Is There a Path Out of the Conflict? Why it Matters

BY GERALD FEIERSTEIN

mong the countries affected by the Arab Spring, only Yemen was able to negotiate a peaceful political transition. In November 2011 Yemen’s major political parties, with A the support of the United States and the international community, signed the Gulf initiative that included provisions for the:

■■ replacement of the government of former President Ali Abdallah Salih; ■■ election of a new interim president; and ■■ establishment of a two-year roadmap for new presidential and parliamentary elections to include the creation of a National Dialogue as a forum to address Yemen’s problems.

Taken on its own, the overall implementation of the initiative was relatively successful.1 Yemenis elected Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadi as interim president in an election/referendum featuring a high voter turnout. The Yemeni military and security services, with substantial assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other international participants, drafted new organization charts and set about restructuring their operations. A National Dialogue Conference—the key step in the transition process—concluded in the spring of 2014 and a constitutional drafting committee worked through the summer to complete recommended revisions and amendments to Yemen’s constitution for final approval by the National Dialogue.2 By the fall of 2014, few steps remained before the Yemeni people would be able to go to the polls and elect a new government, completing a peaceful transition of power. Developments outside of the initiative, however, were ominous and proved fatal to the transition process. Comprised equally of members drawn from Ali Abdallah Salih’s General Ambassador Gerald Feierstein served as U.S. Ambassador to Yemen from 2010–13 and as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs from 2013–16. He now serves as the Director for Gulf Affairs at the Middle East Institute, where he is also a Senior Fellow.

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People’s Congress and the opposition Joint Abdallah Salih, despite his earlier antagonis- Meeting Parties, under the leadership of tic relationship with the Huthis, joined his Prime Minister Mohammed Basindwa, the forces with theirs, seizing the opportunity to interim government was weak, dysfunctional, confront their common enemies: the govern- and riven by party and personal rivalries. ment of Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadi, Ali Governance and security collapsed, while Mohsen, the al-Ahmars, and the Islah corruption surged to new levels. Sabotage party—Yemen’s branch of the Muslim and insurrection around the country brought Brotherhood. economic activity to a halt as the capital, The combined Huthi/Salih forces placed , and other urban centers were plunged increasing military pressure on the govern- into darkness for days and weeks at a time.3 ment through the summer and fall of 2014 Despite the fact that the negotiators of aimed at overturning the political process. the initiative were committed to addressing The Huthi/Salih forces were able to take legitimate Huthi grievances and included in advantage of the weakness of the transitional the roadmap special provisions to that effect, government and the collapse of Yemen’s and despite the fact that the Huthis partici- security forces to move aggressively into pated in all of the agreement activities Sanaa. In September 2014, the Huthis forced (except for the February 2012 election of Abd the signing of a new political agreement, the Rabuh Mansur Hadi to serve as interim Peace and National Partnership Agreement, president, which they boycotted), and specifi- organizing a new government under Prime cally endorsed the National Dialogue Minister Khalid al-Bahah. But by early 2015, process, they remained a disruptive force.4 amid fresh fighting between Huthi elements They refused to withdraw their armed and government security forces, the Huthis elements from the resistance encampment in moved to dissolve parliament and the Sanaa, dubbed Tagher (Change) Square, and government and force President Hadi to frequently adopted obstructionist positions resign. Hadi, who had been placed under within the Gulf initiative mechanisms.5 house arrest by the Huthis, fled initially to Most concerning, the Huthis resumed in February 2015 and, when Aden itself their siege of a Salafist madrassa in the town came under attack, escaped to Oman and of Dammaj, forcing its evacuation and then Saudi Arabia, a month later. breaking a ceasefire that had existed for two As the political crisis deepened inside years. Emboldened by their success at Yemen, the Huthis also menaced neighbor- Dammaj, the Huthis continued their advance ing Saudi Arabia. Thousands of Huthi into Amran governorate, neighboring Sanaa. fighters and military cohorts joined military There, they defeated forces loyal to arch “maneuvers” near the Saudi–Yemeni border enemy Ali Mohsen (the architect of six failed in a move clearly intended to provoke the military campaigns against the Huthis from Saudis. Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a member 2003–09) and elements of the Hashid tribal of the Huthi Political Office, told the Yemen confederation, followers of the al-Ahmar Times that “the maneuvers aim…to send a family that had also fought against the message to regional powers that the Huthi Huthis previously. Former President Ali

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popular committees will not allow any plots ■■ defeat Iran’s efforts to establish a against Yemen to succeed.”6 foothold in the Arabian Peninsula threatening Saudi and Gulf security. Operation Decisive Storm Begins

The precipitous collapse of the Hadi As events unfolded in the spring of 2015, Government, and the power grab by a group the rapid collapse of the Hadi Government closely associated with the Government of undercut Coalition plans to defend Aden and Iran and hostile to key U.S. goals and to establish a secure position there to push objectives, alarmed the Obama back against Huthi/Salih aggression.8 Administration as well as our friends and Despite initial optimism that the Saudi-led partners in the region. In urgent consulta- Coalition could achieve its limited military tions between the U.S. Government and the objectives quickly, the fighting devolved into Government of Saudi Arabia in March 2015, a protracted stalemate. Forces loyal to the the United States accepted that Saudi Arabia Hadi Government and the Coalition have would intervene militarily to prevent the secured most of the southern and eastern Huthis from completing their occupation of portions of the country while the Huthi/Salih Yemen and would seek to stabilize the area forces are entrenched in the North, including around Aden to permit the Hadi Government Sanaa.9 to reestablish its operations in the south as a The Costs of Conflict in Yemen prelude to a return of the government to Sanaa to complete implementation of the The Coalition has relied heavily on airpower Gulf initiative.7 For their part, the Saudis in the conflict, placing it in a situation not organized a coalition of predominantly dissimilar to the asymmetric warfare facing Sunni Arab states, principally the United U.S. forces in places like Afghanistan. Arab Emirates (UAE), to support their Members of the Coalition are fighting a military campaign. The United States low-tech insurgency where their massive committed to logistically support the Saudi advantage in sophisticated weapons is intervention, including provision of limited neutralized. The insurgents are mostly intelligence information. It was further fighting on their own turf; they blend in with agreed that the intervention by the interna- the local population, making identification tional community in Yemen should seek to: of legitimate targets difficult; and they are willing to accept extraordinary losses to avoid ■■ restore the legitimate government in defeat. The consequences have been consid- Yemen to complete the implementa- erable. tion of the Gulf initiative and the Saudi Arabia National Dialogue; ■■ prevent a Huthi/Ali Abdullah Salih The impact of the conflict on Saudi Arabia takeover of the government through has been steep. The military has suffered violence; significant casualties and Saudi security ■■ secure the Saudi–Yemeni border; and forces have proved incapable of defending their country from missile and ground attack;

PRISM 7, no. 1 FEATURES | 19 FEIERSTEIN the financial burden has been enormous at a The financial burden of the conflict in time that the social safety net has been Yemen, too, has been considerable for the trimmed; and Saudi performance has been Saudis. Estimated costs of the Saudi air criticized domestically and internationally. campaign in 2015 alone were in excess of $5 The Saudi air campaign has complicated billion.10 Moreover, the Saudis report that Saudi relations with the Yemeni people, who they have provided more than $8.2 billion in hold Saudi Arabia responsible for the death humanitarian assistance to Yemen from and injury of thousands of Yemenis and 2015–17.11 trauma suffered by tens of thousands more. Perhaps the greatest, and most unantici- In retaliation for Saudi attacks inside Yemen, pated, impact of the conflict has been the the Huthi/Salih forces have launched dozens strain it has placed on Saudi Arabia’s rela- of Scud and SA–2 missiles refitted as surface- tionships with its key western partners, to-surface missiles targeting Saudi cities, principally the United States and the United especially Najran and Jizan, as well as Kingdom. The reputational damage to Saudi mounted cross-border raids into Saudi Arabia and its Coalition partners should not territory. As a result, the Saudis have suffered be underestimated. Accusations of war crimes dozens of civilian and military casualties leveled against Saudi and Coalition armed while being forced to evacuate civilians from forces and threats to end arms sales to the towns and villages along the border. Saudis have the potential to inflict long U.S.

International naval forces in the Arabian Sea in spring 2016 seized multiple shipments of illicit arms that the United States later assessed originated in Iran and were likely bound for Huthi insurgents in Yemen.

20 | FEATURES PRISM 7, no. 1 IS THERE A PATH OUT OF THE YEMEN CONFLICT? lasting damage to these relationships that go evidence to support the claim. Following the well beyond the scope of the Yemen conflict Arab Spring, however, Iranian support for the and could undermine the international Huthi movement became clearer. Well before community’s determination to confront the breakdown of Yemen’s political transition Iran’s regional threats. Furthermore, as noted in early 2015, Iran was engaged in smuggling by the International Crisis Group: “The weapons, in some instances highly sophisti- [Saudi] intervention has layered a multidi- cated weapons, to Yemen for the Huthis. In mensional, thus more intractable, regional early 2012, Yemeni authorities seized a conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran onto shipment containing fabrication equipment an already complex civil war, significantly for explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), complicating prospects for peace.”12 the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used to devastating effect against American forces Iran in Iraq a decade earlier, destined for a Yemeni For the Government of Iran, the Coalition’s businessman with close ties to the Huthis, inability to defeat the insurgents and restore according to a senior Yemeni security the legitimate government in Yemen is a official.13 A year later, U.S. naval forces, in significant win. Iranian support for the cooperation with the , seized an Huthis comes at very little cost in contrast to Iranian dhow carrying 40 tons of military the financial, human, and reputational equipment with markings indicating they damage suffered by the Coalition. came from IRGC facilities.14 During the past several years, there has Since the political situation in Sanaa been some debate as to the extent of Iran’s deteriorated in the fall of 2014, Iranian support for the Huthis and whether the intervention has expanded in scope and Huthis are an instrument of Iranian policy as become more blatant. Former Secretary of determined by the Iran Revolutionary Guard State John Kerry told PBS Newshour in April Corps (IRGC) and the hardline factions 2015 that Iran had sent “a number of flights surrounding Ayatollah Khamenei. In fact, every single week” to Yemen with supplies while Iran’s control over the Huthis may be for the Huthis.15 In addition to the materiel less determinative than some have specu- supplies, Iran dispatched IRGC Quds Force lated, its intervention in Yemen’s internal and Hezbollah trainers to assist the Huthis. A affairs in recent years has been unambiguous. USA Today article, citing Reuters sources, It is difficult to discern any vested interest quoted unnamed senior Iranian officials as that Iran might have in Yemen aside from a saying that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards desire to provoke and threaten Saudi Arabia had hundreds of military personnel in Yemen and the other Gulf states. training Huthi fighters: “About 100 Huthis In 2014, the Iranians exploited Huthi traveled to Iran in 2014 for training, and the successes in Sanaa by encouraging and pace of money and arms transfers has facilitating threatening actions on the increased since the seizure of Yemen’s capital, Saudi–Yemeni border. Allegations of Iranian Sanaa, this year.”16 A number of IRGC intervention have been a commonplace for personnel and their Hezbollah allies have years but there was never compelling been killed or captured in Yemen, but

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compared to the toll in Syria, the losses have Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb.19 In a rare been negligible. video, Mehdi Tayeb, a senior cleric who Between April 2015 and October 2016, reportedly advises Supreme Leader Ali U.S. or allied naval forces seized four Khamenei, acknowledged that Iran had weapons shipments from Iran for the Huthis, provided the missiles to the Huthis, declaring according to the U.S. Fifth Fleet Commander, that: “Iran’s catering [sic] of missiles to the Vice Admiral Kevin Donegan. The Australian Huthis was carried out in stages by the Government released photos of an additional Revolutionary Guards and the support and shipment of light anti-armor weapons seized assistance of the Iranian Navy.”20 In a further from a smuggling vessel in January 2017.17 development, the U.S. Office of Naval But there is no reason to believe that the Intelligence in April warned of a possible various naval forces patrolling in the Red Sea threat to commercial shipping in the Bab successfully interdicted all or close to all of al-Mandeb from naval mines possibly placed the Iranian weapons destined for Huthi in the area by the Huthis.21 forces. The bulk of Iran’s weapons supply has Al-Qaeda been low-tech weapons, including small arms, C4 explosives, anti-tank and anti-armor Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) missiles. During the conflict, however, has also been a beneficiary of the political Iranian weapons supplies have included conflict in the country. Having suffered a increasingly sophisticated arms, including series of setbacks from 2012–14 as a result of surface-to-surface and anti-ship missiles. In focused coordination and cooperation October 2016, USS Mason detected incoming between the United States and the Hadi missiles, deploying countermeasures to Government, AQAP has reconstituted itself defeat the attack. That attack appeared and regained much of the ground that it lost. similar to the attack two weeks earlier on an “In recent years,” notes the Sanaa Center for Emirati supply vessel. The U.S. Naval Strategic Studies, “AQAP has heavily Institute News, citing experts, reported that exploited the increasing polarization of the missiles resembled Chinese-built C–802 Yemeni society, the retreating authority of the anti-ship missiles. The same model had been Yemeni state and security services, and sold to Iran previously and reverse engi- gained significant financial largesse when it neered by the Iranians, who fielded it as the controlled the port of al- from April Nour missile.18 2015 to April 2016, such that today, AQAP The missile attacks, as well as a “drone and its affiliate Ansar al-Sharia are arguably boat” attack on a Saudi frigate in January, stronger and wealthier than they have ever make explicit the threat from the Huthis and been.”22 Iran to challenge shipping in the vital Red In particular, al-Qaeda has successfully Sea waterway and the Bab al-Mandeb. Long positioned itself within the framework of before the crisis, President Hadi had warned tribal resistance to Huthi advances in three of Iranian ambitions to gain a chokehold on governorates of southern and western Yemen, the global economy through its ability to al-Bayda, Abyan, and Shabwah, capitalizing block shipping transiting the Strait of on specific socio-political, tribal, security and

22 | FEATURES PRISM 7, no. 1 IS THERE A PATH OUT OF THE YEMEN CONFLICT? economic dynamics there as well as percep- the presence of violent extremist groups is tions that the civil conflict is, in fact, a useful leverage in obtaining financial support sectarian struggle between Sunni and Shia and neutralizing western and regional Yemenis.23 Although Yemenis are very opposition to their rule. As al-Muslimi and conservative religiously, they are generally Barron of the Sanaa Center for Strategic not drawn to al-Qaeda’s ideology. Studies conclude, “as long as Yemen contin- Nevertheless, desperate times call for desper- ues its slide into failed statehood and ate measures, and many Yemenis, confront- catastrophic humanitarian crisis, AQAP and ing perceived existential threats to their social similar groups will continue to thrive.”24 and economic survival, have aligned with Humanitarian Suffering al-Qaeda as a matter of self-preservation. The idea that the Huthis are a “natural Rough estimates of civilian casualties since enemy” of AQAP because of their sectarian fighting began in March 2015 now exceed differences is a misconception. They have no 10,000 killed with more than 40,000 injured, history of fighting against al-Qaeda and may according to press reports, and the human well conclude, as the Salih regime did, that toll continues to mount. The UN Office of CIA World Factbook CIA World

Yemen transportation map from 2012.

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the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs The key to addressing the supply side of reports that more than 3 million of Yemen’s the food crisis confronting , 27.5 million citizens have been displaced by home to an estimated 75 percent of the total the conflict, while more than half of the Yemeni population, is restoring to full population is considered to be food insecure. operation the port of al-Hudaydah and Famine and epidemics of disease may be on guaranteeing access for humanitarian the near horizon for Yemen. supplies. According to the UN, al-Hudaydah This April, a humanitarian relief fund is the entry point for 70–80 percent of the raising conference, co-sponsored by the country’s humanitarian deliveries and an Governments of Sweden and Switzerland, even higher percentage of commercial food generated an estimated $1.1 billion in fresh and fuel imports. But operations at the port pledges, including a $94 million commit- have been severely limited by damage from ment by the United States, or half of the $2.1 Coalition airstrikes in August 2015 and billion UN appeal, according to press subsequent fighting. Port workers have been reports.25 Despite the improved donor forced to offload cargo by hand.29 The Hadi response, more than half the population, or Government and the Coalition are insistent 17 million people, is considered by the UN that the port is the entry point for Iranian to be food insecure. The World Food smuggled weapons as well as a source of Program’s regional director, Muhammad substantial funding to the Huthi/Salih war Hadi, said in an interview that the WFP effort. They have, therefore, insisted on a provided rations to five million people in rigorous system of inspection slowing the March but it is seeking to expand deliveries process of deliveries. The Huthis have also to reach nine million “severely food inse- interfered in port operations, and their cure” people a month.26 The humanitarian control of the road from Hudaydah to Sanaa, crisis is driven by supply and demand the principal route for supplies leaving the challenges. port, has posed an additional obstacle for On the supply side, a Famine Early humanitarian deliveries. Warning System Networks report from late Early this year, the Coalition made clear March noted that: “recent food import data its intent to cut off the Huthis from the Red suggest that food imports into al-Hudaydah Sea coast, known as the Tihama, believing port recently declined sharply. As this port that a successful operation to gain control of supplies many key markets in western the coastal region would cripple the Huthi Yemen, declining imports raise concerns war effort and pressure them to return to the about future supply levels and food markets negotiating table. Coalition forces success- that rely on this port as a source.”27 Overall, fully seized control of the port of Mocha, 200 however, the UN Verification and Inspection km (124 mi) south of Hudaydah, and began Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) reported to move north. But progress has been stalled that March deliveries of food, fuel, and since March.30 Local observers report that general cargo equaled a total of 636,810 pro–Huthi elements are well-entrenched in metric tons—an increase of 223,467 metric Hudaydah, home to more than one million tons from February.28 people, and warn that a military assault on

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the city would likely be highly destructive. ($597 million)—an amount roughly equiva- The observers voiced skepticism that, even lent to two months of the government with a successful operation, the Coalition payroll—in fresh currency from the bank’s would be able to maintain security, re-open Russian printers.34 the port, and open the roads to normal 31 The Situation Today—Ending the traffic. As of this writing, the planned Insurgency Will Not End the Conflict offensive appears to be on hold. Equally, obstacles to the distribution of Two years of fighting in Yemen reveal that the food and medicines rest on the demand side. fissures dividing Yemeni society persist and Even where food remains widely available in will not be resolved by an end to the conflict. the marketplace, the lack of liquidity, One potential flashpoint is the possible de exacerbated by the failure since August 2016 facto re-division of Yemen along the pre– to pay the public sector salaries upon which 1990 border. The majority of anti-Huthi/ 25 percent of Yemeni workers depend, has Salih fighters in the former South Yemen, contributed to the developing crisis. The according to the International Crisis Group, International Crisis Group reported that the belong to a network of loosely allied militias failure to pay salaries “is a product of dubbed the “Southern Resistance,” who are shrinking state finances, an acute liquidity fighting for independence and resistance to crisis and the banks’ inability to move “northern invaders.”35 These groups are financial resources between areas controlled likely to reassert their desire for southern by conflict parties.”32 In a letter this April to independence once the threat from the UN Special Envoy Ismail Ould Chaikh Huthi/Salih forces is eliminated. While there Ahmed, Huthi “Foreign Minister” Hisham are some outside of Yemen who might Abdullah proposed that a technical team welcome that prospect, it is fundamentally drawn from Central Bank personnel in Sanaa an outcome to be avoided, as it will mean and Aden, headed by a neutral individual, be two (or more) failed states in the southern allowed to operate from either Cairo or Arabian Peninsula, each one incapable of Amman. The team would communicate their providing adequately for its population and decisions to the in-country branches of the both becoming breeding grounds for violent Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) for implemen- extremist groups.36 tation.33 However, Deputy Central Bank Moreover, the two Yemeni coalitions that governor Khalid al-Abbadi responded that are parties to the conflict are, themselves, bank management is not the issue. He internally fragile. The Huthi–Salih alliance, reiterated that the failure to receive antici- in particular, is a marriage of convenience pated donor funding or oil revenue is the real rather than a true partnership and is unlikely source of the bank’s difficulties. He called to survive in a political environment rather again for the Huthis to permit the Sanaa than an armed conflict. Long years of enmity branch of the CBY to function without between Salih and his followers and the political interference. Nevertheless, al-Abbadi Huthis have been papered over, not resolved. did acknowledge that the CBY branch in And both sides have political aspirations that Aden is in possession of YR 150 billion will be difficult to reconcile when it comes to

PRISM 7, no. 1 FEATURES | 25 FEIERSTEIN a real political process. It has long been Arabia would have ripple effects globally and anticipated that the final act of the drama would complicate U.S. efforts to re-stabilize over political control in Sanaa will be a the region. The Kingdom is a pillar of the showdown between Salih and the Huthis, global economy, owing to its role as the and signs of tension between the two sides world’s largest oil producer, and Riyadh has abound. partnered with Washington for promoting The pro–Hadi Government side also regional stability and security since the end contains the seeds of its own dissolution. The of World War II. defense of Taizz, under siege by Huthi forces Heightened Saudi–Iranian Tension for 18 months, is divided between pro–Hadi forces aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood A Coalition failure to ensure that Yemen’s under Adnan al-Hamadi and forces aligned government remains in friendly hands would with the Salafist militia commander, Abu almost certainly mean that the Iranians al-Abbas, who are both anti-Huthi and would, once again, seek to establish a anti-Muslim Brotherhood, and receive military presence in Yemen threatening Saudi support from the Coalition. Their internal Arabia’s southern border. The Saudis would conflict reflects deeper fractures within the see a need to respond, either militarily pro–government coalition.37 against Iran or by destabilizing the govern- ment in Yemen. This would mean, at the very What this Means for the United States least, prolonged instability on the Saudi– Five years after Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadi’s Yemeni border. election as interim president started the clock As Saudi Arabia perceives a heightened on the only negotiated political transition of threat from an Iranian-supported, Huthi- the Arab Spring, the future of the survival of dominated regime in Sanaa, they almost Yemen hangs in the balance. In the almost certainly will expect that the United States certain absence of strong governance or law will step up its pressure on Tehran. For their enforcement, the likelihood is that internal part, the Iranians may see Huthi success in dynamics, as well as the revived tribal Yemen as further evidence that their cam- rivalries and enmities, will drive continued paign for regional domination is succeeding. instability and conflict in Yemen, at great This could encourage them to become more consequence to U.S. interests. aggressive at challenging U.S. interests, particularly in the Gulf. A pro–Iranian regime Saudi Arabia’s Internal Stability in Sanaa would also represent a continuing A failure in the campaign would open the security concern for freedom of navigation in House of Saud, especially King Salman and the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The his son, Crown Prince Muhammed bin Iranians may see that holding the global Salman, to charges of mismanagement and economy hostage by credibly threatening to incompetence. It could increase tension close the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab surrounding succession and also affect the al-Mandeb simultaneously is their most Saudi military, generating restiveness and a effective insurance policy against interna- loss of morale. Domestic instability in Saudi tional pressure.

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Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Cohesion existential threat, the United States is at best a reluctant and unreliable partner. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are unhappy over Recommended Actions for the United the role that Oman has played in the Yemen States to Take This Year conflict, which they see as enabling the Huthis and facilitating Iranian intervention. The conflict in Yemen has grown more Should the Huthis succeed and establish a complex and can no longer be characterized government in Sanaa that is hostile to Saudi primarily as a clash between two rival Arabia and other Gulf states, there will likely coalitions fighting for political power in be fingers pointed at the Omanis from Sanaa. Indeed, the social, economic, and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. A failure may also political structure of the country has been generate tension between Saudi Arabia and fractured and Yemen’s ultimate survival as a the UAE. The Emiratis joined the Coalition to unified country, which ought to be a princi- support Saudi Arabia, but they have reserva- pal objective of U.S. policy, is not assured. In tions about the conflict, are dissatisfied with view of that reality, the United States should many aspects of Saudi leadership, and seek to achieve several goals this year. believe the fighting has gone on too long. An Secure a Limited Political Agreement unsatisfactory outcome could have repercus- through the UN-led Negotiations sions for Saudi–Emirati security cooperation. U.S.–GCC Relations UN Security Council Resolution 2216 remains the basis for a resolution of the Although the United States has been heavily political conflict in Yemen. While changes criticized domestically for what is perceived in the government may come about as a as open ended support for an illegitimate result of subsequent political negotiations, Saudi war on Yemen, this is not the way it is they should not be determined through perceived in the region. The Saudis see that force or violence. A successful outcome to U.S. assistance, including arms sales and the negotiations would provide for: the tactical and logistics support, has been restoration of security in Sanaa; resumption grudging from the start and steadily scaled of government operations while negotiations back during the conflict. While the Trump for a new interim arrangement continue; Administration has suggested that it intends restoration of Central Bank operations; and to change course, details of renewed coopera- the return of diplomatic missions to support tion are unclear. Opposition remains strong the process. Utilizing Oman’s diplomatic in the U.S. Congress and among the public. channels to Iran, the willingness of the The Saudis may conclude that U.S.–GCC Iranian leadership to support negotiations security cooperation is a one way street. should be assessed.38 When the U.S. perceives a security challenge, it calls for GCC support. But when the Assist the Saudi-led Coalition in Ending the Conflict reverse is true, even in an instance where the Saudis believe they are confronting an Achieving an end to the fighting is the sine qua non of progress toward a political

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resolution. Moreover, it is important to offensive and establishing a neutral third recognize that Saudi Arabia has legitimate party mechanism to operate the port in concerns about the potential Iranian threat exchange for a Huthi/Salih commitment to to its security should a pro–Iranian regime withdraw their forces from the port, city, and come to power in Sanaa. Limitations on U.S. surrounding environs, including the road assistance to the Coalition, whether through connecting Hudaydah to Sanaa. The neutral restrictions on the resupply of munitions or party would be responsible for inspecting all denying advice and assistance to Coalition cargo, ensuring that the port was not being armed forces is counter-productive. The used in violation of the UN arms embargo, United States should reengage with the Saudi providing for unfettered access to the port for military and political leadership to humanitarian relief organizations, and strengthen Saudi border security and encour- contracting with local transport companies to age a more careful, deliberative use of distribute relief supplies throughout the military force in Yemen, limited to defensive country. operations and emphasizing avoiding Preserve the Goodwill of the People collateral damage. Offensive military actions should only be undertaken to advance the AQAP’s success in embedding itself within political process. the larger Sunni resistance to the Huthi insur- gency poses challenges to the United States. The fundamental reality that there is no Legitimately concerned by al-Qaeda’s ability purely military solution to the threat that al- to resurrect its presence in Yemen and Qaeda poses has not changed. Our objective of potentially pose new threats to global peace defeating and destroying violent extremism in and security, the United States has resumed Yemen is a long-term challenge and it requires kinetic operations to deter and defeat the that we take a long view on how to achieve it. organization. Although U.S. motivation is understandable and justifiable, the addi- tional layers of complexity that we now Relieve Humanitarian Suffering confront in Yemen argue for extreme caution in conducting military operations targeting Securing the port of Hudaydah remains the al-Qaeda there. The fundamental reality that key to addressing the deepening humanitar- there is no purely military solution to the ian crisis in Yemen, which must be the threat that al-Qaeda poses has not changed. highest priority. Coalition determination to Our objective of defeating and destroying mount a military offensive to take the port violent extremism in Yemen is a long-term and city of Hudaydah appears to be fading in challenge and it requires that we take a long the face of tactical obstacles as well as intense view on how to achieve it. international opposition. The pause provides Preserving the goodwill and cooperation an opening to seek a political rather than of the Yemeni people is essential if we are to military solution to the problem. The UN has be successful, and there is no quicker way to proposed, and the government and Coalition lose that goodwill than through ill-consid- should accept, halting plans for a military ered military operations that generate high

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numbers of innocent civilian casualties. community can provide essential assistance Thus, military operations should be limited in institutional capacity building, especially to those instances where our intelligence is in providing adequate schools and health impeccable, and we must maintain the facilities. In addition, GCC member states standard of near certainty that there will be have suggested that they would consider no collateral damage. offering Yemen full membership in the organization (Yemen participates in a Recommendations for Outlying Years number of GCC specialized committees but If these efforts are successful this year, we is not a full member). Such an offer would should seek to accomplish additional steps be very well-received by the Yemeni popula- next year. Without these measures, Yemen’s tion. PRISM continued descent into complete social, political, and economic collapse is all but guaranteed.

Establish a New, Time-limited Transitional Government

Based on the successful conclusion of UN-led political negotiations, the United States should support the establishment of a new, credible interim government with a mandate Notes limited to implementation of the GCC transitional arrangement and the conclusions 1 Not everyone would agree with the character- of the National Dialogue Conference and ization of the implementation of the Gulf initiative as reasonably successful. See Nadwa al-Dawsari, charged with conducting new parliamentary “Breaking the Cycle of Failed Negotiations in Yemen,” elections within one year.39 During its POMED (May 2017), and “Yemen: Is Peace Possible,” limited tenure, the interim government can International Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 167 (February 2016). I would not dispute that there begin the process of restoring security and were shortcomings in the process, but the implemen- stability, repairing damaged infrastructure, tation was as good as could have been expected given and restarting economic activity. the state of political organization, weakness of the political parties and civil society, and the deep Begin a Discussion of Reconstruction fractures, especially within the southern movement that undermined coherent policy making. The United States ought to help facilitate a 2 Both the Huthis and Southern Movement pledging conference to begin a discussion of representatives expressed unhappiness at the outcome reconstruction and provide the Yemeni of the National Dialogue. Several southerners either resigned in advance or refused to sign the agreement. people with confidence that the international The Huthis boycotted after their representative, Dr. community will assist them moving forward. Ahmad Sharifuddin, was assassinated. Southern and Yemen has suffered billions of dollars in Huthi unhappiness was particularly focused on the decision to create six “federal” units. While there was damage to its infrastructure and key eco- broad, albeit not universal, agreement that Yemen nomic capacity. Beyond pledges for infra- should institute a federal system, the drawing of new structure reconstruction, the international boundary lines among the federating regions was

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poorly done and was clearly intended to disadvantage 11 Handout from the King Salman the Huthis who had supported federalism in Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center. The Saudis principle. (The Islah Party, the Muslim Brotherhood provided $8.2 billion in assistance to Yemen between affiliate, disapproved of the federal system in April 2015 and April 2017. The aid includes principle.) The author had many conversations with $847,598,580 in humanitarian aid and relief, President Hadi about this issue, arguing that the $1,130,186,557 for aid to Yemenis in Saudi Arabia, country would be better off maintaining existing $2.95 billion in development assistance allocated to governorates as the federating units. But the Yemen, $2.276 billion in bilateral government President was determined to re-draw the map, assistance, and $1 billion as a deposit in the Central observing that the Yemeni people would demand to Bank of Yemen. see “something new.” In the end, his effort was 12 International Crisis Group Middle East probably the most significant cause of the failure to Report No. 167, February 9, 2016, i. implement the conclusions of the National Dialogue 13 Eric Schmitt and Robert Worth, “With Arms Conference. for Yemen Rebels, Iran Seeks Wider Mideast Role,” 3 Author observations. New York Times, March 15, 2012. 4 “Agreement on the Implementation 14 Barbara Starr, “Weapons Seized Off Yemen Mechanism for the Transition Process in Yemen in Point to Iran, U.S. Official Says,” CNN, January 29, Accordance with the Initiative of the Gulf 2013. Cooperation Council,” Article 21(d): “Examination of 15 Oren Dorell, “Iranian Support for Yemen’s the Various Issues with a National Dimension, Huthis Goes Back Years,” USA Today, April 20, 2015. Including the Causes of Tension in .” See also 16 Ibid. Haythem Mouazahem, “Yemeni Houthi Leader 17 C.J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt, “Arms Seized Committed to National Dialogue,” Al-Monitor, posted Off Coast of Yemen Appear to Have Been Made in May 20, 2013. Iran,” New York Times, January 10, 2017. 5 Both on the Yemeni side and within the inter- 18 Sam LeGrone, “Destroyer USS Mason national community, there were extensive efforts to Unsuccessfully Attacked from Yemen,” U.S. Naval bring the Huthis into the transition process more Institute News, October 10, 2016. constructively. The UN Special Envoy and the 19 Conversation with the author. European Union representative, in particular, traveled 20 “Iranian Cleric Admits IRGC Provides frequently to Saada to meet with Abdul Malik Weapons to Huthis in Yemen,” Iran Observed, Middle al-Huthi and his inner circle to encourage their East Institute, April 20, 2017. engagement. Despite those efforts, the Huthis 21 Dale Wainwright, “Shipping Faces Fresh remained obstructive both within the transition Yemen Mine Threat,” Tradewinds: The Global mechanisms and in the street. Shipping News Service, April 18, 2017. 6 Bassam al-Khameri, “Houthi Military 22 Farea al-Muslimi and Adam Barron, “The Exercises Continue Near Saudi Border,” Yemen Times, Limits of US Military Power in Yemen: Why al-Qaeda March 16, 2015. in the Arabian Peninsula Continues to Thrive,” Sanaa 7 The author participated in the discussions as Center for Strategic Studies, March 27, 2017, 3. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near 23 Ibid. East Affairs 24 Ibid; Finally, it is the author’s experience that 8 Aden wouldn’t be liberated until July 2015 the Ambassador on the ground is a key player in when UAE forces successfully expelled the Huthi/ maximizing the effectiveness of U.S. military Salih occupiers. operations, both as the main interlocutor with the 9 Coalition spokesmen accurately note that this host government and as the U.S. official with the leaves some 75–80 percent of Yemen’s landmass in most accurate perspective on the impact these pro–government hands. But the statistic is mislead- operations are having on the ground. The role of the ing, as most Yemenis live in the 20–25 percent of the Ambassador should be preserved. country that is contested or in the hands of the 25 “UN Seeks Help for Famine-Hit Yemen, Huthi/Salih forces. Where a Child Dies Every 10 Minutes,” Business 10 Mehmood Hussain, “Saudi Intervention in World, April 26, 2017, S1/8. Yemen and Its Impact on Saudi’s Economy,” Foreign 26 Ibid. Policy News, December 11, 2016.

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27 Yemen at the UN—March 2017 Review, leadership fears that the current confrontation with Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 5. the United States could lead to a war, with devastating 28 Ibid.,7. consequences for Iran. Recent efforts by President 29 Mohammed Ghobari, “Yemen’s War- Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif to engage Damaged Hodeidah Port Struggles to Bring in Vital friendlier GCC leaders in a dialogue to reduce Supplies,” Reuters, November 24, 2016. tensions suggest that many in the Iranian leadership 30 Yemen at the UN— March 2017 Review, 3. recognize this reality and would like to find a way to 31 Author interviews. tamp down the regional tensions. Ending the conflict 32 “Instruments of Pain: Conflict and Famine in in Yemen would be the easiest and least costly avenue Yemen,” International Crisis Group Middle East that the Iranians could pursue should they decide to Briefing No. 52, (April 13, 2017), p. 4. adjust their strategy to the new conditions. There may 33 “Subject: Yemeni Salaries, An Update & be a window of opportunity following the upcoming Proposal,” Letter from Hisham S. Abdullah, “Minister Presidential elections to test whether the Iranians of Foreign Affairs, Sana’a” to H.E. Ismail Ould Cheikh might be willing to encourage the Huthis to return to Ahmed, UNSG Special Envoy to Yemen, April 15, the negotiating table and find a peaceful resolution to 2017. the conflict. The Omanis would be the best posi- 34 Statement by Khalid al-Abbadi, Deputy tioned of the GCC countries to test this proposition. Governor of the Central Bank of Yemen, “Yemen— 39 Any agreement on a new interim arrange- The Way Forward,” A Yemen Crisis Workshop ment should not be open ended. The two-year Co-sponsored by the U.S. National Defense transition envisioned by the GCC initiative has University/NESA Center and the Gulf Research already extended to six years. There are only a few Center, May 5, 2017. steps left to complete the implementation and those 35 “Yemen: Is Peace Possible,” 12. should be concluded rapidly. One outstanding issue 36 There is no reason to believe that a re-divi- will be the fate of Ali Abdullah Salih and his family. sion of Yemen would stop at the borders that existed Permitting Salih to return to any position of between the and the People’s authority, either directly or by remote control through Democratic Republic of Yemen prior to 1990. In 2011, his family, will make all of the efforts and the the author hosted a lunch for a visiting senior U.S. suffering of the last six years meaningless. Salih Government official to meet with southern Yemenis. should be required to abandon his positions and The discussion was dominated by representatives leave Yemen permanently without any further from Aden and Abyan, who argued on behalf of a involvement in Yemen’s public affairs. Alternatively, re-separation of the country. Several guests from the he should be stripped of his immunity and pros- eastern part of the country remained silent until the ecuted. end of the lunch when they launched into a harsh indictment of the Aden/Abyan contingent and made clear that, should the country divide, they wanted an Photos independent state of their own, comprising Hadramawt, al-Mahra, and . The other Yemenis were as nonplussed as the Americans. Page 16. Photo by Email4Mobile available at < https:// 37 Maysaa Shuja al-Deen, “The Endless Battle in en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_Revolution#/media/ ,” Atlantic Council, April 26, 2017, 2. File:Yemeni_Protests_4-Apr-2011_P01.JPG>. Licensed 38 The Saudis argue that Yemen is an “Arab under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share alike problem” and want to exclude Iran from the 3.0 unreported, < https://creativecommons.org/licens- discussion. But Iran is a party to the conflict playing es/by/3.0/deed.en>. Reproduced unaltered. an unconstructive role. It is deeply involved in supporting the Huthi/Salih forces and exacerbating Yemen’s internal problems. Hardline elements around Ayatollah Khamenei, especially the IRGC, have dominated Iran’s Yemen policy until now. Deepening tensions between Iran and the Sunni Arab Gulf states of the GCC, however, are not in Iran’s interest. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that Iran’s

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