Misunderstanding Judy Norman: Theory As Cause and Consequence
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University of Connecticut OpenCommons@UConn Connecticut Law Review School of Law 2019 Misunderstanding Judy Norman: Theory as Cause and Consequence Martha R. Mahoney Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 51 JUNE 2019 NUMBER 3 Article Misunderstanding Judy Norman: Theory as Cause and Consequence MARTHA R. MAHONEY Judy Norman shot her abusive husband during a late afternoon nap while he rested before violently trafficking her that night. The sharp contrast between the extreme violence and danger Judy faced and the denial of a self-defense instruction triggered extensive academic debates about justification and the use of deadly force. Norman became one of the most famous cases involving battered women, appearing in many casebooks and hundreds of law review articles. Despite all this work, the facts of the case contradict much of what scholars have said about Norman. Misconceptions about expert evidence, “Battered Woman Syndrome,” and battered women drive academic errors that affect evaluation of her need to act immediately, including the timing of sleep and death and the idea that her perceptions of risk were distorted. Almost all legal scholars failed to grapple with the looming threat of violent, forcible sexual slavery and therefore did not explore the larger question of whether that threat may justify deadly force in self-defense. Battered woman syndrome and learned helplessness are terms of art. In law, the term “battered woman syndrome” became a generic umbrella for expert evidence whether or not the expert applied Lenore Walker’s original theory. For decades, social scientists have applied other frameworks to understanding the impact of battering, especially “survivor theory” and “coercive control.” From the mid-1990s, the term “intimate partner violence and its effects” replaced battered woman syndrome and learned helplessness, but syndrome terminology persisted in legal contexts, giving Walker’s theory disproportionate influence. Simplified concepts of the syndrome led some criminal law theorists to believe that critics of the Norman holding must be relying on expert testimony about passivity and helplessness to argue for change in the concepts of imminence and reasonableness. In fact, the forensic expert at Judy Norman’s trial had applied the “coercive control” framework that became more influential over time. This Article analyzes facts and confronts doctrinal questions in light of current social science. Replacing battered woman syndrome with “intimate partner violence” and replacing learned helplessness with “. the effects of intimate 671 partner violence,” we should reevaluate the literature on Norman and self-defense to identify the best arguments and address new questions. ARTICLE CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 675 A. THE NORMAN CASE IN COURT AND IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP ......... 675 I. JUDY NORMAN’S STORY ................................................................. 682 A. HISTORY OF THE MARRIAGE ........................................................ 682 B. ASSESSING THREAT: CRISIS AND DEATH ...................................... 689 II. UNDERSTANDING THE EXPERTS .................................................. 702 A. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS AND RESEARCH ON INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE ................................................................................... 702 B. WHAT EXPERTS REALLY SAID AT TRIAL: DR. WILLIAM TYSON (FORENSIC RECONSTRUCTION AND COERCIVE CONTROL) AND DR. ROBERT ROLLINS (PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND COMPETENCY) 712 C. JUDY NORMAN THROUGH DIFFERING FORENSIC LENSES ............... 719 D. AFTER CONVICTION: THE APPELLATE PATH FROM COERCIVE CONTROL TO “BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME” ........................... 725 III. JUDY NORMAN IN THE IMAGINATION OF LEGAL SCHOLARS— WHAT WE MISSED AND WHY WE MISSED IT ........................... 735 A. ASSUMPTIONS AND ERRORS ABOUT JUDY NORMAN, BATTERED WOMEN, AND EXPERT TESTIMONY ............................................... 735 B. A VULGARIZED VERSION OF THE “SYNDROME”—EVIDENCE AND INFLUENCE .................................................................................. 741 C. LOCATING THE HELPFUL POINTS IN THE DEBATES ........................ 746 IV. REVISITING REASONABLENESS, IMMINENCE, AND JUSTIFICATION .............................................................................. 747 A. INTERROGATING SLEEP—CONTEXT VS. “A MATTER OF LAW” ...... 747 B. TIMING, SEX, AND DEATH—TEMPORAL URGENCY AND THE THREAT OF SEXUAL SLAVERY ................................................................... 751 C. REASONABLE BELIEF AND EYEWITNESSES .................................... 755 D. WAS IT POSSIBLE TO HELP JUDY NORMAN? .................................. 757 E. CONTEXT AND IMMINENCE, JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE .............. 759 EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION ............................................................ 765 APPENDIX: MODEL OF COERCION IN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (MARY ANN DUTTON & LISA A. GOODMAN) ........ 767 Misunderstanding Judy Norman: Theory as Cause and Consequence MARTHA R. MAHONEY * INTRODUCTION A. The Norman Case in Court and in Legal Scholarship Late in the afternoon of June 12, 1985, near Spindale, North Carolina, John Thomas Norman (J.T.) was taking a nap before transporting his wife Judy to a “truck stop” rest area where, every night, he forced her to sell sex.1 For two days, J.T. had beaten Judy continuously and threatened to maim her and to kill Judy and her mother. His threats frightened Judy’s mother, Laverne Laws, so much that Laverne borrowed a gun and put it in her purse. Judy’s efforts to find help had failed. Afraid that a crying baby would wake J.T. from his nap, Judy took the baby to Laverne’s house thirty yards away. J.T. had not allowed Judy to eat for three days and she had a splitting headache. She asked her mother for something for the headache; Laverne said that there were pain pills in her purse in the next room. Judy opened the purse, saw the gun, took it, walked across the road, and shot J.T. while he 2 slept. * Professor and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, University of Miami School of Law. Portions of this Article were presented at faculty workshops at Fordham University School of Law and the University of Miami School of Law, and I am grateful to participants for their comments. Donna Coker and Ken Casebeer provided many rounds of insights and priceless suggestions. I am deeply grateful to Mary Ann Dutton, Mary Ann Franks, Madeleine Plasencia, and Stephanie Wildman for extended comments and discussion, to Richard McAdams for suggesting that the Judy Norman case merited an article of its own, to Holly Maguigan and Jessica Siegel for thoughtful comments and questions as the project got underway, and to Robert Wolf for his thoughts, his time, and the transcript. Elizabeth McIntosh, Nicole McLemore, Patrick McGee, Summer Galitz, and Mackenzie Garrity provided superb assistance with research. Thanks also to Robin Schard and the reference librarians at University of Miami School of Law. These generous helpers are not responsible for any mistakes that remain; all errors are my own. 1 Transcript of Record at 17, State v. Norman, No. 85-CRS-3890 (N.C. Super. Ct., Rutherford County 1987) [hereinafter Transcript] (presenting testimony of Deputy Sheriff R.H. Epley that located the Norman residence a mile or two outside of Spindale city limits); id. at 48 (presenting testimony of Mark Navarra about trafficking Judy at the “truck stop”); id. at 128 (presenting testimony of Judy Norman referring to a “truck stop” and clarifying that it was a “rest area” on I-85 near Kings Mountain, North Carolina.). Judicial opinions used both terms. See State v. Norman (Norman II), 378 S.E.2d 8, 1011 (N.C. 1989) (majority opinion) (using the term “rest area”); id. at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting) (using the term “rest[ ]stop”); State v. Norman (Norman I), 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (using the terms “truck stop” and “rest stop”). 2 For a description of the history of the marriage, see infra Part I.A. 676 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:3 At Judy’s murder trial in 1987, a detailed record of violence, degradation and threats emerged from thorough, intelligent work by her attorneys, Robert Wolf and Robert Harris; the court-appointed forensic psychologist, Dr. William Tyson; and the trial judge, John Gardner.3 Although Judge Gardner denied Judy’s request for a jury instruction on self-defense, he had appointed Dr. Tyson, admitted all evidence relevant to evaluating both provocation and self-defense, and given the issue serious consideration until the end of the trial.4 The jury convicted Judy of manslaughter.5 In 1988, an appellate court ordered a new trial, holding that a jury could find J.T.’s sleep to be only “a momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror” that might show imminent threat of death or great bodily harm.6 In 1989, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that Judy had “ample time” to find other ways to protect herself; they saw no evidence that could give rise to either actual or reasonable belief that she faced imminent threat or needed to use deadly force.7 Justice Harry Martin dissented, emphasizing not only Judy’s fear but her inability to escape, the failure of her efforts to get help, and the fears and perceptions of threat among the people closest to her.8 The sharp contrast between the violence and danger facing Judy Norman and the denial of a self-defense