THE Struggle for Sweden's Defence Policy

CSS Analysis in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 138 • July 2013

The struggle for Sweden’s defence policy Sweden is witnessing an intense dispute over the nation’s defence policy. The supreme commander of the Swedish armed forces has warned that they would only be able to defend their country against an aggressor for one week. While the military had strongly realigned itself towards the requirements of foreign deployments, territorial defence is once more becoming an issue due to concerns about Russia’s intentions. Critics doubt whether Sweden would be able to defend itself at all in case of a war. This has given rise to debates over collective defence and mutual assistance – though Sweden still adheres to its status of military non-alignment.

emergency, based on the so-called “assistance clause” in the EU’s Lisbon Treaty (Article 42) and a unilateral statement of solidarity with its neighbour, NATO member Norway.

However, NATO has recently stated pub- licly that its assistance obligation only ap- plies to member states – not to Sweden. This still leaves Sweden with the EU assistance clause, but in view of the current erosion in the EU’s security and defence policy due to the financial crisis, this is cold comfort. For Sweden would rather rely on NATO than on the EU in the case of a war.

M. Carlsson / Försvarsmakten Cold War “neutrality” During NATO’s “Cold Response 2010” exercise, Norwegian tanks roll across the border into Sweden. After the Second World War, Sweden had the world’s fourth-largest air force and On 29 March 2013 at 2 a.m., as part of Danish fighters to take off from Lithuania. was able to mobilise up to 850,000 troops a military exercise, Russian long-range A few weeks later, when the incident be- during the Cold War. Tanks, fighter jets, and bombers and fighter jets in the Baltic un- came public, Swedish politicians lamented submarines developed by Sweden’s own expectedly began simulated attacks on the lack of combat readiness in the armed arms industry reinforced the credibility of Stockholm and military targets in south- forces. the country’s armed neutrality. Defence ern Sweden. Instead of their usual route, against all comers was the official stra which would have taken them from Since the resurgence of Russian great- tegy during the East-West conflict. The St. Petersburg via the Gulf of Finland and power ambitions under President Vladimir country’s well-equipped mass army was across the Baltic down to the Russian ex- Putin (cf. CSS Analysis No. 136 ), Sweden to deter and, if necessary, repel enemies clave of Kaliningrad, the six aircraft stayed is taking its traditional territorial defence from all points of the compass. Neutrality on course towards the island of Gotska seriously once more. The Swedish govern- was regarded as part of the national iden- Sandön, 40km north of the island of Got- ment has openly acknowledged that the tity. Strong territorial defence was comple- land (see map). The Swedish air force was country would now be unable to defend mented by an active neutral foreign policy unable to react to the Russian provocation. itself against a military attack on its own. aimed at reducing tension between the Although a state of permanent readiness Sweden, an EU member, has incrementally two military blocs of NATO and the War- was theoretically in force, no Gripen jets moved away from its official non-aligned saw Pact. As part of the UN, the country were available to intercept the foreign air- status in the past ten years. Since 2009, was also engaged militarily far from home. craft heading towards Swedish airspace. Sweden has relied on the EU and NATO From 1948 to 1991, Sweden supplied 12 per NATO, on the other hand, ordered two providing assistance in case of a military cent of all UN peacekeeping troops.

both NATO and the EU, stabilizing Swe- Russian military exercise against Sweden, Good Friday, 29 March 2013 den’s geopolitical environment.

“Enemy from the East” However, in recent years, political and military circles in Sweden have increasingly criticised the alignment of the armed forces towards international operations as lop- sided. After the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, a gentle change of course in defence policy was introduced. Concerns also arose in Sweden over an increase of Russian military operations in the Nordic- Baltic region, such as the resumption of strategic bomber patrols over the Arctic, cyber-attacks against Estonia (though Rus- sia’s alleged authorship of these attacks was never proven), military operations us- ing scenarios directed against the Baltic, Beginning in 1948, the official policy of Sweden supplied 1,500 troops to the EU and ambitions in the resource-rich Arctic. neutrality was complemented by secret Rapid Reaction Force and 1,100 troops to Sweden was also taken aback by the in- agreements with the US and the UK on the Nordic Battlegroup. Sweden was able creasing Russian defence budget and the military cooperation with NATO in the case to internationalise its security policy be- modernisation of the Russian armed forc- of a Soviet attack on Sweden. These prepa- cause the EU specialised in overseas crisis es. The matter of whether Sweden was be- rations for war in coordination with NATO management and not on collective de- ing defended at the Hindu Kush (against were highly classified during the Cold War fence with mutual security guarantees, al-Qaida) or on the Baltic island of Gotland and were only discussed in public after its which at the time was still a delicate and (against Russia) became a matter of grow- end. Today, it is certain that from 1948 on- sensitive topic for Sweden. ing urgency. The old adage of the “enemy wards, Sweden undertook concrete prepa- from the East” gained renewed currency. In rations for cooperating with NATO. Military Since 1994, Sweden has also been an ac- March 2009, a Swedish white paper for the runways were extended to be able to active member of the NATO initiative “Part- first time assessed the protection of Swe- commodate NATO bombers; a dedicated nership for Peace” (PfP). In NATO exercises den’s territorial integrity as being of equal telex line from Sweden to the NATO air and overseas operations from Kosovo to importance as participation in global crisis force command in Wiesbaden, Germany the Hindu Kush, the Swedish armed forces management operations. was established; plans were elaborated for have gained experience operating togeth- joint airspace monitoring together with er with other armies. In doing so, Sweden In December 2012, Sverker Göransson, NATO members Norway and Denmark; gained the respect of the international the supreme commander of the Swedish and in case of a war, high-ranking Swedish community and is regularly praised by the armed forces, added fuel to the fire when officials were to be embedded inO NAT US and NATO for the ef- he stated in an inter- command staffs. fective transformation In the Libyan war of 2011, view that, should the of its armed forces and Sweden was responsible country be attacked, Sweden, the EU, and NATO its modern professional for 25 per cent of NATO’s his army would only be With the end of the Cold War, Sweden’s army. In the Libyan war airborne surveillance. able to defend it for one strategic calculation changed fundamen- of 2011, the Swedish week. After that point, tally. The danger of a direct attack on Swe- Air Force was responsible for about 25 per Sweden would have to rely on help from den was strongly diminished. The coun- cent of NATO’s airborne surveillance. other countries. His alarmist statement try’s Russia-centred foreign policy was was taken up gratefully by the co-govern- now realigned more globally. In 1995, Swe- The Swedish armed forces shifted the ing parties – the Liberals, the Christian den joined the EU for economic reasons. focus of their operations away from na- Democrats, and the Centre Party. They de- In doing so, the country became part of a tional defence towards crisis management manded an increase of the military budget political security community. After the Ko- operations between 1995 and 2009. De- and an increased emphasis on territo- sovo war of 1999, the EU states reaffirmed fence installations were shut down, based rial defence. A study by the Swedish Royal their determination to become a strategic closed, and units amalgamated. These Academy of War Sciences later confirmed actor in security policy and to build a ca- reforms were completed in 2010 with the shortcomings in defence capabilities: The pability for joint military response in crisis abolition of conscription and a downsizing army lacked mid-range air and missile de- situations. Sweden reduced its neutrality of the army to 50,000 soldiers. While dur- fence systems, the air force needed long- to the core of military non-aligned status. ing the Cold War, the military budget ac- range air-to-ground missiles, and the navy From 2003 onwards, Sweden participated counted for 3.1 per cent of GDP, that share required air defence systems. actively in EU overseas military missions has declined to 1.2 per cent today. Sweden in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the benefited from the peace dividend when The conservative government attempted Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the former Warsaw Pact countries of Cen- to assuage the heated tempers. Prime Georgia. tral Europe and the Baltic states joined Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt emphasised

that no Russian attack on Sweden was Military expenditures 1988 – 2012 EU Assistance Clause (Art. 42) to be expected, and that his government had to take not just defence policy, but One of the most important novel features also education and health policy into ac- of the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into count. Foreign Minister Carl Bildt added force on 1 December 2009, is a specific assistance clause patterned on Article V that while Russia was currently upgrading of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 42 (7) its armaments and modernising its armed of the Lisbon Treaty states: “If a Member forces, there was no comparison to the So- State is the victim of armed aggression on viet era. The current political fault lines in its territory, the other Member States shall Sweden are remarkable: The pacifist Social have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, Democrats, currently in the opposition, are in accordance with Article 51 of the United much more vociferous in their advocacy of Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice strong defence than the traditionally pro- the specific character of the security and military conservatives, who have been the defence policy of certain Member States.” The phrase “specific character” refers to the leading party in government since 2006. military non-aligned status of EU states such as Sweden, Finland, or Austria. The current debate in Sweden is taking place against the background of an overall strategic macro-situation that has been Sweden at the end of 2012, NATO Secretary undergoing transformation in the past General Anders Fogh Rasmussen made five years. In Europe, the financial and clear that the guarantee of assistance debt crisis since 2007 has also perceptibly in case of a military attack under Article slowed down the dynamics of EU security V only applied to NATO members, not to and defence policy. As a result of the crisis, UN peace support operations be increased. countries outside of the alliance. Norwe- governments of EU member states are try- Secondly, it advocated a strengthening of gian Defence Minister Anne-Grete Strøm- ing to save as much as possible on military the EU’s Common Security and Defence Erichsen also declared in February 2013 expenditures. At the same time, the US is Policy (CSDP). Third, it called for an expan- that Norway had neither the capability nor reducing its military presence in Europe sion of the Nordic Defence Cooperation the intention to assist Sweden in case of and increasingly turning its attention to- (NORDEFCO) with Norway, Finland, Den- an attack. wards the Pacific. They expect the Europe- mark, and Iceland, which had been insti- ans to take on a greater share of the bur- tutionalised in 2009. In 2014, Sweden and These unmistakable statements constitut- den within NATO. Globally, after a decade Finland are to assist in monitoring Ice- ed severe setbacks for the Swedish “policy of war in Afghanistan, land’s airspace for four of solidarity”. The country had tried during NATO is changing from Collective defence is the months to relieve NATO the past decade to compensate for the de- an alliance of world- only sensible option member Norway. Since ficiencies of its non-aligned policy through wide military interven- against a superior enemy 2009, the Scandinavi- statements of solidarity and concrete con- tion into a regional for a small country. ans have been trying to tributions. In a unilateral statement of defence alliance, with achieve cost-efficiency solidarity in a white paper of 2009, Swe- Russia becoming an increasingly impor- in the arms sector through NORDEFCO as den promised to provide assistance to any tant factor. As a result, Sweden’s strategic well. However, for Norway and Denmark EU partner as well as Norway or Iceland in focus is also shifting towards the Baltic – and ultimately also for Sweden – hav- the case of military attack. In return, Stock- and its more proximate surroundings. ing the US on board in NATO is more im- holm expected the EU as well as Norway portant than Nordic cooperation. Fourth, and Iceland (i.e., NATO) to also support Who will help Sweden? cooperation with NATO is to be intensified, Sweden in case of an attack. At the end of May 2013, a cross-party par- especially in the area of regional military liamentary defence commission issued a exercises. In 2013, the issue of NATO ac- The origins of Sweden’s policy of solidar- statement on the controversy over defence cession was once again broached by the ity are to be found in the terrorist attacks policy. In a 200-page report, it recommend- Liberals, the fourth-largest party in parlia- in Madrid in 2004. At the time, the EU ed that the international cooperation strat- ment. While 50 per cent of Swedes reject- responded with a statement affirming egy of the past 20 years be upheld and even ed NATO membership in 2011, that number solidarity among members in case of ter- expanded. The report states unambiguous- had declined to just 32 per cent by the be- rorist attacks or natural disasters. Stock- ly: “Sweden is not alone. Security is achieved ginning of 2013, with 29 per cent in favour holm initially regarded this as a political through solidarity.” The commission thus and more than one third of respondents statement. In 2007, Sweden extended its clearly rejected the return to autonomous undecided. applicability to Norway and Iceland. In the national defence as demanded by individu- following year, the reference to terrorism al military officers and politicians. Solidarity, not neutrality was omitted; the defence policy report for In the matter of whether Sweden was able 2008 now stated: “Sweden may contrib- The commission praised Sweden’s broad at all to defend itself against a Russian ute military assistance in case of disasters range of security policy options that from invasion, Defence Minister Karin Enström or conflict situations.” In the same year, 1994 onwards had replaced secret military emphasised that the country could rely the Russian invasion in Georgia reinforced cooperation with NATO during the Cold on its EU partners and Norway in case of Sweden’s desire for a military guarantee in War. First of all, the report demanded that an emergency. However, during a visit to case of war. After the Swedish parliament

had ratified the Lisbon Treaty including ever, Sweden’s policy of solidarity has lost then once more be crucial issues of secu- its new mutual assistance clause (Art. 42) credibility in recent months. Without NATO rity policy debates in Sweden. in November 2008 (cf. info box), the gov- membership, Sweden cannot be certain of ernment in Stockholm declared in March the alliance’s military support in wartime 2009 that under the new policy of solidar- – however, NATO membership is a far dis- Author: Christian Nuenlist ity, in practical terms, the Swedish armed tant prospect. For the time being, though, [email protected] forces had to be able both to receive and the EU’s mutual assistance clause is a pa- responsible editor: Daniel Trachsler extend military assistance. per tiger, since CSDP is geared towards [email protected] crisis management, not collective defence. Collective defence in practice The recently published defence report for Translated from German: Today, Sweden openly discusses its reli- 2013 constitutes an important basis for Christopher Findlay ance on foreign military assistance in case the next Swedish white paper in 2015 and german and French versions / of national defence. In case of war, the thus for Sweden’s defence policy from 2015 other CSS Analyses / mailinglist: country would rely on the military solidar- to 2018. The perception of Russian inten- www.css.ethz.ch/cssanalysen ity of its EU partners and hope for support tions and the question of credible national from Norway and NATO. From Stockholm’s defence or reliable collective defence will iSSN: 2296-0244 point of view, collective defence is the only sensible option against a superior enemy for a small country, which is why Sweden Previous issues entered into secret agreement with NATO from as early as 1948 onwards. 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