Revisiting Osirak Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks

Revisiting Osirak Revisiting Osirak Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks

Thirty years after the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor on June 7, 1981, its long-term implications for Iraq’s nuclear weapons program remain hotly contested. The Israeli attack on an alleged nuclear site in Syria in 2007 and the prospect of a similar attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure have intensiªed interest in the lessons from Osirak. This article examines the conclusions scholars have drawn about the impact of the attack and offers a reinterpretation of these conclusions based on sources that became available following the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Iraq’s nuclear weapons program has been subject to long-standing controversy. Disagreements revolve around the origins of the program, how Israel’s attack on Osirak affected the future development of the program, and how close Iraq came to producing nuclear weapons under Saddam.1 Other disagreements concern the impact of the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War and Saddam’s decision to invade Kuwait in 1990 as Iraq approached the nuclear weapons threshold. Some basic facts are undisputed. Iraq’s nuclear program began in the mid-1950s and accelerated as Baghdad began to pursue a complete nuclear fuel cycle (including the basic capability to produce and reprocess plutonium) in the mid-1970s. These developments fueled international concerns that Iraq was seeking these capabilities to produce weapons-grade plutonium for the purposes of a military program.2 Israel sought to curtail Iraq’s efforts by at-

Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer is Assistant Professor at the Institute for Defence Studies at the Norwegian Defence University College.

The author owes a great debt of gratitude to the external reviewers of International Security. A particular note of thanks is due to Graham Allison. She also wishes to thank Tom Bielefeld, Matthew Bunn, Jeff Colgan, Zachary Davis, Charles Duelfer, Ehud Eiran, Thomas Hegghammer, Nelly Lahoud, Frode Liland, Martin Malin, Marvin Miller, Negeen Pegahi, Matthew Sharp, Jonathan Tucker, Richard Wilson, Melissa Willard-Foster, and participants at the Oslo International Contem- porary History Project conference at the Nobel Institute in August 2010.

1. The later controversy over whether Iraq pursued nuclear weapons capabilities from 1998 to 2003 is discussed elsewhere. See Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofªce, 2004); Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009); and Målfrid Braut- Hegghammer, “Nuclear Entrepreneurs: Drivers of Nuclear Proliferation,” Ph.D. thesis, Depart- ment of International Relations, London School of Economics, 2010. 2. There are basically two ways to produce ªssile material for the core of a nuclear bomb. States can pursue the so-called plutonium route, producing plutonium-239 by reprocessing spent fuel. A

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tacking Osirak, a French-supplied reactor complex that stood on the verge of becoming operational in June 1981. In response, Iraq established a covert nuclear weapons program to pursue an alternative technical route, namely, uranium enrichment. These efforts intensiªed after the invasion of Kuwait in the fall of 1990, but were interrupted by the U.S.-led attack on Iraq in January 1991. The academic debate on the consequences of the Osirak attack for Iraq’s nuclear weapons program remains polarized. Supporters of the attack argue that the strike prevented the development of an Iraqi nuclear weapons capability.3 Critics argue that the strike accelerated Iraq’s nuclear efforts, pointing to the establishment of a clandestine weapons program in the fall of 1981.4 Both sides of the debate apply lessons from Osirak for predicting the consequences of similar attacks on Iranian or North Korean nuclear facilities.5 Drawing on accounts from key players in the Iraqi nuclear establishment, I reexamine the impact of the destruction of Osirak on Iraq’s nuclear program. I identify valid points made by both sides in the debate and integrate these into an argument based on a more complete historical account of the Iraqi nuclear program. I describe Iraq’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons before and after the Israeli attack over two separate phases: a drift toward a nuclear weapons option from 1975 to 1981 and a covert nuclear weapons program from 1981 to 1991. I argue that the Israeli attack had mixed effects: it triggered a nuclear weapons program where one did not previously exist, while forcing Iraq to pursue a more difªcult and time-consuming technological route. Despite these challenges and added delays resulting from inefªcient management, within a decade Iraq stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. Ultimately, I conclude that the Israeli attack was counterproductive. I develop these arguments in three main sections. First, I provide an updated history of the Iraqi nuclear program before the Osirak attack. I examine the nature of the program, the proliferation risk posed by the Osirak reactor in particular, and how far Iraq had advanced toward a nuclear weapons option

second, more challenging option—particularly for small developing states—is to enrich uranium mechanically (by centrifuges) or chemically (gaseous diffusion) to produce uranium-235. 3. See, for example, Jeremy Tamsett, “The Israeli Bombing of Osiraq Reconsidered: Successful Counterproliferation?” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Fall/Winter 2004), pp. 70–85; and Shai Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq—Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 114–142, especially p. 126. 4. Dan Reiter, “Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the ‘Success’ at Osiraq,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2005), pp. 355–371; and Richard K. Betts, “The Osirak Fallacy,” National Interest, Vol. 83 (Spring 2006), pp. 22–25. 5. See Reiter, “Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the ‘Success’ at Osiraq”; and Whitney Raas and Austin Long, “Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 7–33.

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on the eve of the attack. Second, I consider the attack’s inºuence on Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons from 1981 to 1991. I juxtapose the effects of the attack with an analysis of the impact of domestic drivers (e.g., bureaucratic politics and technological path dependency) on the direction and pace of the program. Third, I provide a net assessment of the impact of the attack on Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and consider whether this case holds lessons for understanding how preventive attacks can inºuence proliferation risks in the long term.

New Sources and Perspectives

Since 2003, leading ªgures in Iraq’s now-defunct nuclear weapons program have published memoirs and accounts that present a different picture of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program than that available in the scholarly literature. These individuals include Jafar Dhiya Jafar, the scientiªc leader of the program; Mahdi Obeidi, head of the centrifuge program; Imad Khadduri, who was in charge of documentation and involved in procurement; and Hamam Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafur, the former head of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). Dhaªr Selbi, former IAEC commissioner and head of administration in the nuclear establishment, and some of his colleagues are currently producing an account of their involvement in the nuclear weapons program.6 These accounts offer unique insights into Iraqi debates over the nuclear program and its management. In particular, they shed new light on poorly under- stood issues such as the origins of the program, the program’s domestic drivers, the timing of key decisions, and why Iraq opted for technologies that other states had discarded because of their high costs and inefªcient output. Together with analyses of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program provided by UN agencies and multinational investigation teams, these sources help to ªll gaps in scholars’ analytical understanding of the program. Although these accounts contain substantial disagreements concerning the program’s technical priori- ties and management, they present a coherent picture that contrasts sharply

6. See Jafar D. Jafar, Numan Saadaldin al-Niaimi, and Lars Sigurd Sunnanå, Oppdraget: Innsidehistorien om Saddams atomvåpen [The mission: The inside story of Saddam’s nuclear weapons] (Oslo: Spartacus, 2005); Mahdi Obeidi and Kurt Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden: The Secret of Saddam’s Nuclear Mastermind (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2004); Imad Khadduri, Iraq’s Nuclear Mi- rage: Memoirs and Delusions (Toronto: Springhead, 2003); Hamam Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafur and Abd al-Halim Ibrahim al-Hajjaj, Istratijiyat al-barnamij al-nawawi ª al-Iraq: Fi itar siyasat al-ilm wal-tiknulujiya [Iraq’s nuclear weapons program: Political and strategic aspects] (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2009); and Dhaªr Selbi, Abdul Qader Ahmed, Zuhair Al-Chalabi, and Imad Khadduri, Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program: 1981–1991 (forthcoming).

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with the account that most analyses have relied on, namely that of Khidhir Hamza.7 Hamza was a nuclear scientist who began working in the Iraqi nuclear program in the early 1970s. After 1981 he concentrated his efforts on the diffusion process in the nuclear weapons program. He was reassigned to head the group working on weapons design in 1987.8 After a few months, he was demoted to work on theoretical physics in the Physics Department at the Nuclear Research Center. He appears to have retired from the program altogether in 1990.9 After defecting to the United States in the early 1990s, Hamza published a book in which he described himself as “Saddam’s bomb-maker” and argued that a decision to pursue nuclear weapons was made in the early 1970s.10 Hamza’s claims contradict the accounts of his senior Iraqi colleagues with regard to his personal role, the program’s time line, the reasons for key decisions, and turning points in the nuclear program. Nonetheless, recent analyses still rely on his claim that a political decision in 1971–72 triggered Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.11 As a result, the impression that the Israeli attack on Osirak interrupted a nuclear weapons program remains prevalent. A pressing analytical challenge is to discern the character and intensity of Iraq’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons before and after the Osirak attack. Analyses have tended to focus on Iraq’s technical capabilities and have had less to say about the seriousness, level of funding, and degree of organization that characterized Iraq’s nuclear efforts. These latter issues exert signiªcant

7. For details, see Khadduri, Iraq’s Nuclear Mirage; Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnanå, Oppdraget; Obeidi and Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden; al-Ghafur and al-Hajjaj, Istratijiyat al-barnamij al-nawawi ª al-Iraq; and Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program. Saddam’s son-in- law Hussein Kamel, who took charge of the nuclear weapons program in the mid-1980s, characterized Hamza in his 1995 debrieªng with IAEA and United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) ofªcials as a “professional liar.” Hamza’s account is described as “full of technical in- accuracies” and prone to exaggeration, according to his former colleague David Albright. See Pe- ter Beaumont, Kamal Ahmed, and Edward Helmore, “Should We Go to War against Saddam?” Observer, March 17, 2002. 8. See Khadduri, Iraq’s Nuclear Mirage, p. 91. 9. Ibid, p. 92. 10. Khidhir Hamza, “Inside Saddam’s Secret Nuclear Program,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54, No. 5 (September/October 1998), pp. 26–33; and Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam’s Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York: Scribner, 2000). 11. For examples, see Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 147; Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nu- clear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (New York: Ox- ford University Press, 2006); and Reiter, “Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the ‘Success’ at Osiraq.” The most comprehensive analyses by international disarmament veriªca- tion agencies do not comment on when the proliferation decision was made but note that a nuclear weapons program was established after the Israeli attack in 1981. See Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD; and United Nations Security Council Report, S/1997/779, October 8, 1997, Annex: Letter Dated 6 October 1997 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary-General.

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inºuence on whether and how fast a state can develop a nuclear weapons capability. Therefore, only with a comparison of the character of Baghdad’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons before and after the attack can analysts fully assess its consequences. Below I describe the emergence of nuclear research and development in Iraq.

“drifting” toward the bomb Iraq’s exploration of nuclear technology began in 1956 when the Iraqi government initiated a nuclear program under the aegis of Atoms for Peace. The program’s initial efforts were characteristic of those of many developing states’ early attempts to acquire nuclear capabilities: ambitious yet seemingly lacking in direction.12 After the Baathist coup in July 1968, the regime accelerated development of its nascent nuclear infrastructure. Later, the IAEC noted that during this stage Iraq’s program “was open-ended with the main objective of acquiring the know-how in various aspects of the nuclear technology including the fuel cycle.”13 According to Jafar Dhiya Jafar, who would later become the scientiªc leader of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, even the senior management of Iraq’s nuclear physics establishment struggled to identify the intentions of the political leadership for the direction of the program in the late 1960s.14 Beginning in the early 1970s, individuals in the nuclear program began to contemplate and advocate a nuclear weapons option, a fact that previous studies have not addressed. Speciªcally, enterprising nuclear scientists began to pursue a mandate from the political leadership to develop a nuclear weapons option.15 In December 1972 Abdul Razzaq al-Hashimi, who was in charge of the Baath Party organization at the IAEC (and later served as its vice chairman), interrupted the commission’s annual meeting to criticize the IAEC’s work as “worthless academic exercises” and to propose projects more likely to attract attention and funding from the Iraqi leadership.16 One such option would be to develop a nuclear weapons option. There is no evidence suggesting that

12. See, for example, the case of Pakistan in Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Pro- gram: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 178–204; and Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Proliferation Motivations: Lessons from Pakistan,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3 (November 2006), pp. 501–517. 13. Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, “Preface,” in Iraqi Nuclear Programme, 1956–1991 (Baghdad: Al-Adib, 1992), p. vii. 14. Jafar Dhiya Jafar, unpublished manuscript, (no title), May 13, 2004, pp. 6–7. 15. This dynamic was not exclusive to the nuclear arena. Iraq’s efforts to develop biological weapons started in the early 1970s and intensiªed in the early 1980s when Nasser Hindawi persuaded decisionmakers of the value of such capabilities in ªghting Iran. A similar argument was proposed in Jed C. Snyder, “The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad’s Quest for the Bomb,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Autumn 1983), pp. 565–593, especially p. 589. 16. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 14.

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Baathist leaders supported al-Hashimi’s statement. There was, however, an emerging consensus within the nuclear establishment that President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Vice President Saddam Hussein considered nuclear weapons an inevitable consequence of advanced nuclear technology.17 Saddam, in particular, took a strong personal interest in the nuclear question. On assuming the IAEC presidency in 1973, he stated, “I am the Godfather of the IAEC and I love the IAEC.”18 Others in Iraq’s nuclear establishment assumed that Saddam ultimately wanted a so-called breakout option from the nuclear program—developing all the necessary skills and technologies to be able to rapidly produce nuclear weapons from the civilian nuclear infrastructure— but they had no clear evidence to support this assumption.19 No explicit mandate to develop such capabilities was forthcoming at this stage. Nonetheless, al-Hashemi’s statement appears to have spurred initiatives from nuclear scientists to develop a nuclear weapons option. Hamza reportedly proposed developing such an option to the political leadership in 1973 or 1974. The 1973 oil crisis, following the nationalization of Iraq’s oil industry the previous year, represented a turning point for the country’s nuclear establishment.20 Saddam seized this opportunity to turn Iraq’s nuclear program into one of the most ambitious in the Middle East.21 This development mirrored the trajectory of the nuclear power program in Iran. The expansion of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure during the 1970s raised questions about whether Iran was seeking to develop a nuclear weapons capability as an offshoot of its civilian program.22 Saddam instructed the Iraqi nuclear establishment to closely moni- tor these developments.23 In 1975 he ordered the establishment of a nuclear power program, an order that coincided with a restructuring of the IAEC to facilitate greater compartmentalization and secrecy.24 Saddam then instructed the IAEC to prepare a strategy for “the introduction of a nuclear power program and aspects of the related fuel cycle...based on turnkey projects and the transfer of nuclear technology from abroad.”25

17. Jafar D. Jafar, interview by author, Rome, Italy, May 4–5, 2005; Dhaªr Selbi, interview by author, Amman, Jordan, September 5, 2005; and Imad Khadduri, interview by author, Toronto, Can- ada, March 31, 2005. 18. Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Vol. 1: Regime Stra- tegic Intent, p. 26. 19. Jafar, interview by author. 20. See Jafar, al-Niami, and Sunnanå, Oppdraget, pp. 32–33. 21. Snyder, “The Road to Osiraq,” p. 566. 22. For an account of the Iranian program under the shah, see William Burr, “A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 65, No. 1 (January/ February 2009), pp. 21–34. 23. Khadduri, interview by author. 24. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 17. 25. Ibid.

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Saddam’s decision to pursue a complete nuclear fuel cycle presented Iraq with the option of developing a nuclear weapons capability. When procuring the required technologies, the Iraqis emphasized plutonium extraction and reprocessing—technologies that would be essential for creating an indigenous nuclear power program as well as developing ªssile material for a bomb.26 During this period, Iraqi efforts were conªned to procuring what may be called the “hardware” for a nuclear weapons program but did not extend to developing the “software” (human resources such as know-how) necessary for an operational program. Iraq’s initial efforts to explore a nuclear weapons option lacked the characteristics of a formal nuclear weapons program: the Iraqis had no explicit mandate, no dedicated organizational infrastructure, no budget, and no strategic plan.27 The notion of a nuclear weapons option remained an abstraction. For example, senior IAEC ofªcials did not assess the technical requirements of an indigenous nuclear weapons program.28 Their limited human and organizational resources during this period made it difªcult for ambitious scientists to start developing the skills necessary for a weapons program. For example, Khalid Saeed, who coauthored the plan for introducing a complete nuclear fuel cycle commissioned by Saddam and later headed efforts to develop a nuclear weapon design, wanted to explore reprocessing technology in the mid- 1970s but was unable to do so for lack of human and technical resources.29 In the late 1970s, Iraq was assembling the building blocks of a complete fuel cycle. After entering into nuclear cooperation agreements with France and Italy in 1976, Iraq upgraded and expanded its nuclear infrastructure and research and development facilities. It acquired the basic capability to explore the production of nuclear fuel (the so-called 17 July project) and to reprocess small amounts of plutonium into weapons-grade ªssile material (the 30 July project).30 From 1976 to 1979, Iraq procured a reactor complex from a French

26. Khadduri, interview by author; and Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program. 27. France, India, and Israel also began to pursue a nuclear weapons option without an explicit commitment to acquire nuclear weapons. See Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), p. 236. 28. Jafar D. Jafar, interview by author, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, November 12, 2006. 29. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program, p. 9. 30. The 17 July project encompassed two research reactors supplied by a French consortium, including the Osirak reactor destroyed by the Israeli attack and a laboratory for testing irradiated material. The 30 July project involved the acquisition of a complex of nuclear infrastructure from Italian companies, including a research-scale radiochemistry laboratory capable of handling plutonium in gram quantities; an experimental fuel fabrication laboratory; a technological hall for chemical engineering research; a materials science laboratory; a laboratory for the production of radioactive isotopes; and mechanical and electrical workshops. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, pp. 18–22.

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consortium, a laboratory-scale Italian reprocessing capability, and other components essential for developing basic skills in nuclear fuel production and reprocessing. At the turn of the decade, Iraq’s nuclear establishment was preparing to initiate laboratory-scale plutonium reprocessing. The prototype radiochem- ical laboratory installed in 1979, at the Nuclear Research Center in Tuwaitha, provided the IAEC with the option of reprocessing up to one burned fuel rod at a time from its Russian IRT-2000 reactor.31 Hussein Shahristani, a director-general in Iraq’s nuclear establishment, was in charge of the spent fuel–reprocessing laboratory.32 The reprocessing project was not publicly an- nounced within the IAEC.33 Although such compartmentalization was not unique in the Iraqi context, it is indicative of the sensitive status of the project. The international community greeted Iraq’s increasingly rapid advance toward a complete fuel cycle with growing suspicion. Concerns mounted following Iraq’s acquisition of the two French (Osirak) reactors. These concerns were rooted in fear that, despite International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, “plutonium...produced during normal operations...could be diverted for weapons use.”34 Iraq’s original request to the French for a gas- graphite power reactor capable of producing 150 kilograms (kg) plutonium annually appeared inappropriate for the purpose of power generation or civilian research. External analysts interpreted Iraq’s request as proof of Saddam’s desire for nuclear weapons.35 Deeply worried about Iraq’s nuclear intentions, Israeli intelligence began targeting Iraq’s nuclear scientists for assassination and destroying some of Iraq’s nuclear-related acquisitions.36 Although these efforts inºicted losses, including the assassination of an Egyptian scientist working in the Iraqi nuclear program, they did not substantially halt Iraq’s nuclear advances.37 The Iraqi regime’s concerns about domestic security following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, however, did succeed in disrupting the nuclear establishment’s efforts.38 In December 1979, the authorities arrested Director-General Shahristani.39 Shahristani, who was in charge of the reprocessing laboratory,

31. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program, pp. 9–10. 32. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 39. 33. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program, p. 10. 34. Richard Stone, “Proªle: Jafar Dhia Jafar,” Science, September 30, 2005, pp. 2158–2159. 35. See Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq,” p. 115; and Snyder, “The Road to Osiraq,” p. 567. For more on this request, see Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnanå, Oppdraget, pp. 30–31. 36. See Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. 65; and Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, p. 321. 37. See Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, p. 321. 38. Jafar, interview by author, Rome, Italy, May 4–5, 2005; and Selbi, interview by author. 39. Selbi, interview by author.

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was suspected of supporting an illegal Shiite movement. Director-General Jafar was arrested in January 1980 as a result of his repeated protests over Shahristani’s incarceration. As a consequence, Iraq’s nuclear advances came to a standstill.40 In June 1980, Saddam (now president) apparently decided that Iraq should pursue nuclear weapons, yet he failed to act on this decision in any substantial way. Jafar and Shahristani, who were still imprisoned, were in- formed that Saddam wanted a nuclear weapon.41 Jafar agreed to cooperate while Shahristani declined. Jafar was subsequently “upgraded” to house arrest while Shahristani remained in custody until his escape in 1991. During his house arrest, Jafar studied enrichment technologies. He refused to return to the IAEC until Vice Chairman al-Hashemi, who had overseen his arrest, left the program. Jafar remained incarcerated until the Israeli attack on Osirak. We can only speculate on when Iraq would have established an operational nuclear weapons program if Israel had not attacked Osirak in 1981. Neverthe- less, it seems clear that Saddam was either unwilling or unable to initiate a formal nuclear weapons program without Jafar. Saddam does not appear to have approached other nuclear scientists during Jafar’s house arrest. He may not have considered the establishment of a nuclear weapons program an urgent matter, or he may have been distracted by Iraq’s war with Iran.

pursuing a plutonium option Iraq’s efforts to move toward a nuclear weapons capability during the late 1970s were informal and incremental. They lacked the institutional foundations and dedicated resources that constitute a nuclear weapons program in any meaningful sense of the word. The absence of several critical resources created this situation: a dedicated budget, a dedicated staff, a mandate, and an independent infrastructure (i.e., one not subject to safeguards and external oversight). As a result, Iraq’s nuclear efforts during this period can be characterized as a form of “drift”—an exploration of the technical foundations for a nuclear weapons program without an explicit political mandate guiding these efforts.42 Iraq’s approach mirrored developments in Iran, where the shah’s even more ambitious pursuit of a complete nuclear fuel cycle, combined with

40. Ibid. 41. Jafar, al-Niaimi, Sunnanå, Oppdraget, pp. 46–47; Amatzia Baram, “An Analysis of Iraqi WMD Strategy,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2001), p. 28; “Interview with al- Shahrastani,” Al-Majalla (London), January 28–February 3, 1996; and Khadduri, Iraq’s Nuclear Mi- rage, p. 79. 42. This dynamic has also been observed in other states that proceeded to establish nuclear weapons programs, such as India and Pakistan.

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Table 1. Iraq’s Advance toward a Plutonium Weapons Option by June 1981

Capability Experimental Scale Industrial Scale

Fuel production X Reprocessing X Weaponization

his de facto admission of a nuclear weapons ambition, fueled suspicions that he intended to develop a nuclear weapons option.43 In the spring of 1981, Iraq stood on the verge of having an operational light- water research reactor and a laboratory-scale reprocessing facility at Tuwaitha, which would enable the Iraqis to develop the skills necessary to establish an operational weapons program. Iraq had made signiªcant advances toward developing the capability to produce such material but was not yet able to produce ªssile material in large quantities or assemble nuclear weapons. Table 1 offers a summary of Iraq’s technical advances toward developing the infrastructure necessary for two critical components of a weapons program: ªssile material (fuel production and plutonium reprocessing) and a weaponization capability. What can we conclude about the momentum driving Iraq’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons option following Saddam’s seemingly “inconsequential” proliferation decision? Figure 1 provides an overview of the political, ªnancial, institutional, and technical resources available to Iraq in its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability by the spring of 1981. In sum, on the eve of the attack on Osirak, Iraq was in the process of establishing a technological base that could facilitate developing the building blocks for a nuclear weapons program (e.g., fuel experiments) but that would not easily facilitate production of nuclear weapons. To produce sufªcient plutonium for several nuclear weapons, Iraq would need larger facilities that were not subject to external oversight and safeguards. The political momentum driving Iraq’s efforts to develop a weapons option appears to have been inconsistent at best. Saddam had not secured the basic organizational resources or budget. As a result, Iraq’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability was both directionless and disorganized.

the osirak reactor Could the Iraqis have employed the Osirak reactor as part of a nuclear weapons program? Speciªcally, could the reactor produce plutonium in suf-

43. See Burr, “A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations,” p. 22.

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Figure 1. Iraq’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons prior to June 1981

ªcient quantities for such a program? At the time of the Israeli attack, analysts were concerned that the Osirak reactor complex at Tuwaitha (hosting the 40-megawatt research reactor and a smaller 500-kilowatt reactor) could be used to produce sufªcient amounts of plutonium—a reasonable concern given that India and Israel used similar reactors in their nuclear weapons programs.44 Unlike these other reactors, however, the design characteristics of the Osirak reactor and the fact that it was subject to IAEA safeguards placed signiªcant constraints on the feasibility of using this reactor for the purposes of a nuclear weapons program.45 A key concern among analysts was that Iraq would divert Osirak’s reactor fuel for making nuclear weapons. Iraq’s original agreement with the French stipulated that the two reactors at the Tuwaitha complex would be supplied with 70 kg of 93 percent enriched uranium fuel. According to Jafar’s own estimate, this amount of fuel could have sufªced, in theory, to produce four to ªve nuclear weapons.46 Measures to detect any Iraqi attempts to divert reactor fuel in the form of on-site French engineers and a bimonthly IAEA inspection regime made large-scale diversion unfeasible.47 In response to pressure from the United States, France sought to amend its agreement with Iraq and reduce the risk of fuel diversion. First, the French stipulated that only 12–13 kilograms of highly enriched uranium fuel would be available to the Osirak reactor at any given time. This amount could have sufªced for the production of one nu-

44. Israel’s DIMONA heavy water reactor was a copy of the French template for the Osirak reactor. Prior to the strike, there was disagreement within the Israeli government and the military and intelligence services as to whether an airstrike would reduce or intensify the risk that Iraq would acquire nuclear weapons. See, for example, Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, p. 322. 45. This hardly represents an immediate proliferation risk. 46. Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnanå, Oppdraget, pp. 53–54. 47. “How Long Would It Take for Iraq to Obtain a Nuclear Explosive after Its Research Reactor Began Operation?” CRS Report for Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings: Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facility, 97th Cong., 1st sess., June 25, 1981.

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clear weapon once Iraq possessed all of the other necessary skills, technologies, and components for weaponization.48 But, again, diversion of even this amount of fuel would have been detected by French engineers on site or by IAEA safeguards. Second, in early 1981 France proposed replacing this fuel with less efªcient “caramel” fuel (9 percent enriched uranium), which Iraqi ofªcials refused on the grounds that such fuel was not yet being produced on an industrial scale.49 A U.S. assessment following the Israeli attack suggested that, if the Osirak reactor was dedicated to producing plutonium, it could have provided material for a sophisticated bomb in fewer than two years and a simple device in slightly more than one year.50 Although the reactor could have been used to produce small amounts of plutonium, this may not have been realistic. Early assessments are unlikely to have accounted for the design characteristics of the reactor.51 Furthermore, it is unclear how Iraq would have secured consistent access to sufªcient highly enriched uranium (HEU) to fuel the reactors given that it relied on French supplies and was still not fully capable of producing the HEU indigenously. Finally, Iraq would still have had to master an additional range of skills, technologies, and materials to assemble nuclear weapons. The design of the Osirak reactor made it suboptimal for the purposes of a weapons program.52 For example, Osirak’s neutron beam hall was too far away from the reactor itself to facilitate large-scale plutonium production.53 Israeli estimates assumed that the reactor had the same neutron ºux as the Ϫ Ϫ French Osiris reactor (4 ϫ 1014 n/cm 2.s 1).54 Osirak’s neutron ºux was lower.55 According to Jafar, the neutron ºux in the 40-megawatt light water re-

48. Ibid. 49. Ibid.; and Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnanå, Oppdraget, pp. 53–54. See also Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, p. 321. 50. “How Long Would It Take for Iraq to Obtain a Nuclear Explosive after Its Research Reactor Began Operation?” 51. The assumed technical characteristics forming the basis for these calculations were not spec- iªed. 52. Richard Wilson, “A Visit to the Bombed Nuclear Reactor at Tuwaitha, Iraq,” Nature, March 31, 1983, pp. 373–376; Hans Gruemm, “Safeguards and Tamuz: Setting the Record Straight,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1981), pp. 12–13; Obeidi and Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden; Yves Girard, Un neutron entre les dents (Paris: Editions Rives Droite, 1997); and Khadduri, Iraq’s Nuclear Mirage, pp. 81–82. 53. Wilson, “A Visit to the Bombed Nuclear Reactor at Tuwaitha,” p. 374. 54. See Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq,” p. 116; and Government of Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Atomic Energy Commission, “The Iraqi Nuclear Threat—Why Israel Had to Act,” Jerusalem 1981. 55. Wilson, “A Visit to the Bombed Nuclear Reactor at Tuwaitha,” p. 374.

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actor was up to 3 ϫ 1014 n/cm2.s.56 The reactor would require signiªcant modiªcations to facilitate timely production of large quantities of weapons- grade plutonium.57 Apart from the Iraqi estimates from the late 1970s, there are no exact calculations available for how much plutonium the Osirak reactor could have produced based on its particular characteristics. A 1979 estimate by Jafar and Shahristani and later assessments by IAEA ofªcials concur that the reactor could produce up to 2 kg of plutonium per year with uranium blankets placed inside the reactor.58 According to Mahdi Obeidi, however, problems with the aluminum pipes in the reactor would have required repairs and possibly imposed delays in its operation.59 Although the conventional wisdom may have overestimated the ease with which Osirak could have been used to produce plutonium in large quantities, its production capacity could have been enhanced.60 Two options have been suggested: (1) introducing natural or de- pleted uranium into the reactor’s core or chimney, and (2) producing plutonium in the neutron hall under the reactor.61 IAEA assessments deemed the latter option unfeasible.62 Modifying the reactor would have been possible only if Iraq withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty and the associated IAEA safeguards regime.63 The question of whether the IAEA safeguards regime could provide suf-

56. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 17. 57. For one scenario on how Iraq could modify the facility, see Wilson, “A Visit to the Bombed Nu- clear Reactor at Tuwaitha,” p. 376. See also Richard Wilson, “Incomplete or Inaccurate Information Can Lead to Tragically Incorrect Decisions to Preempt: The Example of OSIRAK,” paper presented at Erice, Sicily, updated February 9, 2008, http://phys4.harvard.edu/ϳwilson/publications/ pp896.html. 58. The IAEC estimate assumed that uranium would surround the core of the reactor, according to Jafar and Shahristani, whereas Herzig’s estimate assumes placing uranium in the chimney of the reactor. Jafar and Shahristani, personal correspondence with author; Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 24; and Christopher Herzig, “Correspondence: IAEA Safeguards,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 195–197. See also Obeidi and Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden. 59. Reiter, “Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the ‘Success’ at Osiraq,” p. 358; and Obeidi and Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden, p. 50. 60. The IAEA noted that the Iraqi Soviet-supplied IRT-5000 reactor was useful for research and development but of “very limited usefulness as a plutonium production reactor.” United Nations Se- curity Council Report, Attachment 1: The Components of Iraq’s Clandestine Nuclear Programme, S/1997/779, p. 53. 61. Feldman “The Bombing of Osiraq,” p. 116; Reiter, “Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Pro- grams and the ‘Success’ at Osiraq,” p. 358; and Marvin M. Miller and Carol Ann Eberhard, “The Potential for Upgrading Safeguards Procedures at Research Reactors Fuelled with Highly En- riched Uranium,” November 1982. 62. Gruemm, “Safeguards and Tamuz,” pp. 12–13; and “Peaceful Nuclear Development Must Continue,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1981), pp. 3–7. 63. See the debate in Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq”; Gruemm, “Safeguards and Tamuz”; “Peaceful Nuclear Development Must Continue”; and Herzig, “Correspondence.”

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ªcient protection against attempts to divert fuel or clandestine plutonium production from the Osirak reactor was ªercely debated following the Israeli attack.64 The reactor was subject to an inspection regime designed to detect fuel diversion and other proscribed activities, including structural changes of the facility.65 Israeli ofªcials argued that the safeguards regime could not detect attempts to introduce uranium into the reactor between inspections.66 This stood in contrast to the assessment of Iraqi ofªcials that such attempts would have been detected.67 Subsequent IAEA assessments argued that visual ver- iªcation techniques and materials accounting would have detected such efforts.68 In addition to the safeguards, on-site French engineers provided additional insights into the activities at Tuwaitha. Carrying out proscribed enrichment activities would have necessitated either collusion with the French (highly unlikely) or their expulsion.69 One U.S. assessment concluded that Iraq would have needed between ten and thirty years to produce enough material for a bomb by diverting plutonium produced during routine operations.70

the breakout option A breakout option based on a declared facility entails high risks. To establish a viable breakout option from Osirak, Iraq would ªrst have to develop the other components needed to build a nuclear weapon (notably, a large reprocessing capability and weaponization technologies) under the watchful eye of an international community determined to deny Iraq this option. Even with all of these other components in place, Iraq still would require at least three to four years to produce the minimum amount of plutonium for a weapon (perhaps more, given the problems with the reactor’s aluminum pipes). Thus Iraq’s breakout option in 1981 was subject to serious constraints. If, however, the reprocessing and fuel production capabilities had been enhanced and expanded

64. Miller and Eberhard, “The Potential for Upgrading Safeguards Procedures at Research Reac- tors Fuelled with Highly Enriched Uranium”; and Gruemm, “Peaceful Nuclear Development Must Continue.” 65. See the debate in Herzig, “Correspondence,” pp. 195–199; Hans Gruemm, “Safeguards Veriªcation—Its Credibility and the Diversion Hypothesis,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1983), p. 29; Gruemm, “Safeguards and Tamuz,” pp. 12–13; and Albert Carnesale, “Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facilities,” hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st sess., June 25, 1981, p. 48. 66. See Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq,” p. 120. 67. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 22. 68. See Herzig, “Correspondence”; Gruemm, “Safeguards Veriªcation”; and Gruemm, “Safe- guards and Tamuz.” 69. Herzig, “Correspondence,” p. 198. 70. “How Long Would It Take for Iraq to Obtain a Nuclear Explosive after Its Research Reactor Began Operation?”

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during the early 1980s, a breakout option by the middle of the decade could have been theoretically feasible. A more realistic scenario is one in which Iraq developed the necessary skills for handling the complete fuel cycle in the Osirak facility and then established an undeclared reactor elsewhere for the purposes of a weapons program. Work at the French reactor could have aided the Iraqis in developing general skills for handling radioactive materials and industrial procedures that would have been helpful for a weapons program. Senior Iraqi ofªcials believed that this was the most likely route for acquiring nuclear weapons.71 This scenario would have been consistent with Iraq’s enduring focus on plutonium extraction and would avoid the risks of using a declared site well known to the international community. Following this approach, Iraq could have developed a weapons capability by the mid-to-late 1980s (assuming—perhaps optimistically—that necessary foreign assistance had been forthcoming despite the Iran-Iraq War). Doing so would have required strong political will and a large investment. It is unclear what would have intensiªed Saddam’s determination to facilitate such efforts in the absence of the Israeli attack on Osirak.

Iraq’s Covert Nuclear Weapons Program, 1981–91

Israel destroyed the Osirak reactor as it stood on the verge of becoming operational. The Israeli government cited self-defense, claiming that the reactor was “designed to produce atomic bombs.”72 Following the destruction of the reactor, Iraq established a covert nuclear weapons program. This program can be divided into three distinct phases: a research program (1981–87), an operational program (1987–90), and a crash program (1990–91). The research program was hampered by the arduous technological routes taken and suboptimal management, resulting in years of delay. As a consequence, in 1987 the Iraqis decided to restructure the program. From 1987 to 1990, the Iraqis made

71. See Robert E. Kelley, “The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs: The Importance of Management,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 27–38, especially p. 28. 72. “Statement by the Government of Israel on the Bombing of the Iraqi Nuclear Facility,” June 8, 1981, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org. For an analysis laying out Israeli concerns about the reactor, see Yuval Ne’eman, “The Franco-Iraqi Project,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 37, No. 7 (August/September 1981), pp. 8–10. The attack itself has been extensively studied elsewhere. For more on the Israeli attack and the Begin doctrine, see Amos Perlmutter, Michael I. Handel, and Uri Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad (London: Vallentine-Mitchell, 1982). See also Raas and Long, “Osirak Redux?” For more recent arguments in support of Israel’s attack, see Nicholas Kristof, “The Osirak Option,” New York Times, November 15, 2002; and Alan M. Dershowitz, Preemption: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006).

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substantial advances toward establishing a weapons capability. Finally, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, a crash program was launched to at- tempt to rapidly assemble a nuclear weapon by diverting safeguarded reactor fuel.

a window of opportunity The Israeli attack on Osirak created a window of opportunity for Iraqi nuclear entrepreneurs to persuade Saddam to establish a nuclear weapons program. First, the violation of Iraqi sovereignty created a strategic imperative to re- spond. Second, the attack refocused Saddam’s inconsistent attention on the issue of nuclear weapons. In his public response to the attack, Saddam warned the international community of the consequences of denying Iraq access to advanced nuclear technology. In July 1981, he stated that the attack “will not stop the course of scientiªc and technical progress in Iraq. Rather, it is an additional strong stimulus to develop this course...with even greater resources and with more effective protection.”73 Ominously, he declared, “[W]e have gained from the side-effects of this attack, certain points which might not have oc- curred to the Israelis when they launched their aggression.”74 Further, “when we feel an imminent danger posed by ‘Israel’ to the Arab nation, we will let the Iraqis’ minds operate to the maximum, and try by every possible means to protect ourselves.”75 These statements signaled a reinforced commitment to bolster strategic defenses and a desire to sooth Iraq’s wounded pride. Behind the scenes in Baghdad, Jafar seized the opportunity to design a clandestine nuclear weapons program that would be technically feasible in the wake of the Israeli destruction of Osirak. After the Osirak attack, Jafar wrote to Saddam arguing that a nuclear weapons program was necessary if Iraq wanted to continue its pursuit of nuclear power.76 Jafar suggested that the nuclear weapons program ought to be based on the development of indigenous skills and technologies, rather than seeking to buy key components from foreign suppliers. Furthermore, he argued that Iraq ought to pursue diffusion technology rather than centrifuges.77 Jafar’s suggestions effectively

73. President Saddam Hussein’s Speech on National Day (1981): Thirteenth Anniversary of the 17–30 July 1968 Revolution, trans. Naji al-Hadithi (Baghdad: Dar Al-Mamun for Translation and Publishing, 1981), p. 17. 74. President Hussein’s Press Conference on Iraq’s Internal, Arab, and International Policies (Baghdad: Dar Al-Mamun for Translation and Publishing, 1981), p. 16. 75. President Saddam Hussein Interviewed on Zionist Raid on Iraqi Reactor (Baghdad: Oar Al-Mamun, 1987), p. 14. 76. Jafar, interview by author; and Khadduri, interview by author. 77. He also unsuccessfully argued in favor of withdrawing from the Nonproliferation Treaty. Jafar, interview by author.

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came to constitute the “road map” for Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.78 On September 3, 1981, Jafar returned to the Nuclear Research Center at Tuwaitha and established Directorate 3000, the organization initially charged with plan- ning the nuclear weapons program.79

phase i: acceleration and stagnation, 1981–87 The Israeli attack on Osirak effectively forged an alliance between Iraqi nuclear entrepreneurs and the Iraqi leadership. This alliance produced a more determined and organized effort to acquire a weapons capability. First, the nuclear entrepreneurs were able to secure Saddam’s ªnancial support for the program. From the fall of 1981, the nuclear weapons program experienced a consistently high growth rate, despite general economic hardship during the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam’s decision to start the program in September 1981 came with the offer of a “blank check”: in other words, abundant and consistent funding.80 From 1983 until 1991, the program’s staff increased by 60 percent annually.81 According to Jafar, the Iraqi nuclear establishment spent 792,899,913 Iraqi dinars on the weapons program from 1982 to 1988, and an additional 669,446,170 dinars during 1989–90.82 Second, Saddam’s strong personal support enabled the nuclear entrepreneurs to effectively intensify the pace and shift the direction of Iraq’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability. staking out a new direction. From 1981 to 1987, Jafar and his senior colleagues in the Iraqi nuclear establishment were given free rein to plan and im- plement a nascent weapons program. Paradoxically, despite the establishment of a large and well-funded nuclear weapons program, Iraq failed to make substantial progress toward an operational nuclear weapons program over the next few years. How can this failure be explained? What was the role of the Osirak attack in determining the new direction and pace of this program? Proponents of the attack have argued that denying Baghdad the plutonium option played a crucial role in delaying Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. On the other hand, critics have argued that the Osirak reactor could not have played a key role in a nuclear weapons program. I argue that the attack did play a role in shaping Iraq’s efforts to establish a nuclear weapons program, but that other domestic factors contributed to create delays that have often been attributed to the Israeli strike.

78. Ibid. 79. Khadduri, Iraq’s Nuclear Mirage, p. 82; and Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program, p. 17. 80. Jafar, interview by author. 81. Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnanå, Oppdraget, p. 66. 82. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, pp. 88–90.

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The Osirak attack led to a fundamental change in Iraq’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, by causing the Iraqis to pursue a more difªcult and more time-consuming technical route to develop ªssile material for a nuclear weapon (uranium enrichment rather than plutonium). Furthermore, faced with an international environment rife with suspicion with regards to Iraq’s nuclear program, Jafar and his colleagues resorted to suboptimal technologies in order to be able to secretly develop a uranium enrichment capability. Their choices appear so inefªcient and difªcult to explain that observers have incor- rectly suggested that the scientists wanted to sabotage the program. Below I explore why these choices were made in the ªrst place and why the Iraqis failed to seriously consider alternative technological approaches until 1987. As Iraqi scientists contemplated how to pursue nuclear weapons, lessons from the attack on Osirak seem to have weighed heavily on their minds. Al- though the Osirak reactor does not appear to have been intended for the purposes of a weapons program, the attack did inºuence how the Iraqis sought to develop nuclear weapons. Their key priority was to develop a program with a small signature (i.e., one that would be difªcult to detect by other states) and technologies that required developing minimal additional skills and capabilities.83 The plutonium route was ruled out because of the challenges and risks of developing a suitable reactor not subject to safeguards (notably, because of the likelihood that such a reactor would be attacked) and the need to develop a large-scale reprocessing capability.84 Furthermore, a plutonium program would necessitate reliance on external suppliers.85 The preference for a small signature was a key factor informing the Iraqi decision to opt for a clandestine uranium enrichment program. Already during the summer of 1981, the Iraqi nuclear establishment had begun literature surveys focusing on uranium enrichment. At the same time, Jafar prepared a report, while under house arrest, on how an indigenous enrichment program could be established.86 stagnation. From 1981 to 1987, the Iraqi leadership made available political, organizational, and ªnancial resources to the nuclear establishment, yet a viable technological basis for an operational nuclear weapons program remained elusive. The Iraqis continued to pursue inefªcient technologies, despite failing to make signiªcant progress in uranium enrichment. Iraqi sources demonstrate how the management of the program produced path dependencies, resulted in years of delay and, arguably, created a deeply ºawed program.

83. See also David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010), p. 85. 84. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, pp. 44–45. 85. Kelley, “The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs,” p. 28. 86. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program.

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These factors appear to have played a much more direct role in creating substantial delays in the program than has thus far been recognized. From 1981 to 1987, the Iraqis explored different avenues to developing a uranium enrichment capability.87 Jafar and his colleagues began by focusing on two different methods to enrich uranium: electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gaseous diffusion. Iraq’s research on EMIS technology, which appeared to be feasible given Iraq’s existing resources, predated the nuclear weapons program.88 Information about the EMIS method was easily accessi- ble, and it could be pursued with skills and resources already available in Iraq. In contrast, gaseous diffusion would require more intensive research and development efforts and would have necessitated procuring components from abroad.89 Gaseous diffusion proved to be particularly challenging given the difªculty of domestically manufacturing key components, such as compres- sors, and the Iraqis made little progress with this approach.90 Jafar and his colleagues therefore opted to focus on EMIS as the primary technology and pursued gaseous diffusion as a secondary approach. Iraq’s adoption of EMIS and, to a lesser extent, gaseous diffusion, as the preferred enrichment technologies seems curious from a technical standpoint. The United States, for example, had discarded EMIS decades earlier because of its high costs, and gaseous diffusion was clearly beyond Iraq’s existing capabilities in 1981.91 To understand these choices, it is necessary to consider what options were considered feasible by the Iraqis given their existing industrial and scientiªc capabilities, on the one hand, and the level of suspicion cast on their nuclear program following the Osirak attack, on the other. In the aftermath of the destruction of Osirak, the Iraqi regime and the nuclear establishment were equally determined to base the nuclear weapons program on indigenous capabilities and avoid reliance on foreign-supplied materials and assistance—even at the expense of developing an expeditious nuclear weapons program. The EMIS method was described in detail in open source literature, and the basic materials could be produced indigenously.92 This meant that the Iraqis could rapidly initiate research and development activities. Had they opted to pursue centrifuges as their primary enrichment technology, this would perhaps have

87. Despite the emphasis on developing indigenous skills and resources, external suppliers and individuals played a signiªcant role in setting up Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. For details see United Nations Security Council Report, Attachment 1, S/1997/779. 88. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program, p. 17. 89. Ibid., p. 18; and Jafar, unpublished manuscript, pp. 40–41, 44–45. 90. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program, p. 18; and Kelley, “The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs,” p. 28. 91. Kelley, “The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs,” p. 28. 92. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program, p. 21.

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facilitated a more efªcient program in theory, but in practice it would have required a higher reliance on outside assistance. This would make Iraq’s efforts more vulnerable to detection and countermeasures from other states. There- fore, EMIS was deemed the most feasible route to enrichment given Iraq’s existing capabilities and the leadership’s concern that other states should not be in a position to determine the fate or the direction of its nuclear weapons program. Over the next few years, Iraq’s nuclear weapons program focused on research and development. Surprisingly, there was no direct pressure from the regime or an explicit focus on developing deployable nuclear weapons from 1981 to 1987. Weaponization appears to have remained an abstract goal, which is puzzling given the common assumption that the Iran-Iraq War was a key driver in the program.93 A closer look at the nuclear weapons program during this period suggests that the senior managers freely determined the pace and targets of the program while the political leadership remained detached from these issues. In a meeting between Saddam and the senior leadership of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program in April 1985, Vice Chairman Hamam presented a report he had prepared with Jafar. The report had not been circulated to their senior colleagues, including the ªve commissioners of the IAEC who were also present at this meeting. In the presentation, the vice chairman claimed that the program would reach its objective—presumably, establishing a nuclear weapons capability or reaching a major milestone toward establishing such a capability—by 1990.94 This promise came as a surprise to the nuclear establishment, because it still had not moved beyond laboratory experiments with the chosen enrichment technologies.95 After the meeting, heated confrontations ensued within the IAEC, as the commissioners argued that 1990 was not a realistic target and resented the de facto implication of making what they considered would be an unfounded promise.96 Although it may appear logical to assume that the Iraqis were determined to rapidly acquire a nuclear deterrent following the Israeli attack on Osirak, and that their desire only intensiªed during the Iran-Iraq War, during this period the nuclear weapons program was neither particularly efªcient nor ori- ented toward the war effort. Furthermore, Jafar and Hamam’s decision to voluntarily impose a seemingly unrealistic deadline on the nuclear weapons

93. See, for example, Solingen, Nuclear Logics, pp. 143—147. 94. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program, p. 24. 95. Ibid. 96. Ibid., pp. 24–25.

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program is perplexing. To understand the peculiar character and orientation of the Iraqi nuclear program during the Iran-Iraq War, then, it is necessary to examine the impact of the leadership and organizational characteristics on it. During the Iran-Iraq War, the nuclear program’s leadership and organizational characteristics contributed to create path dependencies and, ultimately, caused lengthy delays. The managers of the program failed to prioritize effectively and typically favored convoluted technological solutions.97 The Iraqi scientists, argues Robert Kelley, “seemed to have given less thought to the con- ªguration of the [nuclear weapons] system...size and weight were general targets. There was more discussion in the design documents of the physics and expected performance of the device. This is more consistent with a program run by physicists with a more abstract goal of emulating weapon state programs.”98 The inclination toward abstract and complex solutions was not unique to the Iraqi context, and, as Kelley suggests, has also been seen in other nuclear weapons programs dominated by nuclear scientists. Such programs tend to be abstract in orientation, emphasizing theoretical problems and fundamental research, rather than being primarily focused on solving the complex engineering challenges associated with developing nuclear weapons. From the outset, then, the leadership of the Iraqi program struggled to identify efªcient solutions to the many practical challenges facing developing states seeking to produce nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Iraqis went on to pursue unvi- able technological paths for more than ªve years, wasting valuable time and resources.99 The organizational inefªciencies of the Iraqi program also contributed to in- hibit the development of a large-scale uranium enrichment capability. The program was heavily compartmentalized, with little interaction among the various departments involved in the operational program. This structure, combined with the absence of institutional capacities to provide critical feed- back and carry out internal audits, exacerbated inefªciencies. Although individuals in the nuclear weapons program occasionally voiced concern to the senior management about the chosen enrichment technologies or encouraged exploration of alternatives, their suggestions had no discernable impact. Given the organization of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, it is perhaps un- surprising that mounting evidence that the chosen technologies were ill suited for enriching uranium on a large scale did not result in any changes. There

97. See discussion in Kelley, “The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs,” pp. 36–38. 98. Ibid., p. 36. 99. See ibid.

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Figure 2. Iraq’s Covert Nuclear Weapons Program, 1981–87

were no formal or informal rigorous internal audits that could identify inef- ªciencies. Instead, IAEC reporting appears to have exaggerated the program’s progress and provided overly optimistic assessments of the likelihood of meeting self-imposed deadlines.100 Despite strong disagreements within the nuclear establishment concerning the chosen technological routes, voicing such concerns carried personal risks.101 The lack of real progress and the program’s failure to meet self-imposed deadlines led to increasing tension within the nuclear establishment.102 Figure 2 presents a summary of the resources available to the Iraqi nuclear weapons program from 1981 to 1987.

phase ii: moving toward weaponization, 1987–90 By the spring of 1987, it was clear to the senior and midlevel management of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program that the program was failing to achieve its objectives.103 This failure was perceived as a mounting crisis and led to a reassessment of the enrichment technologies and overall structure of the program. In April 1987 Jafar presented the ªrst quarterly report of the year. He concluded this presentation by stating that it would not be possible to make the deadline of 1990 that was promised to the president in 1985. His conclusion led to a lengthy heated debate in the IAEC. During this meeting, Dhaªr Selbi, IAEC commissioner and head of the directorate charged with overseeing the administration of the entire IAEC as well as the Department of Engineering

100. Ibid. p. 30. See the forthcoming account in Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program. 101. See Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD; and Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program. 102. For example, in 1987 Khidhir Hamza allegedly ªled a report criticizing Jafar and cited the inefªciencies of the chosen technological route. See Khadduri, Iraq’s Nuclear Mirage, pp. 89–90. 103. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program; and Khadduri, Iraq’s Nu- clear Mirage.

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Services, was given the responsibility of sharing some of Jafar’s duties in Directorate 3000.104 This was meant to enable Jafar to focus on overcoming the technical obstacles facing the nuclear weapons program. According to Selbi and colleagues, the conclusion that the program would fail to meet the self- imposed deadline of 1990 was not communicated to anyone outside the nuclear establishment.105 Confronted with the lack of progress, the management had to concede that the chosen technology for performing EMIS, namely, the Penning ionization gauge (PIG), remained deeply problematic and that alternative technologies needed to be explored. With regard to EMIS, a long overdue adoption of calutrons as a parallel effort to the work on PIG in 1987 illustrates how patho- logical path dependencies hindered technical advances in the program. Al- though calutrons were a proven technology that had been used in the Manhattan Project, PIG was a more recent technology for performing EMIS and had been the preferred approach of Jafar from the outset of the nuclear weapons program. During the 1987 reassessment, it emerged that although individuals in the program had manufactured calutrons at their own initiative, these had not been put to any use because of the management’s preference for PIG.106 Following heated debate, the decision was made to pursue further work on calutrons.107 Subsequently, the nuclear weapons program was reorga- nized to facilitate the development of technological alternatives to improve enrichment capabilities (including a centrifuge program headed by Mahdi Obeidi). The reorganization of the nuclear weapons program and the efforts to develop a centrifuge capability in tandem with the EMIS route accelerated Iraq’s advance toward a nuclear weapons capability over the next few years. In late 1987, the nuclear establishment began to make preparations to establish an operational program. This effort enjoyed the necessary political, ªnancial, organizational, and technical resources to facilitate an operational nuclear weapons program (see ªgure 3). Although it is has been assumed that the Iran- Iraq War was the direct cause of this development, recent Iraqi accounts suggest that bureaucratic momentum played a more direct role in bringing about the decision to establish an operational weapons program. In April 1987, the vice chairman of the IAEC proposed to Saddam that the nuclear weapons program was ready to transition from research and development to weapon-

104. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program, p. 28. 105. Ibid. 106. Ibid., p. 34. 107. Selbi, interview by author. See also Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program.

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Figure 3. Iraq’s Covert Nuclear Weapons Program, 1987–90

ization.108 Saddam agreed and put his son-in-law Hussein Kamel in charge of the weaponization project.109 In this way, as the program entered a sensitive phase, Saddam took measures to enhance the regime’s oversight, involvement, and control.110 The Al-Hussein Project was established to ascertain how Iraq would produce nuclear weapons.111 The target date for completing research and design for a 20-kiloton implosion device was December 1990, and the target date for weapons production was June 1991.112 In April 1988, efforts to develop a working enrichment capability intensiªed with the establishment of “Group Four,” a unit dedicated to weaponization. In January 1989 the PC-3 unit, which focused on weapons design, was placed under Hussein Kamel’s supervision in the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization. How, then, did the Iran-Iraq War inºuence the Iraqi nuclear weapons program? Generally speaking, the experience of the war is likely to have intensi- ªed the regime’s desire for a nuclear deterrent. Given that the war was a catalyst for Iraq’s development of chemical and biological weapons, this appears to be a reasonable assumption. Accounts from the Iraqi nuclear establishment, however, suggest that there was no clear causal link between the war and the intensiªcation of the nuclear weapons program.113 As noted, during the ªrst six years of the program, there was no pressure from Saddam to de-

108. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 57; and Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnanå, Oppdraget, p. 74. 109. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 58. 110. Khadduri, Iraq’s Nuclear Mirage, p. 93. 111. United Nations Security Council Report, Attachment 1, S/1997/779, p. 54. 112. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration, pt. 5, chap. 11, pt. 3: “Nuclear Device Development,” submitted to IAEA on December 7, 2002, pp. 49–50. See also the account of how the initial deadline of 1990s was set in Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraq’s National Nuclear Program, pp. 23–28. According to Jafar, these targets were later adjusted. See Jafar, unpublished manuscript. 113. For further analysis of the security motive and Iraq’s nuclear program see Solingen, Nuclear Logics, pp. 144–149.

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velop deployable weapons. Furthermore, the weaponization decision came at the initiative of the nuclear establishment. If the regime wanted nuclear weapons to end the war with Iran, presumably there would have been more direct involvement at an earlier stage and an explicit emphasis on developing deployable weapons. Accounts of senior ªgures in the nuclear establishment suggest that senior Iraqi ofªcials were surprised that the political leadership did not draw a direct link between Iraq’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability and the ongoing war. At least, this did not translate into any added pressure to produce nuclear weapons. According to Jafar, “Since Iraq was at war with Iran at that time and heated battles were taking place almost daily, we were rather surprised that Saddam had refrained from pushing us to do the impossible. On the con- trary, he seemed happy to let us work at our own pace, which we did.... Should Saddam have had Iran in mind, he would have been strident in his de- mands.”114 In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi nuclear establishment made substantial progress toward establishing a nuclear weapons capability. According to the IAEA, by 1991 “Iraq was at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of HEU through the EMIS process, the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines, and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon.”115 The key challenge facing the Iraqis at this point was to produce HEU on an industrial scale. The decision to opt for an implosion weapon, which would require less HEU than a gun-type weapon, was an acknowledgment of these difªculties.116 The EMIS route continued to face signiªcant obstacles. Iraqi scientists disagree exactly how long it would have taken to solve the remaining technical problems, but they concur that a nuclear weapons capability could have been established by the mid-to-late 1990s. In sum, by the early 1990s Iraq stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. At this point, nuclear weapons programs typically encounter a plethora of engineering challenges that can add several years to their efforts to produce nuclear weapons. It is likely that Iraq also would have experienced delays as a result of such challenges, given the noted characteristics of the program and its management. By the turn of the decade, Iraq was overcoming many of the obstacles it had faced with regard to uranium enrichment, such as producing gas centrifuge

114. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 62. See also Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnanå, Oppdraget, p. 62. 115. United Nations Security Council Report, Appendix: Fourth Consolidated Report of the Direc- tor General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779, p. 21. 116. United Nations Security Council Report, Attachment 1, S/1997/779, p. 56.

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cascades.117 Iraq aimed to produce sufªcient weapons-grade uranium to produce one nuclear bomb per year by 1994 (speciªcally, 10 kg of 93 percent HEU annually).118 The head of the centrifuge program, Mahdi Obeidi, did not believe, however, that Iraq could produce a 1,000-centrifuge cascade by this date. According to his estimate, 1997 or 1998 was more realistic.119 With regards to weaponization, Iraq was making progress in developing ignition mechanisms and pursuing pilot production of uranium metal for the weapon’s core.120 The Iraqis also sought to reduce the weight of the nuclear warhead.121 Jafar assessed that production and cold testing of a nuclear weapon would have begun by 1993.122

phase iii: the crash program, 1990–91 As Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was approaching a critical stage, unre- lated concerns once again disrupted the nuclear establishment’s efforts. Saddam’s worries about the long-term consequences of an economic down- turn for his regime’s standing led to his decision to invade Kuwait on August 2, 1990.123 In January 1991, a U.S.-led coalition forced Iraq to leave Kuwait, and subsequently a WMD disarmament regime was imposed by the UN Security Council. Despite the unfortunate timing, Saddam’s fateful decision to invade Kuwait appears to have had little to do with the nuclear weapons program. Saddam did not see nuclear weapons as useful for addressing the challenges he associated with the economic crisis and apparently did not believe he could afford to wait for the development of nuclear weapons. Having observed the international community’s initial response to the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq launched a crash program (Project 601/603) on August 17, 1990, to develop a crude nuclear weapon within six months.124 For the ªrst

117. David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 1996), pp. 330–333; and Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnanå, Oppdraget, p. 97. 118. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 77; Albright, Berkhout and Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996, p. 329. 119. Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996, p. 337. 120. United Nations Security Council Report, Attachment 1, S/1997/779, pp. 56–57. 121. Ibid. 122. Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnanå, Oppdraget, pp. 98–99. 123. See for example, ibid., p. 102; Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conºict, 1990– 1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 38–41; and F. Gregory Gause III, “Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter 2002), p. 61. 124. Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnanå, Oppdraget, p. 100. See United Nations Security Council Report, Appendix, S/1997/779, pp. 17–18, and Attachment 1, 1.3: “The Intended Diversion of Research Reactor Fuel”; Hans Blix, “Annex: Letter Dated 11 April 1996 from the Acting Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary-General,” in United Nations Security Council Report, S/1996/261, April 11, 1996, p. 8; Duelfer, “Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline Events,” Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Vol. 1, appendix, p. 3;

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time, a clear link was established between the nuclear weapons program and the regime’s immediate security concerns.125 As Iraq somewhat unexpectedly came into conºict with the United States and its allies, a nuclear deterrent carried renewed appeal. At the same time, increasing attention to Iraq’s nuclear efforts in the international media gave rise to fears in Baghdad that a preemp- tive strike similar to the Israeli attack on 1981 might be launched.126 Iraq’s crash nuclear program was a mission impossible from the outset. First, the program set out to use safeguarded reactor fuel as the basis for a nuclear weapon. This entailed signiªcant risks, because diversion of safeguarded reactor fuel would be discovered during upcoming IAEA inspections.127 This step would constitute a clear break with the long-standing practice of seeking to avoid rousing the international community’s attention. The alternative, re- fusing to facilitate the upcoming inspections, would have alarmed the international community. Second, although Iraq was rapidly approaching a nuclear weapons capability, solving the remaining technical obstacles would have taken more time than Baghdad had available. Given the character of the Iraqi regime under Saddam, pointing out that the crash program was doomed to fail entailed considerable personal risks. This created a situation where the regime may have believed that nuclear weapons were within reach even though the nuclear establishment knew this was technically impossible.128 There is no evidence that the Iraqi nuclear establishment actively led the regime to believe it could produce nuclear weapons in such a short time frame, but the scientists did not inform the regime of the unfeasibil- ity of the project. On January 17, 1991, Operation Desert Storm interrupted Iraq’s scramble for the bomb.

The Strike on Osirak: Consequences and Implications

The debate on Osirak has been heavily polarized between scholars arguing that it accelerated the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear weapons and those arguing that it caused delays in these efforts. The new history I have provided here sug-

and Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration, pt. 5, pt. 3: “Nuclear Device Development,” pp. 50–51. There was also a biological “crash program.” See United Nations Special Commission Report to the Security Council, S/1995/864, October 11, 1995, par. 78. 125. Jafar, interview by author. 126. For more information on the Iraqi concerns, see Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conºict, pp. 32, 34; and Gause, “Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990,” p. 55. 127. Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnanå, Oppdraget, p. 100. 128. Analysts have argued that the scientists were prone to exaggerate their prospects of success prior to the crash program. See, for example, Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, and George Perkovitch, with Alexis Orton, “WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications” (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2004), p. 26; and Kelley, “The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs,” p. 30.

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Table 2. A Comparison of Iraq’s Nuclear Advances in 1981 and 1991

June 1981 January 1991

Resources mandate X X budget X organization X technological base x x Capabilities fissile material x x weaponization x

A capital X indicates a high value of the variable; a small x indicates a lower value.

gests that both arguments are basically valid but incomplete. Below, I provide a net assessment of the consequences of the Israeli attack for the Iraqi nuclear weapons program and relate these ªndings to the academic debate on the case of Osirak. Then, I consider whether we can draw implications from this case for analyzing how preventive attacks elsewhere inºuence nuclear proliferation risks. What does this updated history tell us about the following contested questions: What were the origins of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program? What were the consequences of the Israeli attack on Osirak? How close did Iraq come to developing a nuclear weapons capability? Table 2 compares Iraq’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons option prior to the attack with the weapons program following the attack. These two phases differed in terms of technical orientation, resources dedicated toward acquiring a weapons capability, and the overall capability resulting from these efforts. The intensity and scope of Iraq’s efforts to pursue nuclear weapons differ dramatically in 1981 versus 1991. Before 1981, the Iraqi nuclear establishment had a basic mandate to develop an infrastructure that could facilitate the development of a nuclear weapons option over the next few years. By 1991, in contrast, the Iraqis had all of the necessary resources to develop nuclear weapons and were making rapid progress toward developing the overall capability to do so. The issue of resources is pertinent for comparing Iraq’s nuclear weapons options in 1981 and 1991. It is clear that the Israeli attack effectively deprived Baghdad of pursuing the plutonium route to develop a nuclear weapons capability. It is theoretically possible that Iraq could have developed nuclear weapons by the mid-to-late 1980s if Israel had not attacked Osirak. Still, the Iraqis lacked the organizational, ªnancial, and organizational resources to imple- ment the 1980 proliferation decision. There were no signs in 1980–81 that Baghdad was taking meaningful steps toward an operational program.

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Saddam’s failure to act on his proliferation decision in the year that passed between making this decision and the Israeli attack suggests that an operational nuclear weapons program was simply not a high priority.129 In 1980 the Iraqi leadership faced domestic security challenges and, from late September, a war with Iran that detracted Saddam’s attention from the nuclear program. Thus, it is far from clear that Iraq would have chosen to pursue this option in a determined manner in the early 1980s. Once the Iraqi leader had made this decision, dysfunctional management would most likely have slowed the program’s progress, as it did in the enrichment program following the Israeli strike. The attack on Osirak triggered a well-funded covert program to produce nuclear weapons, which increased the proliferation risk posed by Iraq in the long term. The establishment of such a program created an independent bureaucratic momentum toward weaponization and vested interests in the development of a nuclear weapons capability. Another counterproductive consequence of the attack was the fact that the destruction of the Osirak reactor gave the international community a false impression that the Iraqi nuclear proliferation risk had been eliminated even while it was intensifying. The international community underestimated Iraq’s ability to pursue the enrichment route to a nuclear weapons option, which effectively enabled the Iraqis to pursue nuclear weapons without raising suspicion for nearly a decade. Other studies have implicitly or explicitly posited Osirak as a critical case for assessing the likely impact of preventive attacks on other states, but such conclusions can be misleading. First, because these analyses have not captured the mixed impact the attack had, or the extent to which it transformed the Iraqi program, they may have identiªed the wrong lessons. Second, the idiosyn- cratic character of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program suggests that it is perhaps difªcult to extrapolate direct lessons from this case for analyzing how preventive attacks elsewhere may inºuence proliferation risks. The pace of the Iraqi program from 1981 to 1991 was inºuenced by peculiar organizational dynamics and decisionmaking characteristics that may not be present in other states and different political systems. Further, other states may not be required

129. It is possible that Saddam’s proliferation decision in the summer of 1980 was impulsive and that subsequent developments detracted his attention. Following his decisive ascent to power as Iraqi president in 1979, Saddam’s personal inºuence on strategic decisionmaking mounted. His personal views and moods effectively constituted Iraq’s intentions and grand strategy, which translated into impulsive and at times inconsistent policies. Some of the clearest examples can arguably be found in the nuclear arena (notably, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the 1991 decision to launch the crash program to produce a nuclear weapon). It is noteworthy that Saddam’s decision coincided with a rise in the price of oil, as the expansion of the civilian nuclear program in the mid-1970s followed a similar hike in Iraq’s oil income. Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Vol. 1: Regime Strategic Intent, p. 36.

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to develop an alternative technological basis for a nuclear weapons program in the wake of an attack, as was the case in Iraq. There is, of course, a substantial difference between reconstructing a damaged infrastructure for the purposes of a nuclear weapons program and developing an alternative basis for such a program. Although it can be difªcult to draw concrete lessons for other cases, the Osirak case can provide useful insights for thinking about how preventive attacks can inºuence long-term proliferation risks. As this remains the best un- derstood case of a preventive attack on a nuclear reactor, it can help to identify some of the consequences from the attack for the Iraqi program that may be relevant for thinking about other cases. Perhaps the most pertinent lesson that can be drawn from this updated history of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program concerns the intensiªcation of Baghdad’s commitment to acquiring nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and the delays in the nuclear weapons program, on the other. First, scholars have underestimated the extent to which the Israeli attack intensiªed the Iraqi elite’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons and secure sufªcient resources to establish and expand the nuclear weapons program over time. This case demonstrates that states seemingly determined to develop a nuclear weapons option may not have sufªcient consensus to initiate a nuclear weapons program short of an external shock. Second, if the Iraqis had had a more developed domestic foundation for research and development in the nuclear arena, they would have been in a position to focus on more efªcient enrichment technologies, such as gaseous diffusion or centrifuges, from the outset. If so, these efforts could have been successful at an earlier stage—perhaps before 1991. While the Osirak attack required Iraq to pursue a more laborious technical route, several years of delay were added by the inefªcient management of the program. Despite making virtually every possible mistake, the Iraqis stood at the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability by early 1991. An important lesson, then, is that the observed delays in the Iraqi program were not determined by the 1981 attack. It seems unlikely—but not impossible—that another targeted state would make as many ill-advised decisions in their efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability following an attack. The case of Osirak suggests that preventive attacks can have negative effects on nuclear proliferation risks in the long term for at least two reasons. First, such attacks can solidify or create an unprecedented consensus among ruling elites about the need for a nuclear deterrent. This consensus can, for example, trigger decisions to provide nuclear establishments with a mandate to develop nuclear weapons or lead to the creation of a dedicated organization or an increased budget. Such decisions can have dramatic short-term effects (such as

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the establishment of a nuclear weapons program or the dedication of additional resources to a preexisting program), but the consequences can also be long-lasting. Providing for rapidly expanding budgets and organizations can create self-reinforcing dynamics and bring about independent momentum because of vested bureaucratic and individual interests. Second, such attacks may create a false sense of security, making the international community obliv- ious to a rapidly intensifying proliferation risk. The mixed consequences that can result from such attacks in terms of technical capacity and political will make it difªcult to predict their longer-term effects. In other words, even though such attacks can buy time by necessitating more time-consuming technical approaches, they can have serious counterproductive consequences. In the long term, such effects can make the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the targeted state a more likely outcome.

Conclusion

This article has reexamined the history of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and the impact of the Israeli attack on the Osirak reactor in light of sources that have emerged since 2003. I have argued that Iraq’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapons option prior to the Israeli attack are best described in terms of an informal drift, whereas those that followed took the form of a determined nuclear weapons program. The attack on Osirak forced the nuclear establishment to pursue a more laborious technical route. At the same time, the creation of a clandestine nuclear weapons program intensiªed the proliferation risks posed by Iraq. As a result, the attack transformed the momentum and direction of Iraq’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Despite making every conceivable mistake, resulting in a delay of more than ªve years in the program, by 1991 the Iraqis were close to the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. A net assessment suggests that the attack was ultimately counterproductive, triggering the establishment of a covert program that was not detected by the outside world before it was interrupted by the 1991 Gulf War. This updated history is important for the scholarly debate on the Osirak case and the broader debate on preventive attacks. The ªndings suggest that both sides in the heavily polarized debate on Osirak make valid points, but that neither offers a complete explanation of the impact of the Israeli attack. In this article, I have integrated the correct observations made by both sides in the debate into a net analysis based on a richer set of source material. I conclude that the attack had mixed effects, but that the most important consequence was a transformation and intensiªcation of Iraq’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Iraqi sources illuminate the role of domestic inºuences

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in creating lengthy delays that have previously been attributed to the Israeli attack. The updated history of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program demonstrates that preventive attacks may cause delays in a state’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, but that these attacks can also have unintended consequences that intensify and complicate proliferation risks in the long term.

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