Occupation Authorities, the Hatoyama Purge and the Making of Japan's Postwar Political Order

Juha Saunavaara

Occupation Authorities, themanipulated Japanese politicians through Hatoyama Purge and the Making of informal but authoritative directives. The occupation authorities’ aims and methods were Japan’s Postwar Political Order dynamic and changed over the course of time. However, policy concerning Japan’s Juha Saunavaara conservative parties and politicians adopted The purge of Hatoyama Ichirō and the elevation during the first months of the occupation was of Yoshida Shigeru as a substitute prime not simply a result of arm-wrestling between minister in May 1946 deeply impacted their American New Deal reformers and those respective political careers. More important, emphasizing the use of Japan as a bulwark these actions taken by the Allied occupation against the Soviet Union, but closely followed authority set the course for postwar Japan’s plans and priorities developed during the war conservative parties. This article examines the years. The planners’ duties extended from thinking of GHQ leaders that led to these assessing the character of individual Japanese actions. The bureaucratic rule of the so-called to their postwar role in the production of Yoshida-school was the long-term side effect of general roadmaps aimed at creating a a policy that was meant to guide thedemocratic Japan. It is thus necessary to development of Japan’s conservative political examine how wartime planning in the United parties at the dawn of the occupation. The States’ State, War, and Navy Departments, as bloodlines of the two statesmen continue to well as in the Office of Strategic Services influence contemporary Japanese politics as (OSS), influenced SCAP’s decision to purge Hatoyama’s grandson, Yukio, replaces Yoshida Hatoyama Ichirō, the leader of the victorious Shigeru’s grandson, Asō Tarō, as Japan’s prime political party of the April 1946 elections, and minister. anoint Yoshida Shigeru.

Introduction Several theories exist concerning Hatoyama’s purge on May 4, 1946, just hours before he was Occupation authorities under the command of to assume the prime ministership and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers leadership of a single-party cabinet to be built (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur, purged a on the socialists’ extra-cabinet cooperation. legitimate candidate for the premiership in May Most assume that the answer can be found in 1946 with the purpose of clearing the way for the activities of the members of either the another, more acceptable, conservative. In various General Headquarters (GHQ) sections other words, the occupation authorities not or the Japanese politicians themselves over the only produced the framework in which party first months of the occupation. These theories evolution and cabinet building took place, but introduce different measures taken by these also shaped the processes and the decisions groups and individuals and offer plausible that emerged. Instead of using formalmotives for their actions. However, they ignore directives, the occupiers continuouslya significant feature of occupation policy

1 7 | 39 | 2 APJ | JF behind GHQ’s decision to purge Hatoyama and Believing that Republican China would be seat Yoshida: the preference for prewar non- America’s most important ally in postwar East party-affiliated political actors over party Asia, the China Hands demanded that the politicians. Related to the interpretations that occupation administration force upon Japan emphasize the Government Section (GS) New extensive political, social, and economic Dealers’ decision to expel Hatoyama is the reforms. The influential members of this pro- question of why they eventually accepted China, anti-emperor, and anti-zaibatsu group another conservative in Yoshida. The answer to were State Department officials Stanley these questions lies in the juxtaposition of the Hornbeck, Dean Acheson, and John Carter concepts of party politics and statesmanship as Vincent. George Atcheson Jr., who headed the defined by the both occupation planners and Office of Political Adviser to the Supreme administrators through their criticism of Commander for Allied Powers (POLAD) that Hatoyama and other party politicians. represented the U. S. State Department in Tokyo, is often mentioned as the most visible member of this group at the start of the occupation. Yet there are also claims that despite his background as a China Hand, Atcheson became MacArthur’s trusted ally within a few months of arriving in Tokyo.[2] This group drew many of its ideas from academics and Asia experts like Owen Lattimore, Thomas Bisson, Andrew Roth, and E. Herbert Norman.[3] Occasionally, planners in other U.S. government departments also took firm stands toward Japanese society. Captain H.L. Pence of the Navy Department is often cited as a China Hand because of his propositions calling for the stern treatment of Prime Minister Yoshida (left) meeting with Japan. Wartime opinion polls show that this Hatoyama Ichirō in October 1952 group’s views reflected those of Americans who wanted to see radical action taken against The Evolution Of An Anti-Party Politician Japan.[4] Policy Joseph C. Grew, Eugene Dooman, Robert Interesting studies exist that not only explain Fearey, Joseph Ballantine, Cabot Coville, and the structure and the division of labor between Earle R. Dickover formed the nucleus of the the various occupation planning organizations, Japan Hands. These men shared the view that but also the topics and contents of thealthough Japanese society contained some anti- discussions that continued and constantly re- democratic features, Japan could prove to be a emerged during the multi-year planningloyal U.S. ally should the proponents of process.[1] It is well-known that thedemocracy be returned to power. Grew, who participants in these meetings could only agree had served as U. S. Ambassador to Japan prior on a few things concerning the surrender of to the war, and his closest subordinates, Japan and its post-defeat treatment. The advanced a pendulum theory—the 1930s was traditional characterization of the competing an exceptional period in the democratic views is their division into the so-called ‘China tradition and the pendulum would eventually Hands’ and ‘Japan Hands.’ swing back toward more liberal and

2 7 | 39 | 2 APJ | JF cooperative development.[5] They insisted that Japanese moderates and described the emperor the emperor was not responsible for Japan’s and his henchmen as sacred cows protected by drive for military conquest. Blame lay instead Grew and other so-called Japan experts. In with Japan’s military extremists and the other 1945 Lattimore insisted that “we must . . . not ultranationalists who disrupted the country’s be soft with the old-school-kimono “liberals” earlier modernization progress. The Japan from Prince Konoe on down, who used to Hands supported a “soft peace” that revived, entertain the Embassy crowd so charmingly rather than created anew, Japan’s prewar and made such a good impression on Wall political and economic institutions.[6] Street, art collectors, and members of the Garden Club.”[11] The Japan Hands also believed that Japanese moderates could help in their country’sYet it was not only Grew and his colleagues in reconstruction. It is well-known that asthe foreign office who believed that Japan’s ambassador Grew had developed close ties postwar democratic leadership could be drawn with people associated with the throne. Grew, from aristocratic Japanese and moderate together with prewar scholars like Kenneth W. diplomats. The historian Hugh Borton, who in Colegrove, did not hesitate to praise men like 1940 authored Japan Since 1931, was also Count Makino Nobuaki in prewar and wartime influential in State Department planning publications.[7] The second group of desirable organizations and reached similar conclusions postwar Japanese leaders were the moderate in two memorandums. In these documents, and pro-Anglo-American officials in Japan’s written in July and September 1943, Borton foreign ministry, including Shidehara Kijūrō, mentioned people and groups who could who guided Japan’s internationalist foreign contribute to the establishment of a democratic policy in the 1920s. [8] Grew argued that Japan, including representatives of the emperor’s inner-circle. He also praised Ozaki Yukio, a politician without party affiliation who …in the heat and prejudice of war was often hailed as Japan’s greatest some will deny that there can be any good elements among the parliamentarian. The only party-affiliated Japanese people. Yet those critics, Japanese that he noted positively were former in all likelihood, will not have cabinet leaders such as Hamaguchi Yuko and known personally and directly Inukai Tsuyoshi who fell victim to ultra- those Japanese who were bitterly nationalist assassins of the early1930s. His list opposed to war with the United included intelligentsia, such as professors from States – men who courageously but Japan’s imperial universities, younger futilely gave all that was in them bureaucrats in the foreign ministry, former and ran the gravest dangers of foreign service officers, and representatives of imprisonment if not assassination – the judiciary, as potential moderate leaders for indeed several were assassinated – a non-militaristic Japan. To the contrary, he in their efforts to stem the tide or, raised doubts over any future political role for let us say, to halt the tidal wave of Japan’s business leaders.[12] Divisions among insane military megalomania and wartime planners concerning the so-called expansionist ambition.[9] Japanese moderates and prewar political parties continued after 1945 and had a significant effect on occupation policy. Grew’s support for the Japanese moderates led some to question his objectivity.[10] Owen Plans for occupied Japan began to take Lattimore, for example, denied the existence of concrete form in early 1944 with general

3 7 | 39 | 2 APJ | JF policies created under the auspices of the a similar message regarding party politics to Postwar Programs Committee (PWC), and with the future occupiers, as described in a July Grew and his former subordinates taking 1944 Civil Affairs Handbook: charge of the various planning organizations. The War Department’s Civil Affairs Division … Evolution toward a popularly (CAD) in Japan also demonstrated increased controlled parliamentary interest, as seen in the list of concrete government was really blocked not questions it sent, together with the Navy so much by constitutional checks Department’s Occupied Areas Section (OAS), to as by fundamental weakness within the State Department on February 18, 1944. the political parties and by These questions included inquiry on whether inhibiting social forces… the two there were any political agencies or political main political parties the Seiyūkai parties with whom the Army could work to and the Minseitō, were restore essential authority in Japan and in its pronouncedly venal, their following subsequent administration, as well as whether drawn by individual leaders rather any political parties, organizations or groups than principles.[14] should be dissolved.[13]

Answers to these questions began arriving in Another set of institutional changes occurred spring 1944: no political party or agency in during the war’s final year, after the State-War- wartime Japan was to be preserved in the Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was postwar period. The Imperial Rule Assistance created to coordinate occupation planning. In Association (IRAA, Taisei Yokusan Kai) and the November 1944, long-time secretary of state, Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society Cordell Hull, retired and was succeeded by (IRAPS, Yokusan Seiji Kai), a parliamentary Edward R. Stettinius, who appointed Grew as body established after the 1942 Tōjō-elections, under-secretary of state. On April 12, 1945, which comprised 98.3 per cent of the House of Harry S. Truman succeeded the deceased Representatives, were listed as Japan’s only President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In July 1945, existing political parties and were to be James F. Byrnes, an affiliate of the China Hands dissolved. The weakly organized groups in who advocated a tough occupation in Japan, Japan’s House of Peers were judged to be was chosen to head the State Department. closer to clubs than political parties. The State Competition among different interests was Department, temporarily under the influence of severe and new approaches challenged old the Japan Hands, did not create much original policy papers. Eventually the final decisions policy but continued in many ways in line with were made inside the War Department, with Borton, George Blakeslee, and other academics Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy who dominated the planning at its onset. The acting as the prime decision-maker. This Japan Hands sought to preserve the emperor complex process culminated in three key and campaigned on behalf of the extra-documents that set the course for the parliamentary political elite it knew well, but occupation: the Potsdam Declaration, the US discarded party politics as a source of desirable Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (also elements for the reconstruction of Japan. known as SWNCC-150/4), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Pessimism over the conservative political Military Government in Japan Proper parties and politicians also arose within the (JCS-1380/15). [15] Although these documents OSS. Direct OSS influence in planningreconsidered the basic structure and aims of remained limited, but its publications conveyed the occupation, they did not question prior

4 7 | 39 | 2 APJ | JF evaluations of Japan’s prewar conservative Tokyo Headquarters as a political adviser but party politicians and the expectationsactively transmitted his ideas to the general regarding their postwar activities. The prewar through letters.[19] party politicians were not expected to play a significant role in Japan’s postwar recovery. Finally, a great number of the division and branch leaders, including Pieter K. Roest who Nevertheless, the documents that recognized was placed in charge of the unit working with the occupiers’ indirect rule through existing Japanese parties inside the GS, had governmental institutions shared the premise backgrounds in different Civil Affairs Training that democratic political parties wouldSchools and Military Government schools.[20] encourage the democratic advancement of the Thus, they had gained their knowledge of Japan Japanese people. They advised the removal of during the war and had been influenced during all obstacles to democratization. Yet, the limits their training by the opinions of those officials of party formation were bound by how the who planned the occupation. This brain drain ambiguous term “democratic” was to be explains how the occupation authorities’ interpreted. These documents provided no quickly developed a conception of political clear definition of what a democratic party was, currents that worked as a basis for their search nor did they identify clearly any potential of suitable leadership for postwar Japan. Men action models to be employed to reach that and women transferred to Tokyo from the end. Finally, they strongly emphasized the need United States had already formed assumptions to exclude the elements responsible for Japan’s over Japan’s existing political situation and aggression, which clouded the future of Japan’s features of the desirable future model prior to conservative politicians.[16] The basictheir arrival in occupied Japan. directives, in other words, obligated the occupation authority to set up a political party In short, while many felt that the political system but did not determine which Japanese parties had a place in a democratized Japan, should be allowed to participate in it. nobody envisioned the old conservative party politicians who had dominated the prewar These basic policy papers, together with situation being able to establish themselves as several other official documents, transmitted positive political forces in postwar Japan. The Washington’s views to Manila and then to Japan Hands had their own answer as to where Tokyo headquarters. Although the top positions more appropriate political influences were to in GHQ were eventually filled by men close to be found. Namely, many occupation planners MacArthur and members of the so-called shared the view that a clear distinction should Bataan Gang, other GHQ members included be made between self-seeking party politics John K. Emmerson who was in charge of and what might be called statesmanship or political party reporting during occupation’s altruistic work on behalf of the common good. first autumn, Charles L. Kades who was the The latter was believed to be characteristic of second most influential GS officer, and his certain elite Japanese groups who either close aide Frank Rizzo, who all had experience corresponded in many ways with the planners in Washington planning agencies.[17] An even who had experience in various ministries, greater number of GHQ officials came from the diplomatic corps and academic circles, or who offices of the Foreign Economichad been affiliated with influential planning Administration.[18] State Departmentoffices during the prewar period. This representatives in Japan included men who had distinction that selected the actors who could experienced Tokyo in the mid-1930s. Grew contribute to the building of a democratic turned down MacArthur’s offer to join the postwar Japan was the most important legacy

5 7 | 39 | 2 APJ | JF of the planning process in the actualas Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Tanaka Giichi occupation policy concerning the conservative cabinet at the end of the 1920s and as Minister political parties. of Education in the cabinets of Inukai Tsuyoshi and Saitō Makoto in the early 1930s. As a Hatoyama and Yoshida – A Party Politician member of the Seiyūkai he had been an and a Statesman influential leader within the Kuhara Fusanosuke faction. During the war and after The immediate postwar destiny of Hatoyama the dissolution of political parties, he led the Ichirō and Yoshida Shigeru had much to do Dōkōkai, a group of Diet members who did not with the fact that although both were join the Diet Members’ Imperial Assistance conservative and anti-communist, believed in League organized in September 1941 under the capitalism, and had connections with big auspices of the IRAA. According to Ben-Ami businesses, the occupation authorities Shillony, most of the Dōkōkai’s thirty-seven recognized one of them as a party politician members were known for their moderate and and the other as an old-school statesman. This liberal inclinations.[21] Hatoyama’s name, assessment governed both the occupiers’ early however, never appeared in occupation evaluations of Japanese conservatives and their planning documents. Even the report by the decision-making after the April 10, 1946 Lower OSS Research and Analysis Branch issued at House elections. the end of September 1945 stated that little was known of his wartime activities. The exception was the commonly reported information that he had resigned from IRAPS in 1943 and continued to serve in the Diet as an independent.[22]

The group that had gathered around Hatoyama during the war quickly initiated efforts to establish a new party immediately after Japan’s defeat. Scholars have emphasized different points in assessing Hatoyama’s actions from his August 11 meeting with his former party comrade Ashida Hitoshi to the November 11, 1945 birth of the Liberal Party of Japan (Nihon Jiyūtō).[23] Yet, it is clear that the selection of Hatoyama to serve as party president, along with his preferred policies, attracted interest among American political observers. Hatoyama made his first visit to occupation headquarters to deliver the party’s platform the day after his nomination.[24]

Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō with his Those who commented on Hatoyama offered grandsons Yukio (center) and Kunio less than glowing praise for the politician. He (right) had been evaluated in October by POLAD’s John K. Emmerson, a former subordinate of Hatoyama was a party politician with a long Joseph C. Grew in the U.S. Embassy prior to career in the prewar Seiyūkai Party. He served the war. Emmerson identified the Liberal Party

6 7 | 39 | 2 APJ | JF strongly in relation to its leader, but did not see party leaders. Most importantly, Hatoyama in Hatoyama any fresh viewpoint. Emmerson himself was not affected by this particular stressed Hatoyama’s personal connection with purge. He continued his vigorous attacks on the militarist Tanaka Giichi cabinet of the late the communists and led his party in the April 1920s and criticized his term as minister of 1946 Lower House election. As election day education in the early 1930s. He notedapproached, Hatoyama appeared to be the only Hatoyama’s vigorous anti-communist stance as feasible rival to the incumbent Prime Minister presented in a speech at the inaugural meeting Shidehara Kijūrō.[28] of the party and in interviews with various GHQ officials. He also described him as a man of Yoshida Shigeru, on the other hand, was unimpressive character with poor English associated with the Anglo-American moderates. skills.[25] The most interesting evaluation for His father-in-law was Count Makino Nobuaki, our purposes, was made by POLAD’s John S. and he had served as Japanese ambassador to Service, who concluded, “Mr. Hatoyama is not the United Kingdom. He had also developed impressive as a person of great conviction, warm ties with Joseph Grew in the 1930s.[29] forcefulness or leadership. Although pleasant in Grew praised Yoshida in the ambassador’s Ten personality, he seemed more of a ‘politician’ Years in Japan as a “pronounced liberal.”[30] than a ‘statesman.’”[26] Yoshida, however, was not included in Hugh Borton’s early list of potential moderate This description followed an emerging trend leaders. Immediately after Japan’s surrender which saw occupation officials describeYoshida’s name did appear on the War political parties and their leaders inDepartment Military Intelligence Division unflattering terms. As with Hatoyama, the document titled “Friendly Japanese.” This criticism most often linked with thedocument, distributed widely internally in conservative parties was their lack of fresh September 1945, listed Japanese believed to ideas or clear party programs. Parties were willing to cooperate with the Allied occupation seen more as groups that gathered around forces. It described Yoshida as a liberal who influential individuals who shared thefavored cooperation with the rest of the world experience of frustration and were prone to throughout the 1930s. Moreover, the Japanese political corruption. Moreover, theseArmy’s resistance to his nomination as foreign descriptions often considered their shared minister in 1935-36 worked in his favor.[31] responsibility for the war.[27] Yoshida was also mentioned in an OSS report dealing with the imprisonment of five SCAP issued its directives, “Abolition of Certain prominent Japanese in June 1945. The group Political Parties, Associations, Societies, and had allegedly plotted undercover peace Other Organizations” (SCAPIN 548) and negotiations with the United States and Great “Removal and Exclusion of UndesirableBritain.[32] Although this interlude was not Personnel from Public Office” (SCAPIN 550) on mentioned, for example, in “Friendly Japanese,” January 4, 1946. These directives where it later strengthened Yoshida’s image as a translated into Japanese over the following representative of anti-war elements and as the weeks. Such directives had a major impact on leader of a group of like-minded people known conservative political parties. They ended or to the Japanese police by the code name temporarily suspended the political careers of YOHANSEN, an abbreviation for Yoshida quite a few members of Hatoyama’s party. Still, Hansen (Yoshida Anti-War).[33] the shock caused by the purge was far less than that of their conservative rivals who lost almost Yoshida made his entrance onto the postwar all of their incumbent Diet members and acting political stage at the suggestion of Prince

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Konoe Fumimaro, and he in turn promoted unprecedented and urgent problems. Still, he Konoe as leader of the movement to establish recognized that someone had to lead Japan and the Liberal Party. Yoshida replaced Shigemitsu therefore concluded that Japan’s leaders should Mamoru as foreign minister on September 17, be chosen from among those who were the 1945, and retained this position whenleast tainted by the war.[37] As for the Shidehara Kijūrō, another representative of the pre-1931 statesmen, their inflexibility was a pre-1931 moderates, became premier after the lesser evil than the war responsibility that collapse of the Higashikuni Cabinet on October tarnished party politicians. POLAD’s leader 5, 1945.[34] By this time State Department leaned toward the group recommended by the officials had already begun to mention Yoshida old Japan Hands during the war in determining as a future prime minister.[35] Yoshida’s who to support among Japan’s potential connection with the Liberal Party, however, leaders. remained unclear to political observers. Emphasis on the party politicians’ lack of On the other hand, like more than a few political leadership and the use of prewar members of the Shidehara Cabinet, Yoshida history to confirm their unacceptability did not Shigeru also had ties with major zaibatsu end in spring 1946. The past served as a guide through family or personal relations. He openly to the probable pattern of Japan’s democracy to sought to protect what he called the “old the immediate future. Thus the leadership of zaibatsu” and argued on October 19, 1945 that the democratic movement that would they had done much good for Japan in the necessarily work through the political parties prewar period. They also had suffered during would be found outside the Diet rather than the war and thus there was no good reason to among the party politicians.[38] do away with them. Instead, he held, it was the “new zaibatsu” created in the 1930s that had cooperated with the militarists and benefited from the war. As occupation authorities had recorded Yoshida’s press statement[36] it is inconceivable that such anti-zaibatsu New Dealers as Charles S. Kades, who disliked Hatoyama, would show any more interest in Yoshida.

POLAD’s role as the leading agency for policy regarding Japanese political parties began to weaken in spring 1946. Prior to then, on December 18, 1945, its leader George Atcheson Jr. authored a memorandum that was in line with the policy practiced at the start of the occupation. Using the same arguments introduced above to criticize Japan’s political parties, Atcheson doubted their capability to produce leaders for postwar Japan any time soon. He was also critical of the group that he called the pre-1931 statesmen. According to Atcheson, this group lacked the flexibility of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru with his mind that Japan needed to meet its grandchildren in December 1952. (Asō

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Tarō rear center) Party of Japan (Nihon Shimpotō) weakened the party’s chances of forming a coalition with the Intervention – Results Without Points Liberal Party and the Japan Socialist Party From Style (Nihon Shakaitō). This presented the occupation with yet another problem. The Given the existence of various studies dealing obvious choice for prime minister was with the political purge program,[39] I will only Hatoyama Ichirō, who was organizing a three- briefly review the details of the process that led party coalition that required the support of the to the purge of Hatoyama on May 4, 1946 and Socialist Party. devote more attention to the argument made by Tominomori Eiji, who claims that SCAP treated The GS, Public Administration Division the bureaucracy softly during the purge, at interviews with the leaders of the Socialist least when compared to its treatment of Party and the Japan Co-operative Party (Nihon conservative party leaders. This leniency Kyōdōtō) revealed that the coalition allowed former bureaucrats to emerge as the negotiations had deadlocked over Hatoyama. In leaders of the conservative parties.[40] If an April 19 interview, the socialists’ Katayama Tominomori is correct, we need to explain why Tetsu made it known that he considered occupation authorities preferred politicians Hatoyama unacceptable. There were other such as Yoshida and Shidehara, whose conservative politicians with whom his party backgrounds were outside of political party could cooperate. Four days later Nishio Suehiro activity, over career politicians with strong suggested to GS’s Harry Emerson Wildes ways party ties. to form a coalition cabinet should Hatoyama be In the April 10, 1946 Lower House elections the purged. Ikawa Tadao, a leader of the Co- conservative parties emerged victorious as operative Party, also let it be known that expected, though no single party received a Hatoyama’s unresolved situation blocked majority. Pre-election evaluations of Hatoyama settlement of the cabinet crisis.[43] Thus the showed that occupation forces viewed his past GS political observers focused on getting rid of political activities in a negative light and, like the piece that did not fit. The emergence of other acting party heads, he was thought to familiar and acceptable moderate conservatives lack the necessary attributes of soundsuch as Matsudaira Tsuneo, the former leadership. Instead, U.S. officials preferred that Imperial Household Minister and ambassador Shidehara be retained. Shidehara’s prestige, to the United Kingdom and the United States, his impeccable character, and the personal and Yoshida, under whose leadership the left- confidence that General MacArthur and the center parties were ready to cooperate, most emperor allegedly held toward him contributed likely increased the occupation authorities’ to this opinion.[41] Claims by Chief Cabinet temptation to intervene in Japan’s domestic Secretary Narahashi Wataru further suggest politics. The nomination of suitable that the occupation authorities supported the conservatives that the occupation authorities incumbent cabinet.[42] The challenge facing hoped to see at the helm of the Japanese occupation officials was how to secure the Government would most likely be deemed Japanese leadership they desired whileacceptable by all but Japan’s left-wing parties. maintaining the impression that the selection process was democratic. The Office of the Chief Counter-Intelligence Officer (OCCIO) concluded that the available The collapse of the Shidehara Cabinet and the records did not prove that Hatoyama would fall clumsy entrance of Shidehara into the political within the purview of SCAPIN 550. Yet his party world as the president of the Progressive acceptability as prime minister remained in

9 7 | 39 | 2 APJ | JF questioned and some believed that his purge Shidehara’s plan to propose him to the throne would have a salutary effect on Japanese as the next prime minister. He asked the politics.[44] A twelve-page memorandum issued general for his opinion on the matter. by the GS on May 3, titled “Report on MacArthur’s response was short and Hatoyama, Ichiro” depicted Hatoyama as a straightforward: he did not oppose the idea and politician whose education and politicalwished Yoshida luck in his bid for the experience gave him the potential to make an position.[47] Having cleared the way for effective fight for the cause of liberalism in Yoshida’s premiership, GHQ stepped back so as Japan. Unfortunately, it went on, he had failed not to raise suspicions about its already fragile to accomplish this over his long public career. claim that the Japanese themselves had To the contrary, it claimed, Hatoyama had selected the new premier. aided the forces of obscurantism, reaction and militarism throughout his career. TheThe existing interpretations of the purge of occupation authorities decided to intervene Hatoyama Ichirō emphasize either the after Shidehara recommended to the emperor importance of the power struggle among that Hatoyama be nominated as prime minister. Japanese politicians or the role of certain GHQ The occupation authorities even backdated the officials. Some doubt that the purge would have directive to purge Hatoyama to create the been implemented had Shidehara illusion that his purge had preceded his recommended Hatoyama earlier. Similarly, recommendation for the post.[45] Home Minister Mitsuchi Chūzō’s decision to withhold two documents from GHQ that GHQ showed no support for the socialists’ supported Hatoyama, is alleged to have attempts to form a minority cabinet following contributed to the purge. Finally, it has been the purge of Hatoyama, nor did it comment on noted that Narahashi Wataru provided Shidehara’s decision to withholdinformation about the incompleteness of recommendation of such a cabinet to the Hatoyama’s pre-election questionnaire to the throne. On the other hand, experiencedCivil Information and Education Section Japanese politicians were certainly capable of together with the communists that facilitated reading the situation, as shown by the list of the purge of Hatoyama while supporting a requirements that Hatoyama’s follower was second Shidehara cabinet.[48] Masuda, who expected to fill. The leaders of the Liberal Party offers the most complete argument on the were looking for someone who had close purges, emphasizes the role of the GS left-wing contacts with GHQ, was internationallyNew Dealers in Hatoyama’s purge. Yet others acceptable, who strongly supported thestress the central role played by foreign constitution and was capable of seeing the correspondent Mark Gayn, who mobilized an constitutional issues resolved, and enjoyed attack against Hatoyama at the Tokyo Press congenial relations with the Imperial Court. Club on April 6 by resurrecting some After attempts to promote Kojima Kazuo and unflattering passages found in Hatoyama’s Matsudaira Tsuneo failed, a small group of Sekai no Kao (The Face of the World), which he Liberal Party leaders, led by the purged published in 1938.[49] Having received a Hatoyama himself, decided to promote Yoshida translated copy of the book from occupation Shigeru as party president and Japan’s next officials, he distributed parts of it to other prime minister.[46] foreign correspondents. One of the harshest critics of the occupation authority, Gayn Yoshida, well aware of the political situation, explained his motives as two-fold: As an sent a letter to General MacArthur on May 15 American he felt that a ranking war criminal informing the Supreme Commander ofwas ill fit to serve as prime minister: as a

10 7 | 39 | 2 APJ | JF newspaperman he was looking for a front-page leadership of the occupation was also anti- story.[50] His reporting certainly embarrassed communist. Rather, it was his background in Hatoyama, but it is perhaps a stretch to trace prewar party politics that spelled his doom. the Hatoyama purge to the reporter’s efforts. Regarding Hatoyama’s case, the upper echelon of the occupation authority agreed with the While all of these theories are worthNew Dealers, although for different reasons, examining, attention needs to be paid to two and found the purge both desirable and critical questions. Why was the occupation eventually necessary. Although the views of leadership willing to follow the guidelines of these two groups clashed over Yoshida’s the GS, and why did the GS New Dealers purge appointment, in the end the top leadership one conservative (Hatoyama) only to accept carried the day. another (Yoshida)? Only Masuda seems to offer a compelling answer to the first question. He The New Deal-wing of the GS did not welcome contends that Hatoyama’s over-confidence, Yoshida’s premiership, [53] but General typified by his open attack on the communist MacArthur and his closest conservative aides party that GHQ had legalized, explains why the did. A Civil Intelligence Section memorandum occupation’s upper echelon sided with the GS. of early May suggested that, “it is most Furthermore, the occupation authorities used probable that a government headed by Yoshida Hatoyama’s case as a lesson to the Japanese on would be similar in policy and practice to the GHQ power and the relationship between the recent Shidehara cabinet.”[54] This was what victors and the vanquished.[51] Masuda’s first the Supreme Command wanted: the continuity observation is especially important. Open anti- of the cooperative and anti-revolutionary policy communist statements in democratized Japan under the party cabinet supported by the most certainly irritated occupation authorities alleged freely expressed will of the Japanese since they opened the door for criticism from people. The new leadership was expected to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it does not ensure social order and thus protect GHQ from seem that Hatoyama’s purge resulted from his external criticism and provide a firm ground for own mistakes, that is that the purge grew from occupation reforms such as constitutional seeds that he himself had sowed. Masuda revision. From the very beginning, the claims that it might have been possible for occupation authority not only accepted a Hatoyama to advance to the premiership had government led by Shidehara and Yoshida but he adopted a more effective way of dealing with defended it against communist attacks. On the the occupation authority, as Yoshida did. That other hand, it continued to curtail the influence is to say that his open challenge to, and of party politicians. contradiction of, stated GHQ policy sealed his destiny and forced him to delay his ascent to Hatoyama’s purge had an enormous influence the office of prime minister until 1954, after the on postwar political history but he was not the occupation had ended.[52] only target in May-June 1946. Other prewar party politicians were displaced as well to make Yet, regardless of Hatoyama’s statements or room for those who had existed outside the activities, the heart of his purge and Yoshida’s prewar party machines. The purge of Kōno nomination lies in the occupiers’ negative Ichirō, secretary-general of the Liberal Party, attitude toward the political parties and the and Miki Bukichi, elected speaker of the house dichotomy between party politics andand one of the leaders of the Liberal Party, statesmanship outside the Diet. It was not demonstrated that a reputation as a non- Hatoyama’s eagerly expressed anti-communism recommended candidate in the 1942 election that brought about his purge; in fact, the top and as an opponent of the rise of military

11 7 | 39 | 2 APJ | JF authority was not enough to spare one from the successfully selected the new leadership of the purge. Although not openly specified, their political parties and the Japanese government background as party politicians and their from people suggested by Joseph C. Grew and connection with Hatoyama Ichirō also made like-minded analysts. It is therefore not them candidates for purge, as was the case of surprising that Grew praised the situation in Liberal Party leader Hayashi Jōji.[55] The only Japan and the policy adopted by General evidence that rendered Kōno unsuitable was an MacArthur in a his summer message to GS’s interpretation of a Diet speech that he gave in Kenneth W. Colegrove, in which he March 1940 that contained no clearlycomplimented the general for pushing through incriminating statements, but warned of a a successful policy despite ill-conceived possible war should the United Statesdirectives from a State Department that had government lack wisdom in its China policy. been emptied of Japan Hands, the men with the Miki passed the screening for the candidates best knowledge and capability to understand running in the April election but at the end of Japan’s problems.[58] May he was purged over evidence that occupation authorities found in the Personal GHQ’s policy favoring old-school conservatives History Files of the General Affairs Section of like Yoshida and Shidehara, however, had its the Diet Secretariat concerning Miki’s role as limitations. Cooperation with statesmen with adviser (komon) to the Great Japan East Asia loose party affiliations worked well for the first Development League. Miki’s denying any one and a half years of the occupation, at a knowledge of this alleged appointment was not time when the more remarkable reforms like enough to save him from purge.[56] constitutional revision needed to proceed as smoothly as possible. Their enthronement was Conclusion a result of an undemocratic action made to ensure that they would appear as an acceptable The purge of Hatoyama and the embrace of democratically-elected government centered on Yoshida manifested the victory of prewar extra- the political parties. The occupation parliamentary statesmanship over what key authorities’ support of the Yoshida Cabinet occupation authorities viewed as corrupt and began to fade as domestic opposition to his self-seeking party politics. The situation in June party strengthened. Spring 1947 witnessed the 1946 thus demonstrates the influence of birth of a middle-of-the-road regime. Although wartime planning on occupation policy over the GHQ sponsored the emergence of the new conservative parties. Occupation planners who regime that seemed to promise maintenance of harbored diverse preferences concerning the the social order, it lasted less than seventeen general course of the occupation agreed that months. The cabinets of Katayama Tetsu and the prewar party politicians should not play a Ashida Hitoshi were soon followed by a series major role in the creation of Japan’s postwar of Yoshida cabinets that outlasted the democracy. Views of their track recordoccupation’s tenure in Japan. Yoshida’s last expressed doubt over the possibility of their term as prime minister came to an end in making any future contribution to this cause. November 1954 but his influence did not Questions concerning the future of Japanese disappear. In fact, terms like the Yoshida moderates divided the occupation planners. In Doctrine and Yoshida School are used to the end, the influence of the Japan Hands and describe the policies of his protégés such as Japan experts like Hugh Borton prevailed. The Ikeda Hayato. Hatoyama Ichirō succeeded course established by occupation planning was Yoshida after his purge ended in 1951, finally followed faithfully at the beginning of the allowing him to return to politics. The occupation and the occupation administration intervention created a juxtaposition that

12 7 | 39 | 2 APJ | JF initiated the rivalry between the competing Greenwood Press, 2003, 6. conservative parties in the early 1950s and [4] Iokibe, 2005, 56; Mayo, 1984, 23. then, after 1955, within the Liberal Democratic [5] For Grew’s direct references to the swing of Party.[59] the pendulum, see for example Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan. A Contemporary Record Juha Saunavaara Drawn from the Diaries and Private and Official University of Oulu, Department of History Papers of Joseph C. Grew United States Graduate School of Contemporary Asian Ambassador to Japan 1932–1942, Westport, CT: Studies Greenwood Press Publishers, 1973, 32, 338. [email protected] [6] Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan – The American Occupation As New Deal, New York: Recommended citation: Juha Saunavaara, The Free Press, 1987, 16-18. "Occupation Authorities, the Hatoyama Purge [7] Kenneth W. Colegrove, Militarism in Japan, and the Making of Japan’s Postwar Political Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1936, 24. Order," The Asia-Pacific Jounal, Vol. 39-2-09, [8] John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath – September 28, 2009. Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Notes University Press, 38, 96, 106-07, 229; * I am indebted to Mark Caprio for comments Schonberger, 1992, 14-15. and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. [9] Grew, 1973, xi. [1] See for example Dale M. Hellegers, We, the [10] Iokibe, 2005, 78-79. Japanese People: World War II and the Origins [11] Owen Lattimore, Solution in Asia, Boston: of the Japanese Constitution, Volume One: An Atlantic Monthly Press Book, Little, Brown Washington, Stanford, CA: Stanford University and Company, 1945, 190. See also pages 29, Press, 2001; Iokibe Makoto, Nichibei Sensō to 46. Sengo Nihon (The Japan-American War and [12] Documents T-358 and T-381 introduced Postwar Japan), Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2005; Rudolf before for example by Janssens. Janssens, 1995, V. A. Janssens, ‘What Future for Japan?’ U.S. 124-27. wartime planning for the postwar era, [13] For earlier analysis of these questions see 1942-1945, Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1995; Marlene Hellegers, 2001, 160-65; Janssens, 1995, 152. J. Mayo, “American Wartime Planning for [14] OSS, R&A(#1319,2A), Army Service Force Occupied Japan”, in Americans as Proconsuls – Manual (M354-2A), Civil Affairs Handbook. United States Military Government in Germany Japan, Section 2: Government and and Japan, 1944-1952, edited by Robert Wolfe, Administration, July 1944, 1-2. The Occupation 3-51. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University of Japan – U.S. Planning Documents 1942-1945. Press, 1984. Published by Congressional Information [2] Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War – Service and Maruzen, (OJUSPD), 3-B-4. See Americans and the Remaking of Japan, also Army Service Force Manual (M354-2A), 1945-1952, Kent, OH: Kent State University January, 1945, 63-66. OJUSPD 3-B-3. Press, 1989, 23, 36. Concerning Atcheson [15] More on these developments in Takemae Theodore McNelly, The Origin of Japan’s Eiji, The Allied Occupation of Japan, translated Democratic Constitution. Lanham: University and adapted from the Japanese by Robert Press of America, 2000, 36. Ricketts and Sebastian Swann, New York: the [3] Henry Oinas-Kukkonen,Tolerance, Continuum International Publishing Group, Suspicion, and Hostility – Changing U.S. 2002, 210, 217; Iokibe, 2005, 108-13, 146, Attitudes toward the Japanese Communist Janssens, 1995, 257, 265-71. Movement, 1944–1947, Westport, CT:[16] These basic documents can be found for

13 7 | 39 | 2 APJ | JF example in Occupation of Japan: Policy and Carlile, Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Progress, The Department of State, Far Eastern Studies, University of California, Berkeley Series 17. s.l.s.a., 53-55, 73-81; Joint Chief of Center for Japanese Studies, 1985, 78-80; Staff, Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Shinobu Seizaburō, Sengo Nihon Seijishi, Military Government in Japan Proper1945-1952, Volume I (Postwar Japan Political (JCS-1380/15), November 3, 1945 . NDL, History, 1945-1952, Volume I), Tokyo: Keisō GHQ/SCAP Records, Government Section, Shobō, 1965, 201; Tominomori Eiji,Sengo GS(B)00291. Hoshutōshi (A History of Postwar Conservative [17] For more about the background of these Parties), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006, 1-3. men, see Justin Williams, Sr., Japan’s Political [24] Hatoyama Ichirō, Hatoyama Ichirō - Kaoru Revolution under MacArthur – A Participant’s Nikki (The Diary of Hatoyama Ichirō – Kaoru), Account, Athens: University of Georgia Press, Tokyo: Jōkan Hatoyama Ichirō hen - Chūō 1979, 35-36, 61. Kōron Shinsha, 1999, 412. [18] Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation – [25] John K. Emmerson, POLAD, Political My Years in the State Department, New York: Parties in Japan, October 11, 1945. NDL, W. W. Norton & Company, 1987, 46-47; Dale GS(A)02522; John K. Emmerson, POLAD, M. Hellegers, We, the Japanese People: World Weekly report, November 12, 1945. NDL, War II and the Origins of the JapaneseGS(A)02521. Constitution, Volume Two: Tokyo, Stanford, CA: [26] John S. Service, POLAD, Memorandum of Stanford University Press, 2001, 580-81, 632, conversation, November 25, 1945, 3. The 645. United States National Archives, College Park, [19] Grew’s letters transmitted his ideas Maryland (NARA), RG 84, Box 11, Folder 18. concerning both prewar and postwar Japan. [27] John K. Emmerson, POLAD, Political Grew even sent MacArthur a copy of his book Parties in Japan, October 11, 1945, 1-2. NDL, where he praised his Japanese affiliates. Grew GS(A)02522. memorandum of Conversation, 16 July 1945. [28] While the other names were lacking, the OJUSPD 5-E-33. Concerning thetwo leading candidates were compared. For correspondence between Grew and MacArthur: example POLAD’s William J. Sebald did not Grew memorandum of Conversation, July 16, hide his preference of Shidehara. William J. 1945. OJUSPD 5-E-33; Grew to MacArthur, Sebald, POLAD, Weekly report, April 9, 1946. August 22, 1945. NDL, MacArthur Memorial CUSSDCF Reel 1 windows 659-62. Archives (MMA) MMA-14 (RG 10) Personal [29] Dower, 1979, 108-09, 217-18, 229. Correspondence VIP File, Reel 2, Box 5, Folder [30] Grew, 1973, 178. 7 Joseph C. Grew; Letter from Grew to [31] P. E. Peabody, War Department, Military MacArthur, 3 October 1945. MMA-14 (RG 10) Intelligence Division, Washington, for the Personal Correspondence VIP File, Reel 2, Box Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, (August 1945). 5, Folder 7 Joseph C. Grew. NDL, Legal Section (LS)24079-LS24084. [20] See for example Williams, 1979, xiv, 52-63, [32] OSS, R&A Branch Division. Intelligence 69. Reports, Alleged Japanese Peace Plot of June [21] Ben-Ami Shillony, Politics and Culture in 1945. NARA, RG 226, Box 262, XL 17358. Wartime Japan, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981, [33] Detailed introduction of YOHANSEN 19-20. activities, see Dower, 1979, 227-72. [22] OSS, R&A, (#3263) report, September 28, [34] See Masumi, 1985, 42-43; Ashida Hitoshi, 1945, 3-4. OJUSPD 3-C-31. Ashida Hitoshi Nikki, volume 1 (The Diary of [23] For more on the formation of the Liberal Ashida Hitoshi, volume I), Tokyo: Ikanami Party, see Masumi Junnosuke, Postwar Politics Shoten Kankō, 1986, 213. in Japan, 1945 – 1955, Translated by Lonny E. [35] Department of State, Interim Research and

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Intelligence Service, R&A Branch, R&A 3449. under the Occupation, Berkeley: University of Biographical Notes on the Japanese Shidehara California Press, 1959, passim; Mayumi Itoh, Cabinet Appointed in October 1945. November The Hatoyama Dynasty. Japanese Political 9, 1945. O.S.S/State Department Intelligence Leadership Through the Generations, New and Research Reports, Part II, Postwar Japan, York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 84-102. Korea and Southeast Asia (OSS/SDIRR), Reel 2, [40] Tominomori, 2006, 20-22. Document 15; Department of State, Office of [41] William J. Sebald, POLAD, Weekly report, Intelligence Collection and Dissemination, April 9, 1946. CUSSDCF Reel 1 windows Division of Biographic Intelligence, R&A 3767. 659-62. June 14, 1946. Biographic Reports o the [42] Narahashi Wataru, Gekiryū ni Sao Sashite Members of the Yoshida Cabinet Appointed in – Wa ga Kokuhaku (Boating in a Swift Current – May 1946. OSS/SDIRR, Reel 3, document 6. My Confessions), Tokyo: Yokushoin, 1968, [36] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan 133-134; See also Masumi, 1985, 98-99. (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, October [43] P. K. Roest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public 24, 1945. Foreign Relations of United States. Administration Division, PPB, Memorandum to Diplomatic Papers (FRUS) 1945, vol. 6,the Chief of Section, April 19, 1946, 3-4. NARA, 780-781; Robert A. Fearey, POLAD, Review of RG 331, Box 2142, Folder 2; P. K. Roest, GHQ, Developments in Japan August 26 – November SCAP, GS, Public Administration Division, PPB, 20, 1945. Confidential U.S. State Department Memorandum to the Chief, GS, April 23, 1946. Central Files. Japan Internal Affairs 1945 – NARA, RG, 331, Box 2142, Folder 2; P. K. 1949, A microfilm project of UniversityRoest, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Administration Publication of America, 1985. (CUSSDCF), reel Division, PPB, Memorandum to the Chief, GS, 1 windows 324, 331. April 26, 1946, 1. NARA, RG 331, Box 2142, [37] George Atcheson Jr., POLAD,Folder 2. Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, [44] This and the following documents were December 18, 1945, 3-4. GS(A)02521. introduced by Masuda. Masuda, 2001, 43-57. [38] See for example: POLAD, Sebald, Political Originals can be found from NDL, GS(B)03013 Parties in Japan, March 12, 1946, 1-3. NARA, and GS/B)00905-00910 or NARA, RG 331 box RG 226, Box 445, XL 46249; Civil Intelligence 2275B and box 2134. Section, SCAP, Occupational Trends Japan and [45] Masuda, 2001, 57-58. Korea. Report No. 15, 5, March 27, 1946. [46] Kōno Ichirō,Kōno Ichirō Jiden (The NARA, RG 331, SCAP, Natural Resources Autobiography of Kōno Ichirō), Tokyo: Denki Section, Library Division, Publications,Kankō Iinkai, Tokukan Kōkai, 1965, 187-89, 1945-51. Entry 1828, Box 9091. 191-93. [39] Various studies deal with the political [47] Yoshida Shigeru to General Douglas purge program. Among them the mostMacArthur, General of the Army, May 15, profound reading is offered by Masuda Hiroshi 1946. NDL, MMA-14, Reel 6, Yoshida Shigeru whose detailed interpretation of the causes and 1946. effects of the individual purge cases is based on [48] Mayumi Itoh introduces various readings exceptionally rich source material. Another concerning the purge of Hatoyama, Itoh, 2003, classic study is written by Hans H. Baerwald, a 84-102; Masuda, 2001, 42. former purge officer who shows how the purge [49] Ibidem. served as an instrument for the[50] Mark Gayn, Japan Diary, Tokyo: Charles E. democratization of Japan. Masuda Hiroshi, Tuttle Company, 1981, 159-64, 176. Seijika Tsuihō (The Purge of Politicians), Tokyo: Gayn’s source may have been in the Civil Chuōkōron Shinsha. 2001, passim; Hans H. Information and Education section because Baerwald, The Purge of Japanese Leaders archival sources reveal that CI&E’s Lieutenant

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Colonel Donald R. Nugent sent a confidential Division, Publications, 1945-51. Entry 1828, report to the OCCIO three days before the Box 9091. Press Club incident. Report contained excerpts [55] Headquarters, 81st Military Government from Sekai no Kao and Nugent’s conclusion Company, Kochi, Shikoku, APO 24, Captain according to which it should be studied Korb, Memorandum, March 22, 1946. NDL, whether Hatoyama was to be purged under the GS(B)03008; PAD, Note to Commander Swope, provisions of Category G of SCAPIN 550 and May 28, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03008. In the end, the Jiyūtō be dissolved under the terms of the Hayashi managed to escape purge at this time. statement issued by SCAP on February 18, [56] G-2 to Government Section, June 18, 1946. 1946. Donald R. Nugent, C, CI&E to OCCIO, NDL, GS(B)03182; CW, GS to G-2/CIS, June 21, April 3, 1946. NDL, Hans H. Baerwald Papers, 1946. NDL, GS(B)03182; General BAE-122. Headquarters, United States Army Forces, [51] Masuda, 2001, 33-34, 59-60. Pacific, Check Sheet, from G-2 to GS, June 1, [52] Masuda, 2001, 60-61. 1946. NDL, GS(B)03332; GHQ, SCAP, GS, [53] See for example Kataoka Tetsuya, “The Memorandum for Record, June 5, 1946. NDL, 1955 System: The origin of Japan’s Postwar GS(B)03332; General Headquarters, SCAP, Politics”, in Creating Single-Party Democracy - Check Sheet, from GS to C of S, June 6, 1946. Japan’s Postwar Political System, edited by NDL, GS(B)03332. Kataoka Tetsuya, 151-168. Stanford, CA: [57] Wildes, GHQ, SCAP, GS, Public Affairs Hoover Institution Press, 1992, 158; Masuda, Division, PPB, Liberal Party, June 20, 1946, 8-9, 2001, 22, 42, 61. 11-12. NDL, MMA-03 (RG 5), Reel 82. [54] Civil Intelligence Section, SCAP,[58] Grew to Colegrove, July 6, 1946. NDL, Occupational Trends Japan and Korea. Report MMA-14 (RG 10) Personal Correspondence VIP No. 20, 1-4, May 1, 1946. NARA, RG 331, File, Reel 2, Box 5, Folder 7 Joseph C. Grew. SCAP, Natural Resources Section, Library [59] Kataoka, 1992, 11-15.