International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to the DPR Korea: Past, Present and Future May 35, 1999

Beijing, China

Conference Proceedings

Sponsored by the InterAction DPRK Working Group,

Washington, DC 1

PREFACE

This document is the official report of a significant gathering of NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) held in Beijing, China from May 3 to 5, 1999. Initiative of the North Korea Working Group of InterAction, the conference brought together for the first time NGOs worldwide involved or interested in providing humanitarian assistance to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Since 1995, the food shortage in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has drawn considerable international attention and scrutiny. The response of the international community, spearheaded by the United Nations and the European Union, has been generous. It has also made quite a difference. According to most observers, the humanitarian assistance has prevented a worsening crisis for DPRK’s population of twenty three million, especially among the young children.

The NGOs in Asia, Europe, and North America have played their own significant part in helping to alleviate the suffering of the people of DPRK. They have shipped food, grain, medicine and livestock. They have provided human and other resources. They have organized delegation visits and involved themselves in advocating for additional aid and access to the country. As in other crisis situations, the NGOs have reflected yet again an impressive mosaic of the humanitarian imperative.

The Beijing Conference had several other noteworthy aspects. NGOs resident in the DPRK participated to share their experience and perspective. The chief officials of UN agencies active in the DPRK such as the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Food Program, UNICEF, UNDP and WHO supported the conference with their presence and gave updates about their work. The European Union and the International Federation of the Red Cross were equally supportive and briefed the conference about their activities. The NGOs’ own Pyongyangbased Food Aid Liaison Unit staff was also present in full force to give a memorable account of their impressive activities.

The necessity of convening such a conference was affirmed by the participants. A continuation committee was set up to plan for another gathering. Members are: the Carter Center, the Korean American Sharing Movement, the Korean Sharing Movement, and the Stanley Foundation.

The conference organizers wish to express their deep appreciation to the Ford Foundation for its generous grant. The following organizations, several of whom served on the Conference Planning Committee, also made financial contributions: Adventist Development and Relief Agency, American Baptist Church, American Friends Service Committee, CARE, the Carter Center, Catholic Relief Service, Church World Service, Institute on Strategic Reconciliation, Joint New Society, Korea American Sharing Movement, Korea Sharing Movement, Lutheran World Relief, Mercy Corps International and the Salvation Army.

Victor W. C. Hsu

Convenor, Planning Committee New York May 7, 1999

International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea Past, Present and the Future May 35, 1999 Beijing, China

Monday, May 3 9:00 – 9:45 Opening Welcome Ells Culver, Chairperson InterAction North Korea Working Group Welcome by SouthNorth Institute for Sustainable Development Jike Yang, Chairperson Aims and Objectives of the Conference Victor Hsu, Convenor, Planning Committee Chair 10:30 – 11:00 Coffee and Tea Break, Second Floor Lobby

11:00 – 11:45 Intergovernmental Agency: Response to Date and Future Plans Session I, Moderator: Ells Culver Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance/World Food Program, David Morton, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for DPRK UN Development Program, Kirsten Jorgensen World Food Program, Judy ChengHopkins, Director, Asia and CIS Region

11:45 – 12:30 Discussion/ Question and Answer session

12:30 – 14:30 Lunch Break

14:30 – 15:30 Intergovernmental Agency Presentations, Session II 4

UNICEF, Herbert Raaijmaken World Health Organization, Eigil Sorensen, EHA Office International Federation of the Red Cross, Patrick Howard, Federation Representative, Beijing, China and Sheila Wilson, Health Delegate, DPRK ECHO, Ole Gronning, ECHO Representative in Pyongyang

15:30 – 16:00 Discussion/Question Answer session

16:00 – 16:30 Coffee and Tea Break

16:30 – 18:00 The Experience of FALU ErichWeingartner, and Thomas Hoerz, Emergency Officer

19:00 – 20:30 Welcome Reception Tuesday, May 4 9:00 – 10:30 Experience in the Food Aid Sector Moderator: Erich Weingartner, WFP Food Aid Liaison Unit USA Consortium, Chris Arthen, Catholic Relief Services, DPRK Program Coordinator Action Contre La Faim, Michel Anglade, Head of Mission, DPRK Korean Sharing Movement, Moon Kyu Kang, Director of Saemaul Movement Japan International Volunteer Center, Michiya Kumaoka, President Canadian Foodgrains Bank, Nan Hudson, United Church of Canada Area Secretary for East Asia

10:30 – 11:00 Coffee and Tea

11:00 – 12:30 Experience in the Agricultural Sector and Sustainable Rehabilitation Moderator: Kathi Zellweger, Caritas International World Vision International, Ed Reed, Director of DPRK Program

American Friends Service Committee, Randall Ireson, Development Assistance Coordinator German AgroAction, Uwe Muller, Agronomist Concern Worldwide, Tim Roberts, Agricultural Program Manager KADECO, Dr. Chang Won Suk, Professor and Dean of School of Agriculture, Danduk University, ROK

12:30 – 14:30 Lunch Break

14:30 – 16:00 Experience in the Medical and Health Sector Moderator: Maj. Roland Sewell, Salvation Army WFPFALU, Marilyn Weingartner, Health Unit Medical Assistant CESVI, Marzia Mongiorgi, Liaison Officer DPRK ECHO, Ole Gronning, ECHO Representative in Pyongyang

16:00 – 16:30 Coffee and Tea

16:00 – 18:30 Panel Presentations Continued

Evening FREE

Wednesday, May 5 9:00 – 10:30 Working Groups: Grand Ballroom A (two groups), Hong Kong Macau Rooms 9 and 10 (third floor) i) Advocacy the main task of this group will be to identify the advocacy issues and develop a plan of action. It is necessary to bear in mind that the issues may be country specific. What are they? At the same time there may be issues that cut across national boundaries and concerns including developments in the United Nations system. The plan of action should address both national and international concerns. Moderator: Ells Culver, Mercy Corps International Rapporteur: Chong Ae Yu

ii) Networking the main task of this group is to suggest ways and means for enabling the humanitarian aid community to be well informed about the situation and the needs of the DPRK. How can this be done? How can the experiences of this community be shared systemically and how can information be disseminated? What should be the roles of the UN, the NGO community or the WFP Food Liaison Unit? Moderator: Shawar Pataudi, OCHA Rapporteur: Nan Hudson, Canadian Foodgrains Bank

iii) Modalities for Humanitarian Assistance both within and without the DPRK –the main task of this group is to suggest modalities for cooperation with the DPRK on the basis of reviewing the experience to date. What has worked best and why? What are the principles and methodologies that have been effective? How should the modalities be modified for maximum input of aid? With this in mind, what are the suggestions to the NGO community, the UN agencies and the DPRK authorities? Are there issues related to the governments that need to be addressed? Moderator: Rudy Monsalve, ADRA Rapporteur: Chris Arthen, Catholic Relief Services

iv) Economic Engagement and Sustainable Development –the main task of this group would be to assess the current status of economic engagement between the DPRK and the international community, and find proactive approaches to expand economic engagement between the DPRK and other parties on “humanitarian grounds.” Considering midtolong term measures of economic engagement, the strategic recommendations may be again country specific, international body specific, or intercontinental, including ROK, US, UNDP IFAD as well as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

Moderator: Roger Rumpf, Church World Service Rapporteur: Jong Park, Korean American Sharing Movement

10:30 – 11:00 Coffee and Tea, Second Floor Lobby

11:00 – 12:30 Working Groups Repeated (participants choose another group)

12:30 – 15:30 Lunch Break (working group leadership prepare written summary of discussion, recommendations, and future strategies)

15:00 – 18:00 Conference Plenary, Grand Ballroom A Working Group Reports and Recommendations, and Adjournment

Yang Jike Chair of the SouthNorth Institute for Sustainable Development

Feasible and Efficient Technology for Agriculture and Energy Development in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

On behalf of SouthNorth Institute for Sustainable Development, I’d like to welcome you to Beijing, and to indicate to you that I feel privileged to be part of this very important gathering. When I was invited to give a keynote speech, I welcomed the invitation not only because of the critical nature of the subject matter, but also it would be a opportunity for me to thank this body for what you do everyday to help the people of the DPR Korea, and for assisting those of us in the region to think through one of the most challenging issues of our time.

Although there are a number of issues that are of importance, I’d like to take this occasion to share briefly on how China, and specifically Chinese NGOs like our institute, can assist the DPRK, our friendly neighbor, during this difficult period. I preface my comment here by saying the local conditions in the DPRK are different than that of China’s, hence it is entirely up to the DPRK to determine its own development discourse.

1. Relations between SNISD and the DPRK

My personal history with the DPRK goes back to 1992. As a representative of the China National People’s Congress, I attended the International Parliamentarian Union Conference in Pyongyang in 1992. At that time, I had the privilege of meeting with the late Kim Il Sung, and I was impressed with his interaction with others. When the DPRK’s food crisis began after severe flooding in 1995 and following years, compounded by other difficulties, I began searching for concrete ways to help. As a humanitarian, I was deeply interested in identifying approaches that would improve the plight of ordinary people.

In 1998, with the support of the W. Alton Jones Foundation from the US, the SouthNorth Institute for Sustainable Development invited a small group of officials from the DPRK’s State Science and Technology Commission to China to discuss issues of energy development in the DPRK, and to explore together possible options for small scale energy alternatives. The discussions included a case study report on how energy efficiency may be used as the best development tool to balance the demand/supply equation, the economics and the institutional (policy) implications, demand side management, integrative resources planning, project financing and renewable technologies. After the twoday meeting, the group visited the pilot windpower station in Badaling, and the UN small Hydropower station in Hangzhou.

2. Energy and food security issues in the DPRK

In my view, the fundamental solution to the food shortage in the DPRK is to increase its ability to secure the food sources wither by selfsufficiency in food production or by food import.

Unfortunately, the present situation in DPRK requires external food aid. However, I would argue that a solution to the food insecurity in the DPRK could begin with efforts to increase food production. I am happy to note that the DPRK has already taken initiatives towards this direction.

In 1998, the DPRK allocated the largest share of its budget towards economic revival. The main news agency in the DPRK, KCNA reported that, “This year the state will increase financial expenditures for the national economy 2% as against last year in order to give full play to the production potentials of the economic foundation and stabilize and improve the people’s standard of living.” Again, KCNA reports the national spending will grow 11% in agriculture and 15% in the power industry.

Here I see a potential cooperation with the DPRK. China has a number of simple, but appropriate agricultural technologies that could be applicable in the DPRK.

One such example is the integrated greenhouse technology developed by the farmers in Dalian, Liaoning province. This technology integrates pigsties, biogas generation, greenhouses and crop cultivation to enable farmers in cold climates to cultivate yearround, maximizing production potential from limited arable land.

Another example is smallscale hydropower stations and biogas generators used in urban and mountainous regions in China. This is a good example of appropriate technology requiring only moderate investment. This technology could reduce energy shortage in domestic consumption in the DPRK in a relatively short span of time. Within one year of installation, this technology produces

10 tangible results. This type of alternative energy development is a pragmatic technology that is less costly and more environmentally preferable compared with the ongoing nuclear energy.

3. Current and Future Undertakings

The delegation from the DPRK and SouthNorth Institute for Sustainable Development discussed the possibility of establishing a group for the promotion for sustainable development in the DPRK, to be composed of international eminent personnel and specialists on energy. One of the immediate goals to start a pilot project of constructing a multilevel, small hydropower station in the DPRK as part of a rural energy development project. I believe that this type of rural energy development could be used effectively to defray the current shortage of energy in the agricultural production areas, and at the same time, it may continue to resolve acute energy shortages in the country.

I am scheduled to visit Pyongyang on the May 25, 1999, to discuss these issues with relevant government agencies. I am looking forward to a productive visit. I would like to invite the international NGO community to work with us in this endeavor. We can work together as partners and I look forward to support from new channels.

Again, it is the DPRK who will need to decide the discourse of the country, not us. But the support from the NGO community can be the oil that can lubricate the engine of economic revival.

In closing, I would like to share an old Chinese proverb: it is much better to teach others how to catch a fish than give a fish. It is also important to remember to be respectful of those in need in the time of difficulties. One never knows when one will need the other’s help. This, in my view, is the essence of the spirit of the global community.

Finally, I would like to thank all of you for making the long trip to Beijing to attend this very important conference. I wish both you and the conference every success.

Thank you. Kamsahamnida.

David Morton, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for DPRK Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)/ World Food Program (WFP)

My first impression upon arrival in the DPRK last year was that there is no consensus about situation in the country. The views ranged widely from there is no crisis to “there is a severe crisis.” This is very confusing not only for the people working inside the country, but particularly for the people working outside the country in trying to raise resources.

I saw primarily an industrial country, not really an agricultural country. Only 20% of the landmass is arable land and suitable for agriculture. Therefore there is severe constraint on the ability of the country to produce enough food to feed the population, even in the best of circumstances with all the inputs they would need, fertilisers, pesticides, fuel for the tractors, etc. I saw a country that probably would have normally a comparative advantage in light industry, in provision of services as well as export of minerals. But I saw very limited economic activity—the smokestacks weren’t smoking very often.

I saw a country where national security is paramount and effects everything that happens in that country including our ability as agencies to operate and provide assistance. DPRK is country that is isolated and receives virtually no economic aid. But I was happy to note that there was very good information exchange between agencies working to provide assistance, both resident in the country and the agencies working outside the country, there was good cooperation, collaboration, and information exchange.

I’d like to say a few words about the success of Food Aid Liaison Unit (FALU), and the valuable role and that agency has provided in terms of the contributions of both resident and nonresident NGOs. The FALU within WFP channeled $25 million during 199798 from ACT, Adventist Relief Agency (ADRA), CARITAS, Canadian Food Grains Bank, Mercy Corps International, World Vision International, PMU Interlife, CARE International, Taize Brothers. FALU is an innovative mechanism that promotes partnership between agencies inside and outside of DPRK, and a high degree of coordination avoids duplication of efforts.

The United Nations

Late last year we received two very important visitors, Mr. Speth, the head of UNDP and in December, Mr. DeMoro, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator. They visited the country late last year and following their visit there were consultations in New York between all of the UN agencies to ensure that there was an agreed coordinated approach of the UN system for the future. And in New York on February 10, the UN Three Track Approach was agreed to and outlined. There was still a very urgent need to continue humanitarian aid. There crisis was real and assistance had to be maintained. However there was also a very urgent need to support recovery activities and the main vehicle for this is the roundtable that was organised by UNDP and the Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Program, with agricultural (and other) recovery aid. As well as the humanitarian aid which is not solving problems but it is keeping people alive, but we need to move forward on recovery and development. The third track of the Three Track Approach is to support capacity building within DPRK. During 1998, the UN agencies in DPRK prepared the UN consolidated appeal for 1999. This was done in a very democratic process—there was a working group consisting of all the UN agencies, together with all the representatives of the NGOs, as well as representatives from the limited number of donors who are present in DPRK. Over a twoweek period we developed the Common Humanitarian Action Plan.

Operational objectives of this plan were: ● Food security including both the provision of food aid, and increasing the amount of food in the country through agricultural recovery. ● HealthIt is vital to address both the immediate and the reemerging public health needs. The WHO pointed out the reemergence of diseases that had previously been contained in the DPRK. ● Water supplies and sanitation were considered an integral part of health, and let me point out that the problems of malnutrition in DPRK is not just a problem of a shortage of food but is compounded by all of these factors. It is the shortage of food leading to weakness and susceptibility to diseases, aggravated by poor health delivery systems, by water supplies that are no longer chlorinated due to a lack of supplies. All these factors combined to contribute to the large numbers of hospitalized children ● Capacity buildingIt is very important to build up the capacity within the country of our counterparts and the institutions there. ● EducationPrincipally promoted by UNICEF. ● Coordination—This is the role of Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

During this process as part of the UN consolidated appeal, we drew up a set of humanitarian principles, principles to guide agencies providing assistance to DPRK to ensure that we all followed the same common standards and approach. These principles were incorporated into the UN consolidated appeal.

Humanitarian principles:

1. Knowledge about the overall humanitarian situation in the country according to assessed needs; 2. Assurance that humanitarian assistance reaches sectors of the population in greatest need; 3. Access (physically and to information) for assessment, monitoring and evaluation; 4. Distribution of assistance only to areas where access is granted, and all of the agencies that subscribed to these principles agreed to the principle that if access is denied to certain areas, then aid should not be provided if it cannot be followed through monitored and evaluated; 5. Protection of the humanitarian interests of the population; 6. Support to local capacity building; 7. Beneficiary participation in program planning and implementation; 8. Adequate capacity in terms of international staff; 9. Meet the health and safety needs of the international humanitarian organizations. Particularly the medical facilities, in case of emergencies with the support staff.

These humanitarian principles have been developed and maintained as a dynamic set of principles that can be revised and updated and we now have 24 organizations and agencies that have endorsed these principles and we welcome more. The Access Map principally applies to the ability of WFP but it is fairly common for all resident organizations in terms of the areas were international staff are allowed to travel. Presently we have access to 159 of 211 counties. The counties around the DMZ, principally in Kaeson province were until recently inaccessible, but in the last two months or so we have been granted access. It comes and goes a bit—we get access and then we don’t. That gives you some idea of where we can travel to and of the situation.

What do we observe in DPRK? ● The situation is not readily apparent. There is very little economic activity, factories and production is not really taking place. Individual street selling in towns is increasing. ● A lot of malnutrition in older children (1112 +) and stunting. The younger children are getting aid, in the nurseries and primary schools, but the secondary school children are in the most difficult situation. But with new shipments of food coming WFP will be extending food aid through the secondary school children. ● There are geographic differencesthe public distribution service distributes the harvest pretty evenly until now, in April, when it stopped. Then you see geographic differences in the area’s ability to cope once the public distribution system stops. You see especially vulnerability of depressed industrial towns, there are towns that were primarily supported by a mine or a cement factory, for example, and the people in those towns are very vulnerable. ● There is a low attendance rates of care providers. In the schools or the hospitals, 25% of the staff might be absent because they are securing food for their own families. ● There is very severs deforestation and cultivation of hillsides. And, as I mentioned earlier, WHO reported reemerging diseases and we see lots of reports from refugees who come out through China.

Agricultural Production and Food Distribution Agricultural areas are in the West Coast area, particularly around the “breadbasket,” but on the East Coast there are lots of people and not much agricultural land to support them. Cities on the East Coast are highly populated. The second and third largest cities Hanbung and Chungjun are located on the East Coast. Which is why we observe these geographic differences. The Northeastern areas where there are high densities of population, not much agricultural land, furthermore they are susceptible to the cold winds from the sea in August, which is a very critical period for rice production. This region also has a shorter agricultural production season than the south, so those areas are more vulnerable to food shortages.

The distribution systems of the past, where areas that were producing food, supplied food to nearby areas that weren’t producing food, has largely broken down since 1995. These areas that cannot produce their own food are basically on their own. There is still some redistribution, but not much.

Present Situation The Public Distribution System (PDS) completed the distribution of the harvest in early April. Many if not most, Public Distribution Centers are continuing the distribution of the alternative foods. May and June are the most critical months because the harvest has

15 been consumed by much of the population and yet no new growth has come up since the winter. In late June and July potatoes will become available, and barley and wheat will become available from the spring/winter planting. But the next two months are the most critical for most people in DPRK even more so than the two months before the harvest.

There are differences in coping capacities—once the PDS ends, the survival depends on each community’s ability to cope with the situations and there are many differences, geographic variables, whether they are farmers or factory workers.

There is a lot of speculation and comment on mortality rates. I don’t think anyone really knows what effect the shortage of food and medicines, plus the contaminated water having on mortality. What is clear to us is that there have been significant increases in mortality. It varies from area to areait is probably higher in the Northeast, but not limited to that area. Extrapolation of reports from that area to the whole country could lead to an exaggeration, and I am skeptical of these high numbers that are being reported in newspapers and other reports. But certainly it is serious, it is significant and it needs to be addressed.

Most of the food going in through the UN system to DPRK, through WFP, is not going to adults; it is going to children and to hospital patients. But there is a program called “Food for Work.” The US Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) Consortium is channeling though WFP about 75,000 tons for “Food for Work.” These are very useful ways to target food to adults in critically affected areas.

What are the main coping mechanisms? People use their wages and pensions, and if they have money they are better off. Farmers markets exist in all the towns and cities and are open everyday. They are a very important means for people to survive, but one must have cash. There has also been an increase in street vendors.

Having relatives in rural areas is a very important coping mechanism because the farming cooperatives retain a portion of the harvest right after the harvest so if one has a relative living on a farm they can help.

Alternative foods through the PDS are dangerous to the health of young and old—food is not nutritiousit is a stomachfiller and can cause more problems than it solves. The consumption of wild foods is also an important coping mechanism.

People at Risk Infants have very low birth weights because mothers are malnourished, cannot breast feed, so infants begin life malnourished. The elderly are very much at risk. Children over the age of twelve who have not been reached by food aid, are at risk, although they will receive food aid beginning this month and continuing for at least the next two months. People with large families to support—the whole family is at risk. And industrial or mine workers, particularly in industries not fully functional, are a highrisk group.

Significant Developments ● UNICEF/WFO/EU nutrition survey was allowed to take place ● Success of the double cropping program supported by UNDP and FAO ● Adjustments to the DPRK agricultural policy ● Government followup to nutritional survey: rehabilitation and prevention skills upgrading ● Consensus on humanitarian principles ● Strengthened relations at the provincial and county level, for example, there are now 7 Food for Work workshops at the provincial level ● Pregnant and Nursing Mothers roundtable and workshops (FALU) ● CSB factory, local production of HEB

Incremental Changes ● DPRK appraisal rate of NGOs ● Better knowledge ● Engagement has resulted in better understanding and confidence building with counterparts ● Some improvements in quality of access

Looking Ahead Humanitarian aid is urgently needed, but not the solution. There must be agricultural rehabilitation. Economic recovery is vital, as are confidence building and capacity building. There need to be more NGOs in the DPRK and I encourage partnership between agencies in DPRK and other interested and contributing agencies. And we must maintain donor and agency interest and support.

Kirsten Jorgensen Deputy Resident Representative, DPRK United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

Response to Date and Future Plans

North Korea embarked after the Korean War on reconstruction and selfreliance ideology and achieved within two decades a living standard that was historically among the best in the developing world. Social development indicators such as educational standards revealed almost universal literacy, and preventative medicine standards with provisions of hospitals and clinics resulting in high life expectancy.

The economy was built on heavy industry, mining and mineral refining with simultaneous development of agriculture and light industry. The industrial sector support for agriculture included the production of agricultural equipment tools, fertilizer, pesticides and tractors.

The economy has suffered form the termination at the beginning to the 1990’s of the country’s historical trading relationship with the exSoviet Union and with the socialist countries in Eastern Europe. Import prices of major industrial and agricultural inputs (fuel, fertilizer, and agrochemical) have risen since 1991. At the same time, industrial production and export earnings have fallen sharply because of disrupted trading ties and more importantly, the challenge of competing with other countries in established export markets. Finally, the imposition of economic sanctions further marginalized the economy.

Agricultural production was also affected. Agricultural production has been limited, as arable land comprises only 20% of the mainly mountainous country. The growing season is limited and the country experiences prolonged severe winters. In the past, the country was able to import the balance of its food needs on concessional terms from China, the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. From the beginning of this decade, hard currency was required for these imports, whilst at the same time fertilizer production virtually ceased and from three plants in the DPRK because of the shortage of energy inputs.

Falling industrial sector production since the midnineties had directly affected agriculture production. Low export earnings prevent the importation of petroleum for fuel and fertilizer, other agrochemicals and farm equipment. The lack of imported raw materials for industry aggravated by erratic power supply is preventing the local production of equipment and spare parts. Electrical power shortages aggravate irrigation problems caused by old pumping equipment and deteriorating water supply and drainage systems.

The first food shortages appeared in the early 1990s as the country found it harder to import food, and local production was affected by the shortages of inputs, particularly fertilizer. Production was also affected by the aging of agricultural plants and equipment, and by the shortage of fuel. Since 1994, the shortages have been aggravated by a series of natural disasters.

The floods of 1995, 1996, and 1998 destroyed or damaged roads, bridges, railroads and communication facilities as well as factories. Therefore GDP stagnated in 1993 and declined by 50% form 1993 to 1996. Per capita income thus fell to US$ 481 in 1996 and may have stayed at this level since then.

The latest harvest, only moderately affected by climate factors, represents an average year for DPRK in the present circumstances and taking into account the present constraints, particularly the shortage of fertilizer. Nevertheless, FAO/WFP estimate that the food gap for 1999 will be 1.3 million tons, a slight improvement on the 1.8 million ton shortfall for the previous season.

The Roundtable Process To meet the food security challenges in a way that is consistent with the goals of UNDP’s mandate and in promotion of sustainable human development the Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection Program (AREP) was developed to provide the tools for the launching of food security related activities.

IN 1997, the government requested UNDP to prepare and organize the first RTM, focusing on Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection. One of the aims of the DPRK government and UNDP was to phase out the cost of international food aid program through the restoration of sustainable food production.

The first thematic Roundtable meeting on Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection in May1998 approved the overall objectives and strategic options for agricultural recovery under AREP over the 19982002 period. Furthermore it was recognized that the AREP Action Plan would be more cost effective than emergency food aid. Following a request from the participants in the Roundtable, agricultural sector studies were implemented under a joint effort by a team of specialists from UNDP and FAO in collaboration with IFAD and WFP. The sector study and AREP proposal (a total of US$ 343.7 million over 35 years) were presented at the Roundtable followup meeting in Geneva in November 1998.

The 1998 Roundtable meetings should be looked at as breakthrough events. They opened the doors to a dialogue and that process should now foster a more sustained and farreaching policylevel effort that involves especially the main partners that have so far declined assisting with longerterm issues for political as well as security reasons. In other words, it will require a specific longterm mandate by the international community. This new mandate would be for the UN to go ahead as a system with the type of assistance

19 that will phase out the humanitarian program within a given timeframe in favor or sustainable recovery. Such new strategy would have the potential to lead to peace through development and human rights.

The Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection Program (AREP) The AREP includes innovative short to mediumterm agricultural programs such as doublecropping, diversification, agroforestry, land rehabilitation, local marketing channels, credit and the provision of fertilizer through a combination of direct fertilizer aid and rehabilitation for fertilizer plants. This would in principle enable most fertilizer aid and rehabilitation of fertilizer plants. That would in principle enable most food aid to be phased out over a period of three to five years as a local production of cereals and vegetables picks up.

The AREP Strategy The proposal to phase out of food aid and replace it with input supplies is based on two considerations: 1. Three times more food can become available if assistance is given as input rather than as food aid; and 2. Food aid, even at the rate of 600700,000 tons annually costing about US$ 150200 million, has its limits in ensuring food security and adequate standards of nutrition to the population.

DPRK medium objective is to restore cereal production to about 6 million tons (rice as paddy). This would ensure selfsufficiency in food grain under government norms (1575 Kcal to a population of 23 million). The cost of the cereal selfsufficiency target in terms of foreign exchange for inputs and raw materials may be estimated at US$ 250 million annually.

Foreign exchange to purchase these items on the world market can be generated in the long run through growth of industrial exports. In the short and medium term DPRK import capacity is limited due to the decline of the industrial and export sector, the loss of preferential trade agreements with the former Eastern Block and lack of access to financing on concessional terms from multilateral financing agencies.

The government consequently requests support from the international community to implement the following Action Plan in Agriculture over the years 1999 to 2004: 1. Phasing out most of the emergency food aid over the years 19992000 and concurrent replacement of food aid by input supply assistance, the latter to be progressively replaced with commercial imports and local production by 2004. 2. Implementing a fast disbursing and quick yielding rural rehabilitation program designed to complement the input program. 3. Implementing a series of support projects and program to make agriculture more sustainable and efficient.

The extent and speed of transition from food aid to input aid will depend on donor response. It is realized that the switch alone will not be determined by the logic of cost efficiency of international support to DPRK. It also depends on different treatment of the two types of assistance in budgetary appropriations of donor countries, accessibility to aid agencies of different types of resources and appraisal criteria for humanitarian or emergency aid on the one side and development assistance on the other. It is not expected that food aid will cease entirely during the AREP implementation period. A minimum will be required to sustain special vulnerable groups.

Input assistance, as it becomes available, will be directed towards area and users where it can provide immediate benefits, that is, where no bottlenecks of infrastructure and farm equipment hinder optimal input use. As rural rehabilitation makes progress the remaining areas will be supported as appropriate. Similarly, assistance for rural rehabilitation will aim at ensuring that conditions under which input assistance is given are in place and supportive. No major new investments are planned at this stage. Rather it is intended to implement quick, high yielding emergency repairs of irrigation systems, farm mechanization and land reclamation.

An enabling environment is emerging that will increasing facilitate appraisal of development projects to acceptable standards. There are clear signals of movement towards more economic efficiency, transparency, decentralization and participation has started. Under the impact of the crisis this development has made faster progress than is commonly perceived and given credit. The rural sector has developed its own coping mechanisms while remaining a mainstay of internal stability. The strategic importance of agriculture has grown with the crisis that has affected other sectors comparatively harder. Government institutions have proven their effectiveness in using international assistance quickly and equitably.

Longterm adjustment of the sector will be started during the AREP implementation process but results will show only later. The adjustment will aim at greater sustainability, efficiency and flexibility of the sector, greater capacity to respond to changing market conditions and to increase agricultural incomes through higher productivity. This phase will be initiated through a series of more slowly maturing projects designed to strengthen the programming capacity of institutions and improve various agricultural support services.

However, intensive agriculture is not sustainable over the long term in the absence of economic recovery and is only valid as a catalyst to introduce change and promote openness, dialogue, and new economic cooperation.

UNDP’s AREP program and the humanitarian program provide short to medium term measures that can only buy time until the political and economic circumstances are such that economic recovery takes place, returning the country to a position where it can

21 provide for its citizens. Economic recovery will require very substantial investment in the industrial base and infrastructure far beyond the likely resources of the UN system. This would enable it again to import the balance of its food needs and raw materials for production. Furthermore, the chronic shortage of energy will need to be addressed as a priority for longerterm recovery.

Judy ChengHopkins, Director of World Food Program, Asia and CIS Region

WFP History in DPRK WFP began operations in DPRK in 1995 and this was in response to the first ever request by DPRK for emergency assistance. Lately there is an increasing recognition inside as well as outside of structural causes of difficulties and as a result there has been an evolution of programs. In the early years, 1995, the program was very modest$9 million—and focused only on those farming communities most severely effected by the floods. Through the years, as it became evident that the situation wasn’t going to be abated, in further discussions with the government, we began to include other sectors of society. In 1998 we extended our programs to all accessible counties, focusing on children under 7, hospital patients, kindergartens, orphanages. In 1999, our most recent emergency operation ($260 million) was extended to include all schoolchildren, the elderly, more Food for Work programs. The bulk of food assistance is targeted at institutional feeding, as it focuses on most vulnerable and it is the easiest to track and monitor. Although there was an initial hesitance on the part of the government for this program, there is an increasing acceptance of Food for Work. This gives us the opportunity to channel food to chronically food deficit areas, while at the same time, addressing infrastructure needs such as repairing dykes, roads, both social and economic infrastructure. We will shortly start the 10th food and crop assessment mission. FAO and WFP missions go twice per year, once in June (after the harvest) and then again in November. The input requirements are the basis for establishing emergency operations each year. Some expert projections indicate deficits of up to 2.4 million metric tons in 2010.

Achievements Some achievements may appear marginal, but are quite significant in the context. We have grown from an incountry staff of 3 to now 46, and it is not the numbers that count, but the fact that 6 suboffices have been opened all over the country manned by two international staff who rotate appointments. Our suboffices are vital in gathering and obtaining information all over the country and the relationships, Our partnerships with local counterparts are more substantial today. The contacts and the trust that is built with local populations go a long way in terms of our information gathering, and feeds back again into out programs. We now have deeper and wider monitoring and better accountability partnerships with local counterparts, we are no longer “in the closet” so to speak people know that food aid is coming from the outside and even from the US. We have been able to expand and improve to meet international humanitarian standards. We now have access to 159 of 171 promised counties (out of 211 in total). Previously we had access only to farmers, today we have access to school children, caregivers, hospitals, schools, and family visits elderly.

We are better able to assess needs through food and crop assessment missions and the nutritional assessment. Even more significant are the findings of that nutritional survey: acute malnutrition 16%, and stunting of 65%. The only countries in Asia with higher acute malnutrition rates than DPRK are India and Bangladesh. Lessons Learnt We leaned that you can’t run operation without cooperation of government. In the early days there was a lot of frustration especially in terms of access. WFP has discovered it has to be done the Korean way, building trust patiently. It is the little activities that have been successful, such as the series of workshops on Food for Work (7 so far) and nutritional educational been rewarding. These workshops are practical, nonpolitical and pragmatic in content and in the Korean context they have been significant in opening up people’s minds to new ideas and people from the outside world. Course content includes project appraisal, monitoring, evaluation. We have been seeking out relationships with professionals, not just senior bureaucrats, and it can be rewarding.

Need to constantly explain to and keep outside world, notably donors, in the loop, need communicate complexities. Donors assume that this is a humanitarian operation like all the others, which is not the case. Therefore need constantly to provide information underlining its unique nature and character. We now have a lot more credibility with our donors because of our openness.

Two Related Questions: 1) Building Dependency with Food Aid? Are we creating dependency? We may well be, but what alternative is there?

Our mandate was and is to save lives. The humanitarian need was enormous, and in spite of initial critics, this imperative has become increasingly accepted.

The second factor is that we were constrained in our knowledge of the institutional arrangements and setup in both central and local government, particularly in terms of how foodforwork could fit it, and therefore limited in our abilities to design appropriate interventions.

Government has insisted throughout that the only source of their difficulty is weather – difficult to engage in productive discussion on that basis.

The most overwhelming factor of course was that donors were simply not interested – they wanted hard evidence of reform before committing investment funding. While the donor countries were able to convince their constituencies regarding the protection of women and children, they were unable to be convincing regarding large capital and technical investments in the absence of tangible

24 policy reform. Since the government would be hard pressed to do this for reasons of pride etc., this was considered a nonstarter at that time.

Finally, even within socalled emergency operations, rehabilitative initiatives have always been included to start the process of addressing longerterm issues. In the DPRK, the notion of foodforwork was initially resisted, but gained enthusiastic acceptance as the authorities and population gained experience.

2) Although late, are we now focussing on the wrong sectors for rehabilitation? Are we barking up the wrong tree?

DPRK is primarily an industrial country, and needs investment in order to exploit comparative advantage in order to be able to eventually import required food for food security. Although there were external reasons for industrial failure (loss of export earnings and traditional trading partners with break up of the Soviet Union), DPRK itself took wrong measures, exacerbating the vicious cycle. For instance, the DPRK did not invest in purchasing needed capital equipment for many years, which further depressed export performance. There are no financial institutions, no development banks, and there is no significant capacity to go down this road, with the DPRK government itself ambivalent about joining institutions like the World Bank and IMF.

Thus despite the fact that industrial recovery can save DPRK, WFP is going into agriculture for two reasons. (1) The first is to maximize food production to reach optimal levels (not selfsufficiency – selfsufficiency itself is neither realistic nor desirable from an environmental point of view). With appropriate technical input, appropriate land utilization, better crop varieties, appropriate policy framework, significant gains are possible. (2) The second objective is to abate further environmental degradation, encourage reforestation, agroforestry, and similar longerrange interventions to invest in the environment now before it is too late.

Bottom line: there will continue to be a pressing humanitarian need, but WFP also wants to move on into more rehabilitative directions and will be designing shortly a rehabilitation proposal encompassing FFW in key agricultural and rehabilitation activities.

Attachments: (source of all tables below except one on food and crop assessments: Dr. N. Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute) ● Comparative Demographic Indicators from Official Data: DPRK and ROK, 1993 ● Comparative summary of FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions ● DPRK Capital Goods Trade in International Perspective ● Estimated Life Expectancy at Birth for DPRK and ROK; 195585

Comparative Demographic Indicators from Official Data: DPRK and ROK, 1993

DPR ROK K Population (millions) 21.2 44.2 Area (thousands sq. km) 122.8 99.3 Population Density (persons per sq. km) 173 445 Sex Ratio (males per 100 females) 94.9 101. 3 Median Age (Years) 27 31* Population aged 014 (percent) 27.9 23.2 * Population aged 1464 (percent) 66.6 70.7 * Population aged 65 and older (percent) 5.5 6.1* Crude birth rate (births per 1000 pop.) 19.9 16.5 Crude death rate (death per 1000 pop.) 4.9 5.5 Rate of national increase (per 1000 pop.) 13.9 11.1 Average household size (persons) 4.7 3.3*

Notes: DPRK census data are for yearend 1993; ROK census data are for midyear. *=1995.

Sources: Derived from DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics, Tabulation of the Population Census of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (31 December 1993); and ROK, National Statistics Office, Social Indications 1995, and Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1996

Estimated Life Expectancy at Birth for DPRK and ROK; 1955~85

North South Korea Korea Both Sexes Male Femal Both Sexes Mal Femal e e e 195560 NA NA NA 49.6 46.9 52.5 1960 49.0 46.0 52.1 NA NA NA 196065 51.9 48.9 55.0 50.7 48.1 53.5 197075 61.3 58.2 64.6 NA NA NA 197879 65.2 62.1 68.4 NA 62.7 69.1 1980 65.7 62.7 69.0 64.9 63.2 68.8 1985 67.2 64.1 70.4 NA 64.9 71.3

NA = Not available

Comparative Summary of FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions

Date of Crop Assessment Report Dec.'95 Dec.'96 Jun.'97 Nov.'97 Jun.'98 Nov.'98 Marketing Year 95/96 96/97 96/97 97/98 97/98 98/99 Total Availability 4,077 2,995 3,032 2,663 2,838 3,481 Production 4,077 2,873 2,874 2,663 2,838 3,481 Opening Stocks 158 158 Total Utilization 5,988 5,359 4,966 4,614 4,674 4,835 Food Use 3,688 3,798 3,798 3,874 3,874 3,925 Feed Use 1,400 600 400 300 300 300 Other Use, seed and post harvest losses 900 645 452 440 500 610 Closing Stocks 316 316 Import requirement 1,911 2,364 1,934 1,951 1,836 1,354 Commercial imports 700 500 430 700 500 300

Remaining Import Requirement 1,211 1,864 1,503 1,251 1,336 1,054

DPRK Capital Goods Trade in International Perspective Capital Goods as a Proportion of Trade Capital Goods Trade per person Import Country/Region (Current $ (Percent) value) 1970s 1980 1990 1970s 1980 1990 s s s s

USSR 35.9 37.1 45 18 CMEA Europe 35.7 31.7 175 303 Cuba 26.6 31.7 21 97 237 77 China 21.8 28.6 37.8 2 10 28 DPRK 27.7 19.8 16.4 14 17 9 ROK 28.8 30.2 35.1 68 238 774 Developing 27.4 32.1 46.5 27 57 144 Economies Exports USSR 18.4 14.6 24 49 CMER Europe 42.3 46.7 192 455 Cuba negl. negl. negl. negl. negl. negl. China 3.7 3.3 13.9 negl. 2 11 DPRK 3.8 6.9 10.4 1 6 6 ROK 14.8 32.3 45 32 294 922 Developing 4.8 12.8 27.4 4 23 67 Economies Trade volumes estimated in official exchange rates, imports c.i.f. (except developing economies), exports f.o.b. "Developing Economies" defined per UN taxonomy (less China); per capita trade volumes calculated according to 1975, 1985, 1990/95 pop. Sources, for Cuba and USSR: US CIA, Handbook; Eastern Europe: Handbook; ROK: Korea Statistical Yearbook; developing countries: International Trade. Population derived from UN World Population Prospects 1990

Dr. Dilawar Ali Khan, UNICEF Representative

Health and Nutrition Issues in the DPRK: UNICEF Response

Infants ISSUES CONTRIBUTING FACTORS UNICEF RESPONSE Increased perinatal mortality ● Obsolete delivery equipment ● Provision of delivery kits and operation room equipment ● Inadequate knowledge of health providers ● Upgrading skills of health providers

● Unhygienic deliveries ● Provision of hygienic kits

● Neonatal tetanus due to low ● Revival of TT vaccination TT2 coverage

Increased infant mortality ● Childhood diseases (DD, ARI, ● Promotion of Oral Rehydration other infections) Therapy

● Low immunization coverage ● Promotion of proper Case management of ARI ● EPI revival in collaboration with WHO

● Malnutrition ● Nutritional rehabilitation and micronutrients supplementation

● Failure of exclusive breastfeeding

● Promotion of exclusive breastfeeding and complementary feeding ● Inadequate care ● Training of caregivers ● Lack of essential drugs, misuse of drugs ● Provision of essential drugs and upgrading of skills of the medical staff ● Unsafe drinking water and inadequate sanitation ● Provision of safe water and sanitation in targeted institutions

Under 5 Children ISSUES CONTRIBUTING FACTORS UNICEF RESPONSE Increased under 5 mortality ● Inadequate food intake ● Nutritional rehabilitation, ● Imbalanced food intake micronutrients supplementation ● Inappropriate food intake and promotion of complementary feeding

● Low immunization coverage ● Regularization of Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI)

● Inadequate care ● Training of caregivers

● Disease incidence (DD, ARI) ● Promotion of ORT and proper case management of childhood diseases, supply of essential drugs and upgrading of

knowledge of the health ● Micronutrients deficiencies providers

● Universal iodization of salt, (UNDP,UNICEF, WFP) ● Vitamin A and multivitamins supplementation

Second phase growth (children above 12 years) ISSUES CONTRIBUTING FACTORS UNICEF RESPONSE Malnutrition ● Inadequate food intake ● Area of no or weak response. ● Imbalanced food intake Girls in this age group need ● Inappropriate food intake special attention (food and caring) Infections ● Poor immune system ● Inadequate hygiene conditions ● Essential drugs ● Water and Sanitation ● Hygienic awareness and promotion ● Information, Education and Anemia ● Low iron and vitamin C intake Communication activities

● Micronutrients supplementation

Pregnant women ISSUES CONTRIBUTING FACTORS UNICEF RESPONSE Less weight gain during ● Inadequate food intake ● Targeted food distribution by pregnancy ● Imbalanced food intake WFP and NGO’s ● Inappropriate food intake ● Micronutrients supplementation ● Health and Nutrition Education

● Obsolete health facilities ● Upgrading of health facilities Inadequate health care ● Knowledge gap of health ● Retraining of health providers providers ● Improvement of referral system ● Weakening commitment and interest of health providers ● Delayed and weak referral practice

● Nonavailability of Tetanus ● Revival of Tetanus Toxoid Low Tetanus Toxoid Toxoid vaccines vaccination coverage ● Information, Education and Communication activities High work load

Lactating women ISSUES CONTRIBUTING FACTORS UNICEF RESPONSE Poor health and nutrition status of ● Inadequate food intake ● Targeted food distribution by WFP women ● Imbalanced food intake and NGO’s ● Inappropriate food intake ● Micronutrients supplementation

Breast feeding failure ● Promotion of breastfeeding

High work load ● Information, Education and Communication activities

MAIN ACCOMPLISHMENTS TODATE ● Many precious lives saved

● Most of the malnourished children admitted to targeted institutions almost fully rehabilitated

● Quality of health care, WES and education in targeted areas/institutions improved

● Measles and polio coverage significantly improved

● Rational drug use enhanced

● Data base on key social indicators significantly improved

● Skills of counterparts in nutrition rehabilitation and other services enhanced

LIMITATIONS OF UNICEF RESPONSE ● Partial coverage

Six out of nine provinces

37 children’s institutions

Under 7 population

Safe motherhood support covers only 9 maternity hospitals

WES support falls short of the total national needs

● Weak monitoring due to restricted access

● IEC component only partly implemented

ISSUES

1. Capacity building not a priority for the policy makers; albeit the counterparts have shown great interest

2. Need for serious review and discussion on child survival and development issues

3. Limited transparency in operations

4. Restricted access to:

● Counterparts ● Geographic areas ● Data on morbidity and mortality and other similar key indicators

Eigil Sorensen World Health Organization, Office for Emergency and Humanitarian Action, DPRK

Health Briefing, DPRK, April 1999

Health and Nutritional Situation In spite of considerable external assistance for the health sector in DPRK during the last twothree years, the health situation in the country remains a serious concern. Indications suggest that the assistance from relief agencies have prevented further deterioration of the health situation rather than marked improvements. Although access is provided to more areas and the working conditions for relief agencies seem better a full assessment of the health situation is still very difficult. Limited data on morbidity and mortality is available. However, the nutritional survey and other surveys and programs carried out by different agencies have provided a better insight to specific health problems.

The results from the nutritional survey carried out in SeptemberOctober 1998 confirm a high level of wasting or acute malnutrition, affecting 15.6% of children (weightforheight<2SD). 62.3% of the children showed signs of stunting or chronic malnutrition (heightforage<2SD). The survey was the result of long process of discussions with the government, and in spite of certain shortcomings, the survey provides probably a reasonably accurate assessment of the nutritional situation. The total sample size was 1762 in the age group of 684 months, including children from 130 out of 211 counties. Unofficial information also suggests a significant drop in mean birth weight of about 400 grams over the last 4 years, another indication of the severe nutritional problems.

The age breakdowns indicate especially a very high level of acute malnutrition among children less than 3 years, suggesting that exposure to diseases in early childhood and a lack of proper health care, are important contributing factors to the present nutritional problems. The interventions to alleviate malnutrition must consequently address the underlying factors including food security, improving disease control and health services and ensure access to clean drinking water and sanitation.

The breakdown of the immunization programs over recent years was documented in the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MOPH/UNICEF), showing a low general vaccination coverage. The proportion of children 1223 months vaccinated by BCG was 63.9%. The percentage of children that had completed DPT and measles immunizations was less than 40%. The polio vaccine coverage was 76.5%. Only 4.6% of pregnant women and mothers of children under two years had two doses of Tetanus Toxoid.

The activities in health institutions have improved over the last two years and can be attributed to more drugs being available, food being supplied for patients in the hospitals and better heating of health institutions during the winter. The country is now fully dependent on external assistance for vaccine supply of the regular EPI program. The water in many cities is being chlorinated, but this depends on chlorine input by relief agencies. In the short term, the supply of essential drugs, medical supplies, vaccines and food

36 supplies to the vulnerable groups will have to continue in order to avoid a humanitarian crisis. However, it might be increasingly difficult to acquire sufficient funds for relief assistance of the essential commodities to DPRK.

Besides the UN agencies and IFRC who are providing the major part of the assistance to the health sector, NGOs play an important role in support for the health sector on provincial and county levels, both in provision of supplies, training and continuous assessment of the health and nutritional situation. However, the number of NGOs presently operating in the DPRK is not sufficient. Reports suggest that the food and health situation seems to we worse in the industrial towns in the northeastern provinces. More NGOs are needed to support the health care in these remote provinces.

Further efforts are also needed to ensure that recognized national and international guidelines are applied to the relief activities. This is especially important in the area of donations of pharmaceuticals and commodities for the nutritional programs.

Rehabilitation Although DPRK in the short term will depend on the support for the health sector of import of drugs, vaccines, and other essential commodities, more sustainable solutions are necessary. In the past DPRK has been more selfreliant than most countries and the aim must be to facilitate less dependency on the outside assistance for functioning of the basic health care services. Economic recovery is clearly the most important issue for longterm sustainable solutions of the health sector. However, more can also be done to find domestic solutions that can enhance the medium to long term recovery.

International agencies plan to spend about US$ 10 million for import of essential drugs in 1999. The country has pharmaceutical factories with capacity and capability to produce drugs. The experiences suggest that drugs can be manufactured at an acceptable quality with modifications of the present production facilities of the raw materials are available. This has been confirmed by recent visits of WHO consultants' assessing the manufacturing practices and the mechanisms for quality assurance. Increased domestic production of pharmaceuticals should be expanded in 1999, but with a rate and modality that ensure the necessary quality control. Priority should be given to the most essential drugs, and import of raw materials or active ingredients should take into consideration what type of drugs that are technically suitable for the existing production facilities. External support for local production should also include capacity building aimed at reaching eventually Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) standards.

External assistance to increase local production of pharmaceuticals needs to be effectively coordinated, and should be an area for interagency collaboration. WHO is planning provision of technical assistance for the manufacturing procedures and the quality assurance laboratories. Support for the development of a commercial cooperation in the pharmaceutical sector should also be explored. Besides the pharmaceutical production, domestic production of chlorine should also be possible. Some microchlorine

37 production units (OSEC) have been provided, but this only provides tiny quantities available for smaller towns. More than US$ one million is presently spent by relief agencies on importing chlorine for water treatment. Reestablishing the domestic vaccine production will require some more time to meet the recommended international standard.

After years of economic decline and natural disasters, the health services have been suffering severely. But even prior to the problems in recent years, the country had limited exposure to international trends in health development. Although DPRK has a good structure and coverage of the health services, medical practices and treatment guidelines are not always in accordance with what is recommended internationally. The humanitarian assistance through the involvement of health agencies has provided exposure to international recognized standards and guidelines in health care and created an entry point for a dialogue with the government and professionals on health issues. Capacity building and qualitative improvements are therefore important elements in the humanitarian assistance in the health sector and should be further strengthened. This will be one of the main priority areas for the WHO assistance to DPRK.

Reemerging diseases Prevention and control of communicable diseases remains a key priority area for the health sector. Improved surveillance and better diagnostic facilities for infectious diseases, including strengthening early warning system and control of epidemics, is being emphasized in the WHO support for DPRK. However, simple and effective preventative measures for control of gastroenteritis and skin infections are hampered because of the shortage of soap. The highest priority must therefore be given to the most efficient and costeffective interventions in the prevention and control of outbreak of diseases.

After years of shortage of drugs for treatments of tuberculosis, the number of patients with active tuberculosis has increased sharply. The estimated incidence rate in DPRK for all forms of TB in 100200/ 100,000 population/year, in other words 22,00044,000 new cases every year. The concept of shortcourse directly observed treatment (DOTS) was introduced to seven training counties in the latter part of 1998. The program emphasizes improved diagnosis of tuberculosis using sputnam examinations. These examinations improve the accuracy of the diagnosis compared to the use of Xrays, traditionally the main tool for diagnosis by the Korean doctors. The plan is to gradually expand the DOTS program to new countries during 1999, based on the learning experiences from initial training counties. The expansion is urgently needed to avoid unnecessary deaths but will depend on the availability of funds. Treatment for TB based on the DOTS strategy is a very costeffective health intervention. The chance for cure and full recovery is very high for a disease that without treatment 50% will be dead after 5 years.

Malaria has reemerged in the DPRK, affecting mainly the southern provinces. Although training in diagnosis and treatment of malaria was carried out last year with assistance of WHO, further training is needed, as many health workers are not familiar with the management of malaria cases.

WHO/EHA activities: The main activities of the WHO Office for Emergency and Humanitarian Action (EHA) in DPRK include: To provide technical advisory capacity to the government of DPRK and international agencies on health policies and practices in relation to the humanitarian assistance. To act as a coordinator and link between Ministry of Public Health and international health sectors. To facilitate use of the resource within the WHO Regional Office in New Delhi (SEARO) and WHO headquarters for assistance and technical advice related to the present health problems in DPRK. To ensure that the health assistance provided by the international community is in accordance with recognized guidelines and standard as recommended by WHO and international relief agencies. To enhance local capacity building and training in the health sector as well as providing essential equipment and supplies. To carryout health programs with the Ministry of Public Health, UNICEF, IFRC and NGOs with special attention to: Immunizations (EPI and polio eradication) Control of TB Strengthening of early warning system and control of epidemics Improving the quality of community based health services

The programs are described in further details in the UN Consolidated Interagency Appeal for DPRK 1999. Additional funding is needed for the health programs carried out by WHO in DPRK.

For more information please contact: Dr. Eigil Sorensen Dr. Johanna Larusdottir WHO EHA Office DPRK WHO South East Asia Regional Office (see list of participants for New Delhi, India contact information) Tel: 91 11 331 7804/23 Fax: 91 11 332 8438 Email: [email protected]

Patrick Howard, Federation Representative, Beijing International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Health, Disaster Preparedness and Response in DPRK

Summary 1. Health Program

Provinces Provincial City/Count Industrial RiHospital RiClinics Total Hospitals y Hospitals Hospitals s N. 1 28 18 81 511 639 Pyongan S. Pyongan 1 24 50 127 519 721 Chagan O 8 7 30 170 215 Kaesong 1 9 3 51 53 117 Total 3 69 78 289 1,253 1,692

● Distribution of drugs, medical kits ● Workshops and training ● Monitoring ● Updating of RC, UN Drugs Manual

2. Winterization Program ● Distribution of blankets and sheets ● Distribution of coal to medical institutions ● Plastic sheeting for windows in medical institutions

3. Disaster Preparedness and Response (DPR) ● Disaster Preparedness Center in Pyongyang ● Develop DPR Management Training Program ● Workshops/Training ● Develop Disaster Manual

● Develop procedures for disaster response

4. Future Needs ● Water and sanitation ● Basic disease control ● Health promotion ● Community based first aid ● Food for hospitals

5. 1999 Appeal 12.4 million CHF/ US$ 8.4 million

Introduction Economic upheaval, natural disasters and resulting food insecurity in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have dramatically increased the vulnerability of the population. In addition, most public water supplies are unsafe, diarrhea diseases are widespread and health facilities are poorly equipped. The International Federation has been working with the DPRK Red Cross Society since 1995 on food aid and shelter rehabilitation programs in flood affected areas, and in 1998; program emphasis was redirected at assisting health institutions with essential medicines and supplies. In 1999, this support will continue and will be complemented by the expansion of the society’s communitybased first aid program. At the same time, the International Federation will support capacity building of the DPRK Red Cross, including the development of a comprehensive disaster preparedness and response program.

The Context After three years of devastating natural disasters and a decade of collapsed trade with the Eastern bloc, the famine in DPRK shows every sign of getting worse rather than better.

The health sector is almost paralyzed. It is now largely reliant on herbal medicines and acupuncture, since the pharmaceutical industry, with rundown production facilities and no pharmaceutical raw materials, has come to a standstill. Hospitals, though clean, lack even the most basic equipment and, not having received any maintenance budget for years, are unable to replace broken windows, even with plastic sheeting, which leads to very cold temperatures in the winter. Public distribution coal deliveries stopped in 1995. A sharp increase in admissions of patients with gastrointestinal ailments, as a result of eating socalled “substitute food,” is further straining the inadequate facilities.

The public watersupply system is in a very bad state; when available, water is heavily contaminated due to the absence of chlorination. As a result, diarrheal diseases are widespread. The life expectancy is 69 years of males and 79 years for females, while the infant mortality rate is 52/1,000 (Britannica Online Statistics).

It is difficult to predict how the situation in the DPRK will develop. To overcome the government’s midterm strategy will reportedly concentrate on the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector in order to maximize food security. The goal of the national plan is to end dependence on direct international humanitarian assistance by the year 2000. This means that basic humanitarian assistance will be needed during 1999, but at a gradually decreasing level. The WFP, the chief international food supplier in 1998, is planning to continue to provide important quantities of food in 1999.

The Operating National Society Founding in 1946, the DPRK Red Cross is a large and wellestablished organization. Its branches extend to nearly 23,000 villages and factories, and it runs 8,000 first aid posts. Before the 1995 floods, its main activities were medical and social programs and disaster preparedness. Now, in addition to these, and as one effect of the International Federation’s programs, it is restructuring its headquarters, including recruiting and training new staff.

The International Federation At the end of 1998, the International Federation’s delegation in DPRK consisted of seven delegates, aided by the regional logistics delegate from Beijing. Monitoring and evaluation has been a special problem from the beginning of operations in the DPRK. Access to all counties is not possible, although there was some improvement in 1998 when on the spot assessment visits were authorized. At present, access for international humanitarian assistance is possible in 171 out of 210 counties. In the present Red Cross operational area access to 25, out of a total of 41 counties, is available.

As a result, the ability to monitor program implementation remains constrained. Nevertheless, the close cooperation between the DPRK Red Cross and the International Federation delegation gives a clear advantage, in comparison to the constraints faced by many other international agencies. The international Federation was also authorized in mid1998 to collect basic data regarding disease patterns, drug consumption and prescription patterns, as a basis for drug supply management and for planning future assistance.

Objectives ● To continue healthsystem support programs through drug distributions, and assistance to health institutions, including water and sanitation activities and training of their personnel; ● To increase the number of health institutions receiving drug distributions form 853 to some 1,600, in response to a DPRK government request to the International Federation to provide essential drugs to two additional provinces—South Pyongan and Kaesong—in 1999; ● To implement basic disease control projects, health promotion, communitybased first aid—all nationwide projects with a strong involvement by the DPRK Red Cross in close cooperation with the Ministry of Public Health—in the Red Cross operational area in 1999, with a possibility of expansion during 2000 and onwards; and ● To continue the reinforcement of the DPRK Red Cross disaster relief preparedness project.

Programs Introduction The International Federation/DPRK Red Cross emergency operation, launched after the severe floods in July 1995, has evolved from food aid and shelter rehabilitation in all the disasteraffected areas of the country to a health program, focused on support to 853 health institutions in two northern provinces (North Pyongan and Chagang). In late 1998, the health program was operational in 25 countries in the two provinces, with a total population of 2.2 million. The change of emphasis was made in response to the severe lack of drugs and basic supplies in medical facilities at all levels, as highlighted in the International Federation assessment reports of May and November 1997. A midterm assessment was made of the current Red Cross project in April 1998.

The frequency with which natural disasters have struck DPR Korea in the past several years (flooding, drought and tidal waves) has shown the need for the DPRK Red Cross to develop its disaster response and preparedness capacities.

An increasingly significant factor in the political context is the development of relations between the two Korean states—a process to which the Red Cross is contributing. During the emergency period, thee agreements have been signed between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea Red Cross Societies, resulting in the donation of 150,000 metric tons of food from the South to the North.

Health Projects Drug distributions will be continued in 1999, supplying drug kits limited to 30 to 40 essential drugs and designed for primary health care, as will monitoring, and training activities for health personnel. At the request of the government, essential drugs will be provided to two additional provinces during 1999—South Pyongan and Kaesong—representing an additional 19 countries.

From January 1999, drugs will be distributed to 1,608 medical institutions (hospitals and clinics) which include 853 facilities in North Pyongan and Chagang provinces, which were also discovered in 1998, and 755 facilities in the new areas of South Pyongan and Kaesong.

The needs of patients in these facilities, already addressed in 1998 through the provision of coal for heating, blankets and bed sheets, will be further improved by continuing to provide these same items, carrying out minor repairs of doors and windows, and supplying safe drinking water. Working conditions for doctors will also be improved with a more extensive water supply system, roundtheclock running water and separate latrines. It is expected that the incidence of diarrhoeal diseases will decrease with the introduction of this safe drinking water supply and through health education efforts.

First Aid The DPRK Red Cross has first aid activities throughout the country, consisting mainly of training and the diffusion of health messages through four regional training centers. In 1999, it plans to upgrade these health activities into a more comprehensive primary health care/communitybased first aid program.

The project covers two years. In 1999, it will concentrate on the Red Cross operational areas: North and South Pyongan, Chagang and Kaesong. Later the program will be expanded to the whole country. The main activities in 1999 will be: an assessment of needs and capacities, the upgrading of DPRK Red Cross resources and communityoriented training of first aid workers and volunteers.

Disaster preparedness and response capacity This project will establish a comprehensive emergency response capacity within the DPRK Red Cross, coordinated with the general national emergency function.

The 1995 floods were the DPRK Red Cross’ first experience of a major emergency operation. During the floods that followed in 1996, and the drought and tidal waves in 1997, the society was increasingly involved in evacuation, rescue, mass feeding and shelter provision in coordination with the authorities. It now considers that its experience of the past three years should be consolidated into a comprehensive disaster relief preparedness development program and has given this project the highest priority in its longterm capacity building. The first steps will be the establishment and maintenance of material, human and financial resources and financial resources to cope with disaster relief operations.

Conclusion As the economic and food security situation remains precarious, the International Federation recognizes the need to continue its assistance in improving the health of the DPRK’s most vulnerable by providing essential drugs and supplies to health institutions and, at the same time, supporting the DPRK Red Cross in expanding communitybased first aid activities throughout the country. Experiences gained during recent relief operations will also be focused into the development of the National Society and its disaster preparedness and response capacities.

For additional information, please contact Marcel Fortier, desk officer for East Asia, in the Asia and Pacific department at the Federation Secretariat, (4122) 7304268 or by email, [email protected].

Erich Weingartner Head of the Food Aid Liaison Unit (FALU) UN World Food Program Democratic People's Republic of Korea

A Cooperative Approach to Humanitarian Assistance in the DPR Korea

History of NGO involvement in the DPRK NGO contact with the DPRK has preceded the recent natural disasters by several decades. Many of the people present at this conference belong to groups that have entertained longstanding relationships with partners in the DPRK. Overseas Koreans, for example, have had contact with Koreans in the north for many years – sometimes in strained circumstances, given the political context. There have also been numerous exchanges – artistic, academic, sports – whose role should not be forgotten. Sometimes these were the only ways possible for maintaining contact between the DPRK and the rest of the world. In addition, a number of friendship associations have been created and promoted to relieve the isolation. Other groups have promoted the peaceful reunification of Korea and peace building in the region. Then there have been various religious associations and church groups that have made and continue to maintain contact and relationships with their religious counterparts in the DPRK. The disasters, which have befallen the DPRK since the beginning of this decade, have changed the nature of the relationship of all that had previously been in contact. The breakup of the Soviet Union (1991), with the resulting cutoff of DPRK trade relationships with all of Eastern Europe began a downward spiral of economic woes. The death of President Kim Il Sung in 1994 had a significant psychological impact on a people who from childhood had been raised to see him as the caring father of the whole nation. His death affected the mood and confidence of the country to a degree not always appreciated by outsiders. There followed a series of natural disasters: hailstorms in 1994, floods in 1995 and 1996, and a drought in 1997 (during my first summer in Pyongyang, when everyone was expecting floods). NGOs responded to the disasters even before UN operations began. At that point, it was of course impossible for NGOs to reside in the DPRK. All aid shipments and followup had to be done externally. That raised inevitable questions about accountability. Needs assessments couldn't easily be done on the spot. Beneficiary selection was left up to Government. Monitoring or reporting could only be done through occasional visits – mainly guided tours to observe commodities being distributed.

Creation of FALU The World Food Program established an office in Pyongyang in1995. Some NGOs immediately began to channel their contributions through WFP, as a way to increase accountability. In fact, NGOs were among the largest donors to the WFP in the early days of the emergency. At that time, many countries were hesitant to engage in the DPRK for political reasons. Before long, the idea of an NGO unit within WFPDPRK was born. By mid1996, the Government had agreed to the plan. It took almost a year for the necessary procedures and permissions to be in place, and FALU began operations with my arrival in May 1997. FALU is a hybrid organization, byproduct of a happy marriage between NGOs and the UN system. As such it is unique in the entire humanitarian community. FALU is controlled by a consortium of six NGOs (Action by Churches Together, Caritas Internationalis, Canadian Foodgrains Bank, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, World Vision and Mercy Corps International), who form a Steering Committee which decides on structure, budget, financing, programming and selection of staff. Yet at the same time, FALU is an NGO unit working within United Nations parameters. It is integrated within the WPFGovernment Letter of Understanding on emergency operations in the DPRK. Although FALU staff is chosen by NGOs, they operate as UN staff, according to WFP rules and procedures. Like the WFP, our Government counterpart is the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC, a section of the Foreign Ministry). Also like the UN agencies, FALU is inclusive. It was the strong desire of the WFP Executive Director Catherine Bertini that FALU should serve the needs of all NGOs who ask for our help, regardless of who pays the bills. That is something unique and an example that is worthwhile emulatingNGOs cooperating with and providing services to other NGOs. Although FALU enjoys both the stature and the restrictions of life as a UN agency in the DPRK, FALU acts more like an NGO. FALU is more responsive and responsible to NGOs. We have flexibility in our approach, which is more difficult for a large UN institution. The WFP leadership – especially those in place in Pyongyang – have given FALU great latitude. Although FALU was initially meant to deal with food aid only, it has been able to integrate food security and health needs among its activities, providing the type of holistic approach more appropriate to NGOs. FALU can react quickly to perceived needs. We don't usually have to go though a lot of red tape. We discuss new initiatives with Country Director and Representative, then proceed very quickly to implementation. FALU’s initiatives can serve as a testing ground for new ideas, which can later be adopted by WFP on a larger scale. FALU’s capacity for carrying out pilot projects is clearly of benefit to both NGOs and the UN system.

The Coordination Imperative Necessity is the mother of FALU. At the time FALU was created, it was the only way in which NGOs could be represented in a resident capacity. Soon this changed, however. At this conference there are representatives of European NGOs who have achieved residency with the help of the European Commission. USbased PVOs have established resident status related to US Government donations. World Vision has been approved for residency by working with the AsiaPacific Peace Committee. All NGOs – whether resident or nonresident – soon discover, however, that no one can work effectively in the DPRK without remaining in close touch with what the other agencies are doing and experiencing. Anyone who tries to go on their own soon discovers that cooperation and coordination are also a part of “necessity” in this context. FALU has considered one of its major tasks to be the coordination of relief efforts not only among NGOs participating in FALU, but also between NGOs & UN agencies, between NGOs & DPRK Government, and between resident & nonresident NGOs. Consultative services are provided even to NGOs who do not channel food or other commodities through FALU. Many NGO delegations visit Pyongyang. We are always happy to meet with them. Often we seek them out in their hotels if information of their visit reaches us. We encourage them to participate with the rest of us in interagency meetings. We share our information and invite them to share theirs. The betterinformed all of us are, the better we can shape our programs for the good of the vulnerable Korean people. My colleague Thomas Hoerz will "put you through the drill" on how we track commodities from the port through to the beneficiaries.*

The Residency Debate Many NGOs ask FALU for advice on how they might obtain residency in the DPRK. I suppose that this should not surprise me, since part of the funding appeal of NGOs in humanitarian disaster areas is being there. The “handson” approach is the normal operating procedure of most humanitarian agencies. So it should be stated very clearly: FALU can represent nonresident NGOs in the DPRK and can service the shipments of nonresident NGOs, but FALU cannot help nonresident NGOs obtain residency. This needs to be openly laid on the table, particularly at this conference, which gathers together both resident and nonresident NGOs. It is a sensitive issue for FALU as well, because the very existence of FALU could possibly be used as an excuse by Government not to extend residency to others. Some might even suspect that it is in the interest of FALU – whose “clients” are nonresident NGOs – to discourage NGOs from obtaining residency.

We need to be aware of the fact that among those present at this conference, there are numerous quite different approaches. There are those who feel that residency is essential in order to be able to carry out the programs of assistance for which they have expertise. There are other NGOs who choose not to be resident, because they calculate that the limited resources at their disposal should be spent on aid to the vulnerable, rather than on infrastructure. There are NGOs for whom residency is precluded because of political circumstances beyond their control. And there are still others who feel that encouraging the largest possible number of NGOs to take up residence in the DPRK is in itself a valid humanitarian contribution. Why is residency in the DPRK so important? Is it because the DPRK is the last frontier of a certain type of system of government and we just want to be there? Are we in a competition to see which NGO will get there first? Or do we want to be where history is in the making? Maybe even take credit for making that history? Or is it because there is a desperate humanitarian need? I might be stepping out of line in my role here, but I feel we have to be careful of our motivations as humanitarian organizations. Our intentions are no doubt honorable, but good intentions have caused great harm in the past. We may be convinced that the people of the DPRK need us, that what we have to offer can save and change lives. But genuine changes can only happen from within. We can offer our help and expertise as part of a partnership. We cannot and certainly should not force changes on unwilling subjects. If we are looking for changes in DPRK, let's look for changes that are going to help the humanitarian purposes that we espouse. We should resist the temptation of humanitarian imperialism. So, residency or nonresidency is not really the question. The question is what needs to be done in the situation and what is the best way to do it. Nonresident NGOs sending commodities in an appropriate way to meet the needs of people can accomplish certain tasks very well. A limited resident setup like FALU can help to assure accountability in this respect. Other tasks require more handson expertise, the sharing of education and experience. Here we need to persuade DPRK partners that residence will serve the common purpose of a genuine humanitarian partnership.

Small Changes, Large Significance The question I am repeatedly asked: Has anything changed in the two years I have lived in Pyongyang? The answer is yes, but most changes are imperceptible to the outside world. Yet in the DPRK small changes usually have a very large significance. Most initiatives in the DPRK have fragile beginnings and need to be tended carefully – outside the glare of the media spotlight. A recent example is the Pregnant and Nursing Women (PNW) roundtable, which was organized by FALU with Government counterparts from different ministries and related professions. It should be noted that the subject matter was a very delicate, sensitive one for our counterparts and the decision to have the roundtable at all was very slow in coming.

When it was finally held, the roundtable turned out to be quite different from what we had first imagined. The success of the meeting was evident in the fact that our counterparts were very positive about it. We will not publicize this widely, but we have been invited to hold similar workshops on a provincial basis. This is just one of many examples of quiet, unspectacular but significant changes on the ground in the DPRK. As far as the humanitarian community is concerned, a clear change has been the recognition that the food shortages in the DPRK will not disappear quickly. It is no longer a secret that these problems require longterm engagement. It has also become clear that the problems are multifaceted and interrelated. You cannot solve the problem of hunger without solving the problem of health. Agricultural recovery has to go handinhand with economic recovery. This means that approaches to solutions must also be multifaceted. And that points the way to further cooperation and coordination among all of us. That said, the FALU idea has a future in the DPRK. FALU itself may require changes over the coming period, and other coordinated initiatives – like the US PVO consortia for example – may have to be created or invented. In the meantime, those NGOs who continue to see the wisdom of supplying costeffective, responsible, principled commodity inputs, those who continue to see the wisdom of pooling resources for such operational tasks as needs assessment, targeting, monitoring, and recording, can count on FALU to continue to serve their needs while serving the needs of the people of the DPRK. Expanding trust and "pushing the envelope" go hand in hand. We need to cultivate an attitude of partnership with our DPRK counterparts in order to accomplish our humanitarian goals. Let's face it: if problems are going to be solved in DPRK, they are not going to be solved by any of us – whether resident or nonresident. All we can do is offer our partnership and help as the Korean people themselves take charge in solving their own problems.

*The text of Thomas Hoerz's report follows Erich Weingartner's report in this conference report.

Thomas Hoerz, Food Aid Liaison Unit (FALU) Emergency Officer World Food Program (WFP), DPRK

FALU at Work: A Consortium of NGOs Providing Relief Aid to the People of DPRK Action by Churches Together Adventist Relief Agency Canadian Foodgrains Bank CARITAS International Mercy Corps International World Vision International

Getting started … how FALU Projects develop. The FALU office in Pyongyang is in close contact with the group of donors that founded and fund FALU. In addition to our regular and special reports they receive the WFP monthly update and the OCHA monthly bulletin. They are further informed about special and urgent needs through FALU appeals. All this and regular visits enable them to design annual appeals with commodities that “fit in”.

Other NGOs have special funds for DPRK available for food, medical aid or agricultural rehabilitation. We advise them what best to do in terms of appropriate commodities, target area and beneficiary group. Timing of inputs can be important. Oral rehydration salt, for example, is most important during summer months with high diarrhoeal incidence. Timely delivery of agricultural inputs is crucial for the viability of the donation. Food aid needs depend not only on the season (with April to October being the most difficult time) but also on the pipeline situation of WFP.

When NGOs have a specific commodity to offer, we provide our advice on the appropriateness of it. At times, we are involved in “damage control”, discouraging donors from sending inappropriate or dangerous items, particularly with medical commodities. For most food items, we can find a niche, as long as the donation is well within the expiry dates and of good quality. It also happens that an NGO comes to us with little more than the wish to help. We then try to tailor a project in line with the NGOs profile, the funds available and the most pressing needs. Any NGO is welcome when seeking information & advice.

Increasingly, FALU becomes proactive, launching appeals to participating donors. Whenever we come across interesting, promising and innovative projects, we let our donors know.

Our Sources of Information Being an information switchboard between the UN system, the NGOs in DPRK and NGOs abroad, FALU has a large number of information sources: ❑ On the food situation through our close interaction with the WFP Emergency Operation (EMOP), by participating in the fortnightly Food Aid Meeting in Pyongyang and, most importantly, by our regular filed visits to a wide range of beneficiary groups in all Provinces and Cities.

❑ For medical inputs, FALU liaises closely with WHO and UNICEF, participates in the regular Health Coordination Meeting, occasionally hosts consultants sent by our donors and, of course, frequently visits health institutions ranging from general and specialized hospitals to Riclinics. ❑ On the agriculture situation we collect information from UNDP who coordinates the agricultural aid and rehabilitation, and convenes the Agriculture Coordination Meeting. During the farming season we try to get out to “our” beneficiary farms as often as possible.

Paperwork Most donations start with a tripartite contract between the donor, the DPRK Government (through FDRC) and the WFP. The contracts outline duties and responsibilities of each side and, in particular, describe the role of FALU in the distribution and monitoring process. For new donors, FALU can make available a standard contract.

Less regular donors simply announce their donation to FALU and the Government / FDRC, indicating that the donation is consigned to WFP/FALU. Consigning to WFP/FALU assures that FALU has the right and the responsibility to monitor the distribution, use and impact of the donation.

Each shipment is accompanied by a bill of lading (B/L). It is of utmost importance that the B/L is consigned to WFP/FALU, if donors expect monitoring and reporting on the shipment. To implement necessary steps in a timely manner, the B/L must be faxed to us as soon as possible. Parallel to that, the original must be sent via DHL or TNT. Based on the wishes of the donor and the specific needs on the ground, a distribution plan is worked out together with the government. This plan details the number of institutions and beneficiaries, the rations and the duration of use. It is usually broken down to countylevel as the distribution plan also serves as a transport plan from the port of entry to the beneficiary counties.

Monitoring Joint Venture

Through the exchange of distribution plans, FALU knows which commodities of WFP go when, where, and to whom. And vice versa. This not only avoids duplication but also forms the basis of a joint monitoring effort.

During monitoring visits, EMOP monitors fill in the FALU checklists, FALU does the same with EMOP checklists. This way, WFP has added two international monitors to their monitoring capacity, the FALU NGOs can make full use of the monitoring visits of over 20 EMOP monitors.

Through the computer network of the WFP office and the whole humanitarian community in Pyongyang and through various meetings, we permanently exchange the latest information to improve our programming, monitoring and reporting. The five WFP Suboffices in Sinuiju (North Pyongan), Wonsan (Kangwon), Hamhung (South Hamgyong), Chongjin (North Hamgyong) and Hyesan (Ryanggang) are important outreach offices for FALU monitors in the provinces farthest away from Pyongyang. Reporting Every single shipment (donation) is reported on by a separate document. The report is a direct, unfiltered feedback from the FALU team to the donor. The reports do not require approval by WFP nor by the DPRK authorities. They contain: ❑ A brief description of the agreement. ❑ The rationale behind and an outline of the distribution plan. ❑ A description of the shipment, discharges and transport procedures. This includes losses (if any) and the delays encountered. ❑ The monitoring results on the county level (by records). ❑ The monitoring results at the beneficiary level (by physical count and observation). ❑ Other details at county and beneficiary levels like vulnerability of certain groups, the impact of the donation and the uses to which the donation was put. ❑ Each monitoring report concludes with recommendations for future donations of a similar kind or alternative donations to achieve the intended impact for a certain beneficiary group.

Typical FALU Projects Since the beginning of nonresident NGOs’ deliveries through FALU in 1997, 127 projects have been dealt with. Of these, 99 projects have been reported on. The remaining 28 projects are under monitoring or the related shipments under transport. Over 100,000 MT of increasingly highvalue relief items have been processed by FALU. The range of projects goes far beyond food aid, even though food still is the main input. Rather large shipments of over 16,000 MT wheat down to airlifted 5 MT of HE biscuits are sent through us. Below is a sample of four typical shipments that have reached DPRK through FALU this year:

2,235 MT yellow peas, 2,125 MT vegetable oil from Canadian Foodgrains Bank through CARITAS HongKong. Area: the East Coast Provinces of Kangwon, North and South Hamgyong. Beneficiaries: 513,700 children in 7,676 nurseries and kindergartens. Daily rations between 30 and 40 grams peas and oil (+ 450 grams wheat from WFP), cover basic needs for 130 days.

180 MT maize from Taizé Community, France. Area: Kaesong City. Beneficiaries: 8,224 pregnant and nursing women through the public distribution system. With a daily ration of 400 grams, this maize provided a source of energy for 54 days.

500 MT barley seed from ACT/Geneva. Cooperative farms in 15 counties of North Hwanghae received spring barley seed, allowing 3,300 ha to be planted before the rice or maize crop. Even with the low input situation of DPRK, a harvest of approx. 3,600 MT can be expected.

Medical equipment for the Pyongyang maternity hospital including a tablet press, feeding tubes for newborns, blankets.

FALU Project Proposals One of the important tasks of FALU is to point out urgent relief needs to our donors and other concerned NGOs. This includes alerting about gaps in the pipeline of WFP. Below we have listed some of the currently important proposals.

Supplementing WFP grain deliveries Provision of pulses and oil to all those vulnerable groups that are currently receiving wheat deliveries from WFP. Targeted beneficiaries are children in nurseries and kindergartens, pregnant and nursing women, school children, hospital patients and elderly persons. Oil and pulses are distributed through public or institutional distribution mechanisms. Over 20 international observers secure monitoring and reporting.

Supporting Production of High Energy Biscuits This unique jointventure project, undertaken by the DPRK government (manpower, machinery, energy, transport), the WFP (wheat, salt, baking powder, packing material) and UNICEF (DSM, mineral/vitamin mix) still requires donations of sugar and oil to go into full production. With all other ingredients being readily available, a donation of only US$ 11,500 worth of sugar and oil can trigger the production of 100 MT of HE biscuits.

Agricultural packages to promote vegetable and grain production To support the effort of cooperative farms in double cropping, complete sets of agricultural inputs are recommended: seeds for winter wheat and spring barley, vegetable seeds for seed production (no hybrids!), mineral fertilizer, pesticides with knapsack sprayers and protective clothing. A crucial input with extremely high returns in agricultural production are plastic sheets or resin to produce sheets. Plastic sheets are used to raise rice, maize and vegetable seedlings.

Contacting FALU The FALU team is glad to respond to any questions and proposals (it’s our job!). Please contact us via

Telephone: 00850 2 3817 236 Fax: 00850 2 3817 639 email: [email protected], [email protected]

Chris Arthen, North Korea Program Coordinator Catholic Relief Services US PVO Consortium

Experience in the Food Aid Sector

The origins of the US PVO Consortium can be traced back to June 1997, when several US non governmental organization came together to form a committee to address rising concerns over the severe food shortage in North Korea. This committee began as advocacy campaign to heighten the awareness of the food crisis in North Korea, adopting the name “Committee to stop Famine in North Korea.” The membership of the committee was ad hoc in nature and included agencies that were intimately involved in the issue and committed to engaging the US Government about the food crisis in the DPRK.

Several PVOs took the lead in approaching the United States Agency for International Development in 1997 about the provision of food aid to North Korea. Shortly thereafter, these PVOs merged to form a consortium – Amigos Internationals, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Crops International and World Vision. After joining forces, the Consortium proceeded to obtain United States Government resources to support the administration and management of food assistance project in North Korea. To date, the PVO Consortium has completed two food assistance projects, is currently implementing a third, and an expanded consortium of US based PVO’s is on the verge initiating a forth project.

The PVO Consortium’s first on the ground effort in North Korea included a fivemender team based in Pyongyang for threemonth assignment, August to November 1997. The team monitored 55,000 metric tons of food aid provided by the United States Food for Peace Office our of a total US Government commitment of 100,000 MT to a World Food Program appeal. The team worked closely with WFP umbrella. In carrying out its duties, the team traveled to ten out of twelve North Korean provinces and visited ports, warehouses, distribution centers, schools, hospitals, and Food for Work sites.

The team arrival in DPRK coincided closely with the arrival of Typhoon Winnie that Caused major damage to western coastal area. The Team, in conjunction with its North Korean counterpart, the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee, utilized commodities from the program’s first shipment in a Food for Work program to repair damage to sea dikes caused by the typhoon. The remaining shipments were distributed to children aged 717 and the elderly. These vulnerable groups were not being reached in other food aid programs.

The PVO Consortium’s second food program in North Korea was implemented from June to October 1998 and included eight Pyongyangbased American staff members. The goal of the project was to program and monitor the distribution of 75,000 metric tons of US government commodities donated in the World Food Program and allocated for Food for Work projects. The DPRK requested that the food be programmed in 55 countries in five provincesthe four southern and southwestern provinces of North Hwanghae, North Puongan, South Hwanghae and South Pyongan and in the East Coast province of South Hwanghae. The program contributed to shortterm food security by directing food to county populations that were dependent on it for most of not all if their daily food intake for a period of 30 to 60 days. The program also made a longterm contribution to the country’s food security by providing incentives to workers who repaired, rehabilitated, or built sea walls, river embankments, or reservoirs. Many of these projects contributed significantly to the protection or reclamation of farmland and the protection for homes, public building, roads, and other infrastructure from future floods. The project also contributed to an increase in the country’s irrigation capacity. Through it’s 59 Food for Work projects, the program targeted 500,000 direct beneficiaries and 1,000,000 members of the beneficiary families with a ration of 2kg per workday.

The project made several significant advances over the previous program. The eightmember team was on the ground for five months – the longest time US PVOs had been allowed to stay in the country. The team had better access to countries and provinces. The team was able to develop a bond of trust over the fivemonth period to allow for better photographic project documentation and random interviews with workers. In addition, three Koreanspeaking team members provided insight into Korean culture and bolstered the motoring regime.

The Consortium’s third program, initiated in February 1999 and running through July 1999, continues to function under the WFP umbrella. Activities consist primary of major earthworks associated with the construction or rehabilitation of embankment along riverbeds and coastal areas in order to protect agricultural lands from periodic flooding and salt infiltration. Food for Work projects also include a limited amount of pilot reforestation activities. The Food for Work program is currently implementing 93 individual projects within the provinces of North and South Hamgyong, South Pyongan, North Hwaghae and South Hwangae. Rehabilitation interventions will ultimately employ 625,000 persons for an average of 60 days and benefit approximately 1,250,000 family members through the provision of food staples.

As the food crisis continues in the DPRK, an expanded US PVO Consortium will implement a potato production initiative with the goal of improving longterm food security in North Korea. This initiative will be supported by 100,000 MT bilateral Food for Work program. A PVO technical team composed of potato, agricultural and food specialists visited the DPRK in march to assess the feasibility of the potato project for this planting season and to lay foundation for a comprehensive twoharvest cycle potato production project linked to a oneyear Food for Work program.

For the initial 1999 harvest cycle, the PVOs will provide up to1000 MT of potato seed. Several varieties are currently being transported from China via Pyongyang for planting on 7 cooperative farms in Kangwon Province. A single variety from the US will be grown on a trail basis at various research stations throughout the country. The PVOs will provide related agricultural inputs required for successful potato production, including fertilizer, pesticide, insecticide, fungicide and backpack chemical sprayers.

This project will be a partnership between the PVOs, the FDRC and technical personnel from the DPRK Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Academy and farm managers and workers. The PVOs will provide technical assistance as required throughout the planting and harvest of the crop, with an evaluation team available in the pastharvest period to determine the success of different varieties. Harvest use will be determined jointly by the PVOs and their counterparts with some production reserved for seed stock for the year 2000.

The second cycle of this project will be determined upon the conclusion of the first harvest, with potential provision of potato seed and agricultural inputs anticipated for planting and harvest next year.

In support of the potato initiative, the US Government will provide 100,000 MT of food directly to the US PVOs for distribution in Food for Work projects, marking the first bilateral assistance program with the DPRK. These FFW projects will both be linked to the potato initiative and target the neediest area of the country.

In order to implement this initiative, the PVO consortium has now expanded to include Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Church World Service, Korean American Sharing Movement and The Carter Center.

Michel Anglade, Head of Mission, DPRK Action Contre la Faim

Introduction Action Contre la Faim (ACF) has been working in DPR o Korea since January 1998. From May to December 1998, ACF carried out a nutritional program in North Hamgyong province. We have drawn from our experience a few lessons I would like to share with you.

1. Action Contre la Faim program in DPR of Korea a) North Homgyong province, a vulnerable area North Hamgyong is likely to be one of the most affected areas of the country. Large depressed industrial towns (Chongjin, Kimchaek). People in these towns are especially vulnerable (no income, no possibility to cultivate) Limited agricultural activities (mountainous province, harsh climatic conditions) We noticed large population movements inside the province North Hamgyong is not a priority for the central authorities

b) ACF nutritional program ACF supported 1,300 nurses and 1,000 kindergartens, i.e. 155,000 children from six months to six years, though Supply of cereal milk for the children from six to eighteen months Supply of hygiene kits (soap, shampoo, antilice and antiscabies) and detergents Supply of winter clothes Nutritional training (detection of malnutrition, treatment, use of scales and measuring boards) The program was implemented by a term of these expatriates (2 nutritionists and one logistician), based in Chongjin. The term carried out 450 monitoring visits over a period of seven months.

2. Food aid is a partial answer to nutritional problems A nutritional program needs to address the issues of Poor quality of water, inadequate sanitation conditions Emergence of diseases (TB), low vaccination coverage, TB, if not treated, is a major factor of malnutrition

Harsh climatic conditions. Very Severe winter in North Homgyong. Children institutions/households not or poorly heated. Child loses a lot energy if cold Poor feeding practice

It is necessary to run a comprehensive program if we really want to address nutritional problems. If one component is missing, the overall impact of the program is limited.

3. Constraints for program implementation and their consequences ACF faced several constraints fir the implementation if its program. We believed that these constraints have important consequences on the overall impact of humanitarian aid in North Hamgyong province a) Assessments and monitoring limits No comprehensive list of the nurseries and kindergartens was provided by the authorities Monitoring visits had to be scheduled one week in advance and are therefore were prearranged by the authorities. We mainly saw what the authorities wanted to show us Number of expatriates allowed in the country by the authorities is limited We had to work through translators, access to beneficiaries is dodged b) Access Limits Six counties of the province were not accessible (one of them, Musan, is a very affected area, according to reports from Korean people who fled to China) Access to pediatric hospitals was denied. No followup of the malnourished children referred from nurseries was possible and we may have reservations about the quality of the nutritional rehabilitation done in the hospitals Access to households was not granted c) Humanitarian and limits A key question: is humanitarian aid and reaching the most vulnerable people? All aid is channeled through official channels. We targeted nurseries and kindergartens but we don't know if all the children attend these institutions. During our 450 monitoring visits, only 45% of the children registered were actually present in the nurseries and kindergartens. What about the 55% absent? Are they too weak to attend because of health/ nutritional problems? Parents with social problems? Children excluded from the official system? Street children?

A lot of questions to which we didn't get any answers.

We found only 29 malnourished children during our visits. A very limited number compared to the level of malnutrition underlined by the nutritional survey of September/October 98. Do the malnourished children attend the children institutions? If not, where are they?

We believed that two worlds/realities may coexist at the present time in North Hamgyong. The reality of people starving to death, as it is described by Korean refugees interviewed in China, the reality of the apparent and official world to which humanitarian workers have access.

A key question is also: how many people are excluded from the official system and therefore don't receive any aid?

4. Engagement, its limits and possible new initiatives a) A presence in the country is necessary if we want to push for the respect of humanitarian principles and the access to the most vulnerable people b) However, we need to see some progress on these issues if we really want to save lives. Access to the most needy is currently denied and these are not satisfactory working conditions. We face an emergency situation and we have to act quickly. c) All humanitarian actors in DPR of Korea should have a common line to ensure that the humanitarian principles are respected d) New initiatives like soup kitchens or street children programs should be put forward to reach the most vulnerable

Moon Kyu Kang Korean Sharing Movement

It is my pleasure and honor to make a brief presentation on the activities of Korean Sharing Movement to you this morning. We had an informal meeting last night among KSM participants here in Beijing. As usual we could hardly reach consensus except on a few minor points. Therefore, I take my personal liberty in this presentation to reflect how do I assess general Korean sentiment with regard to NGO support activities for the North.

Korean Sharing Movement is a loose umbrella of organizations of around 30 Korean NGOs aiming development assistance to the DPRK. We organized KSM three years ago when we heard that food shortages in the North had had reached a critical point due to continued flood and drought calamity, and that mass starvation seemed to be taking place in the affected areas. Several other NGOs in the South are also conducting food campaigns.

From 1995 to December 1998, a rough estimate of the total support from KSM members to the North reached about US$ 42 million in grains and other daily commodities. But this does not include all Korean NGOs support to the North; other large donors are World Vision and Won Buddhism.

Their support consists primarily of rice, flour and maize. Major donors for these food supplies are Protestant, Roman Catholic and Buddhist groups with some other organizations like trade unions and student groups. So far the South Korean government's total giving is much higher than the total of NGOs. ROK Government giving has been done through international Red Cross or WFP.

During the beginning stage of our support campaign for the North, we faced two major obstacles and even now they still prevail to a certain extent. The first burden that we had to break through was how to promote our humanitarian appeal to the general public in the South without falling into the trap of the longstanding enemy syndrome of NorthSouth relations; specifically, the accusation that we are supporting the enemy regime with humanitarian aid that could eventually end up as military aid in the North.

Secondly, we faced the practical issues of how to propel our "food for the hungry campaign" under the government noncooperation policy imposed on all levels of social sectors, including NGOs. Under these circumstances our public campaigns were not easy. There were numerous subtle forms of interception that affected our campaign through public media or in seeking cooperation from business circles. Furthermore, the government was controlling our food supply channels to the North.

Since January 1998, with the new government of Kim Dae Jung, which has adopted a unification policy that is far more flexible and optimistic for reconciliation and cooperation, we are now in a better position for fundraising and diversifying our channels for support, including direct contact and visits to the North. In March 1998, the ROK government lifted restrictions on NGOs, media, and the business world and allowed them to engage in public fundraising efforts for the North. In September 1998, the government diversified channeling of South Korean NGOs support to the North according to their respective contacts. There is now virtually no restriction or controlling of South Korean visits to the North. I myself have visited DPRK twice since March 1998.

With this radical change to a more reconciling policy toward the North, NGO support activities to the North are far more free and flexible. Although we had to face the unexpected IMF currency crisis since November 1997, out sociopolitical climate of SouthNorth cooperation has been improving and consequently our NGO level of support and exchange activities are improving.

We can note the following trends in our Korean NGO support activities: a. Main trend is still grain supply to the North. In early stages we have done this through USNGOs with American grain shipping from the West Coast of the US. Now we can buy much cheaper grains mainly Chinese maize from the North East of China and transport by railroad via Dandong to the North. b. Gradual diversification of supply items including clothes, shoes, livestock, medical items including numerous drugs and books. c. Careful but patient negotiations for joint cooperative farm activities in the field of agriculture, fishery and medicine factories. d. Increasing the number of direct contacts with the North for numerous exchange programs in the field of sports and culture or joint festivals.

Two major concerns hopefully to be discussed in the Conference.

What is our strategic projection or understanding (without going into the perennial controversy between the socalled humanitarian and nonhumanitarian demarcation line) of our support activities to the North? I am not attempting to extend the repetitive discussion on international standards, but to raise the issue in the context of the Korean peninsula where the North and South perpetuate highly confrontational power relationships during the last halfcentury. The two can hardly agree on humanitarian and political standards.

For example, when the governments of the North and South met in Beijing last May (1998) to discuss mutual humanitarian support; the North outlined the urgent humanitarian need for the excess fertilizer from the South so that their agricultural productivity could multiply. The South insisted that their humanitarian agenda was to reunite the 10 million divided families on the Korean peninsula. The South felt that the fertilizer issue was highly political and the North felt that family reunions were a highly sensitive political matter.

What I am trying to say to you is that your argument of humanitarian support without monitoring could sound like a highly political demand in the name of humanitarian support. It could have highly political influence, both positive and negative in the North and the South.

Monitoring and transparency requests could be an accepted standard international practice in ordinary aid action. But in such a highly confrontational context as is the reality on the Korean peninsula, we could be a little more tolerant before we impose such international standards. I can imagine the negative impacts when such monitoring and transparency is not available. It may lead to a decline in fundraising or speculative estimation on the death toll may lead to an inflation of numbers. What we should not do is polarize the situation further, but develop the frame of a standard that can accommodate both the realities of the donor and the recipient.

The same appeal could also be made to MSF when they withdrew from the North out of frustration with nontransparency in the distribution of medical care. I am wondering whether MSF could reconsider going back to the field and continuing their medical services to enemy soldiers in a battle.

Assessing our NGO assistance to the DPRK with its future projections is our common concern at this conference. I note that there are some frustrations among us out of our last 4 years of assistance, and that the food crisis continues. We are all concerned as to the real cause of the food and agricultural crisis in the North. We then have to evaluate our longterm strategy because this emergency situation shouldn't continue.

Without prolonging my presentation too much to touch upon the overall sociopolitical situation of the North, I could simplify our assessment to a few points for further discussion.

Of course the repeated calamity of floods and drought since 1995 directly impacted the already vulnerable agricultural structure in the North. When we monitor the decline of agricultural productivity, we can begin from 1985 when total grain production of 10 million metric tons was at its peak. That means that the decline of agriculture began 56 years before the collapse of the Eastern Block. The reasons for that could be traced to the total agricultural policy assessment and the socalled Juche agricultural policy as well. Such a policy mistake would be interpreted as part of the total government development policy of the North.

On the other hand, we also must consider the relationship between longstanding US economic sanctions and the gradual downfall of economic growth in the North. US economic sanctions have lasted more than 40 years, since the end of the Korean War in 1953.

DPRK is now a member of the UN as a sovereign nation, and they have their own right to survive apart from ideological disputes. Longstanding sanctions affect mostly ordinary people. I think it is time for humanitarian NGOs to advocate for the lifting of trade sanctions, the unfreezing of North Korean assets held in the US and for the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the DPRK.

The time is right to recognize that the Cold War needs to end on the Korean peninsula, that the familiar stalemate must be broken down for the future prospect of maintaining peace in the region and allowing for peaceful economic development for both the North and the South.

Michiya Kumakoa Japan Volunteer Center Relief Campaign for Children, Japan Japanese NGOs Liaison Group for Assistance

Report from Japanese NGOs

1. Past and Present Situation (19951997) Immediately after the flood in DPRK in 1995, we were informed by UN organizations of the serious damage in DPRK. Some officials were those whom we had worked with on the ThaiCambodia border or in Ethiopia. Though it took some time to prepare for relief due to practical difficulty in access and logistics, five or six NGOs offered food relief in the end of 1995 through 1996. These NGOs are: National Christian Council in Japan (NCC), CARITAS, Association to Send Eggs and Bananas, Relief Campaign for Children—Japan and others. Also at the time, the Japanese government was able to send rice bilaterally and food through UN agencies against objections from other countries. (e.g., Over 200,000 tons of preserved rice and donations to WFP, etc.)

Despite of several actions committed, detailed and concrete information regarding the situation in the country and distribution was not well received or shared by the Japanese society due to difficulty with monitoring. But for it was just after the Kobe Earthquake (1995) and its relief activities, with much extended by the international community, generally our public was positive toward humanitarian relief. a) Conscientious groups, especially religious groups, were very aware of offering an apology and possibly compensation for past offensive acts including atrocities made during Japanese imperial times against Korean people. b) People felt compelled to do something for people suffering from natural disasters and hardships in a neighboring country that shared a lot of cultural and historical relationships as well as geographical closeness. Also, some groups of people hope to have stability and reconciliation in the East Asia region through peaceful means including humanitarian assistance, rather than a combative relationship on both sides. c) Many NGOs wish to react with global concern regarding the combined issues of foodagricultureenvironment, with their knowledge and past working experiences in Indochina and Africa (e.g., Ethiopia).

1998 Present Due to the worsened official relationship between North Korea and Japan, caused by recent issues such as “missiles” and mutual condemnation, the Japanese government stopped the already limited channels and means of communication, including food

67 aid. A longterm absence of a formal diplomatic relationship and no solution for historical issues also resulted in negative circumstances. At the same time, the work of Japanese NGOs for humanitarian assistance became extremely disturbed not only by the “right wing” but also by the negative attitudes held, for the most part, by the general public and the mass media in Japan. A few NGOs continue to assist with food aid and agriculture. 1. At this stage, and in the long run, we believe our cooperation with Korean NGOs (in the ROK) will also be important, as well as our relationship with other organizations and groups in Japan. In April 1998, we responded to and joined the “International OneMeal Campaign” called by Korean NGOs. In February 1999, Korean and Japanese NGOs organized a joint workshop and symposium “Humanitarian Assistance for People in DPRK” with the intention of appealing to our governments and the general public.

2. Tasks and duties of Japanese NGOs in the present situation. We shall push for peaceful ways and relationships against warlike way of propaganda, with the combination of positive attitudes toward the future and a deep reflection on historical issues. As in Cambodia in the 1980s, Japanese NGOs shall cover, act and be a channel where our government lacks an official diplomatic relationship and many channels. ● To make a continued effort for action, even with a limited amount of aid, in order to break the present iceberg situation. ● To inform officials of the positive impacts and effectiveness of aid by UN organizations, NGOs and the international community, and the related DPRK departments. ● To inform the general public of the perspectives of ordinary people, farmers and children, in order to counterbalance the media coverage on political and military issues. ● To make an advocacy and lobbying effort on the government to take humanitarian assistance through UN organizations and NGOs in full cooperation with the international community, especially people NGOs and organizations working in the DPRK.

3. Goals to be achieved in the near future: ● We shall call on the Japanese public and civil sector for more support, and NGOs shall lobby for the commitment of our government to humanitarian assistance, and act as monitors where it is possible. ● Japanese NGOs should have a liaison person or representative office in the DPRK, possibly through UN channels or a NGO/PVO unit in the DPRK. ● We should continue to realize cooperation and exchange of practical knowledge of Japanese organic farmers because of the similar climate and soil in DPRK and particularly the Northeast part of Japan.

Rev. Dr. Nan Hudson, Area Secretary, East Asia, United Church of Canada

Report on the Experience of Canadian Churches through the Canadian Foodgrains Bank

Introduction and Context: I’ve been asked to speak on behalf of the Canadian Foodgrains Bank (CFGB), and to share something of CFGB’s experience in the provision of food aid to the DPRK since 1996.

I am not actually a staff or board member of the Foodgrains Bank, but rather am on staff with one of the thirteen member churches of CFGB. Let me begin by explaining to you who the Canadian Foodgrains Bank is, and by giving a little of the background and context for the current decade’s work.

The Canadian Foodgrains Bank is a churchbased organization that collects and channels not only funds but also donations of grain and other agricultural commodities to hungry people throughout the world. It is based in Winnipeg, Manitoba, and those of you who know something of the geography of Canada will know that it therefore is centered in the Prairie Provinces, the great grain basket of Canada. CFGB enjoys much support from church members, especially in the rural areas of Canada where farmers will often designate an extra field at the beginning of a growing season as a donation to the Foodgrains Bank, or communities will work together to produce an extra field of grain for donating. Grain that is donated is either cashed in or made available to ship inkind to destinations overseas. In addition to contributions from the farm community, churches and individuals also donate to CFGB’s work, and matching contributions from the Canadian government make up the rest of CFGB’s budget. Contributions are used by the Foodgrains Bank to support Food for Work programs, provide emergency food rations, or purchase other needed inputs, and it is the latter two interventions that have been used in the DPRK.

There is also, however, a historical dimension to the CanadianKorean connection, at least for a couple of the Foodgrains Bank’s member churches. One hundred and one years ago, the first Canadian missionaries were sent to Korea, and were assigned the area in the northeast of the Peninsula to commence their work. For the next sixtytwo years, interrupted at times through the difficult days of Japanese occupation, those missionaries labored in the fields of education, church planting, and establishing medical work in the form of clinics, the first hospitals, and teaching facilities. Their work was centered in the cities and surrounding areas of Wonsan, Hamhung, and Chongjin. Following the Korean War, connections were of course severed.

It wasn’t until the early 1980’s when contact with the church in North Korea was reestablished through a series of meetings hosted by the World Council of Churches that became known as the Tozanzo process. These meetings were arranged and facilitated by a young World Council staff person, FALU’s own Erich Weingartner, and they brought together church people from both North and South Korea at a time when their own governments were not on speaking terms. This process was supported through the international ecumenical community, and opened doors of communication for the first time since 1950. There are a number of people here today who were participants in some or all of those important meetings. Through the openness that developed, the Canadian Council of Churches was invited to send a delegation to Pyongyang in 1988, and we hosted the third of the Tozanzo meetings near Toronto in 1991.

It is out of that context then that some of the member churches of the Canadian Foodgrains Bank attended a special meeting in January 1996 in Macao, at which the Korean Christians Federation from Pyongyang appealed for assistance in the wake of the previous summer’s disastrous floods. Given the partner relationship that already existed with the KCF, we were anxious to respond.

Response of the Canadian Foodgrains Bank The Canadian Foodgrains Bank has supported nine projects to the DPRK since 1996, and coupled with support from the Canadian government, have made Canada the fourth largest donor to the World Food Program’s Emergency Program in the DPRK.

In 1996, CFGB made three separate shipments of locally purchased Vietnamese rice to North Korea, totaling $1.8 million Canadian. In 1997, 23,500 metric tons of Canadian spring wheat were shipped, this time with matching funding from the Canadian government, for a total of $7.5 million Canadian. The wheat was milled into flour upon arrival in Nampo, and distributed from there to Kangwon province. In addition, the Mennonite Central Committee sent an additional local purchase of Vietnamese maize, also in 1997. In 1998, 16,150 metric tons of wheat were shipped, totaling $5 million Canadian, and as we speak an additional 4,223 metric tons of oils and peas are en route to the east coast of North Korea for arrival this week. This shipment was envisioned in direct response to the first nutritional survey’s findings, and also in response to the request of WFPFALU staff for other food items that could supplement the largely grainbased contributions being received at present. The current shipment will be distributed to children in nurseries and kindergartens in Kangwon, South Hamgyong, and North Hamgyong provinces.

In addition, CFGB has provided significant nonfood contributions in the form of barley seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and equipment in support of the barley doublecropping project operated by Mercy Corps International. In Canada, we have a large population of Korean Canadians, and CFGB has also been the channel for some of the funds raised by groups such as the KoreanCanadian Sharing Movement, or Canadians for North Korea, two very active KoreanCanadian organizations.

From the beginning of CFGB’s operations in North Korea, the Canadian Foodgrains Bank has benefited greatly from a close collaborative relationship with CARITAS – Hong Kong in the person of Kathi Zellweger, who has assisted in the procurement and shipping of goods purchased locally, as well as in followup visiting within the DPRK. We have also provided support for and been greatly assisted by FALU, the Food Aid Liaison Unit, headed by Erich Weingartner, which has been an instrument that has proven most worthwhile for ourselves and the NGO community who have utilized their services. For these reasons, CFGB has never felt it necessary to become resident within the DPRK itself.

The member churches of the Canadian Foodgrains Bank also take some credit for the support provided to North Korea by the Canadian government. North Korea is one of the few countries in the world that is still on the list of nations deemed ineligible for Canadian government assistance. Therefore, our government turned down our initial requests for permission to use in North Korea funds that were already allocated to CFGB for humanitarian assistance. Church members commenced a letter writing and advocacy campaign, and the Canadian government softened. Since then, we have used $12.6 million Canadian of matching funds from the Canadian government to augment our own contributions. In addition, the Canadian government has now also added additional contributions of $17.25 million Canadian that has been channeled directly through WFP and UNICEF, and so we feel good about that also.

Through the stages of procurement (either in Canada or locally within the region), shipment to the DPRK (within the Asia region usually by North Korean vessels at no expense to CFGB), arrival and offloading, shipment to targeted provinces and counties, distribution, and monitoring, CFGB has been satisfied that our contributions have been handled properly and have reached the targeted beneficiaries. We have found our DPRK partner agency, the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee, most helpful in facilitating our shipments and our requests.

As I mentioned at the beginning of this presentation, I am not a staff member of CFGB, but have had the opportunity to travel to North Korea twice, once in August of 1996 and then last April 1998. While this only really gives one a taste of the situation there, I am grateful for the perspective offered by two trips that were 20 months apart. You have heard it said already, but one observation I had on the second trip was that the North Korean people were far more relaxed in dealing with foreigners and seemingly less rigid. It was also clear that the cumulative effects of the years of shortfalls are taking a toll on the people.

We know that widespread famine has been largely avoided only due to large infusions of food aid. Knowing that the need is likely to continue for some years to come poses us all with the challenge of finding ways to continue to raise needed support into the future. There are signs in our churches and elsewhere of what we call “donor fatigue”, and so the future feels uncertain even though the commitment of the Foodgrains Bank members continues for North Korea.

The Foodgrains Bank has made a provision for each member church to use some of our equity towards food security projects, but in the current context in the DPRK, opportunities to move beyond emergency aid are not easily found.

Finally, it is still the hope of the Canadian churches that our interventions today will not only alleviate suffering and save lives but also contribute to the longer term hope of the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. For some of the members of CFGB, our Korean partner relationships on both sides of the DMZ remain cast in that policy framework, and to that end we continue to pray and to labor.

Edward Reed, Director, DPR of Korea Program World Vision International

Some Observations on Agricultural Recovery in the DPRK Based on the Experience of World Vision International

1. Factors underlying the food production crisis in the DPRK are well known: a) In spite of the supreme effort made by DPRK farmers under the Juche system, the DPRK territory may not be ecologically capable of food selfsufficiency. b) Collapse of industries, especially fertilizer, chemicals and fuel processing, that supplied the highly inputdependent production system of the past. c) Cropping systems not necessarily suited to local conditions did not maximize food production potential and may not have damaged the environment. d) Unprecedented natural disasters in 1995 and 1996 (and unfavorable weather in 1997) further reduced production in those years and damaged infrastructure.

2. The DPRK authorities have responded to the food production crisis by: a) Immediately inviting international assistance to close the food gap and support food production. b) National campaigns to rapidly introduce or expand supplementary crops and animals (winter barley and wheat, potatoes, goats) and alternative methods for restoring soil fertility (adding topsoil, compost, etc.) c) New policy to give increased authority to the cooperative farms regarding cropping systems in order to adjust production to fit local conditions. d) Accelerated research and extension programs aimed at rapid dissemination of appropriate varieties and practices. e) Cooperation with UNDP and other international agencies to develop a mediumterm plan for restoring food production and rebuilding local capacity for production of inputs.

3. What role can NGOs play in supporting agricultural recovery in the DPRK? Over the last two years World Vision International has attempted to respond in the following ways: a) Temporarily supply production inputs to a relatively small number of selected locations. b) Cooperate with selected cooperative farms to support onfarm trials of new cropping systems, varieties and practices. c) Help address other onfarm problems such as soil restoration, draught animal upgrading, pasturage, irrigation, winter farming, and appropriate farm machinery (at selected locations).

d) At the national level and on selected cooperative farms, support campaigns for producing supplementary food sources (crops and animals). e) Support capacity building and international linkages at the national level for strengthening applied research and rapid extension. f) Help link onfarm experimentation and adjustment to regional and national support and research policies and programs. 4. Some limitations and challenges: a) Scope: The problems are related to macroeconomic factors (trade, foreign exchange, and industrial rehabilitation) that are beyond the reach of NGOs. Also, the problems are not local in nature, but nationwide. b) Sustainability of the response: NGOs, and other aid agencies, cannot provide production inputs for more than two or three years. It is justified as a more efficient form of emergency food aida kind of super “seeds and tools” project. It can only buy time for the macrolevel supply problems to be solved. c) Sustainability at the farm level: Aid agencies have essentially replaced the DPRK government as the supplier of inputs, threatening continued dependency. How can the value of these inputs be used to increase the selfreliance of the farms, in a context of limited modernization and limited supply? d) Overintensive farming: With the imperative to grow more food by multiple cropping, cultivation of hillsides, etc., will these projects put additional stress on the longterm capacity of the soils and the environment. e) Transport systems: Lack of vehicles and fuel, as well as greatly reduced rail capacity, is a major constraint to efficient and timely distribution and use of inputs (as well as harvests). NGOs are not normally in a position to respond to this need. f) Access: To date, WVI has had adequate access at the farm level for conducting needs assessment and observing impact. However, as projects focus more on technical assistance and onfarm trials, more frequent and intensive access will be needed. g) Coordination: DPRK authorities have approached many aid agencies with the same or related requests for technology and training. Duplication seems to be welcome by the DPRK, but it is not efficient given the limited resources of the agencies. Likewise, aid agencies working in the country are discouraged from collaborating and coordinating with one another. Overall impact is weakened.

5. Some recommendations: a) NGOs and other agencies should give strong support to the AREP plan, or a similar initiative. Unless critical agricultural supply industries are restarted (or foreign exchange sources generated for importing supplies), massive aid in the form of food or fertilizer will be required for many years to come. b) Aid agencies and the DPRK Ministry of Agriculture should cooperate to develop a workable and standard method for modernizing the inputs supplied to the farms, so as to make the aid effort more sustainable.

c) Aid agencies and the DPRK should cooperate to address questions such as: what is an environmentally and economically sustainable level of domestic food production for the DPRK? What is it for different regions with different resource base? What farming systems are most appropriate for sustainability? Assistance plans should be drawn up accordingly. d) The DPRK agricultural authorities should develop and provide overall plans for agricultural sector recovery and for specific campaigns, such as the potato initiative. NGOs and other aid agencies could offer to support specific aspects of the plan. e) The aid agencies should increase coordination and collaboration among themselves, with or without such a DPRK plan. For example, all agencies prepared to respond to the potato initiative should form a working group (under the coordination of UNDP?) to coordinate with DPRK authorities, assess needs, and plan a coordinated response. The problem is too big, and our resources too limited, to waste time and money. f) A fundamental factor underlying this problem is the division of Korea. Historically, the south was the rice bowl of the country while the north was the industrial base. Unnatural division imposed on the Korean people destroyed the natural symmetry. Ultimately this is a problem for the people of Korea to resolve. However, aid agencies can help by appropriate advocacy for removal of political and economic obstacles to DPRK recovery and by supporting reconciliation whenever possible.

Randall Ireson DPRK Development Assistance Coordinator American Friends Service Committee

The AFSC Experience in Agricultural Assistance

I. The current situation in DPRK is well known and has already been well described at this conference by other speakers. It is important to recognize that one cannot separate the agricultural and food situation from the overall structural and politicaleconomic situation of the country. However NGOs are for the most part only able to work on specific and defined “problems” which do not directly affect the underlying structural causes of the current food and economic crisis. This does not mean that NGO work is insignificant, but that we must understand both the limitations and opportunities of our work in the DPRK.

II. The AFSC experience in the DPRK is moderated by two factors not common to other NGOs: our contact organization is not the FDRC but the Korean Committee for Solidarity with World’s Peoples, and we are an American organization. A. We have worked with the KCSWP or its predecessor since the early 1980s; this organization was not established to receive aid, and thus at first didn’t know how. Nor is it a technical organization, thus it has been necessary to educate our counterparts in agricultural issues. They have learned very quickly, and have been quite responsive to our initiatives. Also, because the solidarity committee is a small organization, decisions can be made relatively quickly. Because it is a Partyrelated organization, the political agenda especially regarding USDPRK relations has a high priority and underlies all assistance work. B. Being an American organization, we have limited access and are not able to set up a resident office. There are also extra political overtones attached to the results (or lack of results) of our assistance.

III. Outline of AFSC agricultural assistance A. AFSC assistance to the DPRK began in early 1997, with provisions of food, and later fertilizer to one cooperative farm. We are now assisting three cooperative farms, all within 70 km drive of Pyongyang. Assistance has mostly been provision of fertilizer, clear plastic sheeting, and limited amounts of chemicals, sprayers, and other seeds. We have participated in the joint spring barley and winter wheat projects. B. A second channel of assistance is through the Korean Academy of Agricultural Sciences. Since November 1997, AFSC has sponsored three study tours for KAAS scientists to the US, visiting US agricultural universities and commercial

farms. The last delegation focused closely on rice, corn and soybean breeding issues. We also sponsored a study tour to China to study potato production, especially True Potato Seed.

IV. Difficulties and drawbacks in this work A. It is difficult to raise or sustain a longterm perspective on assistance when the problem is defined by the government as a “temporary setback” that will be overcome in two more years. B. Because of the definition of the current problem as shortterm, aid is mostly relief the provision of expendable commodities to the farms rather than developmental, such as capital investment or new approaches to farming. C. The US embargo also limits development assistance to DPRK, though humanitarian relief aid is permitted. D. The physical environment in DPRK has many constraints climate, soil, terrain which limit possibilities for improved agricultural production. E. There is a tension between supporting shortterm food production increase (e.g. through providing fertilizer) vs. longterm agricultural system changes such as crop diversification, use of green manures, integrated livestock/crop farming, etc. F. Farms and the KAAS don’t appear to see much beyond immediate national priorities (such as potato production, doublecropping) and planning directives. For example, representatives have said that because of the limited arable land and need to increase grain production, farms cannot rotate corn with soybean, even though this would improve soil fertility and corn yields and provide an important domestic source of protein.

V. Promising changes A. AFSC has had some discussions with farms about soilfertility enhancing changes, such as Effective Microbial (EM) fertilizer and green manures, and may be able to support trials of these. B. Some new varieties of corn and potato have been introduced to some farms. C. AFSC has been able to support KAAS work in breeding new varieties of the main crops, through study tours and provision of genetic resources for possibly modified priorities in the crop breeding programs.

VI. The bottom line: AFSC, like most NGOs, wants to develop partnerships with the DPRK, and to work together for selfreliance and development of the agriculture sector. So far we mostly work in ways which do not lead to sustainability or to development, because the system does not allow it at this time. But we continue in hopes of eventually helping a sustainable agricultural system to emerge, and in helping keep Korean people alive while the DPRK government finds an acceptable solution to its current economic difficulties.

Uwe Muller, Agronomist German Agro Action/Deutsche Welthungerhilfe

● German Agro Action commenced its activities in DPRK in 1997, based on a Framework agreement with the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee. The framework is frequently updated. ● German Agro Action is nongovernmental and nonpolitical agency. ● German Agro Action first activities had been humanitarian aid in kind of food provision, winter clothing etc. ● Since 1998 German Agro Action is also working in agricultural recovery and is providing agricultural material to 50 cooperatives in South Hwanghae Province.

Socioeconomic aspects of agricultural recovery activities in DPRK Working in DPRK it is important that both sides recognize each other as partners. The basic of partnership is a situation of confidence in the capacity of each side. At the same time NGOs should understand historical and socioeconomical background of DPRK. This leads to three major questions of socioeconomical issues for an agricultural recovery in DPRK.

➢ What is the aim of the activities? DPRK has asked the international community to assist in a humanitarian issue German Agro Action assist people in need for humanitarian aid Indications can be seen that Indications of flexibility are recognized, e.g. commodity exchange between cooperatives It is starting that cooperatives are able to decided on their arrangements for crop production Therefore Cooperatives should be supported to put their ideas into action, e.g. crop diversification, improving soil fertility It is not the mandate to change the system

➢ What is the overall goal of agricultural activities? Selfsufficiency is not possible to implement Soil fertility versus maximum crop production Indications can be seen that

Provincial administration and chief engineers of cooperatives are mentioning major aspects of crop production, e.g. post harvest losses Cooperatives are aware of poor soil fertility Therefore Cooperatives are supported to improve crop diversification Technical support through supply of new varieties, fertiliser and pesticides Capacity build is an important impact on provincial, county and farm level

➢ What are the resources of DPRK? ➢ Human resources: man power educated people disciplined people organised people Despite this capacity appropriate skilled in certain fields are missing Therefore Capacity build is an important impact on provincial, county and farm level Training and dissemination of extension material will be an important future aspect ➢ Technical resources Local crop varieties/lines are available Most cooperatives have basic technology available, e.g. machinery Despite this capacity Yield potential is low in comparison to new breed varieties Sensitivity for pest and disease of local varieties is severe Most agricultural inputs or spare parts for machinery are missing Therefore Providing new varieties to improve crop production Providing of fertiliser and pesticides to support crop production Providing assistance for agricultural inputs

Tim Roberts, Agricultural Program Manager DPRK Concern Worldwide

1. Who we are! A non government organization based in Dublin, Ireland, working in over 20 Countries around the World including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos and DPRK in Asia; several Countries in Africa & Central America and most recently Kosovo (Albania).

2. General Activities in DPRK. A team of 3 expatriates which include the Country Director, an Agricultural Program Manager, and a Food Aid monitor; plus 6 local staff including our FDRC Liaison Officer, 2 interpreters, 2 drivers and a cleaner.

All our projects are carried out in 3 counties of South Pyongan Province; namely Pyongsong, Pukchang and Anju. We have worked in the first named since November 1997, and the other two, only since the start of 1999.

Initial non agricultural work in Pyongsong involved the provision of winter clothing during the winter of 1998 and further winter clothing and the supply of coal to institutions for heating, during this last winter.

Currently, Concern is participating in a program of distribution of food aid consisting of rice, split peas, oil and sugar in Pyongsong, which has been supplied by the European Union DG8, through the World Food Program.

3. Agricultural Background. All our activities are effected through the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC) at National, Provincial and County levels. Most contact is with the Cooperative Farm Managers.

All three counties have large urban centers supported by productive cooperative farms:

County Population No. farms Arable area (ha) City Rural Total Rice Maize Other Total

Pyongsong 250,000 47,000 297,000 14 2,700 6,000 2,500 11,200

Anju 200,000 32,000 232,000 15 4,900 3,600 560 9,060 Pukchang 147,000 33,000 180,000 15 700 5,700 750 7,150

Total: 597,000 112,000 709,000 44 8,300 15,300 3,810 27,410

Pyongsong is unusual in having a cropping distribution of 25% paddy rice, 50% maize and 25% vegetables primarily because it is a fertile region in the river Taedong valley and adjacent to Pyongsong city and the capital Pyongyang. Pyongsong city has many industries including a vehicle assembly plant.

Anju is more typically over 90% rice and maize, but with farms situated in the fertile lands adjacent to the Changchon River. The city has a large number of industries.

Pukchang is located on the eastern side of the Province, at a higher altitude on the fringe of the central mountains. On their much more sloping land, only 10% is suitable for paddy rice, with a big area devoted to maize and potatoes. The city has a large coal fired power station which produces much of the electricity supply for Pyongyang.

It is possible to visit all 3 areas within a day from Pyongyang, though it does take twice as long to visit Pukchang (2 hrs) as the other two and a night’s stay there is preferable for work to be effective.

4. Agricultural programs. a) The provision of plastic sheeting for nursery seed beds of the principal crops of rice and maize. Over 2 million square meters have been supplied in the two seasons that we have been involved. b) The construction of 300 greenhouses adjacent to institutions such as hospitals, nursery schools and kindergartens and on farms. Of these 188 are new structures of the tunnel type and the remainder was rehabilitation of existing structures, mainly of leanto type. These, though unheated, have enabled vegetable production to continue into mid November and commence again in February, thus adding two more crops (one in the Autumn and one in the Spring) into the production cycle. c) The provision of hydroponic kits for use at the household level. This has been difficult to monitor and not as successful as anticipated.

d) Intensive cropping programs at Pyongsong (unless indicated otherwise): Winter wheat Spring wheat (Anju) Spring barley POTATOES (and in Pukchang) Soybeans

Inputs included seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and knapsack sprayers.

N.B. Concern is the biggest importer of potato seed amongst the aid agencies in 1999! (1,300 tons)

5. Donors. Our donors include the following: The European UnionDGVIII and ECHO programs. SIDA (Sweden) DIFID (U.K.)

6. Support. We would have been unable to operate without the valuable support of our Korean counterparts and great emphasis is placed on the fact that we operate as a team.

Similarly our work is facilitated by the excellent spirit of coordination that exists between ourselves and our NGO colleagues in other organizations.

Cooperation with the UN agencies is enhanced by a biweekly meeting of agricultural staff hosted by UNDP and participation in the weekly inter agency meeting hosted by WFP.

The Agricultural Recovery & Environmental Protection (AREP) program document produced by FAO is of great assistance in preparing our future strategy for agricultural assistance to DPRK.

Our business partners including the Rungra 888 Trading Co. in Pyongyang and the Wanshida, Tuhsu & Dandong Import/Export companies based in Dandong, all of whom have been efficient and reliable suppliers of goods during the past 18 months.

7. Lessons so far! (still early days) a) Trust we have established good relationships at the farm level. b) The socalled “double cropping” system will not be a longterm solution to food production needs. c) Timeliness – the importance of fitting in to the regular farm planning cycle and procuring inputs on time. In particular, if potato tuber seed is to be provided in the future it should be purchased in China at the time of harvest in September and brought into DPRK straightaway for storage on farms. d) Recognizing the changing requirements of the farms tractor tires and fuel are now the most commonly requested items in our areas of work whereas previously seed and fertilizer were the priority. e) There are no “magic solutions” to the food deficit problems in DPRK and there have to be many changes in the industrial sector also, before agricultural production can realize it’s potential.

8. Conclusion. It is of the utmost importance for DPRK to keep the Cooperative Farms producing to the maximum possible, within the current circumstances, to minimize the suffering of the general population. This needs to continue alongside assistance for more sustainable longer term development issues, as outlined in the AREP report. It is with these goals in mind that we hope to be able to continue our assistance in the agricultural sector.

Marilyn Weingartner, Medical/Health Consultant WFP Health and Hospital Unit, DPRK

As a Medical Assistant, I coordinate and monitor medical inputs from NGOs through FALU to DPRK.

This position has the following responsibilities:

● To monitor the arrival and distribution of medical inputs; ● To prepare written reports on distribution of medical consignments for contributing NGOs; ● To monitor progress in the production of medicines using raw materials sent by NGOs; ● To report on conditions in DPRK for identification of needs which could be met with NGO contributions; ● To coordinate among international agencies in DPRK such as UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, WFP, for the sharing of information regarding activities and to update NGOs on the situation.

I like to think of myself as “MALU” (FALU is the Food Aid Liaison UnitMALU is the Medical Aid Liaison Unit!)

My position and my work are an example of the kind of creative initiatives which can be taken on by an organization like FALU due to its position straddling the NGO world and the world of intergovernmental agencies.

In my presentation I would like to highlight some of the activities which FALU has undertaken as pilot projects.

Pilot projects: 1. MALU itself is a pilot project!

2. Domestic Pharmaceutical Production

● Cost of donated medical aid In August 1998, Mr. SIN, Do Gyun, General Manager of the Pyongyang Pharmaceutical Factory, told me that between the time of the natural disasters in 1995 and Spring 1998, US $ 60, 000,000 worth of medical supplies – drugs and equipment – had been delivered to DPRK by the international relief effort.

With such costs in mind, the German Institute for Medical Mission (DIFAM Tubingen) has done a cost analysis comparing the price of drug kits for “ri” and county hospitals substituting locallyproduced medicines for some of the medicines purchased readymade in Europe. The calculations were based on a typical order for 7 essential drugs supplied by UNIPAC.

Cost “readymade and bought in Europe”: US $ 315,756 Cost of the drugs if produced locally (including extra expense of material for packaging locallymade drugs): US $ 190,000 ● advantages to domestic production can be identified:

1. Local manufacture means: development / selfconfidence / work for employees 2. Local manufacture means: relative independence from imported drugs and the “Westisbest “ mentality, which threaten traditional medicines 3. Local manufacture means: saving money for donors Towards Good Manufacturing and Good Laboratory Practice: (GMP and GLP)

Drugs produced locally have so far been of a quality to “pass the tests” conducted, for example, by the Central Laboratory of German Pharmacists for quality assurance.

The next steps will be in the direction of assistance to move the factory and the drug inspection laboratories towards internationally accepted standards of Good Manufacturing and Good Laboratory Practice. World Health Organization and NGOs have funded technical experts to study the processes of production and quality assurance.

The next steps: Short term Medium term Long term

They recommend a variety of initiatives in short, medium and longterm, starting with : ● plaster of paris and enamel paint for the walls ● glassware and so on for the labs ● basins and scoops and buckets for the factory ● resurfacing work tables, tightening windows and doors, ● purchase of books and literature regarding current methods

All the way to: ● sophisticated instruments ● computers ● training in other countries

FALU has played a role as liaison among the technical experts of NGO and intergovernmental agencies and the Factory officials.

3. Pilot project: assistance to Tuberculosis hospitals

Monitoring medicines produced at the Pyongyang Pharmaceutical Factory brought FALU into contact with the # 3 Prevention Hospitals where inpatients with tuberculosis are treated.

For the first time, the international community had a glimpse of the situation of these hospitals, both in terms of their medical needs and in terms of their nutritional situation. As you may know, malnutrition and tuberculosis go handinhand.

Treatment programs for tuberculosis are based on 3 components: medicines accurate laboratory diagnosis nutrition

World Health Organization has drafted a protocol for appropriate treatment medications for TB in DPRK and a DOTS pilot program of treatment and training has begun in 7 counties. Estimated cost: US $ 3,000,000 / year for between 3 and 5 years. FALU is making an appeal to donors.

As a consequence of this contact with TB hospitals, WFP has begun to direct rations of wheat through hospital feeding programs for “specialized hospitals”. NGOs have begun to contribute food commodities as a way to improve the quality of nutrition for TB patients. For example, Swiss Disaster Relief will designate TB hospitals for their shipment of meat.

NGOs are also active with donations of microscopes, chemicals and glass slides as a step toward rehabilitation of laboratory services for accurate diagnosis and followup of TB patients.

4. Pilot project: supplementary feeding program for pregnant and nursing women (PNWs)

● To “round out” the food basket Based on the results of the nutritional survey which show that children under the age of two are among the most severely affected by malnutrition, FALU has appealed to NGOs to contribute to expand WFP programs of supplementary rations for PNWs. To be precise, the WFP ration of grains being complemented through the FALU program of adding pulses and oil in order to raise the quality of the food basket being supplied for these mothers.

Of course, the major problem associated with feeding mothers is: how to be sure that the mother herself gets the benefit of the food and does not give away her rations to other members of the family – what mother would leave her children, husband, parents hungry while she herself eats?

To try to explore this issue further, FALU organized a brainstorming workshop attended by members of the UN and NGO communities.

Discussion focused on issues such as: ● How to distribute effectively to mothers? ● How to assess the impact on mothers and babies? ● What is the situation in hospitals and clinics where these mothers are cared for during pregnancy?

… And many other questions!

To date, FALU donors have sent pulses and oil to PNWs in 6 provinces.

This leads me directly to another sort of pilot experience of FALU. Following the workshop among internationals, FALU convened a Round Table discussion on Humanitarian Aid to Pregnant and Nursing Women (or PNWs as we like to call them).

5. Pilot project: Round Table discussions FALU’s flexibility in exploring the issues and trying out new solutions has indeed created some fascinating encounters.

● Round Table on Humanitarian Aid to Pregnant and Nursing Mothers brought together Korean counterparts from FDRC, the Korean Institute of Child Nutrition, Ministry of Public Health, the Women’s Health Management Section of the Pyongyang Maternity Hospital, the National Society of the IFRC, the Ministry of Public Health, and the Korean Academy of Medical Sciences, well as members of the international community.

The objective of the Round Table was to lay the basis for continued dialogue between the international humanitarian agencies and government counterparts and experts for the provision of aid to PNWs in DPRK.

● Round Table on Domestic Production of Pharmaceuticals brought together DPRK officials, pharmaceutical scientists, UN agencies, donors and NGOs for an indepth discussion of the prospects of medical production in the DPRK using raw materials donated from international agencies.

Marzia Mongiorgi, Liaison Officer DPRK CESVI, Cooperazione e Sviluppo

CESVI’s Experience in the Health Sector in DPR of Korea

1. The Past: 19971998 CESVI began its operations in DPR of Korea in 1997 with two successive ECHOfunded projects. At that time, CESVI provided essential drugs, medical equipment, and hygiene items to 45 general hospitals, 158 Rihospitals, and 430 clinics in the two provinces of South Hwanghae and Kaesong. Regular monitoring visits of health services teams, together with various training courses and two workshops on drug use were organized. Additionally, thanks to a national solidarity campaign among Italian citizens, CESVI has been able to provide various relief items and food, such as dry food from Vietnam and BP compact biscuits for nurseries and kindergartens, and blankets and soap for medical institutions.

2. The Present: WinterSpring 1999 At the moment, CESVI is implementing another ECHOfunded project in Kangwon Province, on the East Coast. It is a winterization program that includes distribution of coal and hygienic kits to medical institutions, and the rehabilitation of central heaters in Rihospitals of Wonsan City.

3. The Future: Summer 1999 The new project of CESVI is related to the nutritional problems and Pregnant and Nursing Women (PNWs) have been facing in the last few years. It has still to be officially approved by the European Commission and for that reason, for the time being it remains a proposal of a project that CESVI is looking forward to implementing in the DPRK.

● Purpose of the Project: the purpose is to provide PNWs with supplementary food enriched with essential vitamins and minerals in order not only to improve PNWs food intake quality and quantity but also to prevent incidence of low birth weight and malnutrition. The medical food will also be given to the PNWs during the 3 months before and the 3 months after the delivery of the baby. ● Beneficiaries: pregnant and nursing women, from the 6th month of pregnancy until the 3rd month after the delivery of the baby. ● Number of Beneficiaries: there are 24,531 PNWs in Kangwon Province. It has been estimated that 30% of pregnant women in the province are in their 6th month of pregnancy. The target number of PNWs is around 7,500. ● Area of Intervention: Kangwon Province. The project will provide medical food aid to the PNWs of that Province. ● Period of Intervention: The project will last 6 months, starting from June 1, 1999. The implementation will start June/July 1999. The resources moblization being the determining factor in the establishment of the operational timetable. ● Implementing Partner and Coordination: The project will be implemented by DPRK CESVI in collaboration with the authorities of the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee, both central and provincial committees.

The medical food for PNWs will be distributed through the following institutions: Central FDRC in Pyongyang => Local FDRC in Wonsan City => County Level drug warehouse in Kangwon Province => Rihospitals => Maternity section: family doctors can deliver the medical food at home when the pregnant women won’t be able to collect it at the hospital.

Furthermore, there has been, and there will be, a constant exchange of information with agencies of the UN system and with other NGOs providing humanitarian assistance in the DPRK. This project is the direct result of the collaboration and coordination between NGOs and WFPFALU in DPRK. In fact, the idea of the entire project came from the roundtable on PNWs held by FALU.

● Type of Medical Food The medical food for PNWs is vitamin and mineral enriched biscuits. Each box of 100 grams to be consumed daily, consists of 10 rectangular biscuits with a sweet flavor. Each woman will receive 18 Kg. of biscuits in 6 months (100 grams x 180 days). The nutritional values and the composition of the biscuits are the following:

Nutritional Values per 100 grams of Biscuits Energy 450 Kcal Proteins 15% Fat 15% Carbohydrates 63.5%

Vitamins and Minerals Vitamin B1 0.8 mg Vitamin B2 0.8 mg Vitamin B6 0.8 mg Vitamin B12 3.1 mg Vitamin PP 6.5 mg Vitamin C 45 mg Vitamin A 1560 IU Vitamin D 160 IU Vitamin E 9 IU Folic Acid 270 mcg

Iron 4.2 mg Phosphor 170 mg Pantothenic 3.7 mg Calcium 260 mg

● Evaluation and Monitoring In order to ensure that the target group will be reached, CESVI staff will supervise the distribution, will visit the target institutions and will interview the target group at various stages of project implementation. It would be optimal to have a suboffice in Wonsan City to better follow the distribution of medical aid.

Advocacy Working Group

Main Task: I. To Identify advocacy issues that are a) national, and b) international in scope and to develop a plan of action. II. Should there be a followup conference? If yes, identify a possible location and mechanism for preparation. ______I. Advocacy issues and a plan of action: there will be an international concept from which NGOs will formulate appropriate national strategies.

A. Advocacy issues that cross the national boundaries: ● Lifting of the US sanctions ● Simultaneous support for humanitarian aid and development ● Breaking the barriers of isolation ● Constructive engagement ● Support peace initiatives

B. It was understood and affirmed by the majority that: ● We can only represent ourselves at the conference. ● There are national and international agendas, and each requires a different strategy to be effective. ● The DPRK situation is life threatening. Hence we recognize that it will take both continued emergency aid as well as support for longerterm development. It will take much more than the provision of commodities. The isolation from the international community is a very important factor. The isolation is reinforced by both the international community and by the DPRK. ● Sanctions in general afflict more suffering on the people, and sanctions do not work. Lifting sanctions will provide a way for the DPRK to begin steps towards food security and towards joining the international community. Sanctions also impede humanitarian aid for the most part, and perpetuate the crisis itself. ● Call for continued engagement with North Korea. ● We want the conference to subscribe to the consensus statement of all UN agencies, NGOs and donor agencies operating in the DPRK, and the statement of humanitarian principles, particularly the point: "We are well aware of the constraints and difficulties of operating in the DPRK. We believe that only with a continued presence and constructive engagement here will we be able to work towards the position of providing accountable assistance. We remain committed to working towards there objectives." ● Development program is more cost effective than relief. We encourage the international donor community to support funding the AREP initiative and support positive development/initiatives by EU, UNDP, etc. We also support North Korea receiving bi and multilateral support; to facilitate the longterm change in DPRK economy as well as communication and dialogue. It is the support for economic rehabilitation that will address root causes, and this is fundamentally a humanitarian activity.

C. There are to be three working groups to followup on these above suggestions, the groups are advocacy, conference committee (to plan the next conference) and a group to engage the private sector. There are sign up sheets. Each working group will communicate via email to discuss proposed actions and suggested ideas.

II. The group agreed that there should be two types of conferences after this one: one that is a followup conference to this one, for NGOs, and the other specifically to involve the representatives of the DPRK on the aid/development cooperation. There were suggestions to change the name of the conference as well. The next NGO followup conference has been agreed upon. Possible venues are: Japan or Dailian or Dandong in China. A detailed report will follow.

Networking Working Group

Review of Existing Information Systems and Networking

Internal to the DPRK: Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has existed in the DPRK since 1997 The UN partners / NGO’s/ Government share info through the InterAgency meeting once a week Sectoral coordination meetings take place once every two weeks (Food aid, Health, Agriculture, and Water and Sanitation) The Humanitarian Coordinator meets with the NGO’s once a month In 1998, the Consolodated Appeal process brought together government, donors, NGO’s, and UN partner representatives to establish principles of engagement… the result was the nine Principles of Humanitarian Engagement, which has proven important in terms of networking FALU also an important forum for networking and infosharing SIDA has provided bridge financing to NGOs during 1998 which has been critical to their survival. OCHA has repeated the same funding during 1999 and would welcome additional contributions.

External to the DPRK: internet and email have proven invaluable; top recommended information web site is Relief Web, under DPRK; agencies can access 1999 consolidated Interagency appeal on relief Web currently maps are being prepared and produced by OCHA and WFP; they will see if downloading is possible; if not, may be available through WFP Rome or Beijing suboffice Korean Sharing Movement and other Korean NGO’s and networking connections are strong, but sharing of information between Englishspeaking and Koreanspeaking groups is weak

Main Issues in Networking: communication is sensitive and not always easy; for example, agencies within the DPRK are unable to access web sites such as Relief Web the group acknowledged a need for increased networking between all groups, inside and outside of DPRK, Korean and English speaking it was strongly suggested by South Korean participants is that a fundamental principle which must be understood is that the people ultimately responsible for resolution of problems in the DPRK are the Korean people themselves, in whole of Korean Peninsula;

until present government however, South Korean people were not able to freely work in support of North Korean relief and rehabilitation… that has now changed. South Koreans must be kept in the loop in DPRK info networks South Korean organizations seeking to assist the DPRK last month formed a working group which will meet monthly; contact will be World Vision Korea InterAction group in US also meets regularly, and could also be a point of contact, especially for South Koreans Competition between DPRK channels for receiving resources into the country Way in which DPRK government determines the relief/rehab/development agenda, e.g. Potatoes currently “Trendy” greater need for vigilance by agencies in communicating with one another Need for agencies to overcome hesitancy in sharing information with one another for fear of “offending” the authorities

Main Recommendations: 1. People should seek to watch for information (and post information?) on Relief Web’s site: www.reliefweb.int 2. Internet updates from Jim Bishop also helpful to receive: [email protected] 3. Other helpful web sites or sources of email information include: Geneva Headquarters of OCHA WFP Headquarters in Rome; suboffice in Beijing FALU reports 4. Suggestion that one major web site external to DPRK would be helpful; for the moment recommendation is use of relief web. 5. Desire to see this conference reconvened at a later date. Korean participants suggested Japan; others suggested Dandong; Europe was also suggested.

Modalities Working Group

What has not worked? ● Debate about policy reform ● No comprehensive acceptance if international standards (shades of differences standards) ● Access to most vulnerable people ● Access to social and other data (improving) and lack of rigorous data on mortality, morbidity and other key indicators ● Hesitancy to acknowledge donations from certain sources ● Prearranged monitoring visits (discussion about cultural characteristics not ready, importance of hospitality, etc.) ● Limited access hampers measurement of impact

What has worked? ● Engagement ● Support of nationally stated priorities ● Recognition of national security concerns ● Introduction of NGO's ● Direct correlation between scale of support of national priorities and degree of access ● Unconditional donation ● Improvement in the quality of access ● Better understanding and confidencebuilding with counterparts ● Moving one step at a time; slow and gradual change ● Approval with central authorities facilitates implementation ● Good personal relation Dilemmas ● Tension between media efforts/fundraising with constituencies and low key operations in the DPRK ● Recognition that patience is required but we are dealing with an emergency situation ● What is the point of reference by which one measures emergency, development and rehabilitation stages?

Suggestions ● Place more stock in trust and relationships than codifying everything in an MOU ● Enthusiastic support for agreed programs ● Be conscious of social impact and design programs to strengthen families and communities

● Continued humanitarian assistance while trying to address systemic needs ● Tailor assistance that maintain individual dignity ● More NGO's with the caveat that they accept minimum standards (code of conduct, sphere, etc.) ● Donations should meet international standards ● Emphasize the emergency situation in coming months (May and June particularly) ●

Economic Engagement and Sustainable Development

1. General Observations ♦ DPRK trade with Japan, China and South Korea is noticeable. ♦ Trade with South Korea is not flourishing except for tourism.

2. Some NGO and UN Projects outside of relief aid. ♦ Soap factory production. ♦ One NGO asked to support factory for disposal medical supplies. ♦ Plastic sheeting production supported by NGOs. ♦ Technical school supported by NGO. ♦ Training through UNDP/World Bank.

3. Constraints on Economic Engagement ♦ Irregular and lack of electrical power for production activities. ♦ Lack of machinery to produce parts. ♦ Production facilitates are spread across a wide geographical area. ♦ Infrastructure is insufficient. ♦ Business uncertainties. While some companies may see investment returns in textiles they might not see sufficient return in large projects like mining. ♦ High bank fees for transferring foreign currency. ♦ Lack of clear business laws and regulations for foreign investment. ♦ High prices and quality limit incountry purchases of aid goods.

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4. Industry with Foreign Investment Potential ♦ Animation and video production. ♦ Light industries such as garment making. ♦ Mining.

5. Strategical considerations ♦ DPRK economy is primarily manufacturing rather agriculture based. ♦ Hard currency earnings could reduce the need for agricultural production. ♦ However, agriculture projects are windows for engagement. ♦ DPRK has educated and hard working labor. ♦ A Beijing based Foreign Business Development Association has been initiated for DPRK. ♦ Need International Financial Institutions to address macro infrastructure needs. ♦ Difficulties caused by East European economic transitions raises questions about the wisdom of changed imposed from outside. ♦ NGOs may be able to play a special role as trusted intermediary between officials and foreign business.

6. Sanctions ♦ The lifting of sanctions does not guarantee successful economic engagement due to the constraints mentioned above. ♦ However it will encourage private companies and bilateral development aid from countries other than USA. ♦ Lifting sanctions will create environment for involvement of International Financial Institutions.

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Name Organization Title Address Country Phone Fax Email NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) Abdalla, Save the ChildrenUK Nutritionist 17 Grove Lane, London SE5 BRD UK (0171) Fathia 7035400 Ahn, Byung Hana G&L Project Manager #1501 Hanshin Building, 1361 ROK (822) (822) [email protected] Il Mapodong, Mapoku, Seoul 31890101 31890104 121050 Ahn, Cynthia Joint Together Society of New Executive 570 Main Street, New York, NY USA (718) (212) 7592014 [email protected] Choi York/Council of Greater NY Director 10044 3580074 “Help My People” Anglade, Action Contre la Faim (ACF) Head of Mission Diplomatic Area 53 University DPRK (8502) (8502) [email protected] Michel Street, Building 9, Entrance 6 3817706 3817706 Pyongyang Arthen, Chris Catholic Relief Services North Korea 209 West Fayette St., Baltimore, USA (410) (410) 2343121 Carthen@catholicrelief Program MD 21201 6252220 Coordinator x3425 Boddie, South North Institute for Secretary China Caroline Sustainable Development Brandt, Joan Heifer Project International HPI Volunteer Chang, Won KADECO/ Dankook University Chair/ Dean of Dankook University, 29 San. ROK (82) (82) Rice0505@chollian Suk President Anseodong, Chonansi, 4175503600 4175531618 co.kr Chungnam, Chonan Chen Qing South North Institute for Director Suite 3028, Beijing International China (8610) (8610) [email protected] Sustainable Development Hotel, Beijing 100005 65254443 65254445 Cho, Sung KADECO General Secretary Rm 1301 Christian Building ROK (822) (822) 7084988 kadeko@chollian Beom Yunchidong, Seoul 7084988 Choi, Dai Dongguk University KSM Professor Dongguk University, Seoul 100715 ROK (822) (822) 2603820 [email protected] Seok 2603820 Chung, SouthNorth Kangwon Province Director/ Chair Rm. 408 GongYoung bldg. 9, 1ga, ROK (82) (82) Sungheon Interchange and Cooperation Jungangro, chunchonsi, Chunchon 3612532012 3612422416 Planning Group/KADECO Cornwell, Asia Pacific Center for Justice Conference 110 Maryland Avenue, NE, Suite USA (202) (202) 5465103 [email protected] Rachel and Peace Secretariat 504, Washington, DC 20002 5431094 Creti, CESVI Cooperozione e sviluppo Agricultural Munsudong Diplomatic Compound DPRK (8502) (8502) Pantaleo Projects 502, PO Box 4, Pyongyang 3817137 3817816 Coordinator in DPRK

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Cui, Yiping Dandong Wanshida Economy and Business Manager Room 101, Building No.3, Jinhai China (86415) (86415) Wanshid@public cn Trade Co. District, Caishi Street, Dandong, 2819101 2819723 Liaoning 118000 Culver, Mercy Corps International Senior Vice 3030 SW First Avenue, Portland, USA (503) (503) 4712493 Eculver@mercycorps Ellsworth President OR 97201 7966800 x251 Flory, Ralph Christian Aid Ministries Asia Coordinator P.O. Box 360, Berlin, OH 44610 USA (330) (330) 8932305 for Agricultural 8932428 Programs Giebel, German Red Cross Desk Officer Asia FriedrichEbertAllee 71, 53113 Germany (49228)5411 (49228)54114 [email protected] Hellmut Bonn 332 23 Gray, Sherry Stanley Foundation Program Officer, 209 Iowa Avenue, Muscatine, IA USA (319) (319) 2640864 Sgray@stanleyfdn International 52761 2646877 Programs Hamilton, Concern Worldwide Agricultural 62 Munsudong, Pyongyang DPRK (8502) (8502) Concernk@public Richard Program Manager 3817112 3817647 Han, Buddhist Committee for a Standing 383 3rd Floor, Susongdong, ROK (822) (822) 7332559 Bukbul@chollian KiJoong Concord Nation Chairman chongrogu, Seoul 7332557 (MyungGin) (BCCN)/KADECO Hartke, Linda Church World Director of 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY USA (212) (212) 8703523 Lindah@ncccusa Service/NCCCUSA Programs and 10115 8702061 Operations Howard, International Federation of Red Federation c/o Chinese Red Cross, 53 Ganmian China (8610) [email protected] Patrick Cross/Red Crescent Societies Representative Hutong, Beijing 100010 65224784 Hsu, Victor Church World Director of 475 Riverside Drive, New York NY USA (212) (212) 8702064 [email protected] Service/NCCCUSA Church World 10115 8702373 Service Hudson, Nan UCC/Canadian Foodgrains Bank UCC Area 3250 Bloor Street West, Etobicoke, Canada (416) (416) 2326008 [email protected] Secretary for East Ontario M8X2Y4 2317680x Asia 5131 Hui Yuming, South North Institute for Project Manager Suite 3028, Beijing International China (8610) (8610) [email protected] Timothy Sustainable Development Hotel, Bejing 100005 65254443 65254445 Ireson, AFSC Development 3590 Elderberry Dr. South, Salem, USA (503) (503) 3649492 rireson@compuserve Randall Assistance OR 97302 3649492 Coordinator

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Ishii, Hirdaki Peace Winds Japan Programme Shimazuyama House #1, 3155 Japan (813) (813) Peacewin@netlaputa Coordinator Higashi Gotanda, Shinagawa, Tokyo 34469431 34469432 1410022 Jeon, Jaeheon KASM Secretary General 969 Mayer Ave. #3, Silver Spring, USA (301) (301) 5857564 [email protected] MD 20910 5880703 Jiabi, Pu Heifer Project International China Kang, National Council of Saemaul #1093 Hwagokdong, Kangseoku, ROK (822) (822) 6003618 Saemaul17@chollian Moonkyu Movement in Korea 157723 Seoul 6998888 Kim, David Holt International President 1195 City View, Eugene, OR 97401 USA (541) (541) 6836175 [email protected] Emeritus 6872202 Kim, Institute for Strategic Senior Research Yan He Road #71, Meihekou, Jilin China (448) (448) 4221324 [email protected] Gertrude Reconciliation Fellow/China 135000 4212952 Representative Kim, Susan Team International, Inc. Executive Room 339, Harbour Plaza, China (8610) (8610)6434181 Chayon Director Chaoyang District, Beijing 64341748 8 Kumaoka, Japan International Volunteer President Higashi Ueno 1206, Taitoku, Japan (81) (81) [email protected] Michiya Center (JVC) Tokyo 0338342388 0338350519 1108605 Kwon, Federation of Korean Industries Researcher FKI Building, 281, Yoidodong, ROK (822) (822) [email protected] SoonBum (FKI) Youngdungpogu, Seoul 150756 37710225 37710130 Lee, Jihyun Join Together Society of New Secretary General JTS Center 158516 Seocho3dong, ROK (822) (822) 5878996 [email protected] York Seochoku, Seoul 137073 5878996 Lee, Keum Korea Institute for National Research Fellow 535383 Sooyu 6dong, kangbukgu ROK (822) (822) 9012542 [email protected] Soon Unification Seoul 142006 9012593 Lee, Myung Mercy Corps International Senior Medical 6127 Starburn Path, Columbia, MD USA (410) (410) 6141149 [email protected] Ken Coordinator 21045 8721129 Lewis, Gerald ADRA Regional Vice Le Chateau, No. 603, 55 Soi Ekamai Thailand (662) (662) 3817128 104474.2705@compuserve President for Asia 12th Charoenjai, Sukhumvit 63, 3817130 com Klontan, Bangkok 10110 Li, Ping China Agricultural University Professor 100094 Beijing China (8610) 82905287 Liu, Dandong Wanshida Economy and General Manager Room 101, Building No.3, Jinhai China (86415) (86415) Wanshid@public Guocheng Trade Co. District, Caishi Street, Dandong, 2819101 2819723 cn Liaoning 118000 Lu, Xioaping Dept. of International Director Beijing China (8610) (8610) [email protected] Cooperation, Ministry of 64192444 64192451 Agriculture

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Lyu, Tae Sun Presbyterian Church of Korea Executive Room 404, Centennial Memorial ROK (822) (822) 7470043 [email protected] Secretary for Building, 135 Yunjidong, 7414358 Dept. of Social Chongroku, Seoul 110470 Service and Witness

Mongiorgi, CESVI Cooperozione e sviluppo Liaison Officer/ Munsudong Diplomatic Compound DPRK (8502) (8502) Marzia Administration 502, PO Box 4, Pyongyang 3817137 3817816 Emergency Project, DPRK Monsalve, ADRA International Senior Grants 12501 Old Columbia Rd., Sliver USA (301) (301) 6806370 Rmonsalve@compuserve Rodolfo Administrator Spring, MD 20904 6806375 com Muller, Uwe German AgroAction Agronomist Pyongyang DPRK Nichols, Lee Amigos International NE Asia 420 Hillmont Ave., Longview, TX USA (903) (903) 2341648 Lnichols@pobox Programs/Plans 75601 7534038 Director Nichols, Amigos International NE Asia 420 Hillmont Ave., Longview, TX USA (903) (903) 2341648 Lnichols@pobox Norma Programs/Plans 75601 7534038 Director O’Dea, John Nuffield Institute of Health, Lecturer and 136 Street Lane, Leeds, LS8 2BW, United (44113) 106631.3050@compuserve International Division, University Teaching Fellow Great Britian Kingdo 2933684 com of Leeds m Oh, Jae Shik World Vision Executive Yoido P.O. Box 230, Seoul, 150602 ROK (822) (822) 7824253 [email protected] Korea Director 7835164 Pack, Stuart Global Resource Services North East Asia Mars Hill College, Mars Hill, NC USA (824) (822) 6891478 (Amigos) Projects 28754 6891306 Coordinator Park, Hee Won Buddhism Kangman Temple Venerable Mother Yangiaedong, 69 Seochogu, Seoul ROK (822) (822) 5786007 Sook 5746282 (Chung Soo) Park, Hye Coalition for Sharing with the 210 E. Broadway #H1208, New USA (212) (212) 2190248 [email protected] Jung People of North Korea York, NY 10002 5294581 Park, Jenny Korean Buddhist Sharing Manager JTS Center 158516 Seocho3dong, ROK (822) (822) 5878996 [email protected] Jihyun Movement Seochoku, Seoul 137073 5878996 Park, Jong Korean American Sharing Senior Director 11237 Korman Dr., Potomac, MD USA (202) (202) 4523819 [email protected] Movement for Policy and 20854 4523170 Planning

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Park, Kwang Korean Conference on Religion Associate General Chongroku Kyungun dong 88 Seoul ROK (822)7362250 (822) 7342252 [email protected] Soo and Peace Secretary 110310 Park, Sung International Center Director 10th Floor SISA Journal Building, ROK (882) (822) 7346462 Sup 581 Chongjeongro 1ga, Chungku, 7256462 Seoul Pelant, Heifer Project International Asia South Pacific 1015 Louisiana Street, Little Rock USA Robert.pelant@heifer Robert Program Director AR 72202

Piao, Jianyi Institute of AsianPacific Studies, 3 Zhang Zizhong Road, Beijing China (8610) (8610) [email protected] Chinese Academy of Social 100007 64063922 64063041 Sciences Quinones, Asia Foundation Representative KPO Box 738, Seoul, 110607 ROK (822) (822) 7396022 Kenneth 7322044 Reed, Edward World Vision International Director, DPRK #7E Strata 100 Building Philippin (632) 633 (632) 6320596 [email protected] Program Emerald Ave. Ortagis Ctr. es 2264, (632) Pasig 1605 7643451 Rim, Jong Medical Aids for Children of Cochair/Executiv Jungan Building 4th Floor, 167014 ROK (822) (822) 5886943, Rebeca@chollian Chul DPRK e Director Seocho 1 dong, Seochoku, Seoul 5239756, 5239753 5239752 Roberts, Tim Concern Worldwide Agricultural 62 Munsudong, Pyongyang DPRK (8502) (8502) Concernk@public Program Manager 3817112 3817647 Robinson, John Hopkins School of Public Associate 615 N. Wolfe Street, Baltimore, MD USA (410) Crobins@earthlink Court Health 21205 9553928 Rumpf, CWS 235 SE 581 Road, Warrensburg, USA (660) (660) 7479501 Rojacmir@earthlink Roger MO 64093 7479889 Schneider, OXFAM Program Manager Building 9, Apartment 32/33 DPRK (8502) (8502) Robert Diplomatic Compound, Munsudong, 3817941 3817941 Pyongyang Sewell, Salvation Army Major 101 Queen Victoria Street, London United (0044) (0044) Roland EC4P4EP Kingdo 1713328076 1713328076 m Shepherd, World Vision International Liaison Officer, Pyongyang DPRK Geoffery DPRK Program Shin, Hue Jae Won Buddhism, Kangnam Staff 102601 Mokryun Apt. Ildondong, ROK [email protected] Temple Kangnamku Seoul 135230 Shin, Sook International Center 10th Floor SISA Journal Building, ROK (882) (822) 7346462 Hee 581 Chongjeongro 1ga, Chungku, 7256462 Seoul 106

Soh, Kyung Korean Sharing Movement Executive Soounhwegwan 1107, ROK (822) (822) 7348770 [email protected] Suk Director Kyungundong 88, Chongroku 7347070 Seoul Suzuki, World Conference on Religion WCRP/Japanese Fumon Hall 5th Floor, 261 Wada, Japan (813) (813) [email protected] Katsuji and Peace Committee Suginamiku, Tokyo 1660012 33842337 33837993 Tan, Liying Amity Foundation China Taiyong, Heifer Project HPI China Deputy China Chen Director Takagi, JT Coalition for Sharing with the 110 West 96th St. #2A, New York, USA (212) (212) 3163611 Jtakagi@pipeline Orinne People of North Korea NY 10025 6633799

Wilson, International Federation of the Health Delegate DPRK Sheila Red Cross Yamamoto, National Christian Council in Executive 231824 Nishi Waseda, Japan (813) (813) Nccj[email protected] Toshimasa Japan Secretary for Shinjukuku, Tokyo 1690052 32030372 32049495 International Affairs Yang, Jike South North Institute for President Suite 3028, Beijing International China (8610) (8610) Sustainable Development Hotel, Bejing 100005 65254443 65254445 Chuntao, Yin South North Institute for Secretary Suite 3028, Beijing International China (8610) (8610) Sustainable Development Hotel, Bejing 100005 65254443 65254445 Yoon, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, ViceDirector 2842 Samchungdong, Chongroku, ROK (822) (822) Yoondk@kyungnam Daekyu Kyungnam University Seoul 110230 37000700 37000707 Yoon, Suk ChungAng University KSM Professor ChungAng University, Seoul ROK (822) (81) Sukwon@chungang Won 156756 2334521x304 3346751381 7 Yoo, Ki Korean Council for Executive Dongwoo Bldg. 4th Floor, 134 ROK (822) (822) 7616590 Theway21@unitel Hong Reconciliation and Cooperation Director Yoidodong, Yungdungpogu, Seoul 7611213 Yu, Chong The Carter Center 433 Wadsworth Ave., Pennsylvania, USA [email protected] Ae PA 19119 Zellweger, CaritasHong Kong Director of Rm. 603, Caritas House, 2 Caine China (852) (852) Zellweger@caritas Katharina International Road, Hong Kong 25229211 25230438` Cooperation UN Agencies ChengHopki World Food Programme Director, Asia and Via Cesare Giulio Viola, 68/70, Italy (06) 65132209 (06) 65132863 Judy.cheng[email protected] ns, Judy CIS Region Parco da’Medici, Rome, 00148

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Crilly, Denise WFP Liaison Officer, UN Building 2, Liang Ma He Nan China (8610) (8610) [email protected] DPRKBeijing Lu, Beijing 100600 65323731 65324802 Office x109 Hoerz, WFPFALU FALU Emergency Munsudong, Pyongyang DPRK (8502) (8502) Thomas.hoerz@wfp Thomas Officer 3817236 3817639 Jorgensen, UNDP Deputy Resident PO Box 27, Pyongyang DPRK (8502) (8502) [email protected] Kirsten Representative 3817566 3817603 Kehler, Al WFP Programme Pyongyang DPRK (8502) (8502) [email protected] Advisor 3817220 3817639 Khan, UNICEF DPRK 14 Munsudong Street, P.O. Box 90, DPRK (8502) (8502) Dilawar Ali Representative Pyongyang 3817676 3817150 Lam Nai Jit UNHCR Protection Officer 121 Tayuan Diplomatic Office China (8610) (8610) [email protected] Building, 14 Liangmahe Nan Lu, 65326806 65321647 Beijing 100600 Long, WFP EMOP Reports UN Building 2, Liang Ma He Nan China (8610) (8610) [email protected] Kimberly Officer Lu, Beijing 100600 65323731 65324802 x232 Morton, OCHA/WFP UN Humanitarian Pyongyang DPRK (8502) (8502) David.morton@wfp David Coordinator/WFP 3817298 3817639 Representative Pataudi, UNOffice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Munsudong, Pyongyang DPRK (8502) (8502) [email protected] Shawar Humanitarian Affairs Affairs Officer 3817217 3817639

Raaijmaken, UNICEF DPRK Herbert Rhee, SooJin UNHCR Smerdon, WFP Public Affairs UN Building 2, Liang Ma He Nan China (8610) (8610) [email protected] Peter Officer Lu, Beijing 100600 65323731 65324802 x209 Sorensen, WHO, EHA Office DPRK (8502) (8502) Eigil.sorensen@undp Eigil 3817914, 3817639 (8502) 3817306 Weingartner, WFP Head of FALU Munsudong, Pyongyang DPRK (8502) (8502) Erich.weingartner@wfp Erich 3817236 3817639 Weingartner, WFPFALU Health Unit Munsudong, Pyongyang DPRK (8502) (8502) Marilyn.weingartner@wfp Marilyn Medical Assistant 3817236 3817639

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Wright, Geoff UNDP Tumen Secretariat Deputy Director China Governmental Representatives Gronning Ole ECHO, European Commission ECHO Munsudong Diplomatic Compound, DPRK (8502) (8502) Ogronning@hotmail Correspondent Pyongyang 3817247 3817661 Kim, Jin Goo Ministry of Unification, Republic Deputy Director ROK (822) 7202435 [email protected] of Korea Lee, Kang Embassy of the Republic Korea Second China World Tower No. 1, Jian Guo China (822) (822) Kuk Secretary Man Wai Avenue, Beijing, 100004 65055314 65053458

Zotter, Darcy US Embassy, Beijing Second 43 Xiu Shui North Rd., Beijing China (8610) (8610) Fyock Secretary, 65323831x626 65326422 Economic 5 Section Press Hirai, Kyodo News China Bureau China (8610) (8610) Hishashi 65322680 65325798 Kim, Munhwa Broadcasting Beijing China (8610)6532634 (8610) [email protected] SangChul Corporation (Korea) Correspondent 5 65326348 Lee, Don Yonhap News Agency (Korea) Beijing China (8610) (8610)6532617 Kwan Correspondent 65326169 0 Lee, DongA Daily News Beijing China (8610)6532620 (8610)6532620 JongHwan Correspondent 3 4 Pons, Le Monde Correspondent Tokyo Japan (813) (813)34466098 Phillippe 34466097 Shim, Jae Far Eastern Economic Review Bureau Chief ROK (822) 7333696 (822) 7308138 Jaehoon.shim@feer Hoon Soung, Hankook Ilbo and Korea Times Beijing China (8610) (8610) DeaSoo Correspondent 65326240 65326239

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International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to the DPR Korea: Past, Present and Future May 3­5, 1999

International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to the DPR Korea: Past, Present and Future May 35, 1999