf. tegic Policy Institute), Sept. 21, 2012, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/abandonment-entrapment-and-the-future-of-us-conventional-extended-de- 53 Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, “Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial and Precision Strike Challenge in the Baltic Region,” terrence-in-east-asia-part-i/. The RUSI Journal 161, no. 5 (2016): 12–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253367; and Lionel Beehner and Liam Collins, “Can Volunteer Forces 61 Benjamin Schreer, “After the INF: What Will US Indo-Pacific Allies Do?” Washington Quarterly 43, no. 1 (2020): 143–57, https://doi.org/10.108 Deter Great Power War? Evidence from the Baltics,” Journal of Strategic Security 12, no. 4 (2019): 50–68, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.4.1747. 0/0163660X.2020.1736885. 54 Kofman, “It’s Time to Talk.” See also, Corporal Frisk, “The True Face of the Baltic Fleet,” Corporal Frisk – Analysis and Consulting, Oct. 12, 2019, 62 On NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures in relation to Russia since 2014, see, Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “A Strategic Odyssey: Constancy https://corporalfrisk.com/2019/10/12/the-true-face-of-the-baltic-fleet/. of Purpose and Strategy-Making in NATO, 1949-2019,” National Defense College, Research Paper no. 3 (June 2019), http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/ 55 Luis Simón, “Demystifying the A2/AD Buzz,” War on the Rocks, Jan. 4, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/demystifying-the-a2ad-buzz/. news.php?icode=1330; and Sara Bjerg Moller, “Building the Airplane while Flying: Adapting NATO’s Force Structure in an Era of Uncertainty,” Nation- al Defense College, Policy Brief no. 11 (May 2019), http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1315. 56 See, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Rebuilds Artillery Arm for Large-Scale War,” Breaking Defense, April 27, 2020, https://breakingdefense. com/2020/04/army-rebuilds-artillery-arm-for-large-scale-war/. 63 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.

22 23 The Scholar The Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

air and sea combat assets based in Western Europe advantages in land warfare near its borders. This Russian naval assets in the Baltic Sea at risk.68 ing possible, there will be growing pressure to find or on U.S.-based ICBMs. The reason is simple: A plan does not hold at risk what Russia values, and Ground-based, theater-range missiles comple- cost-efficient solutions to deterrence.71 gap exists between NATO capabilities already in misses important changes in how Moscow sees the ment NATO’s ground presence in another way. NATO Ground-based, theater-range missiles also have a theater (i.e., four multinational battalions and an character of modern warfare.”65 Though Kofman countries are unable and unwilling to provide the useful role to play in the strategic competition pres- embryonic missile-defense architecture) and the overlooks the assurance that ground forces can conventional forces in Poland and the Baltic region ently unfolding between the United States and Rus- promise of long-range air and missile power. The provide to allies that host them, his critique does needed to deny Russian armed forces victory on the sia. The biggest worry revolving around the enhanced extreme downsizing of military forces in post-Cold highlight gaps in NATO’s deterrence posture.66 battlefield. Meanwhile, the Baltic countries them- Forward Presence battlegroups is their imperma- War Europe has hobbled conventional deterrence Deploying ground-based, theater-range missiles selves are dwarfed by Russia’s capabilities and face nent nature. Russia will always be a neighbor and in part because the alliance has few counter-at- could complement the NATO ground presence in massive manpower and tack options. For example, a U.S. brigade could northeastern Europe. As one recent report high- budgetary limitations such take at least two weeks to arrive in Europe from lights, “ground-launched theater-range missiles that they cannot develop a the United States, thereby leaving allies vulnerable could hold high-value enemy targets at risk while suite of denial capabilities to territorial faits accomplis.64 Given the lack of a helping U.S. air and naval forces obtain access to against Russia.69 Western serious military footprint in northeastern Europe, hotly contested battlefields, thereby contributing European countries may this gap means that NATO has no intermediate op- to military operations in challenging warfighting be larger and much richer, tions, forcing the alliance to take a significant esca- scenarios.”67 Ground-based missiles have certain but their own militaries have latory leap in order to deter further aggression by advantages over sea-launched and air-launched been hollowed out by under- Russia in a crisis. An additional problem concerns missiles. If dispersed and well-hidden, road-mobile spending in the post-Cold the assumption that air reinforcements based in transporter erector launchers can complicate tar- War period, overstretched across Western Europe would be able to get into theater. geting by creating uncertainty about their location, multiple missions around the Unfortunately, they may encounter sufficient re- thereby requiring Russia to track and monitor their globe, or both.70 Ground-based, sistance from Russia’s theater-range missiles so as movements. Russia cannot simply target airfields theater-range missiles offer a to discourage them from being dispatched in the or naval bases. Moreover, the European theater of- deterrence solution that can be strategically attrac- so may be biding first place. This problem may be mitigated as F-35 fers much more territorial depth for ground-based tive and, comparatively speaking, politically feasible its time for complacency to develop within NATO. It fighter jets come online, but Russia could poten- missiles than East Asia, where the maritime envi- since it would not involve Western European gov- can simply wait out these deployments. However, a tially learn to identify these stealth aircraft with ronment is more of a constraining factor to their ernments paying for a forward ground presence. deployment of ground-based, theater-range missiles data collected from S-400s sold to Turkey if those deployment. To be sure, sea-launched missiles can Moreover, the fact that the United States is going in northeastern Europe could address this issue in air-defense systems become activated. be effective deterrents, especially if very quiet sub- to develop such missiles suggests that there will be two ways. The first is that missiles can complement Ground-based, theater-range missiles would also marines carry them. The problem with these mis- significant economies of scale, making them rela- existing deterrence measures in a more durable close the gap in another way. Current NATO de- siles is not so much the so-called discrimination tively attractive from a cost perspective. For NATO manner and at a relatively low cost. Depending on terrence measures have largely been premised on problem, whereby Russia would be unsure wheth- allies in Europe, these missiles represent a solution the force package, a missile force — based, for ex- “contact warfare” with Russia. Shortly after the er an incoming missile is carrying a conventional that is cheaper than alternatives such as the F-35 or ample, in western Poland — could have a small foot- annexation of Crimea, the United States began weapon or a nuclear one, but that surface warships Rafale fighters. Indeed, cost-efficiency is likely to be print yet boast an outsized punch. NATO could then to pre-position military hardware in the region armed with them can be tracked once deployed to an increasingly important consideration in light of range and hold at risk Russian targets on a perpetu- for possible use by ground forces in some future the region. For their part, surface warships carry- the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic impact. al basis. Even if the United States prioritizes China contingency. Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit, ing sea-launched missiles need to be outside the Although it may be too early to assess the implica- and prepares to fight only a single major war against NATO countries agreed to create the enhanced range of opposing defenses in order to be most ef- tions of the novel coronavirus, it is relatively safe that great-power competitor, these missiles could Forward Presence, deploying a multinational bat- fective. Finally, strategic bombers by their nature to assume that the question of trade-offs between help the United States address key deterrence chal- talion-sized battlegroup to each of the Baltic coun- do not represent an intermediate option: Countries policy priorities (including in defense) will become lenges that persist in the European context.72 The tries and Poland. The United States also rotates may be reluctant to deploy theater bombers and increasingly acute. With cuts to defense spend- second is that these deployments can pressure Rus- an armored brigade combat team and additional other delivery aircraft lest they suffer high attri- forces in Poland while pouring money into various tion rates due to anti-aircraft systems positioned infrastructure projects aimed at improving logisti- in Kaliningrad and elsewhere in Russia’s supposed 68 On the evolving naval balance in the Baltic Sea as it relates to the broader strategic balance in the Baltic region, see, Heinrich Lange et al., cal links between local allies. Yet, some critics ar- A2/AD bubble. We make the case specifically for “To the Seas Again: Maritime Defense and Deterrence in the Baltic Region,” International Centre for Defense and Security (April 2019), https://icds. gue that such measures are too tethered to land. land-attack missiles because it is in the land do- ee/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICDS_Report_To_the_Seas_Again_Lange_Combes_Jermalavicius_Lawrence_April_2019.pdf). As Kofman writes, “proposing to engage Russian main where Russia’s missile advantage is clearest 69 Lanoszka and Hunzeker, Conventional Deterrence. forces in contact warfare, a metal-on-metal ground and most relevant to the local balance. That said, 70 See, e.g., Christian Mölling, “Europe Without Defence: The States of Europe Have to Re-evaluate the Interrelationship Between Political Sovereignty, Military Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comment 2011/C 38 fight, is not a good strategy. Russia holds a lot of anti-ship missiles still have much value in holding (November 2011), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/europe-without-defence/; and Daniel Keohane, “Is Britain Back? The 2015 UK Defense Review,” CSS Analyses in Security Policy, no. 185 (February 2016): 1–2, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/ center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalysen-185-EN.pdf. 71 For preliminary analyses of how COVID-19 might impact defense, see, David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Five Ways the U.S. Military Will 64 Robert C. Owen, “US Air Force Airlift and the Army’s Relevance,” Parameters 47, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 103–12. Change After the Pandemic,” War on the Rocks, April 28, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/five-ways-the-u-s-military-will-change-af- ter-the-pandemic/; and Daniel Fiott, “Will European Defence Survive Coronavirus?” Elcano Royal Institute, March 27, 2020, http://www.realinsti- 65 Michael Kofman, “Permanently Stationing U.S. Forces in Poland Is a Bad Idea, but One Worth Debating,” War on the Rocks, Oct. 12, 2018, tutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/commentary-fiott-will-european-de- https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/permanently-stationing-u-s-forces-in-poland-is-a-bad-idea-but-one-worth-debating/. fence-survive-coronavirus. 66 See, Michael Allen Hunzeker and Alexander Lanoszka, “Landpower and American Credibility,” Parameters 45, no. 4 (Winter 2015–16): 17–26, 72 See, Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery, “One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great Power Competition,” Texas https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3711.pdf. National Security Review 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020), https://tnsr.org/2020/03/one-war-is-not-enough-strategy-and-force-planning-for-great-power- 67 Cohn et al., Leveling the Playing Field, ii. competition/.

24 25 The Scholar The Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

threaten those critical elements of Russia’s missile cal Missile System missiles.79 Whether France, the and A2/AD architecture, including missile nodes as United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, or Spain would well as relevant command-and-control, intelligence, consider procuring the current or extended range surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Indeed, the version of the Army Tactical Missile System re- quantitative requirements may not be very high if mains unclear. Nevertheless, European allies that the missiles can disrupt Russia’s war plans.76 Crit- are procuring the Multiple Launch Rocket System ically, if the positioning of NATO theater-range, and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System with ground-based, land-attack conventional missile Army Tactical Missile System missiles, like Poland batteries overlapped with U.S. and Polish Patriot or Romania, would benefit from any potential up- surface-to-air missile deployments in Poland, then grades. Additionally, those European allies located those batteries would be less vulnerable to a Russian within range of Russian missiles can also play an im- first strike. A broader question relates to whether portant role by hosting missiles on their territories NATO theater-range missiles could be linked to an so as to enhance their own security. Such hosting upgrading of the Multiple Launch Rocket System arrangements could be analogous to existing nucle- and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System with ar-sharing arrangements in Western Europe — ar- longer-range missiles, such as the U.S. Army’s Tacti- rangements that serve to reassure those partners cal Missile System.77 Currently, the Block 1A missile while enhancing NATO’s deterrence and war-fight- that this last system uses has a 300 km range, but ing capabilities.80 Allies like Germany and Poland the U.S. Army is funding development of a version can also participate in the (co)development of that could exceed 500 km.78 Linking such systems theater-range missile systems. Moreover, given how together would make clear that the upgrade is tac- the post-INF and maturing precision-strike context tical and non-nuclear in nature, thereby increasing highlights the centrality of the missile balance for the chances of the deployments being politically ac- European security, European allies with greater ceptable to NATO members. To be sure, any such technological expertise and aspirations of strategic upgrades would require examining the associated autonomy should think harder about the potential surveillance, targeting, cueing, command-and-con- of theater-range missiles. Thus, for instance, France, trol, and communications capabilities. It would also the United Kingdom, or even Germany may need to require determining which level of NATO command think about developing European theater-range mis- sia to invest in costly missile-defense and targeting states — will not be forced to exhaust their combat would have authority to engage such missiles fol- siles in order to lessen their technological depend- systems, rather than power projection capabilities.73 power quickly by trying to burst the A2/AD bubble lowing decisions by the North Atlantic Council, be ency on the United States. Such deployments could help improve the current from within. It is in this regard that surface-to-ship it the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Joint strategic balance by forcing Russia to move from a missiles can, for example, also punch through any Force Commander, or NATO Air Command, as part largely offensive strategy toward a more defensive blockade that Russia might try to impose on a Baltic of an integrated air campaign. Rebutting Potential one and increasing U.S.-NATO bargaining leverage city from the sea. None of this is to imply that NATO European allies are far behind in the development Counter-Arguments in future arms control talks. At present, Russia has must match Russia capability for capability with re- of ground-based, theater-range missiles, with rele- no incentives to engage in such negotiations, where- gard to the missile balance.75 However, NATO can vant programs in France and the United Kingdom Critics might advance at least two sets of objec- as NATO itself has few concessions it can make mitigate the risk of decoupling and thus strength- having been suspended decades ago. Accordingly, tions to our argument. The first is that missiles since its eastern members will never agree to a deal en deterrence in the Baltic region. It should prior- a U.S.-led solution appears to be the only realistic would undermine strategic stability and so further that could directly jeopardize their security. A new itize the missile balance in-theater and complement way for NATO to close the local missile gap with worsen relations with Russia, and that new mis- dual-track process may thus be helpful.74 its missile defense efforts with the deployment of Russia in the short term. Several NATO allies (in- sile deployments would unleash an arms race that The operational value of ground-based missiles is theater-range, ground-based, land-attack, road-mo- cluding France, Germany, Italy, and the United King- would destabilize European security. The second is twofold in the Baltic region. The first is that, in the bile conventional missiles in northeastern Europe, dom) have the Multiple Launch Rocket System, but that new missile deployments would severely dam- opening phases of a military confrontation, theat- as well as anti-ship missiles that can hold off the only Greece, Turkey, and the United States have the age NATO cohesion at a time when discord already er-range missiles can knock out air defense systems Russian navy in the Baltic Sea. Doing so would help Army Tactical Missile System. For their part, Poland characterizes the alliance. located in Kaliningrad and other missile hubs in Rus- create a layered series of defensive fires that would and Romania plan to introduce both the Multiple First, consider the argument that missiles would sia’s Western Military District so as to allow NATO make the Baltic region a difficult target for conven- Launch Rocket System and the High Mobility Ar- undermine strategic stability.81 According to Thom- reinforcements to have more freedom to maneuver. tional aggression or military coercion. tillery Rocket System launchers with Army Tacti- as Schelling and Morton Halperin’s formulation, The second is that local allies — especially the Baltic NATO ought to deploy just enough missiles to

76 We thank Toshi Yoshihara for this observation. 73 Brands and Montgomery, “One War Is Not Enough.” Of course, depending on where in Europe NATO would station these new missiles, they 77 We thank Diego Ruiz Palmer for raising this important point. could also be targeted by Russian precision-strikes. In fact, Russia might prefer attacking them to intercepting them in flight with air defenses. 78 Author’s communication with NATO official, March 27, 2020. Allies should also consider the possibility of deploying ground-based, theater-range missiles in Western Europe. 79 The Military Balance 2020 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2020), 73. 74 On the difficulties of arms control in the present environment, see, Artur Kacprzyk and Łukasz Kulesa, “Dilemmas of Arms Control: Meeting the Interests of NATO’s North-Eastern Flank,” International Centre for Defence and Security (April 2020), https://icds.ee/dilemmas-of-arms-con- 80 David S. Yost, “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” International Affairs 85, no. 4 (July 2000): 759–61, https://www.jstor.org/ trol-meeting-the-interests-of-natos-north-eastern-flank/. These authors similarly argue that NATO should consider new ground-based, the- stable/27695089. ater-range missile deployments. 81 See, e.g., Tom Countryman and Kingston Reif, “Intermediate-Range Missiles Are the Wrong Weapon for Today’s Security Challenges,” War on 75 Comprehensive coverage against the cruise missile threat would also be prohibitively costly. the Rocks, Aug. 13, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/intermediate-range-missiles-are-the-wrong-weapon-for-todays-security-challenges/.

26 27 The Scholar The Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

strategic stability is a situation in which neither to instability in the European system and endanger thus far.87 To counter such narratives in the future, NATO’s cohesion. After all, many of the deterrence side in a conflict has the ability to launch a dis- the security of Eastern European states. A decisive NATO should remind its public that Russia was re- and defense measures currently being implement- arming first strike against the other.82 This fear of — while still proportional — response on the part sponsible for violating the INF Treaty, and that any ed on the northeastern flank do not have a NATO attack can be especially dangerous if war seems of NATO could, in fact, help lead to an arms control new deployments are intended to rectify the imbal- stamp. These measures include U.S. rotational likely. However, many analysts worry about Rus- agreement because of the added pressure it would ance that currently favors Russia. Still, to echo the deployments to Poland, growing security linkages sian intentions precisely because Russia might put on Russia. As noted above, one reason why the Dual-Track Decision of 1979, NATO should pledge between Poland and the Baltic states, increased se- have the ability to launch such an attack on those Soviet Union agreed to the INF Treaty was because that it is open to reversing the deployments pro- curity cooperation between Sweden and Finland, NATO members located on the alliance’s north- the United States and its NATO allies had leverage vided that Russia returns to arms control negotia- and an expansion of Nordic-Baltic ties.89 Ground- eastern flank. Even if Russia may not go so far as over it. Accepting an unfavorable missile balance de- tions in good faith. based, theater-range missile deployments could launching such an attack, its suite of missile capa- prives NATO of the ability to even attempt to recover A second objection that critics might raise is that reinforce NATO’s agenda even if done outside of bilities could give it the confidence to behave ag- that lost leverage while making arms control agree- new missile deployments would damage NATO the alliance’s remit, while giving political cover to gressively at levels that would not trigger Article ments tantamount to unilateral disarmament. cohesion at a time when it is already under major those allies that would have rejected such meas- 5.83 Far from granting NATO the ability to launch Still, some critics may argue that new missile de- duress from within. With President Donald Trump ures. Any NATO allies that decline to support the a bolt-out-of-the-blue strike, new missile deploy- ployments would further undermine, if not antago- exhibiting an aversion to NATO amid an intense deployment of ground-based conventional missiles ments in Europe would complicate Russia’s abil- nize, relations with Russia. They could cause Mos- dispute over collective burden-sharing, NATO can may have to consider expanding their own arsenal ity to undertake faits accomplis by creating new cow to fear escalation even more, in a manner that ill afford another controversy.88 The reasoning here of air-to-surface missiles that would be compati- sources of risks and expanding the set of liabilities destabilizes European security. Moscow would is that new missile deployments will be contro- ble with the F-35 and other similar platforms. Still, that Russia would incur. Indeed, the deployment likely argue that any stated restrictions placed on versial because even frontline allies will not want even these capabilities cannot be acquired in isola- of conventional missiles will not dramatically af- the new missile deployments — whether in terms them deployed in their country and might, in fact, tion from others. Countries going down this path fect the nuclear balance, if at all. One 2019 estimate of their range, payload, or some other character- resist them, while those less concerned by Russia would still have to contemplate the implications holds that “Russia has a stockpile of roughly 4,490 istic — lack believability. To prevent such deploy- would fear being dragged into a war that they do this sort of strategy would have for intelligence, nuclear warheads assigned for use by long-range ments from happening, Moscow could engage in not want to fight. Even though some frontline al- surveillance, and reconnaissance; suppressing en- strategic launchers and shorter-range tactical nu- a campaign of political warfare against members lies like Poland might be reluctant to accept missile emy air defenses; and air-to-air refueling. Moreo- clear forces” in addition to having over 1,800 war- of NATO. However, worries about how Russia deployments initially, they might feel compelled to ver, they would still have to wrestle with the arms heads assigned to nonstrategic and defensive forc- might respond should not be overblown. The fear in order to enhance deterrence of Russia. After all, control implications of the dual-capable nature es.84 Conventional military deployments of the sort of nuclear escalation remains an effective deter- an ally cannot complain of being vulnerable to a of some of these systems, to say nothing of their we propose would thus not undermine Russia’s rent mechanism such that the existence of viable Russian attack while rejecting measures that would questionable appropriateness for dealing with Rus- ability to deter NATO at higher levels of violence. intermediate options in the form of conventional help reduce that very vulnerability. To do so could sian ground missiles.90 Theater-range missiles could even enhance stra- theater-range missiles lends greater credibility to lead the United States to doubt the sincerity of its tegic stability because they would ensure mutual the threat of nuclear war. In current NATO strat- ally’s threat assessments. Still, threat perceptions vulnerability — something that arms control ad- egy, however, a yawning gap exists between the within NATO do vary. Not every member considers Conclusion vocates themselves endorse. Russian missiles are tripwire-like forces represented by the enhanced Russia to be the alliance’s main threat. Some might already enveloping large swaths of NATO territory Forward Presence battlegroups at the tactical level even value Russian cooperation and so would re- The missile balance has become central to deter- within their ranges — theater-range missiles would and the possibility of full conventional or nuclear ject measures that could be seen as provocative. rence and security in contemporary Europe. The simply level the playing field. retaliation at the strategic level. This gap exists pre- But blaming missiles for any intra-alliance discord demise of the INF Treaty and Russia’s embrace of Some critics may similarly worry that an arms race cisely because Russia has already been developing would put the horse before the cart since diver- the precision-strike paradigm have allowed Mos- would be destabilizing. Yet, Russia is already building an arsenal of theater-range missiles, some of which gent threat perceptions already exist. Alliance co- cow to consolidate a position of local escalation up its arsenal. It may be doing so for defensive pur- were prohibited by the now-defunct INF Treaty. Fi- hesion might still unravel if certain members feel dominance in the Baltic region. In order to rem- poses, but NATO defense planners cannot be certain nally, NATO countries should assume that Russia that they cannot get the strong security guarantees edy that situation, we make the case that NATO of this in light of Russia’s behavior in recent years.85 would wage political warfare to forestall any new they need and must remain vulnerable because the ought to deploy ground-based, land-attack, theat- Still, arms races are an inherent feature of strategic measures implemented by the alliance. Russia be- sensibilities of other allies would be otherwise of- er-range, road-mobile conventional missiles in competition: If one party refuses to counter a move, gan broadcasting disinformation with the goal of fended. Simply put, Russian missiles are what drive Europe. Such a move would enhance deterrence it gives the other party an edge, thereby endanger- damaging public support for the enhanced For- disagreements within NATO — not U.S. missiles. and help restore strategic stability between NATO ing strategic stability.86 Accordingly, NATO’s failure to ward Presence battlegroups when they were first That said, new missile deployments on NATO and Russia in a post-INF Treaty context, with the respond to Russia’s INF Treaty violation could lead set up in the Baltic region, albeit with little effect soil would ideally have alliance consensus. Absent chance to give NATO the necessary leverage to such a consensus, however, states interested in force Russia back into arms control negotiations. theater-range missile deployments could seek out The deployment of ground-based, theater-range 82 Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), 9. extra-alliance solutions that limit the damage to missiles in Europe should be limited and propor- 83 See, Alexander Lanoszka, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Europe,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (January 2016): 175–95, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12509. 84 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 2 (2019): 73–74, https://doi.org/ 87 Alexander Lanoszka, “Disinformation in International Politics,” European Journal of International Security 4, no. 2 (June 2019): 227–48, 10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2019.6. 85 For a relatively benign view of Russia’s military program, see, Bettina Renz, Russia’s Military Revival (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2018). Debates 88 On how Trump’s criticisms of NATO may have paradoxically reinvigorated the alliance, see, James Sperling and Mark Webber, “Trump’s For- regarding high-precision weapons in Russia have tended to examine defensive scenarios, but the line between offensive and defensive operations eign Policy and NATO: Exit and Voice,” Review of International Studies 45, no. 3 (July 2019): 511–26, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210519000123. may become increasingly blurred and may be in the eyes of the beholder. See, Roger N. McDermott and Tor Bukkvoll, “Tools of Future Wars—Russia Is Entering the Precision-Strike Regime,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 31, no. 2 (2018): 191–213, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2018.1451097. 89 Luis Simón, Alexander Lanoszka, and Hugo Meijer, “Nodal Defence: The Changing Structure of US Alliance Systems in Europe and East Asia,” Journal of Strategic Studies (2019): 1–29, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1636372. 86 See, e.g., Bradford Lee, “Strategic Interaction: Theory and History for Practitioners,” in Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History and Practice, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012): 28–46. 90 We thank Diego Ruiz Palmer for raising this important point.

28 29 The Scholar The Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

tional. It ought to be confined to the conventional Luis Simón is professor of international security domain so as to eliminate any misunderstand- at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels and director of the ings that the missiles could be nuclear-tipped.91 Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute. He is In terms of targeting, these missiles should be re- also an associate fellow at the Baltic Defense Col- stricted to those critical elements of Russia’s mis- lege, and a member of the editorial board of Param- sile and A2/AD architecture, including both missile eters: The US Army War College Quarterly. Luis re- nodes as well as relevant command-and-control, ceived his Ph.D. from the University of London and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance held a postdoctoral fellowship at the Saltzman Insti- assets. Further research should examine what tute for War and Peace Studies at Columbia Univer- kind of posture would provide the right balance sity. His research has appeared in journals such as between restoring stability and avoiding an es- Security Studies, International Affairs, the Journal calation spiral. Greater attention should also be of Strategic Studies, Geopolitics, and Survival. paid to questions related to the appropriate mix of defensive and offensive missile capabilities in Alexander Lanoszka is assistant professor of NATO’s strategy, corresponding changes to the al- international relations at the Department of Polit- liance’s command-and-control architecture, how ical Science and the Balsillie School of Internation- these debates relate to Europe’s contribution to al Affairs at the University of Waterloo. He is the its own security, and questions of transatlantic author of Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics burden-sharing. of Nuclear Proliferation (2018), policy monographs Indeed, U.S. defense planners and analysts have on Taiwan and the Baltic region, as well as articles already been thinking about the potential strate- in journals such as International Security, Inter- gic role of ground-based, theater-range missiles national Affairs, Security Studies, and the Journal in East Asia. How these policy discussions unfold of Strategic Studies. He received his Ph.D. from will have implications for U.S. defense strategy in Princeton University. Europe. For these and other reasons, an upgrade of existing U.S. Army programs would arguably Acknowledgements: A previous version of this constitute the fastest and most reliable way for article was presented at an expert workshop con- NATO to develop a theater-range missile capabili- vened by the Swedish Defense Research Agency in ty. However, greater involvement from other Euro- Stockholm on Dec. 6, 2019. The authors would like to pean allies would make NATO’s response to Rus- thank Raul Nuevo for his research assistance and sia’s missile advantage collective and more widely Rimas Alisauskas, Jordan Becker, Robert Dalsjö, distributed across the alliance, thereby increasing Darrell Driver, Jacek Durkalec, Michael Jonsson, the shared risk and by extension enhancing de- Karl Mueller, Diego Ruiz Palmer, Elie Perot, Toshi terrence. European allies located within range of Yoshihara, two anonymous reviewers, and the Tex- Russian missiles can also play an important role as National Security Review editors for their sug- by hosting missiles on their territories so as to im- gestions and feedback. prove their own security. Moreover, their partici- pation in current U.S. missile programs means that Photo: Latonja Martin, U.S. Navy allies like Poland or, potentially, Germany, could collaborate with the United States on the (co)de- velopment of theater-range missile systems. More broadly, for initiatives regarding European strate- gic autonomy to have any impact, both Western and Central European states should invest in the development of advanced theater-range missile capabilities, perhaps even drawing on the Euro- pean Defence Fund to finance their development and to demonstrate that E.U. defense initiatives are in line with NATO’s deterrence needs.92

91 Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 92 On the need for greater complementarity between the technological-industrial and strategic pillars of European defense, and how that relates to E.U.-NATO relations, see, Luis Simón, “EU-NATO Cooperation in an Era of Great-Power Competition,” George Marshall Fund, Policy Brief no. 28, November 2019, https://www.gmfus.org/publications/eu-nato-cooperation-era-great-power-competition.

30 31 The Scholar Taming the Lawless Void: Tracking the Evolution of International Law Rules for Cyberspace

The myth that cyberspace is a legal Wild West has been roundly rejected by states and scholars. As cyberspace norms evolve, states will advocate interpretations of existing international law rules that advance their national interests. In this regard, states are treating international law rules as normative firewalls that safeguard their interests by deterring malevolent behavior. At the same time, states are interpreting the rules in a manner that maximizes their response options when facing hostile cyber operations.

n February 2020, Adm. Mike Gilday, the of Governmental Experts charged with identifying U.S. chief of naval operations, observed consensus norms for cyberspace failed to agree on that “We’re not fighting an enemy that peo- including references to such fundamental aspects ple can see … And we’re not fighting a war of international law as “self-defense” and “interna- whereI international norms exist. But make no mis- tional humanitarian law” in its report due to oppo- take, we are in conflict day-in and day-out in the cy- sition from Russia, China, Cuba, and several other ber realm.”1 His remarks came on the heels of U.N. states. Yet, those same states embraced other rules Secretary-General António Guterres’ pronounce- of international law and had earlier signaled their ment that “We … must usher in order to the Wild acceptance of both self-defense and humanitarian West of cyberspace,”2 a characterization of that do- law in the 2015 Group of Governmental Experts main utilized by President Barack Obama five years report.5 The next year, the U.K. attorney general earlier when he remarked, “The cyber world is sort disputed the existence of an international law rule of the wild, wild West. And to some degree, we’re prohibiting the violation of another state’s sover- asked to be the sheriff.”3 eignty by cyber means, a rule of long lineage that Gilday, Guterres, and Obama were not suggest- was previously widely understood to apply to cy- ing that cyberspace is a legal void. Both the United ber operations. However, in the same speech, he Nations and the United States have emphasized endorsed other key international law rules such as international law’s applicability to cyber conflict.4 the prohibition on cyber intervention into another However, their statements could be understood as state’s internal affairs and the right to self-defense suggesting that international law might not be up against severe cyber attacks.6 to the task of governing cyberspace. Meanwhile, hostile cyber operations are on the This apparent skepticism has been exacerbat- rise, in both frequency and severity. Recall, for in- ed by the practice of some states to “cherry-pick” stance, the use of cyber operations during the amongst the international law rules that govern armed conflict with ISIL, the WannaCry attack that cyberspace. In 2017, for instance, the U.N. Group hobbled the National Health Service in the United

1 Naomi VanDuser, “NCWDG Celebrates Opening of Cyber Foundry,” Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, Feb. 18, 2020, https:// www.dvidshub.net/news/363356/ncwdg-celebrates-opening-cyber-foundry#.Xkx8I44ONeo.twitter. 2 Secretary-General António Guterres, “Remarks to the General Assembly on the Secretary-General’s Priorities for 2020,” United Nations Secre- tary-General, Jan. 22, 2020, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2020-01-22/remarks-general-assembly-priorities-for-2020. 3 The White House, “Remarks by the President at the Cybersecurity and Consumer Protection Summit, Stanford University,” Office of the Press Secretary, Feb. 13, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/remarks-president-cybersecurity-and-consumer-pro- tection-summit. 4 For current positions, see, Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, “Department of Defense: Law of War Manual,” June 2015 (Updated Dec. 2016), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20 Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190; U.N. Secretary-General, “Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,” UN Doc. A/70/174, July 22, 2015 [hereinafter 2015 GGE Report], https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/799853?ln=en. 5 Michael Schmitt and Liis Vihul, “International Cyber Law Politicized: The UN GGE’s Failure to Advance Cyber Norms,” Just Security, June 30, 2017, https://www.justsecurity.org/42768/international-cyber-law-politicized-gges-failure-advance-cyber-norms/. 6 Jeremy Wright, Attorney General of the UK, “Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century,” Chatham House, May 23, 2018, [hereafter Michael N. Schmitt Wright Address], https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/cyber-and-international-law-21st-century.

33 The Scholar Taming the Lawless Void: Tracking the Evolution of International Law Rules for Cyberspace

Kingdom, the NotPetya operation against Ukrainian Open-Ended Working Group. The former consists particularly whether they see international law as currently have with the existing framework. cyber infrastructure that spread globally and caused of representatives from 25 states, while the latter is either supporting or impeding the achievement of Having a treaty would also not solve the ques- billions of dollars in losses, and the use of cyber open to all states.10 Clearly, cyberspace has taken those priorities. tion of how it would apply. We would still be means to exploit the novel coronavirus pandemic. center stage in international fora. To gauge the manner in which international law is left with the question of how to interpret it.18 Given the rising importance of cyber conflict, there Just as importantly, individual states are begin- likely to evolve, this article first evaluates how nor- is an evident need to clarify how such attacks can be ning to publicly express their views on the subject. mative evolution is likely to occur. There are three Cynicism about the motives behind the Russian defined within the realm of international law. Two statements on international law appended possibilities: new treaty law, new customary law, proposal is rife, with concern that it is a subterfuge Despite these troubling occurrences, cyberspace to Australia’s International Cyber Engagement and interpretation of extant rules of international designed to limit the reach of international human is hardly a lawless void where the “strong do what Strategy,11 a letter on international law in cyber- law. Interpretation is likely to occupy most of the rights law — particularly the rights to privacy and they can and the weak suffer what they must.”7 In space from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs normative effort. Second, this article lays out the le- expression — into those states that support it. 2017, a distinguished group of international law to Parliament,12 a report on the issue released by gal-strategic options open to states in approaching Such concern is well founded. scholars and practitioners — the International the French Ministry of the Armies,13 and a discus- law’s evolution. States are at a crossroads in that Complicating matters is the current international Group of Experts — published the Tallinn Manu- sion by states of their views during an Open-End- regard. Their attitudes toward the efficacy of inter- political landscape. A treaty restricting cybercrime al 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber ed Working Group session in February 202014 rank national law in safeguarding their cyberspace deter- would require international cooperation. Unfortu- Operations.8 The product of a NATO Cooperative among the most noteworthy statements issued on mine the path they take. Lastly, this article assesses nately, since 2016, the United States has demon- Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence project stretch- cyber operations and international law. the general vector of international law’s evolution strated a hostile attitude towards multilateralism ing over eight years, the manual contains 154 rules Given the rising threat of hostile cyber opera- with respect to cyberspace. A trend is emerging — and has proven wary of limiting its own actions and nearly 500 pages of in-depth commentary on tions, the importance of cyberspace to 21st-century one that acknowledges the power of international through international agreements. Even if this ob- how extant international law applies in the cyber societies, and the ongoing efforts to identify how law rules to hamper harmful cyber operations. stacle could be overcome, philosophical disagree- context. Since the manual’s publication, there has international law applies in the cyber context, it is ment exists over what and how to regulate. This been a flood of scholarship on the subject. an appropriate moment to assess the prospects for fact is evidenced by the conflict between the con- At the governmental level, states have been ac- international cyber law’s continued development. The Means of Normative Evolution cepts of “cyber security” championed by liberal tive since 2004 in a series of U.N. Groups of Gov- Some evolution in the applicable law is inevitable, democracies and so-called “information security” ernmental Experts focused on information and for normative architecture must remain responsive To remain responsive to the realities of transna- supported by China and Russia. Whereas the for- communications technology. Three reports have to the context in which it applies if it is to be effec- tional cyber activities, international law rules can mer generally support the free flow of information, been issued, the most significant of which was the tive. And, the nature of that context is clear — the develop in one of three ways — through treaties, the latter seek to exert control over content. To il- Group of Governmental Experts consensus report reliance of states and societies on cyberspace will new customary law, or interpretation of existing lustrate, Russia and China have refused to partic- of 2015. Endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly, continue to grow at a rapid pace while cyberspace law (or a combination thereof). A new treaty gov- ipate in the Budapest Convention, in part because the report included a short catalogue of interna- will become an ever more dangerous environment erning cyberspace appears unlikely, at least on a it cedes a degree of control over digital information tional law rules and principles that the participat- in which to operate. The more that states rely upon global scale. Although Russia has recently secured that each state would otherwise enjoy.19 ing states agreed applied to cyber activities, as well cyberspace for essential functions, day-to-day ac- support in the United Nations for considering this “Crystallization” of new norms of customary as “voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible tivities, and well-being, the starker their strategic possibility and proffered a draft instrument on cy- international law is likewise unlikely. Customary state behavior” in cyberspace.9 And, there are pres- choice becomes regarding the evolutionary vector ber crime15 (despite the existence of the Budapest international law consists of rules that are not ently two parallel U.N. processes underway: a sixth of international law. Moreover, it will be a choice Convention, which has nearly 70 parties, on the found in a treaty but are nevertheless widely ac- Group of Governmental Experts iteration and an informed by the geopolitical priorities of states, same subject16), the move has faced widespread op- knowledged to be binding for states despite being position.17 Typical of the response of many states unwritten.20 For instance, even though the United was Australia’s observation at an Open-Ended States is bound by no treaty provision that prohib- 7 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. John H. Finley (New York: Modern Library, 1951). Working Group session in February 2020: its conducting attacks against civilians by kinetic 8 Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). or cyber means during an armed conflict, it recog- 9 2015 GGE Report, 7; U.N. General Assembly, “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international A legally binding instrument in this space nizes that customary law prohibits such attacks. security,” Resolution 70/237, Dec. 30, 2015, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/70/237. See also, the earlier report, U.N. Secretary-General, “Group would take years to negotiate. It would likely Crystallization requires a sufficient degree of of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,” UN Doc. end up with the lowest common denomina- state practice over time combined with a belief that A/68/98*, June 24, 2013, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/753055?ln=en [hereafter 2013 GGE Report]. tor result and offer less protection than we the practice is engaged in — or refrained from — 10 United Nations Officer for Disarmament Affairs, “Fact Sheet: Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,” July 2019, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Information-Security-Fact-Sheet-July-2019.pdf. 11 Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, Oct. 2017, 90-1, 15 U.N. General Assembly, “Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes,” Resolution 74/247, Dec. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/DFAT%20AICES_AccPDF.pdf; Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, “2019 International 27, 2019, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/247; Draft United Nations Convention on Cooperation in Combating Cybercrime, Russia, 2017, Annexed Law Supplement,” https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/international-cyber-engagement-strategy/aices/chapters/2019_in- to U.N. General Assembly, “Letter dated 11 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations ternational_law_supplement.html. addressed to the Secretary-General,” UN Doc. A/C.3/72/12*, Oct. 16, 2017, https://undocs.org/A/C.3/72/12. 12 The Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Letter of 5 July 2019 from the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs to the President of the 16 Council of Europe, “Convention on Cybercrime,” European Treaty Series No.185, Nov. 23, 2001, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meet- House of Representatives on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace, and Appendix: International Law in Cyberspace,” 2019 [hereafter Nether- docs/2014_2019/documents/libe/dv/7_conv_budapest_/7_conv_budapest_en.pdf. lands MFA Letter], https://www.government.nl/documents/parliamentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-le- 17 “Open Letter to UN General Assembly: Proposed International Convention on Cybercrime Poses a Threat to Human Rights Online,” Associ- gal-order-in-cyberspace. ation of Progressive Communications, Nov. 2019, https://www.apc.org/en/pubs/open-letter-un-general-assembly-proposed-international-conven- 13 Republic of France, Ministry of the Armies, “International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace,” 2019, [hereafter Ministry of the Armies Posi- tion-cybercrime-poses-threat-human. tion Paper], 6-7, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/567648/9770527/file/international+law+applied+to+operations+in+cyberspace.pdf. 18 See, OEWG. 14 United Nations, UN Web TV, “Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the 19 See, e.g., Council of Europe, “Convention on Cybercrime,” 17-18. Context of International Security, Second Substantive Session,” Feb. 10–14, 2020 [hereafter OEWG], http://webtv.un.org/search/3rd-meeting-open- ended-working-group-on-developments-in-the-field-of-information-and-telecommunications-in-the-context-of-international-security-second-sub- 20 As an example, the United States is bound by no treaty prohibiting cyber attacks against the civilian population during an armed conflict, but stantive-session-10%E2%80%9314-february-2020/6131646836001/?term=%22Open%20Ended%20Working%20Group%22&lan=English&cat=Meet- nevertheless acknowledged that it is bound by an unwritten customary international law rule to that effect. “Department of Defense: Law of War ings%2FEvents&sort=date. Manual,” 1020-1021.

34 35 The Scholar Taming the Lawless Void: Tracking the Evolution of International Law Rules for Cyberspace

out of a sense of legal obligation.21 Satisfying these articulation of legal views that is necessary for the terpretive effort, as well as in the articulation of that states do not want to be seen as violating in- conditions with respect to cyber operations is un- crystallization of new norms is unlikely to develop voluntary, non-binding norms. They enjoy great- ternational law. There is ample evidence that this likely in the near future for a number of reasons. in the foreseeable future. er normative agility than states because they can is so, for most states endeavor to style their actions Most state cyber operations are highly classified focus on objective interpretation without the in- as complying with international law even when or otherwise shielded from observation by other trusion of national policy concerns. More to the they clearly do not — as in the case of Russian ac- states. Practice that is not vis- point, cyberspace is a multi-stakeholder domain. tivities in Ukraine. For states that have adopted the ible does not contribute to the Companies such as Microsoft wield as much pow- approach, international law rules serve as norma- crystallization of a new custom- er in cyberspace as most states while the economic tive firewalls; their corresponding legal strategy is ary law. Additionally, states have impact of cyber activities conducted by companies to strengthen those firewalls. shown a general reluctance to like Amazon is huge. Its advocates are, therefore, likely to pursue clar- engage in the verbal practice that As a result, certain non-state activities are exert- ity in the rules and seek interpretive consensus. might suffice to fill that void. For ing significant influence on the interpretive process, They believe that greater clarity prevents malicious example, they have seldom con- which is certainly the case with respect to the Tal- state actors from exploiting potential ambiguity.23 demned the cyber operations of linn Manual 2.0 as it continues to serve as the pri- The U.S. response to election meddling by Russia other states as violations of inter- mary reference point for how international law ap- in 2016 provides an example of this belief. Russia national law. plies in cyberspace. Other efforts have also captured cleverly operated in the gray zone of international Along the same lines, statements by states setting Of course, the same realities plague the interpre- global attention, including Microsoft’s Digital Gene- law with respect to the two rules its operations im- forth the belief that the state practice is required by tation of existing rules of international law. How- va Convention and the establishment of the Cyber- plicated; the obligation to respect the sovereignty international law — the second condition for crys- ever, as these rules already exist, there is greater Peace Institute. Indeed, states and non-state actors of other states and the prohibition on intervention tallization of a new norm — are rare. Those that incentive for states to interpret them in a manner have been working together to examine norms for into other states’ internal affairs. This hobbled the have been offered deal solely with the interpretation that sets normative precedents, lest other states cyberspace, as is the case with Paris Call and the American response.24 Greater clarity in the appli- of existing norms in the cyber context. In addition, seize the interpretive high ground by establishing Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace. cable international law rules would have provided these interpretations tend to be broad, as with the interpretations that serve their specific interests. The positive influence of such endeavors is appar- Russia with less room to maneuver. U.S. acknowledgement in 2016 by the former State Some states have wisely recognized that, even ent, for they operate to discredit the false narrative Clarity can also prevent unintended escalation. Department legal adviser that “cyber operations though they may not be able to reliably predict fu- that cyberspace is a norm-less void. However, the Consider a cyber operation causing effects lying in conducted by non-State actors are attributable to ture cyber technologies and practices, their nation- development, interpretation, and implementation the gray zone of an ambiguous threshold, such as a State under the law of state responsibility when al interests are best served by trying to shape the of international law remain primarily state-centric that at which territorial sovereignty is violated.25 such actors engage in operations pursuant to the normative environment. This is where most of the activities. The positions and interests of states in- The state launching the operation believes that it State’s instructions or under the State’s direction normative activity regarding cyberspace will take dicate the likeliest vector of international law in cy- did not cross the threshold, but the target state in- or control.”22 Such statements seldom delve into the place over the mid-term. berspace. Although it is still early, the outlines of terprets the rule as having a lower threshold and, gritty details of how to apply the rules in practice. States will continue to play the key role in this that vector are slowly taking shape. therefore, considers the first state’s operation to In part, the unwillingness of many states to ar- interpretive journey. For example, the work of the be unlawful. As a “countermeasure,” a response ticulate their legal positions with regard to cyber- U.N. Groups of Governmental Experts, which are that is only permissible against an unlawful cyber space is due to the principle of sovereign equality, comprised of state representatives and the reports Strategic Options operation,26 the target state launches a hack that by which any customary law norm that crystallizes of which are endorsed by other states in the U.N. disables the cyber infrastructure of its adversary. binds all states. Thus, states are likely to be torn General Assembly, remains at the forefront of this States taking part in this interpretive venture are Believing the response marks an escalation to un- between acceptance of a new norm that constrains effort. There is, however, a noticeable tendency to- facing a crossroads. They can either choose a lib- lawful operations, the first state mounts its own other states and acquiescence to restraints on their ward regional fragmentation among states and col- eral interpretation of existing laws or restrict their countermeasure. As this scenario illustrates, know- own cyber operations. The rapid pace of advanc- laboration among like-minded states. For instance, freedom by adopting narrower or more limited in- ing where the normative red lines lie and having es in cyber technology along with uncertainty as although not binding law, most efforts to craft con- terpretations of those laws. Both paths respond to clarity as to the potential consequence under inter- to how it will be employed in the future reinforce fidence-building measures have been regional, as in the reliance on cyberspace by states and their pop- national law of crossing them has the potential to their hesitancy. It is unclear whether there are ad- the case of the Organization for Security and Co- ulations that is growing at a dizzying rate. minimize escalatory misunderstandings. vantages to be gained by accepting constraints on operation in Europe, the Organization of American On one hand, states may see international law as But, on the other hand, states may logically con- cyber capabilities that may become more useful at States, and the Association of Southeast Asian Na- a valuable tool in combating hostile cyber opera- clude that normative firewalls are counterproduc- a later date. This reality results in disagreement at tions. While like-minded efforts are especially pro- tions. By this view, law deters harmful cyber activ- tive and, as a result, may work towards keeping the interagency level between departments and or- nounced among the so-called “Five Eyes” (the Unit- ity conducted by or attributable to states because them low. They might even intentionally foster nor- ganizations responsible for defending against hos- ed States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, it allows the international community to condemn mative ambiguity. Two motives underlie this legal tile cyber operations and those tasked with con- and New Zealand), there is frequent norm collab- bad actors. The approach operates on the premise strategy. First, states that exploit ambiguity with re- ducting cyber operations in the territory of other oration between Russia and China because of their states in pursuit of their own state’s national inter- shared objective of control over their populations. ests. In the face of such impediments, the requisite Non-state actors also have been active in the in- 23 I discuss this dynamic more fully in Michael N. Schmitt, “Grey Zones in the International Law of Cyberspace,” The Yale Journal of Internation- al Law Online 42, no. 2 (2017): 1-21, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3180687. 24 See my analysis at Michael N. Schmitt, ‘“Virtual’ Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones of International Law,” Chica- go Journal of International Law 19, no. 1 (2018): 30-67, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol19/iss1/2/. 21 United Nations, International Law Commission, “Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law, with Commentaries,” UN Doc A/73/10, 2018, https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_13_2018.pdf. 25 See discussion in Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 18-26. 22 Brian J. Egan, “Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace,” U.S. Department of State Archive, Nov. 10, 2016, https://www.law. 26 “Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session,” U.N. Doc. A/56/10, 2001 [hereafter Articles on State berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/egan-talk-transcript-111016.pdf. Responsibility], 32-33, https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_56_10.pdf.

36 37 The Scholar Taming the Lawless Void: Tracking the Evolution of International Law Rules for Cyberspace

spect to how international law rules apply in the cy- ty of the state into which they are conducted — the ber context will oppose clarification, for ambiguity target state — on the basis of either territorial invi- affords them an advantage. This observation is par- olability or interference with, or usurpation of, an ticularly true of states that do not respect the rule of inherently governmental function.27 law when conducting operations against states that For the International Group of Experts, a viola- do, the so-called “rule of law states.” The former un- tion of territoriality occurs when certain effects of derstand that rule of law states will take a cautious the cyber operation manifest on the territory of approach in the face of gray zone operations as they the target state, whether on the government’s cy- struggle to determine whether the operations they ber infrastructure or that of private entities. Qual- face are unlawful, and can be condemned as such, ifying effects include physical damage, injury, and as well as whether they open the door to options the relatively permanent loss of functionality of the that are only available in response to internationally targeted cyber infrastructure — or of infrastructure wrongful acts like countermeasures. that relies upon it. By contrast, a sovereignty viola- Second, rule of law states with a realist perspec- tion based on interference with, or usurpation of, tive on international relations might conclude that an inherently governmental function requires no clarity gives adversaries that ignore legal strictures particular physical effects. For example, conducting an asymmetrical advantage, for clear legal lines will an operation that even temporarily disables election — in practice — only limit the former’s operational machinery, thereby affecting the vote count, would flexibility. They are a one-way normative firewall. qualify as a violation based on territoriality, where- By embracing ambiguity, rule of law states can re- as a remote search of databases on another state’s tain the operational flexibility necessary to pick and territory would illustrate the usurpation of an inher- choose how to characterize their opponents’ cyber ently governmental act, law enforcement. operations and determine when they have a right Following the publication of the Tallinn Manu- under international law to respond. They can beat al 2.0, observers expected significant debate over their opponents at their own game. It is a rational, how sovereignty could be violated short of causing albeit internationally destabilizing, approach. damage or injury as well as over which functions qualify as inherently governmental. That important debate was sidetracked in May 2018 by the United tionally wrongful act.”30 In other words, sovereign- government systems, or the causation of effects, The Substantive Rules Kingdom’s articulation of a view that sovereignty ty is a rule of law having prescriptive effect. That which would extend to not only private cyber infra- is a principle of international law from which rules the statement came from a NATO ally that is a gen- structure but also knock-on effects more broadly, It is instructive to look at how states are ap- like the prohibitions on intervention and the use of erally like-minded state is of particular significance as a violation of sovereignty. proaching a number of key international law rules. force derive — but that is not a rule in itself.28 In as a (deserved) rebuke to the British position. Other states are beginning to announce their Although only a few states have publicly set forth other words, remotely conducted cyber operations The most robust pushback, however, came from views. For instance, at the February 2020 session of their views, those views are representative of into the territory of other states never amount to France, which not only rejected the British position but the Open-Ended Working Group, Switzerland, Aus- trends that are apparent across a wide range of an internationally wrongful act on the basis of hav- has set forth its own position on when it will deem a tria, and the Czech Republic supported the “sov- states. States are embracing international law rules ing violated sovereignty. cyber operation a violation of French sovereignty: ereignty-is-a-rule” approach that had been adopt- rather than ambiguity; they see normative firewalls The premise that there is no rule of sovereignty ed by the Netherlands and France.32 To date, no both as protection against hostile cyber operations flies in the face of extensive practice by states and Any cyberattack against French digital sys- state has adopted the British view. Even the United and as providing legal justification when they need international organizations over many decades, tems or any effects produced on French ter- States has hedged its bets. At an address during to respond robustly to such operations. as well as judicial pronouncements by the Inter- ritory by digital means by a State organ, a the U.S. Cyber Command annual conference in national Court of Justice and domestic courts.29 It person or an entity exercising elements of March 2020, Department of Defense General Coun- Sovereignty also runs counter to the first of the strategic ap- governmental authority or by a person or sel Paul Ney noted, proaches, which holds that international law has persons acting on the instructions of or un- An ongoing debate over sovereignty in cyber- protective value. This fact provoked a quick reac- der the direction or control of a State consti- As a threshold matter, in analyzing pro- space is perhaps the most revealing indicator of tion from other states. In the aforementioned July tutes a breach of sovereignty.31 posed cyber operations, DoD lawyers take the strategic direction in which states are moving 2019 letter to Parliament, the Dutch Ministry of into account the principle of State sover- with respect to interpreting international law. The Foreign Affairs confirmed, accurately as a matter This French position describes an extremely low eignty. States have sovereignty over the in- International Group of Experts that published the of law, that “Respect for the sovereignty of other threshold of violation, albeit one that is defensi- formation and communications technology Tallinn Manual 2.0 concluded that remotely con- countries is an obligation in its own right, the vio- ble. Moreover, it defines any cyber attack against infrastructure within their territory. The ducted cyber operations can violate the sovereign- lation of which may in turn constitute an interna- French digital systems, which presumably signifies implications of sovereignty for cyberspace

30 Netherlands MFA Letter, 2. 27 See, Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 11-26. 31 Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 7. 28 See, Wright Address. 32 OEWG, fourth session. The Czech approach was especially broad, including in addition to the standard territorial integrity and inherently 29 See, Michael Schmitt and Liis Vihul, “Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace,” Texas Law Review 95 (Nov. 3, 2017): 1639-1670, https://ssrn. governmental function violations, “a cyber operation causing damage to, or disruption of, cyber or other infrastructure with significant impact on com/abstract=3180669. national security, economy, public health or environment.”

38 39 The Scholar Taming the Lawless Void: Tracking the Evolution of International Law Rules for Cyberspace

are complex, and we continue to study this the object of the intervention involves an area of a rule of sovereignty.38 This could be accomplished Due diligence issue and how State practice evolves in this activity that international law leaves to the state by either relaxing the scope of the term “internal or area, even if it does not appear that there (the so-called internal or external affairs of a state) external affairs” through interpretation or by lower- Also indicative of the trend toward viewing in- exists a rule that all infringements on sov- and that the action be coercive in nature.35 As ex- ing the threshold at which an attempt to influence ternational law as an effective normative firewall ereignty in cyberspace necessarily involve plained by the Australian Department of Foreign becomes unlawful coercion.39 With respect to the against hostile cyber operations is the growing ten- violations of international law.33 Affairs and Trade in its International Cyber En- former option, “internal or external affairs” could dency of states to embrace the rule of due diligence. gagement Strategy, be interpreted more broadly to include the target This rule requires states to put an end to hostile cy- A careful parsing of Ney’s statement reveals that of the cyber operation and not just the activity or ber operations by other states or non-state actors it is not inconsistent with the views of those sup- A prohibited intervention is one that inter- policy that the state conducting the cyber operation that are mounted either from within or through porting sovereignty as a rule. For instance, sov- feres by coercive means (in the sense that hopes to coerce. If this were to be done, operations their territory when the operations affect a legal ereignty advocates do not claim that all remotely they effectively deprive another state of the like WannaCry would qualify as intervention. In- right of another state and cause serious adverse conducted cyber operations violate sovereignty. ability to control, decide, or govern matters deed, in the same Chatham House speech in which consequences.42 For instance, if a hacktivist group Ney’s reference to the phrase “necessarily involve” of an inherently sovereign nature), either di- he rejected sovereignty, the U.K. attorney general is launching cyber operations from one state against suggests that there are cyber operations that will rectly or indirectly, in matters that a state adopted this approach: “Acts like the targeting of another state’s government systems, the first state violate sovereignty. That the United States is “con- is permitted by the principle of state sover- essential medical services are no less prohibited in- would be required to take all feasible measures to tinuing to study” the issue and watching state eignty to decide freely. Such matters include terventions, or even armed attacks, when they are terminate the operations. Such measures could practice indicates that it is leaving open the pros- a state’s economic, political, and social sys- committed by cyber means.”40 range from law enforcement to a technical solution. pect of joining the sovereignty-is-a-rule group — a tems, and foreign policy.36 Most discussion within the interna- move that would force the United Kingdom to re- tional law community, however, centers think its legally implausible position. The term “internal or external affairs” is often on the element of coercion, as Finally, it is important to note that both Russia misunderstood as referring to the target of a cyber was the case at a May 2020 work- and China are strong supporters of sovereignty, al- operation. However, the concept actually refers to shop held by the University of though their motive is to use the principle as the the area of activity that the state conducting the Oxford’s Institute for Ethics, Law basis for controlling the cyber activities of people operation hopes to coerce. For instance, the Wan- and Armed Conflict.41 Advocates within their territories and of their nationals abroad. naCry operation by North Korea impacted the Unit- of lowering the threshold at which In doing so, they are overemphasizing the signifi- ed Kingdom’s health sector, but as a ransomware mere influence becomes unlawful cance of sovereignty by failing to pay adequate heed attack it was not designed to coerce any change in coercion, thereby satisfying the to the fact that the enjoyment of sovereignty must U.K. health policy or delivery. By contrast, some second element of intervention, be exercised without prejudice to international hu- of the cyber operations related to the novel coro- argue that a hostile cyber opera- man rights law. But, their approach does signal the navirus pandemic, if attributable to a state, would tion should not necessarily have to deprive a state Although the due diligence rule was set forth by influence of the rule and the extent to which states amount to intervention. An example would be the of all reasonable choice, so long as it renders making the International Court of Justice in its first case, view it as having protective value for their interests malicious cyber operations that disabled a novel the choice difficult. The problem is that, as a result, Corfu Channel,43 and appears prominently in var- — malign though those interests may be. coronavirus testing facility in the Czech Republic. applying the rule becomes more challenging be- ious specialized bodies of law (most notably in- These attacks made it impossible for that state to cause “no reasonable choice” is an easier threshold ternational environmental law44) states have been Intervention fully execute its crisis management plan for dealing to apply than “making the choice difficult.” Interpre- hesitant to acknowledge its existence. Some states with the pandemic.37 tive creativity is simply no panacea for weakening appear concerned that the burden of compliance Interestingly, interpretive discussions regarding In terms of trend analysis, the fact that the pro- the impact of sovereignty. But, the point to be made would be onerous given the number of hostile cy- the prohibition on intervention into the internal or hibition’s existence is uncontroversial supports the is that both states and international law experts — ber operations that are mounted from within their external affairs of other states, which is universally premise that law serves a valuable protective func- faced with one key state’s rejection of the sovereign- territory. For instance, the obligation was set forth accepted as a rule,34 has recently tended to focus on tion. What has been particularly noteworthy is the ty rule — are working hard to find a way to interpret as a voluntary non-binding norm in both the 2013 how to accommodate the normative void that would tendency of those who question sovereignty — or international law so as to retain its protective effect. and 2015 Group of Governmental Experts reports be created by dispensing with the rule of sovereignty. are concerned about the weakening of the rule — to because the consensus to characterize it as a bind- It is well accepted that a violation of the prohi- look to the rule prohibiting intervention to fill any bition on intervention requires two elements: that protective gaps that would be left by the absence of

38 On the relationship between sovereignty and intervention, see, Harriet Moynihan, “The Application of International Law to State Cyberat- tacks: Sovereignty and Non-intervention,” Chatham House Research Paper, December 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/ 33 Paul C. Ney, Jr., “DOD General Counsel Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command Legal Conference,” U.S. Department of Defense, Mar. 2, 2020, publications/research/2019-11-29-Intl-Law-Cyberattacks.pdf. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/dod-general-counsel-remarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-conference/. 39 Indeed, in his speech Attorney General Wright asserted that “The precise boundaries of this principle are the subject of ongoing debate See my analysis of the speech in Michael N. Schmitt, “The Defense Department’s Measured Take on International Law in Cyberspace,” Just Security, between states, and not just in the context of cyber space.” See, Wright Address. Mar. 11, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/69119/the-defense-departments-measured-take-on-international-law-in-cyberspace/. 40 Wright Address. 34 2015 GGE, 12-13. On the prohibition generally, see, Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 312-324. 41 The author was in attendance. 35 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and Orders, “Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activi- ties In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua. v. United States of America),” June 27, 1986, 14, 97-98, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/70/070- 42 For a discussion of due diligence, see Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 30-50. 19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. 43 International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and Orders, “The Corfu Channel Case (Merits),” April 9, 1949, 22, 36 See, Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, “2019 International Law Supplement.” https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/1/001-19490409-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. 37 On the COVID-19-related hostile cyber operations and international law, see, Marko Milanovic and Michael N. Schmitt, “Cyber Attacks and 44 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, “Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,” U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/ (Vol. I), Cyber (Mis)information Operations during a Pandemic,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy (forthcoming, published on-line May 28, 2020), Aug. 12, 1992, 1, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_CONF.151_26_Vol.I_ https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612019. Declaration.pdf.

40 41 The Scholar Taming the Lawless Void: Tracking the Evolution of International Law Rules for Cyberspace

ing norm in either report could not be achieved.45 Use of force Along the same lines, the Netherlands took the — is particularly telling, for most states have adopt- However, as states have become aware of the nu- position in 2019: ed the position set forth by the International Court merous limitations that are placed on the due dil- This trend is augmented by the tendency of of Justice in its Nicaragua judgment that an “armed igence obligation,46 particularly the absence of any states to view international law as a normative It is necessary … to examine both qualitative attack” is the “most grave form” of a use of force.58 requirement to take preventive measures and an barrier against unlawful uses of force. All states and quantitative factors. The Tallinn Manual Overall, there are strong indications that states obligation only to take measures that are feasible in agree that the prohibition on the use of force, res- 2.0 refers to a number of factors that could would like to see normative barriers against the the circumstances, they are beginning to accept the ident in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and cus- play a role in this regard, including how se- use of force go up in order to protect their cyber rule. For instance, both the Netherlands and France tomary law, is a binding rule of international law rious and far-reaching the cyber operation’s assets and activities. This desire has been signaled did so in 2019 and Finland took a very expansive applicable to cyber operations.49 Indeed, the 2015 consequences are, whether the operation is by the lack of any opposition to the functionality view of the obligation at the February 2020 session Group of Governmental Experts report specifical- military in nature and whether it is carried approach, the adoption of the scale and effects of the Open-Ended Working Group.47 The most in- ly “identified as of central importance the com- out by a state.54 test for non-physical effects, and the indication by teresting statement to date has come from Austral- mitments of States to the following principles of some states that even cyber operations solely af- ia, which seemed to straddle the fence in its Inter- the Charter and other international law ... refrain- The Netherlands went on to address the oft- fecting the economy could amount to an unlawful national Cyber Engagement Strategy. On the one ing in their international relations from the threat asked question of whether a non-destructive cyber use of force — a prohibition that had heretofore hand, it observed, “To the extent that a state enjoys or use of force.”50 The report was subsequently operation against the economy could ever qualify been primarily restricted to operations that caused … sovereignty over objects and activities within its endorsed by the General Assembly.51 as a use of force: “At this time it cannot be ruled physical damage or injury, or, as in the Nicaragua territory, it necessarily shoulders corresponding re- Clearly, a cyber operation that causes signifi- out that a cyber operation with a very serious fi- case, activities in support of operations having sponsibilities to ensure [they] are not used to harm cant physical damage or injury qualifies as a use of nancial or economic impact may qualify as the use those effects.59 Thus, the trend with respect to the other states.” This language is that of binding rules. force. As with sovereignty, the notion of functional of force.”55 This view is a significant indicator of use of force tracks all that appears to be emerging But, Australia went on to enumerate the require- damage was adopted as the equivalent of physical the extent to which the Netherlands, which is a with regard to other internationally wrongful acts, ments as if it was a voluntary, non-binding norm damage for the purposes of this prohibition. Inter- thought leader in the field, treats international law including violation of sovereignty, intervention, using the term “should”: “[I]f a state is aware of estingly, no state has opposed this interpretation as protective in the cyber context. and the failure to exercise due diligence. an internationally wrongful act originating from or — one which would apply almost exclusively in the And, the Netherlands is not alone. The same routed through its territory, and it has the ability to cyber context. year, France noted: Responses put an end to the harmful activity, that state should More importantly, a number of states have ac- take reasonable steps to do so consistent with inter- cepted the International Group of Experts’ adop- In the absence of physical damage, a cy- Interestingly, normative barriers to response op- national law.”48 tion of the “scale and effects” test from the law ber-operation can be considered use of force tions may be lowering. States want international Other states — such as Germany, Estonia, Finland, of self-defense for evaluating cyber operations that in the light of several criteria, … such as law to not only shield them from hostile cyber op- the Republic of Korea, and Spain — have also sup- do not cause such effects with respect to the pro- the origin of the operation and the nature erations but also allow them to engage in robust ported the rule’s binding nature in various official hibition on the use of force.52 The International of the instigator (military or non-military), cyber responses that they deem necessary to pro- and unofficial fora, while no state has publicly reject- Group of Experts held that the prohibition extend- the degree of intrusion, the effects caused or tect themselves. They look to so-called “circum- ed the rule as such. Rather, states that are unwilling ed beyond physical damage (including the relative- sought by the operation, or the nature of the stances precluding wrongfulness” to achieve this to acknowledge the rule’s binding character generally ly permanent loss of functionality) or injury and target. These criteria are, of course, not ex- objective. Circumstances precluding wrongfulness take the position that it has not yet matured to that that certain factors would influence states when haustive. For example, penetrating military allow a state to conduct cyber or non-cyber opera- level and, therefore, may only be put forward as a vol- assessing whether a particular cyber operation systems with a view to weakening French tions that would otherwise be unlawful. They ren- untary, non-binding norm. What does appear clear is qualifies as a use of force. It identified a number defense capabilities, or to finance or train der unlawful acts — which may include actions or that states support the notion that members of the of non-exhaustive factors that states were likely to individuals so that they can perpetrate cy- omissions — lawful. international community have a responsibility to en- consider when making that determination. The list berattacks against France could well qualify Consider “countermeasures”: responses to un- sure their territory is not used as the base of hostile included severity, immediacy, directness, invasive- as the use of force.56 lawful cyber operations that themselves would be cyber operations. The growing number of states that ness, measurability of effects, military character, unlawful except for the fact that they are designed accept the rule as “hard law” is further indication of state involvement, presumptive legitimate legality, With respect to economic damage, France went to compel another state (the “responsible state”) a trend towards treating international law as an effec- identity of the attacker, record of cyber operations even further than the Netherlands: “A cyberattack into desisting in its unlawful course of conduct tive tool in deterring harmful cyber activities. by the attacker, and nature of the target.53 could be categorised as an armed attack if it caused and providing the “injured state” whatever repara- substantial loss of life or considerable physical or tions might be due.60 Most states appear to accept economic damage.”57 The reference to “armed at- the legality of countermeasures and have shown a 45 2013 GGE Report, 8; 2015 GGE Report, 8. tack” — the threshold for using force in self-defense willingness to adapt their use to the cyber context. 46 See my thoughts in this regard in Michael N. Schmitt, “In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace,” 125 Yale Law Journal Forum 68 (2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2622077. 47 Netherlands MFA Letter, 4-5; Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 10; Statement of Finland, in OEWG, at third meeting. Finland suggested, 54 Netherlands MFA Letter, 4. See also, Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, 90: “In determining whether a … cyber activity, “If harmful cyber activities take place and cause serious harm to another state, the state of origin must take appropriate action to terminate it, as constitutes a use of force, states should consider whether the activity’s scale and effects are comparable to traditional kinetic operations that rise well as to investigate the incident and bring those responsible to justice.” to the level of use of force.” 48 Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, 91. Emphasis added by author. 55 Netherlands MFA Letter, 4. 49 UN Charter art. 2(4). See also, Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 329-30. 56 Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 7. 50 2015 GGE Report, 12. 57 Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 8. 51 U. N. General Assembly, “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications,” Resolution 70/237, Dec. 23, 2015. 58 ICJ, “Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities,” 101-102. 52 ICJ, “Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities,” 103-104. 59 ICJ, “Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities,” 118-119. 53 Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 331-337. 60 Articles on State Responsibility, 75-76, 129-139; Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 111-5.

42 43 The Scholar Taming the Lawless Void: Tracking the Evolution of International Law Rules for Cyberspace

This approach is best illustrated with respect to international law in a manner that allows for ef- the purported “notice” requirement. fective responses to hostile cyber operations is an The U.N. International Law Commission’s Ar- emerging discussion of collective countermeasures. ticles on State Responsibility suggest that a state In its commentary accompanying the Articles on should normally provide notice of its intention to State Responsibility, the International Law Commis- engage in countermeasures.61 Nevertheless, states sion noted that cases of countermeasures by an en- have repeatedly emphasized that the requirement tity other than an injured state are “controversial of notice in the cyber context is tempered by the and the practice is embryonic,”65 leading to the pre- urgency of the need to respond. For example, vailing view that they are impermissible. Yet, in 2019, There are other France has taken the position that: Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid asserted that:

The victim State may, in certain circum- states which are not directly injured may indications that states stances, derogate from the obligation to no- apply countermeasures to support the tify … where there is a need to protect its state directly affected by the malicious cy- rights. This possibility of adopting urgent ber operation … International security and are uncomfortable countermeasures is all the more appropri- the rules-based international order have ate in cyberspace given the predominance long benefitted from collective efforts to of concealment and traceability difficulties.62 stop the violations.66

with stringent limitations Similarly, the Netherlands has noted that, “if im- This position is sensible for states that may lack mediate action is required in order to enforce the the wherewithal to mount effective countermeas- rights of the injured state and prevent further dam- ures against hostile cyber operations on their own. on their right to age, such notification may be dispensed with.”63 Cy- To date, only France has openly disagreed with the ber operations can unfold in a fraction of a second. Estonian position, albeit without explaining the ba- Interpreting the rule as requiring notice of counter- sis for its opposition.67 self-defense in cyberspace. measures in every case would be impractical. Most noteworthy vis-a-vis responses falling below The most progressive position in this regard the threshold of armed attacks, which allows for was set forth by the United Kingdom in 2018. In the use of cyber or non-cyber force in self-defense, his speech at Chatham House, the attorney gener- is the current U.S. approach. According to the U.S. al observed, “We would not agree that we are al- Department of Defense’s 2018 Cyber Strategy, U.S. ways legally obliged to give prior notification … it forces intend to “[p]ersistently contest malicious could not be right for international law to require cyber activity in day-to-day competition: The De- a countermeasure to expose highly sensitive capa- partment will counter cyber campaigns threaten- bilities.”64 The formulation is significant. Whereas ing U.S. military advantage by defending forward other countries focus on the urgency of the need to intercept and halt cyber threats.”68 Although not to take countermeasures and the impracticality of framed in legal terms, such a strategy would be dif- providing notice, the British approach tenders the ficult to square with a restrictive interpretation of preservation of highly classified cyber capabilities as the right to take countermeasures like the one that further justification. suggests advance notice of the intent to take coun- Also indicative of the trend towards interpreting termeasures is required as a matter of law.

61 Articles on State Responsibility, 119-120, 135-137. The Articles are not binding law themselves, but are widely viewed as accurately reflecting customary international law in most part. 62 Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 8. 63 Netherlands MFA Letter, 7. See also the submission of the United States to the 2014-2015 GGE, “Applicability of International Law to Con- flicts in Cyberspace,” in CarrieLyn D. Guymon, ed., Digest of United States Practice in International Law (2014), 732, 739, https://2009-2017.state. gov/documents/organization/244504.pdf: “[the State] generally must call upon the responsible State to cease its wrongful conduct, unless urgent countermeasures are necessary to preserve the injured State’s rights.” 64 Wright Address. 65 Articles on State Responsibility, 129. 66 Office of the President, Estonia, “President of the Republic at the Opening of CyCon 2019,” May 29, 2019, https://president.ee/en/official-du- ties/speeches/15241-president-of-the-republic-at-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/. 67 Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 7. 68 Department of Defense, “Summary: Cyber Strategy,” 2018, 4, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRAT- EGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF%20. See also, The White House, “National Cyber Strategy of the United States,” Sept. 2018, 20-21, https://www. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf; U.S. Cyber Command, “Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority: Command Vision for US Cyber Command,” April 2018, https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20Vision%20April%20 2018.pdf?ver=2018-06-14-152556-010.

44 45 The Scholar Taming the Lawless Void: Tracking the Evolution of International Law Rules for Cyberspace

States have also discovered the “plea of necessi- er, as emphasized by the Netherlands, “At present For its part, even though France has rejected the Concluding Thoughts ty,” which seldom drew attention prior to the ad- there is no international consensus on qualifying premise that an armed attack can be conducted vent of cyber operations. Like countermeasures, a cyberattack as an armed attack if it does not by a non-state actor with no affiliation to a state, It is clear that the prospects for new laws appli- this plea is a circumstance precluding wrongful- cause fatalities, physical damage or destruction it hedges its bets: “[I]t cannot be ruled out that cable to cyberspace are slim. Instead, most pro- ness. It is available when a state is facing “grave yet nevertheless has very serious non-material general practice may shift towards an interpreta- gress will come in the form of the interpretation of and imminent peril” to an “essential interest” and consequences.”74 tion of the law of self-defence as being authorised longstanding rules of international law, primarily by no means of putting an end to that peril exists Again, France is a trailblazer in interpreting the in response to an armed attack by non-state ac- states. That interpretation is likely to be motivated other than actions that would be considered un- norm. In 2019, it announced, tors whose acts are not attributable to a State.”78 by a prevailing perception that international law is a lawful under different circumstances.69 Impor- Finally, states are confirming that there is a right useful normative firewall against hostile cyber oper- tantly, victim states can rely upon the plea of ne- A cyberattack could qualify as an armed at- to anticipatory self-defense. Of particular note, Aus- ations attributable to or launched from within other cessity when the otherwise unlawful response to tack when it causes substantial loss of life tralia has taken the position that it may respond in states. This approach is a laudatory one that will en- a qualifying hostile cyber operation would violate or significant physical or economic damage. self-defense when “the attacker is clearly commit- hance stability and security in cyberspace. a legal obligation owed to a state that had noth- This would be the case of an operation in ted to launching an armed attack, in circumstances Yet, there will be obstacles along the way. As not- ing to do with the grave and imminent peril. This cyberspace affecting critical infrastructure where the victim will lose its last opportunity to ed, states sometimes cherry-pick amongst inter- distinction is especially significant, for, unlike with significant consequences, or likely to effectively defend itself unless it acts.”79 It points national law rules to suit themselves. To embrace countermeasures, states can turn to the plea of paralyze whole sectors of the country’s ac- to the possibility of a threatened offensive cyber certain rules of international law while rejecting necessity to justify operations against non-state tivity, to trigger administrative or ecologi- operation at the armed attack level that could others without a sound legal basis for doing so is actors or in situations in which the identity of the cal disasters and to cause many victims.75 “cause large-scale loss of human life and damage to place the entire normative enterprise at risk. attacker is unclear. to critical infrastructure. Such an attack might be Moreover, some states will continue to profess fi- France has announced that it “does not exclude In making this announcement, France became launched in a split-second … Is it seriously to be delity to international legal norms while violating the possibility of invoking the state of distress to the first state to unequivocally take a view that the suggested that a state has no right to take action them with impunity — as is common with respect protect an essential interest against a cyberattack notion of an armed attack includes cyber opera- before that split-second?” Since no state in such a to international human rights law obligations. And, below the threshold of military aggression consti- tions that do not cause physical damage or injury situation would likely hesitate to defend itself, the short-sighted tactics are impeding an interpretive tuting a serious danger that is imminent.”70 And, at all. Rather, the approach focuses on the severity Australian interpretation is prescient. journey that will benefit all members of the inter- while the precise parameters of the concepts of of an operation. This focus was a possibility that In fairness, there are a few indicators that ap- national community. Hopefully, governments will “grave,” “imminent,” and “essential interest” are had been raised earlier by the Netherlands’ min- pear contrary to the broad trend towards ensur- grasp the long-term costs of such strategies. unsettled, the Netherlands has suggested that, ister of defense, although it does not explicitly ap- ing international law is interpreted in a manner Nevertheless, there are reasons to be optimistic. “in the government’s view[,] services such as the pear in the most recent expression of Dutch views that allows leeway for victim state responses. The vector of the interpretive efforts in support of electricity grid, water supply and the banking on how international law applies in cyberspace.76 For instance, there now appears to be a growing international law is clearly positive, and the scope system certainly fall into this category.”71 Oth- There are other indications that states are un- consensus that countermeasures must be “neces- and pace of such efforts are growing. Of greatest sig- er states are likely to embrace the plea for crisis comfortable with stringent limitations on their sary” in the sense of there being no alternative nificance is the commitment of many states to en- management purposes, for — again as noted by right to self-defense in cyberspace. Some have ex- to taking them to resolve the situation80 and that suring that cyberspace becomes and remains a rule the Netherlands — “[t]his ground for justification pressed the view that the right includes defense they do not allow for the use of force.81 Further- of law domain. Such states are to be commended. is primarily aimed at giving a state the opportuni- against cyber operations conducted by non-state more, some states still cling to a traditional in- ty to protect its own interests and minimise the actors if the operations cause consequences at the terpretation of circumstances precluding wrong- Michael N. Schmitt is a professor of interna- damage it suffers.”72 armed attack level. In these cases, self-defense fulness, as France does with respect to collective tional law at the University of Reading; Strauss The circumstance precluding wrongfulness that against non-state actors can be conducted in an- countermeasures and self-defense against non- Center distinguished fellow at the University of Tex- allows for the most robust response is an “armed other state’s territory when the territorial state is state actors. And, recall that Russia, China, and a as; Francis Lieber distinguished scholar at the U.S. attack” justifying a use of force in self-defense “unable or unwilling” to take action against the number of other states were unwilling to mention Military Academy at West Point; Charles Stockton pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and operations. Some states have also taken the po- the term “self-defense” or include text referring distinguished scholar-in-residence at the U.S. Na- customary law.73 A cyber operation that generates sition that states are entitled to aggregate effects to countermeasures in the aborted final report of val War College; and senior fellow with the NATO significant damage, destruction, injury, or death of a series of related hostile cyber operations to the 2016-2017 Group of Governmental Experts. But Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence. A would surely qualify as an armed attack. Howev- reach the severity threshold of self-defense.77 the interpretive vector certainly points in the di- version of this article is forthcoming as “The Law rection of a liberal interpretation of circumstanc- of Cyber Conflict: Quo Vadis 2.0?,” inThe Future of es precluding wrongfulness, signaling support for Armed Conflict, eds. Matthew Waxman and Thom- 69 Articles on State Responsibility, 80-84. relying on international law as a viable and useful as Oakley, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021). 70 Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 8. tool in the fight against hostile cyber operations. 71 Netherlands MFA Letter, 8. Photo: Air Force photo J.M. Eddins, Jr. 72 Netherlands MFA Letter, 8. 73 UN Charter Art. 51. See also, Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 333-347. 74 Netherlands MFA Letter, 9. 75 Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 8. 78 Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 9. 76 The Netherlands, Ministry of Defence, “Keynote Address by the Minister of Defence, Ms. Ank Bijleveld, Marking the First Anniversary of the 79 Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, “2019 International Law Supplement;” see also, Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, 351-353. Tallinn Manual 2.0,” June 20, 2018, https://english.defensie.nl/downloads/speeches/2018/06/21/keynote-address-by-the-minister-of-defence-ms.- ank-bijleveld-marking-the-first-anniversary-of-the-tallinn-manual-2.0-on-the-20th-of-june-2018. 80 “Applicability of International Law to Conflicts,” 739; Wright Address. 77 See, e.g., “Applicability of International Law to Conflicts,” 735; Wright Address; Netherlands MFA Letter, 9; Ministry of the Armies Position 81 “Applicability of International Law to Conflicts,” 739; Wright Address; Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, “2019 Internation- Paper, 9 (accumulation of effects). al Law Supplement;” Netherlands MFA Letter, 7; Ministry of the Armies Position Paper, 8.

46 47 48 The Strategist 49

The Strategist

This section is dedicated to publishing the work of current and former senior policymakers, members of the military, and civilian national security practitioners. The Strategist Economic Might, National Security, and the Future of American Statecraft

Given the many significant challenges America faces today — including high levels of debt, political discord, the rise of China, and the emergence of Asian economies as the drivers of global growth — what is the country’s plan for preserving its great- power primacy? In this article, the authors examine the power that resides at the intersection of economics and national security, and propose how better to sustain the country’s economic might and leverage it in the service of American primacy.

he COVID-19 crisis and the resulting ful military and is the global leader in technological economic devastation have fueled al- development and innovation.7 It possesses unri- ready growing concerns about the state valed structural power, due both to its reserve cur- of the U.S.-led world order.1 For the rency and to America’s role in having shaped the pastT decade, public figures have raised concerns principles of the global order and of international about the rise of China,2 the erosion of the Amer- institutions.8 Its network of like-minded allies and ican dream,3 the perceived failures of American partners has endowed it with a unique ability to in- leadership,4 and America’s relative loss of power.5 fluence international affairs.9 And a vibrant, strong Now, suffering through a tragic international crisis, economy has sustained the growth of American it is only natural that people might wonder what power,10 helped along by America’s unique political the future holds. Whether one agrees with these values and culture, and its standing as a symbol of concerns or not, it is undeniable that many Ameri- democracy for the world.11 cans are uneasy about their country’s future.6 At the same time, despite its many advantag- The reality of American power is complicated. es, America currently faces serious headwinds, By most measures, the United States still enjoys including high levels of debt, reduced economic preeminence: It maintains the world’s most power- mobility, political discord, and the emergence of

1 See, e.g., Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2020, https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order; and Richard Haas, “The Pandemic Will Accelerate History David H. McCormick Rather than Reshape It,” Foreign Affairs, April 7, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-07/pandemic-will-acceler- ate-history-rather-reshape-it. 2 This perception is most notably captured in the “Thucydides Trap” concept, popularized by Graham Allison in, among others, Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). 3 See, e.g., Josh Hawley, “Speech at the National Conservatism Conference,” July 18, 2019, https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-josh-haw- leys-speech-national-conservatism-conference. Charles E. Luftig 4 See, e.g., Robert Kagan, “The Cost of American Retreat,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 7, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/thecost-of-ameri- can-retreat-1536330449. James M. Cunningham 5 See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009). 6 A Pew poll, released in March 2019, reported that 60 percent of Americans surveyed thought America’s global status would decline in the coming decades. Kim Parker, Rich Morin, and Juliana Menasce Horowitz, “Looking to the Future, Public Sees an America in Decline on Many Fronts,” Pew Research Center, March 21, 2019, https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/03/21/public-sees-an-america-in-decline-on-many-fronts/. 7 Scientific and technological expertise are leading sources of national power in the modern age. See, Ashley J. Tellis et al., Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000). 8 Hal Brands describes the benefits America’s leadership in international institutions and guiding their underlying principles in, Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016). See also, Susan Strange, “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” International Organization 41, no. 4 (Autumn, 1987): 551–74, https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0020818300027600. 9 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5. 10 Economic power does not lend itself to a simple formulation, but Samuel Huntington identified some of the elements of economic power, including dominance of markets, foreign exchange reserves, and a strong currency. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Economic Renewal of America,” National Interest, no. 27 (Spring 1992): 14–27. See also, William P. Bundy, “Elements of Power,” Foreign Affairs 56, no. 1 (October 1977): 1–26, https:// www.jstor.org/stable/20039804. 11 Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of American Power,” Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 1 (Spring, 1994): 14–15.

50 51 The Strategist Economic Might, National Security, and the Future of American Statecraft

a rising power.12 Even prior to the outbreak of the lieve more can be done to sustain the country’s tration’s forthcoming economic security strategy The Convergence of National Security pandemic, America’s long-term spending commit- economic might and to leverage it in service of will likely outline valuable guidance, the United and Economics ments — including government and private debt, American primacy. States has, for decades, lacked a clear agenda for and pension and entitlement liabilities — totaled As the 2017 National Security Strategy succinct- coordinating its economic statecraft, domestic in- National security and economics have long been roughly 10 times the country’s GDP.13 These de- ly puts it, “Economic security is national securi- vestments, and international partnerships to sus- connected, and, since its earliest days, the Unit- velopments, combined with growing political po- ty.”20 Driven by economic interdependence, the tain American primacy. ed States has leveraged that reality to advance its larization,14 have contributed to domestic unease, race to develop transformational technologies, We believe policymakers should take steps to national objectives.25 However, since World War something the pandemic may worsen.15 and the ubiquity of cyberspace, national security integrate economic and national security policy. II, these two spheres have grown ever more in- The emergence of Asian economies as the driv- and economics are converging. And that conver- They can do this by adopting a three-part poli- tertwined. In many respects, that convergence ers of global growth and the rise of China have gence is, according to Henry Farrell and Abraham cy agenda to promote 1) innovation; 2) economic bolstered American primacy, particularly as a re- also challenged American preeminence.16 The Chi- Newman, “turning the global networked economy statecraft; and 3) international coordination. We sult of America’s influence over the global econo- nese Communist Party has proclaimed its plans into a space of strategic actions, counteractions, propose a principled policy to fund, coordinate, my and its leadership of international institutions to achieve great-power primacy in the coming threats, targeting, counter-targeting and decou- and incentivize domestic innovation and to at- and in innovation. decades and has set about contesting American pling.”21 This has, in some respects, been true for tract and develop the people needed to do so. We Economic interdependence between states is un- economic, military, structural, and cultural pow- decades, but it is accelerating. recommend policymakers evolve the country’s balanced, giving some states an asymmetric, or dis- er.17 These developments in China raise the ques- Other countries, including Russia and China, economic statecraft toolkit and develop a more proportionate, ability to influence their economic tion: What is America’s plan for preserving its have recognized this reality and are already in- targeted and sustainable strategy for its use. And partners. Over time, globalization has also led to great-power primacy? tegrating their economic and security strategies we encourage coordination with allies and part- the development of asymmetric networks, which Some in America have gone through similar in order to compete with the United States.22 ners, as well as engagement in some multilateral have given certain countries, particularly the Unit- crises of confidence before,18 and each time the However, over the past two decades the United structures. Doing so will make pro-innovation pol- ed States, outsized advantage.26 Today, money and country has leveraged its unique strengths and States has been slow to adapt. The Trump admin- icies and economic statecraft far more effective. information flow through central locations in the capacities to recover and reach new heights.19 istration’s recognition that America is engaged To make this new agenda a reality, the U.S. gov- global economy, and the United States has long had How then, with these current headwinds, can the in great-power competition and that China is its ernment will also need new approaches to policy- preponderant influence over those choke points. United States repeat that cycle of renewal? What primary strategic competitor is a critical step in making and managing talent. In this article, we ex- With jurisdiction over the “hubs” of financial and unique strengths and asymmetric advantages can the right direction, as was the administration’s plore potential process and institutional reforms information flows, such as The Society for World- today’s leaders leverage to achieve that goal? That acknowledgment that “promoting American pros- that could overcome longstanding stovepipes and wide Interbank Financial Telecommunication question is the primary focus of this article. To perity makes America more secure and advances bureaucratic interests, and we recommend new (SWIFT) and the dollar clearance system, and the answer it, we examine the power that resides at American influence in the world.”23 Yet, the Unit- talent management strategies to ensure the right institutions built to enforce that jurisdiction, the the intersection of economics and national securi- ed States still needs to improve and develop the people, with the right expertise and experience, United States has often been ahead of the curve in ty and in doing so argue that America’s economic structures and human capital that would best ad- are seated around the policymaking table. its use of economic tools for national security pur- power underwrites its national security. We be- dress those issues. And while the Trump adminis- The policy agenda presented here is an effort to poses.27 Moreover, U.S. leadership allowed America further strengthen America’s economic dynamism to set the standards for many existing technologies

12 See an online series of articles by Ray Dalio: “The Changing World Order,” https://www.principles.com/the-changing-world-order/. and renew how the country builds and leverages and shape the formation of international institu- 13 Greg Jensen and Jason Rogers, “The Crisis Is Accelerating the New Paradigm,” Bridgewater Associates, LP, March 30, 2020, https://www. its power in a rapidly changing and increasingly tions, further extending its influence. bridgewater.com/research-library/daily-observations/the-crisis-is-accelerating-the-new-paradigm/. competitive landscape. There are other critical However, the accelerated convergence of nation- 14 See, e.g., Morris P. Fiorina, “The Democratic Distemper,” The Hoover Institution, May 14, 2019, https://www.hoover.org/research/democrat- building blocks of American power — ranging al security and economic affairs now threatens to ic-distemper. from military readiness and modernization to the undermine America’s traditional power, as can be 15 Decay can be seen as losing the sources of domestic dynamism or of cultural, ideological, or political power. See, e.g., Samuel Huntington’s health of the democratic process — that deserve seen in three interdependent trends: 1) increasing review of the common arguments in, Samuel P. Huntington, “The U.S.: Decline or Renewal?” Foreign Affairs 67, no. 2 (Winter 1988): 76–96, https:// www.jstor.org/stable/20043774. For more contemporary writing on decline and the perception of decline, see, e.g., Hal Brands, “American Grand the attention of America’s leaders but are not ad- economic interdependence and the shifting geog- Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era,” in New Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0: ANU Strategic & Defence Studies Centre’s Golden Anniversary dressed here. This agenda focuses on advancing raphy of the global economy; 2) the international Conference Proceedings, ed. Russell W. Glenn (Acton, AU: Australian National University, 2018); and Ray Dalio, “The Changing World Order.” America’s interests by, in the words of Sen. Mar- development of transformational, dual-use tech- 16 Dalio, “The Changing World Order.” co Rubio, “rejuvenating our nation’s economic nologies; and 3) the increasing ubiquity and impor- 17 Much has been written on China’s rise and geopolitical ambitions. See, e.g., H.R. McMaster, “How China Sees the World: And How We Should power.”24 Our goal is ambitious and targeted — tance of cyberspace. It is important to understand See China,” The Atlantic, May 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/05/mcmaster-china-strategy/609088/; Ashley J. Tellis, “Pursuing Global Reach: China’s Not So Long March Toward Preeminence,” in Strategic Asia 2019: China’s Expanding Strategic Ambitions, ed. Ashley to adapt U.S. policy and policymaking to ensure these trends before determining what steps the J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019); Gary J. Schmitt, “The China Dream: America’s economic, technological, and political United States should take to address them. America’s, China’s, and the Resulting Competition,” American Enterprise Institute, Jan. 18, 2019, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/ the-china-dream-americas-chinas-and-the-resulting-competition/; and Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese leadership for decades to come. State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 18 For example, after the Soviet Union launched the Sputnik satellite and during the oil crisis of the 1970s. 19 See, e.g., H.R. McMaster, “Reclaiming America’s Strategic Confidence,” remarks at the Reagan National Defense Forum, Dec. 2, 2017, https:// 24 Marco Rubio, “American Industrial Policy and the Rise of China,” Remarks Delivered at the National Defense University, Dec. 10, 2019, repub- www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-ltg-h-r-mcmaster-reagan-national-defense-forum-reclaiming-americas-strategic-confidence/; lished in The American Mind, https://americanmind.org/essays/american-industrial-policy-and-the-rise-of-china/. and Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment. 25 Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris review the foundations of economic statecraft and America’s long history of employing economic power 20 The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/up- in, Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016). loads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 26 Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International 21 Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Introducing a New Paper on ‘Weaponized Interdependence,’” Lawfare, July 31, 2019, https://www. Security 44, no. 1 (Summer 2019): 42–79, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351. lawfareblog.com/introducing-new-paper-weaponized-interdependence. 27 Former Bush administration official Juan Zarate has documented some of the innovative ways he and his colleagues used financial tools 22 See, e.g., H.R. McMaster, “How China Sees the World.” to punish and coerce rogue actors, especially through Section 311 sanctions. See, Juan C. Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of 23 The National Security Strategy of the United States, 18. Financial Warfare (New York: PublicAffairs 2013).

52 53 The Strategist Economic Might, National Security, and the Future of American Statecraft

Economic Interdependence Europe as a primary monetary system,33 and Asia to control of data — data that will drive the emerg- Cyberspace — in particular China — has become the key driv- ing global economy and prove essential to effective After World War II, global trade began to grow er of global growth.34 Significant divisions remain national defense.37 It is clear that if a bad actor can With more than 4 billion internet users, cyber- rapidly and that growth has accelerated over the within Asia, but this new environment, left un- access any portion of the communications net- space has been a driving force behind global eco- past 50 years. Trade, as a share of global GDP, has checked, threatens to diminish America’s histor- works, the data that flows through that network nomic growth for three decades. It also increasing- roughly doubled relative to the 1970s.28 Today, near- ical advantages, including its ability to influence will be compromised.38 Unfortunately, the Chinese ly ties into the physical world.43 At the same time, ly half of the goods manufactured in the United the behavior of other states. firm Huawei is outpacing its competitors in devel- as the Cyberspace Solarium Commission warned, States are exported, and supply chains have grown oping 5G, in part because it has received massive “a broad array of threat actors are exploiting glob- more complex.29 Although economic interdepend- state subsidies and can offer favorable financing al connectivity to achieve their objectives.”44 The ence has plateaued in recent years, major econo- terms to prospective clients, which threatens the commission documented recent, illicit operations mies are significantly more interdependent today long-term security of U.S. data, and that of its allies conducted by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and than they were at the beginning of the century.30 and partners.39 non-state actors and echoed the Trump adminis- In some instances, economic interdependence has In other technological sectors where the United tration’s 2018 National Cyber Strategy in warning exacted significant costs to both national security States remains the leader, such as artificial intel- about the numerous vulnerabilities inherent to and American communities, as recently evidenced ligence (AI)-related technologies and quantum ubiquitous connectivity.45 by America’s dependence on China-based supply sciences, that leadership is not guaranteed. These Moreover, multinational technology companies chains during the COVID-19 crisis. technologies will likely have significant economic have been sources of incredible innovation and For many decades, America’s central role in the and national security implications,40 and whoever economic development for the United States and global economy allowed it to set the standards for leads in their development will set their standards the world, but they also short-circuit the tradition- many existing technologies, shape the formation Transformational Technologies and gain the immense competitive advantages they al economic network and act almost as interna- of international institutions, and develop leverage offer.41 America’s innovative edge cannot be taken tional governing bodies. They increasingly operate over primary choke points in the global economy. Longstanding U.S. leadership in technological for granted, and preserving it will require signifi- as choke points of information flows themselves But that balance of the global economy is arguably development and innovation is also being contest- cant national commitment.42 and could soon create new networks of financial shifting toward Asia. China is competing for great- ed — especially in sectors with significant securi- er leverage and jurisdiction and is encouraging the ty implications, such as 5G — though the United reintegration of Asia writ large.31 Some even see a States continues to lead in machine learning and 37 If one company is contracted to provide the bulk of the network architecture, it could quickly knock its competitors out of the market. Jenalea multipolar world emerging, which would severely quantum sciences. These and other transforma- Howell, “Press Release: Number of Connected IoT Will Surge to 125 billion by 2030, IHS Markit Says,” InformaTech, Oct. 24, 2017, https://technology. degrade America’s ability to influence a “China-cen- tional technologies offer significant economic and ihs.com/596542/number-of-connected-iot-devices-will-surge-to-125-billion-by-2030-ihs-markit-says; Zak Doffman, “Network Effects: In 2019 IoT and tric Asia” through economic or political means.32 military potential. The race to develop 5G, for ex- 5G Will Push AI to the Very Edge,” Forbes, Dec. 28, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2018/12/28/network-effects-in-2019-iot-and- 5g-will-push-ai-to-the-very-edge/#5c619a396bbe; Peter Harrell, “5G: National Security Concerns, Intellectual Property Issues, and the Impact on Although previous predictions of American ample, could have a profound effect not only on Competition and Innovation,” Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 14, 2019, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/ decline have proven to be overly pessimistic, a economic prosperity,35 but also on national securi- imo/media/doc/Harrell%20Testimony.pdf; and Hoehn and Sayler, “National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5g) Mobile Technologies.” tri-polar economic environment may be emerg- ty.36 Moreover, 5G appears to be a winner-take-all 38 See, Tom Cotton and John Cornyn, “Keep the Chinese Government Away from 5G technology,” Washington Post, April 1, 2019, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/keep-the-chinese-government-away-from-5g-technology/2019/04/01/ba7a30ac-54b3-11e9-9136- ing. China is pushing to join the United States and sector where control of the infrastructure equates f8e636f1f6df_story.html. 39 Huawei has received, by some measures, as much as $75 billion in subsidies, tax breaks, and other forms of state support. Chuin-Wei Yap, “State Support Helped Fuel Huawei’s Global Rise,” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 25, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-hua- 28 Greg Jensen et al., “Peak Profit Margins? A Global Perspective,” Bridgewater Associates, LP, March 27, 2019, https://www.bridgewater.com/ weis-global-rise-11577280736. research-library/daily-observations/peak-profit-margins-a-global-perspective/. 40 Although estimates vary, one projection suggests that the total economic activity attributable to AI will total more than $13 trillion by 29 The United States leads in high-end semiconductor design, but China produces 70 percent of the rare earth metals and South Korea leads 2030, and AI will likely radically change how businesses operate. Moreover, machine learning will likely offer new military capabilities, including on displays and other crucial inputs. Jason Rotenberg and Jeff Amato, “Peak Globalization?” Bridgewater Associates, LP, November 11, 2016; and advanced autonomous systems and more efficient intelligence gathering, and is expected to revolutionize cyber security, threat intelligence, and Magdalena Petrova, “We Traced What It Takes to Make an iPhone,” CNBC, Dec. 14, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/13/inside-apple-iphone- other applications relying on faster data-processing speeds. Jacques Bughin et al., “Notes from the AI Frontier: Modeling the Impact of AI on the where-parts-and-materials-come-from.html. World Economy,” McKinsey & Company, September 2018, https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/artificial-intelligence/notes-from-the-ai- frontier-modeling-the-impact-of-ai-on-the-world-economy. See also, Mark Esper, “Remarks by Secretary Esper at National Security Commission 30 Signs of reduced interdependence include the leveling off of growth for exports and corporate foreign sales, according to research done by on Artificial Intelligence Public Conference,” Department of Defense, Nov. 5, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/ Bridgewater Associates, LP. See, e.g., “Peak Profit Margins? A Global Perspective.” Article/2011960/remarks-by-secretary-esper-at-national-security-commission-on-artificial-intell/. Although quantum computing is expected to have 31 Some of those efforts, notably One Belt One Road, appear to be running out of steam, but not all. See, Derek Scissors, “The Belt and Road Is a slower build than 5G and AI, once matured, the value in this area could spike to $50 billion or more by 2030. Massimo Russo, Anant Thaker, and Overhyped, Commercially,” Statement Before the Senate Finance Committee Subcommittee on International Trade, Customs, and Global Competi- Suhare Adam, “The Coming Quantum Leap in Computing,” Boston Consulting Group, May 16, 2018, https://www.bcg.com/en-us/publications/2018/ tiveness, June 12, 2019, https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Derek%20Scissors%20-%20BRI%20Testimony.pdf. coming-quantum-leap-computing.aspx. 32 “Globalisation Is Dead and We Need to Invent a New World Order,” The Economist, June 28, 2019, https://www.economist.com/open-fu- 41 Summary of the Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy, Department of Defense, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2019/ ture/2019/06/28/globalisation-is-dead-and-we-need-to-invent-a-new-world-order. Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF. 33 Although use of the RMB remains low in comparison to the U.S. dollar or the Euro, it is the currency for the primary market in the engine of 42 In the words of Attorney General William Barr, “For the first time in history, the United States is not leading the next technology era.” William economic growth — Asia. Moreover, China’s monetary policy operates independently from the U.S. Federal Reserve’s. See, “2020 Strategic Report: Our Barr, “Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference,” Department of Justice, Feb. 6, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/ Economic Outlook,” Bridgewater Associates, 2020, https://www.bridgewater.com/outlook2020/Bridgewater-Associates-2020-Strategic-Report.pdf. opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-keynote-address-department-justices-china. 34 “2020 Strategic Report.” 43 Including to infrastructure, public health systems, and other elements of the “Internet of Things.” See, for example, Kate O’Flaherty, “U.S. Government Makes Surprise Move to Secure Power Grid for Cyberattacks,” Forbes, July 3, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyu- 35 By some estimates, 5G could add another $500 billion to America’s GDP and generate another $12.3 trillion in global sales. Michael Kratsios, k/2019/07/03/u-s-government-makes-surprise-move-to-secure-power-grid-from-cyber-attacks/#64b90e863191; and “ICS Medical Advisory “America Will Win the Global Race to 5G,” Office of Science and Technology Policy, Oct. 25, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/america-will- (ICSMA-19-080-01),” Department of Homeland Security, March 21, 2019, https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/advisories/ICSMA-19-080-01. This medical win-global-race-5g/; Jill C. Gallagher and Michael E. DeVine, “Fifth Generation (5G) Telecommunications Technologies: Issues for Congress,” Congres- advisory warned that hundreds of thousands of implanted defibrillators, programmers, and heart monitors could be subject to cyber attacks. sional Research Service, Jan. 30, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45485.pdf; and Karen Campbell et al., “The 5G Economy: How 5G Technology Will Contribute to the Global Economy,” IHS Markit, January 2017, https://cdn.ihs.com/www/pdf/IHS-Technology-5G-Economic-Impact-Study.pdf. 44 Report of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, Cyberspace Solarium Commission, March 2020, 8, https://www.solarium.gov/. 36 5G, for example, is expected to facilitate new military and intelligence applications, and vulnerabilities in 5G equipment could be used to 45 The cyber operations highlighted in the report include well-known cases, such as North Korea’s 2014 cyber attack on Sony Pictures Entertain- conduct cyber attacks and espionage or to engage in military or industrial sabotage. John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Sayler, “National Security Implica- ment, China’s 2017 breach of Equifax, and the NotPetya attack on Ukraine in the same year, which spread globally and cost companies as much as tions of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies,” Congressional Research Service, June 12, 2019, updated March 25, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/ $10 billion. Report of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, 8–14. National Cyber Strategy of the United States, The White House, September 2018, crs/natsec/IF11251.pdf. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf.

54 55 The Strategist Economic Might, National Security, and the Future of American Statecraft

transactions.46 The United States, Europe, and Chi- three primary areas of focus: 1) innovation; 2) eco- portant steps to promote America’s economic Principle II: Develop nascent technologies na have developed three competing visions of In- nomic statecraft; and 3) international cooperation. dynamism.53 It ought to accelerate these efforts or capabilities with asymmetric upsides ternet and data governance, but no international to help ensure the success of U.S. companies in consensus has emerged, further complicating the I. Develop and Support a National developing emerging technologies and to pro- Government funding for early stage research ac- global landscape.47 Innovation Policy mote domestic innovation.54 The administration tivities could yield significant benefits at relatively should continue its work with commercial entities low cost. Research areas could include metamate- During the Cold War, federal research and devel- to develop and acquire dual-use capabilities, and rials, bio-synthetics, energy storage, and bioengi- A New Policy Agenda opment funding contributed to the prosperity, secu- it ought to pair innovation support with targeted neering, as well as manufacturing capabilities, such rity, and, ultimately, primacy of the United States. economic sanctions and international coordination as advanced additive manufacturing or innovative These three economic and technological trends The U.S. government funded basic and applied to address the reality that U.S. companies do not computer-aided design tools enabled by high-per- pose challenges to American power, but they also research projects and developed capabilities that compete on a level playing field with many of their formance computing.56 These are high-reward, present the United States with opportunities to served agency mandates, including new weapons closest competitors. low-risk targeted investments — the sorts of pro- leverage that power. As Secretary of Defense Mark systems and space technologies.49 It mostly stayed We recognize the real and justified concerns jects that have produced great value for the United Esper recently warned, “The reality of the 21st out of commercial development, but private sector about crony capitalism and the inefficient alloca- States in the past. century is that many economic decisions are also entities still benefited from federally funded re- tion of capital, and we are not endorsing China’s national security decisions.”48 Still, balancing eco- search, turning scientific and technological advanc- centralized, top-down model. At the same time, we Principle III: Support domestic development in nomic and national security policy is no easy task. es into new companies, jobs, and industries, thus believe government should do more. To balance strategic sectors or technologies in which foreign Too often, security concerns related to economic contributing to America’s unmatched prosperity.50 these competing objectives and to help ensure the firms are heavily subsidized by competitor states decision-making get short shrift. But there is also However, this approach is no longer sufficient government does not get in the habit of picking an equal and opposite risk that unconstrained, ad given the convergence of economic and national winners and losers, we propose the following prin- The Chinese Communist Party’s Made in China hoc efforts to protect national security through security affairs. The private sector is the primary ciples to guide its investment. 2025 plan makes clear that, in sectors of significant economic policy could sap America’s competitive source of innovation and research and develop- security import, Chinese firms will enjoy substan- advantage, or worse. If taken too far, restricting or ment funding now, yet new technologies increas- Principle I: Promote development in sectors tial state support, and that non-Chinese firms will constraining key industries in the name of nation- ingly blur the line between military and civilian with winner-take-all structures or large compete on uneven ground.57 Trade adjustments al security could undermine national competitive- use.51 Moreover, as noted previously, these high- first-mover advantages are often the response of choice to such anti-com- ness. Policymakers must therefore be prudent in tech sectors are often winner-take-all. Foreign petitive practices, but considering the first-mover how they weigh their decisions to compete and to states and companies are challenging U.S. innova- Given the long-term shift toward investments advantages present in the high-tech sector, post preserve America’s and its allies’ competitive ad- tion leadership, including through anticompetitive in intangible capital and the scalability of soft- facto trade action may be too little too late.58 In- vantages. The recommendations that follow are policies and the two-way transfer of military and ware-driven products, companies can seize dom- novation support may prove necessary in these in- designed to help policymakers do just that. Our civilian technologies.52 Each of these factors weak- inant market positions if they outpace their com- stances and could be coupled with complementary policy agenda seeks to confront the new reality ens the traditional U.S. approach to innovation, petitors. This phenomenon changes the nature of trade and export policies. described above by balancing investment in U.S. wherein the federal government focuses on either economic competition, but it also has convergent capacity with efforts to redress malicious behav- basic science research or specific applied research national security implications, as seen in the case Principle IV: Develop technologies or capabilities ior abroad, while at the same time strengthening and development projects. of Huawei’s 5G network infrastructure. If Huawei with significant strategic importance America’s network of partners and allies, through The Trump administration has taken some im- continues to seize market share, we could be fac- ing a global 5G-infrastructure market with only one Directed by national strategy, the U.S. govern- 46 Facebook’s development of an internet-native currency, Libra, which is discussed later in the paper. For more on information networks, see, provider, a provider that poses significant security ment should identify technologies or desired capa- Niall Ferguson, The Square and the Tower: Networks and Power, from the Freemasons to Facebook (New York: Penguin Books, 2017). risks to the United States and its partners.55 In cas- bilities that would yield significant dual-use bene- 47 See, for example, China’s “New IP” proposal, presented to the International Telecommunications Union. es like this, the U.S. government should promote fits, such as commercial space launch or advanced Madhumita Murgia and Anna Gross, “Inside China’s Controversial Mission to Reinvent the Internet,” Financial Times, March 27, 2020, https://www. 59 ft.com/content/ba94c2bc-6e27-11ea-9bca-bf503995cd6f. alternatives that favor its standards and principles. energy technologies. 48 Mark Esper, “Remarks Delivered at the Munich Security Conference,” Department of Defense, Feb. 15, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News- room/Speeches/Speech/Article/2085577/remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-mark-t-esper-at-the-munich-security-conference/. 53 For example, the administration has reduced the pace of regulations and prioritized deregulation, promoting competition and economic dynamism. See, The Economic Effects of Federal Deregulation Since January 2017: An Interim Report, The Council of Economic Advisors, June 2019, 49 “National Patterns of R&D Resources: 2017–18 Data Update,” National Science Foundation, updated Jan. 8, 2020, https://ncses.nsf.gov/ https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The-Economic-Effects-of-Federal-Deregulation-Interim-Report.pdf. See also, “Special pubs/nsf20307#&. Briefing with Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Keith Krach,” U.S. State Department, Feb. 4, 2020, https://www. 50 The “knock-on” effects of federal research and development funding are well documented and include GPS, smartphone technologies, and, state.gov/under-secretary-for-economic-growth-energy-and-the-environment-keith-krach/. of course, the internet. See, e.g., Rubio, “American Industrial Policy and the Rise of China.” Rubio said, “What I am calling for us to do is remem- 54 This view is shared by leaders on opposite ends of the political spectrum, from Elizabeth Warren to Marco Rubio. See, e.g., Julius Krein, ber that from World War II to the Space Race and beyond, a capitalist America has always relied on public-private collaboration to further “What Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Marco Rubio Agree On,” New York Times, Aug. 20, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/opinion/ our national security. And from the internet to GPS, many of the innovations that have made America a technological superpower originated america-industrial-policy.html. from national defense-oriented, public-private partnerships.” See also, James Manyika and William H. McRaven, Innovation and National Security: Keeping Our Edge, Council on Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force Report No. 77 (September 2019), 2, https://www.cfr.org/report/keeping- 55 Barr, “Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference.” our-edge/pdf/TFR_Innovation_Strategy.pdf. 56 See, e.g. “Energy Department to Invest $32 Million in Computer Design of Materials,” Press Release by the U.S. Department of Energy, June 51 In recent years, the federal government was the largest source of basic research funding — providing roughly 42 percent of it — but com- 12, 2019, https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-department-invest-32-million-computer-design-materials. mercial entities provided 85.2 percent of development funding. “U.S. Research and Development Funding and Performance: Fact Sheet,” Congressio- 57 “‘Made in China 2025’ Plan Issued.” nal Research Service, updated Jan. 4, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44307.pdf. 58 See, Brad Setser, “Hearing on Made in China 2025 and the Future of American Industry,” Testimony Before the Senate Committee on 52 The Chinese Communist Party’s “Made in China 2025” plan, for example, called for significant government support of 10 high-tech and Small Business and Entrepreneurship,” Feb. 27, 2019, https://www.sbc.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/3/b/3bd85987-d8b4-48b3-a53e- industrial sectors with the goal of ensuring primarily domestic supply chains and Chinese competitiveness on the global market. The party has 8b49d2060821/4E39BD152B9F358A5E4254D80A512D8B.setser-testimony.pdf. since abandoned the label, but state subsidies and protectionist policies remain. See, Lingling Wei, “Beijing Drops Contentious ‘Made in China 2025’ Slogan, but Policy Remains,” Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-drops-a-policy-the-u-s-dislikes-at-least-in- 59 The Department of Defense, for example, recently awarded three contracts for small, mobile nuclear reactors to provide power at U.S. name-11551795370; and “‘Made in China 2025’ Plan Issued,” The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, May 19, 2015, http://english.www. military installations. Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon Awards Contracts to Design Mobile Nuclear Reactor,” Defense News, March 9, 2020, https://www. gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2015/05/19/content_281475110703534.htm. defensenews.com/smr/nuclear-arsenal/2020/03/09/pentagon-to-award-mobile-nuclear-reactor-contracts-this-week/.

56 57 The Strategist Economic Might, National Security, and the Future of American Statecraft

Investment Strategies al, has received significant support from the Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Greater innovation will also require greater in- Technology Transfer programs, and the federal vestment. We recognize that fiscal realities, espe- government has supported the accompanying in- cially in the wake of the much-needed pandemic frastructure and developed standards to sustain relief packages, will constrain available resourc- the industry.68 es.62 Lawmakers will have to reorder their prior- The lesson is simple: There is no substitute for ities and develop enduring, prudent solutions to cash.69 When the U.S. government identifies a long-term fiscal challenges, but should not do so specific area of need, it should consider not only at the expense of research and development fund- support for basic and applied research but also ing. The cost of losing America’s competitive edge ways to provide sustained funding. Government in innovation far exceeds the cost of the invest- contracts are the most direct means, but the fed- ment required to keep it. eral government can also help increase access to The federal government should expand exist- capital through other means. The Department of ing programs, including offering federal grants for Defense took steps to do just that with the es- basic science research to universities, support- tablishment of the Trusted Capital Marketplace, ing federally funded research and development which is intended to support innovative small- centers, and providing direct research and de- and mid-size firms.70 Government-backed venture velopment funding. To incentivize investment in funds serve that purpose as well. basic and applied sciences, Congress should also The two most prominent examples of venture increase the research and development tax credit, funds in the national security field are In-Q-Tel which is currently smaller than that of most mem- (where one of the authors currently serves on the ber countries of the Organisation for Economic board of directors) and the Defense Innovation Co-operation and Development.63 With AI and ma- Unit.71 As these programs develop a track record chine learning in mind, the U.S. government ought of success, the government will be presented with to facilitate access to data — a “valuable nation- an opportunity: The Department of Defense can al resource and a strategic asset”64 — by creating massively scale the Defense Innovation Unit. Raj more open-source datasets, and expand access to Shah, the former managing director of the Defense Principle V: Spend what is needed to harness ment it with additional measures to secure supply cloud computing resources.65 Innovation Unit, called for a “step-change to su- the private sector and market forces chains or protect U.S. industries, as discussed in Many startups fail to innovate — to commer- percharge DoD access to innovation.”72 Funding for the following section. cialize basic research at scale — in part due to a that program and other innovation efforts should In all cases, the government should attempt to To ensure these principles are followed and to lack of demand at such an early stage.66 SpaceX, increase by an order of magnitude. In addition to channel market forces and incentivize private capi- direct innovation efforts, the policymaking process by contrast, became the innovative success it is established venture funds, first-loss funds, where- tal to the extent possible. Well-functioning markets will need to adapt. These reforms should establish today with the support of NASA, which provid- in the government would provide some portion of remain the most productive driver of innovation. accountable systems for setting priorities, identi- ed some 50 percent of its funding in its first 10 initial investment and be responsible for a signifi- The government should engage enough to opti- fying sectors or capabilities for policy action, and years.67 The commercial space industry, in gener- cant portion of potential losses, could be utilized to mize private sector investment, which would help rigidly adhering to these limiting principles. ensure the competitiveness and sustainability of A U.S. innovation policy governed by these prin- 62 See, e.g., Dov S. Zakheim, “Defense Budget Cuts Following the Pandemic Will Be Hard to Swallow,” The Hill, April 19, 2020, https://thehill. private innovation initiatives. ciples would target those areas where government com/opinion/national-security/492756-defense-budget-cuts-following-the-pandemic-will-be-hard-to-swallow. can provide distinct value and likely solve an exist- 63 “R&D Tax Incentives: United States, 2019,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, December 2019, https://www.oecd. Principle VI: Remember that not all sectors require ing market failure. Governments have a unique ca- org/sti/rd-tax-stats-united-states.pdf. innovation support pacity to facilitate information sharing by opening 64 “Project Open Data,” available at https://project-open-data.cio.gov/. channels of communication and establishing a reg- 65 See, First Quarter Recommendations, National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, March 2020, 12–13, https://drive.google.com/ Some sectors that would qualify for government ular process for public-private information sharing file/d/1wkPh8Gb5drBrKBg6OhGu5oNaTEERbKss/view. support under the preceding principles can be sup- and engagement.60 Doing so would help rebuild the 66 See, for example, Rodrik, Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century. ported by diversifying supply chains, expanding relationships among the innovation triangle — the 67 “U.S. Government Support of the Entrepreneurial Space Age,” Space Angels, June 17, 2019, 2, available for download at https://sbir.nasa.gov/ strategic reserves, or enforcing controls on forced public sector, private industry, and academia — content/publications. technology transfers. The government should not and would encourage mutual understanding, a nec- 68 “U.S. Government Support of the Entrepreneurial Space Age.” always turn to research and development funding essary step for breaking down the cultural barriers 69 As Chris Brose, the former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee, once said, would-be defense contractors “need one thing more than any other from the U.S. government: revenue.” Christian Brose, “Supercharging the Innovation Base,” Testimony Delivered Before the as the first resort. Even when such funding is nec- that restrict collaboration between government Future of Defense Task Force, House Armed Services Committee, Feb. 5, 2010, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20200205/110475/ essary, the government will often have to comple- and high-tech firms.61 HMTG-116-AS00-Wstate-BroseC-20200205.pdf. 70 Aaron Mehta, “To Counter China, Pentagon Wants to Create Patriotic Investors,” Defense News, May 10, 2019, https://www.defensenews. com/pentagon/2019/05/10/to-counter-china-pentagon-wants-to-create-patriotic-investors/. 60 Dani Rodrik, “Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century,” Kennedy School of Government Working Paper, September 2004, https://drodrik. scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/industrial-policy-twenty-first-century.pdf. 71 These funds facilitate defense and intelligence community procurement of new technologies, particularly from non-traditional contractors, and they encourage new entrants into the contractor market. 61 See, for example, comments made at the House Armed Services Committee’s Future of Defense Task Force Hearing “Supercharging the Innovation Base,” held on Feb. 5, 2020. Video recording available at https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings?ID=682ABC1D-2B60-481E-B210- 72 Raj Shah, “Supercharging the Innovation Base,” Prepared Testimony for a Hearing Before the Future of Defense Task Force, House Armed Ser- 2F43BC9476B2. vices Committee, Feb. 5, 2020, 3, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20200205/110475/HMTG-116-AS00-Wstate-ShahR-20200205.pdf.

58 59 The Strategist Economic Might, National Security, and the Future of American Statecraft

incentivize private investment and harness market with international partners to help offset the mar- open opportunities for students. Policymakers could most a nation of immigrants — and should remain forces, while offsetting externalities that limit re- ket distortions caused by China’s state subsides. buttress those efforts by sponsoring scholarship a priority.84 As of 2017, first-generation immigrants search and development funding. 73 We remain mindful of the risks inherent to in- programs for both undergraduate and graduate stu- and their children had founded almost half of For- The Trump administration’s efforts to enact reg- novation policy. Close public-private partnerships dents in STEM programs. The federal government tune 500 companies,85 and immigrants “accounted ulatory reforms that loosen the reins on innovation can become politicized, introducing cronyism and should also work with states, universities, and busi- for 25 percent of all new high-tech companies from and ease the adoption of new civilian technologies preferential investment. But those risks, and the nesses to incentivize job-training pipelines and po- 2006 through 2012.”86 The STEM pipeline is also are excellent and should continue.74 For example, potential for inefficient capital allocation, can be tentially scholarships or debt-forgiveness programs. highly populated by foreign-born students, who ac- agencies ought to look for opportunities to adapt mitigated somewhat through clear decision cri- An even more ambitious path would count for 45 percent of STEM undergraduates and regulations or develop new, permissive environ- teria, transparency, and oversight. However, risk roughly half of STEM graduate students.87 ments early in the innovation cycle.75 They should does come with the territory. If the government However, the United States is losing its also remove onerous occupational licensing re- wants to create a step change in U.S. innovation, ability to attract and keep top global tal- quirements, which hinder productivity and limit it will have to expect and, more importantly, ac- ent.88 Policymakers ought to incentiv- opportunities for broad-based innovation.76 cept failure, as any entrepreneur can attest. Con- ize students in STEM fields to remain in Finally, efforts to promote domestic innovation gress will have to give research and development the United States following graduation should be pursued in coordination both with in- projects some freedom to fail and learn from those and develop policies to attract workers ternational partners and with economic statecraft failures, and the government will have to enforce in these fields to the United States. The efforts to achieve the same goal. Consider the do- ethics accountability. It will also need to ensure country could, for example, in- mestic semiconductor manufacturing equipment America has the human capital necessary to sup- crease the number of annual and semiconductor industries. They form the port continued innovation and dynamism. H-1B visas it offers.89 More than backbone of 5G network infrastructure, machine 50 business school deans agreed, learning systems, and most other modern technol- Education and Immigration be to renew the advocating in fall 2019 for the removal of per-coun- ogy, including many critical national security ca- National Defense Education Act, which helped spur try immigration caps and the creation of a new pabilities. And yet, China’s domestic development To quote Undersecretary of State Keith Krach: American innovation after the launch of the Sputnik “heartland visa” for high-skill immigrants to settle programs and the U.S. government’s own export “The team with the best people wins.”79 The abili- satellite.82 Finally, any effort to improve America’s in struggling communities.90 Other options include controls could combine to hamstring U.S. indus- ty to attract, develop, and retain high-skilled talent talent pipeline must include reforming K-12 educa- establishing a new high-skill visa program for for- try. China’s state-supported effort to build out its is critical to national innovation and economic se- tion and promoting STEM education from a young eign workers in the high-priority sectors outlined domestic industry faces serious challenges but it curity.80 To that end, U.S. education and immigra- age. Although it is beyond the scope of this article, above,91 and encouraging high-tech academic and could still reduce the market available to semicon- tion policy should evolve both to support Ameri- the poor state of too many of the nation’s schools scientific exchange with both like-minded partners ductor firms in the United States and elsewhere, can-born individuals interested in pursuing careers is a travesty and poses a high and growing risk to and more adversarial countries. and in turn reduce their ability to fund research and in STEM fields and to keep America competitive in economic and national security.83 There are legitimate security concerns about im- development projects.77 At the same time, unilater- the global race to attract high-skilled talent.81 The ability to attract and retain foreign-born tal- migration, talent exchanges, and, especially, high al U.S. efforts to limit the export of semiconductors The first order of business should be supporting ent has always been a unique competitive advan- numbers of foreign students in STEM programs at or semiconductor manufacturing equipment could home-grown talent. This is essential to America’s tage of the United States — which is first and fore- U.S. universities, something both the government hurt domestic competitiveness by closing off mar- national security. Providing greater funding, data, 78 ket access. The U.S. government should provide computing power, and other infrastructure support 82 Manyika and McRaven, Innovation and National Security, 60 material support to these industries while working to university researchers, as described above, would 83 Much has been written on K-12 education reform, and it is as much an implementation challenge as an intellectual one at this point. Our thoughts are derived in part from a private roundtable on K-12 education held by the Hoover Institution in Fall 2019. See, also, Margaret E. Raymond, The Diploma Dilemma, The Hoover Institution, February 2020, https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/raymond_we- 73 For comparison, the Chinese Communist Party established “guiding funds” to incentivize private investment and establish venture funding for breadypdf.pdf; Katharine B. Stevens, Michael Q. McShane, and Andrew P. Kelly, An Education Agenda for the States: Fostering Opportunity from technology development. See the discussion of these funds in, Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (Boston: Pre-K through College, American Enterprise Institute, April 2015, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/an-education-agenda-for-the- Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), 64–65. states-fostering-opportunity-from-pre-k-through-college/; and Eric A. Hanushek et al., “The Achievement Gap Fails to Close,” Education Next 19. no. 3 (Summer 2019), https://www.educationnext.org/achievement-gap-fails-close-half-century-testing-shows-persistent-divide/. 74 For example, the Federal Communications Commission’s “Restoring Internet Freedom” order. See, The Economic Effects of Federal Deregula- tion Since January 2017: An Interim Report, The Council of Economic Advisers. 84 Gordon H. Hanson and Matthew J. Slaughter, Talent, Immigration, and U.S. Economic Competitiveness, Compete America Coalition, May 2013, https://gps.ucsd.edu/_files/faculty/hanson/hanson_publication_immigration_talent.pdf; and Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. 75 The Federal Aviation Administration, for example, is working with drone developers to modernize regulations. Patrick McGee, “US Considers How Slaughter, “How to Save Globalization,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 6 (November/December 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/unit- to Open Skies to Drones and Flying Cars,” Financial Times, Feb. 27, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/a0341b02-54cd-11ea-8841-482eed0038b1. ed-states/2018-10-15/how-save-globalization. 76 Jim Pethokoukis, “How Will Technological Change Affect the Economy? My Long-read Q&A with Erik Brynjolfsson,” American Enterprise Insti- 85 “New American Fortune 500 in 2019: Top American Companies and Their Immigrant Roots,” New American Economy, July 22, 2019, https:// tute, Feb. 27, 2020, https://www.aei.org/economics/how-will-technological-change-affect-the-economy-my-long-read-qa-with-erik-brynjolfsson/. data.newamericaneconomy.org/en/fortune500-2019/. 77 See, 2019 Annual Report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, November 2019, 135, https://www.uscc.gov/annual-re- 86 Scheve and Slaughter, “How to Save Globalization.” port/2019-annual-report; and James A. Lewis, Learning the Superior Techniques of the Barbarians: China’s Pursuit of Semiconductor Independence, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-pursuit-semiconductor-independence. 87 Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, China’s Technology Transfer Strategy, Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, January 2018, https://ad- min.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf; and “Foreign STEM Students in the United States,” Congressional 78 See, e.g., John VerWey, The Health and Competitiveness of the U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Industry, Office of Industries Research Service, Nov. 1, 2019, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11347. and Office of Economics, U.S. International Trade Commission, Working Paper ID-058, July 2019, https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/work- ing_papers/id_058_the_health_and_competitiveness_of_the_sme_industry_final_070219checked.pdf. 88 Interim Report, National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, November 2019,https://www.epic.org/foia/epic-v-ai-commission/ AI-Commission-Interim-Report-Nov-2019.pdf. 79 Keith Krach, “Remarks at the Digital Panel at the Indo-Pacific Forum,” Bangkok, Thailand, Nov. 4, 2019, https://www.state.gov/under-secre- tary-krach-remarks-at-digital-panel/. 89 “H-1B Fiscal Year (FY) Cap Season,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary- workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations-and-fashion-models/h-1b-fiscal-year-fy-2020-cap-season. 80 See, e.g., The Contest for Innovation: Strengthening America’s National Security Innovation Base in an Era of Strategic Competition, Reagan Institute Task Force on 21st-Century National Security Technology and Workforce, Dec. 3, 2019, 22, https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/355297/ 90 “Letter to President Donald J. Trump et al.,” Graduate Management Admission Council, October 2019, https://www.gmac.com/-/media/files/ the_contest_for_innovation_report.pdf; Manyika and McRaven, Innovation and National Security, 60; and First Quarter Recommendations. gmac/research/talent-mobility/gmac-public-letter-b-schools.pdf. 81 We echo Eric Schmidt’s recommendations to this effect: Eric Schmidt, “Eric Schmidt: I Used to Run Google. Silicon Valley Could Lose to Chi- 91 The Reagan Institute Task Force proposed a similar concept — a “National Security Innovation Base Visa” — in its report: The Contest for na,” New York Times, Feb. 27, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/opinion/eric-schmidt-ai-china.html. Innovation, 24.

60 61 The Strategist Economic Might, National Security, and the Future of American Statecraft

and universities are becoming alert to.92 Foreign gic economic competition appears at risk. Chal- to AI and quantum sciences),97 the Commerce De- Investment Screening governments have used students in American uni- lenges to U.S. standing have been emerging from partment has been slow to implement the changes versities, for example, to conduct influence opera- competitor nations, from multinational companies, mandated by the 2018 act.98 The recent expansion of the Committee on For- tions, censor students and administrators, direct and from the rapid advance of technologies. The Moreover, the U.S. government should seek con- eign Investment in the United States review pro- university policies, and even engage in espionage, development of regional trade blocs reduces U.S. sistency in its treatment of Chinese telecommuni- cess, as directed by the Foreign Investment Risk including illegally acquiring intellectual property influence and asymmetric power; multinational cations companies. As an example, it added ZTE Review Modernization Act, should also help protect or research data from cutting-edge labs.93 For this companies are offering alternative nodes for the to the U.S. Entity List in March 2016 but later re- U.S. firms from intellectual property theft and co- reason, universities, as well as scientific laborato- flow of information, and soon for transactions as moved it.99 Huawei and its non-U.S. affiliates were ercive investments. Building on the good work to ries and relevant private sector companies, should well; and, as discussed below, block-chain or cryp- also added to the list in 2019,100 but the U.S. govern- date, the committee will need to grow even more develop robust rules, procedures, and technical tocurrency-based transactions can elude tradition- ment then issued waivers to allow U.S. chipmakers agile and creative while recognizing that as Chinese guardrails to safeguard intellectual property, re- al network pathways. to continue selling to them. Now policymakers ap- investment in the United States declines it may be- search data, and national security information. Recognizing that geopolitical competition pear poised to require companies to restrict sales come more challenging to track investments.104 U.S. These measures should apply across the board, to centers around economic influence and power, the of semiconductors made with U.S. equipment to adversaries are also growing more creative in their all students. With such measures in place, foreign U.S. government has recently taken steps to re- Huawei, which seems more in line with the appro- investment in vital, dual-use technologies, including students, especially in STEM fields, can continue form its approach to economic statecraft in order priately stern line that the administration has es- through third-party venture funds and by trans- to be, by and large, great additions to the U.S. ed- to preserve America’s advantaged position. As part tablished regarding Huawei and 5G.101 forming initially innocent activity into illegal or illic- ucation and research ecosystem. And to further of this agenda, and in light of the unique challenges Even once clearer guidance is issued, as di- it investment.105 Therefore, the necessary, rigorous ensure that the benefits of this large and valuable presented by the converging trends noted earlier, rected by the Export Control Reform Act, export assessment of foreign investment will likely stress majority of foreign students are not lost, the gov- policymakers will need to continue to pursue new, controls as a standalone policy tool will remain the committee, which will require Congress to stand ernment, universities, and law enforcement should creative export control measures, as mandated by insufficient. However, if paired with a broader set ready to provide greater support if needed. redouble existing efforts to promote transparency recent legislation, to reform the Committee on For- of pro-innovation policies supporting U.S. manu- Similarly, the United States can and should help and reciprocity in research and student exchanges eign Investment in the United States process in or- facturers and nested within a broader strategy to like-minded partners develop stronger invest- and aggressively investigate and prosecute the ma- der to account for the changing nature of foreign develop emerging technologies with international ment screening, consistent with U.S. processes, as licious behavior of the small minority who violate investment and technology transfer and persistent, partners — such as the approach to semiconduc- discussed in the following section. Private actors those rules. costly intellectual property theft, as well as to en- tor and semiconductor manufacturing equipment should also become more vigilant. Many U.S. com- force existing disclosure and transparency laws outlined above — they will be much more likely to panies recognize the dangers of doing business with II. Employ and Sustain the Means governing access to U.S. capital markets.94 More- serve lasting policy objectives.102 Enacting export actors from sanctioned and rogue states, and they, of Economic Statecraft over, while sanctions have been powerful tools of controls on a unilateral basis is of limited benefit arguably, are growing wise to the evolving risks of statecraft when employed in a targeted, strategic as it often harms not just the intended targets but foreign investment.106 The more they can police and Domestic innovation builds a stronger founda- manner, emerging challenges to America’s leverage also U.S. companies and the leading companies of protect themselves, the more secure U.S. technolo- tion for economic competition and expands the over financial transactions — including block-chain America’s like-minded partners and allies. Howev- gies and industries will be. economic statecraft toolkit. Long the preeminent or cryptocurrency-based transactions — threaten er, enacting them in concert with industrial part- While the United States is right to encourage par- global power, the United States possesses certain to undermine their long-term effectiveness.95 ners would increase their impact.103 ticipation in its capital markets, it should also rec- clear advantages in this arena. It is a singular global ognize the importance of those markets as points economic force, with reach and investments around Export Controls of economic and national security convergence. the world, while the U.S. dollar remains the reserve currency. Unlike its competitors, America has tra- The United States has moved in the right direc- 97 “Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies,” Bureau of Industry and Security, Nov. 19, 2018, https://www.federalregister.gov/ ditionally led and worked effectively through inter- tion on export control policies by imposing restric- documents/2018/11/19/2018-25221/review-of-controls-for-certain-emerging-technologies. national arrangements. It tends to operate in pre- tions on the transfer of critical technologies to for- 98 Note that the Department of Commerce issued expansive new rules governing exports to “military end users” and “military end uses” shortly dictable, legalistic ways, preserving the values of eign persons or entities outside U.S. borders. With before this article was published. “Expansion of Export, Reexport, and Transfer (in-Country) Controls for Military End Use or Military End Users in the People’s Republic of China, Russia, or Venezuela,” Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, Final Rule, April 28, 2020, https:// property rights, the rule of law, and open markets. the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Congress s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2020-07241.pdf. Derek Scissors, “Limits are Overdue in the US-China Technology Rela- In addition, the United States remains home to the directed the Department of Commerce to establish tionship,” Testimony Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, On “Dangerous Partners: Big Tech and world’s largest market as well as leading technolo- controls on the export of emerging and foundation- Beijing,” March 4, 2020, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Scissors%20Testimony.pdf. gy developers and companies. al technologies.96 However, aside from an initial list 99 Jack R. Shane and Daniel P. Brooks, “BIS Removes ZTE from Entity List,” Wiley Rein LLP, March 30, 2017, https://www.wiley.law/alert-Cli- ent_Alert-BIS_Removes_ZTE_from_Entity_List. But America’s competitive advantage in strate- of technologies to target (including those related 100 “Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List,” Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, Final Rule, May 16, 2019, https:// www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/all-articles/17-regulations/1555-addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-final-rule-effective-may-16-2019. The 92 Aruna Viswanatha and Kate O’Keeffe, “China’s Funding of U.S. Researchers Raises Red Flags,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 30, 2020, https:// Department subsequently granted temporary licenses to minimize some of the disruptions caused by the listing. www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-funding-of-u-s-researchers-raises-red-flags-11580428915. 101 Bob Davis and Katy Stech Ferek, “U.S. Moving Forward with Rule to Limit Chips to Huawei,” Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2020, https:// 93 See, e.g., Josh Rogin, “Preventing Chinese Espionage at America’s Universities,” Washington Post, May 22, 2018, https://www.washington- www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-moving-forward-with-rule-to-limit-chips-to-huawei-11585261519. post.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/05/22/preventing-chinese-espionage-at-americas-universities/. 102 See, e.g., VerWey, The Health and Competitiveness of the U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Industry. 94 “Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018,” H.R. 5515, Title XVII, P.L. 115-232, 115th Congress, 2017–18, https://www. 103 Aaron L. Friedberg and Charles W. Boustany, Jr., “Partial Disengagement: A New U.S. Strategy for Economic Competition with China,” Wash- congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515/text. ington Quarterly 43, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 32, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1736882. 95 Peter Harrell and Elizabeth Rosenberg, Economic Dominance, Financial Technology, and the Future of U.S. Economic Coercion, Center for 104 So-called “greenfield” investments, for example, will be a particular challenge. See, e.g., Scissors, “Limits Are Overdue in the US-China Tech- a New American Security, April 29, 2019, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/economic-dominance-financial-technology-and-the-fu- nology Relationship.” ture-of-u-s-economic-coercion. 105 For more on foreign venture funding of U.S. research, see, Brown and Singh, China’s Technology Transfer Strategy. 96 See, “John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,” H.R. 5515, Public Law No. 115-232, section 1758, 115th Congress, 2017–18, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515/text. (The Export Control Reform Act was part of the National 106 Rolfe Winkler, “Chinese Cash that Powered Silicon Valley Is Suddenly Toxic,” Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/arti- Defense Authorization Act). cles/chinese-cash-is-suddenly-toxic-in-silicon-valley-following-u-s-pressure-campaign-11560263302.

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Foreign companies have long flouted U.S. rules in order to affect that change.110 cryptocurrency called the Petromoneda (or Petro) in gap between its sanctions program and the realities and regulations governing financial disclosures and The theft of intellectual property, for example, February 2018 that was backed by barrels of oil.113 of cyberspace and emerging technologies.119 transparency while still accessing U.S. markets and takes an enormous financial toll on the United However, the effort has been unsuccessful for a va- In sum, a durable and strategic approach to eco- exchanges. The Securities and Exchange Commis- States.111 U.S. sanctions of Chinese entities that are riety of reasons, including an executive order signed nomic statecraft would use the different tools in sion should rigorously police access and enforce intended to curb that theft should target bad actors, by President Donald Trump in March 2018 that pro- the toolbox in concert. It would complement re- existing rules. However, it may become necessary while also recognizing that those entities often act hibits transactions involving “any digital currency, strictions on outbound investment with technolo- to take even more aggressive steps, in which case under the guidance or direction of political officials. digital coin, or digital token, that was issued by ... gy transfer controls, other forms of targeted sanc- policymakers could consider removing companies Sanctions that only target individual companies or Venezuela on or after January 9, 2018.”114 Neverthe- tions, and domestic investment initiatives. It would that do not abide by disclosure laws and other regu- offenders — and not the figures motivating or even less, North Korea, Russia, Iran, and others are also adapt investment screening and export controls, lations from U.S. exchanges or, in extreme cases, re- directing intellectual property theft — are inherently reportedly exploring cryptocurrencies as part of an implementing reforms mandated by recent legisla- stricting portfolio investments.107 Market access is a limited. Moreover, a coordinated response involving effort to evade sanctions.115 tion and recognizing the increasingly complex and key choke point that the United States ought to lev- sanctions, export restrictions, and targeted tariffs In addition, sanctioned countries can engage in cy- creative statecraft of America’s adversaries. And it erage, and it can do so to enforce respect for norms should punish only known offenders. Sanctioning ber theft against financial institutions or steal cryp- would also respond to emerging challenges to Amer- and the rule of law — fundamental tenants of U.S. entities that have done nothing wrong only incentiv- tocurrencies as a source of funding, thereby under- ica’s economic influence, including cryptocurrencies policy and sources of great advantage for America. izes bad behavior. It would, of course, take time and mining the impact of sanctions. North Korea seems and other alternative financial networks, and to the effort to identify the right culprits and tailor policy to be aggressively pursuing this path. According to long-term viability of U.S. statecraft tools. Managing Economic Sanctions accordingly, but that further highlights the need for the U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, The United States has an extensive economic careful strategic planning. The U.S. government may North Korean state-sponsored cyber groups have statecraft toolbox, one that can be expanded further. Over time, the United States has come to rely on sanction specific firms, but it should do so only as stolen over $1.1 billion dollars from financial insti- Those tools are an asymmetric capability that Amer- economic sanctions as foreign policy instruments, part of a broader strategy to secure America’s posi- tutions and banks in multiple countries. The groups ica should treat as such to maximize its advantage. often with significant success.108 They have been tion and change another state’s behavior. have also reportedly stolen $571 million in crypto- However, they will be most effective if implemented a critical component of U.S. statecraft in the past The long-term effectiveness of these kinds of currency alone, primarily from five exchanges in in concert with like-minded partners, though doing and will continue to be in the future. However, the sanctions strategies will depend on the centrality of Asia between January 2017 and September 2018.116 so can be complicated and slow, or even limit spe- forces of convergence, particularly the growing im- the U.S. financial system and the dollar. The more This suggests that the United States should be in- cific policy options.120 The statecraft and investment port of cyberspace and the rise of cryptocurren- money that sanctioned entities have had flowing tegrating its sanctions program within a broader cy- measures described above must go hand-in-hand cies, could reduce their efficacy unless the United through U.S. banks, generally the broader the im- berspace strategy. At a July 2019 hearing of the U.S. with international coordination on technological de- States adapts. Moreover, the impact of sanctions pact of U.S. sanctions has been.112 And the United Senate Banking Committee, David Marcus, the head velopment, supply-chain management and protec- will increasingly depend on how targeted and States is always better able to apply and enforce of Facebook’s new digital currency, suggested that tion, and trade and investment strategies. well-designed they are and how well they are inte- sanctions when they are used in concert with com- fragmentation of financial services was a risk to sanc- grated with other tools of economic statecraft. plementary trade relationships and international tions and that, “[i]f we don’t lead, others will.”117 The III. Increase International Cooperation Given these trends, policymakers will need to be networks. However, activities in cyberspace and the United States would be in a position to lead — and more discriminating in their use of sanctions and advent of cryptocurrencies threaten to reduce the maintain leverage over block-chain-based alternative The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the uni- clear-headed about whom to target and their desired centrality of the United States and thereby lessen financial networks — “if the technology were devel- versal vulnerabilities inherent to globalization, but impact.109 To that end, experts with deep knowledge the impact of its sanctions. oped or operated by a U.S. company obliged to adhere it also serves as a reminder of America’s unique of target countries and actors should contribute to Sanctioned countries have begun developing to U.S. sanctions, technology-export restrictions, and position in the world. The United States has a sin- the development of sanctions packages. The proper cryptocurrencies that do not need to flow through other relevant laws, or a foreign company with sig- gular ability to lead international efforts, and that composition of such a package depends on what be- the U.S. financial system, thereby evading U.S. sanc- nificant U.S. exposure.”118 This reality speaks to the ability endows it with great power. One of us wit- havior it is intended to change and whom to target tions. Venezuela, for example, developed a national importance of lateral, integrated economic policies. nessed that reality firsthand during the financial cri- The U.S. government requires a strategy to bridge the sis when, as undersecretary of treasury for interna-

107 The administration has indicated it may restrict portfolio investment for the Thrift Savings Plan, a government retirement fund. James Rosen, “White House to Block Federal Pension Fund from Expanding China Investments,” WJLA, April 30, 2020, https://wjla.com/news/nation-world/ 113 Jack Karsten and Darrell M. West, “Venezuela’s ‘petro’ Undermines Other Cryptocurrencies – and International Sanctions,” The Brookings exclusive-white-house-to-block-federal-pension-fund-from-expanding-china-investments. See also, Marco Rubio, “You Can’t Trust a Chinese Audit,” Institution, March 9, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/03/09/venezuelas-petro-undermines-other-cryptocurrencies-and-inter- Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/you-cant-trust-a-chinese-audit-11559687739. Derek Scissors has also written national-sanctions/. extensively on possible capital flow controls. See, for example, Derek Scissors, “In Need of Direction: The Case for Moving Supply Chains out of 114 “Taking Additional Steps to Address the Situation in Venezuela,” Executive Order 13827, March 19, 2018, https://www.treasury.gov/re- China,” War on the Rocks, Nov. 18, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/in-need-of-direction-the-case-for-moving-supply-chains-out-of-china/. source-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/13827.pdf. 108 As Peter Feaver and Eric Lorber write, there is wide disagreement about how to assess the effectiveness of sanctions, but they and others 115 How North Korea Revolutionized the Internet as a Tool for Rogue Regimes, Insikt Group, Feb. 9, 2020, https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/ identify successful approaches, including financial enforcement to target rogue regimes and terror groups. Peter D. Feaver and Eric B. Lorber, reports/cta-2020-0209.pdf. Coercive Diplomacy and the New Financial Levers: Evaluating the Intended and Unintended Consequences of Financial Sanctions (London: Legatum Institute, 2010). See also, David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey 116 “Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Sept. 13, 2019, https://home. J. Schott, and Kimberly Anne Elliott, Economics Sanctions Reconsidered (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1985). For data treasury.gov/index.php/news/press-releases/sm774. on the use of sanctions, see, Kathy Gilsinan, “A Boom Time for U.S. Sanctions,” The Atlantic, May 3, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 117 David Marcus, “Examining Facebook’s Proposed Digital Currency and Data Privacy Considerations,” Testimony Before the Senate Banking Com- archive/2019/05/why-united-states-uses-sanctions-so-much/588625/; and “Sanctions Programs and Country Information,” U.S. Department of the mittee, July 16, 2019, https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/examining-facebooks-proposed-digital-currency-and-data-privacy-considerations. Treasury, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/programs.aspx. 118 Harrell and Rosenberg, Economic Dominance, Financial Technology, and the Future of U.S. Economic Coercion, 25. 109 Zack Cooper and Eric B. Lorber, “The Right Way to Sanction China,” National Interest, Feb. 23, 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/ the-right-way-sanction-china-15285. 119 In 2018, the Treasury Department designated two Iran-based individuals: “Treasury Designates Iran-Based Financial Facilitators of Malicious Cyber Activity and for the First Time Identifies Associated Digital Currency Addresses,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Nov. 28, 2018, https:// 110 Eric B. Lorber, Securing American Interests: A New Era of Economic Power (Washington, DC: FDD Press, 2017), 14. home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm556. But sanctioning individuals involved in certain bitcoin transactions is not the same as having a 111 See, The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy, The National Bureau of Asian strategy for maintaining the effectiveness of sanctions in the face of proliferating digital currencies. Research, 2017, http://ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf. 120 See, for example, Friedberg and Boustany, jr., Partial Disengagement. See also the 2019 Government Accountability Office report — titled 112 “Economic Sanctions: Agencies Assess Impacts on Targets, and Studies Suggest Several Factors Contribute to Sanctions’ Effectiveness,” U.S. “Economic Sanctions” — which found “strong evidence” that “sanctions have been more effective when implemented through an international orga- Government Accountability Office, October 2019, https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/701891.pdf. nization, or when targeted countries had some existing dependency on or relationship with the United States.”

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tional affairs, he helped coordinate the international plus Japan, NATO, and other treaty allies to help policy response. The United States makes the most jointly fund research in these nascent capabilities. meaningful progress when it leads and orchestrates These coalitions could set standards for the adop- international cooperation. tion and use of emerging technologies,126 and they America’s partnerships and its leadership of mul- would not only optimize each country’s resources tinational institutions are invaluable in a global cri- and capabilities but also increase the interoper- sis, but those relationships are also unique resourc- ability of their respective technologies — a boon es to leverage and reshape in this era of great-power for military alliances and economic partners alike. competition. Many international organizations have Similarly, encouraging academic and talent ex- drifted from their founding principles and are in change programs among this group of close part- need of reform. The United States should continue ners would help develop knowledge and innovative to help lead those reform efforts and ensure inter- capacity both at home and abroad. national trade, internet governance, technology, and The case of the 5G network infrastructure is in- public health standards evolve in line with Ameri- structive. The recently released National Strategy to can principles and interests.121 The 2017 National Secure 5G outlines a number of initiatives to devel- Security Strategy rightly highlighted the “invaluable op and govern 5G, including supply chain risk man- advantages that our strong relationships with allies agement and international development goals.127 and partners deliver.”122 America’s leaders should The United States is right to voice concerns about continue to develop its network of like-minded part- supply chain security and the impact of 5G technol- ners and use them to further the innovation and ogy. But, while Australia, Japan, and New Zealand statecraft agendas outlined above. In fact, those pol- share America’s concerns, even close U.S. partners icies are unlikely to be effective without such inter- think they can mitigate the security risks posed by national coordination. Huawei’s 5G technology, as we have seen with the More specifically, to reinforce its domestic inno- United Kingdom.128 Ultimately, the fate of efforts to vation agenda, the United States should consider resist Huawei’s bids will depend on the availability opportunities to establish partnerships dedicated of affordable alternatives. to the principled, multinational development and A bipartisan group of U.S. senators provided one America’s partnerships fielding of core technologies.123 This effort could blueprint for how the United States could work with expand the existing multinational industrial base its partners to make non-Huawei suppliers more and lean on America’s longstanding military and in- viable and affordable: by promoting the research and its leadership of telligence partnerships,124 including its robust intel- and development of open architecture networks, ligence-sharing relationship with the “Five Eyes” providing material support to countries considering partners.125 Close friends, like Japan and possibly alternatives to Huawei, and becoming more active multinational institutions 129 India, should be central to these efforts. U.S. lead- in standards-setting bodies. Another approach ers ought to also consider expanding the Defense would be to establish a U.S.-led “5G Development are invaluable Innovation Unit model and establishing interna- Fund that would extend lines of credit ... to stra- tional venture funds with the Five Eyes partners tegic partners seeking to develop 5G networks,” as

in a global crisis, 121 See, for example, Danielle Pletka, “It’s Time for a New World Order,” The Dispatch, April 14, 2020, https://thedispatch.com/p/its-time-for-a- new-world-order. On technology standards, see, Robert Strayer, “The Role of Global Standards in the Battle for 5G Leadership,” Remarks Given at the Hudson Institute, Dec. 17, 2019, https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Transcript_Role%20of%20Global%20Standards%20in%20the%20 but those relationships Battle%20for%205G%20Leadership.pdf. 122 The National Security Strategy of the United States, 2. 123 For a similar proposal, see, Daniel Kliman et al., Forging an Alliance Innovation Base, Center for a New American Security, March 2020, are also unique https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Report-Alliance-Innovation-Base-Final.pdf?mtime=20200329174909. 124 See, “Defense Primer: The National Technology and Industrial Base,” Congressional Research Service, Jan. 31, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ natsec/IF11311.pdf. resources to leverage 125 See, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ who-we-are/organizations/enterprise-capacity/chco/chco-related-menus/chco-related-links/recruitment-and-outreach/217-about/organization/ icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc. 126 See, for example, Rebecca Arcesati, “Chinese Tec Standards Put the Screws on European Companies,” Mercator Institute for China Studies, and reshape in this era of Jan. 29, 2019, https://www.merics.org/en/blog/chinese-tech-standards-put-screws-european-companies. 127 National Strategy to Secure 5G of the United States of America, The White House, March 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ great-power competition. uploads/2020/03/National-Strategy-5G-Final.pdf. 128 Max Colchester, “U.K. Allows Huawei to Build Parts of 5G Network, Defying Trump,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 29, 2020, https://www.wsj. com/articles/u-k-allows-huawei-to-build-parts-of-5g-network-11580213316. 129 For more information, see, “National Security Senators Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Develop 5G Alternatives to Huawei,” Press Release from the Office of Sen. Richard Burr, Jan. 14, 2020, https://www.burr.senate.gov/press/releases/national-security-senators-introduce-biparti- san-legislation-to-develop-5g-alternatives-to-huawei.

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a Reagan Institute task force suggested in 2019.130 its partners develop and implement mechanisms to in the global economy.138 The International Develop- India. Leaders could exchange information about Through such a fund, the United States and its part- review foreign investments and address technolo- ment Finance Corporation — formerly the Overseas existing strategies, trade arrangements, and invest- ners could offer financial support to any middle- or gy transfer. America’s partners have been subject Private Investment Corporation — and multinational ments, similar to what already takes place in the low-income country that chooses a non-Huawei to malicious foreign investments.135 The European organizations, such as the Inter-American Develop- security arena at NATO summits. provider. America could also help establish an in- Union has awoken to the challenge and is develop- ment Bank and the World Bank, will be the key actors ternational consortium to support alternatives to ing guidance for screening investments in critical or in directing infrastructure investments. Fortunately, Huawei’s 5G technology, such as Nokia or Ericsson. dual-use sectors, including health, energy, and com- they require relatively low levels of federal funding.139 Process and Personnel Reforms There is, in other words, a range of options for in- munications.136 While the United States should tread Finally, U.S. policy should give preference to ex- ternational coordination on 5G development, which carefully, E.U. members may need help implement- panded trade and investment relationships with This agenda, as important as it is, is unlikely to the U.S. government is wisely considering. Similar ing that guidance and establishing processes for de- like-minded states. As Rep. Mike Gallagher has ar- move forward without dramatic shifts in the policy opportunities can be found in AI development and liberate, thorough review, modeled after the U.S. ap- gued, trade is a powerful tool for incentivizing allies process that has been in place for decades. To sup- other emerging technologies.131 proach. The United States could similarly work with and partners to adopt U.S. security standards re- port this policy agenda, policymaking must shift Actively engaging and leading standards-setting G7 members and other partners around the world to garding new technologies and supply chains, which from a siloed, often tactical approach, to one that bodies would help the United States further pro- strengthen their measures. in turn advances America’s economic statecraft is interdisciplinary, broadly focused, and consist- mote both domestic and partner innovation. Amer- The United States should also continue to offer objectives.140 Such agreements also reduce depend- ently strategic. The policymaking process will need ica’s competitors work to influence and set inter- technical assistance and financial support to coun- encies on other countries with interests that may to include clear lines of authority for directing a national technical standards to advance their goals tries considering major foreign infrastructure invest- diverge from those of the United States and give responsible pro-innovation policy, including mech- of technological leadership.132 These efforts func- ments.137 Though often overstated, China’s infrastruc- the United States greater influence over a range anisms for deciding which sectors to support and tion alongside state subsidies and market access ture and investment programs, such as the Belt and of global decisions that address areas of conver- overseeing those efforts. And the U.S government restrictions to net long-term market shares.133 In- Road Initiative, and its push to export its internet gence, including data protection, ethical standards will need to supplement these reforms by attract- deed, as noted by Alan Beattie, “first-mover advan- governance model have challenged America’s posi- for the use of emerging technologies, and other is- ing, training, and retaining people with diverse, tage in setting standards and rules can give a pow- tion in the global economy over the past decade. The sues related to data flows. Offering favorable trade multidisciplinary backgrounds to support highly erful edge to companies and businesses.”134 The United States has been wise not to try to out-compete terms in return for agreement on security proto- informed, high-quality decision-making. National Strategy to Secure 5G recognizes that to China in every corner of the world. Instead, it should cols is a win-win opportunity for the United States It is easy to call for change, but, as history has maintain its innovation leadership and market ac- expand its initiatives to work with partners to offer that protects America’s asymmetric position. To shown across a wide range of government reform cess in high-tech sectors the United States should alternatives to Chinese-backed projects that create quote Aaron Friedberg and Charles Boustany, Jr., initiatives, it is difficult and sometimes impossible be more proactive in promoting favorable and open unsustainable debt levels or corrupted networks. As “High-standard trade agreements linking the econ- to make them happen.142 As change looms on the standards. It can do so by increasing its presence Matt Pottinger, the deputy national security adviser, omies of North America, Europe, and parts of Asia horizon, time and again the forces of inertia — in key multilateral bodies, encouraging U.S. firms explained at the Raisina Dialogue in January 2020, would help fuel the growth of all the nations in- budgetary, bureaucratic, political — have emerged to engage in standards-setting bodies through tax the United States can work with the private sector, volved, enhancing their collective wealth and pow- to quash such possibilities before they gained mo- incentives, and ensuring export controls or other like-minded partners, and international lending bod- er and strengthening their ability to defend shared mentum. So we are under no illusion that change sanctions do not prevent U.S. entities from engag- ies to promote commercial development, transparen- interests and common values.”141 will be easy, and we accept that there are like- ing in these organizations. cy, and high standards and to help developing states International coordination of the type envisioned ly a variety of means by which these goals could To secure international innovation and expand its integrate into that principled, fair, and open system, here will require regular collaboration between U.S. be achieved. At the same time, we are convinced own statecraft efforts, the United States should help which in turn will buttress America’s position with- and partner-state leaders, namely finance minis- that bold modifications to how policy is made and ters. Fortunately, U.S. leaders already meet with to who makes it will be necessary to ensure the America’s chief partners at the annual G7 summit spheres of economic policy and national security and other conclaves. Rather than reinventing the policy are fully integrated, thus securing America’s wheel, the United States should consider estab- economic and political leadership going forward. 130 The Contest for Innovation, 20. lishing a follow-on session to the G7 summit that What follows are a series of suggested reforms and 131 See, for example, Mike Gallagher and Tom Tugendhat, “Five Eyes Must Lead on 5G,” War on the Rocks, April 25, 2019, https://waronth- erocks.com/2019/04/five-eyes-must-lead-on-5g. (In this article, the authors describe a technical cooperation program related to AI). is focused on the convergence of national securi- guiding principles to precipitate the kind of radical ty and economic affairs, incorporating addition- change that is required. 132 The new “China Standards 2035” plan, for example, sets out an ambitious initiative to shape the standards of technologies that will be cen- tral to critical infrastructure. See, Arjun Kharpal, “Power Is ‘up for grabs’: Behind China’s Plan to Shape the Future of Next-Generation Tech,” CNBC, al countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and April 26, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/27/china-standards-2035-explained.html. 133 China, for example, has worked to influence AI and Internet of Things standards, among others. For more information about their AI-related efforts, see, 2019 Annual Report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, 214–15. For more on Internet of Things efforts, see, 138 See, Matt Pottinger, remarks on the “Coalitions and Consensus: In Defense of Values that Matter” panel at the Raisina Dialogue, New Delhi, John Chen et al., China’s Internet of Things, U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, October 2018, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/ Jan. 16, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gotKrQTVKQ4. files/Research/SOSi_China%27s%20Internet%20of%20Things.pdf. 139 Zack Cooper, “Bridging the Transatlantic Divide on China,” Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Europe, 134 Alan Beattie, “Technology: How the US, EU and China Compete to Set Industry Standards,” Financial Times, July 23, 2019, https://www. Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment on China’s Expanding Influence in Europe and Eurasia, May 9, 2019, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/ ft.com/content/0c91b884-92bb-11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271. FA14/20190509/109430/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-CooperZ-20190509.pdf 135 For accounts of foreign direct investment in Europe, see, Agatha Kratz et al., Chinese FDI in Europe: 2019 Update, Mercator Institute for 140 Mike Gallagher, “Let the Trans-Atlantic Trading Begin,” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 6, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/let-the-trans-atlan- China Studies, April 8, 2020, https://www.merics.org/en/papers-on-china/chinese-fdi-in-europe-2019; and Elisabeth Braw, “China Is Bargain Hunt- tic-trading-begin-11581033321. ing—and Western Security Is at Risk,” Foreign Policy, April 15, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/15/china-is-bargain-hunting-and-western- 141 Friedberg and Boustany, Jr., Partial Disengagement, 36. security-is-at-risk/. 142 For example, past efforts to reform the National Security Council process have had mixed success and the defense acquisitions process 136 For recent E.U. guidance, see, “Guidance to the Member States Concerning Foreign Direct Investment and Free Movement of Capital from has gone through nearly continuous cycles of reform, yet costs continue to rise. See, e.g., Charles P. Ries, Improving Decisionmaking in a Turbulent Third Countries, and the Protection of Europe’s Strategic Assets, Ahead of the Application of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation),” World (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2016), 23–25, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE192.html; Obaid Younossi, et al., “Is Weapon Sys- European Commission, March 25, 2020, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/march/tradoc_158676.pdf. tem Cost Growth Increasing? A Quantitative Assessment of Completed and Ongoing Programs,” RAND Corp., 2007, https://www.rand.org/content/ 137 The administration’s Blue Dot Network, for example, is a step in the right direction. For more information, see, “Blue Dot Network,” U.S. State dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG588.pdf; and Thomas L. McNaugher, “Weapons Procurement: The Futility of Reform,” International Department, accessed May 4, 2020, https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/. Security 12, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 63–104, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538813.

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Reform Policymaking Organizations eas.148 These documents, and the underlying efforts of them have pros and cons, but each is worthy of and offices, including the U.S. trade representative. and Processes that guide them, serve an important role in setting consideration as a means of restoring, or in some And it would have a mandate to coordinate not priorities and expectations and can help each office cases creating, the required focus and necessary in- only sanctions but also inducements — positive For decades, policymaking structures have not understand what the others are doing. But in past frastructure where it is most needed.151 measures to promote international coordination been optimized for a converged environment. administrations, they have rarely been well coordi- and advance U.S. interests, such as foreign aid and Making the secretary of the treasury a statutory nated across disciplines. I. Coordinate economic statecraft and innovation infrastructure investments. Japan has taken a simi- member of the National Security Council in 2017 Even when priorities are set, no single entity or in parallel by putting the National Security Council lar step with the express goal of coordinating more better integrated the policymaking community, but person has responsibility for the execution of eco- in charge of interagency coordination of economic closely with the United States.153 much more can be done. Within the White House nomic statecraft. The secretaries of defense and statecraft and creating an innovation policy cell in To coordinate innovation activities, the Nation- itself, authority over the interconnected issues of state and the director of the national intelligence the National Economic Council. al Economic Council could establish an innovation economic and national security affairs has long have clear ownership over the other three aspects office, geared toward facilitating interagency, pub- been spread across multiple offices. The National of national power — diplomacy, the military, and In this model, the National Security Council would lic-private, and international communication and Security Council is “the President’s principal fo- intelligence, respectively. By contrast, the tools of manage an interagency process to identify policy coordination on matters of innovation, as guided rum for considering national security and foreign economic power and their use are split across agen- objectives and facilitate executive decision-making by the principles listed above.154 The same official in policy matters.”143 At the same time, the National cies, including the treasury and commerce depart- regarding economic statecraft. Likewise, the Nation- charge of the economic statecraft office at the Na- Economic Council advises the president on domes- ments.149 As a result, there has long been insufficient al Economic Council would establish an interagen- tional Security Council could lead this office as well. tic and global economic policy. The Council of Eco- top-down authority for the large-scale execution of cy process to coordinate innovation activities. Both By wearing two hats, this person would be responsi- nomic Advisers is “charged with offering the Presi- national objectives in this arena. offices would also be responsible for coordinating ble for ensuring innovation and statecraft activities dent objective economic advice on the formulation These longstanding barriers have limited gener- their efforts with international partners and with work in tandem. of both domestic and international economic pol- ations of policymakers. In the convergent environ- each other. Ultimately, they would be most effective, In some respects, these two councils are the nat- icy,”144 while the Office of Science and Technology ment, it will be ever more important to integrate as discussed above, if they maintained open com- ural centers for interagency processes, given their Policy is responsible for providing “advice on the national security and economic decision-making. munication with the private sector and non-govern- existing interagency roles and the White House’s scientific, engineering, and technological aspects To do so, the U.S. government should consider new ment leaders to get their input and their buy-in. unique executive authority and ability to cut across of the economy, national security ... [and] foreign approaches to developing policy and setting prior- To coordinate economic statecraft policymaking, bureaucratic siloes.155 They also are flexible by de- relations.”145 Each office contributes valuable input, ities for economic statecraft and innovation poli- the National Security Council could create a new sign — with decision-making structures directed but the bureaucratic separation between them is cy. These processes should include international office headed by a deputy national security adviser by the president — making them ideal for address- an impediment to developing national priorities coordination and should break down existing bu- and responsible for an interagency process on eco- ing these rapidly evolving challenges.156 In addition or presidential decisions on innovation, economic reaucratic barriers, establish clearer policymaking nomic statecraft.152 The office would be led by a sen- to practical benefits, establishing these two offices statecraft, and related issues with implications for authorities in the realm of economic competition, ior official who would report to both the national in the White House could also signal the impor- both economics and national security.146 and develop mechanisms to coordinate research, security adviser and to the director of the Nation- tance of innovation and economic statecraft and of The U.S. government’s policy planning has simi- development, and innovation.150 al Economic Council. As with the former Office of integrating economic and national security policy- larly been fragmented across numerous strategy Below we consider several distinct potential re- International Economics, now part of the National making processes. documents for decades. Strategies on national se- form models to the policymaking process and struc- Economic Council, this official would be a deputy However, the flexible design of the councils could curity and defense draw headlines,147 but various ture, looking at methods to address economic state- assistant to the president on the National Security limit the permanence, depth, and potential sustaina- arms of the state also publish strategies on cyber craft and innovation both together and separately. Council and deputy director of the National Eco- bility of these efforts. Both policymaking structures security, spectrum management, and other issue ar- Some of these are not novel approaches, and all nomic Council. This new office would chair an in- would also have limited capacity to influence pro- teragency planning committee to ensure real-time gramming and budgeting, restricting the innovation cooperation, communication, and, hopefully, col- arm in particular.157 Moreover, it is easy to picture 143 “National Security Council,” The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/. laboration among operational agencies, bureaus, these new offices turning into separate pockets 144 Council of Economic Advisers, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/. 145 Office of Science and Technology Policy, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/. There are other groups that could be men- 151 Past efforts to work around existing agency structures and interagency processes have often struggled — for example, the tendency toward tioned among those identified in the text, such as the American Technology Council or the Office of Management and Budget, the latter of which appointing “czars” or special envoys to address emerging challenges. See, Ries, Improving Decisionmaking in a Turbulent World. includes both an Office of the Chief Information Officer and the U.S. Digital Service. 152 In the past, these responsibilities could have been given to the Office of International Economics. However, the administration has moved 146 See, e.g., The Contest for Innovation, 14. that office to the National Economic Council. There are pros and cons for doing so, and that decision is a reminder that the right policymaking 147 The National Security Strategy of the United States; and “Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States,” Department of process is often a moving target that is in need of consistent reevaluation and study. See, Robert C. O’Brien, “Robert C. O’Brien: Here’s How I Will Defense, January 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. Streamline Trump’s National Security Council,” Washington Post, Oct. 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/robert-c-obrien-heres- how-i-will-streamline-trumps-national-security-council/2019/10/16/2b306360-f028-11e9-89eb-ec56cd414732_story.html. 148 See, e.g., Description of the National Military Strategy of the United States, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 2018, https://www.jcs.mil/ Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf; The National Cyber Strategy of the United 153 Shunsuke Shigeta, “Japan to Add Economic Team to National Security Council,” Nikkei Asian Review, Oct. 29, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/ States; The National Strategic Overview for Quantum Information Science, Committee on Science of the National Science and Technology Council, Politics/Japan-to-add-economic-team-to-National-Security-Council. September 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Strategic-Overview-for-Quantum-Information-Science.pdf; 154 As addressed elsewhere in this article, the executive branch has a unique capacity to facilitate information sharing and deconflict projects “Presidential Memorandum on Developing a Sustainable Spectrum Strategy for America’s Future,” The White House, Oct. 25, 2018, https://www. across public, private, and international domains. whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-developing-sustainable-spectrum-strategy-americas-future/; and The National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan: 2019 Update, Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence of the National Science 155 Colin Dueck, “The Role of the National Security Advisor and the 2006 Iraq Strategy Review,” Orbis 58, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 15–38, https:// and Technology Council, June 2019, https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/National-AI-RD-Strategy-2019.pdf. doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.11.007. 149 For a breakdown of export control authority, see, “The U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Initiative,” Congressional 156 McGeorge Bundy argued, quoting Robert Cutler, that the National Security Council’s flexibility was “a peculiar virtue” in a letter to Sen. Research Service, updated January 28, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41916.pdf. Henry Jackson. Organizing for national security: Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations United States Senate, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1961), 1336. 150 A 2015 Government Accountability Office study, for example, found insufficient interagency coordination on the protection of critical technologies and called for the lead departments, including Treasury, Commerce, State, and Defense, to do more to coordinate their efforts to 157 Both councils are non-operational and should remain that way. For a discussion of National Security Council roles, see, Kim Holmes, “Memo protect technologies. “Critical Technologies: Agency Initiatives Address Some Weaknesses, but Additional Interagency Collaboration Is Needed,” to a New President: How Best to Organize the National Security Council,” The Heritage Foundation, April 14, 2016, https://www.heritage.org/ Government Accountability Office, February 2015, https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668382.pdf. defense/report/memo-new-president-how-best-organize-the-national-security-council.

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within the National Security Council and National private sector to understand international threats, National Security Council, the National Econom- most effective when pursuing defined technical Economic Council staff. Should they become di- identify areas of need, and, to the extent possible, ic Council, and other executive offices; and heads goals in areas with either clear customer demand vorced from other council functions, they would not encourage private actors to accept some of the of major research laboratories. Given that it would or existing expertise.164 It struggles in the absence help increase the president’s decision-making ca- risks inherent to modern economic competition. be responsible for strengthening and motivating of those conditions and when asked to trans- pacity.158 There is also the real risk of overly central- There are many ways to do this, including through private sector innovation, this body would need a late research projects into programs of record ized decision-making processes and insufficient ac- rulemaking processes or an advisory body made mechanism to ensure regular coordination across or sustained development projects.165 A national countability, especially regarding innovation efforts, up of business leaders, academics, analysts, and academia, national laboratories, private industry, research and development agency would need so a careful design would have to guardrail against former officials, which would issue regular reports and other innovation hubs. An advisory board, like to overcome both these obstacles. And it would these offices overstepping their bounds.159 and send representatives to high-level committee that described in the previous option, may suffice. ideally receive not only clear strategic guidance discussions. Participating agencies could also con- This new committee could also maintain a stand- about what sorts of projects it could fund but also II. Address economic statecraft separately vene similar executive boards. As we noted previ- ing subcommittee of non-government advisers and hands-off oversight, which introduces risks of un- by establishing an interagency, cabinet-level ously, the private sector has in important role to could be housed either within the executive office or due influence and cronyism. coordinating body, chaired by a member of the play in addressing technology transfer, investment within an executing agency. The options outlined here are by no means ex- president’s cabinet. risks, and emerging dynamics, including crypto- This committee risks running into many of the haustive, and each has its advantages and disad- currencies and data governance. This committee same problems as the economic statecraft commit- vantages. But they all point to a set of guiding prin- As another possibility, the U.S. government could should recognize that reality. tee, as well as the risk of overstepping its bounds ciples that should inform any effort to reform the develop a cross-agency committee responsible for This type of structure would help establish clear and getting into the business of picking winners policymaking process: setting principles and directing traffic across the executive direction over economic statecraft, as ex- and losers. The investment principles outlined economic statecraft portfolio.160 It could be mod- ists for other elements of national power. As such, above would form necessary guardrails to its activ- Principle I: Establish strong lines of executive authority eled on the Committee on Foreign Investment it would need buy-in from participating agencies; ities, as would congressional oversight and regular in the United States process and be chaired by a authority to, at a minimum, set priorities for policy reporting on funding priorities. For this new policy agenda to be effective, there cabinet member. This new committee would be re- and rules; and clear oversight authority. However, A cross-disciplinary advanced research and de- needs to be clearer, more decisive authority to sponsible for strategic planning and setting policy it risks becoming another silo in the expansive bu- velopment agency could direct funding for innova- direct economic statecraft and innovation policy, priorities for the execution of economic statecraft reaucratic landscape that is the executive branch. tion priorities and be responsible for promoting the as there is in other areas of national power. The and the various dimensions of the aforementioned Its success would depend on presidential support, development of technologies that maintain Ameri- policymaking process can leverage the extensive agenda. Members could include senior leaders clear strategic goals, and the right personnel. ca’s innovation leadership. It would be the means strategic planning that already occurs across gov- from relevant agencies and executive offices. Par- to fund research and development projects that fall ernment to set priorities, but there should be more ticipating agencies, such as the Departments of III. Promote innovation separately by outside existing agency mandates and could direct cross-disciplinary execution authority. Commerce and Treasury, may need to develop 1) establishing an interagency coordinating funding across sectors. If modeled after DARPA, more extensive policy-planning capabilities to con- body responsible for innovation policy; such an agency would set and execute its own in- Principle II: Establish clear budgetary authority tribute to this process.161 Specifically, this new com- and 2) creating a cross-disciplinary advanced vestment projects, though it ought to be bounded and prudent oversight and accountability measures mittee, like the Committee on Foreign Investment research and development agency. by our investment principles. It would ideally rep- in the United States, would be complemented with licate the successes enabled by DARPA’s autonomy To the extent possible, new policymaking struc- a working group ideally composed of sub-cabinet Similar to the economic statecraft coordinating and bottom-up governance structure and therefore tures should be given authority over budget priori- officials from the Departments of Treasury and committee just described, an innovation coordi- encourage greater risk tolerance among policymak- ties or even be authorized to direct funding. There Commerce offices involved in the rulemaking pro- nating committee would be responsible for work- ers.163 It could, moreover, serve the dual purpose are substantial risks to forming national innovation cess for the Bureau of Industry and Security and ing with agencies, the private sector and outside of strengthening the innovation iron triangle and policies and centralizing authority, but fear of fail- the Office of Foreign Assets Control; the U.S. Trade experts, as well as international partners to identi- facilitating multilateral innovation initiatives. ure should not get in the way of innovation, which Representative’s office and other White House of- fy, communicate, and direct funding to innovation A generalized research and development agency is a costly, inefficient process. While accountable fices; and the National Security Council and the Na- priorities with the goal of ensuring comprehensive could also be the execution arm of the innovation parties and regular congressional oversight are tional Economic Council. The committee could be research and development efforts.162 The committee committee described above. With knowledge of the necessary, the policymaking process ensures some housed either within the executive office or within would also help develop the types of international research and development programs at each gov- measure of risk tolerance on the part of overseers. an executing agency, as the Committee on Foreign innovation programs described above. ernment agency, that committee would be responsi- Investment in the United States is, and motivated Its members could include senior agency leaders ble for ensuring projects are not duplicative; would Principle III: Convene policymakers from across by strict timelines for action, recalling what makes with knowledge of ongoing innovation work, such set priorities for this agency’s work; and would re- all relevant government offices at the cabinet or the foreign investment committee most effective. as the undersecretary of defense for research and ceive congressional appropriations, earmarked for sub-cabinet level The committee would need to engage with the engineering; White House representatives from the the research and development agency to distribute. However, as multiple Government Accountabil- To reinforce the significance of the reforms and 158 Luke Strange, The National Security Council: A Tool for Decision, American Enterprise Institute, March 2018, 10, https://www.aei.org/ ity Office studies have found, DARPA’s model is break down bureaucratic barriers between execu- wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NSC.pdf. 159 See, e.g., Colin Dueck, Strategic Planning for the New Administration, Hoover Institution, Dec. 15, 2016, https://www.hoover.org/research/ strategic-planning-new-administration. 163 Erica R.H. Fuchs, “Cloning DARPA Successfully,” Issues in Science and Technology 26, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 65–70, https://www.jstor.org/sta- 160 Alexander Bobroske, “Reforming the National Security Council,” American Action Forum, Dec. 21, 2016, https://www.americanactionforum. ble/43315003. org/research/reforming-national-security-council/. 164 See, e.g., “Defense Science and Technology: Adopting Best Practices Can Improve Innovation Investments and Management,” Government 161 Eric Lorber has recommended that the Treasury Department establish its own office of policy planning. Lorber, Securing American Interests, 10. Accountability Office, June 29, 2017, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-499; and “Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Use of Other Transactions for Prototype Projects Has Increased,” Government Accountability Office, Nov. 22, 2019, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-84. 162 The Reagan Institute’s task force on innovation recommended a similar body and outlined positive principles for its role, which we draw from here. The Contest for Innovation, 15. 165 “Defense Science and Technology: Adopting Best Practices Can Improve Innovation Investments and Management.”

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tive offices and executing agencies, the policymak- ogy Transformation Service at the General Servic- agency, multiyear fellowships could fill known gaps possible with diverse, cross-disciplinary, and tech- ing process must include and influence each of es Administration), as well as tech-focused offices in agency workforces and bring in technologists, nical backgrounds, for both political and career ap- those authorities. within the Intelligence Community and Depart- entrepreneurs, and other non-traditional talent. pointments; 2) exercise existing hiring authorities ment of Defense. More broadly, the federal government must reform in full and employ new, flexible hiring tools; 3) ex- Principle IV: Coordinate with the private sector, To ensure America’s primacy in this new era, USAJOBs (the federal government’s online hiring pand career and educational opportunities for civil academia, and international partners these efforts will need to be accelerated. To begin portal) and reduce other unnecessary hiring barri- servants; 4) be open to temporary or alternative with, federal agencies should exercise their sub- ers that might deter otherwise interested talent.169 work arrangements; and 5) draw on the expertise The policymaking process should find ways to stantial, but underutilized, hiring authorities to de- Similar arrangements should be established with of the private sector and universities. support the private sector through co-investments velop a stronger career workforce.166 The pay gap universities and other institutions to promote the and public-private partnerships, to work more between public and private sector jobs disincen- education of students committed to public service * * * closely with allies and partners, and to leverage the tivizes top talent from entering government jobs. in a variety of fields. These students could either unique capabilities of the U.S. government. Agencies could help overcome that obstacle and enter government to help shape the next genera- There is a great deal to be done. The world is A variety of organizational models could adhere improve recruiting and retention numbers by pro- tion of leaders or participate in the research and changing in unprecedented and disruptive ways, to these principles. None will be perfect, but what- viding greater access to continuing education and development necessary to help position the United as the coronavirus pandemic is making clear. To ever form it takes, the policymaking process must training — as the U.S. military does for uniformed States to compete and succeed in this new land- preserve America’s primacy, its political leaders change the way it has operated for decades. The personnel — and should consider offering alterna- scape. Such programs could be linked to scholar- must leverage the country’s unique advantages president should consider establishing a bipartisan tive career pathways that support such talented ship or debt-forgiveness programs as referenced through policies that strengthen America’s inno- commission to study and identify organizational civilian employees.167 above. Other countries have already undertak- vative capacity, economic statecraft, and position and process reforms. The commission could be At the same time, the executive branch ought to en similar efforts. Israel, for example, handpicks as the leader and center of gravity of the inter- comprised of current and former government of- develop cross-disciplinary relationships and exper- young students with a high cyber aptitude to join national community while also making needed ficials with experience in these issue areas, as well tise through “joint” appointment structures. Sim- Unit 8200 of the Israel Defense Forces.170 This has reforms to the processes and the workforce that as business leaders and outside experts, and mem- ilar to the military’s requirement for joint billets significant knock-on effects, as those individuals guide such efforts. bers could be appointed by both the White House in order to be promoted, agencies could adopt a often stay in the military long term and add their To quote Samuel Huntington, “The ultimate test and Congress. Its goal would be to propose new new model of “national security professionals” and expertise to Israel’s public mission. of a great power is its ability to renew.”172 We are policymaking designs that would systematically make promotion to the senior executive service Personnel reforms should not be limited to career optimistic that by taking these, and other, impor- integrate national security and economic policy, contingent upon cross-department experience.168 appointments and civil servants. Political appoint- tant steps, the United States will rise to this histor- guided by the principles presented here. Howev- Participating agencies could include the Depart- ments should draw from a more varied talent pool ic challenge. er, even with the right processes and organization, ments of State, Commerce, Treasury, Defense, of people with unique track records of success and policymaking will suffer without the right people and even Justice, Energy, and Homeland Security. experience. Such individuals are needed to help David H. McCormick is the CEO of Bridgewater sitting around the table. That is the final compo- While the ideal professional experiences and back- confront ever more complex issues at the intersec- Associates, a global macro investment firm. Previ- nent of this reform agenda. grounds would vary by role, these sorts of joint ca- tion of security, technology, and economics. Those ously, he served in senior positions in the Treasury reer experiences would help prepare senior profes- with backgrounds in related issues, especially with Department, the White House, and the Commerce Reform Government Talent Management sional staff for the increasingly integrated spheres cross-disciplinary and high-tech experience, will Department. He is a graduate of West Point and a of economic and national security policymaking. be best prepared to take on these challenges. Yet, veteran of the First Gulf War. To get the right people, personnel and talent In addition, the federal government should de- this is where the current policies, pay limitations, management policies should evolve to include velop far more robust partnerships with private in- and rigorous Senate ethics rules and confirma- Charles E. Luftig is a senior manager at Bridge- programs to attract, retain, and train people with dustry to draw on its talent and ideas. Individuals tion processes can deter even the most patriotic water Associates. He previously served as the depu- different profiles: lateral, creative, out-of-the-box participating in these partnerships could sign up for of high-quality candidates from accepting appoint- ty general counsel in the Office of Management and thinkers as well as substantive experts, particular- temporary, multi-year “tours of duty” or for more ments. These rules exist for good reason, and risks Budget and held several legal and policy roles at the ly in science and technology. The range of policy permanent arrangements that would place private of corruption and unethical behavior must be bal- National Security Council, including senior adviser responsibilities outlined above necessitates differ- sector talent into agencies on a longer-term basis. anced against the risks of not getting the right peo- in the office of the National Security Adviser. ent competencies, but they all require cross-disci- These partnerships could also facilitate the flow ple. But in order to attract and retain the kind of plinary thinkers, with a mix of technical and soft of ideas and solutions into the U.S. government, talent that will be necessary for America to prevail James M. Cunningham is a research associate skills, often with non-traditional backgrounds. whether through short-term private competitions in great-power competition, some dramatic chang- at Bridgewater Associates. He previously worked as Some efforts have already been undertaken to or through longer-term research and development es will be required as highlighted in a recent study a national security analyst at the American Enter- draw this type of talent into civil servant roles in relationships. Agencies could also establish fel- by Business Executives for National Security.171 prise Institute and the Hoover Institution. departments and agencies, producing pockets of lowship programs, in the vein of the White House In sum, the U.S. government’s “talent strategy” technology talent in areas such as the U.S. Digital fellowships, to draw in talented young people with and the much needed reforms should be guided by The views reflected in this article are those of the Service (located within the Office of Management varied skill sets. These programs have their faults, the following principles: 1) attract the best people authors alone. and Budget) and 18F (located within the Technol- but if well-managed and housed within a particular

169 Inspired to Serve, National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, March 2020, https://inspire2serve.gov/reports/final-report. 166 For example, agencies can rapidly hire people into AI-facing jobs and draw talent from outside traditional career pipelines. See, Interim 170 Dov S. Zakheim, “Brains, not Brawn, Matter Most in the Next War — and We’re not Being Smart About It,” The Hill, Oct. 22, 2019, https:// Report, National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 37. thehill.com/opinion/national-security/466679-brains-not-brawn-matter-most-in-the-next-war-and-were-not-being. 167 The “Section 809 Panel” proposed creative reforms to the defense acquisition workforce. Similar models could be considered in other agen- 171 Making Senior Government Service More Attractive, Business Executives for National Security, May 2015, https://www.bens.org/file/poli- cies, including the Departments of Treasury and Commerce. See, “Section 809 Panel,” available at https://section809panel.org/. cy---bens-impact-documents-/Government-Services-Report___May2015.pdf. 168 Ries, Improving Decisionmaking in a Turbulent World, 44. 172 Huntington, “The U.S.: Decline or Renewal?” 90.

74 75 Applying Method to Madness: A User’s Guide to Causal Inference in Policy Analysis

Jessica Blankshain and Andrew Stigler attempt to make the analytical tools frequently used in social science research more “user friendly” by explaining what it means to investigate causality. By providing a reader’s guide to social science and policy analysis, they hope to enable practitioners to make stronger contributions at all levels of policymaking.

hen national security practition- months. More academic exercises in policy anal- ers — military and civilian alike ysis and critical thinking compete for space with — encounter academic social sci- the need to cover ever-changing information on ence, often in the context of pro- emerging threats and operational realities. fessionalW military education, they usually respond In addition to structural constraints, there are in one of two ways. The first is with deep skep- cultural challenges.1 Many military students seek ticism, sometimes bordering on antagonism: All clear, definitive answers to questions, while aca- this academic theory is nice, but it doesn’t have demics are used to raising more questions than anything to do with the real world where I do my we’re able to answer. Students are often uncom- job! Why should I believe this analysis? You can fortable with the idea that social science is still make numbers say anything you want! The sec- science even if it often can’t produce exact pre- ond is with uncritical acceptance: I don’t under- dictions. And as Tami Biddle has noted, military stand the math, but it was published by people practitioners “tend to be skeptical that theories with Ph.D.s so it must be true! This theory pre- produced by academics can help them understand dicts X, so that’s what will happen, right? war, which they believe is their dominion. After all, On the other side of the classroom, faculty like academics dwell in the realm of the abstract and ourselves similarly struggle to communicate social the theoretical while military professionals dwell science findings and approaches to students who in the realm of the concrete and the real.”2 While may or may not have the academic training to crit- this tendency may be particularly acute among ically evaluate them. Should we simply not assign military professionals, civilian practitioners are any empirical social science or tell our students to not immune to it. But simply ignoring academic “skip the math” and just read the introduction and social science — including social science methods conclusion? Or should we assume they have grad- — is not a productive solution. Social scientists uate-level training in social science methods and use a range of tools to investigate hypothesized proceed with our lessons, ignoring the blank looks causal relationships in the real world and create that greet us? Or should we do our best to turn our generalizable knowledge that can be applied to students into full-fledged academics in training? other situations. Familiarity with sophisticated Other professional military education dynamics causal analysis is a key part of preparing practi- exacerbate the challenge of teaching social sci- tioner students for careers in national security ence and other sophisticated analytical work. The decision-making positions. students in any one classroom often have a wide In their 2020 vision for professional military range of experience, both educational and opera- education, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argue that tional. One student might have a Ph.D. in a social military success science field, while another has an undergraduate degree in engineering and hasn’t been in an aca- cannot be achieved without substantially demic classroom in decades, and yet another has enhancing the cognitive capacities of joint a professional degree in law or medicine. Making warfighters to conceive, design, and imple- things even more difficult, many programs op- ment strategies and campaigns to integrate erate on a compressed time frame, for example, our capabilities globally, defeat competitors Jessica D. Blankshain conducting a full master’s degree program in 10 in contests we have not yet imagined, and

Andrew L. Stigler 1 For more on this, see, Joan Johnson-Freese, Educating America’s Military (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013). 2 Tami Davis Biddle, “Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 94–109, http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/8864.

77 The Strategist Applying Method to Madness: A User’s Guide to Causal Inference in Policy Analysis

respond to activity short of armed conflict in duces many different results, and even in retrospect is vitally important to being an educated consumer more likely to occur than if I choose policy B or C. domains already being contested.3 it can be difficult to establish a definitive causal link who is able to critically evaluate and synthesize the By altering an aspect of the environment — the between policy and outcome. This is where social work of others. Even if most practitioners will not cause — one seeks to influence another aspect of They call for an increased focus on “[c]ritical science approaches, especially those focused on find themselves in senior decision-making roles in the environment — the effect. A proposed alliance, strategic thinking,”4 which would seem to include causal analysis, can make significant contributions. the near future, if ever, the analytical products they for example, may be meant to prevent aggressive the ability to critically evaluate information and But while we cannot simply ignore academic so- produce in the form of memos and briefs do signifi- behavior on the part of potential adversaries. This make educated decisions about the likely conse- cial science research and methods, neither can we cantly shape decision-making at the highest levels. was the original intent of NATO. The alliance was quences of different actions or approaches. Stu- assume that it is immediately accessible to our stu- While uncertainty can never be eliminated entirely, an effort to communicate to the Soviet Union that dents cannot achieve the Joint Chiefs’ requisite dents. As an extensive literature on bridging the a better understanding of the analytical tools social an attack on a single Western European member joint professional military education goals, such gap between academia and the policymaking world science can bring to bear will help policymakers of the alliance would automatically result in a war as being able to “[d]iscern the military dimensions has highlighted,8 the partnership between national and military officers successfully navigate com- with the other members of the alliance, including of a challenge affecting national interest,” “[a]ntic- security policymakers and social science research- plexity and avoid common pitfalls. the United States. In other words, Western policy- ipate and lead rapid adaptation and innovation,” ers has not always been a successful one. While This essay attempts to make the analytical tools makers believed that the creation of a mutual de- or “execute and adapt strategy through campaigns much of the literature focuses on what social scien- frequently used in social science research more fense treaty would cause Soviet leaders to doubt and operations,” without a strong grasp of the fun- tists can do to make their work more accessible to “user friendly” by explaining what it means to in- their ability to conduct a successful offensive in damentals of causal analysis.5 As Jim Golby argues, practitioners, Philip Zelikow instead argues that ef- vestigate causality, discussing several primary ways Western Europe, having the effect of improving fective policymaking relies on policymakers having analysts attempt to do so — through formal models, deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It is impor- The U.S. military does not need or want all adequate “software” to attack policy problems, by controlled experiments, statistical analysis, and the tant to note that in the real world, most causes are officers to become social scientist research- which he means “the way people size up problems, use of historical cases and analogies — and provid- themselves the effects of other, earlier causes. For ers, but applied social science can neverthe- design actions, and implement policy.”9 He further ing troubleshooting tips for successfully applying example, one could say that the emergence of the less help develop strategic thinking because argues that one reason social science research of- and evaluating these analytical methods. The aim is Soviet Union as a potential hostile power caused it: (1) focuses on human behavior and influ- ten seems irrelevant to policymakers is that “as the to provide a sort of reader’s guide to sophisticated the Western powers to form a defensive alliance. ence; (2) develops comfort with competing software of policy work has deteriorated, the peo- social science and policy analysis. This is not only Causality has been a key focus of the study of theories; (3) requires creativity; and (4) uses ple doing policy work no longer do the analysis — because social science research can inform the pol- international relations since World War I, when evidence and iteration to better understand or articulate the questions — to seek out and use icy process in important ways, but because critical many of the earliest investigations of internation- the world and adapt to change.6 relevant knowledge, whatever its source.”10 reading is itself an important component of critical al conflict sought to illuminate the causes of war.11 Even in a world where academics often do not thinking. Developing and practicing this important After World War II, the field of security studies A basic part of policymaking, strategizing, or plan- write in terms clearly accessible to a practitioner skill will enable practitioners to make stronger con- became more focused on “describing social be- ning at any level is attempting to anticipate the re- audience — and often assume a level of under- tributions at all levels of policymaking. haviors as they actually occur (rather than as we sults of one’s decisions. For example, will withdraw- standing of sophisticated methods that is a high might wish them to be) and explaining causal re- ing from the Iran nuclear deal shorten or lengthen bar even for other academics — basic literacy in the lationships among the various behaviors.”12 As the Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon? Or will surging language and tools of causal analysis can still help Causality: The Holy Grail field focused more on explaining cause and effect, troops in Afghanistan lead to increased or decreased practitioners make the most of relevant academic of Social Science it also became more “scientific” — that is, gener- violence? Anticipating consequences is, of course, studies and powerful analytical tools. For the most ating falsifiable hypotheses (statements that could extremely difficult because national security poli- part, national security practitioners are consumers, When civilian policymakers and military officers be proven incorrect)13 and testing them against em- cy is made in complicated social, strategic, military, rather than producers, of social science research. make decisions regarding national security policy pirical evidence (things that happened in the real and political environments.7 Any given decision pro- But understanding how this research is conducted or military strategy, they are often seeking to create world).14 One common hypothesis you may be fa- (or sometimes prevent) a particular outcome. For miliar with is the democratic peace theory, which example, a policy to increase military-to-military proposes that two democratic states are less likely 3 “Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Educa- tion & Talent Management,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1, 2020, 2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jcs_pme_tm_vi- engagement, offer financial aid, or threaten sanc- to go to war with one another than one democratic sion.pdf?ver=2020-05-15-102429-817. tions is an effort to alter a political environment state and one undemocratic state. 4 “Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War,” 3, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jcs_pme_ and create a political result. In such instances poli- Frequently, hypotheses will be stated (explicitly or tm_vision.pdf?ver=2020-05-15-102429-817. cymakers are making an assumption about causal- implicitly) in terms of independent and dependent 5 “Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War,” 4. ity: If I choose policy A, my preferred outcome is variables. The aspect of the environment the analyst 6 Jim Golby, “Want Better Strategists? Teach Social Science.” War on the Rocks, June 19, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/want-bet- ter-strategists-teach-social-science/. 7 For more on the influences on foreign policy decision-making, see, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Jessica D. Blankshain, and David A. Cooper, Deci- 11 For a review of the early stages of causal theorizing in international relations, see, Milja Kurki, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming sion-Making in American Foreign Policy: Translating Theory Into Practice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019). Causal Analysis (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), chap. 1. 8 For example, Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 12 Peter D. Feaver and Erika Seeler, “Before and After Huntington: The Methodological Maturing of Civil-Military Studies,” in American Civil-Mil- Press, 1993); Stephen M. Walt, “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 8, no. itary Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era, ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 (2005): 23–48, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104904; Bruce W. Jentleson and Ely Ratner, “Bridging the Beltway–Ivory Tower 2009), 72–90, 74. While acknowledging this shift, it is simultaneously important to recognize that research that simply describes the state of the Gap,” International Studies Review 13, no. 1 (March 2011): 6–11, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.00992.x; James Goldgeier and Bruce world without investigating causal relationships can also make valuable contributions to knowledge. Jentleson, “How to Bridge the Gap Between Policy and Scholarship,” War on the Rocks, June 29, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/06/how- 13 A non-falsifiable hypothesis is one that cannot be disproven. A classic example has to do with the color of swans. “All swans are white” to-bridge-the-gap-between-policy-and-scholarship/; James Goldgeier, “A New Generation of Scholars Looks to Bridge the Gap,” War on the Rocks, is a falsifiable hypothesis — observing a swan that is black (or any color other than white) would disprove the hypothesis. By contrast, the Feb. 22, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/bridging-the-gap/; Michael C. Desch, Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social statement “Black swans exist” is non-falsifiable. A researcher could count white swan after white swan and still never prove definitively that Science on National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019). black swans do not exist anywhere. To give a policymaking example, the statement, “The use of economic sanctions may allow the United 9 Philip Zelikow, “To Regain Policy Competence: The Software of American Public Problem-Solving,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 4 States to avoid military action” is non-falsifiable. Even if one were to prove that economic sanctions have never helped to avoid military action, (August 2019): 110–27, http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/6665. there is always a chance sanctions could have this effect the next time around. 10 Zelikow, “To Regain Policy Competence.” 14 Feaver et al., “Before and After Huntington,” 74.

78 79 The Strategist Applying Method to Madness: A User’s Guide to Causal Inference in Policy Analysis

believes is the cause is called the independent vari- the degree to which an action creates an effect. We able. It is independent because its value is assumed discuss several of these methods for better under- to be determined outside the system being studied standing what would happen in the presence or ab- — in other words, the analyst is not concerned with sence of some causal factor in the next section. what factors affect the independent variable, but in- stead with the independent variable’s effect on the dependent variable. In policymaking terms, the in- Approaches to Causal Analysis dependent variable is the aspect of the environment the policymaker might seek to directly manipulate. Formal Models In the democratic peace hypothesis, the independ- ent variable is the regime type of the two states. In One way to better understand causal relation- keeping with our example, one might note that the ships is to use formal models, which are simplified United States frequently promotes democratic gov- representations of the world that highlight particu- ernance around the globe.15 lar dynamics of importance to the analyst. The key Changing the value of the independent variable is features of a model are: 1) its explicit assumptions expected to lead to changes in the dependent var- about the world and the actors in it, and 2) the in- iable — so called because its value is believed to ternal logic by which it turns these assumptions potentially “depend” on the independent variable into predictions, ranging from simple arithmetic as well as other variables. In the democratic peace to multivariable calculus. Formal models force an- example, the dependent variable is war — have the alysts to be disciplined and transparent in their states in question been at war with one another? thinking about causal relationships. Models can be Changes in the independent variable (regime type) more or less “formal” in the extent to which they are believed to cause changes in the dependent var- use mathematical representation and equations. iable (war).16 In other words, if a totalitarian regime The most commonly used models in social sci- undergoes a revolution and becomes a democracy, ence and policy analysis are based on rational other democracies should feel safer. choice theory. Rational choice theory, in its broad- The difficulty, of course, comes in evaluating est form, assumes that an actor (the decision-mak- these causal hypotheses to determine which can be er), has consistent, rank-ordered preferences with reliably used to predict real-world events, and which regard to the different possible outcomes, and good enough to generate realistic predictions or The models — or games — can be “solved” by de- cannot. In a perfect world, the analyst would be able beliefs about the way their decisions or actions outputs. Other models relax the assumptions of ra- termining each player’s best response to each of to observe two separate timelines in which the key change the likelihood of those outcomes occur- tional choice theory, allowing actors to have incon- the other players’ actions and whether any of these independent variable differed. For example, to test ring. Rational choice theory further assumes the sistent preferences and beliefs, or to choose based best responses form one or more equilibria. More the hypothesis that the assassination of Archduke actor will choose the action that gives him or her on a method other than optimization.18 When these complex games, with more than two players or Franz Ferdinand caused World War I, we would ide- the best expected outcome, or maximum expected models focus on a single actor making a decision, it multiple rounds of interaction are frequently de- ally be able to observe two parallel universes that utility.17 In such a model, an increase in the costs or is generally referred to as decision theory. picted as game trees. Each node represents an ac- are identical until June 28, 1914, at which point the decrease in the benefits expected from a particular Game theory refers to models that build on de- tor’s decision point, with branches from that node archduke is assassinated in one universe but not the course of action would make the decision-maker cision theory by adding strategic interaction be- representing possible choices. The final nodes on other. In technical terms, this is called evaluating less likely to choose that option. Importantly, ana- tween actors to the mix. In keeping with the name the tree, when there are no more decisions to be the counterfactual — trying to evaluate what would lysts using rational choice-based models frequent- “game theory,” actors in these models are often made, display each player’s payoffs from that set have happened if one or more historical fact were ly do not believe the assumptions underlying these called players. An individual player’s decisions are of possible actions. The analyst then reasons back- changed. While counterfactuals are an extremely models are realistic. States are not actually single based not simply on a static view of the world, but ward from these payoffs to determine likely paths useful concept, it is, unfortunately, impossible for actors who make decisions, and even people who on anticipating other players’ reactions to their the players would follow. analysts to jump time streams in this manner, sci- do make decisions don’t often do so by such a me- own actions. Game theoretic models make assump- Perhaps the best-known example of game theory ence fiction films notwithstanding. Instead, analysts ticulous process. But the analyst believes the ac- tions about each player’s objectives or the payoffs as applied to international relations is the theory of are forced to rely on methods other than direct ob- tors in their models behave “as if” these assump- associated with various outcomes, and about the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). In its classic servation to evaluate the counterfactual, or estimate tions hold. In other words, the assumptions are information each player knows about the other Cold War formulation, MAD involved two actors, player(s) and the structure or rules of the game. the United States and the Soviet Union, that each

15 Many independent variables cannot be controlled by individual policymakers, of course. U.S. policymakers cannot wave a magic wand and turn An equilibrium is a set of actions or states from ranked their own total annihilation as the worst other states into democracies. Similarly, even if leaders of authoritarian regimes determine that advances in communications technology are likely which no player wants to deviate, given the other possible outcome and believed that the other would to destabilize their regime, they may not be able to stop these advances. Politicians can impact technological developments at times, but it was too players’ anticipated responses to a deviation. The respond to a nuclear attack with its own nuclear at- late for individual political leaders to prevent communications technology from facilitating the spread of the Arab Spring after a Tunisian fruit-seller immolated himself in a public square. Other potential causal factors — such as naval deployments, diplomatic overtures, and statements of policy simplest game theoretic models — single-round tack, producing total annihilation in the originator. — may be more under the chief executive’s control. interactions between two players — are often de- Given these assumptions, neither country initiating 16 It is possible to discuss variation and correlation among variables without discussing causality. Some scholars argue that causation is a picted as tables that show the players’ respective an attack would produce a stable equilibrium — de- metaphysical notion that lies outside the realm of true knowledge. Steven Sloman, Causal Models: How People Think About the World and Its Alternatives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 5–6. payoffs for each possible combination of actions. viation by either party would lead to total annihila- 17 For a more detailed discussion of rational choice theory, see, Gvosdev, Blankshain, and Cooper, Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy, chap. 3; and Kenneth A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). 18 See, Gvosdev, Blankshain, and Cooper, Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy, chap. 4.

80 81 The Strategist Applying Method to Madness: A User’s Guide to Causal Inference in Policy Analysis

tion, so neither had an incentive to attack. which neither researcher nor subject knows which ple into groups for which the independent variable (true experiments frequently require voluntary The United States (and NATO members) did vary at group the subject is in, is the “gold standard” of varies, but other important characteristics do not. consent), might they have behaved differently times on the role nuclear weapons would play in na- causal analysis, but is quite difficult to administer in Take, for example, a quasi-experiment that sought than they would have in a “normal” setting? tional and alliance defense. In 1954, Deputy Supreme social science research. Social scientists are some- to determine the effect of independent media on Allied Commander Bernard Montgomery offered the times able to conduct what are called “field exper- the 1999 Russian parliamentary elections. The one Statistical Analysis following: “I want to make it absolutely clear that we iments,” taking advantage of situations where they national television channel that was independent are basing all our planning on using atomic and ther- are able to assign control and treatment groups in from the Russian government was accessible to As another option for causal analysis, social sci- monuclear weapons in our defense. With us it is no a natural setting, but these opportunities are rare. only part of the population. The researchers argue entists sometimes turn to what they call “large-N longer ‘They may possibly be used.’ It is very definite- For example, a group of researchers used a field that access to it was effectively random once they data.” Rather than investigating the details of a spe- ly ‘They will be used, if we are attacked.’”19 experiment to evaluate whether Mexico’s Seguro controlled for observable factors such as popula- cific historical case, or cases, the analyst collects Some American leaders, including President Popular health care program was able to success- tion size and urban status (see the next section on more limited information on a large number of cas- Dwight Eisenhower, viewed nuclear weapons to be fully provide resources to low-income households. statistical analysis). They found that access to the es, which are often called “observations.” The goal a reliable means of national defense. But the MAD As the program was being rolled out, the research- independent channel decreased the government’s is to use the large amount of data to control for perspective on nuclear deterrence — the fear of to- ers were able to match pairs of “health clusters,” vote share and increased the vote share for opposi- variation among the observations. For example, to tal annihilation — arguably came to dominate Cold groups of households served by a particular health tion parties.22 While this was not a true controlled test the democratic peace hypothesis, referenced War thinking between the two superpowers. care facility, and give one member of each pair a experiment, it is about as close as one can come in above, one might look at a large dataset of coun- In evaluating a formal model, it is important to treatment that involved encouraging individuals the real world of policy analytics. tries over time to determine whether pairs of dem- ask whether the assumptions are reasonable for to enroll in the health program and providing re- Military operations offer more opportunities ocratic countries are, in fact, less likely to go to war the purpose and whether the analyst seems to have sources for improved health facilities.20 for actual real-world hypothesis testing, in some with one another than are pairs of countries that faithfully followed the rules of the model’s internal One area of social science research where experi- respects. The physical movement and interaction include a non-democracy. The large dataset would logic. So, for example, in the case of MAD one could ments are more common is public opinion research. of forces can reveal facts that are observable on allow the analyst to control for so-called “con- question whether either state considered some Analysts use survey experiments to observe how the ground (or in the air or sea or cyberspace). founding variables,” such as whether each pair of outcome to be worse than total annihilation, or respondents react to various treatments incorpo- In training and in wargaming, actions can be re- countries shares a land border. There are enough doubted that the other state would actually retali- rated in the survey design. One set of respondents peated under different circumstances, or different pairs of countries that the analyst can use statis- ate with a devastating strike. It is important to note gets a particular version of the survey, while oth- actions can be tried in the same circumstances, to tical techniques to determine whether the demo- that such stylized models generate hypotheses — ers get a different version or versions that vary the attempt to discern a relationship between cause cratic peace relationship holds for both countries they do not test them. A model makes predictions questions or framing. In one study, for example, and effect. Other critical causal relationships — that share a border and those that do not. based on its internal logic. These predictions can researchers asked American survey respondents such as deterrence — are more difficult to evalu- If you’ve ever taken a statistics course, you may then be tested in the real world using some of the whether they would support the United States en- ate in this fashion since the results are not purely have heard the statement “correlation does not mean methods described below. gaging in a hypothetical military action. Some re- physical and thus can be more difficult to observe. causation,” but what does that actually mean? What, spondents (the control group) were given no addi- Deterrence played a major role in the conduct (if other than a cause and effect relationship, might ex- Controlled Experiments tional information about the U.S. armed forces that one could call it that) of the Cold War, but it is al- plain a correlation (relationship between two varia- would engage in this action. Respondents random- most impossible to identify which actual military bles) in large-N data? There are three possibilities: The most straightforward and reliable way to ly selected into the treatment group, however, were steps helped generate a deterrent effect. Selection Effects: One possibility is that an un- evaluate causal claims is through controlled exper- told that policymakers were considering reintro- So how is a practitioner to evaluate experi- intended force is “choosing” observations for in- iments. In an experiment, the researcher essential- ducing a draft and that this shift would precede the mental or quasi-experimental evidence for causal clusion in the dataset. During World War II, for ly applies a “treatment” (or cause) to one group of hypothetical military action. The researchers were relationships? As discussed above, key to the ef- example, the civilian Statistical Research Group subjects but not another, and then looks for any thus able to estimate whether the reintroduction fectiveness of an experiment is the random assign- was tasked with improving the design of fighter air- differences in outcomes of interest between the of a draft would affect support for military action.21 ment of “participants” to control and treatment craft. Initially, the military researchers conducted groups. This is what medical researchers do in Frequently, however, the realities of human be- groups. It is important to consider whether these a survey of combat damage on returning aircraft, randomized control drug trials. The researchers havior, not to mention ethical concerns, prevent so- assignments were effectively random. Could the believing that the parts of the aircraft that were randomly assign participants to the treatment and cial science analysts from running experiments to control and treatment groups vary in a systemat- disproportionately struck by enemy fire should re- control groups, attempting to create two groups create ideal circumstances for causal analysis. With ic way that biases the results? Also important is ceive better armor. A statistically trained member of participants who are similar in all important respect to government policymaking, in particular, the “operationalization” of the treatments and the of the staff realized this was a mistake. The survey respects. They then give participants in the treat- policymakers frequently only get one shot — they outcome: Do the treatments actually create the was of a non-random sample of fighters — they ment group the drug being studied and participants cannot simply adjust their treatment and try again, conditions they were supposed to create? Is the were only looking at the aircraft that had returned in the control group a placebo. Any difference in as medical researchers do. Instead, policy analysts dependent variable truly measuring the outcome from combat. A better starting point would be to outcomes between the two groups is theoretically frequently try to find quasi-experiments, where of interest? Another primary concern with social assume that the areas of the returning combat air- attributable to the effect of the drug. existing features of society or the randomness of science experiments is what academics call “gen- craft that were not damaged are exactly the parts The double-blind randomized control trial, in nature have essentially randomly separated peo- eralizability” or “external validity.” Would the re- of the plane that should receive additional protec- sults likely hold outside of the precise experimen- tion. Combat damage to those areas was more crit- tal conditions studied? If the subjects were aware ical, since planes struck in those areas were likely 19 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 84. that they were participating in an experiment fatally damaged and did not return from the mis- 20 Gary King, et al., “Public Policy for the Poor? A Randomised Assessment of the Mexican Universal Health Insurance Programme,” The Lancet 373, no. 9673 (April 2009): 1447–54, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(09)60239-7. 21 Michael C. Horowitz and Matthew S. Levendusky, “Drafting Support for War: Conscription and Mass Support for Warfare,” Journal of Politics 22 Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. “Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia,” American Economic 73, no. 2 (April 2011): 524–34, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611000119. Review 101, no. 7 (2011): 3253–85, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41408737.

82 83 The Strategist Applying Method to Madness: A User’s Guide to Causal Inference in Policy Analysis

sion. This latter approach was eventually adopted data, or there is significant error in measuring vari- cannot make a policy decision without making some a far greater impact than had been anticipated.

by both the Navy and the Air Force.23 In this case, ables, the model’s results may be biased. Data avail- reference to history.25 However, analogies can harm In 1966, American assessments of the vulnerabil- the research design was out of the analysts’ hands able may also not be an exact match for the con- the interests of the policymaker as well, if they pro- ities of North Vietnam’s oil logistics were similarly — the only planes available to examine were those cept the analyst is trying to represent in the model, mote a misunderstanding of the policy options. pessimistic that a sustained air campaign would that survived. But researchers sometimes inadvert- or the analyst may need to attempt to quantify in- When social scientists use historical case stud- have a meaningful impact on Hanoi’s ability to sup- ently introduce selection effects in their results by herently qualitative variables (for example, the de- ies — sometimes called “small-N analysis” — they ply guerrillas in the South. Rostow used his inti- choosing to include only “successful” cases, or cas- gree to which a state is a democracy). These types choose cases carefully depending on the purpose of mate familiarity with the example of Nazi Germany es where the expected outcome occurred. This is of issues can be more difficult for a non-expert to the analysis.26 The cases can be used to develop hy- to argue that American assessments of North Viet- sometimes called “selecting on the dependent var- detect. A more casual reader frequently has to put potheses, to illustrate the plausibility of causal mech- nam were similarly off the mark: iable.” Consider the following statement: “Study some amount of faith in the peer-review process by anisms, or to test hypotheses. For example, compar- finds that 80 percent of successful senate cam- which many academic articles are published and ing two cases that are as similar as possible in all but We used then [in 1944] with respect to the Ger- paigns raised over $X million.” It is tempting to in- trust that reviewers and editors with appropriate one respect can help to test hypotheses about the mans exactly the same analytical methods we fer that high spending leads to campaign success, expertise will have identified such issues. consequences of that difference. In one study, Deb- are now applying to North Vietnam … Assum- but without knowing how much losing campaigns In many cases, a practitioner (or even an aca- orah Avant compares American and British systems ing that they [the Germans] would and could spent, we cannot make this inference. demic) reading a statistical analysis won’t neces- of military oversight — and particularly their respec- cushion front line military requirements, we Omitted Variable Bias: Another possibility is sarily be familiar with the details of the particular tive experiences in Vietnam and the Boer Wars and told our seniors that attacks on oil would be that some other, unidentified variable is causing regression model or statistical technique being em- the Malayan Emergency — to argue that divisions considerably cushioned and delayed in their variation in both the independent and dependent ployed. But that does not mean the reader simply in the civilian government make the military less re- impact on the military situation in the field. variables. Consider, for example, the statistic that needs to take the author’s word that the results are sponsive to civilian attempts to encourage military American military officers disproportionately iden- convincing. An educated consumer of these types innovation.27 Alternately, instead of comparing cases, We were wrong. From the moment that seri- tify with the Republican Party when compared to of analyses can still consider whether the variables, one particular case can be examined in detail using a ous and systematic oil attacks started, [the the overall U.S. population.24 One might note, how- as defined by the author, measure what they are method called process-tracing, which helps to evalu- Germans’] front line fighter strength and ever, that American military officers are also dis- intended to measure; whether any causal claims ate the plausibility of particular causal mechanisms tank mobility were affected. … proportionately white males, compared to the over- might be confounded by selection effects, omitted by looking for them in action. Importantly, the same all population. And white males are more likely to variables, or reverse causality; and whether the case(s) cannot be used for both theory-development With the understanding that simple analogies be Republicans than are individuals in many other author has successfully corrected or accounted and theory-testing, because this can bias the analysis are dangerous, I nevertheless feel it is quite demographic groups. So it could be that omitted for such possible confounders. And again, readers and reduce generalizability. possible the military effects of a systematic variables — sex and race — are driving the rela- should consider external validity: Is there reason to In policymaking, analysts often invoke particular and sustained bombing of POL in North Vi- tionship between officer status and partisan affili- believe the relationship captured might be specif- historical analogies to predict what is likely to hap- etnam may be more prompt and direct than ation, rather than any causal relationship between ic to the study’s sample or to particular contexts? pen in a developing situation. This can be danger- conventional intelligence would suggest.29 military service and party identification. As a reader, it is also important to consider the ous, as Yuen Foong Khong highlights in his analysis Reverse Causality: It is also possible that the an- source — are you reading a peer-reviewed scholar- of the internal deliberations of the administration As events in 1966 proved, Rostow was wrong. alyst has misidentified the causal relationship be- ly article? A report from a well-known think thank? of Lyndon Johnson in 1966. Khong describes a May Johnson went ahead with the bombing that Rostow tween the independent and dependent variables A journalist’s summary of an unpublished study? 6 memo in which Walt Rostow, then national se- recommended, but North Vietnam’s military sup- — that is, changes in the dependent variable cause While there are certainly bad studies published in curity adviser (but also an academic economist), port for the insurgency was not dramatically im- changes in the independent variable, rather than academic journals, and good work done by data offered a comparison between the vulnerability of pacted by attacks on oil production and transport.30 vice versa. Consider exit polling at elections. Say journalists, the answer should influence your level Nazi Germany’s supply chain of petroleum, oil, and Khong notes that Rostow explicitly acknowl- a particular poll found a high correlation between of trust or skepticism toward the findings. lubricants (POL) during World War II, and the POL edges the dangers associated with analogical voters who say that immigration is the most impor- vulnerability of North Vietnam.28 reasoning and yet still falls into the trap.31 This tant issue to them, and voters who voted for Don- Counterfactuals: Historical Cases Rostow pointed out that the Allies’ assessment of is an important caveat, one that can be applied ald Trump. One might infer that those voters chose and Analogical Reasoning Germany’s logistics during World War II had overes- to the full spectrum of policy analysis: Recogni- Trump because they care about immigration and timated Germany’s ability to reallocate POL supplies tion of the possibility of certain types of errors Trump highlights this issue in his stump speeches. Yet another method social scientists and policy from civilian uses to military uses. As a consequence, in reasoning is no guarantee whatsoever that one It is also plausible, however, that these individuals analysts use to evaluate causal relationships is in- as soon as systematic attacks on Germany’s oil sup- can avoid committing those same errors. In fact, say they care about immigration because they sup- vestigating historical cases and analogies. Analogies, plies began, there was an immediate impact on Ger- there is no guarantee that deeper understanding port Trump and are therefore frequently exposed or comparisons between a current situation and many’s military capability — in fact, the bombing had of the potential pitfalls of human reasoning, in it- to his positions on immigration. examples of similar foreign policy problems in the

There are, of course, many other important con- past, are commonplace in national security debates 25 For much more on the use of history in policymaking, see, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for siderations in evaluating a statistical model. If the and policymaking. Analogies are probably unavoid- Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press, 1988). statistical model chosen is not a good fit for the able in national security decision-making, since one 26 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 27 Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). 28 This example is discussed in Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Prince- ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 209–11. 23 W. Allen Wallis. “The Statistical Research Group, 1942-1945: Rejoinder,” Journal of American Statistical Association 75, no. 370 (June 1980): 29 Walt Rostow, “Memo to the President,” May 6, 1966, excerpted from Khong, Analogies at War, 209–10, emphasis Khong’s. 334–35, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2287454. 30 Khong, Analogies at War, 210. 24 See, for example, Hugh Liebert and James Golby, “Midlife Crisis? The All-Volunteer Force at 40,” Armed Forces & Society 43, no. 1 (January 2017): 115–38, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X16641430. 31 Khong, Analogies at War, 211.

84 85 The Strategist Applying Method to Madness: A User’s Guide to Causal Inference in Policy Analysis

self, leads to better decision-making. There is also the Crimean Crisis of 2014? By making histori- historical analogies are used in policy debates, it a strike on Syria in September of 2013, would a fine line between being aware of the perils of cal comparisons, one can potentially assess the is usually to suggest that if a policymaker doesn’t the United States have been set on course for a analytical reasoning and becoming frozen with possible repercussions of a policy choice. do X, it will lead to another Munich/Pearl Har- deeper and doomed engagement in the Middle self-doubt and over-critical reflection. Be aware of 3. Provide Prescriptions. If historical compar- bor/September 11/Vietnam. The dramatic images East? While his decision to approach Congress the human capacity for error, but do not let that isons are appropriate, they may suggest a and emotions that are summoned by making ref- for an authorization of force was unexpected and awareness lead to cognitive immobilization. range of prescriptions, or policy options. Op- erence to iconic past events are used to sway the was seen by many as an example of weakness,36 This may be unsatisfying advice, but there are tions considered in past crises may be appli- listener — and, at times, to reassure the person it may have been part of a causal chain of events rarely by-the-numbers solutions in the arena of cable to new situations. making that reference that their proposed policy that avoided deeper engagement in a civil war reasoning and analysis. There is always opportu- 4. Predict Likelihood of Success. Historical com- decision is the right one. that arguably could not be resolved by American nity to choose theories and evidence that support parisons can aid in determining the likelihood involvement. one’s prior conclusions. Rostow, for example, al- of success of particular policy options, or the In short, when considering an analyst’s use ways adhered to his mistaken assessment of the likelihood of various outcomes. This is per- of historical cases or analogies to investigate a overall situation in Vietnam, claiming until his haps the most perilous use of analogies, since causal relationship, it is important to consider death that America’s involvement in Vietnam was it applies directly to the core question that whether they were chosen in an appropriate a success because it allowed Southeast Asia time faces that policymaker: What is the probabili- way. It is also important to consider whether the to develop economically, thereby preventing the ty a policy will achieve the desired result? case or analogy seems to be rendered accurately fall of the regional dominoes that the Americans 5. Evaluate Moral Rightness. Historical compar- — i.e., are key features of the case being twisted feared in the late 1950s and early 1960s.32 isons can help construct a moral framework or glossed over to make it a better fit for the Historical analogies may help the analyst to “rea- around a policy choice. During the Cuban causal argument? Finally, external validity is a son out” a counterfactual. Arguably, the best coun- Missile Crisis, some of the advisers to Pres- key consideration. If you are convinced a causal terfactuals (in terms of how reliably they can be ap- ident John F. Kennedy recommended a sur- relationship held in one or more cases, is it like- plied to current decisions and unfolding situations) prise military strike on Cuba to eliminate the ly to hold in other cases? If so, what conditions are those that 1) contain only small changes from missiles. As this option was discussed (and Lastly, practitioners should be alert to the silent might those cases need to fit? actual historical events, and so remain as close to ultimately rejected), Robert Kennedy suppos- analogies, the events that did not occur. The ex- history as possible; 2) involve plausible or imagina- edly slipped a note to his brother that read, amples in history of the wars and policy disasters ble deviations from the historical record (such as, “Now I know how Tojo felt when he was plan- that were avoided — due to careful reasoning, risk Troubleshooting Causal Analysis “What if Al Gore had won the 2000 presidential elec- ning Pearl Harbor.”34 For men who had lived aversion, or a rigorously observed policy process in National Security tion?”); and 3) are open to the possibility that histor- during World War II, and would have clearly — are little reflected on in history, since they were ical currents could push the counterfactual environ- recalled the nation’s rage and moral indigna- non-events. Historians expend far more effort an- To conclude, below are some final considera- ment back toward the original, actual outcome. tion following the attack on Pearl Harbor, this swering the question, “Why did history unfold tions for reading, evaluating, and applying sophis- Khong has developed an analogical explanation would have been a telling comparison. the way it did?” than investigating “What is the ticated analytical work in a national security poli- framework, which “suggests that analogies are cogni- 6. Warn About Dangers. Analogies can potential- version of history that didn’t take place?” Non- cymaking context37: tive devices that ‘help’ policymakers perform six di- ly warn of the dangers that may be unwittingly events are notoriously difficult to investigate and agnostic tasks central to political decision-making”33: embraced by pursuing particular policy options. explain, since they often leave a far less precise Know the Goal, Which May Not Be “Success,” For example, Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s actions and less traceable historical record. Non-events Narrowly Defined 1. Define the Situation. By offering a comparison as he pursued retreating North Korean forces also receive far less attention from the electorate. from the past, one can help cast a different during the earlier stages of the Korean War in- As former Rep. Barney Frank, who was chairman While causal reasoning is important to under- light on the policy environment that is cur- creased the likelihood of Chinese involvement of the House Financial Services Committee and standing the likely implications of a policy deci- rently under consideration. Is a policy choice in the conflict. Do current policy choices risk an one of the architects of the plan that averted a sion, it is not the only thing that matters. Policy similar to Neville Chamberlain’s decision to be inadvertent escalation with a third party, or oth- severe economic downturn following the financial choices are often dependent on factors other than conciliatory to Adolf Hitler at Munich in 1938, er dangers? By exploring historical examples of crisis of 2008, noted, “You get no credit for disas- likelihood of success (such as domestic politics). in that it would be a mistake to miss an oppor- how policies went wrong, one can better avoid ter averted or damage minimized.”35 One may have reason to believe that a policy will tunity to nip a growing threat in the bud? Or is similar pitfalls in the future. But these silent analogies must not be over- “work,” but choose not to pursue it for moral, fis- it similar to the American decision to escalate looked. Many are policy triumphs in their own cal, or other reasons. In other words, even when in Vietnam, in that it would be a mistake to In addition to this framework laid out by right — occasions when diplomatic or military you are relatively confident in a causal relationship become stuck in a disastrous quagmire? Khong, national security practitioners should measures prevented a setback or a disaster. Or between policy X and outcome Y, policy X might 2. Assess the Stakes. How serious are the potential keep in mind that analogies are often used as they may be examples of how individuals recog- also affect outcomes A, B, and C, which are just as outcomes of the current situation? What is the dramatic comparisons to strengthen an argu- nized the potential for a policy pitfall and avoid- important to senior policymakers. range of risks to be considered? Is the situation ment, rather than as coldly logical comparisons ed it. If President Barack Obama had launched more like the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 or meant to illuminate a line of reasoning. When

35 Andrew Ross Sorkin, “President Obama Weighs His Economic Legacy,” New York Times Magazine, April 28, 2016, https://www.nytimes. 32 “Walt Rostow,” The Economist, Feb. 20, 2003, https://www.economist.com/obituary/2003/02/20/walt-rostow. com/2016/05/01/magazine/president-obama-weighs-his-economic-legacy.html. 33 Khong, Analogies at War, 10. The framework is introduced in chapter 1 and explained in detail in chapter 2. Explanations and illustrative 36 Peter Baker and Jonathan Weisman, “Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for Strike in Syria,” New York Times, Aug. 31, 2013, https://www. examples have been added to Khong’s list of central diagnostic tasks. nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.html. 34 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 31; see also, Ernest R. May and Philip 37 Portions of this discussion draw on Andrew L. Stigler, “Assessing Causality in a Complex Security Environment,” Joint Forces Quarterly 76, no. D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Concise ed. (New York: Norton, 2002). 1 (January 2015), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-76/Article/577586/assessing-causality-in-a-complex-security-environment/.

86 87 The Strategist Applying Method to Madness: A User’s Guide to Causal Inference in Policy Analysis

Make Causal Reasoning as Explicit as Possible seek to spread communism’s influence in the the diplomatic efforts that led to the successful Day- ness of causal processes, complexity, analogical region instead of consolidating their control of ton accords in 1995 had just been published.40 In it, reasoning, and elementary statistical pitfalls can There are countless examples of major policy de- the country? Wouldn’t nationalist movements in Holbrooke offered what many accepted as conven- considerably improve the underlying analysis that cisions that relied on casual and dubious causal rea- Cambodia and Laos work against such a conta- tional wisdom: The use of NATO airpower against drives national security decision-making. As Golby soning. For example, consider the expectation that a gion effect? Aren’t there few historical examples the Yugoslav Serbs played a key role in coaxing Slo- notes, “the broader interactive and adaptive ap- successful imposition of a democratic government in of such a social contagion? Fuller consideration bodan Milosevic to change his mind about seeking proach that social scientists use relies on the same Iraq following the 2003 U.S. invasion would create a of these countervailing arguments could have un- a political resolution at Dayton. Many of those who fundamental methods and concepts that strategic “beacon of democracy” in the region that would then dercut fears of such a political domino effect tak- had worked with Holbrooke and sympathized with leaders must replicate, usually more quickly, in lead to other democratic transformations.38 There is ing place after the unification of Vietnam. his perspective — including then-Secretary of State practice.”42 There is almost never any danger in a spectacular array of causes and effects at work in Of course, it is never possible to fully assess all Madeleine Albright — were still in government. Key rendering analytical processes as explicitly as pos- this proposal to invade a country, transform its gov- the available information relevant to any given policymakers reasoned that if Milosevic reversed sible, since explicitness can only reveal biases. To ernment, and thereby alter the political trajectory of situation. As former Secretary of State and for- course in 1995 after NATO airpower was unleashed, paraphrase Robert Fogel, everyone has analytical an entire region. What was the likelihood an invasion mer Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin he would probably do so again in Kosovo. biases and the only alternative to open concession would lead to democratic transition taking place in Powell once suggested in regards to how much In March of 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied of these biases is to conceal them.43 Iraq? How did this likelihood depend on the specifics data you need at your fingertips to make deci- Force, a limited air campaign aimed at coercing Mi- The methodological techniques described above of the invasion? If such a transition did take place, sions, an “80% solution” is often good enough.39 losevic to end Serbian depredations in Kosovo. But can prove useful in unexpected places. Alertness would the emergence of a stable democracy in Iraq What Powell had in mind was that a leader who Milosevic’s response was not what the Western allies to analytical and methodological issues is a criti- be viewed by other states in the region as an appeal- waits until all relevant information has been col- anticipated. Almost as soon as bombing commenced, cal facet of policy development in national security. ing alternative form of government, or as a case of lected and assessed has almost always missed the Serbs in Kosovo escalated their attacks, displac- While most national security practitioners will not an outside power imposing a system by force? What the opportunity to deploy a policy at a time of ing hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians. be conducting original research, understanding an- possible setbacks or other events could reduce or maximum potential effectiveness. Now NATO found itself in an undesired position: The alytical concepts is crucial to being able to evaluate eliminate the “beacon effect” of an Iraqi democracy? Similarly, evidence that is consistent with one alliance had inadvertently committed itself to revers- others’ research and one’s own analysis of primary At the same time, there has never been a major poli- hypothesized causal relationship may also be con- ing a worsening situation, but with no strategy for and secondary sources. The fact that many of these cy decision that resolved every causal conundrum be- sistent with other possible causal relationships. guaranteeing a positive outcome.41 Instead of a short potential pitfalls and opportunities go unmentioned fore the policy was put into action. Even though years To assess whether a particular piece of evidence bombing campaign, the aerial assault continued for does not mean that they are not critically important. of thought and preparation had preceded the invasion actually supports one causal relationship over an- 78 days, and the political outcome was almost always A more solid grounding in these aspects of policy of Europe on June 6, 1944, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower other, it helps to make all the alternatives explicit in doubt throughout the conflict. analysis can greatly improve one’s contribution to was in no way certain of the outcome. In fact, he fa- and evaluate whether each piece of evidence sup- Ultimately, the NATO campaign succeeded in any national security decision-making process. mously kept two speeches in his jacket pockets that ports all, some, or none of the possible arguments. removing Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, but the day, one written in anticipation of success and one in sequence of events had not followed the allies’ ex- Jessica D. Blankshain is an assistant professor case of failure. It is certainly impossible to resolve all pectations. Milosevic had certainly not repeated the of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War dimensions of causal complexity prior to deploying a The Practical Importance same pattern he had followed in 1995. To the chagrin College in Newport, RI. She writes on U.S. civil-mil- policy, but being alert to the complex nature of causal- of Causal Analysis of President Bill Clinton and others, the analogy of itary relations and foreign policy decision-making, ity in national security policy is essential. 1995 that had played a role in convincing cautious and is the co-author of Decision-Making in Amer- We conclude this primer with a vignette to il- leaders to initially approve the attack proved to be ican Foreign Policy: Translating Theory into Prac- Assess All the Available Evidence and All the lustrate the dangers of failing to critically evalu- a flawed comparison. This example highlights the tice (Cambridge University Press, 2019). Available Arguments ate evidence in applying causal reasoning. In ear- difficulty of operating in a complex policy environ- ly 1999, as Yugoslav Serbs escalated their attacks ment where the link between action and outcome is Andrew L. Stigler is an associate professor of One should do as thorough a job as possible of on Albanian Muslims in Kosovo, the United States not always clear. It appears policymakers failed to national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War Col- assessing the available evidence about whether a faced a quandary. Throughout the 1990s, America correctly anticipate the effects of their chosen policy lege in Newport, RI. He is the author of Governing causal relationship will or will not hold. During the had been reluctant to commit large-scale ground — in this case by misapplying analogical reasoning. the Military (New York: Routledge, 2019). years preceding the Vietnam War, American policy- forces to attempt to counteract the humanitarian While analytical tools are not guarantors of policy makers feared that a communist takeover of South disasters that unfolded during the dissolution of success, this article has offered a range of analyti- This article reflects the personal views of the au- Vietnam and unification of the country would lead Yugoslavia. At the same time, the long march of cal concepts that can be of use to national security thors. It does not represent the views of the U.S. to a series of Vietnam’s neighbors succumbing to atrocities in the Balkans was of deep concern to practitioners, military and civilian alike. While the government, Department of the Navy, or U.S. Naval communist influence as well — a domino effect. the United States and NATO. vast majority of practitioners will not be designing War College. But what evidence was there that national bor- As Kosovo became the new flashpoint in the region, major U.S. campaigns or strategies on their own, ders would prove so porous to communist insur- policymakers again considered their options. At this their analytical products shape and drive the pol- Photo: Kurt. S. gencies, and that Vietnamese nationalists would time, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s account of icymaking process in important ways. An aware-

40 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Modern Library, 1999). 41 See, for example, Jane Perlez, “Crisis in the Balkans: News Analysis; 3 Options for Washington, All with Major Risks,” New York Times, May 21, 38 This argument was one of several that were offered in support of the 2003 invasion, with others including the now-infamous argument 1999, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/21/world/crisis-balkans-analysis-3-options-for-washington-all-with-major-risks.html. that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. There is room to debate which arguments were predominately part of the political marketing cam- paign of the policy decision and which truly drove the George W. Bush administration’s decision-making. 42 Golby, “Want Better Strategists?” 39 Clark D. Stuart II, Battlefield to Boardroom: Lessons Learned from U.S. Navy SEALs (Bloomington, IN: Trafford, 2006),https://www.overdrive. 43 Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological com/search?q=5C6FED79-3118-4ADB-8014-20CBBEE56F4F, 116. Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 4.

88 89 The Strategist Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age

Increasingly capable and intrusive digital information technologies, advanced dual-use military capabilities, and diffused global power structures will reshape future crises and conflicts between nuclear-armed adversaries and challenge traditional ways of thinking about escalation and stability. This emerging security environment will require new concepts and tools to manage the risk of unintended escalation and reduce nuclear dangers.

n Oct. 24, 1962, the United States raised additional complexity to crisis management even its alert levels to defense readiness as an increasingly competitive and contested se- condition (DEFCON) 2, for the first — curity environment fuels greater coercive risk-tak- and thus far only — time in its history. ing among nuclear-armed states, in particular, the InO a televised address, President John F. Kenne- United States, Russia, and China. dy made clear that any nuclear attack from Cuba The increasing use of hybrid warfare and gray- would be construed as an act of war, and that the zone tactics by China and Russia reflects the view United States would retaliate in kind. Had these that their strategic aims are best achieved through events taken place today, the signaling almost cer- coercive means below the level of direct conven- Rebecca Hersman tainly wouldn’t have stopped — or started — there. tional military interaction. Of course, these coun- A chorus of pre-established online trolls messaging tries are not strangers to information warfare, a Soviet-orchestrated storyline and all-caps Twit- propaganda, and deception, or even using proxy ter threats would likely have come next. A targeted and covert warfare as tools of strategic competi- campaign to weaponize social media, turn elements tion (nor is the United States). Cold War history is of the American public against the president, and littered with such cases from election manipulation undermine the institutional authority and credibil- to state-sponored rebel insurgencies. Moreover, ity of America’s deterrent did not arise because the from the Color Revolutions to Stuxnet, U.S. govern- technology to do so in real time did not exist. In- ment actions, both real and imagined, have fed per- stead, Kennedy stood “eyeball to eyeball” with So- ceptions of a United States bent on shrinking Rus- viet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev during the sia’s and China’s spheres of influence and shaping 13-day standoff until cooler heads prevailed. Flash regional balances of power on favorable terms. And forward and today’s global pandemic crisis offers yet, in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, a glimpse into how a toxic mix of disinformation, America’s conventional military primacy, its ability conspiracy theories, and digital technology can to utilize the institutions and alliances of the lib- complicate effective crisis management, fuel com- eral international order to advance U.S. interests, petition and rivalry, shift blame, and sow mistrust. and its domestic political commitments to a free Unlike traditional concepts of escalation, which press and open internet have limited both the need suggest linear and somewhat predictable patterns and ability of the United States to compete aggres- from low-level crisis to all-out nuclear war,1 escala- sively in the gray zone.2 Both Russia and China, on tory pathways in this new era of strategic compe- the other hand, have felt compelled to challenge tition will be less predictable. Indeed, increasing- institutional structures and avoid direct traditional ly sophisticated sub-conventional tactics such as military competition, while pursuing asymmetric disinformation and weaponized social media, the approaches to competition “below and beyond” blurring of nuclear-conventional firebreaks, and traditional one-upmanship in the conventional the continuing diffusion of global power to region- military domain. Through broad, sub-conventional al nuclear states are adding new challenges and influence campaigns and the engagement of digital

1 Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965). 2 Kathleen Hicks et al., “By Other Means Part I: Campaigning in the Gray Zone,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 8, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-i-campaigning-gray-zone.

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proxies, these states hope to advance their inter- of missile defenses. These developments may bol- levels of violence.”6 In other words, strategic sta- lenge this conceptualization of escalation and call ests without clear attribution or risk of escalation. ster incentives to move first and fast in a high-end bility at the nuclear level could actually encourage into question its utility. Rather than progressing These strategies of strategic competition in the conventional fight. As traditional firebreaks be- or enable conflict at lower levels of the spectrum, (more or less) stepwise, with clear thresholds be- sub-conventional domain may not be entirely new, tween conventional and nuclear warning and de- especially through the use of surrogates or proxies. tween behavior that would elicit a conventional or but the tools that enable them have transformed livery systems erode and the strategic effects of Seemingly, this allowed great powers not only to nuclear response, crisis or conflict between nu- the strategic significance of the unconventional cyber and space operations multiply, the ability keep small wars and big wars separate, but also to clear-armed adversaries in this new environment battlespace and the coercive power of hybrid war- to manage and maintain strategic stability grows engage in levels of sub-strategic conflict and com- is far more complex and unpredictable. And yet, fare. Fueled by technological innovation — particu- more difficult. petition even as the risks of nuclear war appeared even as academics and policymakers question the larly in digital media-based technology as well as Moreover, today’s major powers do not have the to abate. Several behavioral rules seemed to help representative value of this conceptual ladder, the cyber operations, artificial intelligence (AI), and playing field to themselves. The bipolarity that char- limit escalatory risks associated with this type of imagery has proven difficult to shake. machine learning — today’s competitive land- acterized strategic competition during the Cold War conflict, including not attacking the central territo- The challenges of managing conflict escalation scape is more complex and dynamic than before. has disappeared and the U.S.-dominated unipolarity ry of the adversary state, operating via surrogates in today’s strategic environment call for a different The growing number of weapons in the sub-con- that characterized the immediate aftermath of the and third parties where possible, and encouraging metaphor. Drawing from science fiction and phys- ventional arsenal include a range of kinetic and Soviet Union’s collapse has largely dissipated. In- strategic transparency and crisis communications, ics, the trends described above suggest that alter- non-kinetic coercive tools, tactics, and strategies. stead, today’s security environment is characterized especially following the Cuban Missile Crisis. native and less predictable escalatory pathways The rise of the cyber domain; connectivity of glob- by complex asymmetries, multi-domain conflict, It is unclear if these same rules for strate- al commerce, finance, and communications; speed and nine nuclear-armed states with widely diver- gic stability apply in today’s environ- and penetration of the internet; and prevalence gent capabilities and intentions. Indeed, the rise of ment. Gray-zone competitions can now and intimacy of social media that reaches nearly smaller nuclear powers has widened the nuclear be deeply intrusive: Using witting and 40 percent of the world’s population have reshaped shadow and its regional implications, particularly unwitting proxies within enemy territo- the competitive domain now commonly called the in areas where asymmetries in conventional capa- ry, these tactics can strike at the heart “gray zone”.3 Today’s proxies and surrogates look bilities and interests may create divergent beliefs of a country’s institutions, values, and more like online trolls who wander freely inside about the utility of nuclear weapons in crisis bar- populations well inside its digital home- one’s digital homeland, enabled by advanced cyber gaining scenarios.4 In parallel, states can now draw land. Moreover, in this more fragment- and disinformation tools and weaponized social upon a growing range of strategic options, including ed, competitive landscape, the stabiliz- media, rather than armed guerillas fighting internal long-range nuclear weapons; advanced conventional ing of benefits of transparency and an wars with black-market weaponry in distant terri- munitions; and space, cyber, and information capa- assured second strike are unclear for tories. Moreover, these new forms of influence and bilities. In this more fragmented competitive envi- countries with smaller ar- information warfare are not the exclusive domain ronment, emerging technologies, especially in the senals and limited strategic are likely and of great powers. Rather, the accessibility of infor- digital information space, can level the playing field, geographic depth. Finally, that crisis mation technology suggests a leveling of the play- providing smaller states virtual expeditionary forces while states continue to make use of proxies and escalation may instead follow a “wormhole” dy- ing field for great powers, non-state actors, states, with global reach. surrogates, these digital soldiers may be both more namic. Holes may suddenly open in the fabric of and non-government entities alike. Of course, sub-conventional tactics, including intrusive and less controllable than those of the deterrence through which competing states could This technological transformation is not limited information warfare and the use of surrogates, fig- Cold War. This suggests the potential for a new nu- inadvertently enter and suddenly traverse between to the sub-conventional domain. Advanced tech- ured prominently throughout the Cold War and clear paradox: As states drive to compete and win sub-conventional and strategic levels of conflict in nology is also blurring the threshold between con- the many crises and close calls that characterized at the sub-conventional level — in the gray zone accelerated and decidedly non-linear ways.7 ventional and strategic conflict, including the in- the period. During this time, while full-scale war — the risk of strategic crisis may increase, even This article explores three ways in which these creasing commingling of nuclear and conventional between the United States and the Soviet Union as the risk of conventional conflict between nucle- wormhole dynamics — fueled by the pursuit of payloads on non-ballistic missile delivery systems was averted, lower-level conflict was widespread. ar-armed states declines. asymmetric advantage, advanced technology, and such as hypersonic vehicles, long-range cruise mis- In 1965, Glenn Snyder first proposed the exist- This new era of strategic competition will require the diffusion of global power — could unfold be- siles, or extended-range torpedoes, as well as ever ence of a “stability-instability paradox” to explain renewed thinking about the tools and concepts of tween nuclear-armed states. The first section ex- more effective missile defenses. Similarly, con- why mutually deterred, nuclear-armed adversaries deterrence and escalation — adapting older ideas plores the challenges that sub-conventional tactics ventional and strategic warning and surveillance sometimes engage in extensive, seemingly unsta- and developing new ones. Herman Kahn’s 44-rung pose to crisis stability, especially through complex assets and advanced command-and-control capa- ble, conflict and competition even while preserv- “escalation ladder,” which describes a continu- influence campaigns including disinformation and bilities continue to be integrated in ways that po- ing comparative stability at the strategic level.5 As ous, linear escalation path between low-level crisis weaponized social media. The second section out- tentially undermine escalatory firebreaks by creat- Robert Jervis later described it, “To the extent that and all-out strategic conflict, was built on poten- lines the unexpected escalatory potential of con- ing new counterforce or precision strategic-strike the military balance is stable at the level of all-out tially problematic expectations of proportionality flicts that take place along the conventional-nucle- opportunities and enhancing the potential efficacy nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower and universally shared conceptions of deterrence. ar interface where a breakdown of clear firebreaks The blurring of conflict across sub-conventional, between a range of technology-enabled strategic conventional, and strategic levels as well as the capabilities, including warning, surveillance, and proliferation of actors across that landscape chal- communication systems, is blurring the lines be-

3 J. Clement, “Number of Global Social Network Users 2010–2023,” Statista, April 1, 2020, https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/num- 6 Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 31. For an empirical test of the implications ber-of-worldwide-social-network-users/. of the stability-instability paradox, see, Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller, “Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict,” Journal of 4 Christopher P. Twomey, “Asia’s Complex Strategic Environment: Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers,” Asia Policy 11, no. 1 (2011): 51–78, Conflict Resolution 59, no. 1 (2015): 74–92, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713499718. https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2011.0006. 7 First theorized in 1916 by Austrian physicist Ludwig Flamm and expanded upon by Albert Einstein and Nathan Rosen in 1935, wormhole theory 5 Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in The Balance of Power, ed. Paul Seabury (Scranton: Chandler, 1965), 185–201. proposes the presence of “bridges” or shortcuts connecting two widely separated regions of space-time.

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Nuclear powers can engage their competitors’ to AI-enabled social media campaigns, are trans- core strategic interests directly, intrusively, and forming the speed and precision with which influ- coercively (and perhaps unintentionally), well be- ence campaigns can reach and manipulate their low traditional forms of armed conflict, especially desired targets. Adversaries can amplify effects, through cyber, economic, and media-based attacks. obscure attribution, and prime the information It isn’t clear that nuclear strategic stability, particu- space to their advantage long before a crisis begins, larly in the form of a secure second-strike capability, as well as shape it during such a crisis. By promot- sufficiently mitigates these risks. It may even pro- ing false narratives, flooding the information zone vide false assurance. In fact, as a recent Center for with conflicting data points, manipulating social Strategic and International Studies report points and economic institutions, and instigating gener- out, “U.S. success at deterrence by credible threat al or targeted social unrest, potential adversaries of escalation to military conflict has increased in- can break confidence in U.S. and allied institutions, centives for rivals to use gray zone tactics, which increase distrust and confusion, and coerce desir- are attractive precisely because they make the risk able outcomes at lower levels of conflict. The due- of vertical escalation appear too great.”10 As cyber ling “false flag” narratives surrounding the origins weapons and disinformation are deployed across of the COVID-19 pandemic involving the United the globe, states are adapting sub-conventional States and China are worrying indicators of how tactics in pursuit of their own strategies for esca- such narratives can quickly move into the main- lation dominance — the ability to achieve strategic stream of political discourse, sow confusion about impact while limiting strategic risk.11 The possibil- attribution, and disrupt confidence and trans- ity of misperception associated with new non-nu- parency between the United States and potential clear capabilities is especially acute because there great-power adversaries when they must engage in is no clear understanding between rivals regarding crisis communications.13 where these tactics fit in the escalation hierarchy.12 Through tactics ranging from election meddling14 The “stability-instability” paradox would suggest to the hacking of government personnel systems,15 that such sub-conventional or gray zone forms of Russia and China have leveraged cyber attacks and competition can exist without risking strategic con- disinformation campaigns to challenge the United tween conventional and strategic — including nu- The weaponization of social media, enabled by ad- flict as long as each country’s second-strike capabil- States through nonmilitary means. Such approach- clear — domains. The third section examines how vanced cyber and disinformation tools, ranks among ity remains secure and the risks of miscalculation es are even more aggressively employed to dimin- sudden, non-linear strategic crises could emerge in the most effective of these new capabilities, par- remain checked. What if, however, sub-convention- ish the roles and influence of the United States and a multipolar world of regionally oriented nuclear ticularly in its ability to achieve strategic effects at al tactics can achieve strategic-level effects? What its allies in China and Russia’s near abroad. And weapons possessors. The final section discusses great distances and amid high levels of deniability. if political decapitation can be achieved (or feared) yet, these new, digital “proxy wars” do not take both the risks and opportunities these escalato- The United States should expect Russia’s sub-con- through the weaponization of social media coupled place on foreign shores nor beyond the public eye ry dynamics may portend for crisis management, ventional arsenal to be used broadly to neutralize with information-based cyber attacks? What if, by but rather deep inside the U.S. homeland. arms control, and deterrence. its adversaries both before and during a crisis or undermining and manipulating institutions of gov- conflict as part of its plan to contest and compete ernment and political leaders, states can use gray- Fake News Meets Deep Fakes across the spectrum of conflict.9 Take, for example, zone tactics to divide publics from their leaders and New Weapons, New War: Russia’s swift annexation of Crimea in 2014. In the institutions, foment internal conflict, and impede Disinformation and other sub-conventional tools Strategic Crisis in the Gray Zone months leading up to the forced and falsified referen- senior decision-making? Moreover, what if such ac- that target public perception, institutional legitima- dum, Moscow targeted Russian-speaking Ukraini- tions were to take place, perhaps through advanced cy, and leadership credibility can potentially trigger Today, both Russia and China increasingly rely on ans through Russian-backed media and social media pre-deployment, during a crisis or conflict rather escalation to the strategic echelon of conflict. This sub-conventional, non-military weapons as prima- platforms. Through these platforms, Russian govern- than during a period of relative peace? could unfold in several ways. First, it’s possible that ry instruments of coercion. As explained by Dmitry ment-backed entities manipulated online videos and Advances in digital technology, from deep fakes disinformation could cause a “fake-out” in which Adamsky, “Uninterrupted informational deterrence photos, symbolically drawing parallels to Kosovo, … augmented by nuclear signaling, and supplement- where the American-led NATO alliance took unilater- 10 Kathleen Hicks et al., “By Other Means Part I,” 27. ed by the intrawar coercion constitutes an integrat- al military action in 1999. The fabricated feed of dis- 11 Kahn, On Escalation. Kahn introduced the concept of “escalation dominance” to describe one’s ability to maintain superiority over an adver- ed cross-domain campaign” in Russian strategic information targeting the minority Russian-speaking sary at each of the 44 rungs along the metaphorical escalation ladder. In this way, a rival would always be disadvantaged by further escalation. thinking.8 Hence, “cross-domain coercion” includes population was reinforced by coercive intimidation 12 Michael Fitzsimmons, “The False Allure of Escalation Dominance,” War on the Rocks, Nov. 16, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/ non-nuclear, informational, and nuclear influence, techniques employed by Russian special forces, forti- false-allure-escalation-dominance/. and succeeds when it dissuades the adversary from fying the cross-domain coercion to achieve both mili- 13 For additional context on COVID-19 “false-flag” disinformation, see, Philip Ball and Amy Maxmen, “The Epic Battle Against Coronavirus Misinformation and Conspiracy Theories,” Nature, May 27, 2020, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01452-z; Renée DiResta, “For China, aggression or forces the other side to de-escalate. tary and non-military victory. the ‘USA Virus’ Is a Geopolitical Ploy,” The Atlantic, April 11, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/chinas-covid-19-conspir- acy-theories/609772/; Max Fisher, “Why Coronavirus Conspiracy Theories Flourish. And Why It Matters,” New York Times, April 8, 2020, https:// www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/world/europe/coronavirus-conspiracy-theories.html. 8 Dmitry “Dima” Adamsky, “Strategic Stability and Cross-Domain Coercion: The Russian Approach to Information (Cyber) Warfare,” in The End of 14 Philip Bump, “Here’s the Public Evidence that Supports the Idea that Russia Interfered in the 2016 Election,” Washington Post, July 6, 2017, https:// Strategic Stability? Nuclear Weapons and the Challenge of Regional Rivalries, ed. Lawrence Rubin and Adam N. Stulberg (Washington, DC: George- www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/07/06/heres-the-public-evidence-that-supports-the-idea-that-russia-interfered-in-the-2016-election/. town University Press, n.d.), 164. 15 Ellen Nakashima, “Chinese Breach Data of 4 Million Federal Workers,” Washington Post, June 4, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 9 Adamsky, The End of Strategic Stability?, 154. national-security/chinese-hackers-breach-federal-governments-personnel-office/2015/06/04/889c0e52-0af7-11e5-95fd-d580f1c5d44e_story.html.

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false information proves so compelling that leaders efforts on defense strengthening.”17 In effect, then, representatives largely deferred to presidential au- to disinformation campaigns since these attacks advocate for, or even take, hasty action before the deep fakes could give rise to a “deception revolu- thority in this domain and entrusted the military need not penetrate the NC3 system directly to be falsehood is revealed. While by no means the only tion,” where elements of the public, deceived by a with wide-ranging responsibilities of execution and disruptive. Amplification of adversary messaging manifestation of this phenomenan, deep-fake tech- disinformation campaign, become unwitting sol- communication. Traditionally, the public has had through conspiracy theorists and automated bots nology — machine-learning techniques and pro- diers on behalf of an adversary.18 little authoritative, fact-based information about as well as the strategic use of deep fakes are just grams that manipulate and distort audio and video many essential aspects of highly classified nuclear a few examples of how the new age of information to create realistic forgeries — presents a new and Walking Through the Front Door decision-making processes and the technical sys- warfare could disrupt secure and reliable presiden- particularly vexing tool for cross domain coercion. tems and organizations that support it. That very tial decisionmaking simply by moving so much of In September 2018, three members of Congress Adversaries could also use disinformation tactics opacity, however, can in turn elevate the risks dis- the policy discourse outside of that closed and se- expressed concern in a letter to Daniel Coats, the to prompt a leader to take action prematurely or, al- information could pose before and during a crisis cretive system. The luxury of truly private, secret, then-director of national intelligence, regarding the ternatively, to resist a necessary response, despite in ways that could seriously harm the legitimacy of, and controlled decision-making will likely not be threat that deep-fake technology poses to Amer- knowing certain details to be false or incomplete, and confidence in, the NC3 system, especially in a available to future presidents, especially when the ica’s national security.16 Today, the United States as a result of increasing domestic political pressure crisis of longer duration in which the opportunity adversary holds the keys to the timing and validity and its allies must anticipate a world in which more for greater public scrutiny and skepticism emerges. of who knows what and when. sophisticated deep fakes could be employed stra- Direct, back-door cyber attacks designed to dis- tegically by adversaries during momentous events, able or disrupt nuclear command-and-control sys- Flood the Zone such as elections, civil unrest, or even acts of ter- tems and capabilities have long been of concern rorism or cyber attacks, to influence and manipu- because of their escalatory potential. However, less Disinformation could create confusion and delay late public perception in a way that promotes an focus has been dedicated to “front-door” attacks among decision-makers by flooding the informa- adversary’s preferred outcome. on institutions and decision-makers that depend tion zone and causing informational paralysis as As deep-fake capabilities become more read- on the system — attacks conducted through the information management systems, and the policy- ily available and realistic, they will become more weaponization of social media and the manipula- makers who rely on them, struggle to distinguish prevalent as a tactic to circumvent traditional tion of information. Disinformation campaigns by fact from fiction within a loud and crowded infor- war-fighting strategies, disrupt and delay adver- adversaries who seek to sow public distrust in the mation environment. Some have alleged the United sary responses, and weaken adversary resolve. The command and control system itself can focus on States, for example, developed tactics during the utility of deep-fake techniques is not confined to and percep- softer targets accessible through less well-defend- Cold War toward these ends, planning to utilize one geographic region or a single adversary and tions of po- ed networks to erode confidence in systems and computer-simulated voices to mimic authentic or- will most certainly become an attractive tactic to litical weakness. The current interactions between architectures without targeting or disabling those ders and deceive Soviet personnel with false com- gain an asymmetric advantage by state and non- disinformation and domestic politics surrounding systems directly. The nuclear command-and-con- mands during a crisis or conflict.20 In the context state actors alike. Deep fakes could also be used to the wearing of face masks and maintaining social trol system provides the means by which the U.S. of strategic stability, this changes the calculus for decouple military alliances by eroding political and distance in response to the coronavirus pandemic president can authorize the use of nuclear weap- escalation, especially among modern democracies, public support and driving wedges between critical are suggestive of this dynamic.19 In a nuclear cri- ons in a crisis or conflict, as well as the means to where leaders have more to prove if they lack the partners. For example, the Military Times reported sis, in which government decision-making would prevent unauthorized or accidental use of such confidence of their citizenry. Because disinforma- last year that during a NATO training exercise in be far less transparent and decentralized, vulner- weapons. The manipulation of social media could tion is compounded over time, its net effect on the Baltics, a deep fake was deployed after Ameri- ability to such pressures could be exacerbated by exacerbate a crisis by casting doubt on the credibil- crisis stability may only be realized after it’s too can Stryker vehicles collided on a road in Lithuania. the very systems designed to protect sensitive in- ity of decision-makers and reliability of these pro- late to roll back the damage. It is also possible that The deep fake image suggested that the Americans formation and preserve secrecy. For example, the cesses as publics latch on to information spread disinformation could delay or even prevent attri- had killed a local Lithuanian child in the collision. architecture, procedures, and policies on which maliciously by adversaries. bution and accountability, including retaliation, During a 2018 meeting with NATO officials, Lithua- America’s current nuclear command, control and Disinformation campaigns employed in conjunc- by impeding investigations and undermining deci- nian Defense Minister Raimundas Karoblis said of communications (NC3) system depends, which tion with other political or military actions can sion-makers and institutions. the fabricated event, “We have no doubt that this were first developed during the Cold War, were op- seek to distract decision-makers and slow their re- Following the 2018 assassination attempt on Ser- was a deliberate and coordinated attempt aiming timized for security, speed, and secrecy — not pub- sponse time enough to confer a tactical or opera- gei Skripal and his daughter using an advanced to raise general society’s condemnation to our al- lic scrutiny. Public confidence in the system was tional advantage during a crisis. The United States chemical weapon agent in the United Kingdom, a lies, as well as discredit the exercises and our joint assumed as U.S. citizens and their congressional needs to think more about how to maintain situa- King’s College London study found that 138 con- tional awareness across the information ecosystem tradictory narratives were spread through Russian in a crisis to sustain the legitimacy and reliability broadcast media sources RT and Sputnik in the 16 Adam B. Schiff, Stephanie Murphy, and Carlos Curbelo, “Letter to the Honorable Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence,” Office of 21 Congressman Adam Schiff, Sept. 13, 2018, https://schiff.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2018-09%20ODNI%20Deep%20Fakes%20letter.pdf. of its NC3 systems and protect presidential deci- four weeks following the attack. Recent reports 17 Kyle Rempfer, “Ever Heard of ‘Deep Fake’ Technology? The Phony Audio and Video Tech Could Be Used to Blackmail U.S. Troops,” Military sion-making in the event of such tactics. Secre- indicate this operation and others throughout Eu- Times, July 19, 2018, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/07/19/ever-heard-of-deep-fake-technology-the-phony-audio-and- cy and opacity, while helpful in countering some rope were likely executed by a specialized Russian video-tech-could-be-used-to-blackmail-us-troops/. threats to the NC3 system, offer little protection intelligence unit in an ongoing and coordinated 18 Amy Zegart and Michael Morell, “Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: Why U.S. Intelligence Agencies Must Adapt or Fail,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 3 (May/June 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/spies-lies-and-algorithms. 19 Cat Zakrweksi, “The Technology 202: Mask Scams and Misinformation Still Present on Social Media despite Tougher Policies,” Wash- ington Post, April 1, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-technology-202/2020/04/01/the-technolo- 20 Benjamin B. Fischer, “CANOPY WING: The U.S. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps,” International Journal of Intelligence gy-202-mask-scams-and-misinformation-still-present-on-social-media-despite-tougher-policies/5e8378ee88e0fa101a75708f/; Nick Timiraos, “U.S. and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 3 (September 2014): 431–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.900290. Officials Press President Trump to Wear Mask in Coronavirus Fight,” Wall Street Journal, June 28, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-officials- press-president-trump-to-wear-mask-in-coronavirus-fight-11593369136; “Coronavirus Myths, Rumors and Misinformation,” Johns Hopkins Medicine, 21 Gordon Ramsay and Sam Robertshaw, Weaponising News: RT, Sputnik and Targeted Disinformation (London: King›s College London, 2019), 6, June 30, 2020, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/coronavirus/articles/coronavirus-myths-rumors-misinformation.html. https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/assets/weaponising-news.pdf.

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campaign to destabilize Europe.22 Though imme- line encryption algorithms and access or tamper the opposition party as “being soft on militancy”29 tablish deterrence.”34 diately following the attack the United Kingdom with sensitive data. This would allow malign actors in Kashmir. Because Indian Prime Minister Naren- This crisis also raised troubling questions about launched a fairly successful counter-disinforma- to change content after it is published and plant dra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party had 1.2 million the informational basis on which strategic stability tion campaign, the broader information war asso- false narratives in articles from otherwise trust- volunteers operating the party’s social media cam- rests. By creating and propagating their own alterna- ciated with this crisis has proven quite enduring, worthy news sources, which would hinder crisis paign for the elections, misinformation and false tive, and even incompatible, perceptions of victory, particularly in terms of raising doubts among cit- communication and make it even more difficult to narratives about the escalating crisis with Paki- can states secure the benefits of de-escalation while izens of the United Kingdom, as well as the Eu- separate truth from fiction during a crisis. stan spread rampantly. In the days following the forgoing the political costs of military defeat? This ropean Union, about their own intelligence agen- attack in Kashmir, Facebook removed hundreds of appears to have been the outcome of the 2019 Pul- cies and other sources of official or authoritative Technology Trojans and Unwitting Allies fake accounts linked to Indian political parties and wama crisis, and yet this would seem to be a shaky information. Initially, the United Kingdom was able Pakistan’s military. Yet, this disinformation cam- foundation for sustaining strategic stability between to rally strong international support behind its re- Finally, a state or non-state actor could use tar- paign ultimately reached over 2.8 million Facebook nuclear-armed adversaries. Rather, in stability terms, sponse to the attack: Several Western countries geted influence campaigns to enlist elements of an users.30 What was once intended to influence do- such a “victory” may simply be borrowed time — a expelled a total of over 150 Russian diplomats in a adversary’s population to defy or protest their own mestic politics to bolster support for the Bharatiya house of cards ready to collapse even more precip- sign of solidarity and imposed punishing economic government and institutions in highly disruptive Janata Party seemed to spiral out of control even itously with the next crisis. Moreover, this dynamic sanctions on Russia.23 Nonetheless, a “coalition of ways. Such information warfare could be deployed as both countries came to the brink of a broader suggests that information and influence campaigns the unwilling” emerged, comprised of several E.U. in anticipation of a crisis or attack in order to am- military conflict. can take on a highly competitive dynamic with each states that were reluctant to expel Russian diplo- plify its impact and impede effective governmental Ultimately, misinformation and disinformation subsequent crisis raising the information escalation mats or to otherwise criticize Russia too harshly responses. This would allow an actor to shape the brought the most basic facts of the crisis into dis- threshold — a form of “disinformation racing.” How for the brazen attack.24 With a less vigilant coun- information environment early, perhaps even be- pute. On February 26, the Indian Air Force (IAF) India or Pakistan, or even China, might seek to use ter-disinformation strategy, the outcome could fore the receiving nation perceives an attack is un- launched airstrikes against targets it said were ter- this chaotic stream of disinformation and its esca- easily have tilted the other way. derway, sow division, erode public confidence, and rorist bases in Balakot, Pakistan. In retaliation, Pa- latory effect to its advantage in the future merits This incident demonstrates how contradictory delay effective responses. These invisible, virtual kistan sent fighter planes over the Line of Control closer examination, as does the vulnerability of the stories and disinformation have the potential to “sleeper cells” can be awakened with a keystroke to bomb Indian administered Kashmir. During the United States to similar dynamics and pressures, es- slow response time and alter the way actors per- — think “Trojan horse” meets “flash mob.” resulting firefight, Pakistan shot down an Indian pecially when employed against partners and allies ceive risk. While the United Kingdom gained im- The India-Pakistan crisis in February 2019, which MiG-21 fighter jet and captured its pilot.31 Subse- as a decoupling strategy. portant experience countering Russian disinfor- culminated with widespread disinformation and quently, India claimed that the IAF pilot shot down mation, Moscow appears to have learned from the highly escalatory rhetoric on both sides demon- one of Pakistan’s F-16 fighter planes before his jet Driving Strategic Risks in the Gray Zone incident as well, continuing to adapt and evolve its strates the potential “out of control” nature of was downed. In an April 2019 Foreign Policy arti- information and influence campaigns in ways that sub-conventional information warfare. In the im- cle, two U.S. defense officials stated that the United Moving forward, emerging technologies will exac- promote and amplify internal anti-government mediate aftermath of the terror attack in India’s States had counted Pakistan’s F-16s and found none erbate these challenges and risks. Technologically voices, including supposed independent, authorita- Jammu and Kashmir state that killed 40 Indian par- missing.32 The next day, Indian press refuted the advanced influence operations can use AI to pre- tive, online activist sources.25 In the future, advanc- amilitary members, an aggressive disinformation U.S. report in The Wire, saying that radio signature cisely and efficiently target vulnerable individuals es in quantum computing and and AI-enabled dig- campaign was launched to link the incident to In- confirmed the downed aircraft.33 Such an incident and communities with tailored messages and influ- ital technology will allow states to flood the zone dia’s upcoming parliamentary elections.27 Notably, should have been easy to fact check, but instead ence strategies, while also enhancing the speed and during a future crisis with even greater effective- disinformation spread via WhatsApp that claimed the episode remains in truth limbo. This contradic- responsiveness of messages focused on the broad- ness. For example, the creation and dissemination that a leader of the Indian National Congress par- tion of facts in the F-16 case represents a wider rift er public. AI algorithms can enable microtargeting of computational propaganda — human- and auto- ty, the opposition party, had offered a bribe to the in U.S.-India reporting of the incident, and possibly using social media to specifically influence local mation-driven disinformation distributed through suicide bomber’s family.28 Additional narratives an information vulnerability that Pakistan could communities regarding sensitive facilities, military social media26 — may make it easier to bypass on- were also disseminated, many of which portrayed capitalize on in the future. In a Washington Post ar- communities, or individuals predisposed to — or ticle, South Asia experts Sameer Lalwani and Emily particularly receptive to — influence, all with the Tallo stated, “This [incident] will no doubt raise intention of disrupting the government’s ability to questions both inside and outside of India about defend, and protect its institutions and manage cri- 22 Michael Schwirtz, “Top Secret Russian Unit Seeks to Destabilize Europe, Security Officials Say,” New York Times, Oct. 8, 2019, https://www. the [Indian Air Forces’s] conventional advantage if ses. Such influence tactics need not be limited to nytimes.com/2019/10/08/world/europe/unit-29155-russia-gru.html. it is unable to punish a weaker adversary to rees- disinformation — groups and individuals are also 23 Katie Rogers and Eileen Sullivan, “Trump and Western Allies Expel Scores of Russians in Sweeping Rebuke Over U.K. Poisoning,” New York Times, March 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/world/europe/trump-russia-diplomats-expulsion.html. 29 Poonam and Bansal, “Misinformation Is Endangering India’s Election.” 24 Julia Borger, Patrick Wintour, and Heather Stewart, “Western Allies Expel Scores of Russian Diplomats Over Skripal Attack,” The Guardian, March 27, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/26/four-eu-states-set-to-expel-russian-diplomats-over-skripal-attack. 30 Shashank Bengali and Aoun Sahi, “Facebook Removes Fake Accounts Tied to Indian Political Parties, Pakistan’s Military,” Los Angeles Times, April 1, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-facebook-india-pakistan-20190401-story.html 25 Kate Starbird, “Information Operations and Online Activism Within NATO Discourse,” in Three Tweets to Midnight: Effects of the Global In- formation Ecosystem on the Risk of Nuclear Conflict, ed. Harold A. Trinkunas, Herbert S. Lin, and Benjamin Loehrke (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution 31 Sameer Lalwani and Emily Tallo, “Did India shoot down a Pakistani F-16 in February? This just became a big deal,” Washington Post, April 17, Press, 2020). 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/17/did-india-shoot-down-pakistani-f-back-february-this-just-became-big-deal/?noredi- rect=on&utm_term=.062d844de7c3 26 Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard, “Computational Propaganda Worldwide: Executive Summary,” University of Oxford, Project on Computational Propaganda, Working Paper no. 2017.11, 2017, https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Casestudies-Ex- 32 Lara Seligman, “Did India Shoot Down a Pakistani Jet? U.S. Count Says No,” Foreign Policy, April 4, 2019, https://foreignpolicy. ecutiveSummary.pdf. com/2019/04/04/did-india-shoot-down-a-pakistani-jet-u-s-count-says-no/. 27 Neha Thirani Bagri, “Back Story: When India and Pakistan Clashed, Fake News Won,” Los Angeles Times, March 15, 2019, https://www. 33 “IAF Refutes U.S. Report on Pakistan’s F-16 Jets, Says Radio Signature Confirms Downed Aircraft,” The Wire, April 5, 2019, https://thewire.in/ latimes.com/world/la-fg-india-pakistan-fake-news-20190315-story.html; “India, Pakistan and the Pulwama Crisis,” Congressional Research Service, security/india-pakistan-f-16-balakot. Feb. 26, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN11057.pdf. 34 Sameer Lalwani and Emily Tallo, “Did India Shoot Down a Pakistani F-16 in February? This Just Became a Big Deal,” Washington Post, April 17, 28 Snigdha Poonam and Samarth Bansal, “Misinformation Is Endangering India’s Election,” The Atlantic, April 1, 2019, https://www.theatlantic. 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/17/did-india-shoot-down-pakistani-f-back-february-this-just-became-big-deal/?noredi- com/international/archive/2019/04/india-misinformation-election-fake-news/586123/. rect=on&utm_term=.062d844de7c3.

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highly vulnerable to ransomware, encrypted bribes, tims seem more credible and online activists quickly doxing, and other techniques. In addition, various picked up the tweet and amplified it. While his orig- Trojan horse methods can allow Russia and China to inal false tweet received 12,569 retweets in less than use cyber-networked influence operations to make one week, his reluctant correction and admission Russian or Chinese efforts look homegrown and of wrongly assessing the condition of the victims complicate attribution, especially through the use just two days later was only retweeted 43 times.38 of digital “sleeper cells” that can lie dormant until Disinformation that provides a constant barrage of awakened during a crisis. false information is often durable and leads to long- Once unleashed, information warfare is not eas- term “truth decay,” characterized by the blurring of ily stopped. Governments — or their bots — may the line between opinion and fact and the declining start the war, but the effective weaponization of in- trust in formerly respected sources of information.39 formation, especially through social media, depends Most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has high- upon surrogates — witting or unwitting — who am- lighted the speed at which falsehoods can spread plify messages, lend credibility within their media and the power of mis- and disinformation to sow circles, and increase the originating state’s ability to public apprehension and mistrust of the govern- deny responsibility. Yet, many of those surrogates, ment in the midst of a crisis. Perhaps the most Today, the distinctions including the conspiracy theorists and online trolls vivid recent example is the falsehood-ridden, con- who fuel today’s information wars, often behave ac- spiracy-theorist “documentary” Plandemic — a between the upper cording to their own pathologies and may have little 26-minute online video which mainstreamed a awareness or regard for the interests of the originat- number of hoaxes and lies about the novel coro- ing state. Instead, they further proliferate and dis- navirus. In this case, QAnon conspiracy theorists, echelons of conflict have tort false or harmful information in pursuit of their anti-vaxxers, and a handful of supposedly reputa- own interests or conspriratorial proclivities. ble “experts” who offered validation and amplifica- In 2018, an MIT study examined a data set of ru- tion of false narratives helped the video get more become blurry as states mor cascades (the spreading pattern of a statement than 8 million views within a week of its internet or story) on Twitter from 2006 to 2017.35 The re- release and before mainstream platforms attempt- 40 rely more and more search found that new social technologies increase ed to contain and discredit its malicious content. the rate at which information sharing occurs and Now, imagine a future crisis with a determined and that falsehoods travel exponentially faster than technologically savvy adversary who seeks to force on non-nuclear capabilities truths. According to the study, “whereas the truth a coercive outcome while avoiding attribution, rarely diffused to more than 1000 people, the top 1% maintaining deniability, and without having to fire of false-news stories routinely diffused to between a single conventional shot. Unfortunately, in such to achieve strategic ends. 1000 and 100,000 people.”36 In fact, the research a scenario, “wormhole” escalation dynamics may concluded that “falsehoods were 70% more likely to not be confined to science fiction. be retweeted than the truth … even when controlling for the account age, activity level, and number of fol- lowers of the original tweeter, as well as whether the Eroding the Conventional-Nuclear original tweeter was a verified user.”37 Even when Firebreak falsehoods are exposed, fact-checking efforts may come too late and have less reach. For example, a Wormhole escalation risks, however, are not self-described cardiologist named Thomas Binder confined to the gray zone. They can also exist claimed in April 2018 that a photo of two child vic- along the increasingly complex interface between tims of a Syrian gas attack was faked. His purported conventional and strategic levels of conflict. For medical expertise made his assertion about the vic- much of the nuclear age, the concepts and tools

35 Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” Science 359, no. 6380 (March 9, 2018): 1146–51, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559. 36 Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” 1158. 37 Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” 1159. 38 Caroline Orr, “Arc Digital,” Arc Digital (Medium, May 28, 2018), https://arcdigital.media/how-one-doctors-false-claim-was-used-to-erase- atrocities-in-syria-d76459ffa4e2. 39 Jennifer Kavanagh and Michael D. Rich, Truth Decay: An Initial Exploration of the Diminishing Role of Facts and Analysis in American Public Life (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2314.html. 40 Sheera Frenkel, Ben Decker, and Davey Alba, “How the ‘Plandemic’ Movie and Its Falshoods Spread Widely Online,” New York Times, May 20, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/technology/plandemic-movie-youtube-facebook-coronavirus.html; Craig Silverman, “The Information Apocalypse Is Already Here, and Reality Is Losing,” BuzzFeed News, May 22, 2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/corona- virus-information-apocalypse.

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of strategic warfare — nuclear weapons systems has focused on dual-use delivery systems capable of first-strike advantage.45 Operating in space or re- than was previously possible, but some of this in- and the systems that supported nuclear command, of carrying both conventional and nuclear payloads, mote geographic locations, nuclear warning, com- formation may also be vulnerable to intentional dis- control, and warning — and those of the conven- the integration of nuclear and conventional sup- mand, and control systems were traditionally diffi- information and other gray-zone activity.47 Also, the tional battlefield were distinct and highly compart- port structures such as command and control, and cult to target kinetically and contained substantial sheer amount of information itself poses another mentalized. The separation between the systems non-nuclear threats to nuclear weapons systems.42 redundancies designed to ensure their surviva- challenge insofar as processing and deriving useful that were used for nuclear and conventional warf- Far less work has been done on the informational bility in the event of a nuclear attack. Moreover, knowledge from the raw data can be overwhelming ighting reduced the possibility that inadvertent es- aspects of conventional-nuclear entanglement and countries had limited incentives to target strategic for analysts and decision-makers alike.48 calation would occur. This compartmentalization the implications for unexpected escalatory effects, warning and situational awareness systems in a In addition, advanced nuclear-armed states may helped create a firebreak — a barrier designed to especially with regard to situational awareness, conventional conflict, as doing so would not limit become dependent upon conventional surveillance slow or prevent accidental or automatic escalation surveillance, and warning capabilities.43 an adversary’s ability to conduct conventional op- and targeting systems to provide strategic warn- to nuclear conflict in a conventional crisis. For most of the nuclear age, the ability to char- erations and would unambiguously signal the ad- ing. For example, hypersonic weapons, boost-glide Today, the distinctions between the upper ech- acterize the operating environment, detect nuclear vent of a nuclear attack. systems, long-range cruise missiles, and other elons of conflict have become blurry as states and conventional strategic attacks, and discern real Today, the capabilities designed to provide situa- capabilities are designed to elude traditional U.S. rely more and more on non-nuclear capabilities attacks from false alarms has been viewed as a ben- tional awareness and support senior decision-mak- early-warning systems (e.g., radars and satellites), to achieve strategic ends. On the one hand, cyber- efit to crisis stability. In conventional conflicts with ers in crises and conflicts tend to be consolidated reduce confidence in strategic warning, and defeat and space-based threats are ever more capable of non-nuclear adversaries, information dominance, into a single conventional-nuclear ecosystem. Con- American missile defenses. To counter these new achieving strategic effects, raising concerns about much like air superiority, has been a fundamental venience, reduced costs, and flexibility are moti- delivery systems, the United States may have to the role of nuclear weapons in deterring their use. component of precision warfare and a central fea- vating decision-makers to rely more and more on rely on conventional situational awareness sys- At the same time, most nuclear-armed states are ture of American conventional military superiority strategic tools such as early-warning and commu- tems, including systems that are more visible or expanding advanced dual-use (nuclear and con- in the post-Cold War period. Throughout this pe- nications systems for conventional operations — intrusive, to provide nuclear warning, support nu- ventional) delivery systems and integrating many riod, the United States has enjoyed the benefits of tools traditionally reserved for nuclear command clear missions, and supplement strategic situation- of their early warning, command-and-control, and information dominance and the asymmetric ad- and control. While attacks on, or intrusive surveil- al awareness. If an adversary were to discover and surveillance capabilities across conventional and vantage it offered. In fact, information dominance lance of, these assets were considered highly esca- target these surveillance systems, would such an nuclear missions. For example, all U.S., Chinese, has been essential to ensuring U.S. military effec- latory and off-limits during conventional conflicts attack be considered conventional or strategic? Russian, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear-capable tiveness, sustaining the credibility and assurance of the past, their dual-use nature today means ad- These dependencies and entanglements cut both aircraft also support conventional systems, and of military alliances, and stabilizing or reducing the versaries may have difficulty discerning U.S. intent ways. For example, conventional missile warning Russia deploys dual-use, ground-launched cruise risks of miscalculation or collateral damage.44 Simi- during a crisis. As a recent Center for Strategic and currently relies on these dual-use surveillance ca- missiles. Both India and Pakistan have multiple larly, at the nuclear level, by improving the accuracy International Studies report suggests, this consoli- pabilities, increasing the risk that they could be types of ground-launched missiles suspected to and timeliness of warning, improving overall visibil- dation could force decision-makers in the future to targeted in a conventional conflict for convention- be dual-use, and China’s DF-26 intermediate-range ity and clarity on adversary actions, and increasing weigh the benefits of rapid, decisive military victo- al purposes but with profound strategic implica- ballistic missile can carry conventional and nucle- decision time, enhanced situational awareness and ry afforded by information dominance against the tions. Emerging digital technologies coupled with ar payloads.41 In addition, advanced technologies, strategic warning seemed to reduce the risk of nu- high-stakes risks of nuclear escalation.46 advanced sensor and surveillance capabilities inte- such as remote sensing, AI, and hypersonic deliv- clear miscalculation and the use-it-or-lose-it pres- Whereas the traditional command, control, sur- grated across space and cyber domains can provide ery systems are accelerating the precision, lethali- sures that could incentivize a nuclear first strike. veillance, and warning systems focused either on vast amounts of data more quickly and precisely ty, and survivability of conventional tools of war- In addition, the clear line between warning sys- nuclear warning (nuclear strategic situational aware- than ever before, including information about stra- fare in ways that will challenge traditional notions tems used for conventional and nuclear missions ness systems) or on providing intelligence to com- tegic threats that may prove elusive to traditional of stability and potentially open new avenues for also meant that these assets were secure and com- manders about the conventional battlefield (con- warning systems. But given the stakes involved, it escalation to strategic crisis in cases where verti- partmentalized. The systems that provided this ventional strategic situational awareness systems), is also difficult to imagine that in a conflict between cal and horizontal escalation converge — all with strategic warning operated at long range, from out- today dual-use strategic situational awareness ca- nuclear powers, adversaries would allow such in- wormhole effects. side adversary territories, and generally in ways pabilities may be tasked to conduct both missions. formation dominance to proceed unchecked. Most research to date on entanglement — the that were not visible or particularly concerning to Moreover, the combination of new enabling capabil- This reliance on strategic warning and commu- commingling of conventional and nuclear forces — an adversary because they offered little in terms ities — such as advanced sensor technologies and nication assets in conventional conflicts is on the the platforms for their deployment, high-bandwidth rise. As advanced, long-range, and often dual-use networks, and AI tools — are expanding the field missile systems have proliferated dramatically in of view at the conventional and nuclear levels of recent decades, including among a range of nucle- conflict. The speed and precision of these capabil- ar-armed adversaries, such reliance now must fig-

41 James M. Acton, “Is It a Nuke? Pre-Launch Ambiguity and Inadvertent Escalation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 9, 2020, ities may expand decision-makers’ knowledge of ure significantly into the planning and execution https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/09/is-it-nuke-pre-launch-ambiguity-and-inadvertent-escalation-pub-81446.; Hans M. Kristensen, Robert adversary forces, deployments, and actions sooner of conventional conflicts. For example, China has S. Norris, and Julia Diamond, “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74, no. 5 (Aug. 31, 2018): 355, https://doi.org/10.1 080/00963402.2018.1507796; Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74, no. 6 (2018): 363, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1533162. 45 One example is the U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, which became operational beginning in 1959 and was designed to detect 42 James M. Acton, “Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadver- incoming Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles with a network of radars placed in Alaska, Greenland, and the United Kingdom — well outside of tent Nuclear War,” International Security 43, no. 1 (Summer 2018): 56–99, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00320; Acton, “Is It a Nuke?” Soviet territory. 43 One recent contribution on this topic came from the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Rebecca 46 Rebecca Hersman et al., “Under the Nuclear Shadow.” Hersman et al., “Under the Nuclear Shadow: Situational Awareness Technology and Crisis Decisionmaking,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 18, 2020, https://ontheradar.csis.org/analysis/final-report/. 47 Hicks et al., By Other Means Part 1. 44 John A. S. Ardis and Shima D. Keene, “Maintaining Information Dominance in Complex Environments,” U.S. Army War College, Strategic Stud- 48 Isaac R. Porche, III, et al., Data Flood: Helping the Navy Address the Rising Tide of Sensor Information (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, ies Institute, October 2018, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3658.pdf 2014), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR315.html.

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increasingly tasked its submarines, missiles, space al and strategic situational awareness systems adding risk and complexity to escalatory dynamics lower levels of conflict can be enabled rather than assets, and other command and control infrastruc- will likely continue to erode, creating a highly and giving smaller states a larger vote in the nature dampened by stability at the nuclear level because ture with both nuclear and conventional missions.49 networked, real-time, dual-use landscape that is and intensity of large-state competition. In addition, of self-regulating behavior by the states involved. States have strong incentives to target command, both more precise and more complex across all the lack of clear thresholds and triggers for possible However, this theory did not envision a circum- control, warning, and surveillance systems early in levels of conflict — sub-conventional, convention- conflict and divergent nuclear doctrine and declara- stance in which smaller nuclear-armed countries a crisis in order to ensure conventional dominance, al, and strategic. The lack of distinction between tory policies further complicate attempts at escala- might engage in more aggressive or violent com- which will also threaten nuclear-related systems the conventional and strategic domains will only tion management. petition because they believe that large countries whether intentionally or unintentionally. As James intensify as new surveillance and warning sys- Complex regional competition dynamics among will step in to create face-saving backstops or esca- Acton has argued, this type of action could tems come online. As such, the days nuclear-armed states will further complicate our lation “off ramps” and save them from themselves. of clear delineations between nuclear understanding of nuclear escalation and crisis Indeed, Feroz Khan has argued that deterrence in and non-nuclear situational aware- management. For example, the traditional measure South Asia now depends on intervention by the ness capabilities — which help of strategic stability — the presence of a secure sec- United States to manage and minimize the con- maintain a sharp firebreak between ond-strike capability — is problematic for smaller sequences of either side’s destabilizing behavior.55 conventional and strategic conflict nuclear-armed states that may lack sufficient geo- For example, amid an escalatory spiral with Paki- — seem limited at best. Moving for- graphical depth or balance to credibly absorb an stan, India may call on the United States to step in ward, the highly networked nature attack and still respond with sufficiently devastat- or risk allowing it to cross the nuclear threshold. of conventional systems, as well as ing effect. As Lieber and Press argue, regional nu- In this scenario, both global and regional strategic the dual-capable nature of many of clear powers are at a considerable resource disad- stability dynamics shape the way these actors in- them, may elevate the potential for vantage and may not be able to effectively conceal terpret conflict, and by extension their perceived conflict to spill over into the nu- their nuclear arsenals from the rapidly improving freedom of action and relative dominance. clear realm. Technical firebreaks intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaisance tech- The 1999 Kargil Crisis is representative of a have all but disappeared, opening nologies of the United States.54 Also, while move- crisis-escalation scenario in which smaller nucle- leave the targeted state strategically the possibility that steps taken to gain information ment toward increasing strategic transparency ar-armed states perceive that bigger powers will blinded, introducing a variety of esca- on conventional military capabilities will be easily greatly facilitated strategic stability between the swoop in to save them from nuclear confrontation. latory risks into the crisis, including nuclear esca- confused with more escalatory intrusions into nu- United States and Russia, the stabilizing effect of Just one year after India and Pakistan became overt lation due to a “misinterpreted warning.”50 Others clear-related systems. Historically, the conceptual transparency among smaller nuclear powers is far nuclear powers, the two countries approached have suggested that even as China may intend to validity of the “stability-instability paradox” was less clear since many such states — Israel most no- the brink of nuclear war. Following an attempt- adhere to a No-First-Use posture, if it perceives a reinforced by distinct and stratified conventional tably — depend on opacity and ambiguity to man- ed land-grab by Pakistan in the hotly contested conventional strike by the United States as an at- and strategic systems of warfare that amplified the age complex regional dynamics and prevent costly Kashmir region, the United States provided an off- tack on its nuclear retaliatory capability, it could division between nuclear and nonnuclear levels of arms racing. Multipolar strategic stability probably ramp to de-escalate the conflict. At the height of escalate to the nuclear level nonetheless.51 At the war. In a world in which these systems have dual won’t play out according to traditional concepts the crisis, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif same time, surveillance systems designed prin- uses, the durability of that reassuring theoretical and rule sets — such as stability-instability — or at “insisted” on meeting with President Bill Clinton, cipally for conventional missions may also have construct may be further called into question. least not in the same ways as in the past. according to Clinton’s senior director for Near East utility for nuclear missions as well. For example, and South Asian affairs on the National Security the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle was ini- Escalating Off-Ramps Council, Bruce Riedel.56 The United States stepped tially intended “to support joint combatant forces Nuclear Escalation in after Clinton called both India’s and Pakistan’s in worldwide peacetime, contingency and wartime in the Second Nuclear Age Complex regional escalation dynamics that occur leaders. Washington also sent its senior military operations.”52 However, as Keir Lieber and Daryl under a nuclear shadow may also play out at the commander in the region and a senior State De- Press suggest, increasingly capable unmanned The risk of asymmetric escalation is not exclusive- geostrategic level such that “small-state” conflicts partment official to Islamabad. Later, former dep- aerial vehicles, like the Global Hawk, with ad- ly a feature of direct competition and conflict be- can escalate to “big-state” wars in unexpected uty secretary of state Strobe Talbott wrote that vanced stealth and sensor capabilities may also tween great-power adversaries. Sudden and indirect ways. In a regional conflict or crisis, participants the world was closer to nuclear confrontation than be useful to track a small country’s mobile mis- escalation to a strategic crisis can also result from (states and actors who are directly engaged) and during the Cuban Missile Crisis.57 Clearly, diplo- siles — whether nuclear or conventional.53 These the fragmentation of power on the global geopolitical stakeholders (states and actors who are indirect- matic interventions that can deescalate a crisis and and other dual-use capabilities contribute to the landscape and the multipolar dynamics emanating ly engaged) may possess different views about the forestall a nuclear conflict should always be pur- blurring of the line between conventional and nu- from regional nuclear powers. Today’s great-power value and risks of escalation. There is also the po- sued. However, expectations that the great powers clear spheres and the opening of unexpected gaps competition occurs in a context of rising regional tential for states with smaller nuclear arsenals to will step in to rescue small nuclear states caught in escalatory restraint. tensions and growing nuclear capabilities of pre- draw big states into conflict in ways that defy the in an escalatory spiral may shift the burden of re- Distinctions or firebreaks between convention- viously second- or third-tier nuclear-armed states, stability-instability paradox, which assumes that straint and reduce accountability and responsibil-

49 Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” 54 Lieber and Press, “The New Era of Counterforce,” 37–46. International Security 41, no. 4 (April 2017): 50–92, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274. 55 Feroz Hassan Khan, “The Independence-Dependence Paradox: Stability Dilemmas in South,” Arms Control Association, accessed June 30, 50 Acton, “Escalation through Entanglement,” 58. 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003-10/features/independence-dependence-paradox-stability-dilemmas-south. 51 Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear,” 50-92. 56 Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” in Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Conse- 52 “RQ-4 Global Hawk,” United States Air Force, Oct. 27, 2014, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104516/rq-4-global-hawk/. quences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 130–43. 53 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International 57 Strobe Talbott, “The Day A Nuclear Conflict Was Averted,” YaleGlobal Online, Sept. 13, 2004, https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/day-nucle- Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 37–46, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273. ar-conflict-was-averted.

104 105 The Strategist Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age

ity for managing strategic stability among region- Equalizing Asymmetries enhanced transparency. Since the beginning of the ities are employed to gain escalation dominance, al actors in ways that may reinforce rather than Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet definitions of strate- sub-conventional tactics might challenge delib- reduce risk-taking. In such a scenario, the United In recent years, sophisticated technologies have gic stability rested on the notion that possessing erate opacity or ambiguity surrounding nuclear States may not initiate an escalation wormhole, so leveled the playing field for a range of actors to com- a secure second-strike capability would disincen- weapons programs by revealing capabilities or much as get pulled through one. pete across various domains of conflict. Smaller tivize an adversary from launching a nuclear at- processes in ways that are destabilizing. nuclear states are not immune to the allure of gray- tack against the other with the understanding that Reckless Driver Escalation zone tactics and influence operations as means a devastating counterattack was inevitable. This to coerce preferable outcomes at lower cost and concept of stability fundamentally depends not Exiting the Wormhole: Third-party, “escalation pull” dynamics may risk. As cyber weapons and disinformation become only on the survivability of the arsenal — achieved Managing and Preventing Strategic also emerge through extended deterrence when more ubiquitous, regional powers are also learning by the advanced hardening and concealment of Crisis in the New Nuclear Age a nuclear “protectee” feels emboldened in its in- how best to tailor sub-conventional tactics to ena- missiles — but also on sufficient strategic depth to teractions with regional nuclear powers due to ble their own strategies for escalation dominance. make regime survival of such an attack plausible. In today’s security environment, sub-conven- protection under a larger state’s nuclear umbrella. Moreover, asymmetric capabilities may encourage In fact, most analysts believe that secure second tional weapons may no longer be confined to In these circumstances, smaller states — both nu- actors to engage in high-risk, escalatory behavior strike was the principal enabler of strategic stabili- sub-strategic targets. Weaponized social media, clear and non-nuclear — may drive escalation in at lower levels of conflict in attempts to achieve ty even in the face of conventional and sub-conven- widespread open-source information that used hopes of triggering intervention by other actors victory, potentially outmaneuvering militarily su- tional conflicts that largely played out through and to be the exclusive domain of intelligence collec- on their behalf. As the only country in the world perior states without ever having to pull the trig- with non-nuclear subordinate states. tion, and an increasingly “post-truth” atmosphere to extend a formal nuclear umbrella over many ger.60 Smaller states can compete in the digital This form of strategic stability is, by definition, a suggest a new and dangerous battlespace. In this of its formal treaty alliance partners, this risk is information realm far more effectively than they “big-state” phenomenon. However, a second-strike context, small wars could quickly morph into big most acute for the United States. As Barry Posen could in traditional military competition. In fact, capability may not be plausible for smaller coun- wars in ways that are difficult to anticipate or man- writes, these “reckless drivers” may take bold ac- when it comes to disinformation racing, smaller re- tries, such as North Korea or Israel, that do not age, perhaps rendering traditional military conflict tions with little regard for U.S. interests, despite gional powers can give larger states a serious run possess sufficient geographic strategic depth to “overrun by events” before the shooting starts and their relative dependence on the United States.58 for their money. The advances in digital technology absorb a first strike and then launch a second. For prompting consideration of tools and options nor- These participants and stakeholders may have have transformed the internet into a 21st-centu- small states, then, strategic stability may need to mally reserved only for crises of existential propor- asymmetries of stakes and interests that drive ry “wild west” where non-state actors and small rest on a different foundation, one that accounts tion. Similarly, the inclination of competing states their choices and behavior. In Asia, the complex powers can take on militarily superior states with for intense pressures to strike first in a crisis where to pursue horizontal escalation options even as the dynamics between a small nuclear power (North disproportionate impact, high deniability and lim- the first move is also the only move. In such a sce- separation between nuclear and conventional sys- Korea), larger nuclear powers (China and the ited retaliatory risk. North Korea’s infamous cyber nario, the inability to launch a secure second strike tems erodes suggests that the risks of wormhole United States), and extended deterrence alliance attack on Sony in 2014 illustrates this point.61 In may actually accelerate a crisis rather than simply escalation pervade the upper levels of the conflict members (Japan and South Korea) underscore this environment, cyber and advanced-technology fail to control it. spectrum as well. The ever-more interdependent the challenge. In Europe, some of these dynamics tools obscure attribution and accelerate the time Similarly, the stabilizing benefits of transparen- and dual-use nature of emerging technologies, from play out along the “old NATO-new NATO” divide between launch and impact, making it difficult to cy may play out differently in the multipolar land- advanced delivery systems to intrusive surveil- as states closer to the Russian periphery may feel trace where an attack originated or who was be- scape, where sudden or unexpected transparency lance and warning systems, indicates that states the need to test NATO resolve. Some have argued hind it. On this new frontier, anyone and any state may in fact open a new deterrence gap or worm- may have more incentives to move first in a cri- risks of U.S. entrapment were not as high in the can launch an attack with the click of a button. Just hole — especially for states that possess smaller sis, especially if warning and communication sys- bipolar world of the Cold War, when the loss of because a state can start a war, however, doesn’t nuclear arsenals. At the great-power level, trans- tems are compromised. Asymmetric war-fighting any one smaller partner would not have dramati- mean it can end it successfully on its own terms or parency regarding strategic-level capabilities, in- techniques at the sub-strategic level — cross-do- cally upset stability, and there were no major dif- avoid a sudden strategic crisis with a highly antag- tentions, and processes has long been considered main coercion, front-door information attacks, la- ferences in interests between the United States onized nuclear adversary. stabilizing. During the Cold War, transparency tent and out of control disinformation, and shifts and its allies.59 But today’s more diffuse global often accompanied arms control agreements and from opacity to transparency — will shape the way power structure is more conducive to “reckless Break Failure served to enhance strategic stability by prevent- states compete and change how they perceive their driving,” as medium-size partners, such as India, ing arms racing between the United States and relative dominance across the spectrum of conflict. may be more confident the United States would The risk of unexpected escalation in a more re- the Soviet Union.62 However, according to Steve In this unstable security environment, finding come to their aid given their greater importance gionalized, multipolar context stems not only from Fetter, “transparency generally increases securi- new ways to manage and reduce risk is critically to the global balence of power. Moreover, in a different strategic gambling or risk-taking by small- ty only when states are reasonably comfortable important. In particular, managing strategic esca- multipolar system, the interests of U.S. partners er nuclear powers, but also from the absence of with the status quo.”63 Among other nuclear arms lation risks that eminate from gray-zone influence are more likely to diverge from the United States. escalation control measures that can tamp down possessors and aspirants, such as China, Israel, operations requires breaking down long-standing or de-escalate a strategic crisis — most notably North Korea, and Iran, opacity instead has been silos between nuclear policy and other security pol- in the form of a secure second-strike capability or viewed as more stabilizing by creating ambigui- icy experts. Developing a greater degree of political ties that reduce the risk of conflict and reinforce and societal resilience in the face of these manipu- deterrence. In a world where asymmetric capabil- lative tactics well ahead of crisis and conflict is also 58 Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 44. 59 Mira Rapp-Hooper, Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020). 62 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Farewell to Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs 65, no. 1 (Fall 1986): 1–20, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian- 60 Dan Altman, “Advancing Without Attacking: The Strategic Game Around the Use of Force,” Security Studies 27, no. 1 (2018): 58–88, https:// federation/1986-09-01/farewell-arms-control. doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1360074. 63 Nicholas Zarimpas, ed., Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions, Stockholm International 61 Lori Grisham, “Timeline: North Korea and the Sony Pictures Hack,” USA Today, Dec. 18, 2014, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/na- Peace Research Institute, 2003, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI03Zarimpas/SIPRI03Zarimpas.pdf. tion-now/2014/12/18/sony-hack-timeline-interview-north-korea/20601645/.

106 107 The Strategist Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age

essential. Concepts of collective security, like “see differences of view and perspective, and restrain- might not be agreeable or desirable, it presents a risks, and respond to WMD dangers. Prior to joining something, say something,” cannot just be about ing impulsive or risky actions. But to be effective, potential alternative. Open source information can the Defense Department, Ms. Hersman was a sen- suspicious packages, but must include other illicit arms control — and the arms control community only perform this function, however, if its authentic- ior research fellow with the Center for the Study of and nefarious intrusions into the fabric of national — will have to adapt to the current security en- ity and reliability can be ensured and the techniques Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National De- life. Some of the traditional tools of risk manage- vironments and account for rapidly evolving tech- and practices used to collect, analyze, and distribute fense University from 1998 to 2009. Ms. Hersman ment, such as the establishment of clear firebreaks nological and informational factors. Arms control this information are effective and ethical. previously held positions as an international affairs between nuclear and non-nuclear systems, may will need to move beyond overly rigid, stove-piped Furthermore, influence and information opera- fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a spe- not be feasible. In the Center for Strategic and In- approaches and incorporate alternative structures tions can sow doubt and distrust into the public’s cial assistant to the undersecretary of defense for ternational Studies’ two-year study of the impact and models, asymmetric use of trade space, and view of established institutions and can frustrate policy, and a member of the House Armed Servic- of the emerging strategic situational awareness innovations in participation and inclusion of stake- efforts to build multilateral consensus around es Committee professional staff. She holds an M.A. and information ecosystem, the authors concluded holders and participants. In a recent Journal of treaties and their enforcement. States can ampli- in Arab studies from Georgetown University and a that “mutual dependencies between conventional Strategic Studies article, Heather Williams offers fy effects, obscure attribution, and prime the in- B.A. from Duke University. and non-conventional capabilities, and the need for an asymmetric arms control framework that em- formation space to their advantage before, during, strategic [situational awareness] capabilities to ad- phasizes the importance of dynamism in designing and after negotiations. For example, AI-enabled mi- Acknowledgements: This article reflects a year- dress nuclear risks preclude relying on ‘disentan- such agreements.65 A dynamic approach would give crotargeted activities can be used to make organi- long consideration of escalation wormholes and how glement’ as a primary means of risk reduction.”64 states flexibility in their commitment to prospec- zations, individuals, and communities — including these phenomena might better describe many escala- Instead, familiarizing policymakers with this com- tive agreements by allowing for mutual adjustment arms control negotiators, inspectors, and monitors tion dynamics in the emerging security environment. plex information ecosystem through realistic exer- in force posture in ways that differ from the tra- — vulnerable to coercion through ransomware, en- The article benefitted enormously from the assis- cising of senior decision-making processes is es- ditional “like-for-like” approach to arms control. crypted bribes, doxing, and other techniques. tance of several staff members and reviewers along sential to better understand and prepare for high Such issues should also be considered in the con- In a world characterized by global and regional the way. Annalise Ploostser provided much of the ini- escalation risk crises. In addition, expanding the text of broader nuclear risk-reduction strategies. In strategic stability dynamics, escalation thresholds tial research and drafting assistance for early drafts. topics and approaches for bilateral and multilateral today’s multipolar world, there is an opportunity to are being redefined across the spectrum of sub-con- Suzanne Claeys supported many of the speeches and stability talks, including a much broader perspec- address and limit asymmetric tactics by engaging ventional, conventional, and nuclear conflict and articles on disinformation that have been incorpo- tive on risks associated with today’s information in broader strategic stability talks and encouraging perceptions of strategic stability are transforming rated into this analysis. Maxwell Simon picked up ecosystem would be helpful. the development of alternative normative frame- quickly. If a traditional, predictable escalation lad- all of the research support efforts in recent months While these sorts of crisis mitigation measures works. In this context, the discussion of norms and der ever existed, it certainly no longer does today. and contributed greatly. Sameer Lalwani, Heather are important, they will not impose the types of codes of conduct for information and cyber war- Instead, today’s competitive and highly asymmet- Williams, Rebecca Lissner, and Morgan Kaplan read limits or controls necessary to close escalation fare in strategic competition is long overdue. ric security environment suggests the need for earlier drafts and provided invaluable feedback. Fi- wormholes and prevent a destabilizing arms race. Successful and durable arms control in this time new concepts and metaphors to understand and nally, the editorial team at TNSR vastly improved the For that, clearer mutually agreed upon limits will of renewed major-power competition also requires manage emerging escalation risks. Fueled by an flow and readability of the argument. All remaining be required. The same pressures that are increas- thinking in a new way about verification and com- increasingly competitive security environment, flaws are entirely my own. ing strategic competition and complicating escala- pliance in the face of an increasingly weaponized transformational technologies, and a more frag- tion dynamics have also taken a toll on other tradi- information environment. The growing accessibility, mented global order, escalation wormholes may Photo: Matthew J. Bragg tional sources of strategic stability — particularly maturation, and diffusion of online platforms and appear, likely with little warning. Asymmetries of in terms of the transparency and restraint provid- digital tools have democratized information but also tools, domains, and stakes will complicate this ed by arms control treaties. Following the demise contributed to easy manipulation and misuse, which landscape as nuclear-armed states, both large and of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty undermines credible and authoritative sources of small, seek to navigate this new escalatory terrain. and the announcement of Washington’s intention information. Deep fakes, weaponized social media, Wormholes are inherently, and indeed catastrophi- to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty, the New and information sabotage will be used to discredit cally, unstable. Whether in terms of space travel or Start Treaty is the last remaining nuclear arms con- the negotiation, implementation, and verification of nuclear escalation, they seem best avoided. trol treaty between the United States and Russia. arms control. Such tactics will target not only gov- Its expiration in February 2021 now seems nearly ernments but also non-governmental entities and Rebecca Hersman is a leading expert on nu- unavoidable. And yet, in a more competitive secu- individuals with the intention of shaping and ma- clear, chemical, and biological weapons policy rity environment characterized by high risks and nipulating information, not just stealing it. Moreo- and crisis management. In addition to leading the limited resources, measures that build confidence, ver, the explosion of international open-source anal- preeminent national program designed to develop reduce miscalculation, enhance transparency, and ysis means the days of proprietary, private, official next-generation nuclear policy expertise, Ms. Hers- restrain costly and dangerous military competition sources and processes as an exclusive means of man has authored numerous studies and reports may increase both in value and applicability. verification — particularly in the form of national in- on nuclear and chemical weapons policy, emerging Arms control structures and institutions, along telligence — may be over. Open source information technologies and strategic stability, and crisis man- with their mechanisms for dispute resolution and and analysis can and should be leveraged when ac- agement and decision-making. Ms. Hersman joined compliance enforcement, can provide useful ven- curate and accessible. Indeed, for some future arms CSIS in April 2015 from the Department of Defense, ues for addressing sources of conflict, adjudicating control arrangements in which intrusive inspections where she served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for countering weapons of mass destruction

64 Hersman et al., “Under the Nuclear Shadow,” 55. (WMD) since 2009. In this capacity, she led Defense 65 Heather Williams, “Asymmetric Arms Control and Strategic Stability: Scenarios for Limiting Hypersonic Glide Vehicles,” Journal of Strategic Department policy and strategy to prevent WMD Studies 42, no. 6 (2019): 789–813, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1627521. proliferation and use, reduce and eliminate WMD

108 109 The Roundtable Feature

Roundtables are where we get to hear from multiple experts on either a subject matter or a recently published book. Roundtable Distilling the Essence of Strategy

I am certain of one thing: Colin Gray would be exasperated with claims that “Grand strategy is dead.”1 What he would have called a “banality” is commonplace these days.2 Some question the need for grand strategy; others contend the United States has lost the art of developing one.3 Not that Colin would disagree with the difficulty of strategy, or American shortfalls: “In war after war,” he noted, “America demonstrates an acute strategy deficit.”4 There is plenty of evidence over the past two decades to suggest that a deficiency in conceptualizing and conducting national strategy afflicts the United States.

Frank G. Hoffman strongly suspect that Colin’s retort to the While embracing the eloquence of this unique demise of grand strategy would draw upon definition, one modification should be offered. The a theme from his book Another Bloody Cen- use of “development” rather than “direction” cap- tury — namely, that we will see the end of tures one of the potential uses of a strategy: the historyI well before the value of sound strategy is shaping of instruments to better achieve defined eclipsed. It is an enduring human function, eter- policy outcomes. The final purpose of strategy, nally tied to human nature.5 Strategy will retain too often overlooked, is the development of either its utility as long as security communities have in- missing capacity or the inadequate capability of an terests, and as long as policymakers and military instrument of national power. Grand strategies can commanders need to counter challenges and align be anticipatory and long term, seeking to shape the resources to obtain desired objectives. development of instruments of state power, add- Dr. Gray ensured any debate began with a clear ing new agencies and new forms of power. They do definition of basic terms. His concise formulation more than just guide their integrated application of grand strategy has much to commend it. “Grand towards defined goals. strategy is the direction and use made of any or all Some in the academy focus on narrower pieces the assets of a security community, including its of the strategy process by analyzing specific docu- military instrument, for the purposes of policy as ments. Few think of it holistically or consider the decided by politics.”6 Like most scholars, Gray be- dimensions that constitute what Colin termed the lieved that true grand strategy requires the concep- “whole house.” Colin was rare in this regard. While tualization of all of the elements of national pow- some might find his penchant for creating enumer- er, not just its military power. As an unreformed ated lists distracting, including his noted “17 di- Clausewitizian, our dear friend knew that strategy mensions of strategy,” the 23 “dicta,” and 40 max- is defined by policy and decided by the interces- ims, many found it instructive. Colin believed that sion of politics. applying the art of strategy required the “whole

1 Daniel W. Drezner, Ronald R. Krebs, and Randall Schweller, “The End of Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2020), 30-40, https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-04-13/end-grand-strategy. For an immediate response see, Andrew Ehrhardt and Maeve Ryan, “Grand Strategy is No Silver Bullet, But It Is Indispensable,” War on the Rocks, May 19, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/grand-strategy-is-no- silver-bullet-but-it-is-indispensable/. 2 Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski, The End of Grand Strategy, US Maritime Operations in the Twenty-First Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018). 3 Frank Hoffman, “Enhancing American Strategic Competency,” in ed. Alan Cromartie, Liberal Wars, Anglo-American Strategy, Ideology and Practice (London: Routledge, 2015); Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwille, Raphael S. Cohen, Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, October 2014). 4 Colin S. Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), 49. 5 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005); Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy (Cam- bridge, UK: Polity, 2015), 7–22. 6 Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 29.

113 Roundtable Distilling the Essence of Strategy

house” or all the dimensions of strategy.7 These The council table is also where policy aims and opera- considerations represent critical components that tional options are integrated. The discourse required Colin Gray sought to teach aspiring strategists as to create and refine strategies is rarely the product they struggled to achieve their nation’s policy and of a single master strategist. Ultimately, policymak- security interests. 8 This short list provides the gist ers “must weigh imponderables through structured of the holistic understanding of strategy as a prac- debates that pare away personal, organizational, and tical art and comprises the main theme of Colin’s national illusions and conceits.”12 They must squarely intellectual contribution to security studies. Such face the parochial interests of bureaucracy, accurate- an understanding was something our honored col- ly discern strategic options, and make choices with league always endeavored to help us appreciate. imperfect information. There is a tendency in American strategy circles to insist on linear and rational processes, as if politics Context and Culture can be isolated. As Clausewitz argued, military strat- egists must accept that politics frequently intrudes The first and principal consideration for the strat- in strategy and war. The strategist, who holds the egist is a firm grasp of the strategic environment proverbial bridge between policy and military and context in which one’s strategy is to be con- means, must accept the historical fact that purely ra- ducted. Professor Gray referred to the “sovereignty tional methods are not the norm in crafting strategy. of context” to highlight its importance. The sources Rather, strategy’s natural spawning grounds are the of this foundation were listed as political, military, confluence of politics, complexity, uncertainty, and socio-cultural, geographic, technological, and his- constraints. As Colin noted in his lucid definition, torical context.9 Our comprehension of the strategic national strategies are developed to support the at- context frames our understanding of our adversary tainment of “policy as determined by politics.”13 This and the particular environment in which strategy is the best definition, as politics influences or drives will operate. It is clear that shortfalls in strategic policy and thus has an impact on strategy as well. performance by the United States in Iraq and Af- ghanistan stem from shortfalls in understanding the particular context and culture that the United Competitive Strategies States and its allies sought to change. Gray empha- Coherence instruments of national power. The strategic con- sized that strategic culture is neither fixed nor de- As Andrew Marshall and others like Dr. Gray con- cept divined by the strategist should establish this terminant, but it does cue or frame problem recog- sistently argued, strategy must be competitive. To This is the essence of the strategy function, logic and coherence, and they must strive mightily nition and initially forms a lens on solutions.10 Good be competitive means that the strategist recogniz- whereby the strategist exploits the comprehen- to keep them connected. Colin rightfully calls this strategy presumes some grasp of the “other” and es that any strategy operates in an interactive and sion generated from context and cognitively cre- the “heroic duty” of the strategist.16 must incorporate an understanding of the relevant adversarial setting in which other parties seek to ates a strategic concept and logic that promises to history, geography, sociology, and anthropology. advance their own interests. A competitive strategy attain policy ends within the means allocated and respects the choices and options that the opponent the constraints laid upon them. It is not enough Constraints can pose. It reflects the reality that war is a recipro- for the ends and means to be simply “proportion- Compromise and Councils of War cal duel, an interactive exercise of action, response, ate.”15 A good strategy must have an internal logic Strategy is made and executed in the real world, and counteraction. This consideration is the part that ties policy to both ways and means to create an environment that ultimately deals with con- This consideration deals with the development of of strategy-making where one considers the rela- desired strategic effects. That logic is a continuous straints. The most obvious of these are time, strategies and the essence of strategy as a process. tive strengths and weaknesses of one’s self as well thread of thinking that provides strategic intent information, and resources. War in general, and What Eliot Cohen once called the “unequal dialogue” as one’s opponent. Many strategies do not always and informs ways, creating linkages in strategic de- operations more particularly, are competitive and occurs in war councils. Civil-military interaction in give credit to this consideration. As Colin noted, pol- sign that then drives operations. Creating and sus- decisions must be made in a context that rewards the development of strategy is critical to strategic icymakers often seem “to forget that the enemy too taining coherence is the part of strategic practice timely actions. There are advantages to getting success, and, of course, a great source of tension.11 has preferences and choices.”14 where the strategist earns their keep and applies strategy “good enough,” as Colin would put it, their creativity and experience. and fast enough to outmaneuver one’s opponent

7 Colin S. Gray, Perspectives on Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 191–205. Coherence reflects the balance and internal log- in the temporal dimension of strategy. By antici- 8 An earlier version of this list, now revised, can be found at Frank G. Hoffman, “Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations,” Orbis 58, ic in the enduring formula of ends/ways/means. pating, deciding, and acting with time as the most no. 4 (Fall 2014), 472–485, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2014.08.002. Adapting one part automatically alters the logic of precious resource, one can create and sustain ad- 9 Colin S. Gray, National Security Dilemmas: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009), 36–149. that formula and the resultant strategy. In another vantage. The same is true with information. Strat- 10 Gray, Perspectives, 202. direction, coherence must be sustained across all egy relies upon intelligence and knowledge of the 11 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 58; Gray, The Strategy Bridge, 3. 12 Macgregor Knox, “Conclusion: Continuity and Revolution in the Making of Strategy,” in eds. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin 15 William James, “Grandiose Strategy? Refining the Study and Practice of Grand Strategy,” The RUSI Journal (2020), 5–6, https://doi.org/10.10 Bernstein, The Making Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 645. 80/03071847.2020.1767364. 13 Colin Gray, The Future of Strategy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 7. 16 Colin S. Gray, “The Strategist as Hero,” Joint Force Quarterly 62 (July 2011), 37–45, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/ 14 Gray, Modern Strategy, 20. jfq/jfq-62.pdf.

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other side, but as Colin stressed, the future is not for opponents to not do what they are expected A plan is a theory specifying how a particular foreseeable and strategy is laid on a foundation to do. While taking note of Clausewitz’s emphasis goal might be secured, ceteris paribus. Until of assumption, guesses, and genius. The essence on focused aims, Gray grasped that “the practicing the course of future events unfolds, the chief of strategy is the resolution of choices, tradeoffs, strategist has to be ready to adapt as the unique planner and the commander, who may be one and risks produced by uncertainty.17 and unpredictable, though not necessarily unantic- and the same person, are deciding and acting ipateable, course of a war unfolds.”21 only on the basis of a theory of success.24

Contingency This idea of a strategy being a theory or hypothesis Causality to be tested is a key part of sound strategic logic as it This consideration reflects the role of chance in forces the strategist to think about the causal link be- human affairs. We do not fight inanimate objects, Recently, scholars have begun challenging the ba- tween ends and means, and is too often overlooked. but real people with ideas and will of their own. sic elements of strategy, including the ends/ways/ But one cannot accuse Gray of that oversight. Clausewitz’s concept of friction exists at more than means relationship. Some scholars suggest we drop the operational and tactical level. It exists at all lev- it entirely.22 But in exploring the literature, it be- els, and thus Colin Gray’s emphasis on the need for came apparent to me that the “black hole,” or miss- Conclusion prudence in risk-taking and for adaptability in stra- ing element in strategy, was also missing from my tegic thinking cannot be overestimated. Sir Win- own set of fundamental considerations. For a while Strategy is a messy and nonlinear process, as Col- ston Churchill knew about the impact of chance I thought I had found a critical element in strategic in often stressed. It must be done, but just slightly from his own military and ministerial experiences. planning and grand strategy that even the giants like better and faster than one’s opponents. The ability He exclaimed that “The Statesman who yields to Colin Gray had overlooked. This new consideration to challenge conventional wisdom, to see through war fever must realize that once the signal is given, centered upon the need to focus on the critical and the chaff and discern the essence of a problem, to he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of causal logic of a strategy which deals with creating a uncover illusion or conceit, and craft a strategy that unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.”18 Making “way” that connects ends and means. The “way” is advances a theory of success is hard work. Sound allowance for uncertainty and chance were linked a strategic concept that represents an untested hy- strategy is not an illusion or hubristic; it is simply to Colin’s repeated stress on prudence in affairs of pothesis, one which can plausibly attain policy ends the best antidote for strategic poverty and the best state and strategy. within the means allotted and existing constraints. insurance any polity has against catastrophe. A good strategy must establish a causal logic that This succinct set of considerations provide the links both the ways and means towards gaining the fundamentals distilled from a detailed review of Pro- Continuous Assessment desired policy aim and strategic effects. That logic is fessor Colin Gray’s studies. There is nothing guar- and Adaptation a continuous thread of thinking that provides stra- anteed in the realm of human affairs, but strategists tegic intent and informs ways, creating linkages in who recognize these considerations will increase the The confluence of contingency and competitive- strategic design that drives the application of means likelihood that their strategy will be “good enough.” ness produces the need for an additional com- via military operations. This factor is the component There is heroic difficulty in resolving the compet- ponent — that of constant evaluation of ongoing that involves calculation, cunning, and the creation ing tensions inherent to crafting and implementing operations and continuous measurement of pro- of a strategic logic or chain of effects. strategy, and only a few heroes that have taught this gress. Since strategy is an evolving contact sport, Before publishing my putative discovery, I did craft with Colin’s intense style. He will be remem- one should avoid what Lord Salisbury called the some further research and found that I had over- bered for keeping the strategic flame alive and pass- most common error, “sticking to the carcass of looked this central element in Gray’s body of work. ing it along to future generations of strategists. dead policy.”19 Thus, strategies should be thought He once stressed that “strategies are theories, which of as adaptive in nature. The making of strategy is to say they are purported explanations of how de- Frank G. Hoffman is a distinguished research is an iterative exercise that is dynamic, irregular, sired effects can be achieved by selected causes of fellow at the National Defense University. His re- and discontinuous.20 Colin stressed the interactive threat and action applied in a particular sequence.” 23 search portfolio centers on national defense and aspect of strategy and insisted on adaptability to This is not the only occurrence discovered belated- military strategy, military innovation and adapta- deal with uncertainty and the uncanny propensity ly. In Schools for Strategy, he emphasized: tion, and defense economics.

Image courtesy of Antonia Gray 17 Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Thoughts for Defence Planners,” Survival 52, no. 3 (June–July 2010), 159–178, https://doi.org/10.1080/003963 38.2010.494883. 18 Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life: A Roving Commission (New York: Scribner), 232. 19 Quoted by Steve Meyer, “Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO,” Parameters 33, no. 4 (Winter 2003-2004), 96, https://apps.dtic. mil/docs/citations/ADA597083, citing David Steele, Lord Salisbury: A Political Biography (New York: Routledge, 1999), 121. 20 Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (New York: Free Press, 1994), 318. 21 John Andreas Olsen and Colin S. Gray, eds., The Practice of Strategy: From Alexander the Great to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 295. 22 Jeffrey W. Meiser, “Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy,” Parameters 46, no. 4 (Winter 2016–17), 81–91, https://publications.armywarcol- lege.edu/pubs/3298.pdf.

23 Colin S. Gray, Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 30. 24 Colin S. Gray, Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2009), 44.

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