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Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration

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Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration Africa Programme Summary Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration Speaker: Martin Kobler Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) Chair: Alex Vines Director, Area Studies and International Law; Head, Africa Programme, Chatham House 13 June 2014 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and participants do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions. The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. 10 St James’s Square, London SW1Y 4LE T +44 (0)20 7957 5700 F +44 (0)20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org Patron: Her Majesty The Queen Chairman: Stuart Popham QC Director: Dr Robin Niblett Charity Registration Number: 208223 2 Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration Introduction This document provides a summary of a meeting and questions-and-answers session held at Chatham House on 13 June 2014 on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)’s recent developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The speaker discussed MONUSCO’s military achievements in North Kivu, where it has defeated the March 23 Movement (M23) and is helping establish state authority in the region. The re-establishment of state services here is of great importance for ensuring the sustainability of these achievements, as is regional cooperation and investment in the region’s validated mines. MONUSCO is aiding the government increase its civilian presence in North Kivu, as well as reconfiguring its own mission so that the majority of its civilian personnel are based in eastern DRC. A further recent development in the east of the country is the voluntary disarmament of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) ex-combatants. Although the FDLR does not recognize MONUSCO’s role in the process, the mission is facilitating the troops’ surrender. The speaker also discussed the recent border clashes with Rwanda and highlighted the difficulties he faces in lobbying neighbouring governments to support MONUSCO. Additionally, MONUSCO has a role to play in aiding the elections, but it will not participate in these without adequate time and money. MONUSCO is not a permanent mission, so the responsibility of stabilization lies with the government, and without state buy-in these positive changes will not last. The meeting was held on the record. The following summary is intended to serve as an aide-mémoire for those who took part and to provide a general summary of discussions for those who did not. For more information, including recordings, transcripts, summaries, and further resources on this and other related topic, please visit www.chathamhouse.org/research/africa. Martin Kobler The speaker began by discussing how he inherited three new elements that could be used in the fight against M23 on his arrival in the DRC in June 2013. These were the result of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098. The first of these was the creation of the intervention brigade. The speaker explained how the intervention brigade was designed to ‘offensively neutralize all armed troops,’ and this has changed the face of peacekeeping by providing the mission with a far more robust mandate. The speaker described how the establishment of the intervention brigade was met with a variety of expectations, with some viewing it simply as a deterrence measure that should not be used, while others expected that it could help end the cycle of violence in the country. The second new element was the Addis Ababa agreement that was signed in February 2013 by all 11 states of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), as well as four guarantors from the ICGLR, SADC, the African Union and the UN. The speaker explained that the signing of this agreement, as well as the nomination of Mary Robinson to oversee its implementation, had signalled an important change. The third element was the enhancement of international cohesion, and there are now five special envoys appointed to the Great Lakes region from the UN, the AU, the European Union and the United States. The speaker stated that this was a big opportunity, and the five envoys are in frequent communication so as to coordinate policies, with each individual bringing a different value and approach to discussions. These three elements have allowed for significant achievements in the DRC over a short period of time. Martin Kobler examined MONUSCO’s military successes in North Kivu. He highlighted how Goma was practically inaccessible in August 2013, and state authority did not exist in North Kivu a few kilometres outside of Goma. The challenge MONUSCO faced was how to end the dominance of the M23, particularly 3 Stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO Priorities and the Nairobi Declaration in the border area with Uganda and Rwanda, and M23’s attack on Goma provided MONUSCO with a reason to fight the group, given the mission’s new mandate. By the end of November, M23 was militarily defeated and this was followed by the Nairobi declaration. The speaker acknowledged that implementation of the declaration was still lacking and M23 ex-combatants must be re-integrated into the DRC from Rwanda and Uganda. State authority in North Kivu had expanded greatly by December 2013, and the road from Butembo to Goma was secured. By May 2014, the area under the control of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) was reduced and access to Uganda was open. The speaker noted that this was all accomplished within half a year. Following the defeat of the M23, MONUSCO, together with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), fought against the ADF in the north, but the areas under the control of the FDLR remained untouched, and he acknowledged that MONUSCO still had to resolve this problem. He highlighted how Rwanda was pushing for the elimination of the FDLR. However, the FDLR began a process of voluntary disarmament in North and South Kivu the previous month, and a total of 188 ex-combatants have surrendered. This process was initiated by the Congolese government. The speaker noted that the FDLR was surrendering to SADC, not MONUSCO. It remains uncertain as to how to proceed with the surrendered ex-combatants, and he clarified that this decision has to be taken in cooperation with the international community. The speaker described how there had been pressure on MONUSCO to take unilateral military action, but he stated that this would be a military and political risk. He clarified that the voluntary process should be given a chance, but stressed that results had to be seen in days, not weeks or months. An evaluation of the process will take place at the end of the month. He detailed that the process should not be delayed, as it was important for MONUSCO to indicate its commitment to Rwanda in removing the FDLR troops. Despite these military successes, Martin Kobler emphasized that none of the military actions would be sustainable if not accompanied by civilian activities so as to restore state authority in the region. Although the M23’s parallel administration collected taxes, this money was used to purchase weapons rather than invest in public services. This means that security and public services, such as the judiciary, education and health systems, need to be developed in the region. Given the weak nature of the state, this is an enormous challenge. MONUSCO has aided the restitution of state authority in North Kivu by placing UN personnel in islands of stability, as well as helped facilitate the return of the government and basic services. The mission itself is also being reconfigured, and MONUSCO aims to transfer 75 per cent of its civilian personnel from Kinshasa to the east of the country so as to align its civilian development activities with its military ones. Staff involved in operational assistance programmes such as child protection, civil affairs and human rights are to be based in Goma. While the transfer of the civilian staff would be a big burden on the mission, the speaker stressed that MONUSCO’s military action would not be durable or sustainable if it is not complemented by civilian actions. State decisions are all made in Kinshasa, though, so the six frameworks of the Addis Ababa agreement, which include elections, security sector reform (SSR), decentralization and financial reforms, have to be followed up in Kinshasa. The speaker explained that MONUSCO faced a number of issues in combining its peacekeeping operations with the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement. This is particularly true of SSR, as the government consider foreigner’ involvement an infringement of their national sovereignty. MONUSCO also has regional priorities, and the speaker emphasized that the situation in the east would not be sustainable, even with military action and a proactive civilian approach, unless there was cooperation from the neighbouring states. It is important for MONUSCO to not be isolated in the region, and the speaker explained that he travelled to Rwanda and Uganda regularly so as to brief the neighbouring governments on the mission’s activities and lobby the governments for a regional integration approach.
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