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Uber Technologies, Inc Uber Technologies, Inc. FKA: UberCab, Uber Technologies operates as an on-demand car service that allows everyone to have a private driver experience through a smartphone application and web based requests. The company’s application enables users to arrange and schedule transportation and/or logistics services with third party providers. By seamlessly connecting riders to drivers, Uber makes cities more accessible, opening up more possibilities for riders and more business for drivers. • Address: 1455 Market Street, 4th Floor, San Francisco, CA, 94103 • Geographic Region: Silicon Valley • Industry: Consumer Products and Services, Software • SIC Codes: 4119 - Local Passenger Transportation • NAICS Codes: 488490 - Other Support Activities for Road Transportation • Legal Counsel: Fenwick & West LLP • Company Website: www.uber.com Key Management Investors • Khosrowshahi, Dara - CEO, Director • Benchmark Capital • Chai, Nelson - CFO • Bezos Expeditions • Sugar, Ronald - Chair • First Round Capital • Young Lee, Bo - Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer • Founder Collective • West, Tony - Chief Legal Officer • Goldman Sachs & Co • Messina, Rebecca - Chief Marketing Officer • Google Ventures (GV) • Krishnamurthy, Nikki - Chief People Officer • Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers LLC • Gupta, Manik - Chief Product Officer (KPCB) • Camp, Garrett - Co-Founder, Chairman of the Board • Lowercase Capital LLC • Kalanick, Travis - Co-Founder, Director • Menlo Ventures • Harford, Barney - COO • Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund • Pham, Thuan - CTO • SoftBank Group Corp. • Burns, Ursula - Director • Summit Partners • Thain, John - Director • TBA • Al Rumayyan, Yasir - Director • TPG Capital LP • Huffington, Arianna - Director • Undisclosed Firm • Martello, Wan - Director • Undisclosed Investor • Cohler, Matt - Director • Trujillo, David - Director • Graves, Ryan - Director • Meyhofer, Eric - Head of Advanced Technologies Group • Hazelbaker, Jill - SVP, Communications and Public Policy • Macdonald, Andrew - VP, Americas Operations and Global Business Development • Holt, Rachel - VP and and Head of New Mobility • Gore-Coty, Pierre-Dimitri - VP and Regional General Manager of Europe, Middle East and Africa • Droege, Jason - VP, UberEverything [email protected] www.primeunicornindex.com (646) 429-0949 Investment Data Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 01/02/2020 $29.93 - - - Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 10/25/2018 $500.00 $75,188,225,833 1,541,619,666 $48.77 Preferred Price Per Share: $48.77 Participating Preferred Cap: - Round: Series E or greater Anti-Dilution: Weighted Average Direction: Flat Round Redemption: No Liquidation Preference: Pari Passu Cumulative Dividends: No Liquidation Multiple: 0 - 1x Dividend Rate: 8.00 Stock Type: Conventional Convertible Reorganization: NO Capped Participation: No Pay to Play: No Pay to Play Penalties: - Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 03/09/2018 - - $48.77 Preferred Price Per Share: $48.77 Participating Preferred Cap: - Round: Series E or greater Anti-Dilution: Weighted Average Direction: Flat Round Redemption: No Liquidation Preference: Pari Passu Cumulative Dividends: No Liquidation Multiple: 0 - 1x Dividend Rate: 8.00 Stock Type: Conventional Convertible Reorganization: NO Capped Participation: No Pay to Play: No Pay to Play Penalties: - Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 01/17/2018 $1,250.00 $74,599,990,533 1,529,558,800 $48.77 Preferred Price Per Share: $48.77 Participating Preferred Cap: - Round: Series E or greater Anti-Dilution: Weighted Average Direction: Flat Round Redemption: No Liquidation Preference: Pari Passu Cumulative Dividends: No Liquidation Multiple: 0 - 1x Dividend Rate: 8.00 Stock Type: Conventional Convertible Reorganization: NO Capped Participation: No Pay to Play: No Pay to Play Penalties: - [email protected] www.primeunicornindex.com (646) 429-0949 Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 05/27/2016 $4,839.00 $73,129,402,281 1,499,406,635 $48.77 Preferred Price Per Share: $48.77 Participating Preferred Cap: - Round: Series E or greater Anti-Dilution: Weighted Average Direction: Up Round Redemption: No Liquidation Preference: Pari Passu Cumulative Dividends: No Liquidation Multiple: 0 - 1x Dividend Rate: 8.00 Stock Type: Conventional Convertible Reorganization: NO Capped Participation: No Pay to Play: No Pay to Play Penalties: - Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 12/03/2015 $1,866.68 $67,391,793,025 1,381,765,726 $48.77 Preferred Price Per Share: $48.77 Participating Preferred Cap: - Round: Series E or greater Anti-Dilution: Weighted Average Direction: Up Round Redemption: No Liquidation Preference: Pari Passu Cumulative Dividends: No Liquidation Multiple: 0 - 1x Dividend Rate: 8.00 Stock Type: Conventional Convertible Reorganization: NO Capped Participation: No Pay to Play: No Pay to Play Penalties: - Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 05/26/2015 $370.93 $52,981,622,951 1,336,617,548 $39.64 Preferred Price Per Share: $39.64 Participating Preferred Cap: - Round: Series E or greater Anti-Dilution: Weighted Average Direction: Up Round Redemption: No Liquidation Preference: Pari Passu Cumulative Dividends: No Liquidation Multiple: 0 - 1x Dividend Rate: 8.00 Stock Type: Conventional Convertible Reorganization: NO Capped Participation: No Pay to Play: No Pay to Play Penalties: - Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 01/16/2015 $1,690.51 - - - Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 12/04/2014 $2,803.32 $44,271,240,905 1,328,765,401 $33.32 [email protected] www.primeunicornindex.com (646) 429-0949 Preferred Price Per Share: $33.32 Participating Preferred Cap: - Round: Series E or greater Anti-Dilution: Weighted Average Direction: Up Round Redemption: No Liquidation Preference: Pari Passu Cumulative Dividends: No Liquidation Multiple: 0 - 1x Dividend Rate: 8.00 Stock Type: Conventional Convertible Reorganization: NO Capped Participation: No Pay to Play: No Pay to Play Penalties: - Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 06/06/2014 $1,188.00 $19,431,186,654 1,252,570,362 $15.51 Preferred Price Per Share: $15.51 Participating Preferred Cap: - Round: Series D Anti-Dilution: Weighted Average Direction: Up Round Redemption: No Liquidation Preference: Pari Passu Cumulative Dividends: No Liquidation Multiple: 0 - 1x Dividend Rate: 8.00 Stock Type: Conventional Convertible Reorganization: NO Capped Participation: No Pay to Play: No Pay to Play Penalties: - Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 08/14/2013 $257.79 $3,847,121,445 1,079,590,696 $3.56 Preferred Price Per Share: $3.56 Participating Preferred Cap: - Round: Series C Anti-Dilution: Weighted Average Direction: Up Round Redemption: No Liquidation Preference: Pari Passu Cumulative Dividends: No Liquidation Multiple: >1 - 2x Dividend Rate: 8.00 Stock Type: Conventional Convertible Reorganization: NO Capped Participation: No Pay to Play: No Pay to Play Penalties: - Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 12/07/2011 $37.25 $316,016,514 891,505,788 $0.35 Preferred Price Per Share: $0.35 Participating Preferred Cap: - Round: Series B Anti-Dilution: Weighted Average Direction: Up Round Redemption: No Liquidation Preference: Pari Passu Cumulative Dividends: No [email protected] www.primeunicornindex.com (646) 429-0949 Liquidation Multiple: 0 - 1x Dividend Rate: 8.00 Stock Type: Conventional Convertible Reorganization: NO Capped Participation: No Pay to Play: No Pay to Play Penalties: - Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 02/14/2011 $11.00 - - $0.09 Preferred Price Per Share: $0.09 Participating Preferred Cap: - Round: Series A Anti-Dilution: Weighted Average Direction: Up Round Redemption: No Liquidation Preference: Pari Passu Cumulative Dividends: No Liquidation Multiple: >1 - 2x Dividend Rate: 8.00 Stock Type: Conventional Convertible Reorganization: NO Capped Participation: No Pay to Play: No Pay to Play Penalties: - Date Amount Valuation Est. Fully Diluted Shares Preferred Price Per Share 09/30/2010 $1.25 - - $0.01 Preferred Price Per Share: $0.01 Participating Preferred Cap: - Round: Seed Anti-Dilution: Weighted Average Direction: Not Applicable Redemption: No Liquidation Preference: Not Applicable Cumulative Dividends: No Liquidation Multiple: 0 - 1x Dividend Rate: 8.00 Stock Type: Conventional Convertible Reorganization: NO Capped Participation: No Pay to Play: No Pay to Play Penalties: - [email protected] www.primeunicornindex.com (646) 429-0949 Fair Market Value per Common Share Filing Date Shares Price per Share 11/14/2014 7,000,000 $16.85 04/07/2014 1,000,000 $13.18 04/07/2014 5,185,622 $13.18 07/16/2013 30,317,120 $0.08 07/16/2013 74,479,440 $0.06 02/16/2011 96,801,720 $0.00 [email protected] www.primeunicornindex.com (646) 429-0949 Price Per Share With Valuation Valuation Preferred PPS Common PPS 75.2 Billion $48.77 67.7 Billion $43.90 60.2 Billion $39.02 52.6 Billion $34.14 45.1 Billion $29.26 37.6 Billion $24.39 PPS 30.1 Billion $19.51 Valuation 22.6 Billion $14.63 15 Billion $9.75 7.52 Billion $4.88 0 $0.00 09/30/2010 08/23/2011 07/15/2012 06/08/2013 05/01/2014 03/25/2015 02/15/2016
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