•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Congressional ResponsestoMilitaryInterventionsinKosovoandLibya The ElectoralConnectionandtheWarofFuture: Senior ThesisinPoliticalScience Hannah M.Solomon-Strauss Haverford College Haverford, PA 20 April2012 Acknowledgements patience andgoodhumor. process. Iknowdidn'tmakeiteasy,butenjoyedeverystepoftheway.Thankyouforyour who helpedmealongtheway. this thesisofftheground,encouragingmetofocusmyquestioninparticularwaysandoffering everything thathelpedmegethereinthefirstplace. encouraging meinmyfirstpoliticalscienceclasseverandputtingontherighttrackfor insights andresourcesthroughouttheprocess.IoweProfessorMendelsohninparticularfor- next fouryears. still readmypapers.Thankyouforyourhelp,notjustonthisparticularproject,but process. Ienjoyedourconversationsaboutpapersoverlunchandyourhelprehearsing arguments. Itisnotanoverstatementtosaythatanyonewholistenedmeduringthisprocess studies atHaverford,andIowemuchtomyprofessors andclassmates.Itwasatrueprivilegeto helped pushmeonmyway.Iappreciateallofyour support. rigor, experiencedintrue, funHaverfordfashion,issomethingIwillmiss. without allthesupportIgotfrommycommunity. Thisthesisreallyistheculminationofallmy work withallofyouforfouryears.Therewasnever adullmoment.Thelevelofseriousnessand This thesiswasverymuchaproductnotjustofmyownwork,butalsoallthose I wanttothankmyadviser,ProfessorZacharyOberfield,forhelpingmethroughthis Professor BarakMendelsohnandPhilipStreichwereinstrumentalingetting I wanttothankmyparentsfortheircontinuedsupportandguidance.I'msoluckyyou I oweallmyfriendsfortheiroutstandingpatienceindealingwithmethroughthis Thank youallforeverything. And finally,attheriskofsoundingtrite,Ihonestly couldnothavecompletedthisthesis

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • IP I. Introduction

• II. Literature Review 9 • A. The Electoral Connection 9 Application: Rally-Round-the-Flag 12 • Application: Election Cycles 18 B. Alternatives to Mayhew 19 • Application: Ideology and Partisanship 22 • C. Synthesis 28 • 1. Kingdon 29 • 2. Burgin 33 • III. The Cases 39 • A. Kosovo: Operation Allied Force 39 • B. Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn 44 • C. Congressional Responses 47 • • IV. Explaining Senate Action 50 • A. The Question 50 • B. Research Design 51 • The Most-Similar Design 52 • Measuring The Independent Variables 55 • The Dependent Variable: Senate Actions and Senator Positions 58 • C. The Rules of the Game: What Drives Senate Action? 62

• V. Conclusion 83 • • Appendix 89 • Appendix A: Senators, Positions, Involvement 89 • Appendix B: Newspapers 92 • Appendix C: Electoral College Maps 96

• Bibliography 97 • • 41111 • • • • •• •• I. Introduction The military don't start wars. Politicians start wars. ••• --William Westmoreland

There is no instance of a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare. --Sun Tzu ••• War is hell. --William Sherman Tecumseh • ••• An old dictator in a far off land kills thousands, or tens of thousands, of his own people in a desperate attempt to cling to power. This country is small, measured by population, size, importance on the international stage, or all of the above. The violence splits the country not just •••• along political lines but also along ethnic and cultural lines. The United Nations has declared the events to constitute a war crime and has taken steps toward authorizing, or demanding, international intervention. This country perhaps has some natural resources, but the American •••• foreign policy elite does not necessarily consider it an essential ally or an important domino in regional politics. After much public hemming and hawing, the President invokes some ••• combination of the War Powers Resolution and UN approval and decides to deploy troops to • contribute to the international effort. In cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ••• (NATO), he primarily uses air strikes and a no-fly zone; through these actions he mostly, or entirely, avoids putting boots on the ground. Congress is displeased: ranking members of the ••• opposition party appear on news shows and suggest that the President is subverting the Constitutional order by deploying troops without the express consent of Congress. The ••• opposition party holds hearings and threatens to cut off funding for the war. After some time, the dictator is deposed and the President claims victory. In 1999, the President was Bill Clinton, who intervened in the genocide in Kosovo and •••• was opposed by the Republican-led 106th Congress. But 1999 was not the only time this scenario • •• •• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• came tolife:In2011,BarackObamawasthePresident;heintervenedinLibyaandopposed by the112thCongress,featuringaRepublicanHouseandclosely-dividedSenate.Obamamay see thisscenarioplayoutagain,asinterventioninSyriabecomesaseriouspossibility. ethnically diversesuperstatesbegantodissolve,sometimesviolently,asinthecaseofformer Yugoslavia. AndwithoutarivalpowertocontesttheUnitedStates,long-standingbipolar hegemony (Krauthammer1990).TheU.S.hasbeenwagingthese"limitedwars"foryears-- nature oftheinternationalsystemdeteriorated,infavorof,assomehaveargued,American collapse oftheSovietUnion,anewrationalecameintoplay,butpracticedidnotchange. previously, theywere"justifiedasaresponsetoSovietaggression"(Samples2011,3).Afterthe end oftheColdWar.TheU.S.wasparticularlystrongcomparedtorestworldwhen Yugoslavia dissolvedintogenocideandNATOquicklyimplementedaUN-mandatedno-fly challenging theUnitedStates.Shortlyaftermillennium,Statesbecameinvolved zone; RussiahadnotyetemergedfromthewreckageofSovietUnionandwas in warsAfghanistanandIraqresponsetotheSeptember11attacks.Notyetover,war American publichasbecomeincreasinglywar-weary, especiallywhenthosewarsinvolvelarge Afghanistan isthelongestwarinAmericanhistory;Iraqlastedeightyears.The the UnitedStatesshouldnotbeAfghanistananymore (BumillerandKopicki2012).The troop deploymentstohostileterritory.Morethantwo-thirds ofAmericansnowsaytheybelieve American publicwasessentiallyindifferenttoObama's interventioninLibya(PewResearch Center 2011).Butthiswearinessdoesnotnecessarily extendtoallconflicts.Fifty-threepercent This maybethenewfaceofAmericanwarfare.AftercollapseSovietUnion, The practicedidnotchangeinpartbecauseofthebalancepowerimmediatelyafter 2 • • of Americans say they would support military action against Iran if evidence were found of a • nuclear weapons program (Mason 2012). The international system, over the course of twenty years, went from a bipolar rivalry •s between the United States and the USSR, to U.S. hegemony; the system saw the return of Russia • and the rise of China, which may, one day, threaten U.S. dominance. Since the collapse of the • Soviet Union, regional powers have become increasingly important and, especially in the • aftermath of September 11, the international focus on saving state capacity and preventing failed • states was redoubled. With this context in the international system, the United States became • involved in Kosovo and in Libya; this may be how the United States comes to be involved in • Syria. This may be the war of the future. • The international context and domestic politics have both contributed to the war of the • future. The sometimes pro-war American public that is nonetheless wary of large-scale troop • deployments makes air strikes and no-fly zones an attractive option for politicians to consider. • The international context in which the United States, as hegemon, can almost (but not entirely) • be involved in other states' affairs as it sees fit allows the President a broad range of possible • actions. Especially if wars continue to be framed as humanitarian interventions, there may • always be both international and domestic support for the United States' actions. • The increased use of drones is just another part of this war of the future. A CIA-operated • program, the use of drones (also known as unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs) in combat • operations need only be reported to the Congressional Select Committees on Intelligence; these • programs are not subject to scrutiny by the public (Mahanta 2011). The Obama administration • has dramatically increased the number of drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, even though there • •I 3 •I • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• (Miller 2012). is nodiscussionofwhethertheUnitedStatestechnically"atwar"witheitherthesestates international context,andwithaparticularkindofjustification.Itiswagedairstrikes,no- U.S. population.Thewarofthefutureislikelyfoughtagainstacountrythatdoesnotposean as warshavehistoricallybecause,givenhowthewarisbeingwaged,ithaslittleeffecton existential threattotheU.S.andthatprobably(althoughnotcertainly)doesdirectlythreaten fly zone,orperhapsjustwithdrones.Thewardoesnotgarnerasmuchattentionfromthepublic U.S. territoryorcitizens. interests inregionsacrosstheworld,andtoactonthoseinterests,thanitisbeattackedor "existential" warfareremainspossible,limitedinterventionslikethoseinKosovoandLibya become greaterinternationalpowers,RussiaandChinaamongthem,haveavestedinterestinthe have torespondsuchthreatsitsownsecurity.Globalizationistighteningbondsbetween states insuchawaythatstateinstabilityissignificantthreattoothers.Thusmay United Statesremainingstrongandpowerful;stateshaveaninterestinthehelping them defendagainstroguestatesandnon-stateactors.Forthesereasons,whilesomeformof seem farmorelikely. and Holt1980)becausebothCongressthePresident havebeenvestedwithsomewar President andCongress.TheU.S.Constitutionhas beencalledan"invitationtostruggle"(Crabb because theU.S.isnotfighting foritssurvival,itispossibletomakeadistinctionbetween warsthatrespondto,or 1 wars ofnecessityandchoice,respectively.TheAfghanistan warafter9/11isgenerallyconsideredaof avert, significantviolencedirected atU.S.territoryorcitizens,ontheonehand,and, ontheother,conflictsin necessity; theKosovoandLibya operationswerewarsofchoice.Evenif"existential"isnot alwaysliterallythecase which theU.S.,withoutbeing directlyprovoked,involvesitself. Thecategoriesof"existential"warsand"non-existential" aresomewhatimprecise,asthecategoriesof The warofthefutureis,then,awagedinparticularway, The warofthefuturealsoseemlikelytoraisedifficult domesticissuesbetweenthe 1 ThatisbecausetheUnitedStatesfarmorelikelytohave 4 • • powers: the President is designated Commander-in-Chief, but Congress is given the power to • declare war and the power of the purse. Thus the back-and-forth of the two branches can • represent a tactical game as the Executive aims to preserve his power to command wars while the • Legislature struggles to preserve its role in the process. i The war-making process is also complicated by an increasingly unclear definition of • "war". Though the United States has used force abroad over three hundred times since its • creation, it has declared war only five times (Hendrickson 2002, 1). The extent to which • Congress has attempted to play a role in these decisions--as opposed to deferring to Presidential action--has varied over time, as has the degree to which Congress has been successful in limiting • the President's powers (Fisher 2004; Hastedt 2011, 169-171). In 1973, Congress passed the War • Powers Resolution (WPR) over President Nixon's veto, in direct response to what it saw as • massive Presidential overreach during the war. With the exception of Carter, every President • since Nixon has declared the WPR to be unconstitutional and an infringement on his prerogative • as Commander in Chief (Damrosch 2000; Lindsay 1994, 149). • "The WPR requires to the President to do the following: • 1. 'In every possible instance,' consult with Congress before committing U.S. • troops in 'hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in • hostilities' is likely 2. Inform Congress within 48 hours after the introduction of troops if there has • been no declaration of war. S 3. Remove U.S. troops within 60 days (or 90 days in special circumstances) if • Congress does not either declare war or adopt a concurrent resolution approving the action" (Hastedt 2011, 150). • There is a vast amount of literature on what contributes to Presidential action. Though the • Constitution requires Congressional approval for war, this has not, of course, always stopped • Presidents from acting unilaterally. In particular, Mayer and Price (2002) find that "new •S Presidents recapturing the White House" and Presidents "who lack strong popular support" resort S S 5 • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• amid partisancontinuity"andpopularPresidents(380).Thereisalsoamorespecificliterature that seekstoidentifyspecificfactorsinfluenceaPresident'sdecisiongowar.Some to ExecutiveOrders,andotherunilateralpowers,morefrequentlythandoPresidents"operating have arguedthatthestrengthofdomesticeconomyiscrucial(see,forexample,Fordham example, HowellandPevehouse2007).And,ofcourse,thethreatposedbyforeignstatecan affect thisdecision. 1998). OthershavearguedthedecisiondependsonwhichpartycontrolsCongress(see,for examine Congressional--specifically,Senatorial--responsestotheinterventionsinKosovoand Libya, preciselybecause,asIhaveargued,thoseinterventionsseemlikelytobethetemplatefor President hasdecidedtogowar.HowdoesCongressrespond,andwhy?Inparticular,Iwill of Congresstosupport,oroppose,thePresident'sdecisionsundertakesuchinterventions? which hearguedthatmembersofCongress,firstandforemost,areconcernedaboutreelection future militaryactionsbytheUnitedStates.Canweidentifyfactorsthatwillcausemembers and thatthisexplainstheirbehavior.ButitisnotclearMayhew'sthesisappliestoforeign on thedomesticeconomyandsociety.Whatrolewill theelectoralconnection--theconcernthat salient forvotersthandomesticpolicy(Almond1950 wasoneofthefirsttomakethisargument; for areviewoftheliterature,seeLindsayandRipley 1992).WarsofthetypewagedinKosovo policy decisions.Thisisbecausescholarshaveshownrepeatedlythatforeignless and Libyamaybelesssalientthanotherkindsofmilitary actionsbecauseoftheirlimitedimpact those inKosovoandLibya? members ofCongresshavefortheirownreelection--play intheirresponsetointerventionslike I willexaminenotthePresident'sdecisionbutinsteadanalyzewhathappens In 1974,DavidMayhewwroteTheElectoralConnection(whichherevisedin2005), 6 after the •• •• That will be the focus of this thesis. Does the electoral connection hold for the war of the future?

In an effort to answer this question, this thesis will proceed as follows. First, I will offer a ••••• review of the literature, in which I will review and criticize Mayhew's argument. I will also • explain and critically examine the so-called "rally-`round-the-flag effect," which is, in a sense, a specific application of Mayhew's argument to foreign policy questions. I will then consider an alternative model--that members of Congress act in an effort to create good public policy, even if •••• such an action is damaging to their electoral prospects. And I will discuss what are, in effect, •• attempts by John Kingdon and Eileen Burgin to synthesize the two competing accounts. •• Second, I will offer a brief history of the two cases, the U.S. military operations in

Kosovo and Libya. I will try to show the ways in which, given the international context, these

two foreign policy issues presented similar questions for U.S. foreign policy. ••••

Next, in the research design, I will describe how I propose to examine Congressional

responses to the Presidential decisions to intervene in those two cases. I will examine, in ••• particular, United States Senators. Thirty-nine Senators who were in office at the time of the war •• action in Kosovo were still in office when President Obama intervened in Libya, and they will be the focus of this study. I will attempt to explain the positions that these Senators took on both ••• Kosovo and Libya and how active they were in advancing these positions. While there were, of •• course, differences between Kosovo and Libya--no two international situations will ever be

exactly the same, especially when they are separated by a number of years--the issues that ••

Kosovo and Libya presented for U.S. policy were remarkably similar. This similarity enables me •• to conduct a kind of natural experiment: given those strong similarities, how can we explain the •••

7 ••• •• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• actions ofSenatorswhobehaveddifferentlyinthetwocases--eitherbytakingopposingpositions or, perhaps,byparticipatingmuchmoreactivelyononeissuethantheother? although mustberefinedinthecontextofthiskindmilitaryaction,doesholdforwar future. Congressional decisionsevenonthiscrucialcategoryofforeignpolicyvotes.Ireach conclusion byanalyzingtheactionsthatthesethirty-nineSenatorstookinresponseto Senators, boththosewhomaintainedthesamepositionandchangedtheirpositions. Kosovo andLibyainterventions.Iproposeaseriesofrulesthataccountforthebehaviorthese The naturalexperimentdoesnotallowmetoreachdefiniteconclusionsaboutwhatinfluenced that theirbehaviorwasconsistentwiththeelectoralconnectionthesis.Butactionsof the behaviorofSenatorswhoactedinsimilarwaysonKosovoandLibya.Icansay,though, electoral connectiontheory--althoughthattheorymustbemodifiedtotakeintoaccountthefact Senators whochangedtheirbehaviorbetweenKosovoandLibyaprovidestrongsupportforthe that membersofCongressrespondtomorethanoneconstituency. on predictingCongressionalresponsestowarsnotyetwaged,perhapsincludinganimminent venture inSyria. That is,Americanpoliticsdoesnot"stopatthewater'sedge":electoralcalculationsaffect I willarguethat, The conclusionwillsummarizemyfindingsandofferalookintothefuture,withaneye judging fromthebehaviorofSenators,electoralconnectiontheory, 8 II. LiteratureReview A. TheElectoralConnection to votethewaytheydo,and,morebroadly,takeactionstake?Theanswersthese questions overlap,buttheycanusefullybeplacedinafewbroadgroups. This factcan,accordingtoMayhew,explainmuchofthebehaviormembersCongress Connection isthat,firstandforemost,membersofCongressareconcernedwithbeingreelected. (MCs). Hemakesthisargumentonafewdifferentpiecesofevidence. or twobeforeretiringvoluntarily."ItseemsfairtocharacterizethemodernCongressasan continual reelection"(Mayhew2005,15).ButsimplybecauseMCsseekreelectiondoesnot assembly ofprofessionalpoliticiansspinningoutpoliticalcareers.Thejobsoffergoodpayand make thistheirprimarygoal.AsMayhewnotes,"Ofcoursetheansweristhatacomplete high prestige.Thereisnowantofapplicantsforthem.Successfulpursuitacareerrequires do thingsthatmaketheirownelectoralsurvivaldifficult orimpossible"(15).Butultimately, explanation (ifonewerepossible)ofacongressman'soranyoneelse'sbehaviorwouldrequire attention tomorethanjustonegoal.Thereareevenoccasionalcongressmenwhointentionally Mayhew concludes,reelection"hastobethe in thatsense,primary--goal,Mayhewthenaskswhether MCsareinapositiontodoanything about theirchancesforreelection. Otherwise,thatitistheirfirstconcernwould havenobearing achieved overandifotherendsaretobeentertained" (16). There isavastliteratureonCongressionalbehavior.WhatcausesmembersofCongress To beginwith,DavidMayhew'snowfamousclaiminCongress:TheElectoral First, heargues,Congressmenclearlyseekreelection;itisnotajobMCsserveforterm Having determinedthatMCsseekreelection,and thatthisistheirproximate--and,atleast proximate 9 goal ofeveryone,thethatmustbe

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• on behavior.Heconcludesthat,yes,itappearsthatMCshavean"abilitytoaffectthe percentages intheirownprimaryandgeneralelections"(33).Moreimportantly,MCs"thinkthat they canaffecttheirownpercentages...andfurthermorethereisreasonforthemtotrydo so" (33). many MCsarereelectedyearafterwithhighpercentagesofthevote,theydonot, continually declining(33),atleastthetimehewrote.Perhapsmoreimportant,pointsouta realistically, havetofearlosinganelection.TheseMCswouldnotengageinreelection- maximizing behavior.Mayhewshowsthatthepercentageoftheseso-called"safeseats"was in officeandtheirneedtobereelected"(37).Because,afterall,itisnot"CongressmanSmith" legislators willlosetheirseats"but,instead"whetherthereisaconnectionbetweenwhattheydo flaw inthisargument.Whendiscussingsafeseats,thequestionisnot"howprobableitthat continues todothethingsheisdoing"(37).Thuspointaboutsafeseatsmostlyirrelevant; who ishimselfunbeatable;"ratherwemean,CongressmanSmithunbeatableaslonghe them inoffice. members areinsafeseatsbecauseofhowtheybehaveandthiscontinuedbehaviorwillkeep out that"theaveragevoterhasonlythehaziestawareness ofwhatanincumbentcongressmanis actually doinginoffice.Butanincumbenthastobe concernedaboutactorswhodoform own votes"(40).Itispossible,then,thattheMCwho islookingtobereelectedneedonly concerned withaverysmall sliverofthepopulationbecauseelectorate ismostlyuninformed. impressions abouthim,andespeciallyactors whocanmarshalresourcesotherthantheir Mayhew alsorespondstothe"safeseatargument."Thisisargumentthatbecauseso Mayhew harborsnoillusionsabouttheelectorate.Asotherscholarshavedone,hepoints 10 The MCmustonlybeconcernedaboutthosewhoareawareofheractions,care of theMayhewtheory.Ashimselfacknowledges,"'relevantpoliticalactor'neednotbe enough tomobilize,andthosewhoarecapableofmobilizingagreatdealresources. congressional campaignyears"(39).Thus,whileaMCmaychangeherbehaviorinorderto a constituent;oneofthemostimportantresources,money,flowsallovercountryin appeal toaparticularconstituencyandthusincreasethechancesofreelection,itisnotalways her particulargeographicconstituencytowhichsheisappealing.The2012electioncycle demonstrating thisexactphenomenon:ElizabethWarren,runningforSenateinMassachusetts,is receiving asignificantproportionofhercampaigncontributionsfromCaliforniaandHollywood donors (Goodnough2012).Especiallyinthe constituency toexplainbehaviorwouldbeignorethepervasiveinfluenceofmoneyinpolitics. constituency seemstomatterlessandless.TofocuspurelyonaSenator'sgeographic It seemsanespeciallyrelevantpointonforeignpolicyvoteswhich,thoughlesssalienttothe average voter,arehighlysalienttoparticulargroupsofvoters."Forexample,Rep.HelenDelich than $80,000incampaigncontributionsfromSerbianAmericans"(Lindsay1994,41). Bentley's (R-Md.)effortsonbehalfofSerbiafollowingthecollapseYugoslaviawonhermore Richard Fenno(1978)arguesthattherearefourconcentric circlesofconstituencies.In constituency (thosewho will workfortheMC);and increasing orderoftightness(orclosenesstotheMC), theseare:the possible voters);the friends, advisers).Thustwo MCscouldservethesamegeographicarea--as Senatorsdo--andstill This lastpointillustratestheratherfluidnatureofaconstituencyandsuggestscritique Even Mayhew'sconceptionofthegeographicconstituency canberefinedfurther. reelection constituency (thoselikelytovotefortheMC); post-Citizens United 11 personal constituency (family,close campaign, aMC'sgeographic geographic constituency (all primary

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • technically respond to electoral incentives from different constituencies. Fenno's addition to • • Mayhew's argument helps explain, in part, why the voting behavior of pairs of Senators can vary

• greatly.

• Thus, the Mayhew hypothesis is that MCs act in ways to maximize the chances of

• reelection. •

Application: Rally-Round-the-Flag

• The rally-`round-the-flag effect (RATF) can be seen as an application of the electoral • • connection thesis to foreign policy decisions. The rally-`round-the-flag thesis is the work of a

• public opinion-based school of thought that argues that, in times of crisis, the public--and, as a

result, the Congress--"rallies" to the side of the President. The "rally" comes in the form of an

4110 approval rating bump among the public and increased legislative success in Congress. John • Mueller (1970) is credited as the first to specifically define the RATF effect, saying that "certain • • intense international events generate a 'rally round the flag' effect which tends to give a boost to • the President's popularity rating" (21). Muller quotes several other scholars who have noticed 411/ 4110 this effect, too: "Kenneth Waltz has observed, 'In the face of such an event, the people rally • • behind their chief executive. Torn Wicker: 'Simply being President through a great crisis or big

• event...draws American together in his support.' ... Nelson Polsby observes, 'Invariably, the

• popular response to a President during international crisis is favorable, regardless of the wisdom

• of the policies he pursues' (21). • • Mueller then defines the "rally event" that sparks this bump in the President's approval

ratings. "In general, a rally point must be associated with an event which 1) is international and I 2) involves the United States and particularly the President directly; and it must be 3) specific, •• dramatic, and sharply focused" (21). Finally, Mueller argues that there are good and bad rally • 12 • points. Goodrallypointsareeventswherethe"lastingeffectonopinionwaslikelytobe favorable tothePresident"andbadpointsareeventswhere"theinitialsurgecouldbe "malleable" publicopinionintimesofcrisis.PublicthencomestothePresident's good rallypointandtheBayofPigscrisisasabadone. expected toberathertransitory"(22).MuellergivestheexampleofCubanMissileCrisisasa aimed toexplorewhypublicopinion"rallied"thePresident'ssideintimesofcrisis.He such specificmoments,measurablemassopinionappearstohavealteredshow(1)great concludes that"inmomentsofinternationalcrisis,massopinionismalleableinmanyways.In unrelated tothecrises"(794).ThusBowenconcludesthatrallyeffecthappensbecauseof support fordecisivemilitaryactions,(2)heightenedpresidentialpolicypositions specific, anditattributestherallyeffect,atleastinsomecircumstances,torationalbehavioron support, notjustonissuesrelatedtothecrisis,butotherissues,too. Thus oneexplanationfortherallyeffect,hesays,isthat"thepublictendstosupporta the partofmemberspublicwhoaremakingdecisionsonbasislimitedinformation. image ofthePresidentinAmericanpolitics,"default reactionistosupportthepresident information forevaluatingthesituation"(253).And becausethereisa"generallyfavorableof symbolizing nationalunity andpower"(253).ThisechoesMueller'sinitial observation.Lee Presidential action(orinactionattimes)regardlessofitscontent,whenthereisnotenough (253). However,thePresident's"increasedpopularity duetoswellingofattentionislikely becomes thefocusofnational attentionintimesofcrisisorothermajorinternational events, vanish whenthelevelofattentionsubsides"(253). Anotherpossibilityisthat"thePresident The subsequentRATFliteratureexpandsuponMueller'sarguments.Bowen(1989) Lee (1977)alsoaimstoexplorewhytheapprovalbumpoccurs.Hisexplanationismore 13

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• argues that"thePresidentislikelytoappearbeathisbestintheaverageman'seyewhenhe dealing withinternationalaffairs,andthisexplainstherathersuddenincreaseofapproval"(253). explaining whyrallyeffectsoccurinthefirstplace,andthatBowenisthey might continueforaperiodoftime.HetheringtonandNelsonoffertheirowndefinitionthe substantial increaseinpublicapprovalofthepresidentthatoccursresponsetocertainkinds dramatic internationaleventsinvolvingtheUnitedStates"(37).ThenHetheringtonandNelson rally effect,whichisnotverydifferentfromMueller's:"Aeventthesuddenand patriotism. argue thattherearetwomechanismsbywhichtherallyeffectworks.First,becauseof Lee's argument;hehadarguedthat"theaverageman'sreactionwillincludeafeelingof patriotism insupportingpresidentialaction,adesirenottohurtPresident'schanceof president astheanthropomorphicsymbolofnationalunity--akindlivingflag"(37).Thiswas because opinionismalleable,whymustthatnecessarilyresultinsupportingthePresident?And success" (Lee1977,253). "opposition opinionleaders...refrainfromcomment [onthepresident'sconduct]ormake how longisthischaracteristiclikelytolast?Theopinionleadershiptheoryarguesthatwhen opinion leadersareunwillingtocriticizethePresident, journalistshavenothingtoreport--and citizens havenothingtolearn--thatisnotsupportive ofthePresident.Brody(1991)hasalsodone research onthisquestion;hearguedthatthePresident benefitsfromrallyeventsonlywhen cautiously supportivestatements"(quotedinHetherington andNelson37-8).Whenthereis nothing butpositivepress forthePresident,Brodysays,"thepublicwillbe giventheimpliedor Hetherington andNelson(2003)drawfrombothBowenLee,arguingthatLeeis The secondmechanismis "This schoolholdsthatintimesofinternationalcrisisAmericansrallytothe opinion leadership. 14 This relatestoBowen'sargument.Simply explicit message,'appearancestothecontrarynotwithstanding,presidentisdoinghisjob point ofviewintosupportingthePresident. persuasive thanthepatriotismschoolinaccountingfor well' (66).Thus,asBowenwouldsay,publicopinionhasbeenmoldedbythelackofanother Patriotism explainswelltheoriginofrallyeventsbecauseplacePresidentoccupiesin chief ofstate,thepresidentisequivalentBritishmonarch:ceremonialleader way towardexplainingthe lodges thenormallyseparaterolesofchiefgovernmentandstateinoneoffice...As American politics."Theexplanationliesintheconstitutionaldesignofpresidency,which president canbeseenasananthropomorphicrepresentationoftheflag,imagethatpeople nation andthelivingsymbolofnationalunity"(38).AsLeeargued,intimescrisis, sober-minded publicevaluationsofthepresident'sperformanceaschiefgovernment...As wish tosupport,apparentlyoutofpatriotism. leaders tocriticizethepresident'sconduct"(HetheringtonandNelson2003,39).Asnews Brody suggests,theseevaluationsareshapedinlargepartbythewillingnessofopposition opinion ismalleable,andsolongasitbeingpushed intowardthePresident(eitherdirectlyor de factobecausethereisnothingelsetoreport),the rallyeffectwillpersist.Infact,the media begintocoversomeofthisopposition,the rally effectfades.ThisisBowen'sargument: effect canspreadtoissuesbeyondtheparticularquestion ofthecrisis;thisispatriotism argument. Butonceopinion leadersresumetheircriticismofthePresident, therallyeffectwill tend tofade. Hetherington andNelsonarguethatwhilethe"opinionleadershipschoolseemsless But thispatrioticinclinationdoesnotlastforever;"thepassageoftimebringsmore duration of ralliesoncetheyoccur"(38,emphasisintheoriginal). 15 origins of rallyevents,itgoesalong

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • • • Thus the rally-`round-the-flag school of thought argues that, in times of crisis, the public • will rally to the President's side, boosting his approval ratings. But how does this affect • • Congressional behavior? If the public is more likely to support the President after rally events, • • does this mean that Congress will follow suit? Zeidenstein (1980) makes this link, arguing that •411 the more popular the President is, the more support he will have in Congress (221). "Over the • long run annual average popularity and annual support scores...should tend to rise and fall • together" (225). Zeidenstein goes one step farther, arguing that, apart from Eisenhower, • • "Presidents' support rises and falls with their popularity, and it makes relatively little difference • which party controls Congress" (227). • • Thus, the rally-`round-the-flag school of thought applies the electoral connection to • • questions of foreign policy: in times of crisis, Congress will be more supportive of the President's

• agenda because MCs are sensitive to shifts in public opinion, and public opinion will rally to the • President when there is an international crisis.

• The RATF theory can be complicated to apply to wars like Kosovo and Libya. There are • two further questions to consider when trying to discover whether a President has benefited from • • a rally effect. The first is the question of sequence. At the first rally point, the public may eagerly • and easily rally to the side of the President. Perhaps this will occur for a second rally point, too, • • but as time wears on, if crises continue to occur, it is not clear that the public will continue to • rally. There are two sides to the question of sequence and the literature does not always make the • • distinction. The first is whether the public is weary of being called to rally by a particular • • president, and so the effect begins to wear off; the second is whether the public is simply war •411 weary and no longer has the same patriotic responses to threats and the beginnings of wars, regardless of which President they are being called to support. There is evidence that, by the end • •

16 •• • • of his Presidency, George W. Bush's no longer enjoyed a rally effect though the nation was still • at war. After all the casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, the public no longer rallied to his side the • way it once had (Eichenberg, Stoll, and Lebo 2006). • The second question is the issue of wars of necessity versus wars of choice. In • international relations, scholars speak about states feeling an "existential security threat" from • another state and so being driven to war (Lieberfield 2005, 5). The rally literature seems to speak • directly to situations like this: when feeling threatened from an outside source, the people rally to • the side of the president. Certainly Pearl Harbor was such a case. The Cuban Missile Crisis was • also considered an existential crisis. In fact, it could be argued that this fear of a threat outside • our borders shaped many Congressional responses to the President during the Cold War • (Krauthammer 1990; Samples 2011, 3). This is the second condition of the RATF definition; • crises must involve the United States directly. • But after the Cold War ended, the United States was left as the only hegemon. "With the • disappearance of the Soviet threat the rationale for many foreign policy programs • evaporated" (Lindsay 1994, 1-2). Without the policy of containment occupying "the lodestar of • U.S. foreign policy" (Lindsay 1994, 1), Presidents were given much more freedom in foreign • affairs. One consequence was that Presidents were more likely to engage in "wars of choice"-- • that is, wars that were waged for reasons besides feeling an existential security threat from the •• other state. Such reasons could include morality (in the form of humanitarian intervention) or to • ensure continued access to a particular resource (such as oil). Whether, and how, Presidents still • enjoy a rally effect as a result of a war of choice is yet to be settled by the literature. One way • scholars have attempted to reconcile this difficulty is by simplifying the rally theory. • Fundamentally, the theory argues that the President's popularity--which increases because of the • 17 • • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• reluctant tovoteagainstapopularpresident,oronewhoisconsideredaneffectiveleader,evenif war--makes himhardtooppose.BoylanandKedrowski(2004)arguethat"membersmaybe feels underattackorthreatened,whenaPresidentstartswar,hisapprovalratingssoar;this they disagreewithhispolicies"(541).Inthisversion,evenifthenationisnotrallyingbecauseit as aneffectiveleader.Thisisonewayinwhichtherallytheorycanbeadaptedtoexplain Presidential popularityinnon-existentialcrises. happens becausethecountryisguided,perhapsbymediaandopinionleadership,toseehim election, andweakeratothertimes.Specifically,hearguesthatintheyearofactualelection-- argues thatthecyclesofelectionsinUnitedStatescanaffectforeignpolicy.Inthisway,he the fourthyearinanelectioncycle--politicallyexpedientpolicy-makingincreasestremendously (375). Becausemembersneedtobeseenupholdingcampaignpromises,theseactions continue throughthefirstyearofgovernanceButinyearsbetweenelections,attentionto modifies theMayhewthesistoarguethatelectoralconnectionisstrongerinproximityan calculus, logicallySenatorswhoareretiringcanfeel freetomakedecisionsbasedonother politics ofdecisionscanfade.Nincicalsoarguesthatsecond-termPresidentsarelesslikelyto factors--some ofwhichwillbediscussedshortly--and notonthebasisofpolitics. make decisionsbasedonpolitics,giventhattheyhave nomoreelectionstowin.Bythissame has argued,foreignpolicy doesnotmakegoodpoliticsin"breadandbutter" districtsand be partiallyexplainedbyunderstandingwhenthat Senatorisupforreelection.AsFenno(1974) members mayfindithard torunontheirachievementsinforeignpolicy(12). Anelectionyear Another applicationoftheMayhewthesisisofferedbyMiroslavNincic(1990). Nincic's argumentshavetwoimplications.First,the motivationforaSenator'svotecan Application: ElectionCycles 18 may makemembersactinamoreMayhewianmanner,leavinggoodpolicymakingfortheyears between elections.Second,Nincic'sargumentssuggestthatSenatorswhoareretiringmore likely tovotetheirconscienceandlessinapoliticalfashion.Thiscanbeusedas control voteofsorts,indicatingaSenator'strueopinion,andcanbecomparedtoothervotesthat B. AlternativestoMayhew were perhapscastunderelectoralpressures. behavior. AlmostanyscholarwillconcedethatmembersofCongressmustbeconcerned,atleast to somedegree,withtheirreelectionprospects.ThiswasMayhew'sargumentaboutproximate goals. ButasevenMayhewrecognized,memberssometimesvoteinwaysthatareopposition to theviewsoftheirconstituents--behaviorthat,logically,shouldnotmaximizechances reelection. Thequestionthenishowtoexplainthis"anti-Mayhewian"behavior.Oneprincipal account intheliteratureisthatthisbehaviorcanbeexplainedbylookingtoMC'sviewof"good public policy."Thatis,ratherthandoingwhattheirconstituencywants,MCssometimesdo they thinkisright,evenifitincreasestheriskthatwilllosetheirjob. action. FennoarguesthatRepresentativeshavethree maingoals:"re-election,influencewithin their motivationsforactionsanddividesthe interviews bycommitteeassignment.Henotes the House,andgoodpublicpolicy"(1).Heinterviews variousRepresentativestounderstand that committeemembershipisnotitselfanendfor members;rather,"eachmemberofeach committee wantshisservicetobringhim somebenefitintermsofgoalsheholdsas an individualcongressman" (1).Eachmember'sopportunitytoreachthese threemaingoals Mayhew's thesishasyettobedecisivelyoverturnedbytheliteratureonCongressional Richard Fenno(1973)isanauthorwhoarguesthatgoodpublicpolicycandriveMC 19

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • varies between committees, and members match "their individual patterns of aspiration to the 10 diverse patterns of opportunity presented by House committees" (1). If a member is not initially • • assigned to a committee that matches her own goals, she will transfer to one that is a better • • match. • By asking "why did you want to get on this committee in the first place?", Fenno

• discovers patterns that unite the motivations of members of each committee. He finds that the • Appropriations and Ways and Means committees are marked by a desire for "power, prestige, 4110 and importance" (2). He finds that members of the committees on the Interior and the Post Office • are motivated by being able to serve their constituents and thus better ensure reelection (5). He • • also finds that members of the Education and Labor, and Foreign Affairs committees are • motivated by "a strong personal interest in and a concern for the content of public policy in their • • committee's subject matter; in short, they want to help make good public policy" (9).

11 Notably, members on the Foreign Relations committee mentioned frequently that their • • interest in that committee not only did not help their electoral prospects, but were possibly • counter to those interests. "Majority opinion was expressed by one member who said:

• 'Politically, it's not a good committee for me. My constituents are interested in bread and butter,

• and there's no bread and butter on Foreign Affairs' (12). Members did not see the foreign 4111 • relations committee as furthering a career beyond the House, except perhaps for one particular 411/ career: "from 1947 to 1967, eleven members left Foreign Affairs to run for the Senate" (13). • • Fenno also discusses the ways Senators view their committee assignments. "Senate • 411/ Foreign Relations committee members emphasize the same longstanding interest in foreign • policy that motivates Foreign Affairs members...None of the eight Senators interviewed • • mentioned reelection benefits" (141). In fact, Senators generally agreed with Representatives

• 20 ••• the committee,though"noneclaimedthatthisprestigecouldbetranslatedintoanextrameasure that, politically,theForeignRelationscommitteewasnotagoodtobeon(141). of personalinfluenceintheSenate,andnoneassertedthatdesireforinsideledhim Senators didbreakwithRepresentativesandmentionthattheywereattractedbythe"prestige"of to theCommittee"(141).ThusFennoarguesthat,alongwithaproximategoalforreelection, some Senatorsdohaveagoalofmakinggoodpublicpolicy;thisisfrequentlyfoundamong time. Thereisnoindicationthatforeignpolicyhasbecomeanymorerelevantfortheaverage members oftheForeignRelationscommitteeinparticular. Foreign Relationscommitteedoesseemtomaintainitsprestigiousreputation;then-Senator Obama soughtmembershiponthecommitteeinadvanceofhisPresidentialrun,ashadmany voter andthesecommitteesoffernomorepoliticalbenefitthantheyoncedid.TheSenate of thecommitteesheexaminesbutitseemsfairtoextrapolatehisgeneralargumentthatMC committee assignmentroughlyparallelspersonalopinionandambition.Thus,thoughFenno presidential-candidates-to-be beforehim(142).Fenno'sactualargumentisabitlimitedbecause does notdiscusstheotherforeignpolicy-relatedcommittees--suchasIntelligenceorArmed Services committees,and,today,theHomelandSecuritycommittee(whichdidnotexistwhen Mayhew, Fennorecognizesthatreelectionisaconcern thatmotivatesmembers'actions.Fenno as well. Fenno waswriting)--hisargumentcanbeapplied to theSenatorswhoserveonthesecommittees reelection islikelyunrealistic. Butsomekeyquestionsremain."Goodpublic policy"isabitof takes theanalysisonestep further,arguing(asMayhewdoesnotdeny)that asingularfocuson Some ofFenno'sclaimscertainlyseemtocontinueholdtruedespitethepassage Fenno intendshisargumenttocomplement,rather thancontradict,Mayhew'sclaim.Like 21

•••••••••.ii•••••••••••••••••••••••r•••••••• • • black box. Is it possible to explain how members come to view a particular decision as good • public policy? And, perhaps more important, is it possible to say when the electoral connection • •• will dominate--so that the member will be influenced primarily by constituents' views, rather 411, than her own views of good public policy--and when the member will follow her own views of • good public policy rather than her constituents' views?

40 Application: Ideology and Partisanship • 40 One way to explain what members come to view as good public policy may be member • • ideology. While ideology is tied to the electoral connection because constituencies are more

• likely to elect MCs whose ideology they find agreeable, a member's ideology may not coincide • with her constituents' in every respect. Another possible explanation of members' "public policy" • • views is partisanship, which is related to, although distinct from, ideology. Members may vote • • against their constituents' views--and in favor of what appear to be (and what they may profess •1111 to be) their own views of the best policy--because those are the views of their party as a whole, or the party leadership. • There is a substantial literature that argues that partisanship affects the response of • Congress to Presidential war making. Mayhew (2005) notes that Democrats and Republicans • • vote differently, and Uscinski et al. (2009) have found that party affiliation determines position- • taking behavior (490). Miller and Stokes (1963), Overby (1991), and Bartels (1991) all find • • ideology to be an important influence on MC voting behavior in Congress. The argument in

• Krehbiel (2000) also does not seem to be inconsistent with this conclusion. Krehbiel argues that •• partisan voting should be attributed to different preferences--which include ideology--rather than • to "party discipline, party cohesion, party strength, or party government" (225). •• • 22 •• defense andforeignpolicycutacrosspartylines.AsliberalRepublicansconservative closely paralleltheoverallvotingdivisionsinCongress."In1940sand1950scleavageson policy haveincreasinglycoincidedwithpartylines"(LindsayandRipley1992,429;seealso Democrats havebecomemoreandscarceinCongress,cleavagesonforeigndefense Caldeira 1988).HastedtarguesthattheclearestsignCongresswillbeobstructionisttowarda Lindsay 1990,1991b;Trubowitz1986).Thisis"adevelopmentparallelinggreaterpartisanship in Congressgeneralrecentyears"(LindsayandRipley1992,429;seealsoPatterson (167). Further,partyleadersseemtoaffectvotingbehavior.Somehavefoundthatthe president's foreignpolicyisthatCongressandthepresidencyarecontrolledbydifferentparties leadership givesthepresidentmoresupportonforeignpolicyissuesthanrank-and-fileMCs 1987, 1991a;Smith1989). (Hayes etal1984),thoughothershavefoundthiseffecttobelessenedinrecentyears(Lindsay the polarizationinCongressisatunprecedentedlevels.FranklinRoosevelt'sDemocraticParty recent increaseinpolarizationCongress.NearlyanystudyofCongresstodaywillshowthat included bothNorthernandWesternliberalsconservativeSouthernsegregationists(Foner liberal thantheconservativeDemocrats(Kennedy 1999,219-20).Butbeginninginthe Civil RightsActintolaw,hefamouslysaidthat,with hissignature,hehadlosttheSouthfor 1998, 195).Similarly,theRepublicanpartyincluded progressiveswhoweresignificantlymore Democrats forageneration (Economist2010).Johnson'spredictiondidnot cometrue mid-1960s, thepartiesbecameincreasinglyhomogeneous. WhenLyndonJohnsonsignedthe immediately, buteventually SouthernwhitesmovedintotheRepublicanParty, makingthe As partisanshipincreasesgenerally,divisionsonforeignpolicyissuesseemtomore The linkbetweenthisliteratureonpartisanshipandtheideologyschoolofthoughtis 23

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 9

S Democratic Party more liberal, and fewer liberals found a home in the Republican Party • (Patterson 2005, 78-79). "Voters have sorted themselves out so that their party affiliation and

• their ideology are far more aligned now than 30 years ago: thus, most self-identified 410 conservatives are Republicans, while liberals are Democrats" (Pildes 2010, 3). While there is a

• serious question whether U.S. citizens have "sorted" themselves geographically into politically • 111 homogeneous communities--as Bishiop (2008) argues--there seems to be no dispute that the • parties have become more homogeneous ideologically. In response particularly to Bishop,

• Fiorina and Abrams (2012) argue, "political science research has shown that during the past three • decades, party sorting has occurred--liberal-minded Americans have increasingly made the

Democratic Party their home, and conservative-minded Americans have gravitated to the

411 Republican Party" (203). • 1110 Public opinion polls show the dramatic change. In the Eisenhower Administration, the • gap between support for the President from voters of his own party and support from voters of

• the other party ranged from 22-39 points (Pildes 2010, 4). By contrast, "[t]he partisan gap in

approval ratings for President Obama [after his first year in office] is larger than it has eve[r] • • been for a President at this stage;...only 18% of Republicans, but 82% of Democrats, approve of • Obama's performance--a gap of 64 points (Pildes 2010, 6). This was the culmination of a trend. • • "From the Eisenhower through Carter years, this gap in one-year approval ratings never S exceeded 34 points; since then, it has averaged 48 points... Before Reagan, no President had • • averaged more than a 40 point gap in approval ratings during his term; starting then, only the • ilk elder George Bush has averaged less than a 50 point gap" (Pildes 2010, 6). Obama's second year had an approval gap of 68 points; his second year was even more polarized than his first, already •• an historically polarized year (Jones 2011a). •

• 24 • "more elusiveforpresidents"(Sinclair2003,3)Whilepresidentshavealwayscountedontheir party formoresupportthantheoppositionparty,"solongascongressionalpartieswerequite Congress controlledbytheoppositionfacesamuchhardertask.Presidentsdoconsiderablyless other party"(Sinclair2003,3).Butasthepartiesbegantodriftawayfromeachother, ideologically, inthelate20thcentury,"suchsupporthasdwindledandapresidentconfronting ideologically heterogeneous,thepresidentcouldalsoexpectsomesupportfrommembersof divided" (Sinclair2003,3). well bothontheirownagendaandmajorlegislationgenerallywhencontrolis become increasinglyhomogeneous,ideologyandpartisanshiphavecometobe overlap betweenthesetwo,asliberalRepublicansandconservativeDemocratsoftencrossed party linestovotetheirconscience.Butaspolarizationhasincreasedandthepartieshave Partisanship isaboutthepartieswhileideologypointofview;thereusedtobean similar. Thosewhoholdsimilarviewsare,todaymorethanever,likelytobeinthesameparty. enough supportfromhisownparty,theoverlapbetween thepartieswouldensurethathe And LindsayandRipley(1992)havefoundthatideologyisastrongpredictorofhowmember between thePresidentand theCongress. have achancetogetsupportfromtheotherparty. Butwithincreasedpolarizationandideological government wouldmatterless.AsSinclairputsit, evenifthePresidentwasunabletogarner purity, itisnolongeraquestion ofsimplydividedgovernment,buttheideological distance will voteonforeignaffairs(435). The mostobviouseffectofthisincreasingpolarizationisthat"legislativesuccess" Sinclair makesthelinkbetweenpartisanshipliteratureandideologyliterature. This ismorethananissueofdividedgovernment. Withheterogeneousparties,divided 25

00.041400•00110•000011000000000.40000000004000400100 •••.••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••O.....r• foreign policyissues.Beforethepartiesbecamehomogenous,"divisionson[used to] cutacrossratherthanalongpartylines[so]therewassubstantialagreementbetweenthe president andamajorityinCongress"evenduringdividedgovernment(Lindsay1994,25).Party affiliation usedtomatterless,onforeignpolicyvotes,thanideology(BoylanandKedrowski 2004, 541).TheVietnamEra,comingimmediatelyafterthepassageofdivisiveCivilRights each politicalpartymorehomogenousonforeignpolicy,withtheresultthatideological Act, changedeverything."DemographicshiftsandthelegacyofVietnamcombinedtomake differences onforeignpolicybegantofallalongpartisanlines"(Lindsay1994,26).Thusthe result insimilaroutcomestoday'spolitics,butonlybecauseoftheideologicalrealignment. ideology hypothesisisdifferentincrucialwaysfromthedividedgovernmenthypothesis:two (2007) findthat"whenpresidentsconsideramajoruseofforceabroad,thelevelpartisan whether aPresidentwilldecidetogowar.Inanempiricalstudy,HowellandPevehouse support withintheCongressappearstomattergreatly.Astheirparty'sshareof increases, presidentsconductmajormilitarycampaignsabroadwithincreasingfrequency. less often"(228).Thisfindingisobviouslyrelevant forthosewhoaskquestionsaboutwhat Conversely, asthesizeofoppositionpartyincreases,presidentsactwithmajorforcelessand causes presidentstouseforce,butitisrelevantfor thosewhostudytheCongressionalresponse too. AstheideologicaldistancebetweenCongress andthePresidentincreases, considers theCongresslessandfriendly;this fact doesnotchangeinthoseinstanceswhere he does,nevertheless,decide touseforceabroad. The increasingpolarizationofthepoliticalsystemhaschangedshapedebateon The importanceofthispolarizationisthatlevelssupportinCongressstronglyaffect 26 literature. Ideologycanexplainwhenmemberschoosetofollowtheirownpersonalbeliefs furthering theirownbeliefsaboutgoodpublicpolicycanbeappliedthroughtheideology crucially differentfrom,forexample,defensepolicy,withwhichitisfrequentlyconflated.There questions offoreignpolicyhavereducedsalienceforvoters.Inthisrespect,is rather thantheactionprescribedbyopinionoftheirconstituents. have beenmanystudiesofCongress'roleininfluencingdefensepolicy,butpolicyhas domestic policybecausebothhavesimilar"pocketbook",oreconomic,effectsonthevoting crucial differencesfromforeignpolicy(Bartels1991).Defensebettercomparesto (Bernstein andAnthony1974;Fleisher1985;Lindsay1990;1991b;Mayer1991;Nelson domestic consequencesthatdefensepolicyhas:foreignaffairsareconsidered"notterribly consequential inthevotingbooth"(Aldrich,Sullivan,andBorgida1989,125). Silberberg 1987;Ray1981;Rothenberg1989).Foreignpolicyoftenlackstheeasilyfelt public (LindsayandRipley1992,422).Thesameistrueofthemanyweaponssystemsstudies wishes oftheirconstituency--onforeignaffairsmoresafelyandfrequently(Jacobs Page 2005,109)."Thechallengeisthatmostvoters neitherknownorcareallthatmuchabout between MCbehaviorand publicopinionisnotone-dimensional:justas opinion survey evidencesupportsAlmond'sclaimthatthe publicisoftenunconcernedanduninformed specific foreignpolicyissuesbecausefewofthese issueshaveadirectimpactontheir lives" (Uscinskietal.2009,490;alsoUslaner1999, 46).Otherscholarsconcur:"Awealthof about specificeventsinforeign affairs"(LindsayandRipley1992,421).The relationship Good publicpolicycanbeanoutsizedmotivatorinforeignvotesbecause The argumentthatmembersengageinanti-Mayhewianbehaviorwhentheyare This reducedsaliencemeansthatMCscanignorepublicopinion--orvoteagainstthe 27

•••■••••••••••••■••••••••••••■••••••••••••••••• • • • • • influences voting behavior in Congress, so can politicians sometimes shape public opinion. With

a relatively uninformed public, foreign affairs provide MCs the best chance to vote at odds with i their constituencies and then to work to change opinion. 40 On questions of warfare in particular, there are other aspects of "good public policy" to

• examine. The WPR highlights one of these issues: MCs may have strong opinions about the

• Presidential prerogative to wage war. Boylan and Kedrowski (2004) argue that there are two

• "interpretive camps": the Presidentialists and the Congressionalists. The Presidentialists tend to

allow the President freedom in foreign affairs, and tend to look "askance at efforts to usurp the 40 commander-in-chief's power when U S military forces were placed in harm's way" (542). The

• Presidentialists are opposed by the Congressionalists. These MCs claim that the Constitution 40 • gives Congress the "sole power to make war" (542). They claim that the President's power is,

• and should be, "subordinate to the people's (read: Congress's) will, therefore Presidents must • seek congressional authority before initiating any military actions abroad" (543). Whether a MC lb is a Congressionalist or a Presidentialist does not seem to depend on ideology but is more similar O to personal views of public policy. A MC's grouping into one of these categories may partially

• explain voting behavior, just as views of good public policy can. • • • C. Synthesis

• If all of these factors--maximizing re-election chances; ideology; partisanship; and • perhaps some other, free-standing beliefs about good public policy--can influence MCs' • behavior, the question is then whether it is possible to identify the circumstances in which one of • these influences is likely to prevail over the others. That is, is it possible to synthesize the • Mayhewian and non-Mayhewian claims? Some authors--although they do not describe

•

• 28 • attempt tosynthesizetheseviews. themselves ashavingsetouttoprovidesuchasynthesis--haveofferedtheoriesthat,ineffect,do 1. Kingdon affect aMC'sdecisiononanygivenvote.Hehaslistofsomesuchinfluences:constituency, fellow congressmen,partyleadershipandrankingmembers,interestgroups,theadministration all needtobeconsideredtrulyhaveapictureofthedecisionmakingonanygivenvote, and theExecutiveBranch,staff,media.Whilenoneoftheseelementsisexpendable constituency isakeyfactor.ThethevitalgroupforallreasonsthatMayhew highlights, andKingdonrepeatssomeofthesepoints."Theconstituencyistheonlyactorin system hasquitethesamepotentialfornegativesanctionsasdoesconstituency"(Kingdon political systemtowhichthecongressmanisultimatelyaccountable...Noothersegmentof "also amottledcollectionofmanysubgroups"(31-32). Forexample,whilethemajorityofa behavior: MCsmustdefinetheconstituency,understanditsopinion,andreacttothatopinion. 1981, 29-31). The firstchallengeistodefine"theconstituency"understandhowitaffectsMCbehavior. First, thecolloquialconceptionof"theconstituency" isoversimplified.Constituenciesare,in reality, verycomplexandthoughcharacterized"by certaingrossdemographicfeatures"itis constituency might"knowlittleabouttheircongressman's record",theremaybeasubgroup where "someconstituents areattentivetopoliticalaffairs"(31-32). John Kingdon'sbook,Congressmen'sVotingDecisions,discussesallthefactorsthat Kingdon explainsthreewaysinwhichtheconstituencyiscentraltounderstandingMC 29

•••••••••••••••••••••••4000090041••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••0•••••• Kingdon arguesthatMCsinsteadsubstituteameasureofintensity.Someconstituentsfeelvery strongly aboutparticularissues;othersaremoreapathetic."Itisaneasyinference,then,thatthis constituency intensitywillbereflectedincongressionalvotingdecisions.Asconstituentsbecome more intense,thecongressmanwillweightheiropinionsheavily"(35).Understanding interests. intensity ofopinionisonewayinwhichMCsareresponsivetoaconstituencywithmany balanced withtheMC'sownopinionandintensity."Actually,acongressman'sdecisionismore understanding constituentintensitydoesnotleaddirectlytoavote.Constituentis complicated thansimpleresponse,sincehemustweighhisownintensityintothepicture"(38). By balancingherownintensityandthatofconstituency,aMCreachesdecisiononany and congressman'sattitudes"inachart,asfollows(39). particular decision.Kingdonrepresentsthe"situationsofconflictbetweenconstituencyposition Fig 1. especially carefulwhentheymightbeintheposition ofvotingagainstthatopinionseveraltimes 2 the dependentvariablesofthis thesis. Notethattheparticularactions intheboxesrelatetoKingdon'sargumentanddonotnecessarily correspondwith Second, MCsmustdiscernthepositionofsucha"mottled"group,whichcanbedifficult. Third, afterMCsdetermineconstituentintensity,theymustdecidehowtoreact.Simply When decidinghowtorespondconstituentopinion, MCsmayfindtheyneedtobe INTENSITY OWN High Low Prefer constituencyposition Redefine conflictand/or consider otheractors CONSTITUENCY INTENSITY High 30 2

Consider otheractors Prefer ownposition Low in arowonimportantissues.Kingdonarguesthat"evenwhenconstituentsfeelintenselyabout something, thecongressmancangenerallyaffordtovoteagainstthem,ongroundsthatone are safevotes(41).Buttheseina"string"cancauseproblems."Itispossibletocastwhat vote willprobablynotruinhiswholecareer"(41).AsoneMCexplainstoKingdon,mostvotes one congressmancalleda'stringofvotes'againstvariouselementstheconstituency, cumulative effectofwhichcouldbeveryserious"(41).ThusKingdonarguesthat,inadditionto considering constituentopinionandintensityonanygivenissue,MCsmustalsoconsidertheir order tobehaveinawaythatmaykeeptheirseatsafer,MCs"thenmustnotonlytakeaccountof constituency reactiontothevoteathandinisolation,butmustalsoconsiderplace recent behaviorandwhether,recently,theyhaveopposedtheirconstituencytoofrequently.In has inhistotalvotingrecord.Thisconsiderationprovidessomethingofanincentivetovotewith the constituencymostoftime,inordertosavedevianceformattersthatcount"(42-43). constituent intensitygreatlyaffectsMCswhoareconcernedaboutreelection;however,do act contrarytoconstituentinterestsattimes,andthisactioncanbeexplainedbyunderstanding Senate. Runningonlyonceeverysixyears,witha muchlargerandmorediverse(andless Kingdon primarilystudiedtheHouse,andhisconclusions couldbedifferentifappliedtothe MC opinion. gerrymandered) constituency,Senatorsarelikely to besubjectverydifferentpressuresthan Representatives. that MCsconsidertheircolleagues whendecidinghowtovote,andthatopinion leadership Thus, KingdonaimstosynthesizecompetinginfluencesonMCaction.Ontheonehand, There areimportantfactorstoconsiderwhenapplyingKingdon'sarguments.First, The Senatemayaffordoneadvantagewhenextrapolating Kindgon'sthesis.Heargues 31

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••90.•••••••••••••• •••••••••••41000.40••••••••••••••••••••6000000 MCs couldobservetheircolleagues'electionsandmodifybehavioraccordingly(Mayhew within thechamberisformativeforMCs(Kingdon1981,72-145).Mayhewalsoarguedthat are notallrunningforreelectionatthesametime.In112thCongress,OrrinHatch(R-UT)has 2005, 48).ThismaybeaphenomenonthatoccurstobettereffectintheSenatewheremembers colleague, BobBennett,lostinaprimarytochallengerfromhisright(Weisman2012).Thatis, moved totheright,creatingamoreandconservativevotingrecord,intimesincehis Hatch isrespondingtotheelectoralpressuresputonacolleagueandmodifyinghisvoting staggered elections. behavior. ThistypeofbehaviormodificationmayworkbetterintheSenatebecause true forthecasestudiesinthisthesis:onforeignaffairs,scholarshavelongfoundthatvotersare woefully uninformed,evenascomparedtothetypicalvoterapathy(Almond1950;DelliCarpini and Keeter1996;Erskine1963;FreeCantril1968;Hook2005;LindsayRipley1992; the ground"and,especiallyincaseofLibya,domesticissuestendedtotrumpforeignaffairs. Lippman 1922;Simon1974).NeithertheKosovonorLibyainterventioninvolved"bootson determine constituencyintensity.Astatewidemaymakeithardertodiscoverthe A diverse,statewideconstituencycouldhavetwoconsequencesfortheSenatorlookingto Senators mayfindthatsuchabroadrangeofopinions givestheSenatormoreroomtomaneuver: true viewsoftheconstituency,aspopulationis diverseandopinionsmaybemuted.But constituency mayaffordtheSenatormorefreedom whenvoting. when opinionsareeverywhere,theSenatorislistening to Kingdon notesthatdeterminingconstituentintensitycanbedifficult.Thisisespecially 32 someone when sheacts.Thestatewide deciding whethertobecomeinvolvedonanygivenissue,andshefocusesforeignpolicy 2. Burgin issues. First,membersconsiderwhethertobecomeinvolvedornot;second, second calculation. how involvedtobe.Shearguesthatconstituentinterestaffectsthefirstcalculation,and personal convictions,committeeassignments,andambitionsforgreaterdiscretionaffectthe (slightly involved)orvoters(minimally(Burgin1991,523). four variations:leaders(activelyinvolved),activists(moderatelypositiontakers constituency opiniontobepredictive."Havingsupportiveconstituentsistheprincipalforce affecting whetherarepresentativeparticipatesinanissue"(533).Thus,whenmember supporters asaprimarydisincentivedomorethanvote.Thefearofnegativesupporterreactions react todisincentivesfromtheirconstituency."Innosamplecasedidamemberwhoperceived constituency willbetheleastinvolved. perceives asupportiveconstituency,shewillbemovedtoaction.Thereverseisalsotrue:MCs likely toparticipate"(534).Burginfindsthatmembers whoseeadisincentivefromtheir and ofthepossiblepoliticalramificationsinvolvementinhibitseventhosemembersmost considers whendeciding Burgin notes,forexample, thatMCshavemanydemandsontheirtime(528) somereinterest from theirconstituencydoes notnecessarilyproducesignificantinvolvement. Evensupportive Eileen Burginarguesthatmembersfaceatwo-stagedecisionmakingprocesswhen In Burgin'sanalysis,thedependentvariableis"levelofinvolvement",whichshesayshas When consideringthefirstdecision,whetherornottobeinvolved,Burginfinds Thus, Burginargues,theconstituencyismost important factorthatamember whether to beinvolvedornot.Thenextdecisionishow tobe. 33

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • constituencies sometimes only push a member toward symbolic action. "In only one sample case • • did a member merely vote when perceiving a supportive constituency...Yet even when the influence of supportive constituents engenders involvement, it tends not to beget higher levels of • 411 participation--a member can often satisfy the perceived incentive without extensive activity" (533). These symbolic actions are activities that do not "require much effort, such as • • making a one-minute speech, participating briefly in floor debate, or placing a statement in the

41 Extension of Remarks" (534). Thus constituency is not the factor that determines how much a • 4111 member will be involved in an issue. • Instead, Burgin finds that three main factors determine the depth of a member's 411 • participation. "Once a representative decides to participate in an issue, the influence of • supportive constituents wanes in importance. The factors with the greatest impact on a member's

next decision--how extensively to participate--are personal policy interests, committee and • leadership assignment, and the desire for influence" (535). In arguing that committee placement • • affects a member's involvement--and that personal policy interests are relevant--Burgin agrees 411 with Fenno that these two factors are linked and that each affects MC behavior. • Each of these three factors have different levels of importance for particular members.

41 Personal policy interests may motivate more in-depth involvement because "when a member • personally interested in an issue participates, he or she obviously has an inventive to engage in • activities requiring more effort" (535). Committee and leadership assignments may result in

deeper participation because of "the sense of obligation due to a high post... The responsibility

induces a member to become an activist or a leader--remaining a position-taker would not satisfy • • the perceived demands of this influence" (535). Finally, "a member seeking influence may • • recognize that without engaging in certain activities demanding higher levels of involvement-- • 34 ••S • • • such as playing a significant sponsoring role in major legislation...--influence and power may be • unattainable" (536). • Burgin supports all of these claims with a statistical analysis. Her multivariate regression •• analysis finds that "having supportive constituents...is easily the most important determinant of • involvement. Personal policy interests, committee and leadership assignment, and the desire for • influence also emerge as pivotal forces influencing a legislator's participation" (530). • Thus, Burgin synthesizes these competing influences by arguing that, given a permissive • • constituency, MCs will consider their own personal opinion, committee placement, and desire for • influence, but that incentives and disincentives from the constituency are given highest priority •• when considering action. • Burgin's model can be represented visually as a decision tree such as Figure 2. • • • Does constituency opinion support action? • Yes •• Does the member support this action? Stop • Does the member have a relevant committee placement? • Can action on this point earn the member increased discretion? • • Yes (to one or more No (to all) • Member engages in significant action Member engages in symbolic action • Fig 2. • Burgin's project is in some ways like mine. Her subject matter is Congressional • decisions, and for the most part she is addressing decisions that are responses to Presidential • initiatives. Also, she is attempting to explain what she describes as foreign policy decisions. • 35 • • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••4100011009•410000 cannot bedisregarded,aseveryoneagrees.Butwhatelsematters,andcanweclarifywhento Most important,sheisattemptingtosynthesizethevariousinfluences.Constituentopinion what degreeitmatters? focuses ontheHouseofRepresentativesinherarticle,whilethisthesiswillfocusSenate; Senators andRepresentativesarefacedwithdifferentinfluencesontheirbehavior.Also,Burgin also looksatavarietyof"foreignpolicydecisions",focusingon"aidtotheNicaraguancontras, the increaseinInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)quota,MXmissilefunding,and marines inLebanon"(Burgin1991,523).Thesedecisionsarenotforeignpolicythe does notsuggestthatthedecisionssheanalyzeshavekindofsignificanceforfuture.The way thattheKosovoandLibyadecisionswere.Andwhileactionsmay MX missiledebateisperhapsmoreaccuratelycharacterizedasa"defensepolicy"decision, very wellbe,asIhavesuggested,atemplateforfutureAmericanmilitaryinterventions,Burgin different wayindomesticpolitics;thesameispossiblytrueofIMFdebate.OfBurgin's cases, theonlyonethatiscomparabletocasesofLibyaandBosniaissuemarines rather thanaforeignpolicydecision,becauseits"pocketbook"implicationswillplayoutin characteristic oftheinterventionsinKosovoandLibya weretheirnearlynonexistentcasualty killed in1983Lebanonwhentheirbarrackswere bombed(Treaster1983),whereasakey in Lebanon,buteventhatsimilarityisn'tverystrong.Twohundredandforty-onemarineswere counts (zeroforLibyaandtwonon-combatdeaths forKosovo)(BBCNews1999;MacAskill 2011). Logically,thequestionofmarinesinLebanon wouldbeamuchmoresalientissueto voters thantheconflictsinLibyaandKosovo. In importantways,though,Burgin'saccountdiffersfrommine.Burgin,likeKingdon, 36 constituents, especiallyiftheconstituencyisnotintenseaboutthisissue.Further,Burginasked MC andstafferviews:ifaispassionateaboutanissue,shemightattributethatinterestto and staffers'perceptionsofconstituentopinion.Thisperceptioncouldhavebeeninfluencedby staffers andmemberstorecount,afterthefact,whathadmotivateddecisionattime.This could confoundanswersasmemberstrytorecreatethedecision-makingprocess,or answers asmemberschoosetheresponsethatwillcasttheirdecisionsinagoodlight:"Ididwhat "strings ofvotes"--itseemsplausiblethatthismaybeacircumstancearrises.Lindsay(1994) my constituentswanted." strongly aboutanissue(orhasacommitteeplacementordesiresincreasedpower)butthe constituency doesnotsupportMCaction.Shearguesthatanunsupportivestopsthe member's actionsfromcontinuingfurther.ButMayhewnotesthatsometimesmembersengage in behaviorthatmayactuallydecreasestheirchancesofreelection,andKingdondiscusses argues thatconstituencyopinioncanbeconsideredasrangeofpossibleoutcomes,ratherthana situation tomaneuver.Thereisalsomuchliteratureaboutwhetherconstituencyopinion single positionthatmustbeobeyed(45),indicatingtheremaysomeroomforMCsinthis constituency canswaytheMC(see,forexample, Canes-Wrone 2006).Thus,amodifiedversion endogenic orexogenic--thatis,whethertheMCcan swaytheconstituencyjustas of Burgin'stheorymightlooksomethinglikeFigure 3. Burgin alsodoesnotactuallymeasureconstituentopinion.SheinsteadmeasuresMCs' Finally, Burgin'stheorydoesnotincludeapredictionofMCbehaviorifthefeels 37

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••s••••••••••• • • •

Does constituency opinion support action? • • Yes

• Does the member support this action? Does the member support this action? Does the member have a relevant committee placement! Does the member have a relevant committee placement? • Can action on this point earn the member increased discretion? Can action on this point earn the member increased discretion? • Yes(to one or more) No (to all) Yes (to one or No ( n ail) • Member engages: Member engages Member perceives constituency opinion Stop • in significant action in symbolic action as a range and not a rule; • Metaber engages in anti, Mayhew behavior • Fig 3. • • • • • • • • • • • 38 • • • • III. The Cases • • The U.S. military operations in the former Yugoslavia and in Libya are eerily similar. A • brutal massacre erupted in a small country, and though the violence did not constitute a direct • threat of any kind to the U.S., the U.S. intervened anyway, using U.N. authority, in conjunction • with NATO. A key feature of the interventions were the no-fly zones established by the U.S. and • NATO and the use of precision air strikes. The history of each conflict follows. • A. Kosovo: Operation Allied Force • The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was formed in 1963 as a successor • to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The SFRY was made up of six Socialist • Republics: SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, SR Croatia, SR Macedonia, SR Montenegro, SR • Slovenia, and SR Serbia. Yugoslavia was led from 1945 to 1980 by Josip Broz Tito, a dictator • • who worked to lessen the role that ethnicity played in the country, in part by creating an ethnicity • called "Yugoslav" and reminding the population that their ethnic linkages and ancestry were • stronger than the divisions. Starting in 1991, the SFRY disintegrated in several Yugoslav Wars • following the secession of most of the republics. • • In 1990, six republics held their first multiparty elections. Serbian Communist Party • leader Slobodan Milosevic was elected Serbian President. On 25 June 1990, Slovenia and • Croatia declared independence, and, two days later, the Yugoslav army--dominated by Serbia-- • attacked Slovenia ("Chronology"). By July, Serb-Croat fighting, which had been continuing • consistently since early 1991, escalated into a full-blown war. On 2 January 1992, U.N. mediator • Cyrus Vance negotiated a cease-fire for Croatia. U.N. Peacekeepers were placed on patrol in • Sarajevo in an effort to keep conflict from Bosnia ("Chronology"). But on 29 February 1992, • Bosnia-Herzegovnia declared independence, and Bosnian Serbs claimed a separate state and the • 39 •• • • • •

• area dissolved into war. Through April and May the conflict intensified and on 3 July, the • • international airlift to Sarajevo began ("Chronology").

• On 13 August 1992, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 770, which called for • • nations to "take all measures necessary" to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance to

• Sarajevo (Grimmett 2012, 25). This echoed the debate in Congress; many in the Senate in

• particular "had been advocating more assistance to the victims of the conflict" (Grimmett 2012, S 25). The conflict did not cease, despite continued efforts by Vance and the United Nations.

a The United States participated in the airlifts to Sarajevo and monitoring of sanctions by sea • • (Grimmett 2012, 26). On 12 April 1993, NATO jets began to enforce the U.N. mandated no-fly • zone over Bosnia ("Chronology"). As the fighting escalated, President Clinton began dealing

with Congress on the legal authorization for the conflict. "President Clinton consulted with about • two dozen congressional leaders on potential further action on April 27 and received a wide • range of views. On May 2, the Administration began consultation with allies to build support for

• additional military action to enforce a cease-fire and Bosnian Serb compliance with a peace

agreement, but a consensus on action was not reached" (Grimmett 2012, 26). • • At the beginning of 1994, the war had not slowed. "At the NATO summit conference in

• Brussels on January 11, 1994, leaders, including President Clinton, repeated an August threat to • undertake air strikes on Serb positions to save Sarajevo and to consider other steps to end the • conflict in Bosnia" (Grimmett 2012, 26). On 28 February 1994, U.S. F-16 fighters, flying for • NATO, shot down four Bosnian Serb warplanes for violating the no-fly zone ("Chronology"). In • • April 1994, NATO again used airstrikes to prevent the advancing Serbs from reaching the city of • Gorazde. On 22 September 1994, "two British and one U.S. aircraft bombed a Serbian tank in • • 40 • • • • •o retaliation for Serb attacks on U.N. Peacekeepers near Sarajevo; and on November 21 more than • 30 planes from [NATO countries] bombed the runway of a Serb airfield in Croatia" (Grimmett • 2012, 27). • • Just in time for the 1994 midterm elections, "leaders in Congress called for greater • congressional involvement in decisions" (Grimmett 2012, 27). The Senate debated a bill to lift • the sanctions on Bosnia; another resolution was proposed to prohibit ground combat troops in •

Bosnia unless explicitly authorized by Congress (Grimmett 2012, 27). The Defense S • Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995, signed in October 1994, expressed the sense of the • Congress that the President should ask the U.N. Security Council for a resolution to lift the • sanctions on Bosnia. • • In the first half of 1995, NATO continued to conduct air strikes (Fisher 2004, 185). On 25 • May 1995, President Clinton informed the Congress that U.S. aircraft continued to support •• NATO's no-fly zone and were available to support U.N. forces in Croatia (Grimmett 2012, 27). • In August 1995, "when Bosnian Serb forces overran the U.N.-designated 'safe area' of • • Sbrebrenica, NATO carried out the war's biggest air raid" (Fisher 2004, 185). Following the • slaughter at Sbrebrenica, President Clinton reported to Congress that U.S. aircraft had been used • • in a series of NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb army that had been threatening "U.N.- • declared safe areas" in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Gorzade (Grimmett 2012, 27). •• By the end of 1995, Congress was still attempting to play a role in decisions about the • Bosnian war. On 13 December, the Senate defeated H.R. 2606, which "would have prohibited • • funds to be obligated or expended for U.S. participation in Bosnia unless such funds were • specifically appropriated for that purpose" (Grimmett 2012, 29). S. Con. Res 35 was also • defeated; this was a non-binding resolution offered by Senators Hutchison and Inhofe which • 41 • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• opposes PresidentClinton'sdecisiontodeployU.S.troopsBosnia,butnotedthatCongress offered thepositionofCongressonquestionBosnia."Thisresolutionstatedthat strongly supportstheU.S.troopssentbyPresident"(Grimmett2012,29). was assembledtoreconcilethebills.Theconferencecommitteeunnecessarybecause"a "tensions betweenethnicAlbaniansandtheYugoslavsecurityforcesescalatesintoarmed before theDaytonAccordswereformallysignedinParis.Thatactionhadoccurred,and leadership ofbothpartiesapparentlybelievednothingfurtherwouldbeachievedbyaconference on themeasurespassed"(Grimmett2012,29). "reaffirms" thattheorganizationis"readytotakewhatevermeasuresarenecessaryaverta number ofMembersandSenatorshadwishedtoexpresstheirviewsonthetroopdeployment conflict. Hundredsarekilledandnearly300,000civiliansdisplacedfromtheir homes" (MinistryofDefense).On16January1999,45ethnicAlbaniansareexecutedatRacak, NATO preparedforOperationAlliedForce.Hoursbeforethebombingbegan,on23March humanitarian catastrophe"(MinistryofDefense).AfterpeacenegotiationsinParisbreakdown, in Kosovo,asviolenceagainsurges(MinistryofDefense).Inresponse,on1February,NATO of Yugoslavia(SerbiaandMontenegro)"(Grimmett 2012,30).On24March1999,"U.S. operations andmissilestrikesincooperationwith our NATOalliesagainsttheFederalRepublic 1999, theSenatepassedS.Con.Res.21whichauthorized thePresidenttoconduct"militaryair commenced airstrikesagainst YugoslaviainresponsetotheYugoslavgovernment's campaignof military forces,at[PresidentClinton's]directionand incoalitionwithNATOallies,had Though theHousehadalsopassedresolutionson13December,noconferencecommittee The conflictinKosovointensifiedbeginning1998.Inspringandsummerof1998, 42 May theSenatetabledaresolutionintroducedbySenatorMcCainwhichwouldhaveauthorized President ClintonnotifiedCongressofthesestrikeson26March. violence andrepressionagainsttheethicAlbanianpopulationinKosovo"(Grimmett2012,30). (Grimmett 2012,31).TheSenatealsotabledtwoamendmentsthatwouldhaverestricted the Presidentto"useallnecessaryforceandothermeans"accomplishitsgoalsinYugoslavia Clinton's militaryoperationsinKosovo. Congress arguedthatClinton'sactionsconstituted"aclearviolationofthelanguageWar days intheabsenceofCongressionalauthorizationtocontinue"(Grimmett2012,31).These agreed toNATOconditionsforceasefireon10June1999.TherequiredYugoslavia Representatives suedPresidentClintoninFederalcourt.Withthesuitcontinuing,Yugoslavia Powers ResolutionstipulatingawithdrawalofU.S.forcesfromtheareahostilitiesafter60 withdraw itsmilitaryandparamilitarypersonnelfromKosovo,calledforthecreationofa super statedissolvedintogenocideasoutsidestatesrushedtointervenepreserveregional peacekeeping force(KFOR)whichhadtheapprovalofUnitedNations(Grimmett2012,31). the wreckageofSovietUnionandwasinnoplace tochallengetheWestonSecurity time duringwhichthecrisisinYugoslaviawasconfronted. Russiawasonlyjustemergingfrom Council. RussiatoohadinterestsintheBalkans--Russia isahistoricallyverystrongallyof peace andsecurity.Theinternationalcontextwas very differentbetween1992and1999--the Serbia's asaresultoftheir similardemographics--butwasinnopositionto opposetheoperation. As theoperationprogressed,SenatecontinuedtodebateactioninKosovo.On4 On 25May,the60-daydeadlineimposedbyWPRwasreached.Somemembersof The conflictintheformerYugoslaviawasoneoffirstitstype:anethnicallydiverse 43

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • S • Since its execution, Operation Allied Force has provided the model for humanitarian • • interventions across the globe. Under the doctrine of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), those • in favor of intervention argued that all states have a moral responsibility to intervene to prevent

genocide. Though the doctrine is not always evenly administered (Rwanda, for example), it has

been applied with some effect. • • Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was conducted between 24 March and 10 June 1999,

with the U.S. military operating in conjunction with NATO forces, with the goal of protecting the • • ethnic Albanian minority in Kosovo. The sum total of NATO losses included six lost aircraft, 47 • unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) lost, and two military causalities, suffered outside combat

• operations (BBC News 1999; Chalmers 1999). The United States was involved in the war in the • former Yugoslavia almost from the beginning, but Operation Allied Force will be the focus of • • this thesis. Operation Allied Force consisted of an air campaign over Kosovo that lasted about • eleven weeks. There were no American troops placed in hostile territory during the operation and • •• the only casualties were non-combat deaths. • B. Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn • As the Arab Spring swept through the Middle East in 2011, Tunisia and Egypt found • • themselves embroiled in chaos as their dictators were deposed and youth rioted in the streets. S • When violence broke out in Libya, situated between Tunisia and Egypt, few were surprised. The 15 February 2011 arrest of human rights advocate Fathi Tarbel sparked riots and anti-Qaddafi • • protests in Benghazi, Libya (Lamloum 2012). The planned "day of rage" on 17 February caused • the violence to move to the cities as Libyan dictator Muammar el-Qaddafi, desperate to hold on • to power, escalated his attacks. On 24 February, "anti-government militias" took control of the

• coastal city of Misrata, ousting regime loyalists (Reuters 2011). On 25 February, the United 411 •• 44 • • States imposedsanctionsontheregime(CooperandLandler2011),followedbyU.N. considering ano-flyzone(Broder2011).On5March,theNationalTransitionalCouncil(TNC), Security Councilon26February(Reuters2011),andby27February,NATOnationswere March, SenatorsKerry,McCain,andMcConnellappearedontheSundaynewsshowstoexpress based inBenghazi,declareditselfthe"solerepresentative"ofLibya(Reuters2011)andon6 their supportforano-flyzone(Berger2011). sanctions, anddemandedaceasefire(BilefskyLandler2011).Tennationsvotedinfavor saying that"theU.S.hadanimportantstrategicinterestinLibya,includingpreventingaregional rebels' progressthroughtheLibyandesert.On28March,PresidentObamaaddressednation, et. al2011).AsMarchandAprilcontinued,intermittentairstrikeswerereported,alongwiththe would havekilledtheresolution.On19March,firstairassaultsbeganonLibya(Kirkpatrick five abstained,includingChinaandRussia;avoteinthenegativebyeitherorRussia Tunisia" (IISS2011).ObamaarguedthatAmericansupportfortherebellionwouldsignal broader supportforself-determinationandthe"democraticimpulses"acrossregion(IISS humanitarian andrefugeecrisisthatwoulddestabilizefragiletransitionsinEgypt taking action"(IISS2011). NATO missileattackonTripolikilledQaddafi'syoungest sonandthreegrandchildren(Reuters 2011). Obamasaidhe"'refusedtowaitfortheimagesofslaughterandmassgraves'before Congress begantostiras the60-daydeadlinemandatedbyWPRpassed (SavageandShanker 2011). On2May2011,U.S.NavySEALSkilled Osama binLadeninPakistan,switchingthe media's, andthecountry's, focusdramaticallyforafewweeks.Buton20May, bothhousesof On 17March,theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilauthorizedno-flyzone,increased The U.S.andNATOcontinuedbombingLibyancities intoApril.Lateinthemonth,a 45

01.0•0•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • 2011). President Obama wrote a letter to Congress, arguing that the conflict in Libya did not • • constitute "hostilities" and thus the WPR did not apply (Obama 2011). The House voted on 3 • June to reject that argument and "rebuke" President Obama (Steinhauer 2011a). As the 90-day • deadline approached, the administration continued to defend its position. On 21 June, Senators

• Kerry and McCain introduced their resolution supporting the President, authorizing military • • action in Libya, and requesting reports from the administration (Steinhauer 2011b). House • Democrats were not as supportive, and on 23 June, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned the • • caucus against defunding the war effort (Steinhauer 2011c). The Kerry-McCain resolution never

• reached the floor for a vote; it was tabled in favor of discussing the debt ceiling (Kane 2011). • • With the two WPR deadlines passed, Libya faded from public view through the summer • as politics focused instead on high gas prices and the debate over the debt ceiling. On 20 • October, Qaddafi was killed, effectively bringing Operation Odyssey Dawn to a close. • The international politics of the conflict in Libya are clear on some questions but very • • curious on others. The international effort was only possible because of Security Council • Resolution 1973, which would not have passed if either China or Russia had decided to vote no. • • Instead, both abstained, demonstrating rare willingness to allow force to defend an internal • IP uprising.3 Resolution 1973 was tightly worded and very carefully defined the actions that were, • and were not, permissible. After the intervention, both China and Russia argued that NATO • overstepped the limits set by the resolution. • 41111 Libya's oil reserves may be the explanation for the Russian and Chinese votes to • • authorize the intervention. China has been making inroads into Africa for years, and the

• possibility of being closed off from Libyan oil fields may have been the deciding factor. China 111111 • 3 Both Russia and China fear that, someday, these resolutions may be used against them. Russia fears an insurgency • from Chechnya and China is worried about uprisings from Tibet or the Uyghurs from the Xinjiang province. •• 46 110 ••• • and Russia also both consider Libya a relatively marginal regional power (Patrick 2011b). •• Finally, Qaddafi was universally hated by the Arab community; China and Russia, both facing Islamic insurgencies, perhaps calculated that seeming to support Qaddafi would not bring •••• domestic peace and security, but that working to oust Qaddafi would be essentially costless. For the rest of the international community, the decision to intervene was continually •• framed as part of the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine. As a result, even war-weary domestic • populations were shown a war not waged for resources or for increased power in the region, but ••• instead a war waged to protect innocent civilians from a brutal dictator. Qaddafi's reputation preceded him, especially in nations affected by the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over •• Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. The Arab League's support for NATO action supported this • narrative (Samples 2011, 14). •• The American domestic politics around the Libyan conflict are not as straightforward.

Democrats in the House threatened to cut off funding for the war (IISS 2011; Samples 2011, 16) ••• while the Senate Minority Leader outpaced President Obama by supporting the no-fly zone • nearly two weeks before it was implemented (Berger 2011). Even more puzzling, some Senators •• who supported the intervention in Kosovo--substantively a nearly identical operation in terms of the type and scale of the military action--reversed their position on Libya. These responses to ••• Clinton and Obama will be discussed in the next section. • C. Congressional Responses ••• The cases of Kosovo and Libya offer a template to understand Congressional responses to Presidential war making, especially of this type. The cynic will argue that because Congress • has never successfully recalled troops from a war zone abroad, Congress is powerless to stop the

President from waging wars. Congress did successfully end funding for the Vietnam War (several •••• 47 •• •• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• times, dependingonhowyoucount),andhasusedthepowerofpursetorestrictPresidential Congressional responsesandpoorlyinterpretsthePresidentialplanforwarmaking.Especiallyin never recalledtroopsandsoitispowerlesstocheckthePresidentinwar'missespointof war makingseveraltimessincethen(Grimmett2007).Buttheargumentthat'Congresshas wars thatareinthegreyzoneofWPR,andespeciallywhenPresidentishopingnotto Congress, thelessattentionoperationattractsinbetter.ThePresident'sideal have todealwithWPRauthorizationandinsteadsimplywagewarwithoutquestioningfrom potentially politicallyriskyexplanationstoCongress.Congress'sabilitycheckPresidential plan isonewherehegivenfreereintoactasseesfitandnotaskedofferany Congress, everyresolutionaskingforthePresidenttoreportonhiswaractions,takes war makingcomesintheformofdemandingthoseexplanations.Everyspeechbyamember operation ofthewarastepawayfromPresident'sidealplan.Congressdoesnothaveto successfully cutofffundingorrecalltroopstoinfluencethearcofawar.Thethreatthese actions maybeenoughtoalterthePresident'sbehavior. NON-LEGISLATIVE Scott (1997)summarizesneatlytheuniverseofpossibleactionsbyCongress. I .F,GISLATIVE Issue-Specific Legislation Informal Advice/Letters Oversight/Hearings Foreign Commerce Treaties (Senate) Consultations Use ofCourts Appropriation War Power DIRECT 48 Non-Binding Legislation Appointments (Senate) Procedural Legislation Foreign Contacts Framing INDIRECT Opinion Fig. 4. ••••••• In line with Scott's arguments, this thesis considers any action by Congress to be a deviation from the President's ideal plan. This can be seen in both the Kosovo and Libya cases.

Both Presidents Clinton and Obama were confronted by Congress over the 60- and 90-day deadlines mandated by the WPR. Both argued for the WPR's unconstitutionality, but they were forced to make this argument and to spend political capital defending their prerogatives. Each ••••••••• action by Congress, no matter how symbolic, systematically moves the war plan away from the

President's ideal.

With this background--which provides a more subtle way of understanding how Congress responds to Presidential decisions to intervene militarily--I can now examine Senators' responses •• to Kosovo and Libya in more detail. •• •• ••• •• ••••• •• •••••

49 ••• •• 6••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• A. TheQuestion IV. ExplainingSenateAction important influenceonMCaction.Thereisalsoaconsensusthatconstituentsdonotpaymuch questions ofdefensespending--aresimplynotassalientforvoters"pocketbook"economicor attention toforeignpolicyissues.Foreignissues--trueissues,ratherthan spending questions.Somearguethat,whenforeignpolicyissuesarise,MCsaremorefreeto consult theirownopinionsandviewsofgoodpublicpolicybecausetheseissuesarelesssalient "boots ontheground"--ofU.S.armedforcesbeingputatrisk--butOperationAlliedForceand for voters.Sotheinitialquestionisextenttowhichelectoralconnectionhypothesisholds true forforeignpolicy. to examine.Questionsofwartypicallymatteredconstituentsbecausethepossibilitya Operation OdysseyDawnwerewagedinaseriesofairstrikesfromthesafetysky.Some U.S. combatantsdidnotevenleaveterritorybutratheroperateddronesfromdomestic are likelytobemuchlesssalientthanmanyotherU.S.militaryactions.And,asIhavesaid,the military bases.Ifforeignpolicyissuesarelesssalientforvoters,conflictslikeKosovoorLibya kinds ofmilitaryactioninvolvedinKosovoandLibya mayverywellsetthetemplateforfuture U.S. militaryinterventions.Thatmakesitparticularly importanttotryexplainCongressional responses totheseactions. of KosovoandLibya?It seems clearthatthemodelsexplaindomestic policydonot necessarily applytoforeign policyormilitaryactions.WhileMayhewand Kingdondonotfocus The literature,assummarizedabove,revealsaconsensusthatconstituencyopinionisan Among foreignpolicyquestions,KosovoandLibyastandoutasparticularlyusefulcases Given allthis,whatexplainsCongress'sresponse to Presidentialwaractioninthecases 50 specifically onforeignpolicyquestions,Burgindoes,andsheconcludesthatMCswillbe correspondingly, willnotbeinvolvediftheysensea"disincentive"fromtheconstituency).This explain Congress'sresponsetoPresidentialactiononKosovoandLibya?Ifnot,whatdoes explained byotherfactors. is consistentwithwhatMayhewandKingdonsayaboutMCactionsgenerally.ButBurginthen involved foreignpolicymakingiftheirconstituenciessupportinvolvement(and, good publicpolicy,orarethereyetmoreinfluencesparticulartothesecircumstances? goes ontoarguethat,onceanMCisinvolved,thedecisionbe B. ResearchDesign explain MCs'actionsinthesecases?Isit,assomehavesuggested,memberopinionandviewsof Representatives' votes;intheSenate,itislikelyto bemoreilluminatingtoanalyzetheindividual Representatives, theyaremorelikelytodevelopforeign policyexpertisethatwillmakethem be moreprominentnationalfigureswhoseviewsonforeignpolicywilltherefore both KosovoandLibya. (141). TheSenatehastwoforeignpolicypowerstheHousedoesnot,namelyabilityto decisions ofSenators. decision ofthepartyleadership,orasawhole, ismorelikelytodetermineindividual confirm Ambassadorsandtoratifytreaties.Also, because Senatorsservelongertermsthan influential. Fenno(1973)notestheprestigiousnatureofSenate,particularlyonforeignaffairs more influential.Inaddition,theSenate(typically) haslesspartydiscipline.IntheHouse, Thus thisthesiswillexaminethefollowingquestions.Doeselectoralconnection I examined theactionstakenbythirty-nineSenatorswhowereinofficeattimeof I focused ontheSenateforanumberofreasons.Senatorsarelikelyto 51 significantly involved is

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • I consider only those Senators who could have taken actions on both the question of • • Kosovo and the question of Libya. Because these interventions presented similar policy issues, S• Senators' personal policy views on the two actions ought to have been the same, or nearly so. If a • Senator's behavior with respect to the Libya decision is sharply different from her behavior on

• Libya, that is a fact that requires an explanation. Because the Kosovo bombings began in March • • 1999, the most junior Senators in the pool are those who took office in January 1999. This •• produced a group of thirty-nine Senators (G39).4 These are the Senators whom I will examine • because their actions constitute the natural experiment. This is not a study that can be

• extrapolated in the statistical sense because these Senators are not a perfect random sample of a • • population. I can, however, extrapolate in the theoretical sense: I will use these 39 senators to

• develop rules that, I believe, can be applied to the chamber as a whole to explain, more broadly, • • "Senate responses to Presidential war actions." • • • The Most-Similar Design • The similarity of the two cases is important to my research design. The cases are highly • • similar in many respects that are relevant to congressional response. As I have explained, the • international context of the decisions was, while not identical, remarkably similar. It is important • • to understand, however, the exact limitations of this most-similar design. To this end, I will

• briefly compare and contrast the two cases. • • • 4 The Senators are: Akaka (D-HI), Baucus (D-MT), Bingaman (D-NM), Boxer (D-CA), Cochran (R-MS), Collins • (R-ME), Conrad (D-ND), Crapo (R-ID), Durbin (D-IL), Enzi (R-WY), Feinstein (D-CA), Grassley (R-IA), Harkin (D-IA), Hatch (R-UT), Hutchison (R-TX), Inhofe (R-OK), Inouye (D-HI), Johnson (D-SD), Kerry (D-MA), Kohl • (D-WI), Kyl (R-AZ), Landrieu (D-LA), Leahy (D-VT), Levin (D-MI), Lieberman (D/I-CT), Lugar (R-IN), McCain 4111, (R-AZ), McConnell (R-KY), Mikulski (D-MD), Murray (D-WA), Reed (D-RI), Reid (D-NV), Roberts (R-KS), • Rockefeller (D-WV), Schumer (D-NY), Sessions (R-AL), Shelby (R-AL), Snowe (R-ME), and Wyden (D-OR).

• 52 • • • • • Both Kosovo and Libya involved an aged dictator who, in his desperate attempts to cling to power, engaged in military attacks on his own people. Both dictators were deeply despised on • the international stage. Neither Kosovo nor Libya presented an existential threat to the United • States, in the sense that the territory of the United States was not threatened by either. Neither • Kosovo nor Libya is the sort of international or regional power that could have created a •

"domino effect"--that is, a threat to the stability of a neighboring or allied nation with its • collapse. (Libya represented a more significant domino than Kosovo given that its neighbors, • • Tunisia and Egypt, were undergoing their own revolutions as part of the Arab Spring). Libya • may be an important source of oil for the United States in the future but it does not appear that • • this was the primary motivation for beginning military operations. The United States, in both • cases, relied on air strikes and the enforcement of a no-fly zone over the region in conflict; no S• solider was placed on the ground in hostile territory during the course of either operation. • Domestically, the two cases were similar as well. Both President Clinton and President Obama • • justified their use of force to begin the bombing campaign by relying not on congressional • • authorization but on authorizations from international organizations--NATO and the U.N. (U.N. • News Center 2011; Wedgwood 1999). Both rejected the applicability of the WPR on the grounds • that the air strikes did not constitute "hostilities" (Damrosch 2000; Obama 2011). Further, the 410 • Presidents can be considered ideologically similar: one President's wife is the Secretary of State 110 S for the other! • But, again, two cases can never be exactly the same and the situations in Kosovo and •• Libya had important differences. The international community agreed, with almost • unprecedented speed, about the means and ends in Libya; this was a reflection on Qaddafi's • • universally negative reputation. Agreement also came easily in the case of Kosovo, but this was •

S 110 53 110 • • • largely for a different reason: because Russia, not yet recovered from the collapse of the Soviet • • Union, was in no position to oppose NATO. Technically, the intervention in Kosovo was in • response to genocide whereas the conflict in Libya was not defined as a genocide ,5 although in • • both cases the intervention was portrayed, accurately to some extent at least, as a response to an • extremely violent attack by an unpopular dictator on a his own civilian population. This allowed • • leaders to frame both operations as humanitarian interventions (Garamone 1999; Patrick 2011a). • The domestic differences seem to be more important than the international differences. • • Strikingly, both military actions occurred at the same point in the President's term--in March of • the year preceding a presidential election--which is a significant similarity. But President Clinton 411 • was in the final twenty months of his second term in office when he authorized the operations in • Kosovo whereas President Obama was twenty months away from facing reelection when the • • campaign in Libya began. The operations in Kosovo only lasted about eleven weeks but were • preceded by extended American involvement in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, including • • air strikes over Bosnia in 1995 and over 20,000 troops deployed to support the Dayton Accords. • The operations in Libya technically lasted seven months, though national attention began to fade • • after the debate over the WPR in June, refocusing only in October when Qaddafi was killed. • President Clinton was facing a Republican-controlled Congress, whereas President Obama was • • opposed only by the Republican-controlled House. President Clinton's air strikes were • authorized, at the last minute, by the Senate with the passage of S. Con. Res. 21 (1999). By • • contrast, Senate resolutions to authorize President Obama's actions never reached the floor. • • 5 "Genocide" is defined by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Article Two • reads, "In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in • whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such...." By this definition, the conflict in Libya 411 was perhaps not technically a genocide because Qaddafi was not killing civilians because of their identity as 4110 members of a particular group as such ("Convention"). • 54 • operates primarilythroughpublicopinion.TheelectoralconnectioncanalsoaffectSenator "constituent intensity,"andnotjustopinion,matters.Burginarguesthat,inadditionto action throughtherallyeffectandbasedonproximityofanelection.Anotherindependent but thenaturalexperimentpresentedbyKosovoandLibyaoffersawaytoholdpolicy constituent intensity,theSenatormaynotactifshedoessitonarelevantcommittee,both considerations roughlyconstant.BurginandKingdonaimedtosynthesizetheseschoolsof policy. Intheliterature,thesearegenerallymeasuredbyconsideringideologyandpartisanship, thought byaddingothermechanismsthatcanaffectSenatoraction.Kingdonargues variable istheargumentthatsenatorsmayalsoactbasedontheirpersonalviewsofgoodpublic because committeemembershipmayrevealsomethingaboutpersonalviews,andit affords accesstothedecision-makingprocessthataSenatormightnototherwisehave. business ofsellingnewspapers);and,inanyevent, newspaperreportswillbringanissueto on mattersthattheybelievetheirreaderswillconsider important(becausetheyareinthe opinion, Ifollowedhismethodology.Henotes,"Thereisnoreadywayinwhichaclassification [of intensity]couldeasilybeaccomplished.Soasaroughcoding,Imadejudgmentabouthow constituents' attentionand tendtomakeitmoresalient.WhileKingdonsimply madea Kingdon's approachseemstohavetwojustifications: journalistsandeditorsarelikelytoreport much attentiontheissueappearedtohavereceived inthepress..."(314).Thisaspectof measure constituentintensity,whichKindgonarguesismoreimportantthansimplepublic 6 Acompletechartwithallthe data canbefoundintheappendix. The literaturesuggestsseveralpossibleindependentvariables6electoralconnection Thus, thelevelsofeachvariableattimeaSenator'sactionmustbecoded.To Measuring TheIndependentVariables 55

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• "judgment" abouthowmuchattentionasubjectreceived,Ithoughtitwouldbelesssubjectiveto count actualmentionsofthesubjectinspecificnewspapers,andthendeviseawaytocorrectfor mentions thatwerenotrelatedtotheconflicts looked atthenumberoftimesthatnewspapermentioned"Libya"duringtimeinwhich the Senatorwouldhavetodecidehowvoteorparticipate.Isearchedformentionsof"Libya" newspaper withthelargestcirculationinSenator'sstate.Afterdeterminingthatnewspaper,I between 1March2011and30June2011.Becausesome"backgroundnoise"alsoturnedup-- obituaries ofthoseborninLibya,travelguides,andsoon--Imadeacontrolvariable,counting the timesLibyawasmentionedexactlyoneyearprior,from1March2010to30June2011.The final countofmentionsinthenewspaperwas2010subtractedfrom2011count. relevant newspapersarenotavailable,oraccessible,fortheperiodofKosovo intervention. Butthisisnotasignificantproblembecausethevariablemeasuredbynewspaper mentions--constituent intensity--ismuchmorelikelytoplayaroleinexplainingSenators'votes on Libya.EverySenatorinthegroup(exceptCochran)votedKosovo;bycontrast,asizable constituent intensity,accordingtotheKingdonthesis, andsothesedatafromthenewspapers portion ofthegroupdidnotvoteonLibya.Explaininginactioncanbedoneinpartbylookingat were usefulinconnectionwithLibya.Thefinalconcern wasthatlargernewspaperswouldhave more roomtodevotepossibly-less-relevantinternational issues,whilesmallerpaperswould searched "oilspill"intheNew Orleans cases, Irepeatedthesameprocedure butwithadifferentsearchterm.Forexample,aswill beexplainedlater,I focus primarilyonlocalissues,soInotedthecirculation numbersforeachpaper.Ifoundthat 7 be other,moreimportantissues. Inthesecases,Iguessedatwhatthatother,moreimportant issuemightbe.Inthese Insomecases,theLibyacount seemedespeciallylowandaSenator'scommitteeplacement suggestedtheremight Specifically, Idecidedtoapproximateconstituentintensityby,first,findingthe I completedthisprocedureonLibyaandnotKosovobecauseelectronicarchivesofthe Times-Picayune. ? 56 circulation doesnot,infact,correlatewithmentions;newspapersizecanthereforebediscounted as afactorinfluencingthecoverageofconflictinLibya. the specifiedmargins.Forexample,forsomesenators,Ifoundpollingdataatendof2010 different, leadingmetoconcludethatpublicopinionhadnotchangedinanimportantwayover either therewouldhavebeenapolldonesooner,orbesomeotherindicationthat restrictions whenpossible.Sometimesitwasdifficulttofindapublicopinionpollexactlywithin and thenagaininthesummerof2011.Oftentimes,thesenumberswerenotsignificantly their exactpopularitymatterslessthanhowthey themselves wouldusewhentryingtounderstandtheirpopularitybackhome.Because,intruth, that shorttimespan--or,ifithadchanged,wouldhavebeenforademonstrablereasonand such achangehadoccurred.Further,Imostlyusedthemostpopularpollingcompanies--Public clearly themostrelevant;Intelligencecommittee andtheGovernmentAffairs/Homeland considered irrelevant.TheForeignRelationscommitteeandtheArmedServicesare could notfindapollduringtheexactMarch-Junespan,Iusedpollingdatafromnearbydates. Policy Polling,TalkingPointsMemo,Gallup,andsoon--possiblythesamedatathatSenators very relevantcommitteesandtwoslightlylesscommittees,alltherestcanbe back toFenno:theSenator'scommitteeassignments reflectboththeSenator'sinfluenceovera 8 committee, forexample, certainly doeshavearoletoplayintheconductof warfare,thatisnot certain policydomainand,importantly,theSenator's interests.ThoughtheAppropriations data isintheappendix. Security committeeseemtobeslightlylessrelevant. Thereasonfortheseclassificationsgoes Committeeinformationwasavailable oneachSenator'swebsite.Amorespecificexplanation ofhowIfoundthis I alsoexaminedpublicopiniondataonaSenatororPresident,usingthesamedate Finally, IlookedatthecommitteesonwhicheachSenatorsits8Thereseemtobetwo 57 perceived their popularity.ThereforeevenifI

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • its primary purpose. A Senator who is interested in foreign policy and warfare is unlikely to • • choose to serve only on committees like Appropriations, Budget, or Finance, even though those ID committees are important. She is much more likely to seek an assignment to the Foreign • 4111 Relations or Armed Services Committees; or, if she has a slightly less direct interest in military • affairs, on Intelligence or Homeland Security. • ID The last independent variable is the Senator's personal views of good public policy. As • discussed above, the most-similar design allows me to hold policy views constant to a degree. It • • would be difficult to explain a significant change of opinion between the Kosovo and Libya

ID interventions. Otherwise, policy views might be approximated through committee placement or • • through party affiliation because, as scholars have explained, the parties now tend to represent

ID the ideological divisions in the chamber and thus perhaps also illustrate the different viewpoints

• on policy questions. But, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, I assume that policy • views cannot account for different votes on Kosovo and Libya. • • • The Dependent Variable: Senate Actions and Senator Positions

• The universe of possible actions Senators took on Kosovo and Libya is formally different and so

• different methods are required to discover each Senator's opinion. For Kosovo, the Senate ID • actually voted on a resolution to grant President Clinton the authorization for air strikes. This • was S. Con. Res. 21 (1999) sponsored by Senator Biden and cosponsored, from the G39, by ID • Senators Levin, McConnell, and Lieberman. The resolution passed 23 March 1999. The • resolution read, in full: • • Resolved, by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the President of the United States is authorized to conduct military air operations and • missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic • of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). ID

58 • •• The votes by the G39 are recorded in the table below, where votes in favor are indicated by plus signs, votes against are noted by minus signs, and Cochran, the only member to miss the vote, is given a zero.

Akaka + Feinstein + Kyl Reed + Baucus Grassley Landrieu + Reid + Bingaman - Harkin + Leahy + Roberts Boxer + Hatch + Levin + Rockefeller + Cochran 0 Hutchison Lieberman + Schumer + Collins - Inhofe Lugar + Sessions Conrad + Inouye + McCain + Shelby + Crapo Johnson + McConnell + Snowe + Durbin + Kerry + Mikulski + Wyden + Enzi Kohl + Murray +

For the issue of Libya, unlike with Kosovo, there was no resolution that reached the floor to be voted upon; instead, other steps were necessary to discover each Senator's opinion.

Specifically, I considered four types of actions: sponsoring or cosponsoring a resolution; issuing a press release; speaking on the floor or entering remarks into the Senate record; and taking a position in an appearance on a news show or in speaking with a newspaper reporter. There were six resolutions introduced, or cosponsored, by one of the G39.

• Senator Kerry sponsored S.J.Res. 20, supporting the limited use of U.S. troops in support

of NATO. The resolution was scheduled for a vote but was preempted to focus on the debt

ceiling debate. Of the group of 39, Feinstein, Durbin, Kyl, Levin, Lieberman, and McCain

cosponsored this resolution.

• Senator McCain sponsored S.J.Res 102 which called for a no-fly zone and supported the

Transitional National Council as the rightful government of Libya. Of the G39, Lieberman

cosponsored this resolution.

59 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• remarks intotheCongressionalrecord)--IhaveessentiallyfollowedBurgin'sapproach:I appearing onnewsshowstelevision,orspeakingthefloorofSenate(orentering tried tocodethembyopinion(pro-oranti-administration)anddepthofinvolvement.Azero considered theseactionstoreflectthelowestlevel ofinvolvement.(Anegativeonewasgiven administration andonlyissuedapressreleaseormadestatementtothenewsmedia,becauseI meant theSenatorwasentirelyuninvolved.AonegivenforSenatorswhosupported for apressreleaseofcommentsthatopposedtheadministration). AtwowasgivenforSenators short ofsponsoringaresolution.(Anegativetwo, again, wasthesameactivitiesbutinopposition who supportedtheadministrationandactedonthat byspeakingonthefloorbutwhostopped to theadministration).A three wasgivenforSenatorswhosupportedtheadministration andwho sponsored orcosponsored aresolution.(AnegativethreewasgiveniftheSenator opposedthe • • Senator McCainalsosponsoredS.J.Res194,whichexpressedthe'senseofSenate'on Libya. TheresolutionsupportsPresidentObama'spolicyonLibyaandrequestsregular reports bytheexecutivetoCongressonmilitaryactions.Thisresolutionwascosponsored by Feinstein,Kerry,Levin,andLieberman. Two senatorsfromthegroupof39cosponsoredotherresolutions.SenatorHutchison cosponsored aresolutionofferedbySenatorEnsignthatstatedinterventioninLibya was notintheUnitedStates'interestandinsteadcalledonArabLeagueNATOto Cornyn whichaskedfordetailsabouttheoperationandrequestedthatPresidentObama take action.SenatorsInhofeandRobertscosponsoredaresolutionofferedbySenator seek Congressionalauthorizationforthewar.Besidestheseactions,therewasnoother action onLibyaintheSenateviaresolutions. In codingtheotheractions--issuingpressreleases,speakingtohometownnewspapers, 60 awarded thepointvaluethatcorrespondedtomostinvolvedactivityinwhichthey administration througharesolution).WhereSenatorstookmorethanoneaction,theywere itself stronglyanti-administration,butshehadspokenoutelsewhereagainsttheintervention. position. Forexample,SenatorHutchisoncosponsoredtheCornynresolution,whichwasnot participated. Therefore, itispossibletounderstandhercosponsorshipasananti-administrationaction. resolution thatwoulddecisivelyrevealtheSenator'sview. scoring becauseLibya,unlikeKosovo,didnotpresentanopportunityforasinglefloorvoteon intervene) and,second,consideringthelevelofinvolvement.ThisisdifferentfromKosovo first, consideringthedirectionofSenator'sopinion(fororagainstPresident'sdecisionto identify thecasesinwhichaSenator'sviewchanged, despitethestrongsimilaritiesbetween third group,therearemultiple waystochangeopinion.Clearly,thosewho supportedone military interventions,those whoopposedboth,andthosechangedtheir opinion.Inthis two interventions.Therearethreebroadgroupsof Senators:thosewhowereinfavorofboth Bingaman Baucus Akaka Crapo Conrad Collins Cochran Boxer Durbin Enzi If oneactiondidnotrevealtheSenator'sopinion,Iotherthingstotrydiscoverher My scoringofSenators'responsestotheLibyainterventionthereforehastwofacets: The Libyascoresofthegroup39areasfollows: Using thisinformation,eachSenator'sopinionon bothissuescanbeexamined.Ialso -1 -1 -1 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 Grassley Feinstein Kohl Kerry Johnson Hutchison Hatch Harkin Inouye Inhofe -1 -1 -3 -3 -2 0 0 3 3 1 61 Kyl Murray Mikulski McConnell McCain Lugar Lieberman Levin Leahy Landrieu -2 -3 0 0 0 3 0 3 3 3 Rockefeller Shelby Sessions Schumer Roberts Reid Reed Snowe Wyden -1 -1 -2 0 0 2 2 1 1

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• on onequestionandtookapositiontheother.IwillfirstconsiderthoseSenatorswho intervention andopposedtheotherchangedtheirposition,butsodidthosewhotooknoaction positions onbothissues;later,Iwillturntothosewhowereuninvolvedoneoftheissues.The Senators whotookpositionscanbegroupedasfollows. Using thesedata,Iwilltrytoanswertheresearchquestionsbyseeingextentwhich C. TheRulesoftheGame:WhatDrivesSenateAction? Senators' behaviorcanbeexplainedbytheindependentvariablesofferedliterature. and Libyasupportfourrules--fourhypothesesthat thedataroughlyconfirm.Solelyfor convenience ofexpression,Iassume,instatingthese rules,thatthePresidentisaDemocrat, Republican President,andmyclaimisthat,judging fromtheevidenceIhaveuncovered, because thatwasthecaseforbothKosovoandLibya. Obviouslytherulescouldberestatedfora rules wouldstillhold. 9 ThesourcesforeachSenator's positionareavailableinthebibliography. Constant /InFavor Rockefeller Lieberman Group 1: Feinstein McCain I believethatthebehaviorofG39inresponsetomilitaryinterventionsKosovo Durbin Harkin Wyden Boxer Kerry Levin Reed Reid Constant /Opposed Hutchison Group 2: Grassley Sessions Roberts Collins Inhofe Crapo Support K,OpposeL 62 McConnell Group 3: Baucus Snowe Hatch Lugar 9 Kohl

Oppose K,SupportL Bingaman Group 4: Kyl • • • • Senators whohelddifferent positionsonKosovoandLibyawecanbeginto makeprogressin those whodidnot.Butonce wetakeadvantageofthenaturalexperimentby focusingonthe Rule 1:DemocratswillsupporttheirPresidentonquestionsofwar. opportunity topursuetheirownpersonalpolicygoals,butmemberswhowereinactivein constituency isnotasufficientconditionforinaction,assomemembersmayseizethe constituency orwhenanotherissueisofextraordinarysaliencetotheir(suchthat concerns. issues; Iincludeithereforcompleteness.) electoral motivations.(ThisruleappliestoSenators whodidnotgetinvolvedononeofthe Senator tovotebaseduponpublicpolicyandpersonalviews,ratherthanconstituencyorparty an environmentinwhichtherewereeitherelectoral disincentivestoactionorsimplynon- the Senatorsmayfeelthattheycannotbeseentofocusingonanyotherissue).Anapathetic Rule 4:Membersaremorelikelytobeinactiveonanyissuewhenitisoflittlesalienceintheir Rule 3:Retirement--orthelackofanelectoralconnection--can,butdoesnotalways,allowa Rule 2:RepublicanswillopposethePresident. • • • These rulesapplytoSenatorswhochangedtheirpositions betweentheinterventionsand Senator's state. Rule 2b:Theotherpossibleexceptiontothisruleiswhentherearallyeffectthat Rule 2a:Theexceptiontothisruleiswhenamember'sownindividualpolicy Rule la:TheexceptiontothisruleiswhenthePresidentpollingpoorlyin substantially increasesthePresident'spopularity. risk ofaprimarychallenge. convictions areverystrong and supporting thePresidentdoesnotputmemberat 63

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• identifying thelikelydeterminantsofSenators'behavior.AfewRepublicanssupported Democrats didthesame,althoughtheiroppositiontoLibyawasmild.TheRepublicanSenators' Kosovo intervention,insomecasesstrongly,butopposedtheLibyamilitaryaction.Some occasion, anditwouldbeamistaketodisregardtheinfluenceofSenator'spolicyviews. policy viewsseemtohaveplayedaroleintheirwillingnesssupportthePresidentonone electoral connectionthesis.Evenintheareaofforeignpolicy,fromwhichvotersaresupposedly disengaged, Senatorsarepayingcloseattentiontotheirre-electionprospects.But--importantly-- the electoralconnectionthesismustberefinedincertainwaysordertoexplainSenators' behavior. Rule 1:DemocratswillsupporttheirPresident. course, whoisaRepublican.Rule1broadlyconsistentwiththeElectoralConnectionthesis. Democrats representastatethatPresidentObamawonin2008.TheseSenatorsmighthave All theSenatorsingrouponerepresentastatethatPresidentClintonwon1996 thought thatopposingthePresidentwouldhurttheirelectoralprospects.Related,Senatorsmight believe thattheirre-electionchancesarelinkedto thepublic'sperceptionofhoweffective President is;ifthatisso,thenmembersofthePresident's partywillhaveanelectoralincentiveto support him,justasmembersoftheotherpartywill haveanincentivetoopposehim.Also,a which mightbefataltoher electoralprospects.Approvingoftheintervention inKosovoandthe Senator whodeviatesfromherparty'spositionrisks losingsupportfromwithinherownparty, 10 AllElectoralCollegedataisfrom RealClearPolitics.Mapscanbefoundintheappendix. But theexamplesofSenatorswhoswitchedtheirpositionsprimarilyvindicate Rule 1 describes theactionsofgroupone,withexceptionSenatorMcCain, 64 10 . Allthe Senators. itself istheexplanation--perhapstheseDemocratssupportedClintonandObamasimplybecause intervention inLibyathereforeseem,otherthingsequal,tomakegoodelectoralsenseforthese the PresidentswereDemocrats.Related,theseDemocratsmayhavewantedtomaintainor enhance theirpositioninternallyintheCongressionalparty.Or,becausepartyaffiliation,today, tends tocorrespondideologicalorpolicyviews,theseDemocratsmaysharethePresident's chance tobeinvolvedontheissuebecauseofcommitteeplacement,itmayindicatethateach views aboutintervention.Notably,eachofthesesenators,exceptHarkin,sitsonacommittee considers foreignaffairsandnationalsecurityanissueofpersonalinteresttherefore with jurisdictionoverquestionsofwarandnationalsecurity.Notonlydidthisgivethema something onwhichtheSenatorhasstrongviews. will returntotheminamoment. Rule la:DemocratsaremorelikelytoopposethePresidentwhenheispollingpoorlyin their states. In thecaseofDemocrats--and,as Republicans, too--thesecasestendtosupporttheelectoral connectionthesis. explained lateraspartof Rule3. issue ofKosovo,butBingaman'ssituationismost likethatofSenatorKyl,andsobothwillbe But theElectoralConnectionisnotonlypossibleexplanation.Perhapspartisanship Senators Harkinand,ofcourse,McCainpresentsomewhatmorecomplicatedissues.I Kosovo: The Senatorswhochangedtheirviewsenableustosortthroughthesehypotheses. Senator Bingamanwastheonlywhoseactions fitwithinRulelaonthe I will argueinconnectionwithRule2aand2b,the 65

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Wisconsin in1996and2008respectively.Kohldoesnotsitonanyrelevantcommittee, Group Two.Kohl'sactiononLibyais,atfirstglance,puzzling.ClintonandObamawon interest. Inanyevent,hevoted indicating thatmilitaryinterventioninLibyaisnotanissuewhichhehasalotofpersonal Libya positionwastheresultofpersonalpolicyconvictions.And,infact,pressreleasehe issued inresponsetothePresident'sspeechonLibyawasblandandvague;itverycarefully worded andonlyveryslightlyinoppositiontothePresident(Kohl2011). fourteen-point margin,hispopularityhaddeterioratedby2011.ApollreleasedinJuly2011 Wisconsinites saidtheU.S.wasinbadtimeseconomically.Sixty-ninepercentreportedthatthey being dissatisfiedwiththewaythingsweregoinginU.S.attime.Nine10 indicated thatonly50%approvedofObama'sjobperformance,and64%respondentsreported disapproved ofthewayCongresswashandlingitsjob,and59%saidtheythoughtitmore important forthefederalgovernmenttofocusitsattentiononcreatingjobsandreducing unemployment (Kniss2011).Withnumberslikethis,Kohl'sactionsonLibya--averymild distancing ofhimselffromthePresident--becomeeasiertounderstand. retirement untiltwomonthsafterhetookaposition onLibya(Cillizza2011b).Thus,asbest retirement (Cillizza2011b).Thetimingisimportant, though:Kohldidnotannouncehis apparent responsiveness to theviewsofhisconstituentsmayreflectnotconcerns aboutre- election butsimplyhisbelief thatheshouldnotdosomethingofwhichhis constituentswould we canknow,hisposition-takingwasstilldonewith reelectioninmind.Otherwise,Kohl's Libya: Wiconsinites explainKohl'sactions.ThoughPresidentObamawonthestatebya One complicationisthatKohlnot,infact,running forreelection;hehasannouncedhis Rule ladescribestheactionsofSenatorsKohlandBaucus,Democratsin for the interventioninKosovo,soitishardtoarguethathisanti- 66 disapprove (coupledwithanassumptionthattheconstituents'lukewarmviewsofObama extended tohisdecisionaboutLibya). the electoralconnectionthesis.PresidentClintondidnotcarryMontanain1996,soatfirst Senator Baucus'ssupportfortheKosovointerventionmightseeminconsistentwiththatthesis. Democrats approvedofPresidentClinton'sjobperformance,asdidapluralityindependents But whenBaucusvotedin1999tosupporttheinterventionKosovo,nearly72%ofMontana only a40%approvalratinginMontanaandBaucus38%rating.Obamadid,however, (MSU BillingsPoll1999).Thesituationhadchangeddrasticallyby2011.AffordableCare Act hadmadebothBaucusandPresidentObamaunpopularinMontana:has have thesupportofover87%MontanaDemocrats(Johnson2011). of themissioninLibya,andIcontinuetoopposeU.S.involvementthiswar"(Schontzler more mildinhiscriticism.Heissuedastatementsaying:"Ihavedeepconcernsabouttheclarity been insufficientconsultation."Andhesaidwas concernedaboutalackofanexitstrategy 2011). Butatthesametime(inadifferentstoryondayinnewspaper)Baucus said thePresidenthadconstitutionalauthoritytointervene,althoughheadded:"Ithink president shouldhavebeenconsultingwithCongressmorethanhehas.I'mconcernedthere's supported aDemocraticPresident whowasverypopularinhisstate;heopposed anunpopular (Volz 2011).EspeciallyinlightofBaucus'slack acommitteeassignmentrelatedtoforeign Democratic President.But hisoppositionwasmild,perhapsbecausehe awarethatPresident Kosovo andLibyaissues--hisactionsseembestexplained bytheelectoralconnectionthesis.He affairs--which istosay,hispresumedlackofspecialized knowledgeorintenseinterestinthe Rule laalsoexplainstheactionsofSenatorBaucus,whichagainseemconsistentwith Baucus's responsetothissituationwaslikeKohl's.Infact,Baucusmanagedbeeven 67

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Obama remainedverypopularamongMontanaDemocrats,andSenatorBaucusdidnotwantto alienate hispartyorriskaprimarychallenge. Rule 2:RepublicanswillopposethePresident. be motivatedbypartisanship--whichmightinturnexplainedideologyorelectoral voted againstbothinterventions.AswiththeDemocratsofGroupOne,theseRepublicansmight prospects--by personalpolicyconvictionsthatcorrelatewithparty,orbyanelectoralinterestin opposing thePresident.OnlythreeoftheseRepublicanssitonrelevantcommittees,suggesting that theyarenotprimarilyinterestedinforeignpolicyissues.TwooftheSenatorsGroup2do carried, andhevoteddifferentlyfromHarkin,hisfellowIowan,onbothKosovoLibya--facts present somewhatinterestingissues.GrassleyisfromastatethatbothClintonandObama that mightseemtounderminetheelectoralconnection.AndCollinsisanotablecontrastwith Snowe; SnowevotedforinterventioninKosovobutagainstLibya.AsIwillarguebelow, the varioustheories.Clearly,theirpersonalpolicyviewdoesnotexplainvotes:Kosovoand however, theelectoralconnectionthesiscanaccountforthesecases. Libya weresubstantivelysimilarenoughthatitwould behardtoarguethattheseSenators simply feltdifferentlyabouttheinterventions.But Nincic'sargumentaboutelectoralcycles--a refinement oftheElectoralConnectionthesis--seems toexplaintheactionsofthreeGroup Three Republicans.OfthefourRepublicansinGroup Three,Hatch,Lugar,andSnowewereup for electionin2000(immediately afterKosovo)andareupforreelectionin 2012. Rule 2describestheactionsofSenatorsinGroup2,allthemRepublicanswho The RepublicansinGroupThree--whochangedtheirviews--againprovideawaytotest 68 case, wouldhavefaced enough (Lobianco2012).SupportforPresidentObama'spolicies,inanyform,mighthave oppose theinterventioninLibyadespitepriorsupportforKosovo.Itishardtoresist damaged theirchancesintheprimary.TheMayhewiancourseofactionthissituationisto conclusion thattheseSenatorsvotedentirelyontheirelectoralprospectsandnotpersonal policy convictions. Clinton's action!SoitisdifficulttobelievethatMcConnellopposedtheLibyainterventionon supported themilitaryactioninKosovo;hecosponsoredresolutionsupportofPresident Libya, McConnellwascallingforano-flyzone(Berger2011).Butoncetheinterventionin policy grounds.Infact,beforeObamaannouncedhisintentiontoimplementano-flyzoneover the otherthreeRepublicansinthisgroup,wasnotfacingaprimarychallenge.Whatcaused Libya began,McConnellbegantocriticizethePresident(Kasperowicz2011).McConnell,unlike dramatic changeinMcConnell'sbehaviorbetween1999and2011? change between1999and2011:in2011,unlike1999,hewastheleaderofhisparty Senate. McConnell'sownstatementsconfirmthat partisanshipwascentraltohisdecision:he 11 would bedifferent.McConnellsaid:"Ithinksome oftheseviewswereprobablyheldbysome admitted that,ifaRepublicanwereintheWhiteHouse, thepositionofSenateRepublicans moved sodrasticallytotheright--line upwithherpolicyflipbetweenKosovoandLibya. Itispossiblethat,asa Libya occurredbeforethisannouncementsoitisafairassumption thatshewasactingtomaximizeherchancesof reelection whenshetookaposition onLibya.Thereasonsshegaveforretiring--amongthem thattheSenatehad matter ofpolicy,shewouldhave preferredtovoteforLibyabutfeltshecouldnot.Inany event,itisfairtoconsider her 2011actionsastaken tomaximizethechancesforreelection. SnoweannouncedinFebruary2012thatshewouldnotbeseeking reelection.However,therelevantactionson In 2012,however--unlikein2000--eachoftheseRepublicansisfacing(or,Snowe's There isonlyonemoreSenatorwhofitsRule2:McConnell.McConnellnot Partisanship seemstobetheexplanation.OnecrucialaspectofMcConnell'spositiondid 11 ) aprimaryopponentchallengingthemasbeingnotconservative 69

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••i•••••••• them" (Raju2012). my members--eveninthepreviousadministration--butpartyloyaltytendedtokindofmute concerned abouthisownpowerwithintheparty;itwouldunderminepositioninpartyto support aDemocraticPresidentwhenmostofhisRepublicancolleagueswereopposed.Orhe may againhavebeenconcernedaboutelectoralprospects;aRepublicanendorsementof explanation oftheotherRepublicansinGroupThree,thatthesisisconsistentwith(althoughnot election chances.Sowhiletheelectoralconnectionthesisseemstobeonlyplausible the onlyexplanationof)McConnell'sactionsaswell. President Obama'spolicies,especiallyfromthepartyleader,couldonlyenhancere- Rule 2a:Theexceptionto2iswhenamember'sownindividualpolicyconvictionsare challenge. very strong Homeland Security/GovernmentalAffairscommittees.HehasmadeareputationintheSenate Rule 2a.AveteranoftheVietnamWar,McCainsitsonIntelligence,ArmedServicesand was passed,McCainintroducedaresolutionauthorizing Clintontouse"allnecessaryforce"in for havinganespeciallystronginterestinforeign affairs. BeforetheBidenresolutiononKosovo degree the formerYugoslavia--thatis,McCainproposed a resolutionthatsupportedClinton cosponsored athirdwith Senator Kerry.McCainhasthedistinctionofbeing theonlyRepublican issues. InadditiontohisworkonKosovo,hesponsored tworesolutionsonLibyaand Of course,"partisanship"itselfisnotacompleteexplanation.McConnellmayhavebeen than didBiden(CNNPolitics1999).McCainisnot asimple"positiontaker"onthese Senator McCain,whosupportedmilitaryactioninbothcases,istheobviousexampleof and supporting thePresidentdoesnotputmemberatriskofaprimary 70 to agreater to supporttheinterventionsinbothKosovoandLibya,furtherindicatingthat,forhim,these his biographyasaprisonerofwarinVietnamhasinformedpolicypositionsandsupport positions reallyareamatterofpersonalpolicyconvictions.McCainhasevenspokenabouthow for Presidentialuseofforce(Jackson2008). believe thattheirvotesinfavoroftheKosovointerventionreflectedpolicyviews.They each hadbeenre-electedpreviouslybyacomfortablemargin.Theywerevotingagainstparty orthodoxy and,therefore,theirvotescouldnothavebeencalculatedtoenhancepowerin involved inforeignpolicyquestions(Langhorne2012).Moreover,as these Senators,theircontraryactionsinconnectionwithLibyacanbeexplainedbytheprospect the Senate.LugarsitsonForeignRelationsCommitteeandhasalonghistoryofbeing of aprimarychallenge.Alikelyexplanation,therefore,isthattheyvotedforinterventionin Kosovo becausethatvotereflectedtheirpolicyviewsanddidnotunderminechancesofre- the electoralconnectionisanimportantdeterminantofSenators'behavior--althoughnotonly Rule 2b:TheotherexceptiontoTwoiswhen, becauseoftherallyeffect,Senatorscan determining factor,becausepolicyviewsaresometimesdecisive. election. Onceathreattotheirre-electionarose,positionschanged.Thisagainsuggeststhat explain theirvoteasafornationalsecurity ratherthanavoteforthePresident. Three Republicanstovote forthatinterventionwithoutdamagingtheirre-election chances. the Kosovointervention (Samples 2011,10).Thismayalsohavemadeitpossible fortheGroup in 2000.PresidentClintonwasabletocreatealittle bitofarallyeffectthroughhissupportfor Senators Hatch,Lugar,andSnowemayalsofitintothiscategory.Thereisgoodreasonto The rallyeffectisanotherpossibleexplanationfor theGroupThreeRepublicans'votes 71 I explained, foreachof

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• There wasverylittletonorallyeffectforPresidentObamaonLibya,bycontrast(Mak2011).To the extentrallyeffectplayedarole,itconfirmselectoralconnectionthesis.Butinviewof how safetheseSenators'seatswerein2000,andoftheir(Lugar'sparticular)long-standing interest inforeignaffairs,therallyeffectseemslikeamuchlessimportantexplanationthan Senators' abilitytoadvancetheirpolicyviewswithoutfacinganintra-partychallenge. Rule 3:RetirementallowsSenatorstovotetheirpolicyviews. The onlyapparentexplanationfortheirchangeinpositionisthatbothwillretireafter two SenatorstoopposetheinterventioninKosovowhilesupportingLibya. current term,astheyannouncedin2011(Catanese2011;Trygstad2011).Thisexplanationmay intervention outofpartisanorelectoralconcernseventhoughhewouldhavebeencomfortable with theinterventiononpolicygrounds.Then,whenheknewwasleavingSenate,felt work forKyl.ItsuggeststhathejoinedhisRepublicancolleaguesinopposingtheKosovo free tovotehispro-interventionpolicyviewsonLibya.ButsinceseveralotherRepublicans supported theKosovoaction--recallthatMcConnellco-sponsoredaresolutioninsupport,and McCain, Kyl'sfellowArizonan,wasenthusiasticallyinsupport--thisexplanationfor of thevote,andPresidentBushcarriedArizonafairly easily(Trandahl2001).AsfortheLibya Kosovo voteisnotentirelyconvincing.Kyl'sSenate seatwassecure;hewonin2000with79% so constituentopinionseemsnottohavebeenafactor. Kyldoesnotserveonarelevant committee, sohemaynothavewell-developedviews ontheissue;perhapshevotedasdidso that McCain,hiscolleague, wouldnotbetheonlyRepublicansupporting interventionin vote, Kyl'shometownnewspapermentionedtheLibya conflict55times,whichisbelowaverage, Libya, andthevotewascostless forKylbecauseofhisimminentretirement. Senators BingamanandKylpresentaparticularlyinterestingcase.Theyweretheonly 72 of thevotein2000(Trandahl2011).HewasaDemocratwhoopposedDemocraticPresident. (Trandahl 2011),butsinceGoredidwinthestate,andBingamanhimselfwasverypopular,itis Gore barelycarriedNewMexicointhePresidentialelection,winningbyafractionofpercent unlikely thatBingamanopposedtheKosovointerventionbecauseofClinton'sunpopularityin New Mexico.HisvoteonLibyasuggeststhathispolicyviews,unlesstheychangedforsome relevant committee,soitisunlikelythathehadwellworked-outviews.Hishometown reason, wouldhavesupportedinterventioninKosovo.LikeKyl,hewasnotamemberof newspaper mentionedtheconflictinLibyaonly30times,wellbelowaverage,soadesireto represent hisconstituentswasalsounlikelytohavebeenafactor.Lackinganyotherexplanation, when facedwithanimminentelection,bothopposedtheintervention;onlyretirement looming, bothsupportedObamaonLibya--buttheargumentisnotstrong. Bingaman andKylmayperhapsbetakentosupportNincic'sargumentaboutelectioncycles-- reduced salienceintheirconstituency. Rule 4:Membersaremorelikelytobeinactiveonanyissuewhenitisofsufficiently unaware oftheissue.Thiscanhaveonetwoeffects onaSenator.First,believingher discretion andactaccordingtoherownpolicypreferences. Or,second,shemaybemoreinthe constituency tobeuninformedandapathetic,she may seizetheopportunityforincreased focus onothersubjects. mold thatBurgindescribesandhavemanyimportant demandsonhertime.Inthiscase,shemay view anuninformedconstituency asonethatpermitshertoremaininactive ontheissueand Bingaman isanevenmorecuriouscase.LikeKyl,hehadasafeseat;wonnearly62% "Reduced salience"cancomefromanumberoffactors.Theconstituencysimplymaybe 73

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Related to this situation is the constituency that considers a separate issue to have

significant salience. In this situation, regardless of personal policy convictions, the Senator may •••••••

• sense a disincentive toward action on the foreign policy issue; she will not want to be accused of

ignoring the issues that matter most to her constituency and instead focusing on esoteric matters

that the constituency does not care about. So she will remain inactive on the foreign policy •••• question, preferring to act on the issues of great salience to her constituency. Each of these

•• scenarios will be explored in greater detail below, but before discussing members who were

inactive on either the issue of Libya or Kosovo, one more chart is necessary to illustrate the ••

positions of these Senators. •• Group Five: Group Six: Group Seven: Support K, Inactive on L Oppose K, Inactive on L Inactive on Both •• Akaka Enzi Cochran • .Conrad Inouye Leahy Mikulski ••• Murray Shelby

•• Landrieu Johnson Schumer

Inactive on both interventions, Cochran has effectively removed himself from the sample;

••••• because of this inactivity, it is hard to draw many conclusions. It may be that he simply does not

care about foreign affairs. It may be that he missed the vote on Kosovo for a fluke reason (illness,

••• for example) and did not care to get involved on Libya for the same reasons as any other

member. But with no background information, we cannot speculate. •• First, consider Group Five. These are the Democrats (plus one Republican, Shelby) who •• supported Clinton on Kosovo but who did not take a position on Libya. There are two actions to •

•• 74 •• • explain: theirvoteforKosovo,andlackofactiononLibya.First,considertheKosovovote. that PresidentClintonwonin1996and,throughsomecombinationofpersonalpolicy On thisvote,theseDemocratsfallunderRule1:allexceptConradandJohnsonrepresentstates preferences, electoralrewards,partyloyalty,andtheotherpossibleexplanationsIcanvassed explained. Thereareavarietyofdifferentfactors;sometimes,compellingexplanationsexist,but above, theseSenatorsvotedtosupporttheirPresident.TheirinactivityonLibyathenmustbe sometimes thisisnotthecase.TheseSenatorswilleachbeconsideredinturn. "deserved" anotherterm.NumberslikethisshouldhaveplacedSenatorSchumerinGroupOne, the conflictinLibya,between55and64%ofNewYorkvotersapprovedSchumer.Thesame salient totheirconstituencies.SenatorSchumerisoneoftheseSenators.Pollsfoundthat,during (Quinnipiac UniversityPollingInstitute2011).Largemajoritiesalsosaidthat,iftheelection polls foundthatPresidentObamahadanapprovalratingbetween53and60%duringtheconflict salient forhisconstituency.Duringtherelevantperiod, Senator Schumer'scommitteeplacements,which have aheavyemphasisonfinancialand were heldonthedayofpoll,thattheywouldvoteforObama'sreelectionandhe like otherDemocrats.ButSchumerremainedinactive,likelybecauseissuesweremore Libya 73times--justaboutaverage.Aclueformoresalientissuescanbefoundbylookingat business issues.ThismakessensefortheSenator from NewYorkwho,afterall,doescountthe in the The members ofWallStreetamonghisconstituents.Indeed, duringthetimewhen"Libya"appeared because oftheirnationalorientation, Ididnotexaminethemforevidenceaboutthesalience ofissuestolocalvoters. 12 Thenewspaperswiththehighest circulationinNewYorkarethe Daily News Daily News First considerSenatorswhoremainedinactiveonLibyabecauseotherissuesweremore is thethird-largestnewspaper. only 73times,"WallStreet"wasmentioned550times. Thissupportsthe 75 New YorkTimes New YorkDailyNews and the Wall StreetJournal, 12 mentioned but

•••••••••••••••••!•••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • • • literature's argument that domestic--and particularly, financial--concerns tend to trump foreign • • affairs. Furthermore, Schumer's inactivity seems to follow Burgin's argument: without a push • from constituents and without personal interest, Senators will decline to be involved. All of these • • descriptions fit this situation. Senator Schumer seems to have calculated that, despite high approval ratings, he needed to remain inactive on Libya and focus his attention on economic • issues because these topics were of such great salience to his constituency. • 40 Senator Landrieu is in a similar position though with less support at home. A December • • 2010 Public Policy Polling (PPP) survey found that she her disapproval rating was twelve points • higher than her approval rating (Jensen 2010b). Further, after the 2010 midterms, she was left as • • the only state-wide official elected from Democratic Party (Alpert 2011). A RealClearPolitics • poll in 2011 found that, while Senator Landrieu had an approval rating of 50 percent, President

• Obama had only a 37 percent approval rating (Deslatte 2011). These factors would have made it • difficult for Senator Landrieu to support President Obama on Libya--the fact that she sits on

• committees that are not entirely relevant to foreign policy (Government Affairs) only seems to • support this argument. Interestingly, her hometown newspaper, the Times-Picayune, mentioned

• Libya 251 times in the time period measured--one of the highest counts for any Senator. But, like • Schumer, Senator Landrieu was busy working on issues of even greater salience for her • • constituency: the phrase "oil spill" was mentioned 2,930 times during the period that Libya was 40 mentioned 251 times. Thus between lukewarm support at home, only marginally-relevant

committees, and an issue of comparatively low salience, Senator Landrieu seems to have • calculated that she could remain inactive on Libya. • • For other Senators, the explanation seems to lie less in their preoccupation with other

• issues and more with their personal apathy. Consider Senator Leahy. His hometown newspaper •

• 76 • •• • • • mentioned Libya only seven times--one of the fewest totals of any senator in the pool. While • 4111 Leahy's committee assignments sometimes have an international focus (for example, he sits on • the Appropriations subcommittees that fund the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland • • Security), he does not sit on a committee that has jurisdiction over warfare or the armed services. • Given that the Libya debate was suspended to deal with the debt crisis--a topic over which • • Leahy's committees might have jurisdiction--it is possible his attention was elsewhere. But it is • equally likely that, without a proven interest in the topic and without constituent interest spurring • him forward, Senator Leahy decided against taking a position on Libya. • Senator Johnson (of South Dakota) is an even more extreme case than Senator Leahy. • Because while Senator Leahy represents a state that can consistently be considered a Democratic • state, Senator Johnson does not have the same electoral security. A February 2011 poll found that • 47% of South Dakotans approved of his work, with 41% disapproving. He received broad • support from Democrats and Independents and even polls ahead of most Senators with cross- • 4111 party support (i.e. with Republicans) (Jensen 2011c). However, a 2011 poll found President •

Obama to have only a 41% approval rating in South Dakota (Jones 2011b), and Johnson's • • hometown newspaper only mentioned the conflict in Libya twice. Senator Johnson does not sit • on any committees that have jurisdiction over foreign relations. Part Rule 1 a, part Rule 4, all the • numbers point to Senator Johnson's remaining inactive on the issue of Libya. •4b Of the G39, Senator Conrad seems most similar to Senator Johnson, and neither was • active on the issue of Libya, but their backgrounds are different enough that it is less clear what • motivated Conrad's lack of involvement. North Dakota was rated the 17th most conservative state • and Conrad's seat was always considered a target for Republican capture in 2012, even before • • Conrad announced his retirement (Elliott 2011). However, Senator Conrad's hometown •• 77 • • • 4110 • • newspaper mentioned the conflict in Libya 73 times, a tally that is nearly exactly average. • • Further, Conrad sits on the Intelligence Committee, so he may have at least some personal

• interest in foreign affairs. While these characteristics--retirement, personal interest, moderate • • constituency interest--predict Conrad to be involved, or at least to have the freedom to vote his • conscience, he remained inactive. One possible explanation is that his appointment to the • ID Intelligence Committee may have come because of the quotas that committee has for • membership. The Intelligence Committee is technically the "Senate Select Committee on

• Intelligence" because members must be placed on the committee by a certain mechanism; it does • not seat members in the same way as the other committees. The committee's website explains: • • "By resolution, the 15 SSCI members include two members (one per side) from the

Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Judiciary Committees in order to ensure • • appropriate coordination with those Committees" ("About the Committee"). So it is possible • Conrad's seat on the Intelligence committee is not entirely due to personal interest in the topic. • •• Another possible explanation is that, after announcing his retirement, the Senator no longer had any desire to take part in divisive issues. • • Senators Akaka and Inouye, both of Hawaii, follow the same logic, though in less • extreme form. In a 2011 poll, PPP found Akaka to have an approval rating of 48% and a • • disapproval rating of 38% (Jensen 2011a). He sits on a committee that deals with homeland • • security issues and represents a state that Obama won in 2008. But his hometown paper

• mentioned the Libya conflict only 53 times, which is below average. Further, Senator Akaka • • announced his retirement just twenty-four days before President Obama's public announcement

• about the intervention in Libya. These last two factors likely combine to explain Akaka's silence:

• between a comparatively apathetic constituency and the lack of any electoral pressure, he simply did notseeanymotivationtobeinvolved.HiscolleaguefromHawaiiisoneofthemostpopular Senators--a 2011PPPsurveyfoundSenatorInouye'sapproval/disapprovalnumbersat62/23 with strongsupportamongindependentsandevenRepublicans(Jensen2011a).Inouyedoesnot lukewarm constituencyintensityseemtohavecombinedkeepInouyefromtakingaposition. sit onarelevantcommittee,however,andthisapparentlackofpersonalinterestalongwith from Hawaii.HerhometownnewspapermentionedtheLibyaconflict96times,whichisjust (Jensen 2011d).ApolldonealittlewhilelaterfoundPresidentObama'sapprovalratingtobe above average.AMay2011pollfoundherapprovalratingtobe50%,with42%disapproving 50% inWashington(Jones2011b).WhileMurraysitsontheVeterans'Affairscommittee,she does notshowagreatdealofpersonalinterestinforeignaffairs.Again,lukewarmconstituency interest, borderlinepollingnumbers,andlackofpersonalinterestcombinedtokeepSenator Murray onthesidelines. and botharecuriouscasesbutfordifferentreasons.ConsiderSenatorShelby.Hishometown Obama is,notsurprisingly,veryunpopularinAlabama (Jones2011b),andopposingthe newspaper mentionedtheconflictinLibyaonlyseventeentimes--oneoffewestall was theonlyRepublicanwhovotedforKosovo didnotthenvoteagainstLibya.President 41/34 (Jensen2010a).Except SessionsisinGroupTwo:heopposed newspapers measured.Hedoesnotsitonarelevantcommittee.ExceptforSenatorMcCain,he intervention inLibyawouldlikelynothavecostShelby anything.Whynotsimplytakea fellow SenatorfromAlabama arenearlyidentical:Shelbyhasa44/34spread andSessionsisat position? Theanswerisnotclear.PPPnumbersindicate that,onapprovalratings,Shelbyandhis Senator MurrayofWashingtonfacesmanythesamecircumstancesassenators Senators MikulskiandShelbyaretheonlytwolefttoexplainfromGroupFive, 79 both interventions. Perhaps

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • the explanation is that Sessions sits on a relevant committee. Given their nearly identical • • numbers, lack of constituency interest at home, and an essentially free vote, it remains unclear why Shelby did not take a position on Libya. • • It is possible that Senator Shelby belongs in Group Two with Senator McCain. He may • support the intervention as a policy out of some personal conviction. This explains the Kosovo • vote. But he may have believed his constituency too rabidly anti-Obama to be able to vote for the

• President's policy. Rather than vote against the policy (because he actually supported the • intervention), he remained inactive rather than potentially face the fury of his constituents. But

• this is just speculation. In any event, given President Obama's unpopularity in Alabama, Senator • 5 Shelby's actions (or lack thereof) is at least consistent with the electoral connection thesis. • Senator Mikulski is perhaps the most curious case of all. Her hometown newspaper • mentioned the conflict in Libya 206 times, one of the most of all the papers sampled. And the • newspaper was clearly paying attention: when she failed to take a position on Libya, a scathing • • editorial, entitled "Mikulski's disappointing silence on Libya" was published, accusing her of S "dodging the issue." The editorial notes that she has a consistently Democratic voting record and • •• voted against the war in Iraq in 2002. She sits on the intelligence committee (though, again, as with Conrad, this could be less out of personal interest and instead due to quotas). She represents

• a solidly Democratic state and, indeed, is considered to have one of the safest seats in the entire • Senate. A PPP survey described her situation as "unlikely to change" and said that she faced "no • serious contenders" (Jensen 2010c). Indeed, the survey found that she had greater Republican • support than the Republican candidate (Jensen 2010c). As with Shelby, it would seem that • • Mikulski faced no cost for taking a position on Libya aligned with her party's. And, as with 410 • Shelby, the standard analysis of the numbers is not illuminating. •

• 80 • • • The last group to explain, Group Six, contains only Enzi of Wyoming His is not a very • interesting case. Like Shelby, he declined to vote on the question of Libya; unlike Shelby, this is • not likely because of his personal policy preferences because he voted against the intervention in • Kosovo. Thus his Kosovo vote is a simple example of Rule 2. Enzi may have been inactive on • Libya for any number of reasons. He does not sit on a relevant committee and his hometown • newspaper only mentioned the conflict four times. This count was the fourth-lowest of any • newspaper counted; the other three members of this low end were also inactive on Libya. Thus, •I the lack of a constituent-based incentive to participate likely explains Enzi's inactivity. • The final question, so far as the electoral connection thesis is concerned, involves the • • Senators from Iowa: Senators Harkin and Grassley. Harkin voted for both interventions and • S Grassley voted against both. They may, of course, just have different policy views. But since • they represent the same state, their differences might seem to undermine the electoral connection S • thesis. It is difficult to argue that they were both responding to public opinion in the constituency • or to constituency intensity because they seem to serve the same constituency. coS In fact, it may be the case that they serve different constituencies in crucial but subtle S ways. A 2011 poll found Harkin to have an approval/disapproval split of 47/38, while Grassley • S has a 57/30 split--he was found to be the most popular elected official in the entire state (Jensen s 2011b). There is not much cross-party appeal for either Senator. Seventy-five percent of • Democrats approve of Harkin, as compared to 17% of Republicans and 43% of Independents. Grassley does slightly better, with 80% approval from Republicans, 38% from Democrats, and •I 55% from Independents. Of those who voted for Obama in 2008,73% approve of Harkin; of • those who voted for McCain, 74% approve of Grassley (Jensen 2011b). There is also no clear • • 81 S •S • • • • dominant party in the state. The Secretary of State reported 695,125 registered Democrats and

• 646,397 Republicans in March 2011 (Iowa Secretary of State 2011). • Harkin and Grassley may, then, be appealing to different constituencies within the state. • • Each is concerned to maintain the loyalty of his followers while, presumably, appealing to • potential swing voters on other issues. This contrast of Harkin and Grassley suggests what • • several other examples also suggest: that the electoral connection thesis is central to • understanding Senators' votes, even on Kosovo and Libya, but that the thesis is not the sole • • explanation and that it must be refined in certain ways--for example, to allow for the possibility

• of a Senator's appealing not to his entire state-wide constituency but to a group within the state. • • This is a return to Fenno's theory about the concentric constituencies: while Harkin and Grassley • have the same.geographic constituency, they have different reelection and primary • constituencies. Thus they can both be appealing to their constituencies even when they vote • differently. • •• •• • • • • • • • 82 • • V. Conclusion congressional decisionmakingsuggestsanumberofindependentvariablesthatexplainMC MCs careaboutreelectionandactinawaythatmaximizestheirchancesofbeingreelected.The action. Mayhew'sseminalworkon"theelectoralconnection"arguedthat,firstandforemost, rally-`round-the-flag effectcanbeseenasanapplicationofMayhew:thepublicralliesto MCs aresensitivetochangesinpublicopinion.FennoofferedanalternativeMayhew,arguing to producegoodpublicpolicy.FennofoundthatMCswhositonparticularcommitteeshave that althoughMCscareaboutpublicopinion,theymayhaveothergoalstoo,includingthedesire side ofthePresidentintimesnationalcrisis,Congresstendstosupportbecause different outlooksandviewsonthepurposeofbeingalegislator.Theideologypartisanship literature isanapplicationofFenno'sargument.Asthepartieshavebecomemorehomogeneous Congress illuminatesthechallengePresidentfaceswhenhelookstobuildacoalitionin ideologically, partymembershiphasbecomeabetterproxyforpolicyviewsthaneverbefore, and partisanship,includingpartylinevotes,ismorecommon.Understandingthisdynamicin that theconstituencywasakeyfactorinMCdecision-making, butheassertedthatthe opinion werehighlyexplanatory.Burginarguedabout whatshecharacterizedasforeignpolicy support ofhisdecisions. constituency mustfeelparticularlystronglyabout agivenissuefortheMCtofeelpressure follow publicopinion.ForKingdon,thesalienceof theissueandintensityofconstituency involved intheissueatall. But,shesuggeststhatMCsmayconsulttheirown viewsofgood issues, sayingthattheissues mustbesalienttotheconstituencybeforeaMC willbecome What affectsCongressionalresponsestoPresidentialwaraction?Theliteratureon Two authorsaimedtosynthesizethesetwobroadschoolsofthought.Kingdonargued 83

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • public policy, and will be influenced by their committee placements, when deciding the nature • • and extent of their involvement.

The cases of Kosovo and Libya offer a natural experiment in which to test these • • hypotheses about MC decision-making. In both cases, the United States intervened in a conflict 410 within a nation that was not an international or regional power. In both cases, international • attention was focused on the actions of a dictator engaged in a military assault on his own

• people, and the U.S. intervened to stop the dictator. In both instances, the President initially • • justified his decision to intervene, at the outset of U.S. military action, by invoking the actions of

• an international body--NATO, the United Nations, or both--rather than specific congressional • 411 authorization. Both U.S. interventions proceeded by using a combination of targeted air strikes • and the maintenance of a no-fly zone. No U.S. ground troops were involved in either operation. 41/ • No U.S. soldiers were killed in combat in either operation, and the combat portion of both • • operations was over within months.

• I developed a series of rules to describe Senators' actions on the interventions in Kosovo 411 and Libya. There were two types of Senators: those who switched their positions between • • Kosovo and Libya and voted differently, and those who did not switch. Kosovo and Libya 411 constitute a natural experiment because they present such similar policy issues. The natural 4110 experiment allows me to identify with more specificity the variables that influenced those • Senators who switched their votes. With respect to the Senators who did not switch their votes, • my analysis leaves open a greater number of possible explanations. • • The votes of those who did not switch their position can be explained by a combination

• of the electoral connection, policy preferences, and partisanship schools of thought. Votes • •• correlated strongly, although not entirely, with partisan affiliation. The Senators who voted along •• 84 • • party lines may have done so because they thought it would maximize their reelection chances. • Or they may have been concerned with maintaining or enhancing their position within the party S caucus in the Senate. But, given the homogeneity of the parties with respect to policy orientation, • it is also possible that these Senators' votes reflected their personal policy views. Only one S Senator, Senator McCain, crossed party lines on both votes, and his behavior seems to reflect • well-known policy views. The experiment does not test in a way that allows us to separate these • variables in this case; but I can say that, in general, the behavior of these MCs is not inconsistent • with the electoral connection thesis. S The second group of Senators is those who switched their votes between Kosovo and • Libya. It is unlikely that these Senators changed their policy views between the two votes. I was • able to explain their changed votes by using a version of the electoral connection thesis. At the • time of the second vote, on Libya, these Senators had to appeal to a constituency that was much • • less important when they cast their first vote. Specifically, at the time of the Libya vote, these • Senators were facing an intra-party primary challenge; they therefore had to appeal to a more • highly partisan constituency, not just to their state-wide constituency. So their behavior confirms • the electoral connection thesis, although that thesis must be refined to allow for the possibility • that different constituencies will become relevant at different times. • It has sometimes been said--perhaps just as an aspiration--that American politics "stops at • the water's edge." Consistent with that maxim, the electoral connection thesis has been S developed, in the literature, to explain votes on domestic issues. Surveys show that foreign • policy issues are consistently less relevant to members of the public; thus it seems possible that • politics could stop at the water's edge. But in this thesis, I have found that, at least in a certain • subset of foreign policy votes, the electoral connection still seems to hold. I have, I believe, • 85 •S S •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• plausibly extendedtheelectoralconnectiontoanareaofpoliticswhichitwasnotpreviously established thattheconnectionshouldextend. the interventionsinKosovoandLibyaofferamodelofwarfuture:choice waged inalandthatis,otherwise,unimportanttoUnitedStatesgrandstrategy,andby means ofairstrikesthatminimizetheriskU.S.casualties.ForreasonsIexplained,future operations thatinvolvetheriskofnumerousU.S.casualties.Groundkindare American militaryinterventionsabroadarelikelytotakethisform,asopposedground even forrelativelylow-visibilitymilitaryinterventionslikethoseinKosovoandLibya. likely tobemuchmoresalientvoters.ButIhavefoundthattheelectoralconnectionholds between theKosovoandLibyainterventions,thereweresomeelementsthatIcouldnotcontrol for. ClintonwasinhissecondtermwhileObamaisfirstandwillstandforre-election. There istheissueofsequence:LibyawasfirstwarthatPresidentObamainitiatedwhereas Kosovo wasnotPresidentClinton'sfirstwaraction.But,ontheotherhand,evenwhile him) inIraqandAfghanistan;PresidentClintonwasnotfacingacomparablesituation.The intervening inLibya,PresidentObamawasdealingwithongoinggroundwars(notinitiatedby Libya interventionhadtocompetefornewscoverage andvoterattentionwithaveryhighprofile domestic issue--theaftermathofthefinancialcrisis andtheeconomicrecession--inawaythat was nottruefortheKosovointervention. (Democrats inGroupOneandRepublicans Two)totryunderstandwhetherthese votes wereprimarilymotivated bypolicyorelectoralconcerns.Andwhile I uncoverednoreason And thisisnotjustanysubsetofforeignpolicyvotes.AsIoutlinedintheintroduction, Future researchcantesttheseclaimsinmorespecificways.Despiteallthesimilarities Future researchcouldlooktountanglethemotivations oftheparty-linevoters 86 obvious thatcloseattention tovoters'immediateresponseswillleadgood decisions.Edmund overcomes theirpolicyviewsonthesecrucialPresidential decisions.Iamnotsurethatthisis, different setofvariablesfromtheinterventioninLibya.Obamamaybehissecondtermby reelection, which,accordingtomyfindings,couldaffecttheirvotes.Forexample,Hatchand knowledge andcarefuljudgment; thestakesarehigh,calculationsdifficult, anditisnot itself--there arefeedbackeffects;thelikelihoodofoppositioninSenatemightinfluence against PresidentObamaonSyriatomaximizetheirchancesforreelection.Moreover,whileI absence ofaprimarychallenge.ButLandrieuandJohnson,forexample,wouldbefacing that thesetwoSenators--followingRulela,liketheDemocratsinGroupThree--wouldvote the Afghanistanwarinasignificantway.AdifferentsetofSenatorswouldbefacingimminent time hedecidestointervene.ThewarinIraqisoverandObamamaynolongerbedealingwith to interveneintheconflictSyria,ongoingforlastyear.Thisdecisioncouldintroducea the sameruleswouldapplytoaRepublicanPresidentandDemocraticmembersofCongress--a to believethattheruleswereasymmetricalbetweenparties--thatis,asfarmyfindingsgo, Lugar mightreturntotheirpreviously-heldpolicypositionsandvotefortheinterventionin study mightbeconductedtotrytestthatassumption. President's decisionaboutSyria. normatively, agoodsituation.Questionsaboutmilitary interventionrequirespecialized have studiedonlytheSenatorialresponsetoPresidentialdecisions--notPresident'sdecision reelection instead;ratherthanremaininactive,astheydidonLibya,myfindingswouldpredict war ofthefuture,politicswillextendbeyond water's edgeasMCs'desiretobere-elected These findingsallowustospeculateaboutwhatmayhappenifPresidentObamadecides What lessonshavewelearned?Atthemostgeneral level,itseemslikelythat,withthe 87

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • • • Burke's famous formulation of the duties of a representative may be especially appropriate for • • foreign policy decisions of this kind: "Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but

• his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion" (Burke • • 1774). It remains an open question whether politics might again play less of a role beyond the 411 water's edge as representatives recognize an obligation to develop and use their best judgment. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 88 •

•••

Appendix

Appendix A: Senators, Positions, Involvement The charts below contain the following variables: Senator, party, retirement in 2012, vote on Kosovo, vote on Libya, activity on Libya, switch of position and the direction of the switch, explanation of action on Libya, Kosovo committee, and Libya committee. Each chart is accompanied by a paragraph explaining how the information was found. Most of this ••••••• information is in the public record and can be found easily with a simple internet search. For ease of presentation, the data appear in a series of charts. The first is the basic biographical information of each Senator. The second is the positions on Kosovo and Libya plus any note of a position change. The third is Kosovo and Libya committee placements.

Biographical Information Retirement dates were found using an internet search; the sources for each announcement can be found in the bibliography. ••••••

Senator Party State Announced

Senator Party State Announced •• Retirement Retirement Akaka D HI Mar 3,2011 Kohl D WI May 13,2012 Baucus D MT Kyl R AZ Feb 10,2011 Bingaman 0 NM Feb 8,2011 Landrieu D LA Boxer D CA Leahy D VT •••• Cochran R MS Levin D MI Collins R ME Lieberman D/I CT Jan 19,2011 • Conrad D ND Jan 18,2011 Lugar R IN Crapo R ID McCain R AZ Durbin D IL McConnell R KY Enzi R WY Mikulski D MD Feinstein D CA Murray D WA Grassley R IA Reed D RI

Harkin D IA Reid D NV •••••• Hatch R UT Roberts R KS Hutchison R TX Jan 13,2011 Rockefeller D WV Inhofe R OK Schumer D NY Inouye D HI Sessions R AL ••• Johnson D SD Shelby R AL Kerry D MA Snowe R ME 2012 Wyden D OR

89 •••••••••••• •

•••• Position Information

Senator position was derived from a variety of sources for Libya. Searches of THOMAS, the search engine of the Library of Congress, will find floor speeches and sponsored resolutions, as well as list cosponsors and major actions on each resolution. Each Senator's homepage will turn up press releases and, sometimes, floor speeches. Kosovo position was determined by the Senator's vote on the McCain resolution ("Roll Call Vote on the Concurrent Resolution S. Con. Res. 21"). Senators who took no discoverable action on Libya were given a zero. ••••••• Senator Air Strikes Change in Libya Senator Air Strikes Change in Libya in Opinion activity in Opinion activity Kosovo? Kosovo? Akaka Yes Pos/Zero 0 Kohl Yes Pos/Neg 0 Baucus Yes Pos/Neg -1 Kyl No Zero/Pos 3 Bingaman No Neg/Pos 2 Landrieu Yes Pos/Zero 0

••••• Boxer Yes 2 Leahy Yes Pos/Zero 0 Cochran (missing) (missing) 0 Levin Yes 3 Collins No -1 Lieberman Yes 3 •• Conrad Yes Pos/Zero 0 Lugar Yes Pos/Neg -3 Crapo No -1 McCain Yes 3

•• Durbin Yes 2 McConnell Yes Pos/Neg -2 Enzi No Neg/Zero 0 Mikulski Yes Pos/Zero 0 Feinstein Yes 3 Murray Yes Pos/Zero 0 Grassley No -2 Reed Yes 2 Harkin Yes 1 Reid Yes 2

•••• Hatch Yes Pos/Neg -1 Roberts No -1 Hutchison No -3 Rockefeller Yes 1 Inhofe No -3 Schumer Yes Pos/Zero 0 Inouye Yes Pos/Zero 0 Sessions No -2 Johnson Yes Pos/Zero 0 Shelby Yes Pos/Zero 0 Kerry Yes 3 Snowe Yes Pos/Neg -1

••••• Wyden Yes Pos/Neg -1 ••••••••

90 •••• •• •• •

Commitee Information

Committee placement for Libya can be found by visiting any Senator's government homepage, the URL for which is [senator's last name] .senate.gov (for example, akaka.senate.gov). Kosovo committee information can be found at the congressional committee information page at

opensecrets.org. Select the desired committee and the appropriate Congress (the 106th, in the case •••••• of Kosovo) to see the roster for each committee. Only the "relevant" committees are listed.

Senator Kosovo Libya Senator Kosovo Libya •• Committee Committee Committee Committee Akaka Govt Affairs Govt Affairs Kohl Baucus Kyl Bingaman ArmSery Landrieu ArmSery GovtAffairs Boxer ForeignRel ForeignRel Leahy Cochran Govt Affairs Levin Govt Affairs Intelligence ArmSery ArmSery

Govt Affairs ••••••• Collins Govt Affairs ArmSery Lieberman Govt Affairs ArmSery Govt Affairs ArmSery Govt Affairs Conrad Intelligence Lugar ForeignRel ForeignRel Crapo McCain ArmSery Intelligence ArmSery Govt Affairs Durbin Govt Affairs ForeignRel McConnell Intelligence Enzi Mikulski Intelligence ••••••• Feinstein Intelligence Murray Grassley Reed ArmSery ArmSery Harkin Reid Intelligence ••• Hatch Roberts ArmSery Hutchison Rockefeller Intelligence Inhofe ArmSery ArmSery Schumer ForeignRel

Inouye Sessions •••• Johnson Shelby ArmSery ArmSery Kerry ForeignRel ForeignRel Snowe

Wyden ArmSery Intelligence ••• •• •• •

91 •••• • • • Appendix B: Newspapers • The research design section explains how the newspaper data was discovered. The chart • below lists the Senator, the newspaper with the highest circulation in their state, and the number of mentions of "Libya" in the specified timeframe. The website mondotimes.com was used to • find the newspaper with the highest circulation in each state and to find the precise circulation • numbers. The first table is in ascending order of number of mentions of Libya. The second table • includes circulation information to understand whether the size of the paper affects coverage of international issues. It is sorted in ascending order of circulation. The graph that follows plots • "fixed mentions" as a function of circulation and clearly illustrates that there is no correlation • between the two variables. • Senator Newspaper Fixed Mentions Control • Mentions • Crapo Idaho Statesman 0 0 0 • Johnson Sioux Falls Argus Leader 2 2 0 • Cochran Jackson Clarion Ledger 3 3 0 • Enzi Casper Star Tribune 4 4 0 • Leahy Burlington Free Press 7 7 0 • Reed Providence Journal 9 9 0 • Collins Portland Press Herald 12 13 1 • Snowe Portland Press Herald 12 13 1 • Roberts Wichita Eagle 17 17 0 Sessions Birmingham News 17 17 0 • 0 Shelby Birmingham News 17 17 • Grassley Des Moines Register 19 20 1 • Harkin Des Moines Register 19 20 1 • Lugar Indianapolis Star 25 25 0 • Durbin Chicago Tribune 28 29 1 • Bingaman Albuquerque Journal 30 30 0 • Reid Las Vegas Review-Journal 39 40 1 • Baucus Billings Gazette 40 40 0 • McConnell Courier-Journal 47 47 0 • Akaka Honolulu Star-Advertiser 53 56 3 • Inouye Honolulu Star-Advertiser 53 56 3 • Kyl The Arizona Republic 55 58 3 • McCain The Arizona Republic 55 58 3 Conrad Forum of Fargo-Moorhead 73 74 1 • Schumer New York Daily News 73 80 3 • Hutchison Dallas Morning News 78 86 8 • 92 • Rockefeller Lieberman Landrieu Feinstein Mikulski Murray Senator Wyden Inhofe Kerry Boxer Hatch Levin Kohl Milwaukee JournalSentinel Salt LakeCityTribune The Sun(Baltimore) Portland Oregonian Charleston Gazette Detroit FreePress Hartford Courant The Oklahoman Times Picayune Boston Globe Seattle Times Newspaper LA Times LA Times Average Median 93 Mentions Fixed 135 131 131 129 254 251 206 179 154 147 313 96 91 77 53 Mentions 133 133 131 103 255 207 184 166 148 142 322 255 93 Control 12 2 7 2 2 2 7 5 9 4 1 1 1

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • Circulation Data • Senator Newspaper Fixed Mentions Control Circulation • Mentions • Enzi Casper Star Tribune 4 4 0 24,516 • Leahy Burlington Free Press 7 7 0 31,095 Johnson Sioux Falls Argus Leader 2 2 0 34,240 • Rockefeller Charleston Gazette 179 184 5 36,063 • Baucus Billings Gazette 40 40 0 37,310 • Crapo Idaho Statesman 0 0 0 47,724 • Conrad Forum of Fargo-Moorhead 73 74 1 51,165 • Collins Portland Press Herald 12 13 1 52,323 • Snowe Portland Press Herald 12 13 1 52,323 Jackson Clarion Ledger • Cochran _ 3 3 0 59,166 • Roberts Wichita Eagle 17 17 0 67,003 • Bingam an Albuquerque Journal 30 30 0 87,109 • Sessions Birmingham News 17 17 0 102,991 • Shelby Birmingham News 17 17 0 102,991 • Grassley Des Moines Register 19 20 1 105,151 Harkin Des Moines Register 19 20 1 105,151 • Hatch Salt Lake City Tribune 322 9 105,746 313 • Reed Providence Journal 9 9 0 122,558 • Akaka Honolulu Star-Advertiser 53 56 3 124,000 • Inouye Honolulu Star-Advertiser 53 56 3 124,000 • Inhofe The Oklahoman 129 131 2 132,294 • Lieberman Hartford Courant 147 148 1 135,363 • Landrieu Times Picayune 251 255 4 135,716 • McConnell Courier-Journal 47 47 0 142,801 • Mikulski The Sun (Baltimore) 206 207 1 170,510 • Lugar Indianapolis Star 25 25 0 171,662 • Kohl Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 91 93 2 188,819 • Kerry Boston Globe 154 166 12 205,939 Reid Las Vegas Review-Journal 39 40 1 213,078 • Detroit Free Press 142 7 Levin 135 234,579 • Wyden Portland Oregonian 254 255 1 242,784 • Murray Seattle Times 96 103 7 242,814 • Kyl The Arizona Republic 55 58 3 292,838 • McCain The Arizona Republic 55 58 3 292,838 • 94 • •••

Senator Newspaper Fixed Mentions Control Circulation Mentions Hutchison Dallas Morning News 78 86 8 409,642 Durbin Chicago Tribune 28 29 1 425,370 Boxer LA Times 131 133 2 572,998 Feinstein LA Times 131 133 2 572,998 ••••••• Schumer New York Daily News 73 80 3 605,677 •• Fixed Mentions (Y) as a Function of Circulation (in thousands) 320 O

280 ••••

O O 240 ••

200 O O •••• 160 O O O O 120 •••

O O 80 O

O •• 0 0 O 40

0 4 6 4) 0 130 260 390 520 650 •••••• •• • ••

95 ••• •••

• • • Appendix C: Electoral College Maps13 • 1996 ELECTORAL COLLEGE

• Dintcin 379 :159 • 2' EzaorogVo Needed For 14aorty • 20121200812094 200011996 1992:1988 1984 !IPSO 1976:1972 • • • • • • • • •411 • IP • 2008 ELECTORAL COLLEGE • 365 O,ama mcc.-173 MElerldeat Vetes Needed Fur Amity • RefeeqEtK;17.11S: 2012 :2006; 200412900 1996: 1992 1988 ; 1964 1980 1976: 1972 • • •• • • • • • 13 Both images are from RealClearPolitics. • 96 • •••

Bibliography ••• Abrams, Samuel J. and Morris P. Fiorina. 'The Big Sort' That Wasn't: A Skeptical Reexamination." PS: Political Science and Politics 45.2 (2012): 203-210. Ackely, Kate. "Senators Stake Out Libya Positions Ahead of Obama's Address." Roll Call, 27 •••• Mar 2011. Accessed 14 Apr 2012. www.rollcall.com/news/libya-obama-address-mccain- lieberman-204353-1.html Aldrich, John H., John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida. "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do •• Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience?'" American Political Science Review 83.1 (1989): 123-141. •• Almond, Gabriel. The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950. Alpert, Bruce. "Sen. Mary Landrieu plans to seek fourth Senate term." Times Picayune, 5 Feb •••• 2011. Accessed 14 Apr 2012. http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/02/ sen_mary_landrieu_plans_to_see.html

Baltimore Sun. "Mikulski's disappointing silence on Libya." 5 Apr 2011. Accessed 14 Apr 2012. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-04-05/news/bs-ed-mikulski- •••• letter-20110405_1=mternet-access-military-force-libya

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