Africa Programme Summary

Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration

Speaker: Martin Kobler

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) Chair: Alex Vines

Director, Area Studies and International Law; Head, Africa Programme, Chatham House

13 June 2014

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2 Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration

Introduction

This document provides a summary of a meeting and questions-and-answers session held at Chatham House on 13 June 2014 on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)’s recent developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The speaker discussed MONUSCO’s military achievements in , where it has defeated the (M23) and is helping establish state authority in the region. The re-establishment of state services here is of great importance for ensuring the sustainability of these achievements, as is regional cooperation and investment in the region’s validated mines. MONUSCO is aiding the government increase its civilian presence in North Kivu, as well as reconfiguring its own mission so that the majority of its civilian personnel are based in eastern DRC. A further recent development in the east of the country is the voluntary disarmament of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of (FDLR) ex-combatants. Although the FDLR does not recognize MONUSCO’s role in the process, the mission is facilitating the troops’ surrender. The speaker also discussed the recent border clashes with Rwanda and highlighted the difficulties he faces in lobbying neighbouring governments to support MONUSCO. Additionally, MONUSCO has a role to play in aiding the elections, but it will not participate in these without adequate time and money. MONUSCO is not a permanent mission, so the responsibility of stabilization lies with the government, and without state buy-in these positive changes will not last.

The meeting was held on the record. The following summary is intended to serve as an aide-mémoire for those who took part and to provide a general summary of discussions for those who did not.

For more information, including recordings, transcripts, summaries, and further resources on this and other related topic, please visit www.chathamhouse.org/research/africa.

Martin Kobler

The speaker began by discussing how he inherited three new elements that could be used in the fight against M23 on his arrival in the DRC in June 2013. These were the result of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098. The first of these was the creation of the intervention brigade. The speaker explained how the intervention brigade was designed to ‘offensively neutralize all armed troops,’ and this has changed the face of peacekeeping by providing the mission with a far more robust mandate. The speaker described how the establishment of the intervention brigade was met with a variety of expectations, with some viewing it simply as a deterrence measure that should not be used, while others expected that it could help end the cycle of violence in the country. The second new element was the Addis Ababa agreement that was signed in February 2013 by all 11 states of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), as well as four guarantors from the ICGLR, SADC, the African Union and the UN. The speaker explained that the signing of this agreement, as well as the nomination of Mary Robinson to oversee its implementation, had signalled an important change. The third element was the enhancement of international cohesion, and there are now five special envoys appointed to the Great Lakes region from the UN, the AU, the European Union and the United States. The speaker stated that this was a big opportunity, and the five envoys are in frequent communication so as to coordinate policies, with each individual bringing a different value and approach to discussions. These three elements have allowed for significant achievements in the DRC over a short period of time.

Martin Kobler examined MONUSCO’s military successes in North Kivu. He highlighted how was practically inaccessible in August 2013, and state authority did not exist in North Kivu a few kilometres outside of Goma. The challenge MONUSCO faced was how to end the dominance of the M23, particularly 3 Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration

in the border area with and Rwanda, and M23’s attack on Goma provided MONUSCO with a reason to fight the group, given the mission’s new mandate. By the end of November, M23 was militarily defeated and this was followed by the Nairobi declaration. The speaker acknowledged that implementation of the declaration was still lacking and M23 ex-combatants must be re-integrated into the DRC from Rwanda and Uganda. State authority in North Kivu had expanded greatly by December 2013, and the road from Butembo to Goma was secured. By May 2014, the area under the control of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) was reduced and access to Uganda was open. The speaker noted that this was all accomplished within half a year. Following the defeat of the M23, MONUSCO, together with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), fought against the ADF in the north, but the areas under the control of the FDLR remained untouched, and he acknowledged that MONUSCO still had to resolve this problem. He highlighted how Rwanda was pushing for the elimination of the FDLR. However, the FDLR began a process of voluntary disarmament in North and the previous month, and a total of 188 ex-combatants have surrendered. This process was initiated by the Congolese government. The speaker noted that the FDLR was surrendering to SADC, not MONUSCO. It remains uncertain as to how to proceed with the surrendered ex-combatants, and he clarified that this decision has to be taken in cooperation with the international community. The speaker described how there had been pressure on MONUSCO to take unilateral military action, but he stated that this would be a military and political risk. He clarified that the voluntary process should be given a chance, but stressed that results had to be seen in days, not weeks or months. An evaluation of the process will take place at the end of the month. He detailed that the process should not be delayed, as it was important for MONUSCO to indicate its commitment to Rwanda in removing the FDLR troops.

Despite these military successes, Martin Kobler emphasized that none of the military actions would be sustainable if not accompanied by civilian activities so as to restore state authority in the region. Although the M23’s parallel administration collected taxes, this money was used to purchase weapons rather than invest in public services. This means that security and public services, such as the judiciary, education and health systems, need to be developed in the region. Given the weak nature of the state, this is an enormous challenge. MONUSCO has aided the restitution of state authority in North Kivu by placing UN personnel in islands of stability, as well as helped facilitate the return of the government and basic services. The mission itself is also being reconfigured, and MONUSCO aims to transfer 75 per cent of its civilian personnel from to the east of the country so as to align its civilian development activities with its military ones. Staff involved in operational assistance programmes such as child protection, civil affairs and human rights are to be based in Goma. While the transfer of the civilian staff would be a big burden on the mission, the speaker stressed that MONUSCO’s military action would not be durable or sustainable if it is not complemented by civilian actions. State decisions are all made in Kinshasa, though, so the six frameworks of the Addis Ababa agreement, which include elections, security sector reform (SSR), decentralization and financial reforms, have to be followed up in Kinshasa. The speaker explained that MONUSCO faced a number of issues in combining its peacekeeping operations with the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement. This is particularly true of SSR, as the government consider foreigner’ involvement an infringement of their national sovereignty.

MONUSCO also has regional priorities, and the speaker emphasized that the situation in the east would not be sustainable, even with military action and a proactive civilian approach, unless there was cooperation from the neighbouring states. It is important for MONUSCO to not be isolated in the region, and the speaker explained that he travelled to Rwanda and Uganda regularly so as to brief the neighbouring governments on the mission’s activities and lobby the governments for a regional integration approach. The speaker indicated that neighbouring countries tended to view MONUSCO as complicit with the Congolese government, and he explained how he attempted to convince them of 4 Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration

MONUSCO’s honest intentions. He emphasized that he was only complicit with the mission’s mandate and the UN Security Council resolutions.

The speaker concluded by discussing the DRC’s economy, which needs developing. He indicated that the official state budget of $8.3 million was insufficient for a country its size and population of 75 million people. He stated that he did not predict any dramatic rise in state budget, nor did he believe that the development community would be able to deliver dramatic results. Instead, the country must be opened to foreign investment, in particular in the mining sector. While mines do not fall under MONUSCO’s mandate, the speaker explained that the existence of armed groups in the east was closely interrelated to the mining industry. Mining, alongside the absence of state authority, is one of the root causes of the conflict, so MONUSCO viewed this as a crucial issue, and the speaker described how he pushed for the traceability of minerals and the validation of mines. This required the removal of the FARDC from the mines, as well as the monitoring of working conditions. Sixty mines have already been validated, and this number will grow as more areas are liberated. The speaker described the importance of interesting Congolese and international private actors in investing in this sector, as this would help increase the DRC’s prosperity. The development of the economy also has regional components, and the speaker highlighted the importance of integrating into the regional economy, so as to trade Congolese goods in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.

Summary of questions and answers

Question

What progress has been made in the disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) of smaller armed groups, and is there any progress towards a national DDR plan and sufficient financing for this?

Martin Kobler

The speaker described how around 3,500 ex-combatants from smaller armed groups assembled in a camp near Goma following the fall of the M23. He explained that there was a lot of uncertainty as to what to do with them. A third national plan of DDR was developed, but there was no consensus within the international community for financing. The speaker detailed how he established a coordination feature called DESS, which combined DDR, elections, stabilization and security sector reform, and he pushed for the coordination of financing from the international community. He stated that he was not successful in rallying the international community fast enough and 400 of the ex-combatants returned to the bush in the first few months because there were no immediate tangible benefits to their surrender. The speaker stressed the importance of moving quickly when conducting DDR. The World Bank was tasked with the DDR plan, but only finalized about five months later. Coordinating DDR involves obtaining donor financing, discussing this with the minister of defense, finding somewhere for the ex-combatants to stay, as well as something for them to do, and then reintegrating them into society. The speaker specified that this was a difficult process, but the World Bank would be ready soon, and then the final session with the minister of defense could take place and the reintegration process for the ex-combatants could be started.

Questions

How many members of FDLR are there, and what would be considered a good target for the process of voluntary surrender to avoid military action?

Will stability be possible without state buy-in? 5 Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration

Could the speaker comment on the recent border clashes?

Could the speaker comment on the relations with Rwanda, especially in light of the border clashes?

The last military operations against the FDLR resulted in a significant number of abuses against civilians. How will these be avoided should the demobilization process not result in significant numbers?

The last elections set the DRC back dramatically, so how can this be avoided in the next elections, especially given the strong push back from President Kabange?

Martin Kobler

The speaker stated that he was uncertain how many FDLR would have surrendered by the end of the month. MONUSCO was being pushed to undertake military action, and he agreed that military actions would remain an option should the voluntary disarmament not succeed. However, he explained that this issue should be examined within the context of past events. He highlighted a report that was published at the end of 2009, following military action by MONUSCO, the FARDC and Rwanda, which described how there had been 1,000 surrenders, 1,400 civilian deaths, 800 rapes and 800 houses burnt down. He stressed that these could only be avoided if military action took place jointly with the government, as MONUSCO alone could not prevent civilian revenge acts and maintain peace throughout the region. Although MONUSCO is legally allowed to take unilateral military action according to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, the speaker clarified that he would only participate in military action in conjunction with the Congolese army. He noted that he could not provide an answer as to how many FDLR troops must have surrendered by the end of the month so as to avoid military action, as this would have to be discussed with the other stakeholders. He stated that President Kabila’s stance was very clear – he wishes to give the process of voluntary disarmament a chance, but keeps the option of military action open should the time frame not be met.

The Rwandan border clash is a very complex issue. MONUSCO has always had a problematic relationship with the neighboring states, which mistrust the mission and view it as complicit with the Congolese government. MONUSCO’s mandate is very clear though – it is tasked with protecting civilians and removing the armed forces. The speaker explained that he visited Kigale regularly to lobby for improved relations and to convince the government of the mission’s honest intentions to terminate this conflict. He tried to persuade the Rwandan government that stability in the east of the DRC is preferable to instability and that MONUSCO had no reason to maintain armed groups in the region. He stressed that the border clashes were deplorable. There are disputed lines between the two countries due to poor colonial demarcations, but he emphasized that this issue could be resolved by fighting. It is especially important that a peaceful solution is established now that the FDLR has begun to voluntarily surrender, as there are many spoilers who wish to fill the vacuum. The clashes have subsided, but it is clear that the dispute needs to be handled carefully and all parties must remain calm.

Martin Kobler indicated that MONUSCO had no wish to repeat the trauma of the last elections and he stressed that he would not engage the mission in an exercise like the 2011 elections simply because there is pressure on MONUSCO. He explained that MONUSCO had three tasks for the elections. The first of these is technical assistance, for which there will be a United Nations Development Programme project. However, there has been little progress here because the necessary political conditions are lacking, such as the budget and electoral calendar. The donor community will not give money without these. The second area of MONUSCO’s involvement is logistics, and this particular area proved highly problematic in the last elections, as the mission was given three weeks in which to organize them. The speaker stated that 6 Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration

at least eight months were necessary for organizing elections, as well as sufficient money. The third area of MONUSCO’s involvement is the good offices, and with these three tasks MONUSCO helps to facilitate the political decisions that need to be made regarding the elections. These decisions, such as whether there will be direct or indirect provisional elections, are to be made by the Congolese. However, he noted that the international community insisted on the whole election cycle taking place in the lead up to 2016.

Stabilization will not be possible without state buy-in. MONUSCO is not in the position to stabilize the country itself, and the speaker clarified that the mission was more interested in progress than stabilization. He noted that stabilization was necessary for the protection of civilians and the economic programs, but while there was a lot of expectation that MONUSCO would provide this, he stressed that this was primarily the government’s responsibility. MONUSCO’s role is purely to assist the government in this. Additionally, he highlighted how MONUSCO was anticipating an end to its deployment. MONUSCO will have been present in the DRC for 15 years in November, and there is pressure for it to leave. The Congolese government has also stated that the mission must withdraw. While the withdrawal will probably not take place before the next elections, the UN secretary-general will have to produce an exit strategy for MONUSCO by the end of the year. The speaker emphasized that MONUSCO’s presence in the DRC must be seen as an exception.

Question

Is the government interested in providing stability?

Martin Kobler

The speaker clarified that the government was interested in improving stability. This, together with an enhanced economic output, brings votes for the elections. The government understands that these improvements are politically good, and the speaker indicated that this was apparent in Kabila’s visits to the liberated areas. The fledgling economic prosperity of the area also increases business prospects. However, this is not an easy task for the state given its weak nature.

Questions

It is clear that much has been achieved in the DRC by outside forces, and little progress would have been made without the UN’s presence. Was it a mistake not to force the Congolese government to revisit the peace agreements, instead of using military action against the M23? The Rwandans want the defeat of the FDLR and the repatriation of the ex-combatants to Rwanda, so is Rwanda content with MONUSCO revisiting the 2009 agreements now?

Is MOUNSCO going to maintain its presence to protect against the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), given its limited funds and the considerably reduced threat of the LRA?

What does the Congolese government actually want to achieve, given that it appears to be a stumbling block when dealing with FDLR, the economy, the elections and attempts to establish a state authority?

Research shows that extortion and human rights violations in the mining areas by the FARDC continue to be a big problem, undermining sustainable economic growth and the development of a clean trade. What can MONUSCO do regarding the government’s reluctance to confront the problematic role of FARDC in the mining sector? 7 Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration

In light of the difficulties with the government’s security sector reform will MONUSCO consider using any of the recommendations in UNSC Resolution 2136?

The Rwandan government is concerned about a number of the issues that have been raised. First, the FDLR’s surrender to SADC was a departure from the process that had been agreed upon in the ICGLR and the Luanda discussions. This was a unilateral decision, which took place without Rwandan being informed. The Rwandan government views this as an abrogation of the UN’s agreement, as it was originally agreed that the FDLR would surrender to MONUSCO. The FDLR forces are Rwandese who should be returning to the country, and Rwanda has no relationship with SADC. There is nothing new about the surrender and repatriation of the FDLR, and Rwanda has always welcomed this process and taken in thousands of ex-combatants, so why has this process changed? Second, could the speaker clarify why MONUSCO is engaging the FDLR in a process of surrender when the mission’s mandate is to eliminate the armed groups as it did with M23? While 188 ex-combatants may have surrendered, Rwanda estimates that there are 4,000 FDLR troops in the DRC, so what is MONUSCO’s strategy for the remaining troops? Last, Rwanda is uncomfortable with the suggestion that the recent clashes took place in a disputed area. These took place on Rwandan territory. The Rwandan government also has evidence, including IDs, that proves that the individuals who participated in the clashes were FDLR forces wearing FARDC uniforms.

Martin Kobler

The speaker described how the expanded joint verification mechanism (EJVM) had played a constructive role in dealing with the border clashes. The EJVM was activated on the first day of the fighting, and the mechanism is now investigating the incident. If the Rwandan government possesses IDs that prove that the fighters were FDLR, this can form part of the EVJM’s investigations. It is up to the EJVM to determine the veracity of these theories. The speaker stated that the mechanism was a good confidence building measure and explained that Rwanda, the DRC and MONUSCO are all members. He highlighted how MONUSCO’s membership of the EJVM was positive as it allowed the mission to initiate the mechanism, which could then be approved by the member states.

The speaker clarified that he understood Rwanda’s concerns regarding SADC’s involvement, but he emphasized that MONUSCO did not initiate SADC’s involvement. He explained that the FDLR did not actually accept MONUSCO’s role in the process, and wrote letters detailing their voluntary disarmament to all stakeholders except MONUSCO. MONUSCO retained a role in the process because it was the only actor with the necessary infrastructure and capability to provide the ex-combatants with accommodation, food, water and transport. The speaker specified that the EJVM was also involved, and as a member Rwanda had the opportunity to visit the assembly points, however Rwanda opted not to engage in the EJVM.

Comment

The Rwandan government wants members of the FDLR to return to Rwanda, and it has taken back more of the ex-combatants than are left in the DRC. However, the government is interested in maintaining due process and using regional initiatives, and wants the agreed upon process to be followed. Rwanda will not accept the surrender and repatriation of the FDLR to SADC, because it does not recognize SADC as part of this process. Rwanda will only engage if the FDLR come through the UN system as was originally agreed. 8 Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration

Martin Kobler

The speaker stated that the ex-combatants would come through the UN system, but the FDLR currently did not recognize this process. He clarified that the FDLR did not even view this as a surrender or DDR process, rather a voluntary disarmament. He expressed his appreciation that Rwanda had taken in 16,000 ex-combatants and highlighted how the government had dealt with them impressively. The speaker clarified that MONUSCO differed on the number of the FDLR in the DRC, believing there to only be 2,000 combatants. He explained that ten members of the FDLR would also have to go to the international courts, including its leader Sylvestre Mudacumura. The speaker stressed that while he understood SADC’s involvement complicated the process, this was not MONUSCO’s decision. However, a process is now in place, and a delegation from SADC is involved.

Comment

There was no SADC delegation. There was one individual who was a member of MONUSCO and originated from SADC.

Martin Kobler

There was a SADC delegation of three officials, including the SADC director of peace and security and a Namibian colonel. The delegation was sent to witness the voluntary surrender and MONUSCO transported the delegation to the surrender ceremony in South Kivu. This was separate from the Tanzanian representative in the EJVM in North Kivu who noted that he was also from SADC as a Tanzanian.

The speaker indicated his awareness of the claims of double standards in the treatment of the M23 and the FDLR. However, he explained that the situation involving the M23 was completely different. The M23 used mortars to attack Goma, a city of one million inhabitants, and killed eight people. M23’s military defeat followed the group attacking Bunagana and killing a further eight individuals. MONUSCO decided to ignore the calls for the peace talks in the process to continue and used the intervention brigade to attack the M23. MONUSCO took the position that while the Kampala process was positive and voluntary surrenders were welcome, it was not acceptable for M23 to attack cities like Bunanga and Goma. A similar situation has not taken place with the FDLR. The speaker stated that he understood the impatience of Rwanda, and clarified that he too was impatient. He stressed that MONUSCO had no hidden agenda, wished to have peace and stability in the region, and wanted to see the end of the armed groups.

The speaker stated that MONUSCO would maintain its presence to protect against the LRA, and he noted that the mission was in contact with the United States in Dungu.

Many of the processes in the DRC have been shaped by outsiders, and he indicated that this has lead to a lack of real government ownership. He highlighted the example of the Addis Ababa agreement, through which a system with benchmarks, indicators and matrixes has been established. The speaker stated that these concepts were difficult for the Congolese to understand because these words do not even exist in Lingala and Swahili. He emphasized the importance of using words that are translatable to the local language for developing a sense of national ownership, and he stressed the need to adapt more to the local context and act with greater respect for the Congolese and their priorities. Decisions should be made in partnership with the Congolese, and he suggested that this requirement was also apparent in Rwanda’s concerns with SADC’s new involvement in the process of voluntary disarmament. He stressed that all 9 Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration

stakeholders must be incorporated when determining such policies. Additionally, he detailed how a conference on the DRC had never been held in Kinshasa. This has led to a sense of a lack of agency on behalf of the Congolese, with decisions always made by outsiders.

The speaker clarified that the Congolese government was not a stumbling block. He recognized that there were difficulties, and explained that the government felt that many decisions are imposed on it. He acknowledged that the government sometimes had different priorities to MONUSCO, and he gave the example of the government’s wish to fight the ADF before the FDLR, in contrast to MONUSCO’s belief that the FDLR had to be dealt with first. He stated that respect for the Congolese was important and stressed that the government was not an obstacle. There is a great sense of cooperation and a genuine interest in bringing about changes.

The FARDC’s involvement in mining is a concern, and there are also problems with the FDLR and other armed groups’ complicity in the extraction of natural resources such as gold, charcoal and timber as well as illegal fishing. The speaker described how there were high levels of corruption in the country, and he highlighted the DRC’s position at the bottom of the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, followed only by Somalia. He stressed that this was not satisfactory and he indicated that MONUSCO would like to see a lot of improvements take place.

SSR is a difficult issue, and the Congolese government considers this to be part of their internal jurisdiction. There has been some positive progress in certain sectors’ reform, such as the judicial, and the speaker noted that police reform is going particularly well, with transparent plans established for it. However, army reform is proving very problematic. While the UN Security Council resolutions are good, the speaker explained that SSR reforms could not be enforced, and these issues required constant pushing. MONUSCO has pushed for the creation of a rapid reaction force, and he indicated that this should be implemented as soon as possible in order to phase out the intervention brigade.

Comment

The process of the FDLR’s voluntary disarmament should be given a chance. The DRC government wants help from the international community in ending the illegal exploitation of the DRC’s mineral resources, which is the root cause of the war in eastern DRC, as well as in ending the DRC’s conflict with its neighbors. The government’s priorities are firstly peace, then development. It is focusing on the future development of the country and the welfare of its people.

Martin Kobler

The speaker described how discussions were always FDLR-centric, as if this was the only problem. However, there are other issues, including the daily rape of women by armed groups in North and South Kivu, prisoners starving, 2.9 million internally displaced persons and problems in the Central African Republic. The speaker acknowledged that the FDLR was important, but these other issues needed to be resolved as well to restore peace and stability in the DRC. MONUSCO’s mandate involves the protection of civilians and the termination of armed groups, as well as building the country for the sake of the Congolese civilians, and the speaker clarified that his prime motivation was to help the people of Congo.