Corporate Crisis Management:

Wells Fargo Crisis of 2016

Madison Berube Abstract:

Former Chairman, President and CEO John G. Stumpf wrote an entire handbook used in trainings called the Vision & Value of . In it, he explores each avenue of Wells Fargo’s mission, vision and values that clearly represent the brand’s intent and present a stark contrast between the performance of the corporation during the crisis of

2016. The Corporation faced the reputation crisis that impacted their brand and customer loyalty for future years. In this paper we will survey the Wells Fargo Crisis of

2016, in contrast to the vision and values of Wells Fargo prior to the crisis. Wells Fargo faced lawsuits and underwent settlements, under the belt corporate payoffs and inappropriate hiring and firing. This case study showcases one of the largest corporate giant crises that has faced the modern era. The aftermath of this crisis is being managed continually still today with amendments to their policy, company standards and sales initiatives. Index:

Organizational Profile: Wells Fargo Organization Background Mission/Vision Reputation Details Organizational Setup

Case Overview Synopsis Details of Crisis

Business Crisis & Opportunity Case Significance

Crisis Analysis Research Programming Implementation Evaluation

Final Case Analysis Organizational Public Relations Outcomes Organizational Profile: Wells Fargo

Organizational Background

Corporate giant in banking, Wells Fargo has valued it’s reputation of trust by dealing responsibly with their customers and their money since the 1850’s to accommodate for the economic boom brought on by the California Gold Rush. Back then, banking dealt solely with buying gold and selling paper bank drafts, and Wells Fargo, formerly Fargo & Co., trailblazed the banking industry serving customers rapidly through their current corporate symbol, the infamous . After World War I, Wells Fargo was left with only one bank in San

Francisco and has rebuilt its firm standing in the banking industry since. From the 1960’s to the

1990’s, Wells Fargo grew rapidly to what we know today as the banking giant ranging once again from “sea to sea” and “over the seas”, as well as online.1

Mission & Vision

The vision of Wells Fargo is “to satisfy [their] customers needs and help them succeed financially”. They believe “customers can be better served when they have a relationship with a trusted provider that knows them well, provides reliable guidance, and can serve their full range of financial needs”.2 These values were put into action by their predecessor in the early 1990’s. Since then, Wells Fargo has grown from a re-established “network of small

Midwestern banks, to a national company with a growing global presence”.3 President Stumpf states that Wells Fargo has “become one of the nation’s largest financial institutions, serving one in three U.S. households and employing one in 500 working Americans.”4 Their Brand Promise

1 “The Vision, Values & Goals of Wells Fargo.” Vision, Values & Goals - Wells Fargo, ​ ​ ​ www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/vision-and-values/index. 2 “History of Wells Fargo.” History of Wells Fargo – Wells Fargo, www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/history/. ​ ​ ​ 3 See http://www.damicofcg.com/files/74720/Vision%20%26%20Values.pdf, for footnotes 3-12, pages are noted. ​ ​ ​ 4 P. 25 is this: “We’ll take the time to understand your complete financial picture. Together, we work with you, now and over time, to provide the best information and guidance about the products and services you’ll need to help you reach your financial goals. We sum up our promise in two words: Working together.”5

Reputation Details

Wells Fargo puts the highest emphasis on serving their customers, and states,

“we’ll never put the stagecoach ahead of the horses”, meaning that Wells Fargo is dedicated to putting their customers “at the center of everything [they] do in order to succeed together.6 Wells Fargo puts a high priority on their values and ethics, recognizing that “honesty, trust and integrity are essential for meeting the highest standards of corporate governance.”7 Former CEO, John Stumpf, writes in regards to ​ ​ the values of Wells Fargo that they “should guide every conversation we have, every decision we make, and every interaction we have among our team members and with our customers… We have to earn that trust every day by behaving ethically; rewarding open, honest, two-way communication; and holding ourselves accountable for the decisions we make and actions we take.”8 Each member of the Wells Fargo team is called to be honest, build trust and do what is right for each customer. Their reputation stands on the foundation that the customer comes first, and a leader takes responsibility to put that customer first.

5 P. 25 6 P. 15 7 P. 8 8 P. 15

Organizational Setup & Brand Standards

Wells Fargo is governed by a board of directors and an executive suite that holds majority power in the company. Employees at Wells Fargo total to about 262,000 staff members to date ranging from top executives to account managers across the nation. Wells Fargo is a ​ C-Suite organization. Wells Fargo has “become one of the nation’s largest financial ​ ​ ​ institutions, serving one in three U.S. households and employing one in 500 working

Americans.”9 Wells Fargo relies heavily on their corporate ethics as a foundation for which they run their day to day as well as long term business plans.

Stumpf writes in his Mission & Vision handbook, “if you want to find out how strong a company’s ethics are, don’t listen to what people say, watch what they do.”10 A large part of their corporate social responsibility weighs on the importance of their commitment to their mission of putting the customer first and the ethics behind those values. Wells Fargo reputation as a corporate banking giant is that of unique placement within the industry and revered respect for generations of service. They have recognized that their “customers today, more than ever, need a safe, trustworthy, capable financial advisor”, while “not offering products that fail to serve our customers’ best interests or are inappropriate for their needs and circumstances”.11 Wells Fargo was one of the few banks that survived the global financial crisis of 2008 when the stock market crashed and they needed no public bailout. This left Wells Fargo at the top of their industry with an “economic value [of] almost $40 billion, making Wells Fargo the most-valued U.S.

9 P. 3 10 P. 8 11 P. 41 banking brand and the second most-valued banking brand in the world.”12 Their brand was service, and their service was customer centered excellence. In 2013, shocking revelations were revealed about the corporate giant that led to a tailspin of their company, putting all aspects of their business and brand ethics into question, and contradicting what the world thought was their reputation.

Case Overview

Synopsis

Corporate financial powerhouse Wells Fargo faced major repercussions after an audit found that they had created over two million unauthorized initiatives leading to the ruin of many customers credit and financial standings. After in depth investigations, it was found that the company had fired over five-thousand lower level employees,13 executives had taken hundred million dollar payouts to step down, the CEO had sold shares before the company had its tailspin, leaving the Wells Fargo brand and reputation in turmoil without anyone initially taking responsibility for the crisis.

Details of Crisis

On September 8th 2016, financial powerhouse Wells Fargo was fined at $185 million by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau after an audit found that the company had created over “two million accounts over the course of five years that ​

12 P. 25 13That's exactly what happened to Wells Fargo customers nationwide. “5,300 Wells Fargo Employees Fired over 2 Million Phony Accounts.” CNNMoney, Cable News Network, ​ ​ money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/investing/wells-fargo-created-phony-accounts-bank-fees/index.html. weren’t authorized by consumers.”14 Wells Fargo then “discloses it has fired 5,300 low-level employees (but no senior executives) over a five-year period for engaging in unethical behavior.”15 A few days later on Septem​ber 13th, “the bank announces it is ending its employee sales goals program that led to its workforce’s fraudulent behavior by the end of the year.”16 This program was later called out as the “Going for Gr-eight” ​ initiative program created and implemented by the company’s executives. In Stumpf’s

Mission and Vision handbook, he describes this opportunity as as essential program ​ within good customer relations packages (description below).17

“Our average retail banking household has about six products with us. We ​ want to get to eight . . . and beyond. One of every four already has eight or more.

Four of every 10 have six or more. The average banking household, for example, has about 16 products. Our average wholesale bank relationship has six products with us and our average commercial bank relationship, eight. Our wealth management, brokerage and retirement customers lead the pack with an average of 10 products per customer.”

-Chairman, CEO, President John G. Stumpf ​ ​ After news broke out, the House of Representatives’ Financial Service Committee began investigating Wells Fargo’s regulators and practices with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and federal prosecutors in New York and California. It also came out that former executive

Carrie Tolstedt received a $125 million dollar payout when she stepped down just months before

14November 29, 2016 by Sean Czarnecki. “Timeline of a Crisis: Wells Fargo.” PR Week, ​ ​ www.prweek.com/article/1417005/timeline-crisis-wells-fargo. 15 See footnote 14. 16 See footnote 14. 17P. 25, PDF, See footnote 3. in July of 2016.18 Stumpf then testifies in front of the Senate Banking Committee on September

20th, where Senator Elizabeth Warren did not receive Stumpf’s excused remarks well. The bank actually released statements not admitting to the ethical dilemma but rather emphasizing their sale and profit margins. On September 27th, Stumpf “​forfeits $41 million ​ in unvested equity, ​ in addition to a year-end bonus, as the board continues to investigate the scandal.

Speculation grows that ​the guillotine may fall ​ on his stint as CEO. The media is quick to note h​ ow empty the gesture seems ​ compared to the money Stumpf gained while helming

Wells Fargo.”19 Wells Fargo loses billions in market value during this time, and many people are suspect that Stumpf is being reactionary rather than proactive in addressing this reputation crisis.20 The House of Financial Services Committee say that Stumpf​

“buried key information regarding the scandal from the board.”21 On October 12, Stumpf finally steps down as Chairman and CEO, retiring immediately. Wells Fargo’s Chief

Organizational Officer (COO) Tim Sloan, takes his new and current position as CEO. On

October 14th, it comes out that in the months before the CFPB investigation, Stumpf had sold $61 million of Wells Fargo stock.22 This case of crisis that faced Wells Fargo in

2016 was of massive proportions deeply affecting the reputation of the Wells Fargo brand and was shockingly in contrast to their previously stated vision, mission, and reputation stated by their previous CEO John G. Stumpf.

18“Exec Who Oversaw Wells Fargo Unit That Defrauded Customers Got Huge Payday.” Fortune, ​ ​ fortune.com/2016/09/12/wells-fargo-cfpb-carrie-tolstedt/. 19 See footnote 14.

20 NBC: https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&v=WqxhZ2V87Jo ​ 21 See footnote 14. ​ ​

22Kristof, Kathy. “CEO Sold Millions in Wells Fargo Stock before Fraud Revelations.” CBS News, CBS Interactive, 14 ​ ​ Oct. 2016, www.cbsnews.com/news/wells-fargo-ceo-john-stumpf-sold-millions-in-company-stock-before-bank-fraud-revelation s/.

Business Crisis & Opportunity

Case Importance

This case is important because it leaves crisis communications professionals and brand reputation strategists with an example of what not to do. The issue is that a company that puts the highest emphasis on the consumer with the backing of trust and honesty, did the exact opposite and in the process many innocent Americans were affected. Wells Fargo employees forced to reach their quotes were fired for following their supervisor and ultimately their CEO’s initiative of “Going for Gr-eight”, and used shortcuts to get there.23 The issue reached all the way to the top of the executive leadership ladder, and the company failed to recognize the necessary steps to salvage any form of reputation, and instead fell into a tailspin of brand ruin. This case is significant because not only did it affect so many Americans, but it deepened America’s trust in the financial corporate banking industry. American banks were already privy to their distrust of the American people after the stock market crash and financial crisis of 2008, that Wells Fargo somehow escaped, and now a corporation that was something of a beacon during that crisis was actually a faulty one all along. The public relations industry places extreme value on the importance of ethics such as honesty and trust between the relationship of an organization and their publics, and this massive organization caused major distrust and dishonesty towards their customers, and as a company that publicly was recognized for their emphasis on “customer first”, this crisis came as a major blow of rock bottom proportions to the financial giant of Wells

Fargo as well as the banking industry in corporate America as a whole. It is important for public relations and journalist professionals to prepare for reputation crisis and maintain a story of honesty within that as “federal exterminators who should watch for such pestilence had no ​

23Staff, The Week. “Wells Fargo's Phony-Account Scandal, Explained.” The Week - All You Need to Know about ​ Everything That Matters, The Week, 17 Sept. 2016, ​ theweek.com/articles/649015/wells-fargos-phonyaccount-scandal-explained. idea it was happening.”24 Wells Fargo has been called the “poster child” for “a scandal that [people] can understand”, unlike that of the stock market crash.25 The issues of the case can be explained by the fact that, “every tale of corporate scandal begins with ​ ​ ​ culture—and Wells Fargo’s culture, at least in one prominent segment of the company’s business, made it the kind of place where frontline employees could feel ungoverned and libertine enough to fabricate millions of customer accounts.

It also created an environment where such behavior could be concealed, minimized, and willfully ignored by higher-ups.”26 They had one of the largest identity crisis the world had ever seen.

RPIE Analysis

Research

In terms of what the organization knew and did not know, that is one of the biggest issues of this case. They seemingly were at fault, and the executive board of leadership must have had an understanding of their unethical behavior over the course of the four years before being caught. Their awareness of the issues at hand in order to reach their success was not at

24 Watson, Patrick W. “Wells Fargo Scandal Shows Next Bank Crisis Coming.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 15 Sept. ​ ​ ​ 2016, www.forbes.com/sites/patrickwwatson/2016/09/15/wells-fargo-scandal-shows-next-bank-crisis-coming/#48778f27 53d7.

25 McGee, Suzanne. “Wells Fargo Banking Scandal a Financial Crisis We Can Finally Understand.” The Guardian, ​ ​ ​ Guardian News and Media, 7 Oct. 2016, www.theguardian.com/business/us-money-blog/2016/oct/07/wells-fargo-banking-scandal-financial-crisis.

26 “Inside Wells Fargo's Plan to Fix Its Culture Post-Scandal.” Fortune, ​ ​ ​ fortune.com/2017/06/11/wells-fargo-scandal-culture/. question- they were shamefully displayed as having knowledge of the ethical dilemma. The majority of the research of this case was done externally. Once the case was opened by the LA ​ Times report, the chairman in charge of Risk Committee looked to Wells’ Chief Risk Officer ​ (CRO), “in addressing the sales practice issues and to keep the Risk Committee informed ​ ​ of Corporate Risk’s efforts.”27 The Risk Committee had mentioned the issue to the full board in February 2014, but it was never mentioned in the Executive Summary. HR action plans recommended further monitoring sales tactics; however, adjusting executive compensation was deemed unnecessary. In April 2014, CRO Mike Loughlin,

“reported that sales practices had now become a current focus for the Corporate Risk

Division, and at the August Risk Committee meeting.”28 The head of Community Bank assured that the issues were due to a few bad apples rather than sales practices as a whole. Wells Fargo had done little to none quantitative research, reflecting only on positive numbers, perhaps focusing on the wrong numbers. As the Risk Committee furthered their internal investigation after the LA lawsuit, the board finally received accurate numbers regarding sales integrity violations after asking the Chief Global

Ethics Officer to provide a written report to the A&E Committee, which was delivered in

May 2016. The report indicated that 1,327 Community Bank employees in 2014, and

960 in 2015, were terminated for sales integrity violations.”29 Essentially, they had the ​

27 Smith Jr., Joseph A. and Reiners, Lee, Wells Fargo Unauthorized Account Openings: A Case Study for Bank Board ​ Directors (April 26, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3169565 or ​ ​ http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3169565

28 “Wells Fargo Unauthorized Account Openings: A Case Study for Bank Board Directors.” The FinReg Blog, 20 Apr. ​ ​ ​ 2018, sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2017/04/26/phony-accounts-scandal-a-case-study-for-bank-board-directors/.

29 “Wells Fargo Unauthorized Account Openings: A Case Study for Bank Board Directors.” The FinReg Blog, 20 Apr. ​ ​ ​ 2018, sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2017/04/26/phony-accounts-scandal-a-case-study-for-bank-board-directors/. necessary data, only it was overlooked and discovered too late, after the damage had already been done on a massive scale detonating the company’s reputation altogether.

Quantitative examination of the Risk Committee, sifting through the data and each firing case, led to a greater discovery of where indeed the problem lied. Their lack of quality comprehensive research all of those years ago, on sales practices and keeping a close eye on that, ultimately led to their demise. Executive VP and Head of Corporate

Model Risk, implemented quantitative research to protect Wells Fargo from future crises which include stress tests for employees and nine-quarter “planning horizons” to ensure safety of the financial institution.30

Programming

Wells Fargo had an immediate need of any type of brand recovery that started with their research into the individual issues that created the massive fault in ethics. The business needed to have done this research how they did after the suit, much sooner, and could have prepared or even owned up to a misstep.

Their goal was to keep afloat, by maintaining as much value in their brand as possible, even if solely financial standing. Their objective at first, was to be seen as not a faulty organization, and to point fingers to lower level management issues; however, once the numbers of mass proportions in firing had come out, no one was buying into that theory. If that many employees were having an issue, why? Who was really to blame? Those were questions the world and news cycles were asking, as Wells Fargo

30 https://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb44_keynote.pdf ​ tried to plead the fifth on the matter. The issue with waiting to come out with the full truth, is the risk one takes that more of the truth will come out before you get the chance to be honest and apologize which deepens the lack of trust one will already receive from their publics. Their strategy was in full recovery mode. CEO had his own goals and objectives- to try and remain President of a company to which he gave over 30 years; however, the focus of the company was seemingly to save face on all facets. They were on full defense mode, when they should have taken the appropriate offense response by taking responsibility as a whole for the areas of failure. The tactics fell upon the Risk

Committee to go back and do a full sweep of all suspicious and noted activity within the company for the previous 4 years.

Implementation

The timing of their messages could not have been chosen, or acted upon, more poorly. The organization’s crisis was fully in the public eye due to the lawsuit, and constant media presence as they covered a few news cycles. On September 8, the company released their Statement on Agreements Related to Sales Practices via their newsroom.31 They used this in depth statement to show the public what to expect from the corporation in response to the crisis; however, much of the public felt it placed blame for the crisis on the wrong areas of management and

31 “Wells Fargo, Newsroom.” 2017. Corporate and Financial: Wells Fargo Issues Statements Related Sales ​ https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financial/wells-fargo-issues-statement-agreements-related-s ales leadership. They continued to talk to press over the duration of the next few months.

Wells Fargo spoke directly through their personal Newsroom, and crafted news releases to mediate all of the talk. However, statements were being taken from all media sources.

In fact, headline coverage of Wells Fargo spiked to nearly ten thousand during the heat of the conversation.

Wells Fargo’s primary audience was their customers, as to maintain a “customer first” idealism. However, a close second target audience was shareholders. They reached their primary and secondary audience, because it affected nearly all of them. Their primary audience of the customer seemed to be more focused on reputation management and recovery rather than rebuilding reputation trust. Responsibility and reputation greatly impacted the shareholders of Wells Fargo.

Timothy Coombs distinguishes three different types of crises, with Wells Fargo falling into the category of Intentional Crisis, “where the organization knowingly took ​ inappropriate risk – major reputational threat.”32 Coombs, situational crisis ​ communication theory, builds upon professor William Benoit’s “ image restoration ​ model by identifying a limited set 0f primary crisis response strategies: denial, diminishment and rebuilding.”33 Wells Fargo attempted to use denial by scapegoating the issue by firing and looking where to place blame. There was no way to diminish the implications of this crisis, and rebuilding is a necessary tactic that Wells Fargo has looked to for the past several years post-crisis.

Evaluation

There were plenty of pieces missing in their analysis of the case and how it was relayed to the public; however, it was seemingly a timing issue mostly. The organization released statements; however even as Stumpf stepped down, he was replaced by a predecessor in close allegiance to Stumpf, which brought immediate worry to public trust rebuild. This case was the perfect storm, and once it erupted, there was not much

32 “Situational Crisis Communication Theory, Timothy Coombs (1995).” Infinite Ideas, 14 Jan. 2015, ​ ​ ​ www.infideas.com/top-10-management-models-for-your-business-7-situational-crisis-communication-theory/.

33 See footnote 32. ​ the Risk Communications team could do to get ahead of the story, because they started behind. Former CEO’s untimely responses continued to make the company appear less trustworthy and more guilty of full knowledge and intent in direct contrast to their values and ethical framework. Since, they have amended their company's value and mission statements in a public way. Today, they are rising back to their original trustworthy reputation, as they are seemingly recognizing the importance of transparency and following through with putting customers first and upholding that promise. The implementation had little effect on the campaign as at that point the news cycles were booming with proportionally negative but unfortunately true statements about the organization. Wells Fargo has learned the value of having a plan for crises in place as well as due diligence in quantitative research on all aspects of concern before they get carried away.

Final Case Analysis

Organizational Public Relations Outcomes

I believe there were definitely areas for improvement with how this case was handled. Timing and transparency was definitely an area of concern. Their reputation was fully at steak, trust and loyalty had shattered for a company that promoted the value of customers first. Some key lessons PR professionals can learn that would universally apply to most crisis communications situations, is especially in-house PR, be diligent in your watchful eye of minor incidents, because they can add up. Leadership wise, take ownership and responsibility for the actions of your corporation. Handle it with honesty and transparency that is necessary for crisis situations. The Organizational PR of Wells

Fargo was damaged by this crisis, unavoidably so. However, it is slowly coming back to a more healthy state of reputation, and trust with loyalty from customers. Wells Fargo learned a lesson that can be examined by all corporate communications as a cautionary tale, and the importance that a public relations crisis communications team can have in a situation like this. Even within the corporate world, money's not everything.

Reputation, trust, respect and loyalty from your publics, and aligning with your values and ethical standing, corporate social responsibility, is becoming increasingly important. Wells Fargo is now implementing more to protect themselves against this happening again, and have implemented a more strategic transparency and honesty with their customers and employees than before.

Sources

Wells Fargo Issues Statement on Agreements Related to Sales Practices | Wells Fargo Online Newsroom, ​ newsroom.wf.com/press-release/corporate-and-financial/wells-fargo-issues-statement- agreements-related-sales.

“Exec Who Oversaw Wells Fargo Unit That Defrauded Customers Got Huge Payday.” Fortune, fortune.com/2016/09/12/wells-fargo-cfpb-carrie-tolstedt/. ​

“History of Wells Fargo.” History of Wells Fargo – Wells Fargo, ​ ​ www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/history/. ​

“Inside Wells Fargo's Plan to Fix Its Culture Post-Scandal.” Fortune, ​ ​ fortune.com/2017/06/11/wells-fargo-scandal-culture/.

“Inside Wells Fargo's Plan to Fix Its Culture Post-Scandal.” Fortune, ​ ​ fortune.com/2017/06/11/wells-fargo-scandal-culture/.

Kristof, Kathy. “CEO Sold Millions in Wells Fargo Stock before Fraud Revelations.” CBS ​ News, CBS Interactive, 14 Oct. 2016, ​ www.cbsnews.com/news/wells-fargo-ceo-john-stumpf-sold-millions-in-company-stock -before-bank-fraud-revelations/. ​

McGee, Suzanne. “Wells Fargo Banking Scandal a Financial Crisis We Can Finally Understand.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 7 Oct. 2016, ​ ​ www.theguardian.com/business/us-money-blog/2016/oct/07/wells-fargo-banking-sca ndal-financial-crisis. ​

November 29, 2016 by Sean Czarnecki. “Timeline of a Crisis: Wells Fargo.” PR Week, ​ ​ www.prweek.com/article/1417005/timeline-crisis-wells-fargo. ​

“Situational Crisis Communication Theory, Timothy Coombs (1995).” Infinite Ideas, 14 ​ ​ Jan. 2015, www.infideas.com/top-10-management-models-for-your-business-7-situational-crisis-c ommunication-theory/. ​

“Situational Crisis Communication Theory, Timothy Coombs (1995).” Infinite Ideas, 14 ​ ​ Jan. 2015, www.infideas.com/top-10-management-models-for-your-business-7-situational-crisis-c ommunication-theory/. Staff, The Week. “Wells Fargo's Phony-Account Scandal, Explained.” The Week - All You ​ Need to Know about Everything That Matters, The Week, 17 Sept. 2016, ​ theweek.com/articles/649015/wells-fargos-phonyaccount-scandal-explained.

That's exactly what happened to Wells Fargo customers nationwide. “5,300 Wells Fargo Employees Fired over 2 Million Phony Accounts.” CNNMoney, Cable News Network, ​ ​ money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/investing/wells-fargo-created-phony-accounts-bank-fees /index.html.

“The Vision, Values & Goals of Wells Fargo.” Vision, Values & Goals - Wells Fargo, ​ ​ www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/vision-and-values/index. ​

Watson, Patrick W. “Wells Fargo Scandal Shows Next Bank Crisis Coming.” Forbes, ​ ​ Forbes Magazine, 15 Sept. 2016, www.forbes.com/sites/patrickwwatson/2016/09/15/wells-fargo-scandal-shows-next-ba nk-crisis-coming/#48778f2753d7. ​

“Wells Fargo Unauthorized Account Openings: A Case Study for Bank Board Directors.” The FinReg Blog, 20 Apr. 2018, ​ sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2017/04/26/phony-accounts-scandal-a-case-study-for-ba nk-board-directors/.

Smith Jr., Joseph A. and Reiners, Lee, Wells Fargo Unauthorized Account Openings: A Case Study for Bank Board Directors (April 26, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3169565 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3169565 ​ ​

Extra Research: https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/governance/ https://melissaagnes.com/wells-fargos-crisis-management-fail/ https://glean.info/7-pr-crisis-management-lessons-from-the-wells-fargo-scandal/ http://fortune.com/2016/10/13/wells-fargo-crisis-management-reputation/ https://www.prweek.com/article/1417005/timeline-crisis-wells-fargo https://ideas.darden.virginia.edu/2018/03/communicating-through-a-crisis-wells-fargo-circles-the -wagons/ https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargos-textbook-case-of-how-not-to-handle-a-crisis-14763805 76 https://www.agilitypr.com/pr-news/crisis-communications/wells-fargo-went-wrong-crisis-commun ications-commentary/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/09/29/wells-fargo-hires-washington- crisis-management-specialist-as-congress-scrutinizes-bank/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9e17ac b184ca https://www.dlpr.com/blog_posts/richard-dukas-provides-crisis-communications-strategy-wells-f argo/ https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-ceo-john-stumpf-house-he aring.html https://www.forbes.com/sites/melissaagnes/2016/09/12/wells-fargo-is-not-addressing-the-right-q uestions-within-their-crisis-response/#2b8521242fab https://www.prnewsonline.com/wells-fargo-doing-well-pushing-good-stories-yet-overall-theme-la cking-as-it-counters-crisis/ https://hbr.org/2016/10/the-leadership-blind-spots-at-wells-fargo https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickwwatson/2016/09/15/wells-fargo-scandal-shows-next-bank- crisis-coming/#48778f2753d7 https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/investing/wells-fargo-created-phony-accounts-bank-fees/ind ex.html https://www.theguardian.com/business/us-money-blog/2016/oct/07/wells-fargo-banking-scandal -financial-crisis https://abcnews.go.com/Business/timeline-wells-fargo-accounts-scandal/story?id=42231128 https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=P8w0DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA319&dq=Wells +Fargo+crisis&ots=_a5OgLVF4X&sig=S85uFXmHPfJK0n4Ln51Q-Zf1B0s#v=onepage&q=Wells %20Fargo%20crisis&f=false http://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/detail/detail?vid=1&sid=53231e2a-9b1f-407b-9b9d-55cc83b99d f8%40pdc-v-sessmgr03&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWRzLWxpdmU%3d#AN=119038974&db=buh

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3169565

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957318300421 http://theweek.com/articles/649015/wells-fargos-phonyaccount-scandal-explained https://www.forbes.com/pictures/ejhj45fjij/185-million-in-fines/#1f83d47d6d2a https://finance.yahoo.com/news/every-wells-fargo-consumer-scandal-since-2015-timeline-19494 6222.html