H-Diplo ARTICLE REVIEW 974 10 September 2020

Anders Wivel and Matthew Crandall. “Punching above Their Weight, but Why? Explaining Denmark and Estonia in the Transatlantic Relationship.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 17:3 (2019): 392–419. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-019-00020-2. https://hdiplo.org/to/AR974 Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse | Production Editor: George Fujii

Review by Mari-Liis Sulg, J. Skytte Institute, University of Tartu

nders Wivel and Matthew Crandall examine the cases of the ‘super Atlanticist’ small states Denmark and Estonia. Wivel and Crandall describe super Atlanticist small states as conducting foreign policies that are characterized by A unwavering support for the American world order that goes beyond the policies of their peers and that seek to foster a ‘special relationship’ between the small ally and the U.S. superpower. Thus, they find super Atlanticism to be based on close, intimate cooperation with the United States. The authors raise a central research question that seeks to understand why after becoming transatlantic small states both countries have not chosen to free ride but have instead opted to punch above their weight. In order to understand how the transatlantic foreign policy of these countries varies, Wivel and Crandall build a comparative case by studying both countries` response to the changing constraints in their strategic environments. In addition to state-level analysis, the authors study elite interpretations of both countries. The authors use neoclassical realism as their theoretical framework of the study.

The first conclusion of the article and the reply to the why question finds that both Estonia and Denmark have developed their super Atlanticist foreign policy out of necessity and not as a matter of choice. Estonia emerged from its tragic past with the aim to exclude the option to be left alone again as it happened in the eve of the Second World War when it was annexed and incorporated into the Soviet Union. Denmark, on the other hand, created a compensative foreign policy that aims to reciprocate for the protection it received from the U.S. during the Cold War period. These shadows of the past have united Estonia and Denmark in the post-Cold war era and have led them to support the U.S.-led world order.

The second conclusion and the how question shows that both states have developed super Atlanticist foreign policy. The article shows how both, Estonia and Denmark have built strong domestic support to the United States’ out-of-area foreign policy actions and how both countries have managed to show this foreign policy as morally superior, a way out of insecurity. The authors find an interesting variation in how the super Atlanticist foreign policies have been pursued by Estonia and Denmark. They find that Denmark`s super Atlanticist profile is mostly based on its military contributions and that Estonia`s profile is similar but richer as it fulfils the two percent defence spending requirement according to NATO`s criteria and has developed cyber-security competence. This interesting finding shows how small states can pursue active but differently shaped foreign policy in the post-Cold war era. The research outcomes of the article are based the authors’ examination of the post-Cold war strategic environment with a focus on how the permissiveness and clarity of the strategic environment interact with elite beliefs of both countries to their super Atlanticist security policies.. It is hard to criticize the chosen framework for the article as it is based upon the key arenas for understanding and analysing support for the U.S.-led world order. However the authors do not offer a description of their methodological approach, of what is considered a strategic environment and which particular moments have been compared. Neither does the article specify who is considered as to be among the ‘elite’ and how the particular studied elite interpretations of Denmark and Estonia where chosen (the media versus the official foreign policy line etc). Overall, the article is well structured and divided into logical

© 2020 The Authors | CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 US H-Diplo Article Review 973 sub-chapters. However, it is a bit surprising to find out in the Estonian section that the authors conducted an interview, since interviewing, as a research tool, is not mentioned in the introduction.

What can be questioned is the choice to use of neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework and its suitability to study the Danish and Estonian elite interpretations towards super Atlanticism. This reservation is based upon originates in the knowledge that neoclassical realism is not interested in individual calculations, but is rather based on national interests and Page | 2 seeks to understand the nature of the international system—the political environment within which states interact.1 As the article also addresses the state-level strategic environment where Estonia and Denmark interact, it somewhat compensates for the combination of elite interpretations and neoclassical realism. In addition, the policies of U.S. in the post-Cold war era are based on idealism and the moral values that U.S. foreign policy represents (the spreading of democracy, human rights, excluding terrorism). Thus the debate on the applicability of the theories that help one to study the post-Cold war era transatlantic foreign policy remains unfinished.

Thanks to this article, there can be no doubt about Estonia and Denmark both being more than Atlanticist, or super Atlanticist states. If we excluding the issue of whether they are or are not super Atlanticist states, the article provokes a debate on what exactly Atlanticism and super Atlanticism are. In his article on Denmark`s super Atlanticism, Hans Mouritzen includes the concept of continentalism, which is the opposite of Atlanticism, and denotes a tendency to follow the footsteps of European great powers, like Germany and France, that typically is combined with the commitment to deepen EU integration.2 What Wivel and Crandall refer to as “super Atlanticism” reflects a situation in which two small states decide to exclude continentalism and focus on the special relationship with the United States. In other words, Wivel and Crandall present super Atlanticism as the goal of (small) states to be on the winners’ side despite the existing security guarantee of the EU and the multilevel high costs this policy brings, including confrontation with continental Europe. The concept of super Atlanticism that is based on the special relationship with the U.S. leaves little understanding of the difference in the bilateral relations of both states with the U.S. and within NATO. As both Estonia and Denmark are members of the EU, a discussion on continentalism vs Atlanticism could have enriched the authors’ analysis.

Thus, the term super Atlanticism as based on bilateral relationships with the U.S. is a bit narrow for describing the overall Estonian and Danish role in the post-Cold War transatlantic relationship. The essence of super Atlanticism can be seen not only as a static bilateral (special) relationship, but as a foreign policy concept, a survival strategy that has been adapted within the strategic environment throughout the post-Cold War era. The concept of super Atlanticism as based on a special relationship with the U.S. applies well to the period where the U.S. was seen as the only great power that was able to ‘solve’ the crisis in Bosnia, in Kosovo, the only great power with a moral duty to intervene in post-9/11 Afghanistan and Iraq. I would argue that the current, post-Obama, Donald Trump-led strategic environment, super Atlanticism is based not only on the special relationship with the U.S. but also on keeping the unity between Europe and the U.S., meaning maintaining the unity between the EU and NATO. Thus, the post-Obama (and post-Crimean) super Atlanticism has become a wider concept, one which is not only U.S.-oriented, but a foreign policy that includes both Continentalism and Atlanticism and does not necessarily confront these two concepts. Although both Denmark and Estonia are not interested in substitute the so called European Army for NATO, they are interested in the political unity between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean.

When analysing U.S foreign policy and the United States’ relationship with Denmark and Estonia a significant difference must be noted. Namely, Estonia and Denmark do not belong to quite the same category. Denmark indeed may be a part of the two-sided (mutual) strategic relationship, but it is difficult to see an equally mutual relationship between Estonia and the U.S., as the United States’ foreign policy towards Estonia is rather based on the Baltic concept. In addition, if Denmark has acted as a security provider since the end of the Cold War, then Estonia has had to follow a long path, from the time it

1 Norrin M. Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism,” International Relations Theory [online publication: https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e- 36?rskey=CmJxjk&result=81] (2017), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.36.

2 Hans Mouritzen, “Denmark’s Super Atlanticism,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 5:2 (2007): 155-167.

© 2020 The Authors | CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 US H-Diplo Article Review 973 regained its independence to its joining NATO member and building up its profile as a security provider and a ‘proper’ trans-Atlantic small state. The same argument applies to innacurate impression that Estonia and Denmark are small states that are (equally) well equipped by the security guarantee from the U.S. In spite of both states being members of NATO, it must be remembered that Estonia shares a border with Russia and Denmark does not. While Estonia has perceived every post-Cold War action by Russia (the 2008 war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea in 2014) as a threat to its survival, Denmark has been concerned about regional security and not about its national survival. In reaction to the changes in Page | 3 European security environment since 2008, NATO placed rotating troops in the Baltic states and Poland,3 but not on Danish soil. And in order to contribute to keeping the ‘neighbourhood’ safe, Denmark, like other states, contributes into the NATO`s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) on Estonian soil.

Unfortunately, this special relationship between Estonia and Denmark that has played a vital role in Estonia`s path to becoming a super Atlanticist small state is not discussed in this article. The role of Danish support for Estonia`s way to Atlanticism cannot be underestimated. Denmark was one of the first and the biggest supporters of Estonia`s efforts to join the EU and NATO. It was Denmark that invited Estonian Defence Forces platoon (ESTPLA) to join Danish units in their post-Cold War peace missions in the Balkans.4 The Establishing and development of the ESTPLA was a necessary step to contribute into the common Baltic Battalion BALTBAT, a common military unit of the Baltic states that enabled the three Baltic states to develop their defence and security capabilities in order to meet NATO membership criteria. These military missions were crucial for Estonia to start building its profile as a security provider and therefore to becoming a more valuable state in the eyes of the U.S. and other members of the trans-Atlantic relationship.

Wivel and Crandall’s article offers a solid contribution to small-state scholarship with a comprehensive insight that helps us to understand the Danish and Estonian foreign policy thinking. The article’s approach and argument are important given that Estonia`s re-independence period foreign policy is usually analysed in the context of post-Soviet states, Baltic states, or the Baltic- Nordic context. This article is a skilful contribution that introduces the survival strategies of two countries, Estonia and Denmark that stand out in the Baltic Sea region due to their bold foreign policies in spite of being small states. Denmark and Estonia indeed are the best cases to be used when analyzing the puzzling connection between solidarity and survival in transatlantic foreign policy.

Wivel and Crandall conclude their article with a worrisome look into the future of super Atlanticism. I agree that within the new strategic environment where multilateralism is wavering and the U.S.-Chinese rivalry grows, the super Atlanticist small states have reason to be prepared for a challenging strategic environment ahead. Whether continentalism will again be excluded from super Atlanticism, whether it will impose a survival strategy for the super Atlanticist small states, or whether there will be a third option will remain the key dimension to follow in the near future.

Mari-Liis Sulg is a Ph.D. candidate at the J. Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu, Estonia. Her research focuses on small states’ foreign-policy making in the post-Cold War period, in particular Estonian foreign policy. She also works as a Program Manager at the Estonian School of Diplomacy.

3 NATO. “Enhanced Forward Presence” https://lc.nato.int/operations/enhanced-forward-presence-efp.

4 Eesti Kaitseministeerium “Rahvusvahelised operatsioonid ja Eesti osalemine neis alates 1995 aastast” (2007) (Estonian Ministry of Defence on Estonian international missions).