BEYOND THE MUNICIPAL: GOVERNANCE FOR CANADIAN CITIES

Andrew Sancton

Provincially legislated municipal mergers in the last decade have affected eight of Canada’s census metropolitan areas (CMAs), and have been implemented with uneven degrees of success and varying degrees of controversy. The two largest mergers, in and , are definitely works in progress, writes Andrew Sancton, a leading authority on municipal governance and amalgamation. Both the new Toronto and Montreal “super cities” cover only about half of their respective CMAs. The Toronto merger has been slowed by scandal, and the Montreal government has been handcuffed by the refusal of many suburbs to accept “forced mergers” with the old city and their continuing desire to “de-merge,” resulting in proposals from Montreal City Hall to decentralize many powers to the suburban boroughs, including the election of borough . In Toronto much thought is being given to new ways of bringing centralized leadership and cohesion to a huge municipal bureaucracy. But it is time to realize, Sancton argues, that the issue of city governance goes far beyond the municipal. There is a wide variety of municipal structures in Canada and very little evidence that one form is better than another. Canadians have devoted too much attention recently to municipal structures and not enough to improving our cities.

Les fusions municipales décrétées par les provinces ont touché en dix ans huit régions métropolitaines de recensement (RMR), donnant lieu à des réussites variables et des controverses plus ou moins nourries. Pour les deux plus importantes, celles de Toronto et de Montréal, le processus est d'ailleurs loin d'être achevé, note Andrew Sancton, spécialiste de la gouvernance et des regroupements municipaux. Ces nouvelles « super villes » n'englobent en effet qu'environ la moitié de leur RMR respectives. Dans la Ville-Reine, ce sont les scandales qui ont freiné le processus, tandis que l'administration montréalaise s'est trouvée menottée par le refus persistant de nombreuses municipalités d'accepter les « fusions forcées ». Résultat : Montréal a proposé aux « défusionnistes » de décentraliser bon nombre de pouvoirs au profit des arrondissements et d'élire des maires d'arrondissement. Pendant ce temps à Toronto, on s'efforce d'apporter cohésion et leadership à une bureaucratie municipale gigantesque. Il est temps d'admettre, dit Sancton, que la gouvernance urbaine déborde largement le milieu municipal proprement dit. Il existe de nombreux modèles de structures municipales à travers le pays, et rien ne permet de croire que l'un soit meilleur que l'autre. En fait, nous avons consacré trop d'attention récemment à la question des structures municipales, trop eu à l'amélioration de nos villes.

uring the last 10 years much attention has been Canada West Foundation to devote considerable resources paid to the governance of Canadian cities. In east- to the topic. D ern Canada the issue has, at one time or another, The first part of this article outlines the issues that are dominated provincial politics in virtually every province, associated with the debates about boundaries and func- and radical changes have been made to municipal bound- tions. The second part points out that, especially for aries and functions. In western Canada there have been few Toronto and Montreal, the recent municipal amalgama- structural changes, but the issue has been thoroughly inves- tions have prompted wide-ranging attempts to fix the tigated (especially for Edmonton) and has caused the internal municipal governance problems apparently

26 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2004 Beyond the municipal: governance for Canadian cities caused, in some respects at least, by In Montreal, the new City of and the Regional Municipality of Nia- the amalgamations themselves. The Montreal comprises only 53.2 percent of gara. Regional districts in British third part points out that the gover- the CMA population. However, in the Columbia are governed by boards of nance of Canadian cities is too impor- same year (2000) that the province leg- directors comprising members chosen tant to be left to municipalities alone islated the Montreal amalgamation it by and from the councils of the con- — no matter how big and powerful also established the Communauté métro- stituent municipalities and by elected they might have become. politaine de Montréal (CMM) as an upper- representatives of voters in areas that In 1994, the IRPP published a tier municipal authority. When it are municipally unincorporated. Their monograph I wrote entitled Governing chooses to do so, the CMM can take functions are flexible in the sense that Canada’s City-Regions. Its main object responsibility for: regional planning and each regional district provides different bundles of services in differ- Toronto lacks a local-government institution that covers all or ent places under different most of the GTA. This is especially unfortunate because it was financial arrangements. The precisely the establishment of such an institution that was the regional municipalities in Waterloo and Niagara, in main recommendation of the 1996 report of the GTA Task contrast, are both governed Force chaired by Anne Golden, a document that remains to by councils that are directly this day as the most recent and comprehensive analysis of elected and both have governance issues in Canada’s largest metropolitan area. functional responsibilities that are common through- was to “assess various existing institu- economic development, social housing, out their entire territory. Most of their tional arrangements in terms of their artistic and cultural development, met- expenditures relate to social services compatibility with the economic ropolitan infrastructure, planning for (especially income security), a govern- development of Canada’s city- public transit, the management of solid ment function quite outside the regions.” The study examined the waste, and air and water purification. responsibility of municipalities in B.C. municipal structure of the Greater The chair of the CMM is the of In contrast, Toronto lacks a local- Toronto Area (GTA), as defined by the Montreal. Its territory corresponds government institution that covers all Government of , and of closely to that of the CMA. A similar or most of the GTA. This is especially Canada’s other 22 census metropolitan organization, the Communauté métropol- unfortunate because it was precisely areas (CMAs), as defined by Statistics itaine de Québec (CMQ), is established for the establishment of such an institu- Canada, excluding the CMAs of City, with the mayor of Quebec tion that was the main recommenda- Toronto, Hamilton and Oshawa City acting as chair. tion of the 1996 report of the GTA Task because they overlapped with the GTA. Although these two organizations Force chaired by Anne Golden, a docu- Municipal amalgamations in the are still in their infancy and have ment that remains to this day as the last decade have dramatically affected received little public attention in light most recent and comprehensive analy- the pattern of municipal organization of the highly visible controversies sis of governance issues in Canada’s in eight of these CMAs (listed in about the municipal amalgamations, largest metropolitan area. Instead of descending order of population): they have the potential to become pursuing the proposal for an intermu- Toronto, Montreal, , Quebec institutions that can help guide the nicipal GTA council, the Harris provin- City, Halifax, , development of the entire metropoli- cial government invested its political Saguenay, Sherbrooke, and Kingston. tan area. capital in amalgamating the compo- Except for Montreal and Toronto, the nents of the Municipality of newly-amalgamated municipality at mong Canada’s 22 CMAs, there to form the new the centre comprises a very high pro- A are now only four others that City of Toronto. The provincial gov- portion of the total CMA population, have two-tier systems of municipal ernment did establish a weak Greater although the percentages for Ottawa, government in which the upper tier Toronto Services Board (GTSB) cover- , and Kingston are only handles municipal functions of con- ing the City of Toronto and the 72.7, 74.4, and 77.8 respectively. For cern to the entire built-up area: Van- regions of Durham, York, Peel, and Ottawa and Quebec the amalgama- couver and Victoria in British Halton, but the GTSB was abolished in tions did not cross the relevant river, Columbia and Kitchener and St. 2001. It was replaced in February 2002 a provincial boundary in the case of Catharines-Niagara in Ontario. The by the Smart Growth Ottawa-Gatineau. In the case of relevant upper-tier authorities are the Panel, whose territory stretched south Kingston, the amalgamation did not Greater Vancouver Regional District, to include the entire Niagara Peninsula extend west of the border of the Capital Regional District, the and north to include the City of . Frontenac county. Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Members were appointed by the

POLICY OPTIONS 27 FEBRUARY 2004 Andrew Sancton

POPULATION OF CENSUS METROPOLITAN AREAS of commerce. The cities of Toronto and Montreal are now experiencing 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 particularly important disputes around different aspects of such questions. persons (thousands) The disputes result directly from unan- ticipated consequences of municipal Toronto (Ontario) 4,586.7 4,673.3 4,773.6 4,907.0 5,029.9 amalgamation, consequences that Montreal (Quebec) 3,423.9 3,449.2 3,479.4 3,511.4 3,548.8 Vancouver (British Columbia) 1,998.4 2,028.9 2,060.7 2,099.4 2,122.7 have been quite different in the two Ottawa-Hull places. Each will be examined in turn. (Ontario-Quebec) 1,055.6 1,069.0 1,087.3 1,108.5 1,128.9 In Toronto, the key post-amalga- Calgary (Alberta) 903.1 926.2 947.9 969.6 993.2 mation problem has been leading and Edmonton (Alberta) 914.4 928.1 941.8 954.1 967.2 controlling the vast administrative Québec (Quebec) 686.6 688.5 690.8 694.0 697.8 Winnipeg (Manitoba) 677.8 679.9 682.4 684.3 685.5 behemoth that the amalgamation cre- Hamilton (Ontario) 657.8 664.8 672.1 680.0 686.9 ated. The problem starts right at the London (Ontario) 416.0 418.6 422.3 425.2 427.3 top. Mayors in Ontario municipalities Kitchener (Ontario) 408.5 415.8 423.8 431.2 438.0 have very little independent legal St. Catharines-Niagara authority. Furthermore, they almost (Ontario) 387.5 388.8 390.8 391.9 392.3 Halifax (Nova Scotia) 348.9 353.4 356.0 359.1 363.2 never control a stable majority of Victoria (British Columbia) 316.8 316.9 317.1 319.4 318.9 votes on city council, so they can Windsor (Ontario) 295.9 300.6 307.0 313.7 319.9 rarely make credible commitments Oshawa (Ontario) 287.5 292.5 298.9 304.6 310.0 that the city will follow one course of Saskatoon (Saskatchewan) 229.5 230.7 231.0 231.5 231.8 action rather than another. Toronto Regina (Saskatchewan) 199.2 199.8 199.3 198.3 197.0 St. John’s (Newfoundland Mayor David Miller’s victory immedi- and Labrador) 175.2 175.4 176.2 176.4 177.2 ately after his recent election in gain- Chicoutimi-Jonquière ing council support for overturning its (Quebec) 162.6 161.8 160.3 158.8 156.9 previous decision to support a bridge Sudbury (Ontario) 162.0 159.3 157.7 157.0 155.9 to the Toronto island airport so that Sherbrooke (Quebec) 152.3 152.7 153.8 155.0 156.5 Trois-Rivières (Quebec) 141.9 141.8 141.6 141.2 141.4 Miller could deliver on his most Thunder Bay (Ontario) 127.5 126.9 125.9 125.7 125.1 important election promise is surely Saint John (New Brunswick) 127.5 127.7 127.7 127.3 127.0 the exception that proves the rule. Such a system borders on the dysfunc- Note: Population as of July 1. Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table 051-0014 and Catalogue no 91-213-XIB. tional in medium-sized cities; it was a disaster in post-amalgamation Toron- to, although in the early years Mayor provincial government. Not all were isputes about the internal struc- Lastman successfully disguised its elected municipal officials, although D tures of municipalities carry on shortcomings. During these years, the chair was Hazel McCallion, the almost always as a kind of background Lastman had a strong personal staff mayor of . Its functions noise in the local politics of most and was able to work with senior were purely advisory. The panel ceased cities. Is the council too large? Should administrators from his former subur- to exist in April 2003 when it present- councillors be elected at-large or by ban municipality, North York. The ed its final report about how to pre- ward? Should the city manager (or amalgamated city’s first Chief Admin- vent urban sprawl and promote public chief administrative officer) be recog- istrative Officer, Michael Garrett, was transit. The first response of the nized as the sole link between council appointed from outside Toronto by McGuinty government has been to and administrative staff or should the provincially-appointed transition take action itself to limit sprawl by council have direct and equal access to team. When Garrett was relieved of beginning to take steps toward creat- the heads of all major line depart- his position by city council early in ing greenbelt areas within the GTA. ments? Should neighbourhoods or Lastman’s second term, it was clear However we might define the larger neighbourhood associations be dele- that he and Lastman never really Toronto region, it is clear that the gated some form of direct control over developed a trusting relationship. amalgamated City of Toronto includes, decision-making in their respective at most, only about half of the total areas? Attempting to answer such t was during Lastman’s first term population. It is the province of questions has for decades been a cot- I that the events took place that are Ontario, it seems, that will be provid- tage industry for students of municipal now being investigated by the Toronto ing the governance of the larger government, consultants, and “good Computer Leasing Inquiry. Testimony Toronto region. governance” committees of chambers at the inquiry has shown that Garrett

28 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2004 Beyond the municipal: governance for Canadian cities and other senior administrators were difficult — but perhaps not impossible consultants for the Toronto Computer so pre-occupied by ensuring that the — for such opponents of the amalga- Leasing Inquiry state, as a kind of con- amalgamation appeared to be working mation to attempt to counter its obvi- cluding afterthought to their report, (and by the trauma of Y2K) that they ous weaknesses by supporting that “there is a general sense that it will were unable to enforce simple prac- structural reform aimed at moving be increasingly difficult for Council to tices of good management, let alone more power to the centre at the effectively govern a City the size, develop new ones for a municipal expense of the power of individual scope, and complexity of Toronto with- bureaucracy so large that it bore no councillors. out additional reference to alternative resemblance to that of any other service delivery mechanisms such as municipality in Canada. Testimony at nother kind of structural reform special operating agencies.” the same inquiry has also painted pic- A that might counter such weak- In Toronto, concern about weak- tures of certain individual councillors nesses is to establish special operating ness at the centre means that propos- becoming deeply involved in the work agencies to run discrete municipal serv- als to weaken central control in any of individual senior (and even not-so- ices, especially those that generate their way are looked on with great suspi- senior) administrators, as was the prac- own revenues. The aim is to free such cion. In the wake of the Montreal tice in the old pre-amalgamation city agencies from rigid central administra- merger, the situation is almost exactly of Toronto, and the lack of any appar- tive (but not political) control so that opposite. In contrast to the old pre- ent central control over, or even they can be more innovative and entre- amalgamation city of Toronto, the old knowledge of, what was going on. preneurial with respect to providing city of Montreal was noted for its high- In these circumstances, both the such services. Examples of such recent- ly centralized and powerful executive city of Toronto council and the inquiry ly-created agencies at the federal level committee and its mayors who derived have become very interested in are NavCan (for air-traffic control) and considerable power from leading rela- reforming the political and senior the Canada Customs and Revenue tively well-disciplined partisan majori- administrative structures of the city of Agency. Transit commissions and ties within the Montreal city council. Toronto. Council has issued a discus- police services boards are longstanding One of the genuine problems that the sion paper on the subject and the examples at the municipal level of Parti Québécois government of Lucien inquiry has recently begun the second, roughly the same phenomena. Bouchard was trying to correct in or good governance, phase of its hear- Significantly, these municipal “special- sponsoring municipal amalgamation ings, after having commissioned its purpose bodies” have traditionally in Montreal was that established own consultants’ research on the sub- been frowned upon by progressive neighbourhoods within Montreal had ject. Much attention has been focused municipal administrators intent on virtually no control over their immedi- on the possibility of enhancing the clarifying lines of accountability by ate built environments while residents political and administrative authority making municipal councils directly of smaller suburban municipalities of the mayor (through appointing responsible for all local services. The were almost all-powerful. Legislation council committee chairs and senior only serious attempt to establish a new amalgamating the municipalities on administrators) and/or creating a more political- In Toronto, the key post-amalgamation problem has been ly powerful executive leading and controlling the vast administrative behemoth that committee that could the amalgamation created. The problem starts right at the top. focus on providing strategic direction for the Mayors in Ontario municipalities have very little independent city. legal authority. Furthermore, they almost never control a stable The main potential majority of votes on city councils, so they can rarely make difficulty with any such credible commitments that the city will follow one course of changes is that they would (rightfully) be action rather than another. seen as eroding the power of council as special operating agency in the amalga- the island of Montreal provided that a whole and, therefore, of individual mated city of Toronto was a proposal to borough councils would replace the councillors. Both Mayor Miller and the establish an independent agency for suburban municipalities and, more provincial Liberal Party opposed the water and wastewater. Traditional con- importantly, that nine such councils amalgamation in Toronto, in large cerns about accountability, combined would be established within the terri- measure on the grounds that it would with fears in the wake of Walkerton tory of the old city. Considering that diminish the ability of neighbour- that the agency would be simply a prel- borough councils were given direct hoods and individual citizens to influ- ude to privatization, led to the propos- control over local zoning decisions ence local decision-making. It will be al’s early demise. The governance and a surprisingly extensive list of

POLICY OPTIONS 29 FEBRUARY 2004 Andrew Sancton

local services, the main effect of amal- been caused by the realization that policies and institutions relating to gamation within the old city was, par- what goes on in our cities is now more research (universities), health care adoxically, a remarkable degree of crucial to economic well-being than (hospitals) and major cultural facilities political decentralization. The latest what goes on in our mines, farms and (museums, art galleries, opera houses). proposals from Mayor Tremblay, fishing boats. For some, there is a mis- This is why policy-making for suc- aimed at countering the possibility of taken belief that the fate of our cities is cessful competitive cities involves so “demergers,” have involved granting in the hands of municipal govern- much more than what the most effec- taxation powers to boroughs and des- ments. It is true that in theory munic- tive and efficient of municipal govern- ignating the council chair in each bor- ipal governments could do much ments could ever possibly accomplish. ough as a “mayor.” Whether suburban damage — by failing to maintain Effective city governance (as opposed municipalities in Montreal will municipal infrastructure, for example. to effective municipal governance) demerge and still be subject to consid- No one wants to invest in a city where involves complex intergovernmental erable city control or whether they will the sewers don’t work or where it is networks in various policy fields aimed remain within the city as quasi- impossible to move on the roads. But at maximizing the capacity of the city autonomous boroughs is far from municipal governments are rarely to support innovation. It also involves clear. Indeed, it is not even clear — guilty of such sins, except perhaps active involvement from the private except symbolically — how or sector, especially in relation to if one alternative differs from Montreal’s amalgamation is the nurturing of the education- the other. interesting and important not al and cultural facilities that are The key point about gover- because of how it has centralized now understood to be so nance debates in Montreal important for the health of our since amalgamation is that local political and administrative cities. they have focused on weaken- authority but because of how it has ing the control of the centre. It attempted to decentralize it. he tragedy for many is assumed that the apparatus Whether such decentralization T Canadian cities during the of central leadership and con- past decade — especially trol within the city of Montreal within the framework of a single Toronto and Montreal — is (the mayor and his political large municipal corporation will that so much time and effort party and the executive com- actually work — or be given the has been devoted to reorganiz- mittee) are strong enough to opportunity to work — is still far ing municipal structures that set local political priorities and smart people in municipal to control the city bureaucracy. from clear. government, politicians and Governance debates within the new when they are so starved for funds that senior staff, have been unable to focus city are all about political decentraliza- they have no choice. One of the cur- on what it is that municipal govern- tion to the boroughs. It looks now as rent subjects of debate in Canada is ments can do to enhance the quality though Montreal will actually experi- whether or not our urban municipali- of life in cities: provide an interesting ence a form of demerger, continued ties are in precisely such a position and diverse built environment, the territorial decentralization, or both. right now. services for which are reliable and Any such course of action will be Cities are economically successful efficient. In an almost panic-driven unprecedented in the history of the when they attract innovative people effort to make municipal govern- municipal government of the world’s who are able to use resources available ments bigger, provincial politicians major cities. Montreal’s amalgamation in the city to convert their best ideas have forgotten that the intricately is interesting and important not into reality. There has been much built environments of our central because of how it has centralized local analysis recently about exactly what cities might actually be better man- political and administrative authority those resources might be. Such analy- aged by those who live there rather but because of how it has attempted to sis focuses on factors that are not than by residents of distant suburbs, decentralize it. Whether such decen- directly related to economic produc- or that some potential investors tralization within the framework of a tion and those that are. The point is might be better attracted to a metro- single large municipal corporation will that very few of these resources are politan area by a diversity of munici- actually work — or be given the oppor- subject to direct municipal influence pal jurisdictions, each with different tunity to work — is still far from clear. or control. Municipal councils have no mixes of taxes and services, rather control over the main levers of eco- than by the grandiose claim that the uch of the concern about nomic policy (interest rates, corporate- central municipality is the third, M municipal governance in tax regimes, immigration levels) and fourth, or tenth largest in North Canada during the last decade has only very limited involvement with America.

30 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2004 Beyond the municipal: governance for Canadian cities

None of this is to suggest, howev- The urban area around Toronto The Adapted City: Institutional Dynamics er, that Canadian provincial govern- has become so vast, complex, and and Structural Change claims that struc- ments should ever abandon policies interconnected that it is quite unrealis- tural arrangements for such cities as that ensure that residents of well-off tic to expect there to be any agreement Cincinnati, Oakland, Hartford, and municipalities provide funds to sup- as to its boundaries. The fact that the Kansas City “defy classification” in port services in those that are not so Oshawa and Hamilton CMAs, as that “they are not the mayor-council well-off or that provide for some kind defined by Statistics Canada overlap form or the adaptation of that form nor the council-mayor form Cities are economically successful when they attract nor the adaptation of that innovative people who are able to use resources available in form.” In short, these cities have strong mayors, full- the city to convert their best ideas into reality. There has been time councillors, and a sin- much analysis recently about exactly what those resources gle strong appointed might be. Such analysis focuses on factors that are not manager heading the entire directly related to economic production and those that are. municipal staff. The authors, H. George Freder- The point is that very few of these resources are subject to ickson, Gary A. Johnson, direct municipal influence or control. and Curtis H. Wood present evidence to suggest that of mechanism to ensure that the over- with the area that the Ontario govern- this “conciliated” form of municipal all planning needs of the entire metro- ment has traditionally defined as the government is what urban Americans politan area can be examined and GTA is ample testimony to this fact. often want, because they are demand- provided for. Such complexity is also apparent else- ing political leadership, political where. How can we take account of the responsiveness, and administrative here is still a remarkable diversity obvious connections between effectiveness all at the same time. T in how our cities are governed. Canmore and Banff and Calgary? What Institutional arrangements matter The central city of Vancouver compris- about the Calgary-Edmonton corridor? and we need to pay attention to them. es only 27.5 percent of the population Do these areas require planning institu- But Canadians have probably paid for of the Vancouver CMA. It is governed tions separate and apart from the gov- too many studies searching for the by a ten-member council elected at ernment of Alberta? There can be no ideal municipal structure. Ironically, large in which municipal-party slates definitive answers to such questions. It many recent provincial interventions structure electoral choice. The police seems obvious, however, that contem- in our city’s structural arrangements force is run by the city but water, plating a single municipal government (especially in Montreal and Toronto) sewer, and transit services are provided for such a large area is an absurdity. have occurred despite the careful and by agencies associated with the Greater Even if there was agreement in princi- measured conclusions of the studies Vancouver Regional District. The cities ple that our provinces should be these same governments have spon- of Calgary and Winnipeg, on the other replaced by city-states, where would we sored and paid for. Because such arbi- hand, each comprise 92 percent of the draw the boundaries? If the Calgary- trary actions provoke continuing populations of their respective CMAs Edmonton corridor were conceived as a opposition and unanticipated conse- and provide all of the common munic- city-state, how would it really differ quences long into the future, it is ipal services. Both have councils elect- from Alberta as it is today? unlikely that our recent obsessions ed by wards in which there are no with municipal structures will soon functioning municipal political par- ven traditional classifications of subside. However, it is surely time to ties. Unlike other Canadian mayors, E internal municipal government acknowledge that structural changes the mayor of Winnipeg has been given structures are breaking down. The con- in municipal government can do very the authority to choose the members sultants for the Toronto Computer little, if anything, to improve quality of the council’s executive committee. Leasing Inquiry have attempted to of life and economic competitiveness It is not at all obvious that one of these delineate five different “political gov- in Canadian cities. sets of governmental arrangements is ernance structures,” including the superior to any of the others, although common distinctions between strong- Andrew Sancton is Chair of the there are lots of strong arguments to mayor and weak-mayor systems. Department of Political Science at the suggest that Vancouver might be bet- Unfortunately, however, very few big- University of Western Ontario. He was ter off with a ward system so as to city governance systems clearly fit into recently an expert witness on good gover- ensure that all areas of the city receive a particular classification. A just-pub- nance at the Toronto Computer Leasing equal representation. lished American book on the subject, Inquiry. [email protected]

POLICY OPTIONS 31 FEBRUARY 2004