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Oārodek Studiów Wschodnich Studies P R A OÂRODEK STUDIÓW WSCHODNICH Centre for Eastern Studies Prace OSW / CES Studies PRACEW ojciech Konoƒczuk „Sprawa Jukosu”: przyczyny i konsekwencje The ‘Yukos OSAffair’, its MotivesW and Implications CES STUDIES numer 25 W arszawa sierpieƒ 2006 / W arsaw August 2006 number © Copyright by OÊrodek Studiów Wschodnich © Copyright by Centre for Eastern Studies Redaktor / Editor Anna ¸abuszewska Opracowanie graficzne / Graphic design Dorota Nowacka T∏umaczenie / Translation OSW / CES Wspó∏praca / Co-operation Jim Todd Wydawca / Publisher OÊrodek Studiów Wschodnich Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a Warszawa / Warsaw, Poland tel. / phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00 fax +48 /22/ 525 80 40 Seria „Prace OSW” zawiera materia∏y analityczne przygotowane w OÊrodku Studiów Wschodnich The ‘CES Studies’ series contains analytical materials prepared at the Centre for Eastern Studies Materia∏y analityczne OSW mo˝na przeczytaç na stronie www.osw.waw.pl Tam równie˝ znaleêç mo˝na wi´cej informacji o OÊrodku Studiów Wschodnich The Centre’s analytical materials can be found on the Internet at www.osw.waw.pl More information about the Centre for Eastern Studies is available at the same web address ISSN 1642-4484 Spis treÊci / Contents „Sprawa Jukosu”: przyczyny i konsekwencje / 5 Wojciech Konoƒczuk Tezy / 5 Wst´p / 6 I. Jukos w systemie gospodarczo-politycznym Rosji (do lipca 2003 roku) / 7 II. Poczàtek „sprawy Jukosu” (lipiec – paêdziernik 2003 roku) / 11 III. „Sprawa Jukosu” jako element ewolucji rosyjskiego systemu politycznego / 15 IV. „Sprawa Jukosu” w kontekÊcie polityki energetycznej Rosji / 18 Zakoƒczenie / 22 Aneksy / 24 The ‘Yukos Affair’, its Motives and Implications / 33 Wojciech Konoƒczuk Key points / 33 Introduction / 34 I. Yukos in Russia’s political and economic system / 35 II. The beginning of the ‘Yukos affair’ (July – October 2003) / 39 III. The ‘Yukos affair’ as a stage in the evolution of the Russian political system / 43 IV. The ‘Yukos affair’ and Russian energy policy / 45 Conclusion / 49 Annexes / 51 Tezy 1. W „sprawie Jukosu” trudno doszukiwaç si´ jednej decydujàcej przyczyny i jednego klucza, które mogà ∏atwo wyjaÊniç dzia∏ania w∏adz ro- syjskich przeciwko kompanii. „Sprawa Jukosu” by∏a wielowàtkowym procesem majàcym wiele przyczyn. Analiza rozwoju wydarzeƒ wokó∏ firmy pokazuje, ˝e pierwotnie Kreml nie mia∏ ustalonej strategii dzia∏ania, ale ewoluowa∏a ona w miar´ up∏ywu czasu. Poczàtkowo konflikt mia∏ charak- ter przede wszystkim polityczny, dopiero w kolej- nym etapie zdominowa∏y go czynniki o charak- terze gospodarczym, co zwiàzane by∏o bezpoÊre- dnio ze zmianami struktury w∏asnoÊci w sekto- rze naftowym. 2. „Sprawa Jukosu” by∏a wa˝nym etapem ewo- „Sprawa Jukosu”: lucji systemu politycznego Rosji, jednym z punk- tów zwrotnych. Atak na Jukos nie przypadkiem nastàpi∏ tu˝ przed wyborami parlamentarnymi przyczyny i konsekwencje i nie pozosta∏ bez wp∏ywu na ich wynik. Konflikt 5 z najwi´kszà kompanià naftowà spowodowa∏ Wojciech Konoƒczuk * kryzys w elicie w∏adzy oraz sta∏ si´ ostatecznà przyczynà najwa˝niejszej zmiany uk∏adu si∏ w ro- syjskiej polityce w czasie prezydentury W∏adimira Putina. W jej wyniku dawne znaczenie i wp∏ywy polityczne utraci∏a „elita starokremlowska” – ludzie zawdzi´czajàcy w∏adz´ Borysowi Jelcy- przyczyny„Sprawa Jukosu”: i konsekwencje nowi. W nast´pstwie „sprawy Jukosu” dosz∏o tak˝e do istotnych przeobra˝eƒ w stosunkach w∏adza–wielki biznes, w wyniku których jego przedstawiciele stracili mo˝liwoÊç autonomicz- nego dzia∏ania. 3. „Sprawa Jukosu” by∏a katalizatorem funda- mentalnych przemian w sektorze naftowym i sze- rzej – energetycznym Rosji i w rezultacie naj- wa˝niejszym elementem procesu jego reorgani- zacji, który doprowadzi∏ do zwi´kszenia roli w∏adzy i przywrócenia jej przedstawicielom dominujàcej pozycji w tym sektorze. 4. Polityka Kremla wobec sektora naftowego za- cz´∏a si´ radykalnie zmieniaç po wyborach pre- zydenckich 2004 roku, co by∏o bezpoÊrednim skutkiem ataku na Jukos, ale do pewnego stop- nia równie˝ jednà z jego przyczyn. Po wyborach *Wojciech Konoƒczuk jest pracownikiem Fundacji im. Stefana Batorego. P race OSW mo˝na by∏o obserwowaç dzia∏ania zmierzajàce cy. Wa˝nà przyczynà podj´cia tematu jest wresz- do stworzenia kontrolowanej przez w∏adz´ „na- cie fakt, ˝e wcià˝ pozostaje on bardzo aktualny. rodowej” kompanii naftowej. Poczàtkowo mia∏a „Sprawa Jukosu” ujawni∏a bowiem mechanizmy ona powstaç w wyniku fuzji Gazpromu i Ros- nowej polityki energetycznej Kremla oraz wyzna- niefti, a kiedy nie dosz∏a ona do skutku z powo- czy∏a kierunek i trendy w rozwoju rosyjskiej du partykularnych ambicji poszczególnych grup gospodarki na najbli˝sze lata. w elicie kremlowskiej, majàcych interesy w sek- Najwi´kszà trudnoÊcià w analizie „sprawy Juko- torze energetycznym, podj´to prób´ jej utworze- su” jest nak∏adanie si´ na siebie w jej ramach nia na bazie Rosniefti. W ka˝dym z tych warian- wielu wàtków i tematów. WielowymiarowoÊç tów warunkiem sine qua non zbudowania takie- i niejednoznacznoÊç „sprawy Jukosu” powoduje, go koncernu by∏o zniszczenie Jukosu, gdy˝ móg∏ ˝e trudno doszukaç si´ jednej interpretacji i de- on powstaç tylko w oparciu o jego aktywa lub cydujàcej przyczyny. Dlatego te˝ przyj´to, ˝e naj- ich znacznà cz´Êç. lepszym sposobem przedstawienia „sprawy Ju- kosu” b´dzie ukazanie: sytuacji kompanii w prze- dedniu konfliktu z w∏adzà, g∏ównych kwestii, Wst´p które wp∏yn´∏y na genez´ sporu i najwa˝niej- szych wàtków, przez które mo˝na ten konflikt Kiedy w lipcu 2003 roku aresztowany zosta∏ P∏a- t∏umaczyç. ton Lebiediew, prezes Menatep Group i jeden z g∏ównych akcjonariuszy Jukosu, wydawaç si´ mog∏o, ˝e nie pociàgnie to za sobà zbyt daleko 6 idàcych skutków. Zapoczàtkowana w ten sposób „sprawa Jukosu” przybra∏a jednak znacznie po- wa˝niejszy charakter i rozwin´∏a si´ na znacznie wi´kszà skal´ po aresztowaniu trzy i pó∏ miesiàca póêniej Michai∏a Chodorkowskiego, prezesa firmy i jej najwi´kszego akcjonariusza. Szybko okaza∏o si´, ˝e aresztowania oraz ca∏a sekwencja wyda- „Sprawa Jukosu”: przyczyny„Sprawa Jukosu”: i konsekwencje rzeƒ wokó∏ Jukosu to coÊ wi´cej ni˝ tylko spór jednego z oligarchów z w∏adzà. Rozpoczà∏ si´ bo- wiem proces zmierzajàcy do przej´cia przez Kreml najwi´kszego prywatnego koncernu naftowego Rosji. Celem tego opracowania jest próba przedstawie- nia przyczyn „sprawy Jukosu”, jej ewolucji oraz znaczenia i konsekwencji dla rosyjskiej polityki i gospodarki. Mimo ˝e po up∏ywie trzech lat od wybuchu „sprawy Jukosu” wiedza o jej kulisach wcià˝ jest niepe∏na, wydaje si´ jednak mo˝liwe spojrzenie na nià jako na ca∏oÊciowy proces. „Sprawa Jukosu” mo˝e byç traktowana jako swoiste case study, umo˝liwiajàce zbadanie wielu wa˝nych kwestii politycznych i gospodarczych w dzisiejszej Rosji, w tym m.in.: przej´cia przez w∏adze kontroli nad sektorem naftowym, zmiany uk∏adu si∏ wewnàtrz elity kremlowskiej, wyelimi- nowania z polityki i gospodarki podmiotów nie- zale˝nych od w∏adz, procesu powstawania „na- rodowej” kompanii naftowej czy przebiegu ropo- ciàgu na Dalekim Wschodzie. Te i inne aspekty problemu zosta∏y przedstawione w niniejszej pra- P race OSW I. Jukos w systemie rynku, przejmujàc kilka mniejszych firm z sekto- gospodarczo-politycznym Rosji ra energetycznego: Wschodnià Kompani´ Nafto- wà (1997), Wschodniosyberyjskà Kompani´ Naf- (do lipca 2003 roku) towo-Gazowà (2000), Angarskà Kompani´ Nafto- wo-Chemicznà (2001), Arktikgaz, Rospan i Uren- 1. Potencja∏ firmy i jej pozycja goj (2002)6. Dzi´ki nowym nabytkom Jukos móg∏ na rynku naftowym znacznie zwi´kszyç wydobycie, wkrótce jednak pojawi∏ si´ problem braku wystarczajàcej mocy Jukos, podobnie jak wi´kszoÊç najwi´kszych ro- transportowej dla eksportu ropy. Jukos znalaz∏ syjskich firm naftowych, powsta∏ w 1993 roku. si´ w swoistym Êlepym „technologicznym zau∏- Zgodnie z ówczesnà koncepcjà restrukturyzacji ku” – zwi´ksza∏ wydobycie, ale nie mia∏ mo˝li- przemys∏u naftowego Rosji (tzw. koncepcja Sza- woÊci zwi´kszania przetwórstwa i eksportu ropy7. franika1) powstaç mia∏y cztery niezale˝ne od siebie Bez tego z kolei trudniejsze stawa∏o si´ zagospo- koncerny wydobywajàce i przetwarzajàce rop´ darowanie nowych z∏ó˝, na co Êrodki mo˝na by∏o naftowà: Rosnieft’, ¸UKoil, Surgutnieftiegaz i Jukos, uzyskaç dzi´ki eksportowi. Problem ten le˝a∏ kontrolujàce zarówno z∏o˝a surowca, jak i rafi- u podstaw zainicjowanego przez Jukos projektu nerie. Jukosowi, na czele którego stanà∏ Siergiej budowy nowych, prywatnych ropociàgów, w tym Murawlenko, nale˝àcy do grupy dyrektorów za- ropociàgu do Murmaƒska. rzàdzajàcych wczeÊniej radzieckim sektorem naf- W 2001 roku Jukos sta∏ si´ pierwszà kompanià towym, przypad∏y: przedsi´biorstwo wydobyw- naftowà w Rosji publikujàcà kwartalne sprawo- cze Jugansknieftiegaz w Chanty-Mansyjskim Okr´- zdania z dzia∏alnoÊci zgodnie ze standardami gu Autonomicznym, trzy rafinerie w obwodzie mi´dzynarodowymi. Do personelu administracyj- 7 samarskim i przedsi´biorstwa sprzeda˝y produk- nego firmy wesz∏o kilkudziesi´ciu ksi´gowych tów naftowych po∏o˝one w oÊmiu regionach. z Europy Zachodniej i Stanów Zjednoczonych. W 1995 roku w ramach programu „po˝yczka w za- Wroku 2002 Menatep Group poda∏ do publicz- mian za akcje”2 paƒstwo wystawi∏o na licytacj´ nej wiadomoÊci informacj´ o swoich g∏ównych pakiet 45% akcji Jukosu. èle zarzàdzana kompa- akcjonariuszach8. W rezultacie Jukos zaczà∏ byç nia mia∏a wówczas 3,5 mld dolarów d∏ugu. Jego uwa˝any za najbardziej przejrzystà z rosyjskich nabywcà, udzielajàcym po˝yczki, zosta∏ bank korporacji, co niewàtpliwie wynika∏o z planowej przyczyny„Sprawa Jukosu”: i konsekwencje Menatep, który pokona∏
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