The Power of Parliaments

Sara Salman

2017

To my mother and father, I owe it all to you.

And to the believers in democracy in the Arab region, I dedicate this work to you.

THE POWER OF PARLIAMENTS:

UNDERSTANDING WHY AND HOW PARLIAMENTARY POWER CHANGES IN

TRANSITIONING DEMOCRACIES

Sara Salman

ABSTRACT

This dissertation aims to answer four main questions about parliaments: How do we conceptualize parliamentary power? How do we measure it? Why does parliamentary power change? And has it changed in some of the countries in the Arab region? The last question is of particular importance given that Arab parliaments have been largely understudied and dismissed as window dressing used by authoritarian regimes to prolong their rule. The dissertation relied on two case studies, that of the Lebanese and Moroccan House of Representatives, to answer these questions.

The dissertation argues that parliamentary power is a two-dimensional concept. The first dimension is the de jure powers delegated to parliament by the laws of the country, including the constitution. The second dimension is parliament’s de facto capacity to act on the powers granted to it by these laws. The distinction between the two dimensions is crucial to arrive at more comprehensive theories on parliamentary institutions.

Contrary to the general belief that constitution making in the Arab region is a tactic that authoritarian regimes resort to in order to solidify their rule, this dissertation argues that representative constitution-making processes presented pacting moments, during which the different political groups negotiated their access to power, which positively impacted the powers

granted to parliament. Evidence based on the content the analysis of constitutions in Lebanon and Morocco supported this argument.

The dissertation argues that the de facto power of parliament, mainly its ability to carry out its legislative and oversight functions, is determined by three major variables: the nature of the executive-legislative relationship, the organizational capacity of the parliament, and the role and types of political parties represented within it. The analysis relied on two original datasets and interviews with parliamentarians, ministers, and parliamentary staffers, among others.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the evidence presented in the chapters indicates an increase in the powers of the two parliaments over time. The findings of this dissertation warrant future research of Arab parliaments to better understand these institutions, how they have developed and continue to develop under less than ideal conditions.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe a great deal of gratitude to a number of people. Without you I would not have been able to complete this dissertation, nor would have I enjoyed the journey that has brought me so far.

First, I would like to thank my chair Professor Diane Singerman for her unwavering patience, encouragement, and mentorship. There are really no adequate words to express my appreciation for all your support over the past six years.

I would also like to thank my committee members Professor Todd Eisenstadt and

Professor Antoine Yoshinaka. You have been excellent educators, and your comments and feedback were invaluable to guide my research from its inception. I also thank Professor Larbi

Sadiki for reading my dissertation and for all his enlightened comments and constructive criticisms of my work.

I also extend my sincere gratitude to the Secretary Generals of the Lebanese and

Moroccan Parliaments, Mr. Adnan Daher and Mr. Naguib El Khaddi, for facilitating and supporting my research at both institutions. I also want to take the opportunity to thank my former colleagues at the United Nations Development Programme, the late Dr. Salim Nasr, and

Mrs. Karima El Korri, who mentored me and shared my passion for democratization and parliaments in the Arab region.

To my friends in D.C you are my community and home away from home. You are too many to name, but I would like to especially thank my AU cohort and my friends Ana-Maria,

Scott, Rola, and Rami. You have listened to me tirelessly, you copy-edited my chapters, and you celebrated with me my small and big victories along the way.

Finally I thank my family: Mom, Dad, Nadine, Lina, and Omar. Your love, encouragement, and faith push me forward and drive me to persevere and excel. I am blessed to have you as my family.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iv

LIST OF TABLES ...... viii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...... ix

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Introduction ...... 1 Parliaments in the Middle East and the Paradox of Active Rubber Stamps 5 Conceptualizing Parliamentary Power: The Theoretical Framework of the Dissertation ...... 10 De jure Power of Parliament: A Theory on Participation, Constitution Making and Parliamentary Power ...... 12 De facto Power of Parliament: Variables that Explain Variance ...... 17 Neo-Institutionalism Theory as a Methodological Approach ...... 21 Methodology ...... 24

CHAPTER 2 ...... 33

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS ...33

Pacting, Political Development, and Parliaments in the Arab Region ...... 33 The Cases of Morocco and Lebanon ...... 40 Conclusions From the Cases of Morocco and Lebanon: A Response to the Literature on Arab Parliaments: Beyond Authoritarianism, Cooptation, and Clientelism ...... 69

CHAPTER 3 ...... 74

CONSTITUTION MAKING AND THE DE JURE POWER OF PARLIAMENT ...... 74

Introduction: Constitutions, Constitution Making, and Why It All Matters ...... 74 Constitution Making Process and Parliament’s De jure Power ...... 80 Constitution Making and Parliamentary Power: A Theoretical Model ...103 Conclusion ...... 106

CHAPTER 4 ...... 108

PARLIAMENTS DE FACTO LAWMAKING POWER ...... 108

Introduction ...... 108

Parliament’s Lawmaking Capacity: The Cases of Morocco and Lebanon...... 112 Why the Lawmaking Capacity of Parliament Varies: Some Explanatory Variables ...... 124 Conclusion ...... 152

CHAPTER 5 ...... 155

ACCOUNTABILITY AND PARLIAMENT’S DE FACTO OVERSIGHT POWER...... 155

Accountability: Definition and Theory ...... 155 Parliament’s De facto Oversight Capacity: The Cases of Morocco and Lebanon...... 163 Parliament’s Oversight Capacity: What Determines It? ...... 178 Conclusion ...... 192

CHAPTER 6 ...... 194

CONCLUSION ...... 194

Summary of Research Findings and Implications ...... 194 Limitations and Future Research ...... 203 Conclusion ...... 207

APPENDIX A ...... 209

LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE OF PARLIAMENTS ...... 209

APPENDIX B ...... 215

PARLIAMENTARY STRENGTHENING PROJECTS IN LEBANON SINCE 2010 ..215

APPENDIX C ...... 217

ORGANOGRAM OF MOROCCAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2014) ...... 217

APPENDIX D ...... 218

ORAL QUESTION ADDRESSED BY THE LEBANESE AND MOROCCAN HORS ...... 218

REFERENCES ...... 227

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LIST OF TABLES

Table

Table 1: MPs Affiliated with a Political Party 1960-1972 ...... 62

Table 2: Coding Criteria for Constitution Making Process ...... 82

Table 3: Parliaments De jure Power Index (DPI) ...... 93

Table 4: Legislative Performance of the Moroccan and Lebanese HoRs ...... 116

Table 5: Legislative Performance by Majority, Opposition, and Coalitions ...... 120

Table 6: Moroccan HoR - Oral Questions 1977-2016 ...... 167

Table 7: Moroccan HoR - Written Questions 1977-2016 ...... 167

Table 8: Lebanon’s HoR - Oral Questions and Interpellations (1992-2012) ...... 169

Table 9: Legislative Performance of the Moroccan HoR by Parliamentary Group ...... 209

Table 10: Legislative Performance of the Lebanese HoR by Parliamentary Group ...... 211

Table 11: Overview of Parliamentary Strengthening Projects in Lebanon Since 2010 .....215

Table 12: Moroccan HoR: Distribution of Oral Questions by Parliamentary Group ...... 218

Table 13: Lebanon Parliament: Oral Questions 1992-2012 ...... 220

Table 14: Morocco HoR: Oral Questions by Sector 2007-2016...... 222

Table 15: Lebanon HoR: Questions by Sector 1992-2012 ...... 223

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration

Figure 1: Parliament's De jure Power ...... 99

Figure 2: Morocco - Development of Parliament's De jure Powers ...... 101

Figure 3: Lebanon - Development of Parliament's De jure Powers ...... 101

Figure 4: Relationship between Representative Constitution Making and Parliamentary De jure Power ...... 104

Figure 5: Accountability: Principles, Agents and Tools ...... 159

Figure 6: Moroccan HoR – Organogram (2012) ...... 217

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

By the beginning of the 21st century, almost all countries had a parliamentary institution.

Only 108 countries had parliaments in the early 1970s but the number of parliamentary institutions has almost doubled in the span of three decades. This recent ‘proliferation’ of parliaments was driven by the belief that “parliaments are the indispensable institutions of representative democracies” as the first Global Parliamentary Report published by the United

Nations Development Program and the Inter-Parliamentary Union asserted (Power 2012, p. 2).

Parliaments give the people they represent the ability to voice their needs and opinions and ensure that the policies that the government adopts respond to those needs.

However, not all parliaments have the power to carry out their role in the same way.

Some parliaments have the power to engage actively in shaping public policies to best serve their constituents and hold the government accountable for implementing those policies in an effective manner. Other parliaments convene as a formality and rubberstamp whatever policies the government proposes to them. Why do their abilities vary so much? Can one parliament change from a rubberstamp to an active parliament, and what causes this change?

This dissertation seeks to answer these questions. To this end, this chapter begins by conceptualizing parliamentary power. It argues that parliamentary power is a two-dimensional concept. The first dimension is parliament’s de jure power, or the powers that legal texts such as constitutions grant to parliament such as ability to initiate and amend laws and hold the executive accountable. For the purposes of this research, constitutions are defined as “sets of rules,

practices, and customs that polities regard as their fundamental law” (Desmith and Brazier, 1989, p. 3-4).

However, as any scholar studying legal texts or practitioners working with parliamentary institution can confirm, having legal power does not automatically imply that a parliament will employ it. For example, a constitution can give the parliament the right to remove the government if it fails to deliver or abuses its authority, yet the parliament might not actually take action to remove the government in such cases. Therefore, the second dimension of parliamentary power is its actual or de facto ability to act on the powers that the legal text delegates to parliament. It should be duly noted that just as parliaments are embedded in a system of governance that binds them to other political institutions and the electorate, parliamentary power is also not an absolute value or a stand-alone concept, but is understood in relation to powers of other political institutions. To clarify, the power of parliament to make laws cannot be understood independently from the executive’s lawmaking powers. For example, a parliament may amend a law but the executive might have the ability to reject those amendments. Hence, to understand the lawmaking power of parliament, the powers of both the parliament and the executive need to be considered.

This dissertation focuses on understanding the causes underlying the variation of parliament’s powers over time. The focus is driven by the normative assumption that democracy as a system of governance is desirable. Since there is a consensus among scholars of democracy on the centrality of parliaments to sustainable democratic development, understanding how parliaments can increase their powers becomes crucial for scholars theorizing on democratic

development as well as for practioners who are working in the field to strengthen these institutions.1

To understand the variation in parliament’s powers and to test the arguments made in this dissertation, I selected the parliaments of Lebanon and Morocco as case studies. While the case selection is justified in the methodology section presented later in this chapter, the reasons driving this selection deserve some attention. Scholars have not studied parliaments in the Arab region as rigorously as in other regions of the world. The paucity of research on Arab parliaments is partly due to the persistence of Arab authoritarian regimes unlike other regions such as Latin America and Eastern Europe that have largely transitioned towards democracy. As a result, political scientists studying the region either dismissed Arab parliaments as feeble democratic facades or agents that contributed to the persistence of the regimes. The second reason that has limited scholarship on Arab parliaments is the lack of available data. Researchers who studied these institutions had to rely on other sources such as case studies of political movements, regime change, or attitudes about these institutions. Rarely were they able to open the “black box” of parliament and study its performance as scholars of parliamentary institutions in other regions have done. By contrast, this dissertation finds that the power of the selected parliaments has varied and grown over time.

The dissertation begins with studying the variation in parliament’s de jure power. Chapter

3 looks at the relation between the constitution making process and the powers that the adopted constitution grants to parliaments. It posits the hypothesis that increased inclusiveness of

1 Scholars studying democratic development have debated the core conditions needed for democratic consolidation extensively. These conditions include having elected officials at the helm of governing institutions and a system of checks and balances that holds the executive accountable to other autonomous institutions including the parliament (Lijphart 1991; O’Donnell 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996; Diamond 1999; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Powell 2000; Strom 2000). 3

political groups represented in the constitution making process increases the powers granted to parliament. The logic underlying this argument is that in the context of democratic transitions, the larger and more diverse the number of players involved in constitution making is, the more likely they will have to compromise to arrive at power sharing formulas that accommodate the different groups. Parliament can provide a major platform for political participation to different and possibly conflicting groups. Therefore, the representation of different groups including contenders in the constitution making process will result in increasing parliament’s powers as it is more likely to allow the largest number of groups to participate. To test this argument, I first develop the De jure Power Index (DPI) to measure the powers of parliament, then create a classification for the levels of participation in constitution making, and finally develop a theoretical model on constitution making and parliamentary power. The findings of Chapter 3 support the hypothesis posited.

The de facto power of parliaments or its ability to perform its functions, namely its legislative and oversight functions, can be affected by a myriad of factors. This dissertation seeks to identify the major variables that explain the parliament’s de facto powers. It argues that variation in parliament’s de facto power is a function of the parliament’s relation with the executive, the organizational capacity of parliament, and the role and nature of political parties represented within it. These main three variables seemed to affect both parliaments’ legislative and oversight de facto powers as Chapters 4 and 5 will demonstrate. The findings in these chapters indicate that over the years in Lebanon and Morocco, parliament’s capacity to initiate laws as well as its ability to question the government has increased.

This chapter proceeds with surveying some of the literature on Arab parliaments. It then elaborates on the conceptualization of parliamentary power and discusses some of the main

theories that have informed this dissertation. It then explains the arguments made in the different chapters, and justifies the methodology used. Finally, the chapter presents the outline of this dissertation.

Parliaments in the Middle East and the Paradox of Active Rubber Stamps

If you have ever witnessed election season in Lebanon, you know what to expect. Large billboards of smiling candidates cover every building facade and meet you at every corner. Your phone rings incessantly with excited supporters on the other end trying to convince you to vote for their candidate. Heated debates between contenders becomes the number one entertainment segment on every television channel. This scene is not particular to Beirut; it is shared in many cities across the Arab region. From Kuwait to Morocco, thousands of candidates competed in elections. Political parties launched expensive campaigns to elect their candidates to parliament.

On election day voters turned out to support their candidates.2 Yet this scene contrasts with the faltering liberalization and democratization processes across the region.

Scholars have studied the conundrum of “electoral authoritarianism” to explain how autocratic rulers are incentivized to engage with political contenders, and what role political institutions such as parliaments and parties play under authoritarianism. Gandhi (2008) argued that these ‘hyped elections’ were a means for authoritarian regimes to secure and legitimize their rule. Institutions provided controlled channels through which political bargaining between authoritarian rulers and possible contenders ensued. This bargaining occurred mostly when the ruler was faced with significant challenges such as external or internal threats to their power. In

2 In Lebanon, the voter turnout rates for elections since 1996 ranged between 44% and 54%. The 1992 elections had an exceptionally low turnout rate of 24% because the major Christian groups boycotted the elections. In Morocco, the lowest voter turnout rate was 37% in the 2007 election and the highest was 58% in the 1997 elections. (Inter- Parliamentary Union, Parline Database) 5

line with this, Brown (2003) argued that authoritarian regimes were forced to open space for controlled political liberalization as a result of international pressure, as well as their need to parry the opposition during politically sensitive times. This pressure led to constitutional reforms that gave elected institutions such as parliaments more prerogatives, while maintaining the upper hand of the ruling executive (President/King).

Ellen Lust (2009) found that elites in authoritarian regimes engaged in competitive clientelism. Elections provided them with an opportunity to compete over special access to a limited set of state resources that, once in power, they can distribute to their constituents.

Constituents on the other hand are heavily dependent on their elected officials for provision of services in light of difficult economic conditions, high unemployment rates, and the weak role of local governance authorities. As a result, candidates and parties competing in the elections prioritize public services as part of their campaigns to attract votes (Cammett and Issar, 2010).

The resulting clientelistic nature of the elite-citizen relationship weakened political parties and parliaments and reinforced the regimes (Lust 2009, Liddell 2010).

This literature viewed parliaments as means for prolonging the rule of authoritarian regimes and at best dismissed them as rubberstamps that served as democratic facades in failed democratization attempts (Sweet 2001, Sater 2009). Scholars studying authoritarianism and democratization in the Middle East shared the view that there is “little cause for optimism that authoritarian countries in the Middle East will undergo transitions to democracy in the future.”

(Posusney and Angrist, 2005, p.16) They argued that the absence of checks and balances, weak institutions, and limited powers of the parliaments vis-à-vis the executive are among the main reasons why authoritarianism is likely to remain prevalent (Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoso, 2008;

Sadiki, 2009). In his research on Morocco, Liddell (2010) concluded that in light of prevalent

clientelism “real political reform in Morocco is not likely to come from ‘parties’ or the parliament. Then again, it would be an insult to most Moroccans to suggest otherwise” (Liddell

2010, p. 328).

While the above literature makes compelling arguments about state-society relations and authoritarian strategies of survival, it contrasts with evidence from a number of Arab parliaments that have become increasingly more active over time. Members of parliament (MPs) in Lebanon and Morocco sat through hundreds of hours of committee and general assembly meetings, debated and enacted a vast number of laws, and forced powerful executives to answer thousands of questions (Baaklini et. al 1999, Sulaiman 2007, Daher and Ghannam 2010). For example, the

1996 Lebanese parliament rebuffed the Prime Minister’s repeated requests for ‘delegated legislation’ authority, which would have increased the cabinet’s decree power (Baaklini et. al

1999). In Morocco, parliamentarians addressed thousands of questions to the government on different issues including those that were previously considered taboo such as the fate of political prisoners, practices of the armed forces, and the national security strategy.

Are parliaments really rubber stamps, if they bother to convene on a regular basis, initiate and pass laws, and try to hold a domineering executive accountable? The research surveyed above does not provide a convincing answer to these questions. It treats parliaments as static organizations and fails to explain why a parliament’s ability to legislate and oversee the government might change in light of persisting clientelistic relations and sub-optimal democratic settings. One possible reason behind the disconnect between the extant scholarship and these findings is that the researchers did not really open the ‘black box’ of parliaments and relied on other sources in their analysis, most likely due to the difficulty of accessing these institutions and obtaining the needed data.

Some of this scholarship relied heavily on public opinion surveys that revealed how the public perceived elections, parties and the parliament (Lust 2009; Sater 2009). The authors argued that the nature of the state-society relationships has prevented democratic consolidation in the Middle East. While these findings are telling about the crisis of public trust in the state and its institutions including the parliament, they are not very telling about the institutions themselves. The crisis of public trust is not limited to transitioning democracies or the Middle

East. In fact, the “Global Parliamentary Report,” showed that parliaments across the world are facing a public trust problem, as repeated opinion surveys demonstrate that parliaments were among the least trusted state institutions. Even in developed democracies, public trust in legislatures has been waning, averaging around thirty percent in European Union (EU) countries and dropping to nine percent in the United States in 2011.3

Similarly, Liddell (2010) focused on the establishment of pro-palace parties to demonstrate how Moroccan politics revolves around “notables” and their clientelistic and personalistic relations rather than ideology and institutions. Gandhi’s (2008) research examined the pacting process between authoritarian rulers and contenders. Her case studies on Morocco and Kuwait focused on the early days of the state when the first constitutions were drafted but did not trace how the institutions enshrined in these constitutions have developed. This is not to say that the parliaments in the Middle East are functional or powerful, just that the majority of scholarship on parliaments has not been very informative. They particularly fail to explain how these institutions would develop without a major shift in the political paradigm brought about by major regime change (such as a political coup or a revolution).

3 See Power, G. (2012) for more on the findings of this report. 8

Legislative Politics in the Arab World departs from the above trend (Baaklini et. al,

1999). The authors study six parliaments and argue that these parliaments have been crucial for the democratization process in the Arab region. They create a typology of parliament’s strength based on two dimensions: centrality and capacity. Centrality consists of parliaments constitutional powers, policymaking power, and ability to “resist actions emanating from the executive,” while capacity refers to parliaments organizational strength such as its committee system and the expertise of its staff. While Baaklini et.al (1999) provided very rich historical evidence of the evolution of parliamentary institutions, it offered little analysis of the causes underlying their evolution. The methodology suffered from vagueness as the authors do not clearly operationalize their variables and the reader is unsure of how the authors categorized their cases (Brown, 2000). Although their typology rests on centrality and capacity, the latter takes a back seat in their analysis and it is not clear how capacity affects the parliaments’ performance.

Finally, while the authors rely on their wealth of experience with these institutions, the evidence they offer on the parliament’s centrality is limited to few anecdotal examples across the cases.

In her review of Baaklini et.al (1999), Ellen Lust (2000) acknowledged its contribution in drawing the attention to why parliaments matter in the Middle East, and to one of the important questions that the book inspires: what explains the change in parliamentary powers? This is the main question that this dissertation answers; and its findings indicate that contrary to the prevalent scholarship on parliaments in the region, these institutions have changed. Their legislative and oversight capacities have increased over time and their organizational capacity has developed. While they may not be as efficacious as parliaments in developed democracies, one should not dismiss them as rubberstamps either.

Conceptualizing Parliamentary Power: The Theoretical Framework of the Dissertation

Parliaments around the world vary in terms of their composition, the functions they perform, and the way they choose to organize their work. Yet, what they have in common and what defines them as parliaments is that they are “constitutionally designated institutions for giving assent to binding measures of public policy, that assent being given on behalf of a political community that extends beyond the government elite responsible for formulating those measures” (Norton, 1990, p.1).

Norton’s definition reflects the three main functions of parliament that Sartori (1987) identified: representation, legislation, and oversight. The first function is evident in parliament’s ability to represent the citizens. The legislative function of parliament is its ability to initiate legislation as well as to amend or reject legislation proposed by the executive. The oversight function of parliament is its responsibility to enforce a system of checks and balances through holding the executive accountable for the implementation of its policies, and preventing any possible abuse of authority. Parliamentary power, which was discussed earlier in the introduction, is therefore defined in the context of this dissertation as parliament’s ability to carry out its three major functions of representation, legislation, and oversight. Therefore, change in parliamentary power refers to the increase or decrease of parliament’s ability to carry out its functions. Positive change refers to increases in parliament’s ability and negative change, a decrease in representation, legislation, and oversight.

To conceptualize parliamentary power, this dissertation builds on Arter’s (2007) research on comparing and classifying legislatures. He warns scholars studying parliaments from conflating the ‘potential policy capacity’ that is granted to it by the constitution and the political system, with ‘legislative performance’ or the actual policy output of parliaments. This distinction is important to make to understand parliamentary power accurately. Just because parliaments 10

possess constitutional powers does not guarantee that they will act on these powers as the experience of many Middle Eastern parliaments shows. For example, the majority of these parliaments have the power to remove the head of the government with a vote of no confidence, yet they rarely use this power.

This dissertation argues that parliamentary power is a two-dimensional concept. De jure parliamentary power is determined by the prerogatives that the constitution and other legal texts grant to the parliament. Parliament’s de facto power is its ability to translate the legal prerogatives into action. For example, parliament can have the de jure power to initiate a law.

This power will be stipulated in the legal framework governing the parliament, typically the constitution and the parliamentary bylaws. The de facto lawmaking power of parliament would be parliamentarians actually drafting a law. Therefore, to understand the power of a parliament, one has to consider both dimensions.

This approach differs from some of the main scholarship on conceptualizing and measuring parliamentary power such as that of Fish (2006) and Fish and Kroenig (2009), who conflate the two dimensions. David Arter (2007) raises the problem of the absence of precision tools with which to measure legislature’s policy power. Chapter 3 of this dissertation develops the De jure Power Index (DPI) in response to this need. It builds on the work of Fish and

Kroenig (2009) among other scholars to present a more “fine-tuned” measurement for parliaments de jure power that encompasses its representative, legislative and oversight powers as well as its level of autonomy and institutional capacity and other specified powers. The methodology section below elaborates further on the DPI.

De jure Power of Parliament: A Theory on Participation, Constitution Making and Parliamentary Power

The first part of the dissertation focuses on the de jure power of parliament. Chapter 2 builds on pacting theory and the work of O’Donnell and Schmitter to analyze the effect of political pacting on parliament’s de jure power during democratic transitions. It argues that parliament’s de jure power is at the heart of pact making processes, especially in authoritarian regimes, because parliament provides a channel for power sharing and political participation to the different actors including challengers to the existing regime. It also argues that pacting and opening of the parliamentary sphere to regime challengers can have unintended consequences that the authoritarian regime cannot fully predict at the time of pacting. For example, parliamentary participation provides challengers with a learning opportunity to gain political experience. Challengers learn how to use the parliament as a platform to publicly express their demands from the regime and test the limits of their bargaining power. They can also learn to use parliamentary sessions that receive public’s attention to mobilize public support and further pressure the regime. This political experience is useful to them when the next round of pacting with the regime occurs (if it occurs frequently) to further push the limits of their demands. The experience of the opposition parties in the Moroccan parliament in the early nineties is a good example of such unintended consequences of pacting. In 1990, after years of deliberation with

King Hassan II regarding political liberties and constitutional reform, the opposition parties submitted a motion of ‘no confidence’ against the government. They also used the parliamentary platform to garner public support and mobilized their supporters in mass demonstrations.

Observers argue that this “move” that the parliamentary opposition took in parliament had a snowball effect and initiated the series of political reforms including the adoption of two constitutions in 1992 and 1996.

Chapter 2 finds the case of Morocco particularly helpful to test this argument given the long struggle between the Monarchy and opposition parties and the frequency of pacting. The

King and the political parties engaged in a pacting process every time the King came under pressure (foreign threat to territorial unity, coup d’état attempt, international pressure for democratization etc.). Each pacting process resulted in some gains for the opposition including added powers to the parliament that they had been demanding. Therefore, reducing the results of these pacting processes to a regime’s survival strategies as some scholars have argued such as

Gandhi (2008) diminishes the agency of the contenders and their role in furthering the democratization process and strengthening parliament.

Democratic transition in this dissertation is understood in terms of transition theory posited by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986 and later works). The authors divide the democratic transition process into three phases: liberalization, democratization, and consolidation.

Liberalization begins when the ruling regime initiates political openings for its challengers and ends with its demise. The democratization phase is characterized by institution building and developing rules that govern the democratic process, such as adopting a new constitution.

Consolidation is when democracy becomes the “only game in town” (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p.

5), with elections held regularly, having functioning democratic institutions, and the presence of a “political society.” The selected cases of Lebanon and Morocco (from the 1990s until the present day) studied in this dissertation blur the lines between the liberalization and democratization phase as they transition from one phase to another. For example, in Morocco the power of the regime gradually decreased as political institutions developed and civil and political liberties increased. In Lebanon, the withdrawal of Syrian forces in Lebanon in 2005 ushered in new democratization processes. These processes, however, were halted or even reversed at times

due to the political turmoil and violence that followed. The rationale behind selecting these cases is elaborated upon in the methodology section below, and chapter two provides contextual knowledge about the experience of both countries in democratic transition.

However, these governing institutions do not arise overnight. Another assumption made in this dissertation is that strong functioning parliaments cannot be “parachuted” into a country.

They must instead develop and gain incremental power over time even under less than ideal conditions such as authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. Therefore, understanding the conditions that contribute to increasing parliament’s power to carry out its representative, legislative and oversight roles allows scholars, practioners, and political actors to explore ways to instigate democratization processes given that functioning parliaments are a requirement for sustainable democracy, as argued earlier. This is particularly relevant in the context of the Arab region, which has been characterized by a “democratic deficit,” in light of the persistence of undemocratic regimes and faltering democratic development despite citizens’ demands for democratic rule (Posusney and Angrist, 2005; Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoso, 2008).4

One way of ushering in democratic transition is through constitutional reform, i.e., amending existing constitutions or adopting new ones. Constitutions determine the political system, whether it is presidential, parliamentary, or a hybrid system. It stipulates the powers delegated to each of the main branches of government, and regulates the relationship among these institutions, as well as the relation between state and society (Strom et.al, 2003). Therefore,

4 The Arab Barometer, a public opinion survey conducted in several Arab countries, found an overwhelming support for democracy as a system of governance. This was consistent across the two waves of the survey (2006-2007 and 2010-2011). The survey findings showed that the range of support of democracy as a system of governance ranged between 83-96% across the countries (Tessler et.al, 2014).

to study the de jure power of parliament, a researcher has to start by examining the powers granted to it by the constitution. This is the focus of the third chapter of this dissertation.

Chapter 3 builds on theories of constitution making (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) and studies the impact of the constitution making process on the de jure powers of parliament. It posits the hypothesis that increased inclusiveness of political groups represented in the constitution making process increases the powers granted to parliament. The logic underlying this argument is that during moments of political transition, which are marked by constitution making, regime contenders will try to shape the constitution in a way that would increase their access to and representation in state institutions after the constitution is adopted. Therefore, including more political actors and contenders in the constitution making process will increase the need for arriving at power sharing formulas that can satisfy the different actors. Parliaments can offer a platform for participation of more actors in decision-making and governance compared to other state institutions such as the executive. It is also an elected institution rather than appointed an appointed one and therefore easier to access. It thus follows that the increase in the number of actors will result in increasing the powers of the parliamentary institution as it provides the largest number of them with access to state power. It is important to note that this hypothesis is not limited to the number of actors represented in the constitution making process, but rather the inclusivity of this representation. For example, if ten different political actors are represented in the constitution making process, but all ten of them are similar and conservative, while the three main liberal parties are excluded, we cannot consider this drafting process representative.

I test the hypothesis posited in Chapter 3 ‘increased inclusiveness of political groups represented in the constitution making process increases the powers granted to parliament’

using all instances of constitutions and constitutional reforms adopted in Lebanon and Morocco from the beginning of the modern state (the first constitutions were adopted in 1926 and 1962 respectively).

In addition to constitutions, I also analyze parliamentary bylaws. The reason why these bylaws are included in the analysis is that while constitutions draw the limits of parliamentary power they do not necessarily specify in detail how these powers are carried out. For example, the constitution may stipulate the right of parliament to hold the executive accountable, however the tools to hold the executive accountable such as parliamentary questions and the right to form committees of inquiry are typically stipulated in parliamentary bylaws. Parliamentary bylaws on the other hand cannot give parliament powers that exceed those granted in the constitution. For example, if the parliament’s right to hold the executive accountable is not enshrined in the constitution, the bylaws cannot grant the parliament such a right. Chapter 3 builds on the available literature on constitution making and develops a classification for parliaments along three categories, non-representative, semi-representative, and representative. It also develops the

De jure Power Index to measure parliament’s de jure power. The composite index is composed of thirty-six dichotomous variables that capture the representative, legislative, and oversight powers of parliament in addition to its autonomy and institutional capacity. Finally, the chapter presents a theoretical model on constitution making and parliamentary power, and the findings of the analysis supports the hypothesis posited.

My hypothesis differs from arguments made by other scholars on constitution making, political actors and institutional choice in that it adopts a “legislature centric” approach and looks at the effect of the constitution making process on the powers of parliament specifically. In comparison, other scholars such as Negretto (2013) adopted an executive–centric approach.

Negretto studies the effect of the constitution drafting process on the powers granted to the

President or head of the executive. He argues that if a single party dominates the constituent assembly responsible for drafting the constitution, then the outcome will typically be in favor of reinforcing the party’s electoral advantage (through adopting electoral rules and posing feeble constraints on presidential re-election). If the constitution however, is negotiated by multiple parties then the different parties will compromise, resulting in concentrating more powers in the hands of the executive, but imposing stricter term limits.

Shugart (1998) focuses on the effect of the type of political parties participating in constitution making on the distribution of powers between the branches of government. Shugart however, confines his model to who has the power to pass policies, without addressing other powers that the legislative or executive enjoy. This approach limits the understanding of the full scope of powers of each institution. For example, even if the executive has the power to pass legislation by decrees without resorting to parliament, parliament can still hold it accountable via its oversight powers. The argument presented in Chapter 3 therefore adopts a wider lens to capture parliamentary power that goes beyond the choice of political system and the powers of the executive. Parliament’s powers that are studied include its autonomy from the executive, ability to hold the executive accountable, as well as its policy-making ability.

De facto Power of Parliament: Variables that Explain Variance

The second part of my dissertation studies the de facto powers of parliament. It builds on regional comparative research on parliaments in transitioning democracies in Latin America and

Africa (Morgenstern and Nacif, 2002, Barkan, 2009). These studies suggest a plethora of variables that have affected parliaments’ powers to carry out its functions in each region, such as the size of the majorities the executive enjoys in parliament and the level of professionalization 17

of parliamentarians. Chapters four and five test the effect of the variables presented in this scholarship and derive new variables that have a significant effect on parliament’s de facto powers.

Chapter 4 focuses on the de facto legislative power of parliament, i.e., its ability to initiate member bills and amend draft laws submitted by the executive. It argues that the de facto legislative power of parliament is determined by the nature of the executive-legislative relations, the organizational capacity of parliament, and the role and nature of political parties represented within it. To test its argument, I build an original dataset of all the laws initiated by parliament and draft laws submitted by the government in Lebanon (1992-2014) and Morocco (1997-2016).

I also conducted more than forty interviews with parliamentarians, parliamentary staff, and ministers among others. The methodology section presented later in this chapter justifies and elaborates on the methodology used.

The findings presented in the chapter show that the parliament’s ability to initiate laws in both countries has increased despite the negative impact of the relationship with the executive.

The executive in the context of this dissertation refers to the head of the state (president/King) and the government (council of ministers). The second variable that was identified to affect legislative de facto power is the organizational capacity of parliament, which this chapter argues is the function of its level of institutionalization and the human and material resources available to it. To measure institutionalization this chapter adopts Copeland and Patterson’s (1994) definition of institutionalization of parliaments, i.e., its level of formality, complexity, uniformity, and autonomy. The findings of the research indicate that over the years both parliaments have increasingly institutionalized. However, the degree of institutionalization does not necessarily determine the resources available to parliament. For example, a parliament can

have detailed rules of procedure, routinized behavior of committee work and plenary meetings, and a clearly defined organizational structure but still suffer from severe understaffing that hinders the ability of the parliamentarian to engage effectively in the lawmaking process. Both parliaments have increased their resources over the years, however, they both continue to face severe limitations in terms of their resources particularly the availability of skilled staff.

According to interviews with MPs, limited resources had the biggest impact on their day-to-day legislative work.

Scholars studying the lawmaking powers of parliament, such as Polsby (1975) and

Mezey (1979), acknowledged the importance of organizational capacity, but they did not integrate it into their theories on classifying legislative powers of parliament. Furthermore, their theories on classifying legislatures which are surveyed in Chapter 4 do not serve to explain how one parliament can move from one classification of legislative power to another (i.e., from having weak legislative capacity to having strong legislative capacity). The argument made in

Chapter 4 serves to explain this transition or change in legislative capacity.

The role of parties within parliament is the third major variable which influences parliament’s legislative capacity. Similar to Cox and McCubbins’ (1993) argument, this chapter argues that political parties in parliament behave as “legislative cartels” shaping the policy output of parliament through controlling who gets elected to the powerful positions within parliaments such as committee chairs or members of the parliamentary bureau and by ensuring party voting discipline. In addition, parties have also tried to increase parliamentary meeting attendance. Absenteeism had been a major problem that limited the capacity of both parliaments in Lebanon and Morocco, and meetings were often held with minimum quorums. Parties such as the PJD in Morocco have used the stick and carrot approach to incentivize their members to

attend, which proved to be a successful approach as attendance increased. However, as the data analysis shows, the performance of the different parties (even those with comparable sizes) varied in terms of legislative initiatives. The last section of Chapter 4 argues that parties that are embedded or closely connected with their base, that have institutionalized their internal governance, and that were less personalistic were more likely to assist their MPs during the lawmaking process.

The second dimension of parliament’s de facto power is its oversight capacity. The three main variables identified in Chapter 4 that affected parliaments and resulted in the increase of their de facto lawmaking capacity, influenced their de facto oversight capacity as well. Chapter

5, which focuses on parliament’s capacity to hold the executive accountable, finds agency theory particularly helpful to present its argument. Agency theory models the executive-legislative relation, as well as their relation with citizens, in terms of agents and principals. The model highlights the leverage that the principals have to hold agents accountable. For example, in the case of the government’s accountability to parliament, where the parliament is the principal and the executive is the agent, the parliament has an array of tools that it uses to hold the executive accountable, such as parliamentary questions and committees of inquiry.

I created an original dataset of all the parliamentary questions that MPs addressed to the executive in Lebanon and Morocco. Findings presented in the chapter showed a significant increase in Morocco’s House of Representatives (HoR) capacity to oversee the executive. For example, the number of questions that parliamentarians addressed to the executive almost tripled in the Moroccan 2011 HoR compared to the 1997 HoR. In Lebanon, the series of political crises that the country witnessed since 2005 have negatively affected the parliament including its ability to oversee the government. However, despite these crises (elaborated in later chapters) the

parliament’s ability to engage in the budget process and to scrutinize the budget, has considerably increased.

One factor that Chapter 5 highlights is the opposition’s role in enlarging the parliament’s oversight capacity. In Lebanon, a strong opposition entered parliament following the Syrian regime’s withdrawal from Lebanon and contributed to the increase of the parliament’s role in overseeing the public budget. Another factor that seemed to have a pronounced effect on parliaments oversight capacity is the presence (or absence) of vertical accountability. This factor is particularly prominent in the case of Lebanon, where the confessional-tribal relations that bind constituents to their representatives has eroded vertical accountability. MPs who are elected along those social divisions are not held accountable by their electorate and therefore do not have the incentive to carry out their roles.

In addition to identifying variables that result in the increase (or decrease) of parliaments de facto power, chapter five also incorporates the accountability role of parliament into its theory on parliamentary power. The majority of the scholarship that will be discussed in chapters 4 and

5 classify parliaments, focusing on their lawmaking capacity only. This dissertation departs from this scholarship by focusing on both the lawmaking capacity of parliament as well as its capacity to hold the executive accountable.

Neo-Institutionalism Theory as a Methodological Approach

The overarching methodological approach adopted in this research is based on neo- institutionalist theory, and therefore it is important to elaborate on the theory and the reasons it is a good fit for this research before proceeding to the methodology section below. Neo- institutionalism theory developed as a result of the behavioral revolution in the sixties and seventies. It departed from the rule-centered legalistic view of classical institutionalism (Rhodes

et. al 2006) and shifted focus from structures and functions of institutions to their agents. Scott

(1987) categorized neo-institutional theories into two main schools: rational choice and historical institutionalism. Hall and Taylor (1996) suggested a third school, sociological institutionalism.

Historical institutionalism (HI) theories conceptualize the relationship between institutions and individual behavior in broad terms, emphasizing asymmetries of power in operation and development of institutions. According to HI, agents act strategically, but the strategies can harden overtime to become conventions that in turn shape agent’s behavior (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Institutional change is slow. HI theorists argue that once created, the life of the institution is shaped by a self- reinforcement process that increases the cost of reversal over time (Mahoney, 2000). They rely on methods of induction and path dependency, which traces periods of continuity that are separated by critical junctures (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). These junctures are what often bring about institutional change. HI also focuses on the “unintended consequences” of institutional design. HI theory was criticized for its weakness in explaining institutional change, which tends to happen more often than not (Elkins et al. 2009). Another weakness of HI theory is that it does not really address “how” institutions affect the behavior of agents, nor does it explain why critical junctures happen when they happen.

Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) is better equipped to explain how the rules affect the behavior of individuals. It draws from organizational economics, focusing on transaction costs, and the principals who monitor and enforce compliance on agents (North, 1990). It is based on the assumption that actors have a fixed set of preferences and their behavior is geared towards maximizing the utility and attainment of those preferences. Therefore, collective action suffers as individuals, who are seeking to maximize their own utility, are likely to produce collectively sub-optimal outcomes.

RCI theories argue that institutional change is the result of a change in the interests or the resources of actors in power (Riker, 1980). One of the weaknesses of RCI is that it provides a simplistic understanding of human behavior that does not explain well the changes in preferences, or individual actions that do not serve these preferences. Also, RCI does not offer a strong explanation of why institutions persist despite changing individual preferences. The last school of neo-institutionalism, sociological institutionalism (SI), responds to this criticism of

RCI by arguing that individuals are not always strategic and utility maximizers because culture affects them. Institutions therefore are built on culturally specific practices and institutional change is brought by the need to reinforce social legitimacy.

Some of the more recent research bridges historical and rational choice institutionalism.

One good example of this is Negretto’s (2013) research on constitutional design. He argues that constitutional choice is endogenous to the performance of preexisting constitutional structures as well as to the partisan interests and relative power of reformers. According to him, “no institution is created ex nihilo; new institutions always retain remnants of their past selves.

Within constraints of preexisting structures and trajectories, however, there is always room for choice” (Negretto 2013, p. 4)

Similarly, my research also benefits from the three schools of neo-institutionalism.

Formal and informal rules shape parliaments, such as constitutions, bylaws and rules of procedure that govern the behavior of its members. These rules bind the behavior of the agents

(individual staff and members of parliament) and limit their choice of action to what is permissible according to these rules. Yet, these agents possess the capacity to change the rules over time. One of the assumptions made in this dissertation is that agents are rational and aim to maximize their utility, which as Mayhew (1974) argues is to secure their re-election. This

dissertation looks at institutions over a relatively long time period, focusing on critical junctures such as constitutional changes and political upheavals, to understand what brings change to the parliamentary institution and its power. It also considers the varying powers of the different actors within it such as the majority and opposition groups. Finally, I am aware of the possible effect of cultural norms on institutions, such as the nature of state-society relationship. This is exemplified for instance by the tribal and clientelistic relation that binds members of parliaments

(MPs) to their constituents and the effect that has on their ability to perform their work. The dissertation controls for the effect of culture on parliamentary institutions through the case selection, which is discussed in the methodology section below.

Methodology

Case Selection

As discussed above, this dissertation focuses on understanding how and why parliament’s power changes in the context of a transitioning democracy. To this end, it follows a case study approach, which is “a detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test… explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 5).

George and Bennett (2005) argue that case studies are particularly helpful for deriving new hypotheses, exploring causal mechanisms, and modeling and assessing complex causal relations

(pp. 22-23). The case study approach is also encouraged by Yin (2014) who argues that case studies are particularly helpful when the research question is a “how” or “why” question.

I chose to focus my research on parliaments in the Arab region as they have been understudied in the comparative legislative studies. Furthermore, a regional focus allows one to control for culture, norms and language that proponents of cultural institutionalism argue can affect institutions. From the Arab region, two countries, Lebanon and Morocco, were selected as

case studies. In addition to the cultural similarity, both countries are middle-income countries, which would control for the possible effect of economy. Both countries have weak militaries, which controls for a possible effect of the military institution on parliament. Both countries were a French protectorate. This controls any influence that the colonial power had on shaping the political institutions that were installed in the countries under its rule, since institutions carry remnants of their past selves as Negretto (2013) pointed out.

Finally, issues of accessibility and eligibility also influenced the choice of these two countries. Some of the countries in the Middle East were inaccessible during the time of research due to political turmoil and violence. These included Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

Secondly, some of the countries do not have directly elected parliaments, which is a condition for this research. Therefore, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates could not be selected either

The time period covered in the first section of the research spans from the establishment of the modern state until today. The pacting process and the constitutions and constitutional reforms adopted are analyzed in chapters two and three. The second section of the research focuses on the time period between the 1990s and present day. During these years, Lebanon,

Morocco, and a large number of countries in the region witnessed significant political openings as countries embarked on processes of liberalization and democratization, and many countries reformed their constitutions. The parliamentary institutions also witnessed a gradual resurgence in the region during this period.

While two countries were chosen as the focus of this research, each elected parliament is treated as a separate case. To clarify, in Lebanon there were five elected parliaments (1992,

1996, 2000, 2005, and 2009) during this period and in Morocco there were four elected

parliaments (1997, 2002, 2007, and 2011). Therefore, this dissertation looks at a total of eleven cases. This allows for enough variance in the cases, which is needed for sound case selection as discussed below.

The case selection adheres to Mill’s joint method of case selection which requires variation in predictors and outcomes of the cases (Mill, 1970). Despite the similarities discussed above which allow for controlling exogenous factors that may have a confounding effect on parliament’s power, the cases also vary in significant ways both in terms of predictors and outcomes. During the time period covered in this dissertation, both countries, as well as the rest of the region, witnessed a variation in the level of democracy. Since the early nineties, the region has witnessed major political openings including major constitutional developments in many countries, and the initiation of political liberalization and democratization. For example,

Freedom House (an indicator commonly used to measure level of democracy) labeled Lebanon

‘not free’ prior to 2005 but after the 2005 election it became ‘partly free.’ The variation in the level of democracy has impacted the parliaments especially since new constitutions were adopted and new political actors entered parliament.

Both countries showed variation in terms of predictors identified in this dissertation. For example, the main predictor in the argument made in chapter three about constitutional development is participation, which varies across the cases selected. The main predictors in chapters four and five are political parties, parliamentary opposition, and organizational capacity of parliament, which also vary across the cases selected, as shall be demonstrated in later chapters.

Also, both countries witnessed a variation parliamentary power (both negative and positive), during the years studied. For example, the de jure power of parliament (the output in

chapter three) varies across the cases, as does the number of laws initiated and the oversight activity of both parliaments (some of the main indicators used in chapters four and five). This dissertation aims to explain why there was a variance observed in both parliaments.

One of the main differences between my cases is the political system.5 Lebanon is a parliamentary system and Morocco is a constitutional monarchy. Using Mill’s ‘method of difference’ this can be an obstacle since variation between cases can be influenced by this difference, however by studying each case over time, the I expected to find variation within the same country or system, which would be explained by the predictors. Moreover, recent research has shown that variance of political system (parliamentary, presidential, semi-presidential etc.) is not a key determinant of parliamentary power (Fish and Kroenig 2009).6

Data Sources

Field Work

One of the main obstacles facing researchers studying the Middle East is the availability and accessibility of data. Baaklini et al (1999) argued that the scarcity of data is one of the

5 This dissertation does not dwell on defining and differentiating political systems (presidential, parliamentary, semi presidential etc.) as it has been widely debated by scholars (Duverger, 1980; Lijphart, 1984; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Stepan and Skach, 1993; Sartori 1997, Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997; Elgie 1998, 1999; and Strom et.al, 2003). There is extensive research on the effect of political systems on democratization and stability. Some scholars argued in favor of parliamentarism as a system that promotes or is conducive for democracy (Linz, 1994; Kaiser, 1997; Riggs, 1988; Stepan and Skach, 1993; Przeworski et al 2000) while others argue for the advantages of presidential systems (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). Other scholars go beyond the parliamentary-presidential divide altogether and look at other factors that affect democracy and development, such as the effect of environment on socio-economic development (Lane and Ersson, 2000); electoral system design (Powell, 2000; and Lijphart 1999); number and preference of veto players in policy making (Tsebelis, 1995, 2002; Eaton, 2000).

6 Fish and Kroenig’s findings suggest that the powers of the parliament vary significantly across countries regardless of the political system in place. For example, the parliamentary power of the parliaments of Germany and Macedonia that they measured were considerably higher than those of Australia and Thailand despite all sharing a parliamentary system. Similarly, great variation of legislative power was found among semi-presidential systems such as that between the powerful legislatures of Austria and Mongolia, compared to the weaker legislatures of Russia and Kazakhstan. They also find cases of parliaments across different systems that share similar power.

reasons why parliaments in the Middle East are so understudied compared to parliaments in other regions of the world. In light of this deficit in readily available data, I conducted field research in

Morocco and Lebanon. The first field visit to Morocco stretched between April and July of 2014.

The first field visit to Lebanon was conducted between July and September of 2014 and a follow-up visit was conducted in May of 2015.

The field research included accessing the parliamentary archives of Morocco and

Lebanon as well as conducting interviews with members of parliaments, parliamentary staff, members of the executive, and members of civil society organizations.7 While the parliamentary archives are open, they are not easily accessible. I received the approval of the Secretary General of the Moroccan House of Representatives (HoR) to conduct my research. He also extended his help by offering me office space and the aid of a research assistant. At the Lebanese HoR, the

Secretary General also offered access to parliamentary records and the assistance of the legislative expert at the parliament.

The data sources that were used to build the De jure Power Index and the datasets discussed below included Constitutions; parliamentary bylaws; laws pertaining to parliamentary organization (such as laws on staff, and organizational structure); minutes of general assembly meetings; summary of annual parliamentary proceedings; and statistics obtained from parliamentary staff. I obtained some of the data on Morocco for the more recent years from the parliamentary website (2007-2016).

7 IRB approval (Protocol #14059) was received on 3/26/2014, with a modification approved on 04/18/2014, in which the protocol was amended to waive the request for written consent form as that proved to discourage interviewees. Instead, oral consent was obtained from the interviewees, including explicit consent for any material that would be quoted in this research. Another modification was obtained to 16/03/17 to extend the IRB prior to its expiration. 28

To measure parliament’s de jure power, this dissertation conducts content analysis of

Constitutions, constitutional amendments, and parliamentary bylaws adopted since the establishment of the modern state in Lebanon and Morocco (1926 and 1962 respectively). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the reason the parliamentary bylaws were also analyzed is that while constitutions often stipulate the general principles such as the ability of parliament to hold the executive accountable, bylaws detail those powers. However, the bylaws cannot grant parliament powers that go beyond the principles specified in the constitution.

Building on the research of Shugart and Carey (1992) and Fish and Kroenig (2006), a new index is proposed to measure the de jure power of parliament, the De jure Power Index

(DPI). The composite index is composed of thirty-six variables that measure the de jure powers that the constitution and parliamentary bylaws grant to parliament. The variables proposed measure the representation, lawmaking and oversight powers of parliament as well as its institutional autonomy and organizational capacity. The variables are all equally weighted and dichotomous. For example, the variable measuring parliament’s right to initiate laws was coded as 1 if the parliament had the power to initiate laws or 0 if the parliament lacked it. DPI scores are used to measure the variation in parliament’s de jure power across the different constitutions and to test the hypothesis proposed in chapter three on the relation between the constitution making process and the powers given to parliament.

Two original datasets were also built. The first dataset is used in chapter four to analyze parliament’s legislative performance, i.e., its capacity to initiate member bills and pass draft laws. The dataset codes all member bills initiated by parliamentarians as well as all executive draft laws passed in parliament in Morocco (1997-2016) and Lebanon (1992 – 2012), controlling

for political party affiliation, position in the majority or opposition, and if the law was passed or not (the success rate of the laws).

The second dataset coded all parliamentary questions addressed by members of the

Lebanese and Moroccan HoRs to the government, controlling for political party affiliation, position in the majority or opposition, and whether the question was answered or not and the subject of the question. Parliamentary questions are one of the most commonly used tools to oversee the executive. Therefore, this dataset was used in the analysis of parliament’s capacity to hold the executive accountable in chapter five. Chapters four and five justify the selection of the variables and controls and acknowledge the limitations of the datasets.

Interviews

To overcome the dataset limitations and to provide more in-depth understanding of the questions and arguments made in this dissertation, more than forty interviews were conducted.

The interviews were semi-structured and relied on open-ended questions to facilitate discussion.

Depending on the role and level of knowledge of the interviewee, the interviews ranged from half an hour to several hours. Some follow-up interviews were also conducted with the interviewees when needed. The interviews provided the grounds for the qualitative analysis of the parliament’s power, both de jure and de facto. They made it possible to identify and interpret the reasons underlying the variation observed in parliament’s power.

I utilized my professional network I had built over the years from working as a parliamentary development specialist for international organizations in the Middle East.

Interviewees included parliamentarians representing different political parties, heads of parliamentary groups, parliamentary committee chairs, as well as the parliaments secretary generals, committee staff, parliamentary group staff, and parliamentary administration staff.

Many of the MPs and staff interviewed have been in the parliament since the early nineties and some even earlier, and therefore their institutional memory was very insightful to highlight the difficulties faced and progress made over the years.

Interviews were also conducted with a limited number of ministers, members of the

Constitutional Council, Audit Bureau, civil society, and the media to understand the relation of parliament with these bodies, and the external perception of parliamentary performance. Finally, in addition to archival research and interviews, I attended several parliamentary general assembly sessions (in Morocco) to observe the proceedings and the interactions among members of the majority, opposition, and executive.

Additionally, the I draw on interviews with more than thirty parliamentarians and staffers from Kuwait, Jordan, and Tunisia that she conducted between 2014 and 2016 as part of my consultancy work for the World Bank, during which she was commissioned to conduct capacity assessments of the Parliaments of the three countries. These interviews provided me with a comparative regional perspective that I build on in the conclusion when I discuss whether the findings of this dissertation can be extrapolated to other countries at least within the Arab region.

Finally, the methodology in this dissertation meets Arter’s (2007) recommendations on studying the performance of parliaments or its de facto power. He identified three key conditions for accurately capturing parliament’s power. The first is temporal, as it is important to gain longitudinal perspective to properly measure change in performance over time. The second is quantitative, as he advises researchers to look at the output of legislatures (number of laws initiated, for example). The final condition is qualitative. Arter advises researchers to look beyond the quantitative output of parliament to the importance of this output. For example, it is not enough to look at the number of questions that parliamentarians address to the executive but

the impact of those questions need to be determined, and whether they resulted in a change in government behavior or policies.

This dissertation studies the de jure power of parliament since the establishment of the modern state in each country and analyzes the variation in the de facto power of parliament over more than two decades. The dissertation quantifies and analyzes the performance of the parliaments studied through building datasets on both the legislative and oversight performance, despite the labor-intensive process given the absence of readily available information. Additional interviews helped in providing the qualitative analysis of parliamentary performance, particularly in the important realm of deliberating about the national budget (discussed in Chapter 5).

This dissertation aims to achieve three objectives. The first is theoretical, and that is to contribute to a better understanding of how and why parliamentary powers evolve during times of political transition. The second is methodological, and that is to propose more accurate parliament-centric measures of parliamentary power. And the third is political, and that is to contribute to the understanding of parliaments in the Middle East in particular, hoping that the real world implications of this dissertation informs academics, practioners, and political actors focusing on democratization in the Arab region. Finally, this research has many caveats and shortcomings that justify several future research projects. These caveats and the areas for future research are discussed in the conclusion in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS

Pacting, Political Development, and Parliaments in the Arab Region

Democratic transition in the Arab Countries has been painfully slow. While countries of the “third wave” witnessed a fast transition from authoritarian rule to democratic political systems following revolutions or regime breakdown, transition in the Arab region has been to a large extent a top down process and the result of negotiating and renegotiating pacts between the regime and opposition forces. These pacts have been crucial in shaping the political institutions and delineating their scope of authority. However, the majority of the literature on the region

(surveyed in chapter one) argued that these pacts were strategies for survival that authoritarian regimes used to prolong their rule. This literature undermines the agency of political contenders in negotiating the outcomes of these pacts.

This chapter differs from this literature as it views pacting from the perspective of empowering contenders rather than regime survival. It examines the impact of pacting on political institutions namely the parliament and how that affects the democratization process. It argues that contenders, over prolonged period of time, have forced incremental reforms that resulted in opening the political sphere and strengthening participatory institutions such as the parliament. In return, the parliament not only offers the contenders the chance to participate in decision making, but also provides them with experience in the political arena that empowers them. This experience is important as it enables them to force additional compromises and reforms. The chapter supports these arguments through the findings of a rich historical analysis of the cases of political development in Morocco and Lebanon.

Before analyzing pacting in the Arab region’s context and explaining its effect on the parliamentary institutions, it is perhaps useful to further explain this concept. O’Donnell and

Schmitter who wrote extensively on pacting, define it as an “explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among select set of actors which seeks to define, (or better) redefine rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it” (1986, p. 37).

Democratic transition is the interval between one political regime and another that eventually leads to the end of an authoritarian regime and the installation of some form of democracy. It is characterized by changing the rules of the political game. A typical sign that transition has begun is when the rulers start modifying the rules to secure more rights for individuals or groups as a result of internal or external pressures. “Not only are they [the rules] in constant flux, but they are usually arduously contested; actors struggle not just to satisfy their immediate interests and/or the interests of whom they purport to represent, but also to define rules and procedures whose configuration will determine likely winners and losers in the future”

(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p.6). These rules often include constitutions, electoral laws, political party laws, and other laws governing civil and political liberties such as laws on freedom of assembly and freedom of expression.

While pacts are temporary they can become legally institutionalized and incorporated into the Constitution. Pacts are often oligarchical as they are negotiated by the elites rather than the masses as a whole. Pacts therefore should be analyzed as a series of arrangements that modify the rules. The transition towards democratization does not necessarily require complete pact renegotiation. Rather, it needs “a sequence of piecemeal reforms” that move in the direction of democratization (O’Donnell and Schmitter, p. 43). That is while some pacts are extreme such

as those that result in a new social contract, or in replacing an old regime, others are more gradual that build on incremental progress. The latter approach has characterized pacting and democratic transition in the region for the most part as shall be discussed below.

One common outcome of pacting that occur during political junctures is a change of the institutional design and power distribution of the state. O’Donell and Schmitter argue that during such critical junctures, the role of political parties is brought to the forefront as they participate in the pacting process. A cartel of party elites emerges. They are forced to compromise among each other and agree on limiting the agenda of policy choices, sharing the distribution of benefits, and limiting the participation of outsiders.8 Parties thus change from agents of mobilization to that of social control.

The challenge then facing the production of “contingent consent” is to agree on a set of rules that is acceptable by the pacting elites (constitution, electoral laws, etc.). These rules usually focus on three dimensions: who is allowed to play, the formula selected for the distribution of seats within constituencies to create “workable majorities” at the same time guaranteeing accurate representation, and the political structure (parliamentary, presidential etc.).

Contingent consent also indicates a commitment by the major players to resolve conflict and acknowledge the legitimacy of the political regime.

In the Arab region, transition has been slow, elite-driven and paced as a result of a heavily skewed balance of power between state and society. Following the struggle for independence from colonial powers, the majority of Arab countries established modern state

8 The party according to the authors “is the modern institution for structuring and aggregating individual preferences” for representation along territorial lines. Party’s efficacy lies in its “capacity to generate symbols of partial political identity – around its name, platform, ideology, songs, logo, past and present leadership – which bring together voters and militants across many of the lines which otherwise divide them within society, whether class, status, family, gender, religion, ethnicity, language, or age” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p.58).

institutions including parliaments and bureaucracies.9 However, the centralization of power and deteriorating state-society relations resulted in an era of authoritarian rule and dictatorships across the region, from Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, in northern Africa, to Jordan, Syria, Iraq and the Gulf in the East.

By the 1990s several of these countries witnessed political openings due to complex socio-economic reasons and internal and external pressures. In the late 1980s, Zine El Abidine

Bin Ali, then the prime minister, removed President Habib Bourguiba from power in Tunisia and adopted legal measures to improve civil liberties and limit police power. He promulgated a new political party law and engaged in a dialogue with opposition parties that resulted in the adoption of the National Pact in 7 November, 1988. The pact that was signed by six opposition parties at the time stipulated the protection of civil and political liberties including the freedom to form political parties, and the commitment to economic development.10 Parliamentary elections followed with the participation of the opposition parties.11

In Jordan, after years of heavy handed authoritarian rule, King Hussein appointed a sixty- member Royal Commission in 1989 representing different political forces including the Muslim

Brotherhood and the Communists (previously banned parties) to draft the National Charter (Al

Mithaq Al Watani). The charter was promulgated in 1991 and represented a new pact between state and society, allowing new forces to participate in the political process. In Morocco, after the infamous “years of lead,” which were marked by the Monarchy’s authoritarian rule, the King promulgated a series of constitutional and legal reforms in the 90s. The 1989 Taif Accord ended

9 In most countries, these institutions replaced the ones that were installed by the Ottoman rule, and the English and French mandate over the region that resulted from the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the end of World War One.

10 The Labor party, one of the main opposition parties at the time, was one of the few parties that refused to negotiate with Bin Ali and refused to sign the pact.

11 For more details on the transition process in Tunisia, see Barhoumi (2014). 36

the Civil war in Lebanon (1975-1989) and created a new national pact. The Arab uprising post-

2011 marked another wave of renegotiating these pacts, in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen,

Bahrain, Libya, and Syria. While some of these new pacts were concluded and new Constitutions adopted such as the case of Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, others were delayed due to the outbreak of violence and war.

Transitions in the region have not always been forward or unidirectional. Many of the pacts were soon dissolve or abandoned for political exigency. For example, after Sadat pushed the boundaries of Abdelnassir’s “National Pact of Working Forces,” by introducing further political liberalization, legalization of parties and holding relatively free elections in late 70s

Egypt, the regime backtracked and resorted to repression, fearing the growing power of secular and Islamist opposition groups. In Tunisia, Bin Ali repressed the opposition following their fairly good performance in the elections in the early nineties.

In Jordan and Kuwait, a series of gerrymandering and manipulative electoral laws resulted in limiting the opposition’s access to power throughout the second half of the twentieth century. In Lebanon, after the end of the civil war in 1990, the Syrian regime still had great influence over Lebanon and centralized decision-making power and restricted civil liberties. In

Syria, Bashar Al Assad who began a series of reforms including the release of political prisoners in early 2000s, or what was called the Damascus Spring, was unable to continue with this path and halted and reversed its liberalization process. In the Arab region, authoritarian regimes with strong militaries had more difficult transition processes. The army, concerned with maintaining its power and interests, is more likely to resist increasing civil and political liberties. For example, the military elite of strong, large, and well-funded armed forces in both Syria and

Egypt halted the democratic transition process after brief political openings and actually reversed

it while in countries like Tunisia, Lebanon, and Morocco that have relatively weak armies, the military did not interfere in the transition process.

In light of controlled elections, cosmetic reforms, powerful executives, weak parliaments, and the absence of a system of checks and balances, scholars argued that these pacts served more as survival strategies devised by authoritarian regime to propagate their rule. Describing Bin

Ali’s National Pact, Mullin (2015) argued it was “intended to signify a political opening based on consensus between different political forces … yet … Bin Ali’s political project was little more than an ‘official discourse’, expressing the myth of reformism.” His years in power were characterized by “all of the social and economic pathologies associated with neoliberal authoritarianism.” (p.92) Accordingly, these pacts and the “electoral fetishism” that followed them were merely a democratic pretense that served to boost the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes (Gandhi, 2008; Sadiki, 2009). This was achieved through shaping electoral rules that regulate political participation and coopting opposition (Sweet 2001, Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002;

Lust 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, Sater 2009). Transition to democracy under such conditions seemed unattainable (Posusney 2005, Choucair-Vizoso and Ottaway 2008).

The body of literature on pacting and elected institutions under authoritarianism provide a convincing argument on why authoritarian regimes persisted in the Middle East while other

“third wave” countries moved towards democratization. However, this literature undermines the agency of the political groups and contenders of the regimes, who benefited from political opportunities to force the gradual liberalization processes, whether these opportunities resulted from external events such as pressure to please international community or threat to territorial unity, or internal ones such as the need to increase their popular base. In this sense the motives behind regime’s actions are understood differently. Increasing parliament’s autonomy and

authority is not a simple result of the regime giving itself a “democratic makeover” to embellish its image to the international community, it does so in response to contenders’ pressure, who are demanding political participation and a role in the decision-making process.

This literature also fails to address the impact of incremental changes that result from pacting. This chapter and the following chapters of this dissertation argue that over a prolonged period of time incremental progress towards democratization, institutional building, and weakening of authoritarian rule can be made as social forces gain power and experience in the political arena. This enables them to force additional compromises and reforms, i.e. the

“sequence of piecemeal reforms” that O’Donnell and Schmitter identify as a prerequisite for democratic transition.

One outcome of the pacts that were struck in the region between regimes and contenders was widening the scope of authority and autonomy given to the parliamentary institutions through constitutional reforms (as chapter three demonstrates), and opening them to contenders through reforming electoral and political party laws and holding elections. While the regime strategy was to make a trade-off to coopt the opposition, these trade-offs had unintended consequences. Strong opposition parties such as Istiqlal and USFP in Morocco in the late eighties, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 2005 parliament, used their role as the opposition in parliament to strengthen their popular bases and political role as the section below demonstrates.

Some of the parliaments in the Arab region have tried to increase their strength gradually by developing their institutional capacity, engaging in decision making processes, and initiating debate that would have been considered a taboo a decade earlier (such as political prisoners,

relations with Israel, overseeing the military, freedom of the press etc.). As Baaklini and his coauthors observed:

The struggle for democracy in the Arab world revolves to a large extent around changes designed to make legislatures more representative, autonomous, and influential. Parliaments have consequently become the focal point of Arab efforts to expand and institutionalize political participation. They can no longer be dismissed as rubberstamps designed to deceive domestic public opinion and foreign donors into believing that the progress towards democratic governance is being made (Baaklini et al 1999, p.5).

The following section provides a historical analysis of the political development in

Lebanon and Morocco, the cases selected as the focus of this dissertation. It looks at the pacting processes that occurred since the establishment of the modern state to better understand the agency of political groups and contenders in the pacting processes, and their role in increasing the power of parliament. The analysis focuses on political moments or critical junctures such as the promulgation of new constitutions or constitutional amendments as they had the most effect on the distribution of power and institutional equilibrium. Rather than viewing pacts as one-time occurrences and quick fixes for regime survival, this longitudinal approach allows for tracing the incremental change that has occurred in the two countries.

The Cases of Morocco and Lebanon

Case 1: Morocco: The King, the Parties, and the Parliament

The parliament’s power in Morocco has been an issue of contention since the earliest days of independence between the King and opposing political parties. While the King strove to centralize authority in his hands, the political parties struggled to increase their ability to participate in the decision-making process. The Parliament’s autonomy from the King and the executive, and its authority to legislate and oversee the executive were at the center of this struggle as it provided the parties with the main platform for participation in the decision-making process under the monarchy. Each historic interval of this struggle was marked by the adoption

of a new constitution or constitutional amendments that defined the powers of parliament and who can access it through elections. These intervals can be divided into three: The Creation, the

Restoration, and finally the Strengthening of the Parliament.

The Creation of Parliament: Early Struggles between King and Parties in Post-Independence Morocco

Morocco has a long-standing tradition of monarchial rule by the Alouite dynasty dating to the sixteenth century. A monarchy was thus not a foreign choice for the state’s political system following its independence in 1956. However, since the beginning, the main political debate was about the extent of monarchical power versus the desire for liberal representative government. While the King Mohammed V wanted to centralize all powers in his hands, the political parties pushed for a constitutional monarchy and a strong representative parliamentary institution that would allow the parties to pass laws and influence government policy. Parties, such as the Istiqlal party (established in 1944 by Alal Al Fasi), at the time were not powerless.

They had led the resistance against colonialism, had large base of supporters and by the fifties had developed their internal organization structures (Gandhi, 2008; Ashford, 1964).

Despite their strength, the King did not respond to the parties’ demands, and established an advisory council, the National Consultative Assembly, that had the right to question ministers of the government, which was typically parliamentary territory. The Council included members from different professions as well as representative of Istiqlal party. The King maintained full control of the NCA, yet despite its limited autonomy and authority, the NCA was able to insert itself into policy dialogue (Zartman 1964, Gandhi 2008). The King later replaced it with the

Superior Council of the Plan in 1959, which had less authority, and was tasked with reviewing the government’s two-year development plans. The king engineered and reengineered institutions to centralize all power within his hands, even dissolving the government and taking 41

the position of Prime Minister in 1960. The King’s death in 1961 and the succession of his son

Hassan II to the throne provided the parties with a new opportunity to voice their demands for a new constitution and new institutions. The new King was more open to the demands of the parties and the first Moroccan Constitution was promulgated by the King in 1962 after it was ratified by public referendum.

The first parliament elected in 1963 witnessed severe confrontations between the

“royalists” or the Front for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions (FDIC), who were the majority with seventy-one seats, and a strong opposition led by Istiqlal party and National Union of Popular Forces UNFP (who won sixty-seven seats) over government’s policies. More importantly, debates about the constitution and the legitimacy of the regime were heated as opposition was calling for a King that “reigns but does not rule.” Legislative gridlock was the norm during this period. This parliament was short lived as the King Hassan II dissolved it following violent Casablanca demonstrations in which hundreds of people were killed and declared a state of emergency in June 1965.12

For the next five years, the Hassan II ruled by Dahirs (royal decrees) and had full legislative and executive powers. In light of growing political unrest, the King ended the state of emergency and promulgated the 1970 constitution which heavily reduced the power of the parliament, including reducing the number of elected MPs to a third with two-thirds appointed.

The King ratified the constitution after it won 98.7% of the votes of the electorate, a clear sign of fraud, given that the major opposition political parties boycotted the referendum. Legislative elections were held in 1970, also boycotted by opposition, resulted in a victory of the royalists

12 The demonstrations were organized mostly by students against the backdrop of the decision of the Minister of Education to terminate the enrollment of students in middle school (Brevet) if they were seventeen years or older. The demonstrations escalated given the deteriorating political and economic situation and labor forces joined the demonstrations (Azzam, I. 2013). 42

winning 219 of 240 seats (Baaklini et al 1999, p.112-114). The parliament was once again dissolved a year after its elections following a coup d'état attempt in July 1971. In the aftermath of the coup, and to minimize political tensions, the King promulgated a third constitution in

March 1972 that addressed some of the opposition’s top demands including returning some of the powers of the parliament, and increasing the number of elected MPs to two-thirds. Another attempted coup and political tensions postponed the parliamentary elections for several years to come.

The Restoration: 1977-1997

This period witnessed a gradual restoration of the parliamentary institution as a result of external pressures and internal tensions. The dispute with Algeria over the Western Sahara in the mid-1970s, coupled with the pressure for reform by international monetary organizations were the catalyst needed to reopen channels of communication between the King and opposition parties. A gradual political opening resulted. Major parties were able to resume their political activity, restrictions on the press were lifted, and political prisoners were released. The gradual liberalization process culminated in the return of parliamentary life, after the elections were held in 1977. Although independents, who supported the King won the majority of the parliamentary seats, opposition parties that ran in the election were able to win a small number of seats.13 More importantly, the Istiqlal party, which historically had been an opposition party agreed to participate in the government appointed by the King. The following 1984 elections yielded similar results in terms of a majority of pro-palace MPs (who won 215 out of 306 seats) and a

13 Pro King candidates won the majority of seats (140 out of 264 seats). The opposition parties won a small minority (Istiqlal won forty nine seats, the Social Union of Popular Forces (USFP) won sixteen seats, while Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) won one seat (Baaklini et al 1999, p.115).

smaller minority of opposition parties including the Istiqlal party, and the Social Union of

Popular Forces (USFP).14

However, the honeymoon period between the King and the opposition parties did not last long after opposition parties withdrew from government in 1985 in response to the aggressive neoliberal reforms introduced by the government under the Structural Adjustment Program

(SAP). The opposition parties remained in parliament, but their limited number of seats did not give them the quorum required to block the government’s agenda. However, they used the parliamentary sessions to engage with the government in fierce debates that were open to the press. They were also successful in mobilizing their popular bases and benefit from the wide public support they had garnered to pressure the government. As a result, the government amended some of the most controversial bills such as the privatization bill of 1989.

Parliamentarians from different parties, who were interviewed for this dissertation, shared the view that this period was critical in terms of building the opposition’s power within parliament.

Members of the opposition were member of the parliamentary bureau and chaired committees.

They not only used the floor as platforms to voice their opinions, they also learned the ropes of parliamentary procedures which was vital for their performance in parliament.

The opposition parties’ large base of supporters and their strong ties with the labor unions gave them increased leverage in the political bargaining process (Al Barka, 1998).

Although the King could dissolve the parliament and declare a state of emergency as he had done earlier, and control the term of parliament, he chose to compromise with the parties in light of the growing political tensions between 1990 and1992.15 These tensions were manifested in the

14 Ibid. p.131. 15 The King had the power to extend the term of parliament. For example, he postponed the 1983 elections in light of a socio-economic crises (term extended by one year), and under the pretext of holding the Western Sahara Referendum (election postponed from 1990 to 1992). 44

opposition parties (Istiqlal and USFP) submitting a motion of no confidence in parliament; massive demonstrations orchestrated by the opposition parties and labor organizations in several

Moroccan cities; and the formation of an opposition front the “National Democratic Block” (Al

Kutla)16 composed of four of the main opposition parties.

The National Democratic Block drafted a Memorandum for Constitutional Reform and submitted it to the King on 19 June 1992, demanding constitutional reforms that would strengthen the parliamentary institution. These reforms were summarized as follows:

Empowering the parliament as the primary legislating institution through increasing its authority to pass laws; specifying the time limits after which the law passed by the parliament has to be promulgated; increasing the term of ordinary sessions; increasing the parliaments capacity to oversee the executive through allowing it to form committees of investigation, and giving it the right to interpellate members of the government; ensuring the rights of parliamentary opposition in lawmaking and oversight … All members of Parliament should be directly elected for a term of five years. (Bannis 2007, p. 897)

The King once again was forced to practice political containment and appease the opposition, through presenting a new project for revising the constitution on 20 August 1992

(Madani et.al. 2012).17 The 1992 constitution, in line with earlier constitutions kept the balance of power between the political institutions tilted in favor of the executive. Parliament’s representativeness continued to be compromised as the new constitution permitted indirect

16 The National Democratic Block (Al Kutla) was composed of the Istiaqlal, USFP, PPS, and Organization of Action for Democracy and the People (OADP, Monazamet El Amal El Sha’bi El Democrati).

17 The Constitution granted the King the power to propose new constitutions and constitutional amendments that were subject to public referendum. The King enjoyed “traditional powers” of arbitration, where the King was perceived as the arbitrator amongst parties and institutions and the “guardian” of the constitution. For more on the traditional powers of the Moroccan King, see Daadaoui (2011).

elections for a third of parliamentary seats.18 This was particularly contested by the opposition as the palace heavily manipulated indirect elections to secure the election of its supporters.

However, the new constitution did address some of the opposition’s demands regarding the powers of the parliament. It enabled the parliament to hold the government accountable through granting it the ability to remove the government appointed by the King, as well as allowing it to form investigation committees, an important tool that MPs use to oversee the government. The new constitution also increased its legislative power by imposing a time limit on the King to issue a royal decree promulgating a law passed by the parliament.19 It also established the Constitutional Council, tasked with deciding the constitutionality of laws, but granted the King the right to appoint the council’s president and four of its members, while the remaining four members were appointed by the Council’s President after consulting with the parliamentary groups.

The parliament was still heavily dominated by the King, through widespread electoral manipulation. Morocco’s pluralism remained “to a large extent orchestrated from above, by a

King who has proven a master at playing parties and ambitious politicians against each other.”

(Baaklini et al, p.122). However, the parliament elected in June 1993 witnessed the strongest presence of opposition parties ever, after the opposition won almost a third of the seats (106 out of 333 seats). The Istiqlal and USFP were able to form a very strong parliamentary front. One of the senior parliamentary staff, who had been in parliament during that period, identified it as the

18 One third of the seats were filled by indirect elections. 111 parliamentarians were elected by five electoral colleges (members of local councils, and chambers of agriculture, commerce and industry, Crafts, Salaried employees (IPU. Morocco Parliamentary Chamber Elections Held in 1993).

19 In order for a law to take effect, a royal decree (Dahir) has to be issued. The constitution imposed a time limit of thirty days on the King to issue a royal decree (Dahir) promulgating a law passed by the parliament. This was absent from earlier constitutions, which allowed the monarch to stall indefinitely to promulgate a law passed by the parliament, thus limiting parliaments legislative power. This seems important to put in the text. 46

turning point in Morocco’s parliamentary life. He argued in an interview that “this new dynamic parliamentary life and activism of opposition parliamentarians forced pro-palace members to up their game as they had to counter opposition members’ motions, and they could not appear to be asleep on the job.” (Abdelhamid Al Abqary, personal communication, May 2014).

Opposition parliamentarians were active in monitoring the government and addressing questions, benefiting from the fact that the parliamentary question time was now televised, which increased their ability to pressure the government and at the same time appeal to their supporters.

The growing parliamentary hype attracted the media’s attention and in turn encouraged more of civil society to reach out to parliamentarians to support their agendas.

The Strengthening: 1997 - Present

Perhaps the most important political development that occurred in Morocco in the early nineties was an undeclared agreement between the palace and historic opposition forces, whereby the opposition withdrew their demand for a constituent assembly that would redraft a new social contract and a new political system for Morocco (which it had been demanding since the sixties), and the King gave up previous authoritarian practices including controlling the election, and promised gradual political liberalization. This period witnessed the adoption of two constitutions, the succession of King Mohammad VI to the throne in 1998, more democratic elections, and increasing political and civil rights.

By 1996 and despite the political tensions witnessed in Morocco, the King resorted to a familiar routine of practicing his constitutional right to introduce constitutional amendments subject to a public referendum and suggested moving to a bicameral parliamentary system. The opposition parties of the National Democratic Block once again rallied for constitutional change that would result in strengthening the powers of Parliament. They submitted a second

memorandum to the King on 23 April 1996, in which they reiterated the unmet demands of their

1992 Memorandum. It also demanded that the House of Representatives be fully elected, and members of the proposed Upper Chamber be indirectly elected by the trade unions, local councils and others, and that the House of Representatives has the final say when it comes to adopting laws (Bennis 2007, p. 898).

The King promulgated the 1996 constitution, responding to some of the Opposition’s demands. Most of the opposition parties, who had abstained from participating in the 1992 constitutional referendum, joined in the 1996 referendum indicating improved relations with the monarchy. The new constitution changed the parliamentary system from a unicameral to a bicameral system, in which all 325 members of the lower house are directly elected for five years, and the 270 members of the upper house are indirectly elected.20 Scholars studying bicameral parliamentary systems argue that this system in transitioning democracies offers a way to balance the needs of different constituencies through addressing the calls for mass representation with the need to protect elite or minority interests (Tseblis and Money 1997;

Ketterer 2001). This argument is supported by the Moroccan case, where the King will have less control over elections of the lower house held during the next decade thus increasing true representation of the parties and the people. The indirectly elected chamber would play less of an active role, but serve as a reassurance. The King will no longer be able to act in a heavy-handed way, but he can become a mediator (the 2011 constitution clearly gave the King the role of the mediator between political institutions). Thus, elections changed from being “orchestrated” or

20 Three fifths of members are elected from each region by an electoral college composed of local government representatives; and the remaining two fifths are elected in each region by electoral colleges composed of 1) members elected by the professional chambers (agriculture; commerce, industry and services; the craft industry, and marine fisheries), and 2) members elected at the national level by an electoral college composed of employees' representatives (trade unions). The Upper House term according to the 1996 Constitution was nine years, and one third was up for reelection every third year (1996 Constitution, Article 83).

“prearranged” as was the case in the 90s, to becoming competitive, free and fair in 2002, 2007 and 2011.

The other major development witnessed in the late 90s was introducing the “Tanawob” or “alternance principle,” by which the King appoints the Prime Minister (PM) from the party that gains the majority of votes in the elections. This was an important development given that historically, the majority of the Prime Ministers that were appointed by the King as well as the heads of the critical ministries had not been affiliated with any political party. The appointment of USFP Abdel Rahman Al Yousifi as PM in 1998 was a first after the Koutla won 102 of the total seats.21

The Arab uprisings in 2011 sparked the most recent major change in Moroccan parliamentary life. Inspired by the Tunisian revolution, Moroccan youth belonging to leftist and

Islamist movements organized what later became known as the “20 February Movement” and organized widespread demonstrations in different Moroccan cities. Despite the ideological differences of its members, the 20 February movement was able to unite around common demands: a constitutional monarchy, political and judicial reform, and a solution for the growing economic problems (Malki, forthcoming). The King responded to the reform demands in his

‘March 9 Speech,’ in which he outlined a reform process.

The King appointed the Constitutional Reform Advisory Commission formed of 19 members representing different social and political groups including political parties, civil

21 Prior to the 1997 elections, the King and opposition parties negotiated power-sharing. Representatives of eleven parties met with the Minister of Interior, Driss Basri in February 1997 and agreed upon a ‘code of honor’ mithaq sharaf on upcoming elections. A National Commission for the Supervision of Electoral Process was established to oversee the elections. In addition, a set of new laws were also issued regulating political parties, elections, and media. Despite its competitiveness, the elections were considered “orchestrated” and was marred by fraud, however USFP did win the largest number of seats (fifty seven seats), and the Koutla parties, or the historic opposition, became the new majority.

society organizations, rights movements, and key figures.22 The constitution drafting process can be classified as “semi-participatory because while the Commission was appointed rather than elected as in the case of Tunisia and Egypt after the 2011 uprisings,23 the “Political Mechanism for Follow-up and Consultation” was a body that allowed for broad participation. It had an open membership including heads of political parties, trade unions, and civil society organizations

(CSOs). The Commission met regularly with the “Mechanism” to receive the different constitutional suggestions that were submitted by its members. These suggestions were included in the debate over constitution drafting which formed the grounds for the new constitution.

After three months of deliberations and consultations with different groups, the

Commission submitted the draft constitution to the King on June 9, 2011, and the King submitted the constitution for public referendum on July 1, 2011. Despite the boycotting of some of the groups of February 20 movement, the constitution was widely approved by the referendum, and no major accusations of fraud were registered. One of the constitutional experts interviewed considered the 2011 constitution to be “the first constitution drafted by the

Moroccan people addressing the demands of the Moroccan people.” The latest constitutional reforms were the culmination of the long struggle of parties for more rights and participation.

The February 20 movement was the catalyst that sped up the reform movement (Abdallah Saaf, personal communication, June 2014).

The 2011 constitution introduced major changes in the scope of authority and independence of political institutions, including the parliament as shall be demonstrated in

22 The King accepted the participation of most groups. Adl Wal Ihsan party, a radical Islamist banned party, and the Democratic Way Party (Annahj Al Democrati) were the most noticeable parties excluded from this process.

23 Following the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, a constituent assemble was elected to draft the constitution. Those debates were made public or “leaked” to the press. In Morocco the debate remained largely behind closed doors, and no drafts were leaked to the press prior to submitting it to the King. 50

chapter three. A new parliament was elected in November 2011, and the Justice and

Development Party (PJD), the former opposition party, won the largest number of seats.

Difficult Transition: Authoritarian Politics, Electoral Engineering, Party Manipulation and Parliaments

The previous discussion of the development of the Moroccan parliament demonstrates the long struggle for democratic transition of the Moroccan state. It highlights the dynamics of political bargaining between the King and the opposition forces, mainly political parties, over more than fifty years, during which the opposition came to acknowledge the legitimacy of the political system and were coopted to work within its political institutions, and the King compromised and gradually addressed some of the opposition’s demands for power sharing through increasing the power of parliament (Filali 2011, Al Korawy 2010).24 At the core of this struggle were the electoral laws that regulate access to parliament, as well as the political party rights, thus they warrant further examination.

The King, since the establishment of the modern state, had the upper hand as he had the ability to make the electoral rules that regulate different groups’ access to political power. But electoral reform was a constant demand for the opposition. Al Koutla (the Opposition) focused on the need for reforming electoral rules in the early nineties in its memo on demands for reform.

Reforming these rules defined the composition of the parliament, limited electoral corruption, and shaped the relation between representatives and their constituents. The opposition prioritized the following demands: direct elections of all members of parliament to increase its

24 The King during the “7/7 program” broadcasted on the French Channel on 16/5/1993 declared that there is no opposition to the Persona of the King. The opposition is to the government, and the King declared that he is open to having the opposition head future governments.

representativeness; adopting closed party lists with proportional representation;25 electoral redistricting;26 and limiting electoral fraud.27 Although many of those demands were not addressed in the 1992 constitution or in the electoral law, the Koutla opposition parties participated in the elections. However, opposition parties continued to voice those demands for electoral reforms that were gradually addressed over the next two decades in a series of electoral reforms. The

Moroccan elections went from being “pre-arranged” to being considerably free and fair elections.28

In addition to electoral rules, the second dimension of the regime’s manipulation and control of the political scene demanded control over political parties. Nadir El Moumni a political science professor and an expert on political parties, interviewed during this research, argues that “one of the pillars of Moroccan politics is the King’s constant search for political mediators. This results in the Kings’s cooptation and integration of various political actors.” This control was achieved through creating new pro-palace parties to counter opposition parties,

25 Parties, as well as election experts, consider single member majoritarian voting systems (or ‘first past the post’) as a way for the regime to strengthen local notables (A’yan) through increasing the likelihood of their election. Through increasing the incumbency rate of the notables, the single member majoritarian voting system contributed to deepening the clientelistic relationship between these notables and their constituents as it guaranteed their continuous access to power and state institutions. Accordingly, the closed party lists help strengthen party platforms at the national level, therefore breaking the clientelistic relationship between the local notables and their constituents as they don’t stand a high chance of re-election according to the closed party lists.

26 Electoral redistricting was a constant demand for opposition parties. The 1977 electoral law fused cities with their rural suburbs and gave political parties, especially the opposition, electoral support, while the local notables or a’yan were strong in rural areas. Thus, the opposition demanded redistricting to separate the cities from the rural areas, and restore the representativeness of the cities.

27 Opposition demanded several procedural reforms including controlling electoral financing and establishing and independent election monitoring body.

28 The electoral law adopted in 1977 by Royal decree 1.77.177, was revised multiple times in 1984, 1993, 1997, 2002, and 2011 (Organic law No. 7-11 adopted on 29 September. 2011). During this period the Lower House became fully elected, the number of MPs was increased to 395 members, the election method changed from proportional representation to closed party list proportional representation, and an election monitoring body was established. See Filali (2011), Al Korawy (2010) and Al Ansary (2010) for a detailed account of the development of the electoral system in Morocco. 52

contributing to party fragmentation, and allowing parties to partially participate in governing the state.

Canvassing Moroccan political parties can be tricky, particularly given the wide scale fragmentation of parties and their “mushrooming” as some observers have labeled the rapid increase in the number of parties.29 While the traditional right left and center classification can be loosely applied, El Moumni suggests that a better grouping of parties would be: a) historic parties that were established between the 50s and 70s, such as the Istiqlal party, USFP and Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS); b) administrative parties that were established by figures close to the palace to counter the historic parties, such as the Constitutional Union party, National

Democratic party, National Rally of Independents (RNI) and the most recently established

Authenticity and Modernity Party; c) Islamic parties: most notable among those parties is the

Justice and Development Party (PJD) established in 1998 (the PJD gained the highest number of votes in the 2011 elections). The other notable Islamist party is the Justice and Charity party, a radical Islamist party that has not participated in the political process but was part of the 20

February movement; and d) small parties with limited popular bases that split following personal or ideological disputes with party leadership.

To further complicate the political scene, most of the major parties have civil society organizations closely affiliated to them including, women, youth, labor and human rights organizations. Parties rely on these organizations to further mobilize their base.30 For example, opposition parties collaborated closely with labor unions to organize mass demonstrations during

29 By 2013, there were thirty five licensed political parties in Morocco, according to the Ministry of Interior and a 2013 report by the Court of Audit (Kholasat Al Taqareer Allati A'adaha Al Majles Al A'ala Lil Hisabat Hawla Al Ahzab Al Siyasia, 2013).

30 Following the reopening of communication channels between the King and parties, the Communist Party renamed itself as the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), and became legal after it received its license in 1974. 53

the 1990s. The same tactic was used once again in 2011 by the parties participating in the

February 20 Movement.

Political parties have thus witnessed major developments and challenges over the years.

Years of authoritarian rule, competing administrative parties, and their participation in the government weakened their once revolutionary appeal. These parties failed to formulate electoral platforms that addressed their ideological positions as well as their constituents’ needs when they were the majority in the late nineties and 2000s and lost touch with their bases (Filali 2011).

They are struggling in their position as the opposition following the 2011 elections. As one of their MPs said “we will need some time to relearn how to be in the opposition again” (Hassan Al

Khattar, personal communication, June 2014).

This weakness partially explains the rise of popularity of the PJD that maintains strong constituent relations and is among the most active political parties in Morocco today. That being said, political parties are still the main channel of participation at both the national and local political level. Despite their challenges, the major political parties maintain large bases, they also have numerous civil society organizations that act as an extension to the parties and help them mobilize support. Parties still spend a substantial amount of their funding to sponsor thousands of candidates for each election (Catusse and Karam 2010).

The above discussion about elections and political parties are a good example of the elite level bargaining and its effect on the political system and parliamentary institution. The

Monarchy adopts survival strategies to prolong its reign that entail making compromises to the opposition parties when necessary. At the heart of these bargaining processes and compromises is the autonomy and authority of the parliamentary institution, the electoral laws that regulate who can access, and the role that the opposition can play. Thus, while it may be true that

Monarchy used the parliament as a means to ensure its continuity, it is also true that over a long period of time, and during political openings when the political rules change, the regime does not necessarily predict the extent of compromise it has to make, and the consequences of this change. The King and the opposition parties have engaged in pushing the boundaries of these openings, transitioning from an authoritarian system into a more democratic one over the span of several decades. The parliament during this period provided a means for contestation of power as well as a learning medium where parties gained leverage to bargain with the regime and, during specific moments, push for their demands of democratic reform.

This argument does not necessarily negate the literature on democratization and authoritarianism in the Arab region surveyed in chapter one and in the beginning of this chapter.

Instead, it compliments it. Authoritarian regimes use power to maintain their rule. However, gradual democratization and institutional strengthening would not occur without the ongoing pacts that the contenders force upon those regimes when political opportunities arise.

Case 2: Lebanon: Political Institutions and Contentious Politics

Lebanon is a small country that currently has an estimated population of four million beautiful citizens. However, it is very diverse with eighteen different recognized religious confessions, in addition to multiple ethnicities and minorities, including Armenians, Turks,

Kurds and Assyrians. Throughout its modern history, governing Lebanon has been based on power sharing pacts and agreements amongst the different social groups that ensured their representation and protected their rights to varying degrees. These pacts defined the composition and the scope of authority of representative bodies prior to independence, and that of the parliament post-independence. To further understand these pacts and their effects on the political institutions, it is important to categorize them according to historic intervals: Lebanon prior to

independence; Lebanon post-independence and prior to the civil war (1945 - 1975); Lebanon post-civil war (1990-2005); and Lebanon post the Syrian withdrawal (2005 - present).

Pacting and the Constitution Prior to Independence

The consociational nature of governance in Lebanon predates the modern state and has shaped the political system and institutions since then. The following brief historical overview serves to highlight consociationalism to provide a better understanding of the modern day political system and the complexities and challenges it faces.

The first governance body of Lebanon, the Qaimaqamate system, was established under the Ottoman rule in the mid-1800s. This system was put in place to contain the tensions between the Druze and Maronite communities by dividing Mount Lebanon into two districts (one Druze and the other Maronite) that were comparable in size and resources, in an attempt to distribute the power between the two fighting groups. Each Qaimaqamiya had representatives from the notables of each of the six religious communities (Sunni, Shiite, Druze, Maronite, Roman

Catholic, and Orthodox) elected by the high-ranking clergy, in addition to its chief

(Qa’immaqqam) and his assistant. They were tasked with legislative, judicial, administrative, and financial tasks. This partition however proved to be problematic, as further clashes and agitation between them ensued.

As a result of the renewed clashes, the Ottomans established a new governance body, the

Administrative Council, according to “Lebanon’s Basic Law,” otherwise known as the Protocol of 9 June 1861.31 The Council was headed by a Christian appointed by the Ottoman Sultan, and

31 The Ottoman authorities along with ambassadors of France, England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria finally agreed on this Protocol which established the Administrative Council after almost nine months of meetings and debates. It was later amended in 1864 and 1912. The amendments were not significant but increased the number of members. The number of international powers involved in the process indicates the long standing struggle for power over the region.

composed of twelve indirectly elected members, who represented the major Lebanese religious groups, with a majority of Christian representatives since Christians formed the majority of the population. This Council continued its duties until the French occupied Lebanon in 1920 following the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the end of World War One. The French High

Commissioner General Gouraud dissolved the Council and replaced it with an appointed

Advisory Council representing the main confessions. Two years later, the French Mandate authorities transformed the appointed council to an elected one. The first elections of the

Representative Council were held in May 1922 to elect 30 members according to a quota system that represented the main religious confessions, and a second election followed in June of 1925

(Ghannam 1999, Rabbath 1973).32

The first Lebanese constitution was drafted during the French Mandate. The drafting process witnessed a struggle over who has the authority to draft it between the locals and the

French. According to the first article of the ‘Mandate Agreement’ (Sak Al Intidab), France was obligated to draft a Basic law for the Lebanese and Syrian states, in consultation with the local authorities. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated the constitution making process through creating a committee in 1924 to draft an outline of the Constitution and the main issues it should tackle.33

The Representative Council, elected in 1925, considered itself the main local authority that should participate in the drafting of the Constitution. It formed a twelve member ‘Founding

Committee’ to discuss and amend the draft Constitution with the participation of French legal

32 The elections were held according to the first electoral law issued by decree no. 1307 on 10 March 1922. The Council had a majority of Christian representative (seventeen Christian and thirteen Muslim members).

33 It created a committee based in Paris and headed by former Prime Minister Joseph Paul Boncour to draft the constitution. 57

advisors.34 The Founding Committee attempted a participatory approach, involving different social groups.35 The Representative Council discussed the draft Constitution between 19 and 22

May 1926.36 The French High Commissioner declared the adoption of the new constitution on 23

May 1926. This Constitution, which was heavily influenced by the French 1875 Constitution, remains the main source of law until today despite the many amendments that followed

(Rabbath, 1973; Ghandour, 1992; Daher, 2009).37

The Constitution allowed for an indirectly elected Representative Council and a Senate appointed by the French high commissioner. However, consecutive constitutional amendments that soon followed the adoption of the constitution changed this structure combining both houses into a unicameral parliament. The amendments also expanded the membership of the

Representative Council to forty-six members. Four parliaments were elected under the Mandate before the elections were suspended during the Second World War (Daher 2009; Jiha 1995).

During the French Mandate the 1926 constitution was amended twice increasing the power of the

French-dominated executive branch versus the parliament. For example, it gave the President the right to appoint a third of the members. Following the continued demands for independence and

34 The names of those who drafted the constitution and the process of drafting it remain unclear. But what is documented is that the representative council did form this committee on 12 December 1925, with the membership of some of the Councils members as well as French legal advisors (Daher 2009, p. 76).

35 The Founding Committee sent 231 questionnaires to notables representing the various religious confessions. The vast majority of the Muslim notables, however, abstained from answering the questionnaires as they rejected joining the “Greater Lebanon” and insisted on joining the Syrian League, which represented the larger Muslim body in the region as opposed to a Christian majority Lebanon.

36 The Christians had the majority in Representative Council and were thus able to discuss and adopt the Constitution accordingly despite the rejection of the Muslim members.

37 The major amendments were adopted in 1927, 1929, 1943, and 1990.

to end the French Mandate, the parliament convened and agreed to amend the Constitution once again on 8 October 1943 to declare Lebanon’s independence.38

The above overview of the adoption of the first constitution and the formation of the first parliament highlights two important factors that continues to shape contemporary Lebanese politics: the necessity of brokered power sharing among different Lebanese groups (most likely by regional or foreign powers, such as the French during the Mandate, and the Syrians and

Saudi’s following the end of the civil war in 1990), and the centrality of the role that the elected representative body plays in bargaining and agreeing on a power sharing formula. The reason behind this historic digression is to show that prior to its establishment as a modern state,

Lebanese politics and its institutional structure had been governed by striking a precarious balance between different groups.

Lebanon Post Independence (1943 -1975): A Consociational Democracy

On the eve of Lebanon’s independence in 1943, Maronite President Bechara El Khoury and Sunni Prime Minister Riad El Solh agreed on the National Pact. The national Pact was an oral agreement which served as the foundation for the creation and independence of Lebanon.

According to the pact, the Muslims withdrew their demand for unity with Syria and the

Christians reciprocated by renouncing their aim to remain under the protection of France. The pact established Lebanon as a consociational democracy, consecrating the bargaining process amongst the major confessions (Maronite, Sunni, and Druze), and engendering the confessional

38 The amendment of the Constitution without the French’s approval resulted in the imprisonment of the President, the Prime Minister and other key political figures by the French between 11 and 22 November 1943, as the French were reluctant to end their Mandate and recognize Lebanon’s independence. Following the national resistance that the French faced and the discussions between them and the prisoners, the French authorities recognized the Constitutional amendment declaring Lebanon’s independence. 59

based system of power sharing with a 6:5 ratio favoring Christian representation (Daher 2009, p

281; Baaklini et. al 1999).

Perhaps it is important to explain consociational democracy before continuing to discuss its effects on the Lebanese political system and the power of the parliament. According to Arend

Lijphart, the leading political scientist who theorized about this type of democracy, consociationalism is characterized by the representation and participation of all significant groups in the political decision-making process (Lijphart, 1999; 2002). For consociationalism to work, Lijphart also emphasized the importance of proportional representation of those groups.

Consociationalism suggests that despite a divided society, a country can have a stable government through ensuring a maximum number of “winners.” Institutional design in a consociational democracy is of prime importance as it facilitates the cooptation and compromise of different political leaders. Laws governing participation and representation thus become the most influential method with far reaching effects on party systems, parliamentary composition, and democratic durability. In contrast to majoritarian systems, consociationalism focuses on the inclusion of smaller parties and minorities and ensures their representation in coalition governments.

Critics of consociational democracy argue that when executive power-sharing takes the form of a grand coalition cabinet comprising all major parties, it reduces the role of the opposition which is “the sine qua non of contemporary democracy” (Lawson 1993, p. 192-193).

Consociational democracy often fails the turnover and two turnover tests (whether two peaceful electoral alternations have occurred) needed to determine whether a democracy is consolidated

(Huntington 1991, p. 266). Other critics of consociationalism argue that this type of power

sharing can deepen social divisions rather than bridge them, and may lead to state collapse

(Hudson 1988; Reynolds, 2005).

In the case of Lebanon, consociationalism succeeded in achieving an agreement amongst the Lebanese on a system of governance through grand coalitions, and managed to broker power sharing until the outbreak of the civil war (1975-1989).39 However, it greatly hindered the formation of a meaningful opposition and thus limited parliament’s ability to oversee the executive as shall be demonstrated in later chapters. It also did not succeed in decreasing the tensions between social groups evidenced by the continuous outbreaks of civil violence.

However, prior to the outbreak of civil war in 1975, Lebanon did succeed in having peaceful electoral alternations. Parliamentary elections were held periodically, voter turnout increased regularly, elections became more competitive, and instances of fraud became less frequent (Hudson, 1968). These elections shared similar characteristics in terms of electoral districting that moved from larger districts to smaller ones. The 1960 electoral law divided

Lebanon to twenty-six electoral districts. The law adopted a mixed list system was adopted whereby the voter was allowed to choose the candidates from different lists, as opposed to a closed party list, while maintaining the quota of seats to each of the confessions/ethnicities represented in those districts.40

39 The reasons for the outbreak of the civil war goes beyond the power sharing arrangements amongst the Lebanese social groups to complex regional and international factors. There has been many prolific works on the reasons for the war, as well as political analysis of the events and players of this war. For an example of such research see Salibi (1976) and Fisk (2001).

40 Lijphart (2002) proposes several guidelines derived from consociational theory, including electoral system design, which in a consociational democracy needs to be based on proportional representation as opposed to majoritarian methods. In terms to the specific form of proportional representation (PR), Lijphart recommends giving party organizations preponderant power over nominations to encourage formation of strong cohesive and disciplined parties. He makes three recommendations: 1) List PR is preferable to a single transferable vote, 2) List PR with closed or almost closed lists is preferable to open list PR; 3) It is better not to introduce high electoral thresholds (he suggests three percent). In Lebanon this is translated into predetermined sectarian ratios in each district, however the electoral system continues to be majoritarian (first past the post), and the lists are open, which is not conducive to creating political party alliances over national platforms. 61

The electoral districting coupled with the mixed list systems served to strengthen local and feudal notables and weakened political party alliances based on party platforms. The majority of the parliamentarians elected to parliament during this period did not have a party affiliation. Not surprisingly, and despite the presence of strong secular parties with large bases across the country such at the Communist and Nationalist parties, they failed to bring their candidates to parliament despite controlling as much as 10% of the electorate (Baaklini 1999).

The table below demonstrates the distribution of parliamentary seats amongst the parties and independents.

Table 1: MPs Affiliated with a Political Party 1960-1972

Party 1960 1964 1968 1972

Phalanges Party 6 4 9 7

National Liberal 5 6 8 7 Party

National Bloc 6 2 5 3 Party

Progressive 6 6 5 4 Socialist Party

Tashnak 4 4 3 2

Other 1 0 1 5

Total MPs with 28 22 31 28 party affiliation

Without party 71 77 68 71 affiliation

Lebanon 1990 – 2005: Authoritarianism Post Civil War

The devastating fifteen-year civil war ended with a new pacting arrangement among the

Lebanese groups. Members of the 1972 parliament, which remained in power during the civil war, met in Taif Saudi Arabia between 30 September and 22 October 1989 and negotiated the

Taif Accord. The parliament was one of the few remaining political institutions that had some legitimacy in the war torn and severely divided country. The sixty members of parliament, despite having been elected almost two decades earlier, were considered the representatives with the delegated authority to negotiate a peace settlement.

The new pact, consecrated in the Document of National Understanding (Taif Accord), once again reaffirmed the consociational nature of the political rule in Lebanon. And while it stated that confessionalism has to be abolished in the long term, it redistributed power among the

Lebanese confessions according to the outcomes of the civil war, and the country’s shifting demographics. This translated in equally distributing the parliamentary seats between Christians and Muslims, as opposed to the 6:5 ratio favoring the Christians prior to the war. It also redistributed the powers among the government branches, reducing some of the President’s powers and empowering the Council of Ministers and the Parliament. It also distributed the major political positions among the confessions: The President is a Christian Maronite, the Prime

Minister is a Muslim Sunni, and the Speaker of the House is a Muslim Shiite.

The Lebanese Parliament approved the constitutional amendments and agreed upon in the

Taif Accord on 21 August 1990. The new amendments shifted Lebanon’s political structures towards a parliamentary system: although the president appoints the prime minister, he does so after binding consultation with the parliamentary groups, and only the parliament possesses the capacity to remove the prime minister from power (while the president also had this authority in the past). The parliament’s legislative powers increased, for example it now has the power to 63

determine the urgency of bills presented by the executive, and to schedule them on the agenda accordingly (in the previous constitution, the executive set the agenda through determining the urgency of bills and the parliament was required to discuss them within forty days). The

Speaker’s powers also increased, his term was extended from one to four years, and he has the capacity to veto any of the president’s candidates for the prime minister. The new constitution also ensured that consensus among the president, the prime minister, and the Speaker, or what was termed “the Troika,” was mandatory for the approval of public policies. The disadvantage of this system was that it further aligned the institutions with the confessions and any confessional tensions could create institutional gridlock and policy paralysis, as will happen in the late 2000s.

The Taif Accord also legalized the presence of the Syrian Armed Forces, under the pretense of maintaining civil peace. This peacekeeping presence however, translated into fifteen year of Syrian hegemony and authoritarian rule over Lebanon’s economic, political, and security affairs. To ensure its authoritarian rule, the Syrian regime manipulated the electoral laws (and electoral candidates) in postwar Lebanon to create a pro-Syrian political elite tasked with institutionalizing Syrian hegemony through the state institutions including the parliament.

Post-war elections shaped Lebanon’s democratic development in general, and the parliament in particular. As the peace-building literature explains, elections play a significant role in stabilizing post conflict societies (Lyons, 2002; Stedman, 2001). They signify the end of the conflict and materialize the agreement on post-war power sharing and governance. However, electoral system design is crucial for the success of this role, particularly in deeply divided societies (Horowitz, 1985; Horowitz, 1990; Reilly, 2002; Reynolds, 2002). In the case of

Lebanon, the electoral laws were not based on proportional representation; nor did they adopt

closed party lists and medium to large electoral districts, all of which are conditions that Lijphart lists as crucial for the success of the consociational model.41

An examination of Lebanon’s postwar elections shows that the laws, and the parliaments that have been elected as a result of them, have served to consecrate ethnic conflict rather than ameliorate it and entrench the neo-patrimonial nature of the system (El-Huss, 2001; Saghiye and

Saghiye, 2004; Salam, 2004; Salloukh 2006). Despite the electoral inter-ethnic bargaining and collations witnessed prior to each election, which are prescribed by Horrowitz (2003) for moderating social divisions and avoiding conflict, the electoral system has “served to consolidate an already-institutionalized confessional and clientelistic system, thus hardening, rather than ameliorating, sectarian cleavages” (Salloukh 2006, p. 637-638).

Electoral districting was purposefully gerrymandered to reward pro-Syrian politicians and groups and punish those who acted against its interests (El-Khazen, 1993, 2000, and 2003).

The adoption of small districts privileged local sectarian leaders and traditional feudal or political families, who were able to secure the votes of their constituents in their local strongholds, but who did not necessarily enjoy the same level of support at the national level.42

The problem is compounded given that these families head the major political parties in

Lebanon, and gain the unwavering support of their constituents based on confessional loyalties.

The electoral districting thus contributed to the continuation of a polarizing sectarian discourse rather than facilitating reconciliation, while weakening the opportunity for new or more secular forces to rise to power. The elections held in 1992, 1996, and 2000 shared similar

41 It only specified proportional representation of the confessions. But the elections were still majoritarian.

42 Lebanese political/feudal families have dominated the political scene for many decades, if not centuries. Forty families have dominated more than 60% of the elected seats between 1922 and 1972 (Nasr, 2000). This trend continues till today, although the percentage dropped to around 30% after the civil war.

characteristics in terms of the law adopted (including the aforementioned gerrymandering of districts),43 and the heavy-handed manipulation of the electoral processes by the Syrian security forces, and the direct pressure on the voters.44 These pseudo-representative parliaments struggled to practice its powers related to legislation, oversight, and budgeting as will be discussed in the following chapters.

Lebanon Post Syrian Withdrawal: 2005 – Present

The assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq El Hariri in February 2005 marked a new era in Lebanese political life. The Syrian regime withdrew its armed forces from Lebanon after massive protests and while it still retained some of its former allies it lost considerable control over day-to-day politics in Lebanon. Political parties and movements that had been previously dissolved, predominantly Christian, resumed their activity, and several prominent Christian leaders returned to the political scene.45 Unfortunately, a series of political crises shortly

43 The 1992 elections were largely boycotted by the Christian population, who viewed them to be unrepresentative, due to the absence of leading Maronite figures and parties (Free Patriotic Movement, Lebanese Phalanges and the Lebanese Forces). The elections also witnessed the entry of Islamist parties into parliament which had grown in power not only due to the Christian electoral boycott but also due to their ability to work on the grassroots level, and to provide services to constituents (such as health, education etc.) in areas where the state failed to do so (Baaklini et al. 1999). The electoral law was once again disputed in 1996. A draft law submitted to parliament manipulated electoral districting in a way that marginalized Christian voters’ ability to elect their representatives. Amidst Christians protests, ten MPs challenged the law and referred it to the Constitutional Council which declared it unconstitutional. Three days before the elections, the government submitted an electoral law that once again used the Qada for electoral districting to Parliament, and the MPs adopted it. Christian participation in elections was once again debated. Major Christian leaders, who were outside Lebanon (Ameen Gemayel, Michel Aoun, and Dory Chamoun) called for boycotting the elections. However, some of the Christian local figures participated in the elections. Despite the instability, the boycotting of major parties and electoral fraud, the elections were largely competitive with around 180 candidates vying for thirty five seats in Mount Lebanon alone. The 1996 elections yielded five blocks (headed by Rafiq Hariri, Nabih Berri, Walid Jumblatt, Suleiman Franjieh, and Hizbullah), and while their private interests may have differed the five blocks were all pro-Syrian, with a handful of MPs who were independents and in the opposition (such as Salim Al Hoss, Najah Wakeem, and Nassib Lahoud). 44Electoral Law no. 154 of 1992 increased the number of parliamentary seats to 128 from 108, and as many critics believe targeted limiting the Christian/Maronite political influence according to the districting adopted (El Khazen, 2000: 72-82). The 1996 electoral law introduced one amendment to the 1992 law (redistricting in Beqa' area). The 2000 electoral law introduced further redistricting to the benefit of Syria’s local allies. 45 These include Michel Aoun head of the Free Patriotic Movement who returned from exile, and Samir Geagea head of the Lebanese Forces party, who was pardoned from prison. Both men are considered to be the most influential Christian politicians with large base of supporters.

followed this. The severe division of political groups between the pro-Syrian 8 March camp and

Anti Syrian 14 March Camp, Israel’s war on Lebanon in July of 2006, rising religious tensions, and finally the outbreak of war in neighboring Syria have put the country in continuous turmoil since 2005.

These political crises that Lebanon has witnessed since 2005 had a negative effect on all of the State institutions including the parliament. Extreme polarization between the groups represented in parliament made cross party collaboration extremely difficult. The parliament’s general assembly sessions were disrupted several times due to a large number of MPs boycotting the sessions. As a result of the boycotting the quorums needed for general assembly sessions to be held could not met and the parliament could not meet for months at a time.

The elections of 2005, and 2009 were particularly free of Syrian manipulation and fairer than others resulting in a more representative parliament and the entrance of new groups to parliament.46 As one opposition MP interviewed described the parliament post 2005:

The parliament did change after 2005. The Syrian withdrawal and the entry of new parties rejuvenated parliamentary work. There was a larger margin of freedom. The Syrians were involved in the lawmaking process, they would dictate to MPs the position they should take on proposed bills and laws. There were many instances of MPs receiving phone calls during General Assembly sessions from high ranking Syrian security officials on how to vote on a particular law. Debating the budget was pointless. Today the parliament is more independent. The entrance of new parties, after the Syrian withdrawal was key for increasing debate and discussion.

Despite the political crises, the parliament was rejuvenated as chapters four and five will demonstrate. The parliament’s organizational structure was further developed and the number of staff almost doubled, increasing the parliament’s institutional capacity. The public budget was

46 The 2005 elections were held according to the 2000 electoral law. The 2009 elections were held following the Doha conference that served to provide a solution for the severe crisis that Lebanon witnessed. The conference resulted in the consensus amongst the main political parties on a new President, as well as the electoral law (Electoral Law of 1960) according to which the elections were organized.

debated and the government’s fiscal performance was scrutinized, which is an important development as it was previously rubberstamped by earlier parliaments.

The above discussion of Lebanon’s political development has highlighted the role of pacting and electoral engineering on the development of the legislative institution. Political parties and the parliamentary groups they form are among the main players within the parliament. It is thus important to shed some light on the development of these parties in the

Lebanese context.

Political Parties, Parliamentary Groups and the Parliament

The political party experience in Lebanon is as old as the modern state. Parties, with the exception of a few leftist and nationalist parties, are closely aligned with the social/confessional divisions. And thus, when pacting does occur, it occurs among the main political parties that represent the different social groups. Trying to classify these parties following the end of the civil war is a difficult task, as noted by El Khazen (2002). The majority of the parties are small parties with personalistic leadership and suffer from weak internal governance and fragmentation. There are some exceptions to this rule such as Hizbullah that despite its personalistic leadership, does have an elaborate organizational structure.

Parliamentary elections are fiercely competed by political parties who spend significant financial and human resources to guarantee the success of their candidates. However, the majority of those parties do not have clear electoral platforms. In a detailed study on parties and elections in Lebanon between 1990 and 2000, Echtay (2002) finds that the majority of parties depend on social ties and confessional loyalties rather than clear policy platforms to win parliamentary elections. Political parties with opposing ideologies and political positions strike electoral “deals” with one another to secure the votes needed for their candidates. However,

those deals do not necessarily materialize in strong party coalitions within the parliament once elected.

These findings were echoed by the majority of the MPs interviewed for this research, who confirmed that their parties do not have solid platforms and that their campaigns usually consist of attending social events in their districts, and promising services to the voters.

However, there has been some developments since 2005. For example, some of the parties, such as the Free Patriotic Movement, have tried to wade into the elections according to thematic platforms based on fighting corruption. Several parties such as Hizbullah, the Future

Movement, and the Free Patriotic Movement have adopted institutional reforms to strengthen and support their parliamentary blocks. Hizbullah in particular established a research center to support the work of its MPs. The effect of these developments on the parliamentary institution and its performance will be discussed in detail in chapters four and five.

Conclusions From the Cases of Morocco and Lebanon: A Response to the Literature on Arab Parliaments: Beyond Authoritarianism, Cooptation, and Clientelism

The majority of the literature focusing on authoritarianism and democratization in the

Arab region regarding pacting processes as strategies that authoritarian regimes resort to when needed to propagate their rule. Therefore, the institutional reforms such as elections and widening the scope of parliament’s autonomy and authority are mere cosmetic embellishments to improve the regime’s image and coopt contenders. This literature when discussing parliaments has converged on two arguments: the role of elections and parliamentary institutions in prolonging the reign of authoritarian regimes (Gandhi, 2008; Sadiki, 2009); and the role that parliaments play in strengthening the clientelistic nature of constituent–representative relationship through regulating the access to and distribution of state resources (Lust, 2005;

Liddell 2010). 69

These arguments are largely true when one looks at a snapshot of parliament at work, or its work over a short period of time. However, these arguments do not account for the political development that these countries witness, nor the development of the parliamentary institution that occurs over a longer period of time. They also do not answer the question that if parliamentary institutions are mere rubber stamps that provide access to state resources, why have these institutions witnessed an increased level of activity, and why would members of parliament spend hours working in committees, debating in general assembly, and searching for resources to allow them to perform their parliamentary duties of legislation and holding the executive accountable.

It is true that authoritarian regimes make rational choices to protect and preserve its power such as engaging in negotiations and pacting with its contenders. However, in times of transition and political opening, when the political rules change, the authoritarian regime does not necessarily predict the depth of the compromise it was forced to make, nor can it be sure of the consequences of this change. In the case of Morocco for example, both the king and the opposition parties were testing the limits and ability to push the boundaries of these openings during the mid-eighties, mid-nineties, and in the wake of the Arab uprisings in 2011. Both sides acted rationally to maximize their gains and minimize their losses.

The early records of the Lebanese parliament’s predecessor, the Representative Council, indicated a similar struggle for power between the French Mandate and the contending political groups represented in the Council who wanted access to decision making. Political groups played a key role in negotiating the first national pact that established the social contract for the

Lebanese state. Several decades later, the political groups represented in parliament negotiated a new pact that brought the civil war to an end. Despite their different circumstances, political

groups in Lebanon and Morocco were motivated by the same incentive, power sharing and ensuring access to decision making. In Morocco, the contenders had to seize that access from an authoritarian regime. In Lebanon, the contenders first had to take it from a colonial power that imposed its mandate on the country for more than twenty years. At a later stage the different groups had to struggle to find a power sharing formula that would overcome deep social divisions and ensure proper representation for their groups.

A longitudinal approach to studying pacting and parliaments over several decades reveals that as in the case of Morocco, contenders to authoritarian regimes were able to extract hard won compromises from the regime that resulted in opening the political sphere, and strengthening the parliamentary institution. Strengthening the parliament is crucial to them as it provides them with the main platform to participate in decision making and offers them experience that they use to negotiate additional reforms. Parties that would not have been able to participate earlier are now actively involved in the decision-making process and have won parliamentary majorities, and parliaments that once had 90% majorities are now witnessing the increasing strength of opposition parties and actors. Parliaments are not mere embellishments, even in undemocratic environments.

The above discussion highlighted the role of political parties within parliament as one of the main determinants of the outcomes of pacting and the powers granted to parliament. These parties have faced severe challenges in both countries as well as in other countries in the region.

These challenges include the authoritarian conditions the parties operate in; the personalistic tendencies for parties to form around tribal, feudal, or charismatic leaders who serve their own interests; and the parties’ weak institutional structures (Messara, 1996; Suleiman, 2004; Echtay,

2002). Political parties in both Morocco and Lebanon are highly fragmented as a result of either

dissidence within older parties and the defections thereof, 47 or from mushrooming of new parties that revolve around one or more notables (Santucci, 2006). 48

However, there has been some development in the political party scene in both countries over the past three decades. In Morocco, there is a shift towards democratic consolidation as a handful of parties have emerged as the key players.49 In Lebanon, the political parties continue to adhere to social divisions (ethnic and religious) and strong personalistic leaders that represent them. These types of organizations tend to be top heavy revolving around the personalistic leader, with loose coalitions with local leaders that link them to the constituents (Ruland et al.,

2005, p. 153). Despite this, over the last decade some parties have gradually shifted towards expanding their constituency outreach, and developing their internal structures such as

Hizbullah, the FPM, and Future party among others.

Regardless of their weaknesses, these parties continue to be the gatekeepers of elected political office determining who can run and win the elections. One of the findings of “Returning to Political Parties?” an edited book that discusses political parties and political development in eight Arab countries, is that political parties continue to “mobilize and contribute to regulating the political game on behalf of partisan identity” (Catusse and Karam 2010, p. 28).

This chapter presented a historical and chronological analysis of the two case studies to demonstrate that the de jure power of a parliament granted to it by the Constitution was at the

47 In Morocco for example there are thirty five registered political parties. This fragmentation is reflected in the number of political groups represented in both parliaments. The 2009 parliament in Lebanon for had more than twenty parliamentary groups, with some groups having as few as three members.

48 Well established democracies tend to have less than six parties that are strong and that can have a policy impact (Sartori 1976, Lijphart 1999).

49 The number of political groups represented in parliament has decreased by almost half between 1997 and 2011, with stronger parties such as the PJD, Istiqlal, and USFP parties maintaining their representation over the past two decades 72

heart of pact making processes between regimes and challengers in the Arab region rather than simple window dressing attempts. Challengers are motivated to increase the power of parliament because it provides them with one of the few channels for power sharing and political participation. This explanation can justify why the political contenders have repeatedly fought for increasing parliament’s powers. It can also justify why members of parliament would sit through endless hours of parliamentary meetings and engage in parliamentary work that is not necessarily geared towards providing clientelistic services to his constituents.

It also argues that one of the unintended consequences of pacting and opening the parliamentary sphere to regime challengers is that it provides them with a learning opportunity to gain political experience both in bargaining with the regime and in mobilizing public support.

This experience that the challengers gain is important as it can provide them with additional leverage that they could use to their advantage during the next round of pacting when it arises.

The following chapter studies the de jure powers of parliament in further detail. It provides empirical evidence of how the participation political parties in the constitution making process has resulted in increasing the parliament’s powers over the years.

CHAPTER 3

CONSTITUTION MAKING AND THE DE JURE POWER OF PARLIAMENT

Introduction: Constitutions, Constitution Making, and Why It All Matters

Why study constitutions? Among other things, a constitution serves to specify the political system that governs the country, regulates the relation between the main branches of government, and between them and the electorate (Strom et.al, 2003). Constitutions also provide the foundation for the development of political institutions, in great detail at times, delineating the powers granted to each of the institutions including the parliament and the executive

(Copeland and Patterson 1994). Scholars studying constitutions argue that the process of constitution making of constitution making can shape the content of constitutions, their durability, and the democratization process the follows their adoption. This chapter argues that increased inclusiveness of political groups represented in the constitution making process increases the powers granted to parliament. The chapter begins by surveying the literature on constitution making, it then proposes a classification for representation of political groups in the constitution making process, and develops the De jure Power Index (DPI) to measure the powers that the constitutions granted to parliament. It finally builds a model on representation in constitution making and parliamentary power. The chapter tests the hypothesis on the cases of

Lebanon and Morocco, analyzing all the constitutions that were adopted since the establishment of the modern state (1926 and 1962 respectively). The findings support the hypothesis posited.

For the purposes of this research, constitutions are defined as “sets of rules, practices, and customs that polities regard as their fundamental law.” (Desmith and Brazier, 1989, p. 3-4) They emerge out of an explicit and temporally limited process of deliberation, bargaining and voting

(Negretto 2013, p.5). The political system that results from the power distribution and governing processes can range from a constitutional monarchy such as in the case of Norway or Morocco, a parliamentary system or Westminster system as in the case of Great Britain, presidential system as in the case of the Unites States of America, 50 and hybrid systems (semi-presidential or semi parliamentary).51

While it is true that the constitution determines the features of a political system and its electoral rules (Duverger, 1951), governments and parties can also, in turn, influence the selection and development of constitutional rules (Lipson, 1964; Boix 1999; and Colomer 2004,

2005). Accordingly, scholarly research has focused not only on the content of constitutions, but also on the process of making those constitutions, the level of participation in this process by the elites and the citizens, and the effect this process has on the content of the constitution and the political development that occurs following the adoption of the constitution.

For example, scholars studied the impact of the level of participation (i.e. whether participation is limited to the elites, or if it is more open to citizens or their representatives) in the constitution making process on the democratization process and sustainability of democracy

(O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Widner, 2008; Eisenstadt et. al 2015) and on the democratic content of the constitutions (Moehler, 2008; Maboudi, 2016). Other scholars focused on the impact of the level of participation during the constitution making process on the endurance of constitutions (Hart, 2001; Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998; Elkins et. al, 2009). The common thread in all of this research is that who participates in making a constitution matters.52

50 A constitutional monarchy “reunites a one-person non-elected monarch with executive powers and a multiple— person elected assembly with legislative powers” (Colomer, 2006, p. 218).

51 For more on hybrid systems see Shugart, 2006.

52 Advocates for elite driven constitution making processes such as O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argued that an elite driven constitutional process that is drafted behind closed doors creates space for a small number of players to 75

The effect of constitution making, and the actors involved in this process on institutional design and the distribution of power between the branches of government, which is the focus of this chapter, has also received the attention of researchers. Shugart (1998) examined the effect of the party alliance of constitution drafters on the constitution. He argued that constitution makers are more likely to endow the executive with a wider scope of powers if they rely on their personal reputation as providers of narrowly targeted goods and services. The logic behind their choice would be that strong executives would allow the drafters (assuming that they will become part of the executive) to continue to cultivate their reputation. Conversely, if the constitution makers belong to strong parties that they rely on to advance their careers, they are more likely to give more powers to the parliament. The reason would be that they want to strengthen their parties through delegating policymaking powers to their party representatives in parliament.

Shugart, however, confines his model to who has the power to pass policies, without addressing other powers that the legislative or executive enjoy. This presents a limited understanding of the full scope of powers of each institution. For example, even if the executive has the power to pass legislation by decrees without resorting to parliament, parliament can still hold it accountable via its oversight powers.

Negretto (2013) also studies the effect of the constitution drafting process on the powers granted to the President or head of the executive. He argues that if a single party (especially if it is the incumbent party) dominates the constituent assembly responsible for drafting the

bargain, resulting in a higher likelihood for compromises and democratic consolidation. Widner (2008) argued that elite driven constitution making is better fit for countries that are witnessing intense conflict and the need for conflict resolution. Advocates of a participatory constitution making process such as Moehler (2008) and Maboudi (2016) argued that wider participation during constitution making results in embedding stronger democratic values in the constitution. Eisenstadt .et.al (2015) found that participatory constitution making results in more sustainable democracies following the adoption of the constitution. Finally, Hart (2001) Elster, Offe and Preuss, (1998) found that more participatory constitution making processes increased the likelihood of constitutional endurance as it increased public ownership of the constitution and perceived legitimacy of the constitution making process. 76

constitution, then the outcome will typically be in favor of reinforcing the party’s electoral advantage. This is achieved through adopting electoral rules and posing feeble constraints on presidential re-elections. If the constitution, however, is negotiated by a coalition of at least two parties, then the different parties will have to compromise, resulting in concentrating more powers in the hands of the executive, but imposing stricter term limits.

The research of Shugart and of Negretto had an “executive centric” approach focusing on the effect of the constitution making on the powers of the president. This chapter adopts a

“legislature centric” approach and looks at the effect of the constitution making process on the powers granted to parliament. And while the authors focused their research on the policy making power of the president, this chapter adopts a wider lens to capture parliamentary power focusing on its level of autonomy from the executive, its ability to hold the executive accountable, as well as its policy making power. The main argument that this chapter presents is that increased inclusiveness of political groups represented in the constitution making process increases the powers granted to parliament.

This argument goes beyond looking at the choice of political system, whether it is presidential, parliamentary semi presidential etc., focusing instead on the powers granted to parliament vis-à-vis the executive. 53 This approach was informed by recent research findings that the choice of political system does not necessarily imply the extent of powers granted to each institution (Fish and Kroenig 2009; Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg, 2014). For example

Fish and Kroenig (2009), who surveyed the majority of parliaments of the world, found that the legislative powers granted to parliament varied considerably within the same type of political

53 There is a wealth of research on defining and differentiating political systems (presidential, parliamentary, semi presidential etc.), and the consequences of adopting each system. See for example Duverger (1980), Lijphart (1984), Shugart and Carey (1992), Stepan and Skach (1993), Sartori (1997), Shugart and Mainwaring (1997), Elgie (1998, 1999), Strom et.al (2003), Linz (1994); Kaiser (1997), Riggs (1988). 77

system, while some parliaments had comparable powers across systems. Therefore, in order to understand the impact of the constitution making process on the parliament’s de jure power, the research needs to look past the choice of political system to the specific powers that the constitution makers allocate to the parliamentary institution.

This argument limits the representation in constitution making to that of the political groups, particularly the regime challengers, as opposed to mass participation, or participation of special interest groups such as labor unions or human rights groups. This approach is similar to those adopted by other scholars studying constitution making and institutional design such as

Shugart (1998) and Negretto (2013). It is also informed by the recent research of Maboudi

(2016), who found that mass participation during drafting the constitution focused mostly on the preamble and the basic principles and rights enshrined in the constitution. The division of power among the different political institutions received a lot less attention from the public.

Therefore political groups, who gain to benefit the most from the power sharing arrangements, are more likely to influence the decisions on institutional design and the powers granted to the different institutions. This is evident for example in the case of Morocco, as was discussed in the previous chapter. During instances of constitution making, contending parties repeatedly petitioned the King (in 1962, 1972, 1996), as well as the Constitutional Drafting

Committee appointed by the King in 2011, regarding the powers granted to parliament. In

Tunisia, while Maboudi’s (2016) findings showed lower public interest in the distribution of power between the state institutions, this subject was one of the major areas of contention among the different political groups represented in the National Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting the new Tunisian Constitution. Ahmed Ourfally, the former legal advisor to the Tunisian

President described this debate between the political groups as “the most heated in the

Assembly’s meetings, and was the most difficult for parties to reach an agreement about, it was at the core of their struggle for power” (Ahemd Ourfalli, personal communication, November 18,

2015). While certain groups were in favor of centralizing the power with the executive, others were lobbying for a stronger parliament that would control the executive and curb potential abuse of power.

The argument posited in this chapter is tested using all instances of constitutional change that has occurred in the selected cases of Lebanon and Morocco as evidence (for case selection justification see chapter one). In Lebanon, the first constitution was adopted in 1926. This constitution has gone through a series of reforms adopted by the parliament in 1927, 1943, 1947, and 1990. The first constitution was promulgated by the King in Morocco in 1962 after it was ratified by public referendum. The King promulgated a second constitution in 1970 that went through a series of reforms in 1972, 1992, and 1996. The last constitution was adopted in 2011.

While the previous chapter highlighted the political developments that lead to these constitutional changes this chapter provides empirical evidence of how these changes affected the power of parliament.

Before proceeding to operationalizing and testing the hypothesis posited in this chapter in the section below, it is important to note that many researchers have questioned the purpose of constitutional reform in the Arab region. This research comes shortly after the Arab region has witnessed the latest “wave of constitution making” using Elster’s (1995) terminology. Since the uprisings that started in 2011, several Arab countries have amended their constitutions or adopted new ones including Tunisia (2014), Morocco (2011), Jordan (2011, 2014, 2016), Syria

(2012), and Egypt (2012, 2014). Other countries such as Libya and Yemen are still in the process of drafting their constitutions.

While these constitutions are still relatively new, past constitutional reforms in the region have been considered by scholars as tactics that authoritarian regimes resort to during times of escalated contention to prolong their rule (Posusney and Angrist, 2005; Ottaway and Choucair-

Vizoso 2008). Brown (2002) argued that one of the reasons why the constitutional reforms in the

Arab region were futile was that they served to organize powers without limiting them, i.e. the regimes continue to rule uninhabited by the legal texts. These arguments are in line with literature on constitutions in authoritarian regimes (Svolik 2009; Albertus and Mandelo, 2012).

However, even under authoritarian regimes or in transitioning democracies, constitutions can serve functions other than window-dressing and polishing the image of strong executives. In the edited volume by Ginsburg and Simpser (2014), authors argue that in addition to window- dressing, the constitution provides an operating manual that serves as guidelines for governing and constraining the authority of the rulers; it also offers a blueprint that highlights what the country can become in the future. Brown (2002) justifies the importance of studying constitutions in authoritarian regimes on the grounds that they may help establish a limited accountable government in the future. As for the purpose of this dissertation, studying constitutions in transitioning democracies allows for understanding how the powers granted to parliament by the constitution develop over time.

Constitution Making Process and Parliament’s De jure Power

Measuring the Representativeness of the Constitution Making Process

The main hypothesis that this chapter proposes is that increased inclusiveness of representation of political groups during the constitution making process positively impacts the powers granted to parliament. The logic underlying this hypothesis is that the larger the number of players involved in the constitution making process, the more likely the need for power

sharing arrangements that distribute power to multiple actors will arise. Since the parliament is a state institution that can allows for the participation of a large and diverse number of actors, the increased number of different groups represented in the constitution making process will result in increasing the powers of the parliament. The groups have to assume that they will be able to access the parliament in the future after the constitution is adopted. To test the hypothesis below, this chapter first defines and operationalizes the concepts of representation and participation, then builds a composite measure of parliamentary power, and finally tests the hypothesis using the selected case studies.

H1: Increased inclusiveness of representation of political groups during the constitution making process increases the powers granted to parliament.

As justified in the section above, the universe of representation is limited to political groups. Representation measures the extent to which political groups are represented during the three stages of constitution making process: selection, deliberation and ratification. Selection refers to the method of selecting the constitution drafting body. The second stage or deliberation refers to discussing and drafting the constitution. The final stage is ratification, which refers to the method that the draft constitution is adopted into law (Elkins et. al. 2009; Eisdenstadt et. al.,

2015; Maboudi, 2016).

Building on the methodology adopted by Maboudi (2016), the representation of the constitution making process is operationalized using the inclusiveness of representation of political groups during the three stages as an indicator. For each stage the inclusiveness of representation is coded. If no groups are represented then it is coded as zero, if some major groups including contenders are represented then it is coded as 1, and if all groups are

represented it is coded as 2. The representation variable aggregates all three stages, representation can thus range from 0 as non-representative to 6 as fully representative.

Table 2 below clarifies the coding criteria for the constitution making process, which is divided into three categories: representative (R), semi-representative (SR) and non-representative

(NR). The selection stage is coded as NR if no groups are represented during the selection stage of the constitution making body. If the body is appointed or partially elected but includes in its membership representatives of some of the political groups it is coded as (SR). If the body is fully elected and includes representatives of most political groups, it is coded as (R). For the drafting stage, it is coded as NR if the constitution is drafted in camera, and no group can provide their input during the drafting and deliberation process; it is coded as SR if the all groups can indirectly participate in the constitution drafting process through submitting petitions or recommendations to the body; it is coded as R if most groups actively participate in the drafting and deliberation process. Finally the ratification stage is categorized as NR if the constitution is directly promulgated by the ruler via decree; it is coded as SR if some groups participate in the ratification process whether it was through assembly vote or public ratification; it is coded as R if all major groups participate in the ratification process.

Table 2: Coding Criteria for Constitution Making Process

Selection Drafting Ratification Non- A constitution drafting Constitution is drafted in Constitution is Representative body is appointed by strong camera. Groups cannot promulgated by executive/authoritarian provide any input during decree by acting ruler with no representation constitution drafting head of state of political groups. process. (President/King etc.). Semi- A constitution drafting Groups can indirectly Some groups Representative body is appointed or participate in constitution participate in partially elected, but drafting through ratifying the appointments include submitting proposals to constitution through

representatives of major the constitution drafting referendum or political groups. body. parliamentary vote. Representative Most political groups are Groups actively All groups represented in a fully participate in drafting the participate in elected constitution drafting constitution. ratifying the body such as a constituent constitution assembly. through public referendum or parliamentary vote.

Data and Analysis

As mentioned above, the sample of the cases studied includes all constitutions and constitutional reforms promulgated in Lebanon (1926, 1927, 1943, 1947, 1990), and Morocco

(1962, 1970, 1972, 1992, 1996, 2011), totaling eleven cases. Both new constitutions and constitutional amendments are treated as new instances of constitutions. The coding of representation of each stage of each institution is informed by the political context surrounding each constitution discussed in detail in Chapter two. Accordingly, in the case of Lebanon, the

1926 and 1927 constitutions drafted under the French Mandate were least representative with a

DPI score of 1, while the constitutions that followed the independence were highly representative as they were drafted and adopted by an elected parliament.

In the case of Morocco, all constitutions, except for the 2011 constitution, ranked very low on the representation index with a DPI score of 1, given that they were all ratified in public referendum (despite of the fraudulent results and the boycotting of major parties of those referendums). The DPI score of the 2011 constitution increased considerably compared to the previous constitutions. Although the King appointed the Constitutional Reform Advisory

Commission (Al lajna Al istishariya li I’dad al dostour) composed of nineteen members, they represented the different social and political groups including the political parties, civil society,

civil rights movements and key figures. The Political Mechanism for Follow-up and

Consultation (alaliya al siyasiya lil tashawer hawla al dostour) was also established. The Political

Mechanism had an open membership including heads of political parties, trade unions, CSOs. It allowed for broader participation of various political groups during the drafting and deliberation phase. The Constitutional Reform Advisory Commission met regularly with the Mechanism to receive the different constitutional suggestions that were submitted by the parties, which formed the grounds for the new constitution. The constitution was ratified in public referendum that most of the major political groups participated in.

These scores will be used in the model presented in the last section to test the hypothesis of the effect of representation on the powers granted to parliament. One of the admittedly major caveats of the proposed categorization of the constitution making process is the objectivity of these measurements, which can be a challenge for the replicability of the research. Observers or social scientists can differ about how to judge the representativeness of the constitution making process, particularly of the semi-representative category. For example, in Morocco, Abdallah

Saaf, one of the members of the Constitutional Reform Advisory Commission and a constitutional expert, stated that the 2011 constitution was the first constitution “written by the people for the people.” (Abdallah Saaf, personal communication, 27 June 2014). Thus the process was participatory and representative according to him. However, other political observers contest that idea, given that some of the opposition movements (such as the Salafis and the 20 February movement) were not represented. Furthermore, if one group boycotts the deliberation or ratification process, does the process become semi-representative if all other groups participate? Which groups can be classified as major groups? Several factors can determine what constitute a major group such as its size, its role in the opposition as a challenger

of the regime, or if it represents an ethnic group. This caveat however can be circumvented by qualitative research, secondary literature, and in-depth knowledge of the case to ensure the accuracy of the coding methodology. Finally, on of the assumptions made in this argument is that representation of political groups in constitution making implies their participation. This is a logical assumption given that the representatives of political groups in the constitution making body for example are likely to participate and push their agenda during the constitution making process.

Measuring Parliament’s De jure Power

Challenges of Measuring Parliamentary Power

David Arter, in his edited volume on comparing and classifying legislatures, raises the problem of the absence of precision tools with which to measure legislature’s policy power

(2007). He argues that scholars comparing legislatures have a propensity to conflate ‘legislative capacity’ or the potential policy power, with ‘legislative performance’ or the actual policy output. He defines three stages that legislative research has focused on and sometimes conflated:

1) the legislative capacity of parliaments, which evaluates the potential of a parliament to exert influence on the policy process and can be captured by studying the macro-constitutional rules, structures, internal organization and procedures. 2) The input stage, or legislative operation, which can be studied by focusing on the work of committees, party groups, and the relation between parliamentary and executive majorities. 3) The output stage or legislative performance, which is concerned with evaluating the actual result of parliamentarians work in policy making

(such as the number of laws they propose, the questions they ask, the hearings they can organize.). The conflation of these stages lead to skewing the results when trying to categorize parliamentary power, thus affecting the accuracy of analysis based on these results.

The Parliamentary Power Index (PPI) used by Fish and Kroenig (2009) to conduct a global survey of parliaments, is one of the major attempts to create a standard measurement for parliamentary power, and is currently used by other datasets that measure constitutions (such as the Comparative Constitutions Project).54 The index is composed of thirty two dichotomous variables that gauge parliamentary power including its influence over the executive (such as ability to question the executive); its institutional autonomy (whether the parliament is immune from dissolution, if it is has exclusive lawmaking authority); its specific powers (such as power to amend the constitution and authorize war); and its institutional capacity (whether the legislature meets regularly, has staff etc.).

The magnitude of their task is commendable as they measure the power of parliaments in every country with a population of more than half a million. However, their methodology suffers from some shortcomings which become obvious when conducting detailed case studies of parliaments. One of the major weaknesses of their methodology is that it conflates the potential powers (de jure) of the institution and the actual performance (de facto), which Arter (2007) warns against. Their methodology for developing the PPI index involves an analysis of constitutions and other relevant documents of each country to determine the powers of the parliament, as well as the opinion of five experts from each country assessing the extent that these powers practiced in reality. For example, if a parliament has the constitutional power to remove the government through a vote of no confidence, but the experts believe that the parliament would never remove the government, then that power is coded as negative.

54 The Comparative Constitutions Project is a research consortium that has compiled the largest dataset of constitutions from 1789 till today. Among other things this dataset measured is the legislative power based on Fish and Kroenig’s PPI. http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ 86

This conflation between the potential power of parliaments and its performance limits the usage of the index, since parliamentary performance is affected by a large number of exogenous variables in addition to the powers it is granted by the legal texts including the constitution (such as strength of political parties, conflict, civil society activism, to name a few). Therefore, while some parliaments may have strong de jure powers, they might have a weak performance for different reasons. The absence of this distinction between legal powers and performance of parliaments can lead to challenges in using this index. The user, whether an academic studying political systems and institutional design, or a practitioner working in the field of parliamentary strengthening, does not know if the weakness or shortcomings in parliamentary power is a result of the limited constitutional powers granted to parliament or due to other factors affecting the parliament.

Several of the variables used in the index conflate these powers, for example, whether the legislature has effective powers of oversight over the agencies of coercion (such as army, police, intelligence etc.). The parliament’s control over the military is usually confined to overseeing its budget as well as its practice. The authors admit to the subjectivity of this measurement as to what defines effective control given that in the vast majority of the countries of the world, rarely does the parliament have an extensive ability to control agencies of coercion (p. 7).55 Other variables that measure the de facto power rather than the de jure power include those used to measure parliamentary capacity such as the number of personal secretaries and non-secretarial staff available. Other indicator that they use to measure parliamentary capacity include whether the parliamentary seat is “attractive” enough for the MP to seek reelection, for example is it

55 Constitutions and legal text can grant the parliament the power to initiate laws on all issues (which therefore include the security sector), as well as the power to adopt and oversee the budget (which includes the military budget). However these powers do not necessarily ensure the effective oversight of coercion agencies. 87

“esteemed” enough, is there a high incumbency rate. These measurements can be fairly subjective (what is considered to be esteemed, for example), and they are usually not included in the constitution, or other legal texts that can regulate the work of the parliament and are more indicative of a parliament’s performance or de facto power.

Moreover, some of the variables used in the index are problematic. For example, when measuring influence over the executive, one of the variables used to measure the power of parliament is whether parliamentarians can serve simultaneously as ministers (which is the case in the UK parliament, for example). However, it is debatable whether this is necessarily a positive attribute (Smith and Polsby, 1981). While having parliamentarians head the ministries can increase the influence that parliament has over the executive, it can also decrease accountability as MPs who are ministers and are essentially overseeing themselves.

The parliament’s power over the budget receives less attention than it deserves given that it is the most important law that the parliament passes (Cheibub, 2007). The PPI measures this power using one variable: whether the expenditure of funds as appropriated by the legislature is mandatory, or whether the executive can manipulate the actual expenditure. Put more simply, this indicator measures whether the government abides by the budget allocations approved by the parliament or whether it can spend without or contrary to parliament’s approval. This lumps several parliamentary powers into one. A more fine grained approach may allow for better understanding of the extent of parliament’s power over the budget, such as measuring parliament’s ability to: amend budget allocations, whether all extra-budgetary items requires parliament’s approval, and if the parliament can scrutinize the budget’s implementation after the budget has been adopted.56

56 These indicators are widely used to measure parliament’s ex-ante and ex-post budgeting role. See Shugart and Carey (1992). 88

Fish and Kroenig also fuse legislative capacity with institutional autonomy from the executive on the grounds that the parliament has to be autonomous from the executive veto powers to legislate. Yet, their index also blurs the line about what constitutes institutional autonomy and legislative capacity. There is thus an added value in separating the legislative strength of parliaments and adding more detail to their analysis to allow for cross country comparison according to the main functions performed by parliament. Last but not least, the PPI does not have any indicators that capture parliamentary openness, i.e. its transparency and accessibility to citizens. Openness is important for strengthening parliaments as it allows for communication channels between parliaments and citizens, which are crucial for providing feedback loops for parliamentarians to better legislate and oversee the government. Constitutions ensure openness by forcing parliaments to carry on its work openly such as by making general assembly and parliamentary committee meetings public. Supporting legal texts such as parliamentary bylaws and rules of procedure can also include mechanisms for citizens to access the parliament.

Despite its weaknesses, the PPI does offer a starting point for identifying and operationalizing different dimensions of parliamentary power. The authors themselves acknowledge many of their shortcomings and suggest that future research is needed, particularly to be able to differentiate between de jure and de facto powers of parliaments (Fish and Kroenig,

2012). I develop the Parliaments De jure Power Index (DPI) in response to this need for new research building on Fish and Kroenig’s research as well as others including Shugart and Carey

(1992), who have written on legislative-executive relations.

A New Method for Measuring Parliamentary Power: The Parliament’s De jure Power Index

The Parliament’s De jure Power Index (DPI) is a composite index of six different indices, each measuring a different dimension of parliamentary power. DPI is composed of a total of thirty six dichotomous variables coded as 1 if the answer is Yes, and 0 if the answer is No. Each of the six indices is composed of a different number of variables. For example, the oversight power index is composed of ten variables while the openness index is composed of three variables. However, the variables are weighted equally, and all together they form the DPI:

1) Oversight power over index (ranges from 0 to 10): This index focuses on the parliament’s ability to hold the executive accountable by: allowing the parliament to obtain information it needs to oversee the government, and giving it the ability to remove members of the executive in case of misconduct.

2) Legislative power index (ranges from 0 to 7): This index measures both the parliament’s capacity to legislate, as well as its freedom from the executive’s power to control the legislative process. It also pays special attention to parliament’s power over the budget.

3) Institutional autonomy index (ranges from 0 to 5): This index focuses on the freedom of parliament and its members from threat of dissolution or prosecution, and from intervention in appointing its own members.

4) Parliament’s institutional capacity index (ranges from 0 to 3): While most constitutions do not provide great detail about the internal organization of parliaments, they tend to specify the committee structure, frequency of sessions or meetings, and ability to draft their own bylaws to regulate their work, in general.

5) Parliament’s specified powers index (ranges from 0 to 8): While these powers do not necessarily affect the power of parliament vis-à-vis the executive directly, they do reflect the

extent of powers granted to parliament. I adopt the variables used by Fish and Kroenig to measure this dimension as they are exhaustive.

6) Parliament’s openness (ranges from 0 to 3): This index measures both the transparency of the parliamentary institution and the ability of citizen engagement in its work.

The index weighs the different variables equally, which is a tradeoff this research makes knowing that that different variables may have different effects on parliamentary power.

However, the index measures the change in power of the parliament as a whole, and along the different dimensions separately. Therefore, if a researcher is interested in comparing oversight power, for example, she can look at the oversight index on its own. The index score would be calculated as the number of powers the parliament has out of the total number of powers of that specific dimension. For example, if constitution X has two out of the ten oversight powers specified in the index the oversight score of that constitution would be 2/10 or 0.2, with 1.0 being the perfect score for any of the indices.

Table 3 below provides an explanation for each of those variables to justify their selection. I relied on research in the field discussed above, as well as on my professional experience working as a parliamentary development specialist for more than a decade. The DPI offers a more fine-tuned measurement of parliamentary power compared to Fish and Kroenig’s

PPI. The DPI includes variables that measure parliament’s power over the budget process (both ex-ante and ex-post) more accurately. It drops some of the variables that conflate the parliamentary de jure and de facto powers discussed above. It differentiates between two dimensions of parliamentary power that were fused in the PPI: parliamentary autonomy (such as freedom of parliament and of its members from threat of dissolution or prosecution, and from intervention in appointing its own members); and legislative capacity (ability to propose amend

and adopt laws). It also proposes a new dimension: parliamentary openness. Finally, the DPI introduces eleven new variables to measure parliamentary power (variables one, two, ten, thirteen, fourteen, sixteen, eighteen, twenty five, thirty four, thirty five, and thirty six listed in table 3 below).

Table 3: Parliaments De jure Power Index (DPI)

Variable Description Coding

Index 1: Parliament’s Oversight Power Over the Executive A parliamentary question is one of the most commonly used oversight tools by parliaments worldwide (Wiberg 1995). It can be addressed orally or in writing. Questions serve three functions: to provide information, to criticize the government action (or non-action), and to test the honesty or ability of Every Member of Parliament cabinet members. They are usually made public and therefore pressure the has the right to address executive to provide a response. They also provide parliamentarians, 1. questions to the executive; and 1 if Yes particularly members of the opposition, who are at an informational the executive is obligated to disadvantage, with information they need to oversee the acts of the answer within a set time frame. government and hold it accountable (Strom et. al. 2003). Obligating the executive to respond ensures that the questions do not get brushed off and that the parliamentarians obtain information critical for allowing them to practice their oversight role (Salman, 2011). While interpellations are also a form of obtaining information by intensely questioning a member of the executive, they are also used to give rise to The Parliament has the right to debate in parliament about the executive’s policies or actions and in many 2. interpellate members of the 1 if Yes constitutions are linked to a vote expressing the satisfaction or dissatisfaction executive. of the parliament with the executive. Interpellation goes beyond obtaining information and holds executives accountable (Strom et. al 2003). The Parliament has the power This power is used both for obtaining information and for putting pressure 3. to summon members of the on a member of the executive, but it is not linked with the possibility of 1 if Yes executive. voting that member out of office. Parliaments have the right to form ad hoc committees of inquiry that enjoy a wide scope of authority to obtain information, such as the right to force The Parliament can conduct 4. members of the executive or other agencies to respond and provide the 1 if Yes independent investigations. requested information. In some countries they are provided with the power to file accusations when cases of misconduct are uncovered.

The Parliament appoints the This variable is positive if the parliament or if the parliament’s approval is 5. 1 if Yes prime minister, required for the president to appoint the PM. The Parliament’s approval is This variable measures parliament’s control over the appointment of the required to confirm the 6. government either through directly appointing them, or through approving 1 if Yes appointment of individual their selection, but they are selected by the PM or president. ministers. The country lacks a presidency This variable indicates whether the accountability of the head of the entirely; or there is a 7. executive is to parliament or to the people if he is directly elected. 1 if Yes presidency, but the president is

elected by the legislature. If passed, a vote of no confidence results in the removal of the council of The legislature can vote no ministers or one of its members. This tool is rarely used by parliamentarians, confidence in a member of the 8. even the opposition, given the possible political consequences and instability 1 if Yes executive or the cabinet as a that may follow. However, parliamentarians can simply threaten to use it to whole. pressure the executive or one of its members. Impeachment is considered the most severe of oversight powers, and usually The parliament is able to entails accusing the president or prime minister of misconduct before an 9. impeach the president or prime appropriate tribunal. While this is one of the rarely used oversight tools, 1 if Yes minister. endowing the parliament with this power suggests its strength to hold the highest ranking official to account to the people’s representatives. One of the strongest oversight tools that the parliament possesses to hold the Parliament has ex-post scrutiny government accountable is the capacity to monitor the government’s 10. 1 if Yes power of the budget. implementation of the annual budget; for example, the parliament may have the power to approve the Final Accounts.57

Index 2: Parliament’s Legislative Power

57 Final accounts (compte de gestion) are reports that are prepared by the executive at the end of each year detailing how the allocated expenditures were spent, and how the revenues were collected. These reports are submitted to parliament for approval, prior to submitting the budget for the new fiscal year. Final accounts provide the parliament with a detailed summary of the performance of the executive and is a useful oversight tool available to parliamentarians. The parliament’s role in overseeing the budget is discussed in detail in chapter five. 94

The parliament has the right to This indicates that there are no areas forbidden to parliament (such as 11. initiate bills in all policy 1 if Yes national security or the armed forces for example). jurisdictions. This means that all draft bills initiated by the executive require the approval The executive lacks decree of the parliament to become laws. The executive (be it president, monarch, 12. 1 if Yes power. or prime minister) cannot pass laws without referring them to parliament for approval. Parliament has the capacity to If the parliament lacks the power to amend or reject bills, it becomes a 13. amend or reject bills submitted rubberstamp of government policy. Amending or rejecting bills indicate the 1 if Yes by the executive. control that parliament practices on the executive’s legislative capacity. This means that the executive lacks veto power to overturn laws passed by Laws passed by the parliament the legislature, or has veto power but the veto can be overridden by a simple 14. 1 if Yes are veto-proof. majority in the legislature. This indicates that the parliament is the main authority controlling the legislative process. Laws passed by the parliament This is similar to the above in the sense that parliament is the supreme 15. are supreme and not subject to 1 if Yes legislative authority. judicial review. Parliament has ex-ante power Parliament can suggest amendments to the budget allocations during the 16. 1 if Yes over the budget. formulation phase, and the budget has to be approved by parliament. All extra budgetary This indicates that the government cannot spend public money without 17. expenditure requires 1 if Yes parliament’s approval. parliament’s approval. Index 3: Parliament’s Institutional Autonomy This indicates that the parliament is free to regulate its internal procedures as Parliament can adopt its own 18. it sees fit to cater to its operational needs without the interference of other 1 if Yes bylaws. agencies. Parliament is immune from This means that the executive does not control the parliamentary term, and 19. 1 if Yes dissolution by the executive. cannot dissolve the parliament at whim. MPs enjoy immunity. This allows them a larger margin of freedom to carry Members of parliament have 20. their duties without fear of retribution (especially from powerful executives 1 if Yes immunity from prosecution. in less democratic settings, who might not wantto be scrutinized).

All members of the legislature 21. The executive lacks the power to appoint any members of the legislature. 1 if Yes are elected. The parliament controls the The parliament can draft and adopt its own budget and allocate its 22. resources that finance its own 1 if Yes expenditures. internal operation. Index 4: Parliament’s Institutional Capacity This power is relevant to the institutional capacity of parliament, since in many cases of democratizing countries the king or president controls when The constitution specifies the the parliament meets, and thus parliamentary sessions are held at their whim, frequency of parliamentary greatly limiting parliament’s ability to perform its responsibilities. 23. 1 if Yes sessions (parliament is in Specifying the frequency of sessions or meetings makes it constitutionally session for at least six months). binding for the parliament to be in session. The threshold of six months was determined by Fish and Kroenig as a meaningful threshold dividing parliaments that are regularly in session and those that are not. The constitution, bylaws or electoral laws do not impose term limits. This Legislators are eligible for re- allows for higher incumbency rates, which in turn improves the performance 24. election without any of MPs. However this indicator is included in the De jure powers as it 1 if Yes restriction. indicates the presence or absence of the legal barriers limiting incumbency, rather than measuring how the incumbency rates affect the performance. Research and practice has shown that guaranteeing the opposition’s power in parliament is key to increasing parliament’s capacity. This can include Opposition rights are 25. ensuring their representation in parliamentary positions (such as chairs of 1 if Yes guaranteed within parliament. committees for example) and guaranteeing their right to speak during debates. Index 5: Parliament’s Specified Powers The parliament can change the constitution without the involvement of the 26. Power over the Constitution 1 if Yes other agencies. The parliament’s approval is necessary for the declaration of war. 27. Declaration of War 1 if Yes

The parliament’s approval is necessary to ratify treaties with foreign 28. Ratifying Treaties 1 if Yes countries.

29. Amnesty Power The parliament has the power to grant amnesty. 1 if Yes 30. Pardon Power The parliament has the power to pardon. 1 if Yes The parliament reviews and has the right to reject appointments to the 31. Judiciary Appointment 1 if Yes judiciary; or the parliament itself appoints members of the judiciary. 32. Central Bank The chairman of the central bank is appointed by the legislature. 1 if Yes The legislature has a substantial voice in the operation of the state-owned media. For example, the parliament can appoint the director of the state 33. Media 1 if Yes owned media agencies or the national media council in countries where they exist (such as in United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Kenya etc.).

Index 6: Parliament’s Openness

General Assembly sessions are General Assembly sessions are open to the public to attend and to the media 34. 1 if Yes public to cover. Committees meetings are open to the public to attend and to the media to 35. Committee sessions are public 1 if Yes cover. 36. Petitions and Complaints The public can submit petitions and complaints to the parliament. 1 if Yes

Data and Analysis

Using the DPI developed above, this section conducts content analysis of the constitutions and constitutional amendments of primary cases of Lebanon and Morocco. In addition to the constitutions, the parliamentary bylaws of these parliaments are also included in the analysis as they constitute key legal texts that specify the powers of parliament in detail. The justification for compiling both constitutions and bylaws is that the Constitution serves as the supreme law that sets the bar for powers allocated to each institution. The parliamentary bylaws are drafted in consideration of the parameters set by the constitution, but do include more detailed powers that the constitutions do not. For example, the Constitution may stipulate the right of parliament to hold the executive accountable in broad terms, however the tools to hold the executive accountable such as parliamentary questions and the right to form committees of inquiry are stipulated in the parliamentary bylaws. At the same time, parliamentary bylaws cannot give parliament the right to remove the head of the executive if this right is not enshrined in the constitution. Therefore including the parliamentary bylaws does not compromise the analysis as it does not grant parliament powers that contradict the Constitution.

For each of the eleven cases (all instances of new constitutions and constitutional reforms adopted in Morocco and Lebanon), the analysis aggregates the powers granted to parliament by the Constitution and all parliamentary bylaws adopted by parliament up until the next constitution or constitutional amendment is adopted. For example, the powers granted to the

Lebanese parliament by the of the 1943 constitutional amendment include the powers specified in the bylaws that were adopted in 1930 as well.

Figure 1 below shows the aggregate score of DPI for each case. The data-points on the x- axis represent the instances of new constitution or constitutional reform adopted. The y-axis

represents the DPI score. The results show that both parliaments have relatively weak powers, however the power of both parliaments has increased over time. In the case of Morocco, the parliament’s powers in the early years of the modern state were limited (with a DPI score of 12 or 0.3). The repressive “years of lead” (1970 through 1990) that were marked by heavy breakdown on civil and political liberties resulted in further decline in parliamentary power. The political liberalization process that began in the early nineties and the adoption of new constitutional amendments reflected positively on the power of parliament (the 1996 constitution has a DPI score of 17 or 0.47). The most recent Constitution adopted in 2011 following the Arab uprisings resulted in yet another increase in parliament’s de jure power (the DPI score reached

20 of 36, or 0.55).

In the case of Lebanon, the first Constitution promulgated under the French mandate in

1926, and its amendments in 1927 granted the least powers to parliament, with a DPI score of 9 or 0.25 (the context surrounding the adoption of this constitution was discussed at length in

Chapter 2). The constitutional amendments that followed the country’s independence sharply increased powers delegated to parliament (the DPI score increased to 23 or 0.63 in 1990).

25 23 23 23 22 22 22 23 23 23 23 20 20 17 15 13 12 12 12 11 11 11 10 9 5

0 1926 1927 1962 1943 1947 1970 1972 1990 1992 1996 2011 Lebanon Morocco

Figure 1: Parliament's De jure Power

A closer look at the analysis results shows that not all powers developed equally. Figures two and three below show a variation in the development of parliament’s de jure power in

Lebanon and Morocco as measured by DPI along the six dimensions of parliamentary power.

The results indicate that certain dimensions of parliamentary power have developed more than others. The x-axis depicts instances of constitutional change, and the y-axis depicts the DPI score of each of the six indicators.

In particular, the power of parliament to oversee the executive and parliamentary autonomy have developed more over time compared to the other dimensions. In Morocco for example, the oversight score more than tripled between 1962 and 2011, with the oversight score increasing from 0.2 to 0.7 respectively. In Lebanon, this power increased from 0.2 in the 1926 constitution to 0.9 in the 1927 constitutional amendment. Legislative capacity on the other hand did not witness as much change, indicating that legislation continue to be the domain of the executive. 58

The above findings question the validity of the arguments that the constitutional changes witnessed in the region were merely window-dressing efforts, and rather indicate more complex, but slowly developing, power sharing negotiations and mechanisms. They also corroborate the findings from the interviews conducted with parliamentarians, political party members, and parliamentary staff in both countries who emphasized their struggle to increase parliament’s power to oversee the government.

These findings also support the argument made in chapter two about the struggle of political contenders to increase the power of parliament. In the case of Morocco, the power to

58 The decrease witnessed in legislative power in the 1947 constitution in Lebanon was the result of the establishment of the Constitutional Council, which has the power to review laws passed by the parliament. 100

oversee the government had been a constant demand from political parties, especially the opposition, since the adoption of the very first constitution in 1962. In the case of Lebanon, the primary struggle of the first parliament in 1926 was to have the power to oversee the executive, which at the time was heavily controlled by the French authorities.

8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1962 1970 1972 1992 1996 2011

Legislative Power Oversight Power Autonomy Capacity Specific Power Opennes

Figure 2: Morocco - Development of Parliament's De jure Powers

0 1926 1927 1943 1947 1990

Legislative Power Oversight Power Autonomy Capacity Specific Power Opennes

Figure 3: Lebanon - Development of Parliament's De jure Powers

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DPI’s Limitations

One of the major limitations of this indicator is that it weighs all powers equally as mentioned earlier, however, an argument can be made that some powers are more significant than others. For example, in the case of Lebanon, one of the major powers that the parliament gained as a result of the 1990 constitutional amendment (Article 58) was that the parliament became more capable of setting its own agenda. Prior to the amendment, the government was able to set the parliament’s agenda by labeling draft laws submitted to parliament as an “urgent draft law.” This gave the President the power to issue those laws by decree if the parliament did not vote on the urgent draft law within forty days of its submission. The 1990 constitution amended this article changing it to a forty day period from when the parliament schedules the draft law on its agenda. Thus the amendment allowed the parliament to schedule the draft law, even if urgent, as it saw fit with its priorities. This power is weighted equally with the rest, therefore the change in the power captured by the index might not signify the importance (or not) of that change. This is a trade-off that I consciously make, realizing that researchers who use this index may have to compliment it with qualitative analysis if they need to get more in depth understanding of the constitutions and their effect on parliament.

Another limitation of this indicator is that some of the measurements used are “blunt.”

For example, Lebanon’s 1990 constitution continued to give the President the right to dissolve the Parliament, however it constrained this power by adding two severe conditions that would justify the parliament’s dissolution. The first is parliament’s inability to meet in general assembly at least once during a whole parliamentary session. The second is if the President deems that the parliament refuses to pass the budget with the intention to paralyze the government. Even if one of the conditions is present, the President’s decision to dissolve the parliament still has to be

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approved by the cabinet (Constitution, articles 55, 65, 77). In this case the Index addresses the power of the president to dissolve the parliament in absolute terms, based on a yes or no question, but cannot account for other mechanisms at play that can either increase or limit this power.

Constitution Making and Parliamentary Power: A Theoretical Model

The hypothesis that this chapter began with is that a representative constitution making process empowers parliaments, accordingly the more representative the constitution making process is the more powers the parliament is granted. The results of testing this hypothesis using the cases selected is illustrated in the model below (Figure 4). It corroborates the hypothesis and shows a positive relation between the representativeness of the constitution making process and the powers granted to parliament.

The x-axis in figure 4 represents parliament’s de jure power as measured by the DP Index developed above, and ranges from zero (the lowest score given to a Constitution by DPI) to thirty six, which is the maximum score that a Constitution can attain using the DPI. The y-axis is the representativeness of the constitution making process developed earlier in the chapter. The value of this variable ranges from zero, i.e. least representative to six, the most representative constitution making process. The median of each score was chosen as a point of intersection of the two axes.

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Lebanon, 1943 6 Lebanon, 1947

5 Lebanon, 1990

Lebanon, 1927 4 Morocco, 2011

3 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36

Representation Representation 2 Morocco, 1970 Morocco, 1992 1 Lebanon, 1926 Morocco, 1996

0 Morocco, 1972 Morocco, 1962

-1 Parliament De Jure Power

Figure 4: Relationship between Representative Constitution Making and Parliamentary De jure Power

As Figure 4 illustrates, the non-representative constitution making processes, in the cases of the 1926 Lebanese and 1970 and 1972 Moroccan constitutions, scored the lowest on the DPI index, while the more representative constitution making processes such as Lebanon’s 1943,

1947 and 1990 and Morocco’s 2011 constitution scored higher. These findings support the hypothesis posited in this chapter that increased representation of political groups during the constitution making process positively impacts the de jure powers that the constitution grants the parliament.

Some of the limitations of this model have been discussed in the previous sections.

However, there are additional exogenous factors that need to be considered that could have an effect on this model. Historical institutionalists argue that “no institution is created ex nihilo;

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new institutions always retain remnants of their past selves. Within constraints of preexisting structures and trajectories, however, there is always room for choice” (Negretto 2013, p. 4).

Therefore, the effect of pre-existing constitutional and political structures such as those introduced by an occupying power can have a confounding effect on the new constitutions adopted. However, this is controlled for in this research through case selection. Both countries selected were under a colonial French mandate and were heavily influenced by the French constitution while drafting their own, as opposed to choosing countries with different constitutional traditions (such as the French and the Westminster).

Another possible factor could have been the type of the constitutional drafting body. For example, in Lebanon the constitution was drafted and amended by the parliament, which is not the case in Morocco, therefore it could be expected that the parliament would adopt a constitution that increases its own powers. However, recent research on this subject did not find evidence that parliaments were more likely to give themselves more power when drafting a constitution (Ginsburg et al., 2009).

Finally, it can be argued that the type of impetus that resulted in adopting a new constitution can have an effect on the content of the constitution. Elster (1995) identifies eight different reasons that might inspire a new constitution including liberation from colonialism, revolution, and defeat in war. This does not seem to have a significant effect on the cases selected. For example, Lebanon’s 1943 constitution was drafted in the wake of the independence from the French, while the 1990 constitution was drafted to end the civil war, and there is no significant effect or variation in the powers granted to parliament.

Last but not least, this chapter relied on a small number of cases. The small N prevented a more quantitative approach that can test this hypothesis across a large number of cases, making a

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stronger argument for the generalizability of the hypothesis. While this is true, the small N approach allowed me at this stage of my research to gain in-depth knowledge of each case, increasing the accuracy and reliability of her findings. However, one of the areas for future research will be to test whether this argument applies in other countries in the Arab region and elsewhere.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to achieve three goals. The first is theoretical. This chapter aimed at studying the effect of the constitution making process on the powers granted by the constitution to the parliament. It also aimed at better conceptualizing the de jure power or parliament, which would provide scholars and practioners focusing on institutional design and constitution making a better understanding of what constitutes parliamentary power and what would cause it to change or increase. The second goal is methodological, which is to “fine tune” some of the existing measurements of parliamentary power that are currently widely used by social scientists studying the constitution. And third is political, which is to test whether the claims that constitutional reforms in the Arab region were mere window-dressing maneuvers by authoritarian regimes that did not have much impact on the political institutions or participation in the region.

The chapter presented a model of the relation between constitution making processes and parliamentary power. The findings indicated a positive relation between the representative nature of the constitution making process and the powers gained by parliament. It also presented a new, or at least an improved, Parliamentary De jure Power index for measuring parliamentary powers that would hopefully allow more accurate identification of parliamentary power. And last but not least, it presented an in-depth study of some of the constitutions in the Arab region outside the

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distributional theories approach that is usually used to study these constitutions and the clientelistic gains that drive their change.

It also opens the door for future research. As a first step, it would be helpful to increase the number of cases particularly from the Arab region and other transitioning democracies. The small N approach allowed for in-depth analysis of the cases, however increasing the number of cases in future research would allow to further test the hypothesis generalizability. Second, it would useful to study the role that the parties and groups that participated in the constitution making process and lobbied for increased parliamentary powers play in further developing the parliamentary power after the constitution is adopted. A possible approach to understand this process better would be to look at the role that these parties play in further developing the parliamentary bylaws, laws on parliamentary immunity and openness, and other legal texts that govern the parliament.

This chapter focused on studying how and why parliaments in transitioning democracies gain de jure power. The following chapters will focus on understanding how and why these parliaments gain de facto powers through studying the parliamentary performance in the selected cases.

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CHAPTER 4

PARLIAMENTS DE FACTO LAWMAKING POWER

Introduction

The previous chapters of this dissertation have demonstrated the centrality of parliament’s de jure powers during moments of political transition, and how those powers have developed over time. Since the dissertation focusses on understanding the evolution of parliamentary power, both its de jure and de facto dimensions, this chapter and the next focus on the performance of parliaments or their de facto powers. This chapter seeks to explain the reasons that underlie change in legislative performance of parliaments, i.e. the increase or decrease in their ability to initiate, amend and reject laws. It argues that there are three main variables that influence this change: the nature of the executive-legislative relations; the organizational capacity of parliament which is a function of its degree of institutionalization and the resources available to it; and the role and nature of political parties represented within it. This chapter begins with surveying the scholarship on classifying legislatures. It proceeds to explaining the methodology of research used in this chapter, and presents the data findings. In the last section, the chapter elaborates on the three variables identified that determine parliament’s legislative power.

One of the primary purposes of a parliament is to provide a platform for people’s representatives to deliberate and enact laws. Although the parliament is considered as the primary legislative institution, the responsibility of lawmaking is shared with the executive in most political systems and countries of the world. The lawmaking process varies among different political systems (presidential, parliamentary, or hybrid), but can also vary within the same political system. For example, in some parliamentary systems, the president retains the right to

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pass presidential decrees without having to go through the parliament, in others a supreme court can have the authority to revise and overturn a law if it is deemed unconstitutional. Regardless of the political system in place, the most common perception of parliamentary power lies in its

“importance” in the policy making process relative to the executive (Norton 1990, p. 151), which is manifested in the parliament’s capacity to set its own legislative agenda, draft member bills, and amend or reject executive draft laws. 59

Scholars studying the lawmaking capacity of parliaments focused on the legislative power of parliament to initiate laws, and to amend or reject draft laws submitted by the executive through comparing cases from developing and developed democracies. Stronger parliaments were those that had ‘reactive powers’ that is they can introduce meaningful amendments to draft laws as opposed to ‘compliant’ parliaments that lacked this ability (Blondel et al., 1970). They also considered the type of lawmaking process, whether it was conducted in committees or confrontational plenary debates. Stronger parliaments that possessed the ability to amend and transform laws were those that focused their efforts on the committee stages of the lawmaking process rather than the plenary debate (Polsby 1975). The connection between lawmaking capacity and the representative power of parliaments was also studied. Research findings indicated that most active parliaments were those that had the capacity to amend or reject laws and enjoyed the support of the people (Mezey, 1979). Yet, other research argued that it is not sufficient to consider parliament’s capacity to amend laws, focus should also be on its capacity to initiate laws since rejecting a bill does not make the parliament a policy ‘making’ body (Norton,

1990).

59 Member bills are draft bills submitted to parliament by a member of the parliament. These differ from draft laws that are submitted to parliament by the executive. This terminology, which is more common in Westminster systems, will be used in this research to differentiate between laws initiated by parliamentarians and those initiated by members of the executive. 109

This literature offered neat categories for classifying legislative powers of parliament and highlighted the importance of comparative research on legislatures. However, the scholars did not offer solid arguments as to why or how does one parliament transition from one category to another. Some of the research, such as Polsby (1975) and Mezey (1979), acknowledged the importance of institutionalization of parliament and its resources however they did not incorporate it in their theories on legislative power. More recent research on legislatures in developing democracies paid closer attention to the variables that can effect parliament’s legislative powers. For example, Morgenstern and Nacif’s (2002) edited book on Latin American legislatures highlighted several of those variables such as the electoral and party systems and the reelection drive of MPs. Cox and Morgenstern (2002) build on the findings of the cases studied and developed their classification of parliamentary power based on the level of support that the

President had in Parliament and the role of the opposition. They developed four types of legislatures. On the two extremes were recalcitrant legislatures (very low percentage of parliamentarians support the president, will thus reject most proposals), and subservient legislatures (very high support to president, most bills passed). In between the two are workable and parochial-venal legislatures, which frequently accept presidential bills but require policy compromise, or access to resources in return.

More recent research on legislatures in emerging democracies in Africa revealed that professionalism of parliamentarians and the emergence of “coalitions for change” were the primary reasons legislature’s power and autonomy increased (Barkan, 2009). These coalitions were initiated by reform oriented young, educated, and professional parliamentarians, who joined forces with opportunist parliamentarians with particularistic interests. The coalitions succeeded in exerting pressure on the executive and increasing parliamentary autonomy. They also

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reshaped the incentive structure for members of the parliament, as well as of formal rules in a way that enhanced parliamentary authority and capacity. Barkan identified several variables that affected the emergence of these coalitions including the presence of reform minded parliamentarians, the nature of political parties represented in parliament, and the extent to which presiding officers were committed to developing the power of parliaments.

The above literature offered different classifications of parliament’s legislative powers and identified several variables that could affect it such as the role of the opposition, the relationship with the executive and the extent of support they have in parliament, the constitutional powers given to parliament and the nature of political parties. This chapter is informed by the surveyed literature. It aims to study if and why the de facto lawmaking capacity of the selected parliaments has changed over the years. To that end, it uses both inductive and deductive approaches. The research examines the effect of some of these variables on the parliaments’ performance and identifies others that have a significant effect. It argues that the de facto legislative power of parliament is determined by the nature of the executive-legislative relations and the centrality of the parliamentary institution in the lawmaking process; the organizational capacity of parliament which is a function of its degree of institutionalization and the resources available to it; and the role and nature of political parties represented within it.

The research presented in this chapter differs from other literature on parliaments in the

Arab region (surveyed in Chapter 1). The main difference is that it examines the actual legislative performance of parliaments in terms of initiating and amending laws instead of relying on the public perception of those parliaments, or readily dismissing them as agents of authoritarian regimes. It quantifies the legislative performance of the Lebanese and Moroccan parliaments, an arduous task given the data for the time period covered is not readily available

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and had to be compiled through extensive archival research. Interviews with parliamentarians and staff members provided the qualitative data needed to identify and confirm the reasons underlying change of the parliaments’ legislative performance in Lebanon and Morocco. The following section describes the research methodology used in this chapter, followed by the data analysis, and a discussion of the identified variables driving change of parliament’s legislative capacity.

Parliament’s Lawmaking Capacity: The Cases of Morocco and Lebanon

Methodology and Data

This chapter analyzes the legislative performance in Lebanon (October 1992-June 2014) and Morocco (January 1997- July 2016). During this period, five parliaments were elected in

Lebanon (1992, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2009), and four parliaments were elected in Morocco (1997,

2002, 2007, and 2011). Therefore, the total number of cases analyzed in this chapter is nine, with each of the elected parliaments constituting a separate case. 60

To assess the legislative performance of the parliaments, i.e. their capacity to initiate member bills and pass draft laws, I sought to quantify their legislative output. However, in light of the lack of readily available data, I had to create an original dataset of all the laws that were initiated by parliamentarians as well as draft laws submitted by the government in each case. I built the dataset using several primary data sources that I gathered during my archival research conducted at the parliaments of Morocco and Lebanon over the period of six months (April –

September 2014).

60 For more details on the research methodology and the justification of the case selection see the methodology section in Chapter 1. 112

The data that I collected, although open, is not easily accessible. I received the approval of the Secretary Generals at both parliaments to access the needed records which were available in Arabic only. The majority of the data was available in hard copy only.61 The data needed for this research, which is discussed below, was not all centralized in one source or location. I used several primary sources, including parliamentary minutes of general assembly meetings, summary of annual parliamentary proceedings, and statistics obtained from parliamentary staff.

I used the following variables to code the data:

- Type of legislation: Whether the law was a draft law proposed by the executive or a private member bill initiated by member(s) of parliament.

- Success of member bills: This variable controls for whether the private member bills were successful or not, i.e. if it was passed by parliament.

- Parliamentary group: A parliamentary group can be a political party, a coalition of parties, or a coalition of independent MPs that chose to form a parliamentary group. In the case of member bills, they can be initiated by independent MPs or by parliamentary groups. This variable controls for whether the bill was initiated by independent MPs or by parliamentary groups.

- Position of parliamentary group that initiated the member bill: This variable controls for whether the group that initiated the bill was in the majority or opposition.

The dataset allowed me to compare the parliament and the executive in terms of their capacity to initiate laws. It also made it possible to measure the legislative performance of the different groups within each parliament during the years studied. And last but not least, it allowed for observing whether the position in parliament as the majority or the opposition affected the MPs legislative performance.

This dataset suffers from several limitations due to the lack of availability of data. The first limitation is that the dataset does not allow for measuring parliament’s capacity to amend

61 The exception was data on laws in Morocco for more recent years (2007-2016). These were obtained from the parliamentary http://www.chambredesrepresentants.ma/ 113

draft laws due to the fact that amendments of draft laws largely happen during committee meetings. Committee meetings in both parliaments are held in-camera (i.e., in private) and their proceedings are not made public. The second limitation is that the dataset does not control for whether the parliament opposed or rejected bills as this data was also not available at the time of research. Finally, roll call data is also not available for either parliament, which limits the ability to determine the discipline of party voting.

However, these caveats were curtailed through conducting in-depth interviews with parliamentarians and parliamentary staff. To that end, I utilized my professional network that I built over the years from working as a parliamentary development specialist for international organizations. I was able to conduct forty interviews at the Lebanese and Moroccan HoRs.

Interviewees included parliamentarians representing different political parties, heads of parliamentary groups, committee chairs, as well as the parliaments’ secretary generals, committee staff, parliamentary group staff, and parliamentary administration staff.

The open ended nature of the interviews provided a wealth of information that served as the grounds for the qualitative analysis of the parliamentary legislative performance in each case.

The qualitative analysis goes beyond the basic quantitative findings, and add further insight to the factors that have affected the parliaments’ performance. Moreover, many of the MPs and staff interviewed in Lebanon and Morocco have been in the parliament from the early nineties and some even earlier, and therefore their institutional memory was very insightful to highlighting the difficulties faced and progress made over the years. Interviews were also conducted with MPs elected for the first time to shed light on the challenges they face as new incomers and how that affects their legislative performance.

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In both countries, interviews were also conducted with a limited number of ministers, members of the Constitutional Council, and members of civil society and media to study whether these institutions affected parliament’s legislative performance. Finally, in addition to archival research and interviews, I benefited from attending several parliamentary general assembly sessions (in Morocco) to observe the proceedings and the interactions amongst the majority and opposition parliamentarians, as well as with members of the executive sitting in on the general assembly meetings.

Data Analysis Legislative Performance of Parliaments: An Increase in Lawmaking Capacity

Table 4 below summarizes the findings on who initiates laws (executive vs. legislative) and which laws get passed. It shows that members of the Moroccan House of Representatives have been increasingly initiating member bills over the past two decades. The HoR initiated 181 member bills during the 2011 parliament, compared to a mere twenty one bills submitted to HoR in the 1997 parliament. The percentage of the member bills of the total laws submitted to parliament (member bills and draft laws) increased from 16.9% in 1997 parliament to 33.4% in the 2011 parliament. The majority of the proposed member bills were amendments to existing laws as opposed to new legislation. The percentage of the member bills passed, however, remains very low, with an average of 11% of all member bills passed between 1997 and 2011.

In Lebanon, the parliament also witnessed an increase in the number of bills initiated by parliamentarians, from ninety four bills initiated in the 1992 parliament to 322 bills initiated in the

2009 parliament. The percentage of the member bills to total number of laws submitted to parliament increased from 19.5% in the 1992 parliament, to 69.1% in the 2009 parliament.62 The

62 It is worth noting that this relatively large number of laws were submitted despite the continuous disruption of the general assembly meetings due to the political crisis Lebanon witnessed during the 2005 and 2009 parliaments, as 115

percentage of the bills passed in Lebanon was higher than that of Morocco, with around 23% of all member bills passed from 1992 till 2014. Almost half of the bills proposed were amendments to existing laws, although the percentage of member bills that were amendments dropped in the

2005 and 2009 parliaments.

Table 4: Legislative Performance of the Moroccan and Lebanese HoRs

Case Draft laws Member MB passed % of MBs that are passed Bills (MB) Amendments Morocco 1997- 103 78 5 83.3% 2002 2002- 201 103 8 71% 2007 2007- 155 105 16 62% 2011 2011- 361 181 16 62% 2016 Lebanon 1992- 387 801 36 52% 1996 1996- 67 125 35 67% 2000 2000- 346 358 79 63% 2005 2005- 148 241 36 44% 2009 2009- 144 322 74 49% 201463

discussed in Chapter 2. Briefly, during the 2005 Parliament, the Israeli war on Lebanon occurred in 2006; the extreme political polarization between the different factions resulted in the opposition withdrawing from the government and boycotting the parliamentary sessions, thus general assembly session could not be held due to the absence of the necessary quorum. The tensions culminated in the outbreak of civil violence in May of 2008. During this period, the parliament held two general assembly sessions to discuss the budget, and three sessions to question the government session in 2006, and held only one session in 2007 to elect the parliamentary committees. During the 2009 parliament, the political polarization increased with the regional conflicts in neighboring Syria following the 2011 uprisings. As a result, the parliament once again was affected. The parliament extended its own term twice in 2013, and 2014 under the pretense of its inability to organize elections. The presidency was vacant for two years (2014-2016) because members of parliament could not reach consensus and elect a president.

63 Data was available until May, 2014. 116

Majority Rules?

In the case of Morocco, the parliamentary majority initiated the majority of member bills compared to bills initiated by the opposition or parliamentary group coalitions as Table 5 shows below. However, the percentage of the majority member bills that were passed was as low as

2.9% in the 2002 parliament and 9% in the 2011 parliament. Laws initiated by coalitions, despite being much fewer in number, had a higher success rate of being passed into law ranging between a hundred percent in the 1997 and 2007 parliament to around twenty nine percent in the 2011 parliament. No bills were proposed by independent MPs, which is not surprising given that only a handful of MPs across the different parliaments labeled themselves as independents. The vast majority of the MPs belonged to one of the parliamentary groups.

In the case of Lebanon, the lawmaking capacity of the opposition varied significantly.

Until 2005, parliamentary opposition was very small in size holding around eight percent of the seats in the 1992 parliament, and less than five percent of the seats between 1996 and 2005.

During this period, the Syrian regime practiced authoritarian control over Lebanon and its politics as previously discussed in Chapter 2. It gained this control through oppressing parties that opposed its rule and also controlled the electoral districting that the electoral law adopted by parliament to ensure that its supporters won the parliamentary elections and that opposition was sidelined.64 As a result only a handful of opposition MPs reached parliament. They initiated less than six percent of all member bills between 1992 and 2005.

Following the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon, relatively free and fair parliamentary elections were held in 2005. These elections marked the return of opposition to

64 Less than a handful of MPs such as MPs Salim El Hoss and Najah Wakim opposed Prime Minister Hariri’s government. Those MPs, despite being very vocal, did not have the power to influence the parliament’s legislative agenda. 117

parliament. 65 During the 2005 parliament, the opposition initiated almost double the number of bills compared to the majority, and initiated almost the same number of bills in the 2009 parliament as Table 5 below shows. There was also a significantly larger number of laws initiated by cross party coalitions, and those had a higher rate in being passed compared to both majority and opposition member bills (the coalition bills success rate ranged between 60% in the

1996 parliament, and 18% in the 2000 parliament). Independent MPs not belonging to a parliamentary group initiated a large number of laws compared to those of the Moroccan HoR.

However, they had a lower success rate in being passed by parliament (ranging between thirty three percent success rate in the 1996 parliament and zero percent in the 2005 parliament). It is also worth noting that the overall success rate of member bills decreased noticeably in the 2005 parliament (with only six percent of laws initiated passed), which could be explained by the entrance of the opposition to parliament, thus the increased difficulty to build consensus needed to adopt the laws.

Based on the above, the parliamentary majority initiated more member bills than the opposition in most cases in Lebanon and Morocco (with the exception of Lebanon’s 2005 and

2009 parliaments). Interviews with both opposition and majority MPs in Morocco indicated that

MPs were more likely to initiate laws if they were in the majority, as they think that their laws are more likely to get passed. In Lebanon, this did not seem to be the case, as opposition MPs thought that what determines the chances for a bill they initiate to get passed or not was their

65 Parliamentary opposition is generally comprised of the political groups that are not represented in government. However, given the consociational system of governance in Lebanon, most of the major political groups hold cabinet seats. Therefore parliamentary opposition in the case of Lebanon is defined according to the political alliances and who holds the majority of the parliamentary seats. For example, in the 2005 parliament, the 14 March alliance that included the Future Movement, Progressive Socialist Party, and Lebanese Forces among other won the majority of the parliamentary seats and therefore constituted the majority, while the 8 March alliance headed by the Free Patriotic Movement and Hizbullah who won most of the remaining seats became the opposition. Both 14 March and 8 March groups were represented in government. 118

capability to build coalitions with majority parties, hence getting their support and vote. This may explain why in the 2009 parliament the opposition actually initiated a larger number of laws and got more laws passed compared to the majority (Table 5). It also explains why the number of laws initiated by coalitions is significantly higher in Lebanon compared to Morocco.

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Table 5: Legislative Performance by Majority, Opposition, and Coalitions

Year # of % of # of % of # of %Coalition # of Independents Majority Majority Opposition Opposition Coalition MBs Independent MBs passed Member MBs MBs66 MBs passed MBs Passed MBs Bills passed (MB) Morocco 1997-2002 41 2.4% 34 5.9% 3 100% 0 0 2002-2007 77 2.6% 30 3.3% 5 40% 0 0

2007-2011 81 13.6% 21 4.8% 3 100% 0 0

2011-2016 67 9.0% 56 7.1% 21 28.6% 0 0

Lebanon 1992-1996 63 19% 9 22% 63 31% 14 7% 1996-2000 76 28% 9 44% 40 60% 81 66% 2000-2005 811 29% 15 20% 136 18% 31 23% 2005-2009 59 18.6% 100 6% 70 27.1% 12 0% 2009- 95 20% 98 25.5% 91 26.4% 18 5.6% 201467

66 For the cases of the 1992, 1996, and 2000 parliament in Lebanon, the laws initiated by opposition blocks (such as the Inqath wal Taghyeer block headed by Salim El Hoss were coded as opposition. Laws initiated by independent MPs that identified as opposition were also coded as laws initiated by the opposition. These constitute a very small number of instances (less than twenty laws across all the cases).

67 Data was available until May, 2014. 120

Parliamentary Groups: Variance in Lawmaking Capacity

Analyzing the data on laws initiated beyond the majority-opposition divide reveals that the major political parties and their parliamentary groups such as the Justice and Development party (PJD), Istiqlal party (PI), and Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) in Morocco to name a few, and Amal Movement Party (Tahrir Block), Future Party and the Free Patriotic

Movement (FPM) in Lebanon submitted the largest number of members’ bills regardless of whether they were in the majority or opposition (see Appendix A: Tables 9 and 10).

The parliamentary groups that did not submit any member bills in both parliaments were very small with less than three percent of seats. The first factor therefore that seems to determine a group’s capacity to initiate laws is the number of its members, with groups that have less than three percent of the seats rarely having a significant impact on the ability of parliament to initiate laws. This implies that the fragmentation of parliamentary groups both in Lebanon and in

Morocco has contributed to the weakening of parliament’s legislative role as it decreased the number of members that belong to each group (for example, seven of the fourteen parliamentary groups represented in Lebanon’s 2000 parliament were composed of three MPs or less).

However, looking beyond the perhaps obvious effect of size, Tables 9 and 10 (Appendix

A) reveal a noticeable difference in the legislative performance of parliamentary groups that have comparable sizes. For example, in Morocco’s 2002 HoR, the Istiqlal party initiated almost five times the number of laws that the Movement Block initiated despite both being in the majority and having comparable number of seats, while the Justice and Development Party initiated the highest number of laws despites being in the opposition and having less seats than the leading majority groups. In Lebanon, the Resistance and Development Block in the 2000 parliament for example initiated almost double the number of laws as the Karama block, despite being comparable in size (they had 14.1% and 13.3% of the seats respectively). This variation in 121

the performance of the political groups and the role of parties in shaping the lawmaking capacity of their members is analyzed in the section on political parties below.

Lawmaking Capacity of Parliament: Modest Yet Persistent Developments

The Executive, which in this research encompasses the head of the state (i.e. the King or the President) and the Council of Ministers, continues to be the major policy initiator, proposing the vast majority of laws considered by parliament in both Lebanon and Morocco. However, the analysis presented above showed a variation in the capacity of the Lebanese and Moroccan HoRs to initiate member bills over the last two decades. In Morocco, the number of member bills were eight times more in the 2011 than in the 1997 parliament. In Lebanon member bills increased by more than threefold between the 1992 and 2009 parliaments. Senior committee staff and parliamentarians who have been elected to parliament multiple times, attested to the parliament’s increased legislative activity.

Responses from incumbent MPs and committee staff in both countries attributed it to the increased support that MPs have been receiving from both their parties and the parliamentary institution. However, MPs and staff argued that this support, despite its increase, is still rudimentary compared to more developed parliaments. As a result, the majority of the proposed member bills in both parliaments were amendments to existing laws rather than new laws. The

Chair of the Legislation, Justice and Human Rights Committee in the Moroccan HoR emphasized this point, arguing that proposing laws, particularly those that are general or public policy focused require a lot of resources, such as legal research to get comparative experiences of other countries in this field, legislative drafting skills to draft the law and avoid vagueness or misinterpretation, and a political and socio-economic analysis to determine how it would affect the public. It also requires financial analysis to assess what fiscal implications the proposed law will have on the

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budget. Therefore, “in light of limited human and institutional resources available, the ability of

MPs to initiate such laws becomes very modest and depends almost entirely on the MPs’ determination to draft such a bill and advocate for the policy” (Mohammad Zardalli, personal communication, June 2014). Both the role of parties and the effect of developing institutional capacity are examined later in this chapter.

Policy making power is measured by both its ability to initiate laws as well as to amend or reject draft laws submitted by the government. The data on amendments introduced to legal texts was not available given that parliamentary committees are held in-camera as discussed in the methodology section. However, MPs interviewed provided some valuable insight. According to the majority of MPs and staff of the Moroccan and Lebanese HoRs interviewed, MPs ability to introduce significant amendments or reject laws remains rather limited although they have been introducing more amendments to draft laws during committee and plenary debates.

When questioned about the underlying reason for parliament’s weakness in amending or rejecting laws, MPs highlighted multiple factors that were similar to those that affected their ability to initiate laws as discussed above. These included the nature of parliament’s relationship with the executive, and the limited parliamentary resources available to support them during the policy making process. MPs in both countries highlighted an additional factor regarding their ability to amend laws, which is the centrality of parliament in the lawmaking process of major laws. The following section discusses these factors that have a critical effect on parliament’s lawmaking capacity.

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Why the Lawmaking Capacity of Parliament Varies: Some Explanatory Variables

The Nature of the Executive-Legislative Relation

Lebanon and Morocco over the past couple of decades have shifted towards improved or more balanced executive-legislative relations. In Morocco this was partly the result of the liberalization process and constitutional changes that reined in the executive’s powers. In Lebanon, the end of the civil war and the return of consociational governance helped restore the balance between the institutions that were largely divided or paralyzed during the war. However, interviewees from both countries argued that the nature of this relationship had a negative effect on legislative capacity. They argued that the increase in parliament’s legislative initiative should not be interpreted as a result of the improved relations with the executive, especially in light of the low success rate of member bills compared to draft laws. Less than eleven percent of the member bills were passed in Morocco between 1997 and 2016. In Lebanon, only twenty three percent of the member bills were passed between 1992 and 2014.

In Morocco, almost all of the MPs and staff interviewed said that the executive discourages

MPs from proposing bills. The MPs argued that members of the executive, who have the right to attend committee meetings of the Moroccan HoR, often give excuses why MPs should not table a member bill for deliberation. These excuses vary from citing budget limitations that would not accommodate the fiscal implications of the proposed member bill, or suggesting that the cabinet is already working on a similar draft law. Members of the Majority parties interviewed shared the view of the hindering role that the executive plays in this regard. As one Majority MP interviewed described it, “Committees are the graveyards of laws,” since member bills discussed in committees rarely make it to the deliberation stage in the plenary sessions. He suggested that in the 2002 and

2006 parliaments, some of his fellow MPs gave their draft bills to their party representatives in government who then submitted them as draft laws. They did that as opposed to submitting it to 124

parliament as they knew that the law had a higher chance of getting passed if it was submitted as a draft law.

This finding goes beyond the argument that the government controls the legislative agenda through its parliamentary majority (i.e. the majority rejects opposition proposals and adopts government draft laws). In this case the executive also tries to control the legislative initiative of its own majority. The government’s behavior at first glance seems irrational- why would it discourage or block its own supporters from advancing laws that are in line with its policies? The logical answer is that the executive wants to maintain its hegemony on the lawmaking process as opposed to sharing this power with the parliament.

Among the reasons behind the executive’s monopoly on lawmaking in Morocco were the constitutional prerogatives given to the executive. The 1996 Constitution gave the executive the right to set the legislative agenda by determining the priority of the laws that need to be debated in the plenary sessions. It also had the right to reject member bills altogether (1996 Constitution, articles 53, 56, 57). Moreover, the King had a central role in the legislative process, as all draft laws submitted to parliament were discussed and vetted in the Executive Council, which was presided by the King.68 As a result, MPs hesitated to reject or even amend laws that had already been vetted by the King.

The 2011 Constitution drafters tried to curb the executive dominance over the legislative role of parliament. The new constitution stipulated that the parliament has to hold at least one plenary session per month to discuss member bills. This mechanism was meant to ensure that

68 The legislation drafting division at a ministry drafted a law. The Minister submitted the draft law to the Secretary General of the government for review. The law was then submitted to the Ministerial Council presided by the Prime Minister for discussion. Finally, the draft law was submitted to the Executive Council (EC), which was presided by the King for approval. After the EC approved the draft law, it submitted it to parliament (1996 Constitution, Article 67). 125

parliamentarians’ legislative initiatives were tabled for discussion regardless of the government’s priorities. By June of 2014, the Moroccan HoR held less than five of these sessions as most of the draft bills were still at the committee deliberation stage and had not been submitted for plenary debate. The 2011 Constitution also decreased the control of the King on the legislative process as it stipulated that only specific laws, such as regulatory laws and budget laws, are vetted by the

King prior to their submittal to parliament.

The nature of the executive-legislative relation differed in the case of Lebanon. MPs interviewed did not consider the government to have such a domineering and limiting role, which may explain why the approval rate of member bills in Lebanon is double that of Morocco.

Nevertheless, the success rate of member bills continues to be significantly lower than that the executive draft laws. MPs interviewed attributed the low success rates of member bills to the extreme political bargaining that happens between different parties represented in a committee during the discussion of a bill. Given the consociational nature of governance in Lebanon, bills were more likely to be passed if they had the support of the different political groups (majority and opposition). It also explains why the number of bills proposed by a coalition of parties is much higher in Lebanon (coalitions proposed more than half the bills the 2005 Parliament and almost half the bills in the 2009 Parliament, as Table 5 above shows). The same applies for government draft laws, which tend to be agreed on by different parties represented in the Council of Ministers before being submitted to parliament. Thus they face little resistance and political bargaining during parliamentary committee discussions. Although interviews with the MPs indicated that the committees have witnessed more heated debates in the 2005 and 2009 parliaments after a stronger opposition was elected to Parliament.

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As discussed and demonstrated earlier in Chapter 3, the Constitution endowed the

Lebanese parliament with more legislative powers compared to the parliament of Morocco. This difference in powers is another reason why the Lebanese parliament was more active in proposing legislation despite being smaller in terms of number of MPs, and despite Lebanon’s continuous state of political crises.69

One factor that MPs of both parliaments perceived as limiting their capacity to amend or reject draft laws is that some laws are subjected to dialogue and agreement by political and social forces outside parliament and are only submitted to parliament to be passed as a formality. These processes have reduced the centrality of the parliamentary institution in the lawmaking process.

While those laws are not numerous, they tend to be important laws that have a significant impact on social and political life.

For example, during the 1990s, civil society organizations (CSOs) especially women organizations in Morocco, were demanding the reform of the Family Code (Modawanat Al

Osra). The code is a set of “personal status” laws that covered issues such as divorce and child custody. The CSOs mobilized and demonstrated to push for the reforms that focused on attaining gender equality. The government responded by drafting a new Code, however it was heavily contested between liberal and conservative parties and groups (Wuerth, 2005). In response to the sharp division between the liberals and conservatives, the King formed the ‘Commission to

Reform the Family Code’ in March 2001, which included representatives of different political parties in addition to a Supreme Court justice, religious scholars, and representatives of some women’s rights organizations. After two years of Commission debates, the King submitted the

69 Lebanon’s parliament has 128 MPs, while Morocco’s HoR currently has 395 members. 127

draft Family Code to Parliament on October 10, 2003. The Parliament then deliberated the Code, introduced some amendments, and passed it within four months. (Kouzzi and Bordat, 2008).

However, this case can also reflect some development in the role of parliament, given that the previous reforms of the 1993 Family Code were passed by royal decree and were not ever submitted to parliament for deliberation and adoption. However, several of the MPs and staff interviewed that were present during this period felt that the majority of meaningful debate and amendments to the code had already occurred outside parliament and the parliamentary debates were reduced to details and legalities of the Code.

In Lebanon, the electoral law is an example of how some of the most critical laws are debated and agreed upon outside the parliament. Political parties and civil society had repeatedly expressed their dissatisfaction with the electoral law that governed the 2000 and 2005 elections

(law no. 171 for the year 2000) criticizing it for being unfair and unrepresentative and demanded its reform. Following the Syrian withdrawal, the new government headed by Prime Minister

Fouad Sanioura established the National Commission for Electoral Law (NCEL). The NCEL mandate was to propose a new electoral law that responded to the demands for reform. The

NCEL was composed of ten members of leading legal and political experts and headed by former Minister Fouad Boutros. It submitted the draft election law to PM Sinoria in June 2006, and the draft was submitted to parliament for deliberation. However, the parliament did not adopt the draft law given the inability of the different groups to reach consensus as a result of political gridlock and the series of political crises that Lebanon witnessed between 2006 and 2008. To end more than eighteen months of political turmoil and civil violence, the main political parties participated in the National Dialogue held in Doha, Qatar in May 2008.70 Among the key issues

70 The National Dialogue brought together representatives of the major Lebanese political groups in Doha, Qatar in May 2008 after armed conflict broke out between some of the “8 March” and “14 March” factions. The dialogue 128

that the parties agreed upon were electoral districting (small versus large districts) and the electoral system (majoritarian versus proportional), which were the two main problematic elements of promulgating a new electoral law (Milligan, 2012).

The above examples from Morocco and Lebanon demonstrated how stronger political forces both inside and outside the country sidestepped the parliament when discussing some of the critical laws affecting citizens’ lives and the political system, particularly those that can result in civil unrest. Whether it was to limit these discussions between the political elites (as in the case of Lebanon), or to open the discussion to broader participation (as in the case of Morocco), in both instances the parliament’s ability to introduce significant amendments to these critical laws was limited as they had been agreed upon outside the parliamentary institution.

Parliament’s Organizational Capacity and its Effect on De facto Power

The discussion above revealed the centrality of parliament’s organizational capacity to parliamentarians’ legislative performance. MPs and staff interviewed highlighted the positive impact that the increased parliamentary capacity has had on their ability to engage more effectively in the lawmaking process. However, they stressed that the parliaments’ capacity is still far from adequate compared to more efficient parliaments. This section looks at how and why the organizational capacity has developed over the years, and how that impacted parliament’s legislative powers. It argues that parliament’s organizational capacity is a function of its degree of institutionalization and resources available to it (both material and human).

succeeded in reaching an agreement on a basket of issues including the nominee for presidential elections (Michel Suleiman), appointing a consociational government, and the ruled for electoral districting that will govern the parliamentary elections. 129

Institutionalization can be gaged by the level of formality, uniformity, complexity, and autonomy of the parliamentary institution (Copeland and Patterson, 1994). To clarify, formality refers to the degree of regularity of rules and norms of behavior. Most parliaments around the world have formalized their work by developing bylaws and rules of procedures that govern them, have clearly defined leadership roles, and have routinized performance. These rules can specify the structure of parliament (committees, groups, administration, etc.), the interaction among the different actors within the parliament, and their relation with outside actors and institutions.

Uniformity of a parliament is depicted by having a specific set of functions that differentiate it from other institutions such as lawmaking or representation. Complexity is marked by the division of labor within parliament. This division enables the parliament to respond to the increasingly complicated tasks and demands that parliaments today face (Ruland et. al, 2005). Autonomy of the parliament refers to its independence from the domination of other institutions such as the executive, the military, or the church (Copeland and Patterson, 1994, p. 5). Autonomy manifests itself in parliament’s independence from other institutions in managing its affairs such as its ability to adopt its own budget, or recruit its own staff. The discussion below examines the formality, complexity and autonomy of the parliament. Uniformity is not discussed in this chapter, given that the parliamentary functions of both parliaments were discussed at length in Chapter 3.

Parliaments have gradually formalized their work since their establishment, with the

Lebanese HoR adopting its bylaws in 1930 and the Moroccan HoR adopting it in 1962. For example, in Lebanon the parliament adopted four new parliamentary bylaws (1953, 1982, 1991, and 1994).71 The number of articles that constitute the bylaws increased from 118 to 146 articles.

The number of articles is a simplistic indictor that scholars studying constitutions and legal texts

71 The current 1994 bylaws was amended several times in 1999, 2000, 2003. 130

use to measure the degree of development of the legal text, therefore an increase in the number of articles indicate a higher degree of development. Similarly, the Moroccan HoR adopted several versions of their parliamentary bylaws, last of which was in 2013 following the adoption of the 2011 Constitution. The section regulating the parliamentary institution in the 2011

Constitution included forty six of its 180 articles, compared to seventeen of 110 articles on parliament in the first constitution adopted in 1962. The development of the legal framework governing the parliament in Morocco and Lebanon has affected their legislative de jure powers as demonstrated in Chapter 3.

The Moroccan HoR also adopted a number of regulatory laws (Qawaneen tanzimiya) regarding the composition of parliament (1997, 2002, and 2011) and the parliamentary committees of inquiry (laws of 1995, 2001, and 2014). In addition to developing the legal framework, both HoRs have unwritten rules of procedure that govern the parliaments’ work, and both have routinized their processes such as committee reporting or the periodicity of the committee meetings.

As for the autonomy of the parliament, that too has changed over the years since its establishment, and not always in a unidirectional manner. However, since the nineties, both institutions have gradually developed in the direction of increased autonomy from other institutions.72 Both parliaments have the right to hire their own staff as needed. Lebanon’s HoR is financially independent, as it can prepare its own budget without the interference of the executive. Parliament’s budget is then included as a line item in the public budget. In Morocco,

72 See the discussion on political development of both countries in Chapter 2. Briefly, the Lebanese HoR, went through many transitions that affected its autonomy. These included the French Mandate (1930-1943), independence, civil war (1975-1990), Syrian hegemony (1990-2005), and independence once again (post 2005). In Morocco, the HoR after its establishment in 1962, was dissolved twice during the years of the lead (1970s-80s). The nineties witnessed the return of parliamentary life to Morocco and the increased autonomy of parliament from the executive. 131

the HoR prepares its budget in collaboration with the government, which diminishes its financial independence.

The parliaments of Lebanon and Morocco have also developed their internal structures.

As in most parliaments of the world, the majority of parliamentary work occurs in the standing and adhoc committees. The Lebanese HoR has sixteen standing committees.73 In Morocco, the number of standing committees increased from six, as stipulated in the 2004 bylaws, to nine committees in the 2013 bylaws. Among the new committees established is the Public Accounts

Committee (PAC), which is responsible for overseeing the government’s implementation of the public budget. This committee is discussed in further detail in Chapter 5. In addition to the committees, MPs also organize themselves in parliamentary groups, which are discussed in detail below.

In addition to developing the legal framework, the committees, and the groups, the parliamentary administration in both parliaments has witnessed some development since the early nineties. In Morocco for example, the administrative divisions developed to match the growing need of MPs over the years. However, starting with the 2002 parliament, the parliamentary bureau became more proactive in terms of developing the administration and strengthening its ability to assist the MPs.74 The bureau prepared a strategic plan to develop the parliamentary administration by restructuring the divisions and better specifying their responsibilities. This plan was adopted and implemented by the 2007 parliamentary bureau.

During the 2011 parliament, Speaker Ghallab along with the bureau developed the “Strategic

Plan for Upgrading and Enhancing the Work of the House of Representatives”. The strategy

73 The sixteenth committee on ICT was established with the 2003 bylaws amendment, article 20.

74 The Bureau includes the Speaker, eight vice speakers representing the different groups, two rapporteurs, and three secretaries (2013 Bylaws, articles 14-30). 132

focused among other things on strengthening the parliamentarians’ capacity to draft bills. It proposed establishing a legislation drafting unit and increasing the number of committee staff and their technical skills. The strategy also emphasized the need for supporting parliamentarians’ capacity to analyze draft laws.75 The Bureau also implemented a new parliamentary structure that increased the number of units and divisions and adopted clearer descriptions of the duties of each unit in 2013 (Decision no 1834/13, April 2013). The organogram of the Moroccan HoR presented in Appendix C (Figure 6) visualizes the HoR’s organizational structure.

In Lebanon, all decisions relating to the parliamentary administration are highly centralized with the Speaker, whom one of the senior staff interviewed described as the “king who reigns supreme over parliament.” Nabih Berri has been Speaker of the house since 1992, and yields extensive political power not only as Speaker but also as the head of Amal Movement party. Following the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, and the entrance of new parties to parliament, the Speaker attempted to reform the administrative structure of parliament. He issued

Decision no. 934 on Parliamentary Organization in December 2005 that outlined an improved organization of the parliament. The reforms increased the number of general directorates from four to ten. The new directorates included the Directorate for Research and Information which was tasked with assisting the MPs in their lawmaking duties. It also established an ICT directorate, and a Consulting Council composed of a pool of socio-economic and political experts. However, the political crises and the disruption of the parliament resulted in the delay of the implementation of this decision. By 2014, most of these reforms had still not been implemented. The Directorate for Research and Information had one staff member, as opposed to seven staff as was originally planned.

75 Note: At the time this research was underway, the strategy had just been adopted, it remains to be seen how the parliament implements it. 133

The above discussion presented evidence on how the parliaments in Morocco and

Lebanon have gradually institutionalized over the years. However, it is worth noting that significant institutional change such as the adoption of new constitutions and bylaws, as well as the adoption of plans and decisions to restructure parliament have resulted from exogenous shocks related to the political developments that the countries were witnessing. For example as a result of the political liberalization process and increased fairness of elections, Moroccan political parties that had historically been in the opposition (such as the USFP and PI) won the majority of the seats in the 1997 parliamentary elections. After their first “learning” experience as the majority, and upon their return as the majority in 2002, these parties initiated the first strategy to develop parliament’s capacities. Following the Arab uprisings of 2011, the newly elected parliament was urged by the King and the electorate to improve its performance.76 The

Speaker of the newly elected parliament initiated the reform process and adopted a strategy that aim to strengthen the parliament. Similarly in Lebanon, Speaker Berri, who had been in office since 1992 initiated a parliamentary reform process following the withdrawal of the Syrian forces and the election of a new parliament that brought in new parties such as the FPM to office.

It is also worth noting that both parliaments took steps towards increasing their openness.

Both parliaments have gradually developed their websites on which they publicize their work.

Both parliaments allow the media and the public to attend plenary sessions, and they provide the public with a mechanism to submit petitions to parliament.77 However, the fact that committees continue to be held in-camera in both parliaments make them less open and transparent. The

76 During his opening speech of the Second Autumn Session of Parliament held on October 12th, 2012, the King urged the parliamentarians to live up to the expectation of the electorate and adopt all reforms necessary to “do away with obsolete practices and make sure Parliament’s performance is improved.”(Strategic Plan for Upgrading and Enhancing the Work of the House of Representatives, 2012, p. 7)

77 The Moroccan HoR passed law no. 108.16.1 in July 2016 that gave the public the right to submit petitions to parliament. 134

majority of the parliamentary work occur with the committees, and therefore holding them in- camera limits the public’s ability to monitor their representatives’ work and hold them accountable accordingly.

The above discussion demonstrates that both parliaments since the nineties have attempted to further institutionalize in terms of increasing their levels of formality, complexity and autonomy with relative success. The legislative capacity of both parliaments has increased as the evidence presented earlier in this chapter on its legislative output suggests. Yet this legislative capacity remains low when compared to parliaments of other countries with similar levels of economic and political development. For example, the average number of member bills passed in parliament per year in Philippines is twenty two, which is more than all member bills passed through the four years of the 2011 Moroccan HoR (Ruland et.al 2005, p. 232).

This weakness can be partly explained by the limited human and material resources available to both parliaments. Limited parliamentary resources was cited by all MPs interviewed as one of the main challenges hindering their legislative role. Parliamentarians preparing or studying a draft law are confronted by a myriad of complex issues that require technical expertise to understand them. For example, an MP with a degree and experience in the business sector may be asked to scrutinize a draft law on agricultural policy. He would be required to understand the economic impact of the agricultural policy and its effect on his constituents, vote on its adoption, and monitor its implementation for him to have done his job effectively as a lawmaker. Even if

MPs try to join committees that are close to their educational or professional background, they still face a very steep learning curve given the myriad of issues that confront them. This presents a major challenge to MPs, who already have significant time constraints as they try to carry out their responsibilities and maintain their relations with their constituents. Thus, they have to rely on the

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assistance of competent staff to assist them, and they need to have access to adequate sources of information.

The above is admittedly a simplification of MPs legislative work, but it serves to demonstrate why sufficient parliamentary resources are crucial for MPs to be able to do their job.

Both parliaments studied have tried to build their capacities over the years. Their staff has almost doubled in the last ten years, and the percentage of the staff with a university degree has also increased (for example, over 75% of the Lebanese HoR employees have a bachelor degree or higher). Both parliaments have built new office space to accommodate the growing needs of MPs and staff. The budget of the Lebanese parliament for example increased from 7.8 million US

Dollars in 1992 to fifty million in 2015.78

However, despite this improvement, both parliaments continue to suffer from resource limitations. Both HoRs suffer from understaffing as well as challenges with their staffing process. The Lebanese HoR, as part of the 2005 reforms mentioned above, increased its staff from around 100 employees and fifty contractors to 250 employees and sixty contractors. The

Moroccan staff increased from around 200 to 350 employees in the 2011 parliament. In 2014, committees in both HoRs had between one and five staff per committee. Those include technical staff, assistants and secretaries.

In addition to committee staff, the MPs in Lebanon are given financial allocations as part of their salary to recruit one secretary. In Morocco, the parliament allocates to parliamentary groups one staff member for every four MPs.79 Comparing these numbers to Ruland et.al (2005) findings on parliaments of East Asia shows the extent of understaffing at the Moroccan and

78 All the data presented in this section was obtained from interviews with senior parliamentary staff at both Houses.

79 Prior to 2012 reforms, it was one staff member for every five MPs.

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Lebanese legislatures. For example, Philippines, which has relatively similar levels of economic and political development, and a similar size in terms of the number of MPs, had around 2000 staff in 2005, which is almost six times the number of staff the Lebanese and Moroccan HoR recruited.80

As for the recruitment process, both parliaments have the power to appoint their own staff and have regulations that govern the selection and appointment process such as the civil service exams in Lebanon. However, both MPs and staff interviewed regarded the appointment process to be marred with nepotism that resulted in recruiting underqualified employees. Those employees were not held accountable for their performance because of the patronage system prevalent at both parliaments. To illustrate this point, the last civil service exam to recruit parliamentary employees in Lebanon was held in the mid-eighties, at the time the parliament had around seventy employees. The number of staff has tripled since then. All new employees were recruited by appointment, mostly by the Speaker directly. The new recruits did not have to go through any exam or vetting process (interview, July 2015). Furthermore, the staff did not have clearly developed job descriptions and had overlapping authorities and responsibilities. Last but not least, and there were no mechanisms in place to hold the employees accountable for their performance. The recruitment process in the Moroccan HoR suffered from similar challenges.

However, the new basic law adopted in 2013 stipulates that all new staff positions must be filled by exams, and all new staff for technical positions must have at least a bachelor degree (Basic

Law no 25/13 Regarding Parliamentary Staff), whether this law is implemented or not remains to

80 Philippines is classified as partly free according to the Freedom House Index, and it’s a lowed middle income country according to the World Bank classification (http://data.worldbank.org/country/Philippines). It parliaments is composed of 297 members. These attributes are all similar to those of Lebanon and Morocco, therefore it was chosen as a comparison case to illustrate the paucity of the Lebanese and Moroccan HoR staff. Roland et.al (2005) found that Thailand recruited 1,100 staff, while South Korea recruited 3000 staff members (p. 215). 137

be seen. Neither parliament offered trainings to their staff. The limited technical expertise, especially of committee staff have been cited as a major limitation in both parliaments.

In addition to staff, parliaments require material resources, such as office space and equipment, ICT systems, archives, and libraries and information centers. There has been some developments in the resources of the two parliaments studied. For example, both parliaments introduced computers to their work in early 2000. By 2014, most staff had access to a computer compared to only a handful in early 2000. Morocco has been developing its ICT systems to assist

MPs with the lawmaking process, such as creating online databases that MPs can access to obtain committee reports or to track the status of a draft legislation (whether it is in committee deliberation, or in the first or second readings in the plenary session for example). Both parliaments also introduced a software for transcribing plenary meetings and have developed their parliamentary websites to make information more accessible to MPs and citizens.

International organizations and international aid contributed to bolstering the organizational capacity of both parliaments, The Lebanese and Moroccan HoRs have benefited from the support of organizations such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),

USAID, and the World Bank. These organizations contributed their technical expertise and conducted hundreds of training sessions for MPs and staff. They also supported the development of parliaments’ structure and resources. For example, between 2002 and 2007 UNDP assisted the

2002 Parliament of Morocco to prepare its first development strategy. It provided expert knowledge on reforming the administration and developing staff job descriptions. It also contributed to the provision of ICT equipment and trained the staff on using it (to see examples of parliamentary strengthening projects implemented in collaboration with the Lebanese HoR since 2009 see Table 11 in Appendix B).

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The findings of this section indicate that in context of transitioning democracies, scholars and practioners alike should pay attention to the impact that parliamentary resources have on parliamentarians’ lawmaking capacity rather than focusing on the legal powers only. In times of political transition, parliament’s de jure lawmaking powers may suddenly increase as a result of sudden regime change or the adoption of a new constitution for example. However, this does not imply that the parliament’s lawmaking performance will automatically improve as that is affected by a multiple of other factors including parliament’s organizational capacity as this analysis has shown. The importance of political moments, however, lie in their ability to trigger actions that in the long term can result in improved legislative performance. This analysis is in line with historical institutionalists who see institutional change as a result of exogenous factors, minimizing the agency of political actors. The following section remedies this shortcoming as it analyzes another variable that results in change of parliament’s legislative performance: political parties.

Political Parties and Parliamentary Performance: Why We Should Study Parties

Political parties in Morocco have historically acted as gatekeepers to elected office as discussed earlier in Chapter 2. Parties get their gatekeeping powers from controlling who runs on their lists, the order of candidates on those lists, and pooling the electoral votes for their candidates (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997), which they succeeded in doing regardless of the prevailing weak party identification. Voters had enough conceptions of parties and their records including the services they provide for party labels to influence their electoral decisions (Catusse and Karam 2010). In Lebanon, parliamentary seats have been increasingly won by political party lists rather than independent local notables. For example, in the 1992 parliament, independents won 23% of the 128 seats in parliament and nine of the sixteen parliamentary groups were

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electoral alliances of local notables, who did not have any common electoral platform. In contrast, independents held a mere 8% of the seats in the 2009 parliament and only two of the twelve parliamentary groups did not revolve around a political party.

However, political parties’ influence extends beyond their gatekeeping powers. Once elected, party representatives organize themselves in parliamentary groups. These groups control who gets elected to positions of power within parliament such as the parliamentary bureau or chairmanship of committees. These positions have extensive powers in setting the plenary and committee agendas (for example, they schedule the assembly or committee meetings and decide which laws should be tabled for discussion or voting). Political parties therefore behave as

“legislative cartels” using the term coined by Cox and McCubbins, who argue that parties “usurp the rule-making power of the House in order to endow their members with differential power

(e.g., the power of committee chairs) and to facilitate and stabilize legislative trades that benefit their members” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, p. 257). 81 Thus the power of parties within parliament extend beyond controlling who gets elected to setting the legislative agenda through

81 Scholarly research on the US Congress can be helpful to understand the role that parties play in parliament. Cox and McCubbins (1993, p 4-8) group theories on legislative parties into three views. The first view considers parties as “floor-voting coalitions” that have little influence on the committee stages of legislative work (Fenno 1962; Jones 1977). However, this view confines the role of parties to the floor stages of legislation (i.e. roll call voting) and do not pay attention to pre-floor stages and committee work. The second view emphasizes parties as “procedural coalitions” primarily concerned with setting the rules and organizing the legislative work such as establishing committees and making rules (Jones 1965), but it pays little attention to the influence that parties have over the substance of legislation or policies. Theories of parties as procedural coalitions based in the neo-institutional and rational choice school strongly downplayed any role for political parties when studying procedural structure of congress and committee work (Shepsle 1979; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989; and Krehbiel 1987). The third view of parties as “conditional party government” emphasizes the choices of individual MPs, which results in party leaders taking responsibility of policy case by case only when there is widespread support for a particular policy among their members (Rohde1991). Yet this theory only accounts for instances where the party is united on certain issues, rather than party’s role in general. Cox and McCubbins’ approach is therefore most suited for this research as they focus on the role of a party as a unitary actor and study their role in shaping the parliamentary institution in addition to setting the legislative agenda.

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controlling which laws make it from the committee stage to the plenary deliberation stage (Cox and McCubbins, 2005).

Bringing the above debate to the cases studied, the findings of this research showed that parties in the Lebanese and Moroccan HoR have behaved as legislative cartels in terms of appointing their members to positions within parliament. Although the bylaws of both parliaments stipulate that members of the bureau and the committee chairs are to be elected by the MPs,82 in practice however, the leaders of the parliamentary groups bargain amongst each other over those positions.

The leaders of the major parliamentary groups in both countries are powerful political figures. In Lebanon, many parliamentary group leaders are the leaders or senior figures of political parties, such as Nabih Berri and Amal party, Walid Jumblatt and the Progressive

Socialist Party. In Morocco, the parliamentary group leaders are agreed upon by their respective parties from the ranks of the party leadership. According to MPs and parliamentary group leaders interviewed, the parliamentary group leaders in both countries have the final say in the distribution of their group members to the various committees, taking into consideration their members’ qualification and seniority.83 The voting in the plenary session to select the committee

82 In Lebanon, the members of the committees elect their committee chair and rapporteur every October, while in Morocco, the chairs and committee bureaus are elected by the general assembly at the beginning of the first year and in April of the third year of every term. The committee bureau consists of the committee chair, four assistant chairs, the rapporteur, and one or more secretaries. MPs are elected annually to the committees by the plenary in the Lebanese HoR, and can be members in up to two standing committees (Articles 19 and 23 of the bylaws of the Lebanese Parliament). MPs in the Moroccan HoR are appointed by the committee bureau to committees and can be members of one standing committee only. The bylaws of the Moroccan HoR went further to ensure the proportional representation of political groups including the opposition in the chairmanship, bureau, and membership of committees. Furthermore, the chairmanship of at least two committees is guaranteed for the opposition, one of which is the Legislation, Human Rights and Justice Committee (Articles 58 and 60 of the 2013 Moroccan House of Representatives Bylaws).

83 Since not all committees carry the same political weight, parties also bargain fiercely over which committees the members chair. For example the Finance Committee is one of the most contested committees because it focuses on public finance and the decisions on how public resources are spent. It also monitors the government’s implementation of the budget. This committee holds tens if not hundreds of meetings a year and gets media 141

chairs and members and the bureau, therefore, becomes a formality as the distribution of the seats have already been agreed upon by the groups’ leaders.

Parties not only secure the political positions within parliament for their members, they also ensure party discipline within parliament. While roll call data is not available for the HoRs of Lebanon and Morocco, both junior and senior MPs interviewed confirmed that party discipline within parliament has increased over the years. Members nowadays are more likely to vote along party lines in the vast majority of times. MPs have an incentive to toe their party line and vote on laws accordingly, given that they, as Mayhew phrased it, “are single-minded seekers of reelection” (Mayhew 1974, p. 5), and their parties hold the keys to the possibility of their reelection.

The increase in party discipline is especially noticeable in the case of the Moroccan HoR.

Parliamentary groups in the 1996 and 2000 parliaments were very fluid, as their membership changed from one year to another. Parties suffered from “parliamentary nomadism,” i.e., MPs leaving their party blocks to join other blocks after getting elected.84 This phenomena decreased and eventually stopped over the years partly due to the legal restrictions put in place on parliamentarians. The Political Party Law of 2006 tried to limit parliamentary nomadism by imposing financial fines on members who leave their parties or blocks after they get elected.85

attention. While less strategic committees such as the sports committee for example do not enjoy the same level of activity or attention.

84 For example, in the 1997 parliament, the Constitutional Union party lost one fourth of its parliamentary group members going from forty four members in 1997 to thirty members in 2001; the Democratic and Social Movement lost more than half of its thirty two members by 2000, and the remaining members merged with the Democratic Block and formed Democratic Social Block. However, the major parties with the largest number of members, such as the USFP and Istiqlal, maintained their size throughout the years with relatively minimal change in their membership.

85 In the Moroccan 2007-2011 HoR, around thirty five MPs changed their block affiliation. However, this did not reflect significantly on the size of most of the major blocks, who lost some members and gained others, with the exception of the Movement block that went from forty one members in 2007 to thirty two members in 2010 (Idamine, 2011). 142

The 2011 Constitution (article 61) stipulated that an MP who reneges his political affiliation that he ran the elections under, or leaves his or her block will lose their seat in parliament, and so did the Regulatory Law on Political Parties of 2011.

In addition to discipline in terms of voting on policies, some parties also enforced discipline of their members’ behavior within parliament, especially in terms of attendance of plenary and committee sessions. Both parliaments suffer severely from MPs absenteeism within committee and plenary meetings, often held with minimum quorums (Daher, 2014). MPs mainly justify their absenteeism on the grounds of their need to be in their constituencies rather than in the capital. In Morocco this is more problematic given the size of the country. Long time MP

Noureddine Median, the head of the Istiqlal parliamentary group in the 2007 and 2011 parliaments and Vice Speaker shared his work routine:

I have to drive for eight hours to get from my constituency to Rabat. I try to stay in the city Monday through Thursday, and return to my constituency over the weekend. In many cases though I have to make a trip to my constituency during the week. It is vital that my constituents can access me. Maintaining the balance between my duties at the parliament and my obligations to my constituents is very taxing. Knowing this makes it hard for me to demand regular attendance from my group members. (Noureddine Median, personal communication, May 2014)

Both parliaments have tried to limit the problem of absenteeism through adopting legal frameworks that regulated attendance. For example the bylaws of the Lebanese HoR stipulates that attendance of committee meetings is obligatory for its members; and members who are absent for more than three meetings without an excuse lose their committee membership (1994

Parliamentary Bylaws, article 44). But these clauses were rarely enforced (Daher, 2014). In the

2013 HoR bylaws stipulated that MPs who are continuously absent without an excuse are subject to salary deductions. When the former Speaker Ghallab threatened to enforce this clause in 2013, he was faced with extreme pushback from leaders and members and parliamentary groups and in

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the end was unable to enforce it (Abdel Karim Ghallab, Former Speaker of the Moroccan HoR, personal communication, June 2014).

To combat absenteeism, some parties adopted specific measures. For example the

Moroccan Authenticity and Modernity Party in the 2011 parliament appointed committee whips to ensure that their members are attending. The Justice and Development party since 2007 had its member MPs sign a charter prior to their election that stipulates among other things MPs commitment to attend committee and plenary meetings or face financial fines in case of repeated absenteeism. They also have a rotation mechanism whereby at least 80% of their members are present at all times in meetings. In Lebanon, Hizballah, for example, resorted to its religious authority over its members and issued a religious decree (Takleef Shar’i) binding its members to commit to their duties including attending the sessions.

The above discussion answered the question of why scholars should pay attention to political parties in parliaments despite their perceived weaknesses and shortcomings in the Arab region. They directly impact parliament’s de facto powers. However, what the above discussion has not answered so far is why has the legislative performance of these groups varied as the evidenced in tables 9 and 10 (Appendix A). This is the question that the following section attempts to answer.

Explaining Variance of Party Performance in Parliament

Size Matters

The legislative performance varied across parties as the discussion on political groups above demonstrated. The first and more obvious reason behind this variance is the size of the parliamentary groups, given that groups that had less than 3% of the seats were incapable of initiating legislation (see Tables 9 and 10, Appendix A). Larger parties that have wider electoral

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bases are more likely to win more seats and therefore have larger parliamentary groups. Larger parties are also more likely to have more funds and human resources than smaller ones. These resources are critical for providing MPs with the support they need in light of the limited parliamentary capacity, such as assistance with constituent relations, or provision of technical support as will be discussed below. As one of the MPs of a smaller block put it, “My party is rather small, we do not possess the means to hire staff to help us. As members of the parliamentary group, we rely on each other and the skills we possess as a group for the most part.

We also try to form coalitions with other parties to pool resources.” (Antoine Zahra, personal correspondence, July 2014).

Both parliaments have a high number of political groups represented in them. The

Lebanese 1996 Parliament, for example, had fourteen groups. Therefore, the fragmentation of parties and parliamentary groups in both countries has negatively impacted the parliament’s legislative capacity. However, the trend in Morocco has started to reverse over the past few years. The 2011 Parliament for example was composed of eight groups. If the trend continues, it could result in increased capacity of parliament. However, while size might be an important determinant of a group’s capacity it is not the only factor. As Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix A show, some groups with comparable number of parliamentary seats (such as the Istiqlal party block and Movement Block in Morocco’s 2002 HoR) varied significantly in terms of their legislative output, which implies other factors at play as well. This section argues that in addition to party size, the parliamentary group performance is determined by the extent the party is connected to the electoral base, its cohesiveness, and the level of institutionalization of the party.

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The Electoral Connection: Parties Facilitate Constituency Relations

One of the primary responsibilities of members of parliament is to communicate with their constituents to hear their demands, and get their opinions on policies that can affect them.

Constituent relations is also possibly the most time consuming task as MPs have to divide their time between working in the parliament and being present among the constituents ,a challenge that is not limited to Arab parliaments.86 Parties which are closely connected with the electoral base and are present at the local level can offer invaluable help to MPs in managing and facilitating their relations with their constituents.

MPs - constituency relations in the Arab region in general, Lebanon and Morocco included, is marred with clientelism. And while it may not be particular to the Arab societies, clientelism is particularly strong in the region due a complex set of factors including strong ethnic and tribal relations that could bond the MP to his constituents, poor public service delivery in most of these countries, and weak structures of local governance. These factors are amplified in the rural areas were tribal connections are stronger, and the state service is weaker (Cammett and Issar 2010).

All MPs interviewed agreed that constituency relations is the most time consuming aspect of their job. They emphasized that their constituents’ demands were overwhelmingly service- related, such as paving a road or helping them find jobs. MPs stated that one of the main problems they faced was that constituents did not differentiate between the roles of local councils, the government, and Parliament. As one MP expressed it, “I get blamed if the burned

86 In the United States, for example, many members of Congress are part of the “Tuesday to Thursday club” that is they try to be in Washington D.C. for a few days midweek, and return to their districts for the remainder of their time (Mann and Ornstein 2006, 169). 146

street light is not fixed.” MPs acknowledged that this confusion on behalf of the constituents is largely the fault of the parties that run the elections based on clientelistic promises.

Clientelism shapes the priorities of MPs, who focus more of their time on local interests, rather than broad public policy that may not directly affect their constituents. One of the less discussed consequence of clientelism is that it contributes to the negative public perception of the parliamentary institution as it gets blamed for shortcomings that could be beyond its responsibility. As a short anecdotal example, during my research at the Moroccan HoR (April –

June 2014), I witnessed tens of young people demonstrating in front of the parliament in Rabat chanting the slogan “barlaman zero” (parliament is zero, i.e. inconsequential). The protesters were demonstrating against some of the executive’s hiring decisions to fill positions in the ministries. When I asked the protestors why they were blaming the Parliament about decisions that the executive took, the protestors answered that their representatives should be taking actions against those decisions because they represent their interests.

Beyond providing clientelistic services, MPs are expected to engage in social obligations.

Many MPs in Lebanon have open house days for constituents to come visit, socialize or voice demands, and that is not limited to the young or new MPs, who need to foster their relations with their constituents. Walid Jumblatt, the feudal Druze leader and head of the Progressive Socialist

Party group in parliament since 1992, holds those open houses regularly on Sundays in his home in Mount Lebanon. As another MP from Northern Lebanon expressed it, “It is more important for my constituents that I attend their weddings and funerals than engage in drafting a law they don’t know or care much about the latter” (Emile Rahme, personal communication, August

2014). MPs can therefore get stretched between their districts, party responsibilities, parliamentary responsibilities, and personal business as many have private jobs that they attend

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to, and possibly other public responsibilities (many of the Moroccan MPs interviewed, for example, were elected members of their local councils as well). Their time becomes their most valuable commodity, and therefore they have to rely on their parties to try to minimize the time spent on managing constituency relations.

Parties put their resources, such as party offices and staff, in the districts at the disposal of their MPs. For example, Amal Movement (Tahrir block), Hizballah, and FPM in Lebanon and

USFP and Istqlal in Morocco allow MPs to use the party offices in the different districts especially those that are geographically farther away to meet with the constituents. These parties also organize “town hall” meetings between MPs and the constituents during which MPs hear the citizens’ needs and concerns as well as opinions on policies or draft laws studied in parliament.

In the less personalistic parties (i.e. parties that do not revolve around the persona of the political leaders but around the party itself), the parties play a larger role as a linkage between the constituents and the MPs. Constituents relation is with the party itself rather than with the MP, and therefore they come to the party offices with their demands or petitions and the party conveys them to the MPs.

Most of the major parties also have close connections to civil society organizations and labor unions, which the MPs often call upon either to get their input on laws being discussed, or ask to mobilize to pressure the government when needed. The most recent example from

Lebanon was FPM’s collaboration with the trade unions to mobilize over the Bill on Public

Sector Wages (Holmes & Bassam, 2014).87 In addition to the relation with the civil society, parties have also increasingly paid attention to media outlets, which provide MPs with additional

87 The government and parliamentary majority argued that the proposed Public Sector Wages Bill (Qanoon silsilat al rotab wal rawateb) cannot be financed by the budget. FPM MPs and their allies resorted to mobilizing their bases in collaboration with the trade unions. After almost three years of rallying, the bill finally reached the last stages of deliberation, but was still not passed by April, 2017. 148

and easier venues to communicate with their constituents. Most parties in Lebanon and Morocco have established interactive websites, for example, and are present on the social media platforms.

In Lebanon the major parties also own their television and radio stations, such as the Future

Party, FPM and Hizballah that provide their MPs with regular airtime.

Institutionalization of Parliamentary Groups: A Key to Their Success?

There has been a noticeable development of how some political parties institutionalized their work within parliament. Many of the major political parties have adopted internal bylaws for their parliamentary groups and developed their organizational structures. In Morocco, the

Istiqlal party block has over the years built its organizational structure, establishing five administrative units to support that group’s work, including the legislative unit, the oversight unit, the research unit, the media relations unit, and the international relations unit. The PJD block went further by diversifying their organizational structure and developed terms of references and job descriptions for the various MPs and parliamentary staff supporting their work. The party also requires its member MPs to contribute a percentage of their salary to the party for covering the expenses of the support the party offers them.88 Interviews with these groups’ administrative managers and staffers, revealed that this development occurred gradually over the years to meet the MPs growing numbers and demand for support.

In Lebanon, few parties have developed their parliamentary group’s organizational structures. Party meetings were mostly held based on the request of the head of the group.

Probably the one exception in the Lebanese case is Hizballah’s parliamentary group. Following their first election to parliament in 1992, the Hizballah has gradually institutionalized its parliamentary work. The party appointed an administrative director for the block to coordinate

88 The organograms of these groups were obtained directly from the groups’ secretariats. 149

the affairs of MPs. It established the Parliamentary Affairs Council (PAC), which is composed of the MPs and headed by the vice president of the party. The PAC supports the different needs of

MPs to conduct their legislative and oversight work, and also supports the MPs relations with the executive, the civil society, and their constituents. Today there are approximately 100 administrative employees that supports the block. The party also appoints an assistant for each

MP (paid for by the party). It has also built a building in the capital that houses the MPs offices, in addition to the nine regional offices that spread across the country that it puts at their service.

While the party uses its resources to fund its offices and staff, it obligates the MPs to pay a contribution to the party (1000 USD per month) to help pay for the assistance it provides to MPs.

Interviews with MPs from the Future Party and the FPM, showed that their parties have gradually started to institutionalize since 2009. They now schedule periodical meetings for the parliamentary group to coordinate their work, and have established different units to support their MPs.

One important advantages of developing the organization of parliamentary groups is that it allows the group to provide increased support to its members. There are numerous examples of how parties provide their MPs with technical expertise and support during the lawmaking process. For example, the legislative units in both the PJD and Istiqlal parties are responsible for reviewing the party’s member bills before submitting it to parliament. It also assists MPs during the different stages of the lawmaking process. Another example from Lebanon is Hizballah who established the Advisory Office for Research and Studies in 2009. This office provides legislative support to their MPs in drafting or scrutinizing laws. The Moroccan Authenticity and

Modernity Party (PAM) in 2011 built a roster of volunteer experts who are called upon for help when needed. For example, PAM MPs requested the help of several gender experts and scholars

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as they were drafting the Gender Equality Regulatory Law (qanoun al monasafa bayna al jinsain). The experts conducted needed socio-economic research to help the MPs understand the full impact of the law they were proposing. The draft law was finalized and presented to the block members for discussion. After the head of the block approved the draft, the members submitted it to parliament (Miloda Hazeb, Head of the Authenticity and Modernity Block, personal communication, June 2014). This experience is common in many of the parties across the Arab region, for example the Lebanese Future party started a “Research Office” to support its

MPs, while the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood established their “Parliamentary Kitchen” in

2000, which was composed of specialized teams that conducted research, consulted with experts, and collaborated with civil society to gather information needed by the MPs to carry their lawmaking responsibilities (Shehata and Stacher, 2006). The Moroccan PJD developed a capacity building strategy for their MPs in 2011 that included establishing partnerships with universities and holding seminars and training workshops for their MPs. For example, between

2012 and 2013, the party organized more than twenty five seminars and nine training workshops on various subjects that included public finance, the mining sector, and the rights of artists

(Bouano, 2013).

All these examples were cited to showcase the ways that parties can support members of their political groups during the lawmaking process. This is particularly crucial when MPs are suffer from the shortage of specialized staff and the weak technical support that the parliaments provide. In contrast to the cases discussed above, some of the parliamentary groups lacked any form of institutionalization of their parliamentary work. Most of these groups, such as the

Keserwan MPs and the Development and Change majority blocks in the 1996 Lebanese parliament, were formed around loose coalitions of local notables, or small personalistic parties

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(Elie Khoury, parliamentary expert, personal correspondence, August 2015). They rarely held any group meetings to coordinate their position on policies, nor did they offer any support to their members. The performance of the two mentioned groups was minimal compared to other groups with similar sizes, as they did not initiate any legislation (Table 10, Appendix A).

It might seem logical to jump to the conclusion that parties with extensive financial and human resources such as Hizballah are more likely to develop the organization of their groups, however, this is not necessarily true. For example, the Future block has had a strong presence in parliament since 1996 (formerly known as Qarar Beirut, in 1996, and Karama in 2000). It was also headed by billionaire businessman Rafiq Al Hariri, who supported the block with his personal resources. However, the group did not begin to develop its organization until later in

2009. One of the findings of this research is that the level of institutionalization of the parliamentary groups mirrored that of their parties. Parties that have developed organizational structures such as PJD and Hizballah, and have institutionalized their party’s internal governance were more likely to develop the organization of their parliamentary groups. Some of the parties that have recently began to institutionalize have also started to develop their parliamentary blocks. For example both the Future Movement and FPM shifted from being fluid political movements to establishing political parties and developing their internal structures. This was reflected on their parliamentary groups’ internal organization as well.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed at analyzing parliament’s legislative performance in Morocco and

Lebanon from the early nineties till present day. The analysis showed that the legislatures in the two countries are more ‘compliant’ using Blondel’s classification. Their capacity to significantly amend or reject draft laws submitted by the government still remains relatively weak. However,

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despite the fact that the Executive continues to control the lawmaking process, parliament’s capacity to initiate laws, and to a limited extend amend them, has surly increased. The findings of this new research challenges the predominant understanding of Middle East parliaments that readily dismisses them as rubberstamps, or studies them from the lens of their role in prolonging existing regimes. Parliamentarians have been increasingly engaging in the lawmaking process, and have been gradually developing their parliamentary institutions.

The relation with the executive negatively impacted the lawmaking capacity of parliaments in Morocco and Lebanon, albeit for different reasons. Morgenstern and Nacif (2002) find the type of legislative – executive relation and the size of support the President has in parliament (comfortable and uncomfortable majorities) are among the major determinants of parliament’s policymaking capacity in the case of Latin American legislatures. In the cases of

Lebanon and Morocco, the size of the majority does not seem to be as prominent a factor, perhaps because the executive had the support of comfortable parliamentary majorities over the years.

Rather, the constitutional lawmaking prerogatives that are given to each branch of government seem to be the more important factor shaping the executive-legislative relation and the policy making power given to each branch. In this sense, Lebanon’s higher capacity to initiate laws compared to Morocco can be partially explained by the difference in the nature of the executive-legislative relationship and the constitutional powers that the Lebanese parliament enjoys.

In addition to the nature of the balance of power with the executive, the role of political parties and the organizational capacity of parliaments seem to be the major determinants of parliament’s legislative performance. This chapter argued that the organizational capacity of

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parliament is shaped by its level of institutionalization, i.e. the extent of its formalization, complexity and autonomy, as well as the resources available to it. Evidence was presented on the gradual institutionalization of both parliaments, as well as increase in their resources with the number of staff almost doubling in recent years. However, these resources remain very limited even when compared to other similar parliaments. The paucity of resources has considerably hindered parliament’s law making capacity. Change in levels of institutionalization and resources was caused by exogenous shocks to the institution in most cases such as adopting new constitutions or civil unrest.

The final variable affecting the parliament’s legislative performance was the political parties represented in parliament. The parties shaped the parliament’s legislative output by behaving as “legislative cartels” as Cox and McCubbins suggest, controlling positions of power within parliament and enforcing discipline on their members both in terms of their policy positions but also their behavior (such as attempting to limit absenteeism). The data also indicated that the parties’ legislative performance varied considerably. The main reasons underlying this variation seem to be the size of the party, its cohesiveness, its connectedness with the electoral base, and its degree of institutionalization. These factors determine the extent of support that the party can provide to its members. These findings may not come as a surprise for scholars of congress, however in the context of the Arab region, parliamentary parties have been reduced to agents of the regime and providers of clientelistic services. Their role within parliament has been largely left unstudied. The findings of this research may provide incentives for both scholars studying the region and practitioners to focus more on those parties and study ways that can contribute to their development.

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CHAPTER 5

ACCOUNTABILITY AND PARLIAMENT’S DE FACTO OVERSIGHT POWER

Accountability: Definition and Theory

Political accountability is one of democracy’s cornerstones. It ensures that state institutions keep each other in check and limits abuse of power through a system of checks and balances. It also ensures that the state is responsive to citizens’ needs and demands, as citizens control the selection of politicians through elections. Scholars differentiated between two types of accountability: vertical and horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability refers to the accountability of politicians to citizens, while horizontal accountability refers to state institutions keeping each other in check, such as parliament’s role in overseeing the executive.89

Parliamentary oversight is defined as the parliament’s supervision of government’s policies and programs (Schick, 1976; Olson and Mezey 1991). This chapter focuses on the parliament’s actual capacity to oversee the government and hold it accountable. Similar to the argument made about the determinants of parliament’s de facto legislative power, this chapter argues that the de facto oversight power of parliament is determined by the role and nature of parties represented in parliament, the nature of the legislative-executive relationship, and the organizational capacity of parliament. To this end, the first section surveys the scholarship on accountability, and identifies accountability tools and processes. The second section presents the research methodology and provides evidence from the case studies of Morocco and Lebanon on the capacity of parliaments, or lack thereof, to hold the executive accountable. The final section analyzes the factors and

89 This is the generally prevailing conceptualization of horizontal versus vertical accountability (O’Donnell, 1999). However other scholars argued that vertical accountability exists in a hierarchical relationship where the principal is capable of enforcing their demands on the agent (such as the parliament and the executive), while horizontal accountability occurs in a relationship that lacks hierarchy where the principals cannot force their demands on the agent (Bovens, 2005). In this dissertation I use the former distinction between horizontal and vertical accountability. 155

conditions that affect parliament’s oversight de facto powers in the context of a transitioning democracy.

Accountability is the guarantee citizens have that their government will act in their best interest, will provide them with the services they need, and will use the resources that it levies from them to better their lives. However, political accountability and the tools and mechanisms used to enact it may differ in different political systems. In parliamentary systems, the government is appointed and can be removed by parliament. To hold the executive accountable, the parliament has an arsenal of tools, such as question time and votes of confidence.90 In presidential systems, such as in the United States, where the president is elected by the people,

Congress still has the power to hold the President and his cabinet accountable. The Senate reviews and confirms members of the cabinet selected by the President. It also has the power to impeach the President and remove him from power in extreme cases of misconduct. Finally, in semi-presidential systems such as in France, the President is elected but the Prime Minister is often appointed from the parliamentary majority and can be removed by a vote of no confidence.

In both semi-presidential and parliamentary systems, the government is often questioned by the parliament. Thus, while the form of political accountability may vary, it is a constant in all democratic political systems. Even in systems with the extreme separation of powers such as in the United States, the Founding Fathers recognized the need for the government to “control itself.” 91

90 Government is also referred to as the executive, the administration or the cabinet in the literature and in this dissertation.

91 James Madison, one of the founding fathers of the American Constitution argued in his Federalist Papers No. 51 for the need of the government to “control itself” by enabling the state agencies to keep each other in check. While the Madisonian vision of checks and balances focus on protecting each state institution from the encroachment of the other, it also does allow the institutions to hold each other accountable and prevent abuse of their powers. 156

Political scientists have resorted to agency theory to help them understand the intricate relationships involved in political accountability (Ferejohn, 1999; Elster, 1999; Pelizzo and

Stapenhurst, 2012). In the case of vertical accountability, the government is the agent and the electorate is the principal. The electorate suffers from an informational disadvantage as they do not necessarily know or understand what the government is doing, nor are they unified about what they think the government should be doing. The principal’s main tool to reward or punish the government is at the next election ballot boxes. Elections however are not as frequent, and several years can pass before the electorate can hold the government accountable. Furthermore, the electorate may make their decision in retrospect, and therefore can be influenced by a myriad of exogenous factors such as the economy or security concerns at the time of elections, rather than the government’s performance.

In horizontal accountability, the parliament, the principal in this relationship, is still at an informational disadvantage, but less so than the public, given its resources. It also has more leverage over the government (its agent), for two reasons. First, it organizes itself along party lines, which increases its ability to act as a unified principal (or principals in the case of multiparty democracies); and second it has a bigger range of rewards and punishments than the electorate to hold the government accountable.

Recent research such as that of Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012) has introduced newer types of accountability: social and diagonal accountability. Both types are “society driven horizontal accountability” that results from citizens’ participation in holding the government accountable. It is a hybrid form of accountability that bridges horizontal and vertical accountability, by linking citizens with legislatures and other oversight institutions. Social accountability is usually bottom-up demand driven, and can manifest itself in citizens’ watchdog

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organizations. For social accountability to be possible, certain facilitating conditions need to be in place, such as freedom of information laws, free media, and policy-focused civil society organizations.

Diagonal accountability, is also socially driven, but the difference is that citizens participate directly in state institutions, including legislatures and oversight agencies, to hold the executive accountable. It empowers civil society since it “augments the limited effectiveness of civil society’s watchdog function by breaking the state monopoly for official executive oversight” (O’Brian, 2008, p. 111). Citizens are invited to participate in governing through different platforms, such as attending public hearings or submitting petitions. Social and diagonal accountability boosts the parliament’s power by increasing the pressure on the executive to answer to the parliament (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2012). Diagonal accountability developed as parliaments and governments across the globe moved towards more openness and transparency in their modus operandi. Parliaments that opted for transparency adopted freedom of information laws, broadcasted their general assembly sessions on public media and published parliamentary decisions and proceedings on their official websites. For example, the World e-Parliament

Report 2016, published by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), showed significant improvements in transparency and openness of parliaments compared to the findings of their

2012 and 2010 reports. Of the 114 parliamentary chambers surveyed, 89% of them published more information and documents on their websites, while the percentage of parliaments with social media presence increased from 13% in 2010 to 56% in 2016 (World e-Parliament Report

2016, p. 11-12).

Figure 5 below plots the principal-agent relationships (denoted with P or A) between citizens, the parliament, the executive, and the bureaucracy. It also provides some examples of

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tools (denoted in italics) that each principal possesses to hold the agent accountable. These tools are further explained in the following paragraphs.

Figure 5: Accountability: Principles, Agents and Tools

The discussion above differentiated between the players and their roles in each type of accountability. In terms of accountability outcomes, Elster (1999) differentiates between three outcomes: the principal dismisses the agent without punishment; the principal punishes the agent while retaining him as an agent; or the principal dismisses the agent and enforces additional punishment. In terms of the legislative-executive relation, these outcomes translate as follows:

The parliament holds the executive accountable through a) dismissing it through a vote of confidence;92 b) ‘punishing’ the executive through conducting interpellations, for example, but

92 Different countries use different terms to refer to a vote of confidence. These include a motion of confidence, a motion of censure, and a vote of no confidence. 159

they do not exact a vote of confidence; or c) removing the executive or its head through impeachment, and following that with initiating and/or participating in the trial of the impeached executive.93

These levels of accountability according to Elster serve two functions: incapacitation and deterrence. The presence of accountability deters the agent from misconduct out of fear of punishment, and in case that misconduct occurs the principal is able to incapacitate the agent.

Following Elster’s logic, without the power to incapacitate, deterrence becomes futile, or weak to say the least as the principal loses leverage. This implies that there are two stages of accountability: answerability and enforcement (Schedler, 1999). Answerability is more of

“friendly dialogue” between the accounting and the accountable to obtain needed information.

Enforcement on the other hand entails the accounting taking an action against the accountable, such as rewarding good behavior and punishing bad behavior (Schedler, 1999, p 14-15).

Therefore, having the power to enforce accountability and incapacitate the government is essential for parliament to be able to hold the executive accountable. As Laver and Shepsle argue, enforcement mechanisms, such as a vote of confidence, works as “credible threat, a weapon in parliament’s arsenal, in short a veritable club behind the door that induces appropriate behavior.” (Laver and Shepsle, 1999, p. 280) However, deterrence is by far the most practiced form of accountability, as the number of votes of confidence in parliaments across the world remain few and far in between.

Accountability becomes the ‘essence of democracy’ as it allows citizens’ representatives to ensure that policies adopted by the government are in-line with their concerns and priorities.

This holds true regardless of the political system in place as discussed earlier, because even in

93 In some countries, the constitution grants the parliament the right to form or participate in a supreme court that is tasked with trialing heads of states. 160

the purist form of presidentialism, such as that of the United States, the Congress still has power to summon members of the executive and question them about their performance and policies enacted. It creates a medium to monitor government behavior, ensure that the government delivers on those policies, and curtail any possible abuse or misconduct. And finally, parliamentary accountability can somewhat remedy the informational disadvantage of the electorate, as it increases government’s transparency. Parliamentary hearings and reports are often made public, and MPs act as a link between the state and the citizens.

One of the most common ways that parliaments oversee the executive and hold them accountable is through scrutinizing the public budget, adopting it, and overseeing its implementation. The budget translates the government’s socio-economic policies through determining spending levels, allocations to the different sectors, and tax levels, among other things.94 The role of parliaments in a budget cycle is divided into the ex-ante stage where parliament scrutinizes and debates the public budget, and the ex-post stage where the parliament oversees the executive’s performance in implementing the budget and reporting on it.95 The parliament also relies on supreme audit institutions (SAIs), or Cours des Comptes in francophone countries, who audit government spending and identify any abuse or mismanagement.96

94 The “power of the purse” developed in the early 14th century as the English parliament appointed commissioners to audit the tax collectors accounts. It gradually evolved as the Tudor monarchs were forced to ask for parliamentary support to fund their wars (Norton, 1993).

95 For a comprehensive understanding of the budget processes and mechanisms, as well as practices of countries across the globe see “Legislative Oversight and Budgeting: A World Perspective” (Stapenhurst et.al. 2008).

96 The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) has been a catalyst in developing the standards and roles of efficient SAIs. For example developed SAIs have shifted from compliance auditing, which focuses on the accuracy of governments accounts, to performance based auditing that focuses on the efficiency of government’s performance and spending. More developed SAIs can be more helpful to parliaments as they produce punctual and more informative reports, and are more able to respond to parliament’s request for information and assistance. This trend is witnessed in developing democracies as well such as Tunisia and Morocco as I observed during the meetings I held with members of the SAIs as part of my consultancy work with the World Bank in 2015. More developed SAIs can be more helpful to parliaments as they produce punctual and more informative reports, and are more able to respond to parliament’s request for information and assistance. 161

Parliamentary oversight over the budget is attributed to parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, yet research conducted by Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2004) found that 84% of legislatures in presidential systems scrutinize financial reports submitted by the government.

Tools of Accountability

Parliaments have a range of mechanisms and tools at their disposal to hold the government accountable. These can be internal tools such as parliamentary questions, interpellations, committees of inquiry, and votes of confidence or external bodies such as

Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs), Ombudsmen offices, and anti-corruption agencies (Olson and

Norton, 1996; Olson and Mezey, 1991; Yamamoto 2007; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2012; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2014). These tools have different implications in terms of enforcing answerability or enforcement. Questions are the most commonly used tool by parliaments to obtain information from the executive (Yamamoto, 2007). Different types of questions can have different accountability implications. For example, a written question is used primarily to obtain information from the executive and is answered in written format. An oral question on the other hand has to be answered by the executive orally in the general assembly session. In a majority of countries, these sessions are open to the public and the media. Therefore, oral questions can generate more visibility of the accountability process, allowing the public to know what the government is doing and increasing the pressure on the government.

An interpellation is a prolonged questioning of the interpellated person that is delivered and answered orally in general assembly sessions. It embodies a second level of accountability.

Many parliaments that have interpellations, allow MPs to turn their question into an interpellation if an answer was not provided in time or if it was deemed unsatisfactory by the

MP. In many cases, as in the Lebanese legislature, an interpellation can be followed by a vote of

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confidence in the member of the executive interpellated or in the whole government. Committees of inquiry are, in general, ad-hoc committees that parliaments form to investigate a specific issue based on the request of the members of parliament. Votes of confidence are used to approve the appointment of government members or to remove a government from power (a vote of no confidence). These tools can be used to practice ex-ante control over the government (such as voting to approve the government’s program), or ex-post accountability through monitoring government’s performance, such as questioning members of the executive or investigating policy implementation. In the majority of cases, the relationship between the parliament and the external oversight bodies are regulated by the constitution, while the internal oversight tools are detailed in the parliamentary rules of procedure (Yamamoto, 2007). For these tools to be effective, the executive’s answerability and parliament’s enforcement capabilities need to be guaranteed, as argued above.

This chapter has so far defined parliamentary oversight, explained its importance for ensuring good governance, and highlighted some of the tools available to parliament to hold the executive accountable. The following section examines whether the selected cases of the

Lebanese and Moroccan HoRs have the power to oversee the executive and if this power has changed over the years.

Parliament’s De facto Oversight Capacity: The Cases of Morocco and Lebanon

Methodology

This section examines the oversight capacity of the selected cases of the Lebanese and

Moroccan HoRs, in particular their ability to address questions to the government, interpellate members of the executive, form committees of inquiry, and oversee the budget implementation.

To measure parliaments’ ability to question the government, I created an original dataset of the

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parliamentary questions that were addressed by the parliamentarians to the government in both countries. Both oral and written questions from 1977 to 2016 in Morocco were included in the dataset. Only oral questions addressed between 1992 and 2014 are part of the Lebanese dataset

(data on written questions were not available at the time this research was conducted). The dataset included all the interpellations addressed by MPs of the Lebanese HoR to the executive

(1992-2012). Since the Moroccan HoR does not have the power of interpellation, it was not included in the dataset.

This data for the years observed has not been previously collected by other researchers. The data was only available in Arabic, and mostly in hard copy. I built the dataset using several primary sources compiled during the archival research conducted at the Moroccan and Lebanese parliaments. Primary sources included parliamentary minutes of general assembly meetings for the covered time periods, summaries of annual parliamentary proceedings, and statistics obtained directly from parliamentary staff. For Morocco, I obtained the data for the period 1977-1993 from Banis (2007), a three-volume compendium of documents and statistics about the Moroccan

HoRs’ activity between 1977 and 1997. I obtained the data for the period 1993-1997 from Filali

(2011). I compiled the data for the period 1997-2016 using primary sources including the minutes of meetings of the parliamentary sessions (1997-2007) and the parliamentary website

(2007-2011).

The following variables were used in coding the data:

- Type of question: Coded by whether the question is written or oral. - Parliamentary group: Questions/interpellations were coded by the parliamentary group/coalition of groups/independent MPs that addressed them. - Position of parliamentary group(s)/MPs that addressed the question/interpellation: whether they were in the majority or opposition. - Questions answered: The dataset controlled for whether the question was answered by the executive (for the case of Morocco only, data for Lebanon was not available). - Topic of the question/interpellation: The questions were coded by the subject they addressed

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(such as economy, education etc).

The dataset allows for quantifying the parliaments’ ability to address questions while controlling for the effect of political party affiliation and position in the majority or opposition as one would expect that parliamentary opposition is more active in holding the government accountable. It also allows for determining the government’s answerability to parliament by determining whether it responded to the parliamentary questions. The questions were coded by subject to determine whether the parliaments in both countries focused on particular areas, or monitoring the government’s performance as a whole. To circumvent possible subjectivity, the questions topics were coded according to which ministry they were addressed (for example, questions addressed to the Ministry of Education were coded as education). In cases where the question was addressed to multiple ministries, then I coded by what appeared to be most relevant. Finally, the case selection of the Lebanese and Moroccan parliaments allow for controlling other exogenous factors that could potentially affect the parliament’s performance such as the level of economic development, or cultural values and norms (see the methodology section in Chapter 1 for details on case selection justification).

While this dataset is a good start to assess parliament’s actual capacity to question the government, it suffers from some limitations. In the case of Morocco, the data allows for determining the answerability of the government in terms of answers provided to parliamentary questions but does not show if these answers were timely, or if their content provided satisfactory information to the MPs. In the case of Lebanon, data on the government’s answers were only available for the 1992 parliament at the time this research was conducted. To overcome these limitations, I conducted interviews with more than forty parliamentarians and parliamentary staff (see methodology section in chapter one for more details). In addition to the

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interviews with MPs, interviews with parliamentary staff from the oversight unit in each parliament, as well as with members from the Audit Bureau in each country, and with the

Minister of Parliamentary Affairs in Morocco provided me with a wealth of information. These interviews provided more in-depth qualitative analysis of the parliaments’ oversight capacity, including their ability to ask questions, form committees of inquiry, and oversee the budget.

Data Findings

Parliamentary Questions

The Moroccan HoR addressed more than eleven thousand oral questions (OQs) to the government in the 2011 parliament, which is a significant increase from 4837 questions addressed in the 1997 HoR (table 6 below). The government answered almost half the questions addressed to it by the 1997 and 2002 HoRs, however, answerability dropped between 2011 and

2016 with the government responding to 30% of all questions addressed to it. The opposition addressed 33%, 25% and 40% of the questions for the 1997, 2007 and 2011 parliaments, respectively. The government answered more of the oral questions posed by the majority than that of the opposition in the 2007 parliament (60% of the majority questions were answered compared to 30% of the opposition questions). The 2011 parliament witnessed similar government answerability, with around 30% of all opposition questions and 30% of all majority questions answered.

Table 7 below shows that the HoR also witnessed a great increase in the number of written questions, with the 2011 HoR addressing more than twenty seven thousand questions, compared to around five thousand questions in the 1997 HoR. Comparing tables 6 and 7 shows that the opposition’s share of written and oral questions in each parliament was similar, with the

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opposition submitting around 65% of the written questions in the 1993 parliament, and almost

40% in the 2011 HoR.

The Moroccan government answered a mere 30% of the oral question in the 2011

parliament as table 6 shows. The government was more responsive to written questions and was

more likely to provide an elaborate answer with statistics or details about the government’s

activities. However, according to the majority of the MPs interviewed, written questions were

used more as a mechanism for obtaining information, while oral questions were used more for

position taking, i.e. letting their constituents know that they hold the government accountable on

specific issues by forcing the government to explain its actions or shortcomings.

Table 6: Moroccan HoR - Oral Questions 1977-2016

Total # of % of Total Total # of Oral % of Majority % of Opposition OQs Year OQs Opposition Questions OQs answered answered Answered OQs (OQs) 1977 – 318 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1983 1984-1992 2775 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1993-1997 3516 60% 1793 63% 57% 1997-2002 4837 46% 1613 N/A N/A 2007-2011 5245 54% 1313 62% 30.8% 2011-2016 11168 30% 4475 31% 30.1%

Table 7: Moroccan HoR - Written Questions 1977-2016

% of Opposition Total # of Written % of Written % of Opposition Year Questions Questions Questions answered Questions answered 1977 – 269 N/A N/A N/A 1983 1984-1992 1702 79% N/A N/A 1993-1997 4412 98% 65% 97% 1997-2002 7367 89% N/A N/A 2011-2016 27024 68% 49% 73%

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In Lebanon, the parliament was less active in terms of addressing oral questions to the government in comparison to Morocco, as Table 8 below shows. Furthermore, there was a reversal in parliament’s capacity to question the government, as the number of questions decreased significantly in the 2005 and 2009 parliaments (the 2009 parliament submitted a mere twenty seven questions compared to 185 questions submitted by MPs in the 1996 parliament).

The decrease in oversight activity was also reflected in the number of interpellations that the parliament held for members of the executive: the 2005 and 2009 parliaments addressed less than ten interpellations, compared to 137 interpellations addressed by the 1996 parliament. The data on the government’s answers to the questions were only available for the 1992 parliament, during which the government answered 64% of the questions (Sassine 1997, p. 86).

The role of opposition in questioning the Lebanese government and holding it accountable also varied depending on the presence and the size of the opposition in parliament.

During the 1996 parliament, the opposition parties and opposition-leaning independent MPs were active in questioning the government, submitting more than half of all the questions and interpellations despite having around ten percent of the parliamentary seats. The opposition’s oversight role weakened in the 2000 parliament, after the major parties (including Future, Amal,

Hizbullah and their allies) formed an electoral coalition. As a result of this coalition, strong opposition figures such as Salim El Hoss, who lead the Saving and Change group in the 1992 and 1996 parliaments, lost their seats and only a handful of MPs that labeled themselves as the opposition won parliamentary seats.

The 2005 parliament witnessed the return of strong opposition to the parliament following the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and the organization of elections that were deemed free and fair by international observers. New parties that joined the opposition,

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most notably the Free Patriotic Movement, won a sizable number of seats as they entered the

parliament for the first time. And while the number of questions dropped considerably in the

2005 parliament due to the political crises that the country witnessed, the percentage of questions

fielded by the opposition almost doubled compared to the 2000 parliament. The parliament and

the opposition’s ability to question the government was the weakest in the 2009 parliament. MPs

explained this drop in the parliament’s ability to question the government on the extreme

political polarization witnessed during this period.97

Table 8: Lebanon’s HoR - Oral Questions and Interpellations (1992-2012)

Number of Oral % of Opposition Interpellations by Year Total Interpellations Questions Questions Opposition 1992-1996 145 26% 10 40% 1996-2000 185 55% 137 63% 2000-2005 108 20% 33 24% 2005-2009 30 43% 3 0% 2009-2012 27 19% 9 0%

The above data shows significant variance in terms of questions addressed to the

government between the two parliaments and in the same parliament over time. The cases

selected also showed noticeable difference in terms of the performance of political groups in

addressing these questions regardless of their position in the majority or the opposition

(Appendix D: Tables 12 and 13). For example, in the 1997 Moroccan HoR, the Istiqlal and

USFP parties submitted the largest number of questions despite the fact that these parties lead the

97 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Lebanon witnessed a series of crises since 2005, which included the assassination of the Prime Minister Rafiq Al Hariri followed by twelve assassinations of MPs and political figures. The parliament’s general assembly secessions in the 2005 and 2009 parliament were disrupted due to political parties boycotting the sessions and therefore the quorum could not be met. The war that started in Syria in 2011 also contributed to the extreme polarization between the political and confessional groups in Lebanon. 169

government at the time. The PJD submitted the largest number of questions in the 2007 parliament when it was in the opposition, as well as in the 2011 parliament when it headed the government. Similar to the findings of Chapter 4, smaller groups had very limited oversight capacities. Groups that had less than 3% of the seats were unable to address questions to the government or addressed a small number only. However, the role of independent MPs varied between Morocco and Lebanon, as independent MPs hardly played any role in questioning the government in Morocco, while in Lebanon, independent MPs submitted the largest number of questions in the 1996 and 2000 parliaments as Tables 12 and 13 in Appendix D demonstrate.

These findings will be discussed in the analysis section below.

Finally, Tables 14 and 15 in Appendix D show that the parliamentary questions targeted different sectors. In Lebanon, MPs mostly questioned the government regarding its public finance policy, with 15% of all questions addressed between 1992 and 2012 focusing on public finance. It was followed by questions regarding the interior and municipality affairs (14%), health (8%) and telecommunications (7%) sectors. In Morocco, interior and municipality affairs received the largest number of questions (15%), followed by education (12%), transportation

(9%), and health (8%). The subjects of the questions and diversified areas of interests show that

MPs were not only focused on those questions that could be clientelistic in nature, but also targeted more public policy areas, such as public finance and the environment. Obviously this data is very limited in terms of its ability to differentiate between which questions targeted public policies versus those that targeted clientelistic services, however, the range of subjects covered s may be used as a basic indicator of MPs’ diversified policy interests.

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Other Oversight Tools: Investigative Committees

In addition to parliamentary questions and interpellations (in the case of Lebanon), both parliaments used other oversight tools to hold the government accountable, including investigative committees and fact-finding missions. Investigative committees are usually new ad- hoc committees created at the request of MPs to investigate the administration’s actions or certain policies. Fact-finding missions are subcommittees formed by members of standing committees for the purpose of investigating an issue that is being discussed by the committee.

The Lebanese parliament launched one investigative committee in 2005 regarding allegations of corruption against the Minister of Energy (Daher, 2010; p.182-183).

The Moroccan HoR launched ten investigative committees since the early nineties. Most of these committees were launched at the request of the King rather than by the MPs. According to the head of the Legislation and Committee Affairs Division, the HoR has become more active in launching fact-finding missions, with more than sixty-five missions launched since 2011.

Some of these missions successfully influenced government actions and policies. For example, in

2010 the Finance Committee launched a mission on the status of pharmaceutical prices in

Morocco. Over the span of six months, the mission met with the concerned ministers, pharmacists, civil society representatives and drug manufacturers. The mission submitted its findings in a report to the Finance Committee, which was discussed in parliament. In 2014, the government acted on some of the recommendations of the report and decreased the prices by

80% of around 1000 types of medications (Mustapha Ibrahimi, personal communication, June

2014).98

98 Details on this fact-finding mission can be found in “The Report on the Fact Finding Mission on Medications Prices,” Finance Committee, Moroccan House of Representatives, 2014.

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In the case of Morocco, interviews with MPs and staff members indicated that not only did the frequency of using oversight tools, such as investigative committees and missions improve, but also did their effectiveness. Previously, the investigative committees and missions’ effectiveness was limited because their findings were hardly ever discussed in the assembly and no follow up actions were taken based on the findings and recommendations of these missions.

This development could be partly attributed to the constitutional and bylaws reforms of 2011.

Prior to 2011, the Speaker was not obligated to present the reports of the committees and missions to the plenary for discussion. One committee staff member attested that the majority of the old committee findings were buried deep in the drawers and never saw the light of day. After the 2011 amendments to the legal framework, the Speaker became obligated to schedule the discussion of committee and mission reports. This case indicates that enforceability is not only needed in terms of legislative-executive relations, i.e. forcing the executive to be held accountable to parliament, it is also necessary that accountability measures within the parliamentary institution itself are effective. In the case of the Moroccan HoR, the parliamentary administration was forced to submit to the committee of inquiry findings for discussion, rather than leave that choice to the whims of the Speaker. Because of his or her position, the Speaker may not want to bring evidence against the government to the attention of the MPs and the public, either due to political pressures or because he is from the majority party, aligned with the government.99 Moreover, the 2011 constitution and parliamentary bylaws simplified the formation of committees of inquiry by reducing the quorum requirements for requesting these

99 Many investigative committees’ findings never see daylight and are neglected by the Speaker or the administration. For example the findings of the investigative committee on the illegal cutting down of cedar trees were never discussed by the parliament, and continue to be ignored until today. 172

committees, and gave the opposition the right to chair the investigative committees if they wish to do so.

Accountability and Public Finance: Overseeing the Budget

The constitutions of Lebanon (since the 1927 amendments) and Morocco (since the 1996 constitution) granted the parliament the right and responsibility to discuss the annual public budget, propose amendments, and adopt it as a finance law and oversee its implementation. The

Constitutions in both countries also defined the deadline that the government has to abide by to submit the draft budget to the parliament. Spending in the new fiscal year should not commence until the budget is adopted. To ensure parliamentary monitoring of budget implementation and governmental accountability, the parliament in both countries also has to approve the Final

Accounts Law. The final accounts are submitted by the government after the end of the fiscal year, providing details on government implementation of the budget during that fiscal year, which is then adopted by parliament as a law.

The role of the parliament in public financial management (PFM) has been an area of weakness in both parliaments. Indices on public financial management, such as the Open Budget

Survey, repeatedly showed the weakness of PFM in both countries. The 2015 report on Lebanon ranked the country among the lowest countries in terms of budgetary transparency. It also found that the legislature provides weak oversight during both the planning and implementation stages of the budget cycle. The report gave Lebanon a score of 2 out of a 100, compared to a global average of 45. Other countries in the region with limited transparency still fared better, such as

Tunisia that had a score of 42, and Jordan, with a score of 55 (Open Budget Survey 2015,

Lebanon, 2015).

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In Lebanon, the parliament has rubberstamped budgets since 1992 according to the MPs and staffers interviewed. Budgets were submitted to parliament months after the constitutional deadline, which means that the government would spend according to the new budget for months before it was approved by parliament. The continuous political crises since 2005 (explained earlier in this chapter and in Chapter two) have further weakened the parliament’s role. The last budget adopted by the parliament was the 2005 budget. Since 2005, the government has been spending according to the “12th Rule” (Qa’idat Al Ithnai Ashariya). This law stipulates that if the budget is not adopted on time, then the expenditure is approved for one month according to the adopted budget of the previous year. Although this rule was meant to provide a solution for a very short period of time (as in weeks or months in case of a delay in approving the budget), it has been in use for more than a decade. Moreover, compared to 2005, expenditures have almost doubled — without adopting a new budget to match the increasing needs of the public administration. These increases are done outside of the 12th rule, and on a case-by-case basis.100

While the government failed to submit a budget between 2005 and 2009, it did submit one in 2010. However, the parliament refused to adopt it. The Head of the Finance and Budget

Committee, MP Ibrahim Kanaan, argued that the grounds for his refusal to adopt the budget is that the government had not submitted the final accounts, which as mentioned earlier are the details of government finances for the previous year. The last final accounts adopted were for the fiscal year 2003.101 And since the Constitution requires the parliament to review the final budgetary accounts and adopt them prior to adopting the budget for the new fiscal year, the parliament could adopt the submitted budget, otherwise it would be violating the Constitution. In addition to not submitting the required final accounts, the government submitted the 2010 budget

100 By early 2017, the parliament had not yet adopted a budget. 101 The last final accounts submitted to parliament were adopted as law no 716 on February 2nd, 2006. 174

in July 2010, which is nine months past the deadline (October 2009). The government since the early nineties had been submitting the draft budget after the deadline for submission. This delay results in the government spending for months without the parliament’s approval, and the parliament’s retroactive adoption of the budget becomes a mere formality diminishing any real oversight role of the parliament.

In addition to the delay in submitting the budget and not submitting the final accounts, another factor weakening the parliament’s role in overseeing public finance is the use of extra budgetary funds. These funds are “public resources and government transactions that are not included in the annual budget or are not subject to the same general level of reporting, regulation, or audit as other public finance items” (Extra Budgetary Funds, Open Budget Partnership, p. 4).

An example of such funds are the Council for the South and Central Fund for the Displaced, which are partly financed by the budget and by foreign aid (International Monetary Fund, Statistics,

2011).102 The majority of these funds (amounting to billions of dollars) were not included in the budget, and thus, not scrutinized by the parliament. Finally, the parliament’s relationship with other crucial oversight bodies to help oversee public finance is also very limited. The main oversight body in Lebanon tasked with scrutinizing the work of the government and the public administration is the Court of Audit (CoA). While the law regulating the Court of Audit stipulates that the CoA has to submit its report to the parliament annually, the parliament over the past two decades has hardly ever received any report, nor has it tabled the report for discussion in its plenary or committee meetings. (Adnan Daher, Secretary General of Lebanese Parliament, personal communication, June 2015).103

102 The Council for the South was established in 1970 (decree no 9/70) in response the severe development needs of that region at the time. The government established the Central Fund for the Displaced following the end of the civil war in 1993 by law no. 193. 103 Court of Audit Law, Article 49. 175

The above discussion demonstrates the weakness of the Lebanese HoR role in overseeing the budget. Despite this grim picture, there have been some minor developments in the parliament’s role in overseeing public finance. The Finance and Budget Committee has tried to bolster its role in the budget process. In 2010, it held more than fifty sessions to scrutinize the 2010 draft budget.

The Chair of the Finance and Budget Committee described these committee sessions as a learning opportunity for both committee members and staff. The sessions also gained the attention of MPs from different political blocs, and fostered the attention of the media and the public. Civil society organizations were also invited to these meetings to provide their input. This increased activity of the Finance and Budget Committee is an important positive development, given that in previous years the Committee would not spend more than a couple of days debating the budget (Ibrahim Kanaan, personal communication, July 2015).

Furthermore, the Committee formed a commission of enquiry to investigate the missing final accounts at the Ministry of Finance.104 Finally, the Committee submitted thirty-three recommendations to the Prime Minister in 2010 to improve the budget process. The government decided in 2012 to include extra budgetary funds in the budget, in response to these recommendations.

In Morocco, the parliament faced similar challenges in overseeing the budget. Since

1997, the government often delayed submitting its budget final accounts to parliament. A member of the Finance Committee revealed that MPs’ inputs on the draft budget during committee debates were minimal, and usually dismissed by the government. Similarly, the final accounts were not submitted on time. For example, the final accounts for the years 2003 through

2006 were submitted to parliament and approved two years later in 2008. This delay greatly

104 This information was collected from interviews conducted with the Chair of the Finance and Budget Committee, as well as other MPs and parliamentary staff. The Commission’s investigation was still ongoing by 2015, but according to the committee staff interviewed, the Commission did not get very far, as it was unable to gather sufficient accounts of government expenditures for the past two decades 176

reduces the effectiveness of the parliament’s oversight role given that the even if cases of mismanagement or corruption were uncovered, it would be too late to take corrective actions as the funds would have been spent and the government responsible for the budget implementation was no longer be in power and therefore could not be held accountable.

However, the Moroccan HoR has witnessed some significant developments since 2011.

The new constitution of 2011 obligated the government to submit the final accounts to the parliament on an annual as opposed to bi-annual basis, as stipulated in the previous 1996

Constitution. The 2011 constitution also added a new standing committee, the Committee of

Control of Public Finance, tasked with overseeing public expenditure, reviewing the Supreme

Court of Audit (Cour Des Comptes) reports, and studying all laws related to the budget. The

Committee is composed of forty-three MPs representing the different parliamentary groups according to proportional representation. The Parliament’s Bureau puts an annual work plan for the committee based on parliamentary groups’ suggestions to oversee the public expenditure.

The Committee gathers information, conducts the necessary consultations needed to carry out the work plan, studies various fiscal laws and reports, and submits its report to the parliament.

The Constitution also obligated the Supreme Court of Audit to aid the parliament in overseeing the public budget. The Supreme Court of Audit is responsible for answering questions and providing advice on fiscal legislation and oversight. It also submits to the parliament an annual report, and responds to the parliament’s request for information (2011

Constitution, articles 147 – 148; HoR Bylaws articles 218-221, 224-225.). Furthermore, the parliament adopted a new Finance law (Law no 13.130 issued on June, 2nd 2015) that introduced several reforms compared to the previous law of 1998, such as reducing the number of extrabudgetary funds, and limiting the executive’s ability to transfer funds without the approval of the

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parliament. The legal reforms are relatively recent and so it is difficult to assess their impact on the parliament’s oversight capacity. However, interviews with MPs revealed that they have been increasingly engaged in the budget process since 2011. For example the MPs of the 2011 parliament submitted multiple requests to the CoA, which the CoA had addressed. 105 The parliament also adopted the annual final accounts in a timely manner since 2011.

The above discussion of the Lebanese and Moroccan HoRs capacity to engage effectively in the budget process still remains limited. However, in both parliaments there has been some developments whether political, such as the Lebanese MPs refusing to rubberstamp a budget and forcing the government to submit a new budget and justify its spending, or structural, as in the case of Morocco where the parliament established a new committee specifically for the purpose of overseeing the budget implementation. The next section of this dissertation discusses the variables that affect parliament’s capacity to carry out its oversight function.

Parliament’s Oversight Capacity: What Determines It?

Government Answerability: A Requirement for Accountability

Government answerability is crucial for a parliament’s ability to hold the executive accountable. This analysis shows that the availability of a legal framework that provides tools of enforcement is a necessary first step to prompt government answerability. These can be internal tools stipulated by the constitution and parliamentary bylaws, such as time limits imposed on the government to respond to parliament’s request for information, interpellations, and votes of confidence. Other mechanisms, such as requiring the government to submit its final accounts for

105 An example of such reports is the report on the Compensation Fund (Caisse de Compensation) prepared by CoA in 2014. 178

scrutiny by parliament, and requiring Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) to assist the parliament, are also important for the parliament’s capacity to oversee the executive.

In Lebanon, MPs and staff members interviewed indicated that the government is compelled to respond to their questions because it knows that the MPs can change their question to an interpellation if it doesn’t respond on time or if the government does not provide sufficient responses. In the 1996 parliament, MPs protested the government’s delay in responding to their questions, and changed many of their questions to interpellations resulting in the relatively high number of interpellations during the 1996 parliament (137 interpellations compared to thirty three interpellation in the 2000 parliament). MPs can also request a vote of confidence for the government or minister questioned, which they have initiated a handful of times between 1992 and 2012, but was never passed by the majority (Adnan Daher, Secretary General, personal communication, August 2015).

In Morocco, the government’s answerability appeared to be more problematic. MPs interviewed indicated that the government delayed answering their oral questions most of the time or did not answer them at all, despite requirements imposed on the government to do so within a specific timeframe. This delay sometimes made their questions obsolete, especially if the question was about an urgent or timely matter. Another problem that the MPs expressed, and

I witnessed firsthand when attending question-time sessions (May – June 2014), was that the government often provided vague or general answers to oral questions, such as “we are currently studying this issue.” The government blatantly disregarded this obligation as evidenced by the low response rate to MPs questions presented earlier in this chapter (see Table 6 above).

According to MP Abdallah Bouanou, head of the PJD parliamentary group, one of the main problems that PJD MPs faced during the 2007 parliament when PJD was in the opposition was

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that they “lacked mechanisms to force the government to answer them, answer in time, and answer with credibility.” In response, his party in 2008 and 2009 resorted to the press and orchestrated a media campaign or what he described as ‘the battle of the questions.’ His parliamentary group resorted to weekly, and sometimes, daily press releases calling out the government’s delay in responding to their questions, highlighting the public policy issues raised in their questions and implications to citizen’s lives. They succeeded in getting the government to answer around thirty percent of their questions by the end of the parliamentary term

(Appendix D, table 12) as a result of the mounting media pressure and persistence of the PJD

MPs. (Abdallah Bouanou, personal communication, June 2014).

The cases of Morocco and Lebanon show that a legal framework that enforces government’s answerability is necessary, but not sufficient. The governments of both countries have disregarded their constitutional obligations towards the parliament. The government therefore needs to be held accountable to its duty to answer parliament’s requests. Enforcing answerability is where political parties, particularly opposition parties, come into play, as the examples of the PJD in Morocco (2002-2011) and the Free Patriotic Movement in Lebanon

(2005-2012) demonstrate. The following section discusses the role that parties play in holding the executive accountable.

Political Parties: Drivers of Parliamentary Oversight

Interviews with MPs and staff in both countries revealed that the parliamentary groups that were most active in oversight, such as the FPM in Lebanon and PJD in Morocco, received significant support from their parties. Similar to the findings of Chapter 4, larger parties that were connected to their constituents and had institutionalized its work were more effective in

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supporting their MPs. However, in addition to these conditions, parties in the parliamentary opposition had a major role in improving the parliament’s oversight role.

As the data findings discussed earlier in this chapter indicate, parties that had less than three percent of the seats hardly presented any questions (Appendix D, Tables 12, 13). MPs from such parties indicated that between their relationships with their constituencies and their lawmaking responsibilities, they were unable to engage in any effective oversight work.

Accordingly political party fragmentation, from which both the Lebanese and Moroccan parliaments have suffered, has negatively impacted their oversight capacity. However, the size of the parliamentary group is not necessarily the only indicator, as parties with similar sizes varied in their capacity to address questions to the government.

Party’s connectedness to constituents seemed to play a major role in this regard. The experience of the PJD in the Moroccan House of Representatives is noteworthy, given the party’s large capacity to address questions to the government both as part of the opposition in the

2007 parliament and in the majority in the 2011 parliament. Most MPs interviewed stated that the majority of the questions they addressed to the government were based on information or complaints they received from their constituents. One activity organized by their party was particularly helpful; The PJD parliamentary groups organized the annual “Parliamentary

Caravan” (Qafilat Al Misbah) since 2007. Every March, the PJD parliamentarians participate in this “caravan” that takes them across the country to meet with constituents in the districts. The party assists the parliamentary group with the logistics of this caravan, such as hosting the MPs as they travel, arranging for their meetings with the constituents, and taking them on field visits to monitor government projects, as well as the government’s ability to deliver public services.

The parliamentary caravan resulted in the large percentage of the questions tabled by PJD over

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the years (Habib Al Choubani, Former MP and Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, personal communication, June 2014).

In addition to connectedness with constituents, the level of parliamentary group institutionalization (discussed at length in Chapter 4) also affects the group’s oversight capacity.

For example, parties such as the PJD and Istiqlal that had developed their parliamentary group’s organizational structure, established special administrative units responsible for assisting the

MPs with their oversight work. This assistance included helping the MPs gather the necessary information on the government’s performance, draft parliamentary questions, and follow up with the parliamentary administration and the government on the answers to these questions.

Another manner in which political parties assisted their MPs is providing them with technical expertise, which they need to carry out their oversight role. For example, in 2013, the

PJD organized nine study-days for their MPs on various issues, including two on the public budget. These study days served to educate the MPs about the budget process, highlight their role in overseeing the implementation of the budget, and inform them about the party services they can benefit from. Similarly, MP Kanaan from the FPM in Lebanon started a “task force” of

MPs in 2009 to assist each other in learning about the various aspects of the budget and government performance. This taskforce also hired a financial expert to help it with its work.

Finally, parties also assisted their MPs in facilitating their relationship with the media, whether it was the party’s media platforms or other media outlets, as evidenced by the PJD’s

“battle of the questions” and FPM’s power struggle with the government over the budget since

2009 (discussed earlier in this chapter). In both cases, MPs resorted to the media, especially when the government was not responsive to its demands, to build public pressure and force the government’s hand in responding to the parliament’s requests.

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The variables discussed in Chapter 4 and this Chapter affect both the lawmaking and oversight de facto capacity of parliament. However, in addition to these variables, the presence of an active opposition proved to be particularly important for effective parliamentary oversight.

For example, the opposition parties in Lebanon and Morocco were the ones pressuring the government on the budget, as demonstrated by the data analysis section of this chapter showed.

The data analysis also showed that some parties fielded equally large number of questions regardless of their position in the opposition or in the majority (Appendix D, Tables 12 and 13).

However, it is worth noting that majority and opposition questions may not serve the same purpose of holding the government accountable. Governments can use question time to answer supportive questions from the majority party, allowing the government to showcase its progress and action and to avoid answering more challenging questions addressed by the opposition

(Martin, 2013). This is true in the case of Morocco, where the majority repeatedly asked questions served to highlight the government’s achievements so that in one of the assembly meetings one MP from the Modernity and Authenticity opposition party protested against the

PJD questions. The MP argued that the “question time should be to hold the government accountable, not to congratulate it (General Assembly Session, 27 May 2014).”

One difference highlighted in the data-findings in section one was the independent MPs’ oversight role. In Morocco, independent MPs hardly played any role in questioning the government. MPs in Morocco rarely chose to stay independent and preferred to join one of the bigger groups once elected. This choice is partly the result of the support that the groups receive from the parliamentary administration (such as financial and staff allocations). In Lebanon, on the other hand, Independent MPs submitted the largest number of questions in the 1996 and 2000 parliament but less so in the 2005 and 2009 parliaments.

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The phenomena of “strong independents” in Lebanon, particularly during the nineties, can be partly explained by the absence of institutionalized parties and by the electoral law that ensured the election of local notables from small electoral districts, eliminating their need to join party lists. While these active independent MPs were few in number (less than ten MPs), they still managed to play a role in questioning the government. These MPs had several commonalities: They all had considerable political experience, including being incumbents in the parliament. They were also professionalized. For example, MP Ismael Sukkarieh elected in the

1996 and 2005 parliaments, was a medical doctor and an independent MP. He tabled 16% of all questions addressed to the government by the 1996 parliament. Ninety percent of his questions focused on the health sector. The finding in this chapter regarding professionalized MPs differs from that of Barkan (2009), who argued that the formation of coalitions between professionalized MPs and opportunistic political leaders resulted in strengthening the parliamentary role in selected parliaments in Africa. In the case of Lebanon, independent professionalized MPs had some role in questioning the government, but this role diminished in the 2005 and 2009 parliaments, as parliamentary groups moved from loose electoral coalitions to homogenous groups based on party membership and alliances.

This section showed that political parties play a crucial role in influencing the parliament’s de facto capacity to oversee the government. Large parties that were closely connected to their constituents and institutionalized were able to support their MPs to carry their oversight role. This support was particularly valuable in light of parliament’s limited institutional capacity, which is the focus of the following section.

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Institutional Capacity: The Backbone of Parliamentary Work

Interviews with MPs and staff members revealed the centrality of parliament’s organizational capacity to their oversight work. Many of the MPs, especially in Morocco, cited the positive impact of parliament’s improved organizational capacity on their oversight work. Chapter

4 of this dissertation defined and discussed at length parliament’s organizational capacity. Very briefly, the chapter argued that organizational capacity is a function of a parliament’s degree of institutionalization, and the resources available to it (both material and human). The degree of institutionalization is determined by a parliament’s level of formality, uniformity, complexity, and autonomy (see Chapter 4 for more details). Chapter 4 also identified a parliament’s organizational capacity as one of the main variables determining a parliament’s legislative de facto power. The findings of this chapter also indicates the significant impact of a parliament’s organizational capacity on its de facto oversight power, and therefore, warrants more attention

The Lebanese and Moroccan HoRs have developed their organizational structure over several years. The constitutions and parliamentary bylaws of both houses clearly defined parliament’s oversight role and the tools available to hold the government accountable. These powers have gradually evolved with the adoption of each constitution and constitutional amendment as demonstrated in Chapter 3. For example, in Morocco the parliament gained the right to form committees of inquiry following the 1996 constitution. The recent 2011 established a new parliamentary committee, the Public Account Committee, which is specialized with overseeing the implementation of the budget. In addition to the constitutional prerogatives, both parliaments developed their administration to support their oversight function. For example, both

HoRs established the oversight division, which includes the questions office. This office is tasked with receiving and following up on the questions that MPs want to table.

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Oversight structures, such as committees and oversight divisions, are important for the parliament to be able to carry out its oversight role. However, these structures become hollow if they do not have the proper resources. For example, Committee members are faced with the daunting task of analyzing the public budget, as well as the periodical reports that the government submits to parliament on its implementation of the budget. The budget and the reports can amount to thousands of pages, and often contain technical and complex information and statistics on government revenues and expenditure, without necessarily linking this information to the government’s socio-economic policies. MPs often call on the government, the SAIs and budget experts to help them understand these reports. They might also need to conduct meetings with different stakeholders affected by the budget to understand its impact on them. All this requires time and technical knowledge that MPs often lack. Parliamentary staff support thus becomes invaluable in providing technical expertise to MPs, as well as administrative support to organize meetings or field visits where necessary.106 Staff, therefore, need to have the proper skills-sets and knowledge to be able to perform their work effectively.

Lack of parliamentary staffers continues to be one of the major weaknesses of both HoRs as discussed in Chapter 4. Both parliaments are understaffed. For example, the Finance Committee in Lebanon, which is responsible for scrutinizing the public budget, has only one committee staffer.

The Moroccan MP had slightly better support with four staffers and one committee assistant. Both parliaments are trying to improve their resources. In Lebanon, the parliament recruited external consultants to assist the MPs and launched a budget office in 2010 in collaboration with

106 For example committee staff can prepare summaries of the main findings of oversight reports to simplify the work of MPs and shorten the time needed to study these reports. Based on the request of MPs, they can also arrange hearings for members of the executive and the SAI to present their reports and answer MPs questions. They can also arrange the hearings for representatives of different stakeholders such as trade unions and civil society organizations.

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international organizations. Unfortunately, both the recruitment of external consultants and the budget office were not sustainable projects and they ended shortly after they started. In Morocco, the parliament has gradually increased the number of staff, in addition to providing skills training and better definition of their jobs (as discussed in Chapter 4). Furthermore, the Moroccan HoR introduced information management systems to assist its oversight work. This system introduced in the 2011 parliament allows MPs to submit and track parliamentary questions electronically, which simplified the process for both the MPs and staff and encouraged MPs to submit more questions to the government. These developments can partially explain why the number of questions almost doubled between the 2007 and 2011 parliaments.

As they currently stand, both parliaments have institutionalized the oversight function of parliament. However, the resources available to MPs and staff remain limited. The scarcity of these resources hinders MPs from effectively overseeing the government. It also necessitates that MPs complement these resources with others elsewhere, such as their political parties as discussed above. MPs can also call on other sources of expertise, including public oversight bodies, such as the audit institutions and members of the civil society. In Morocco, MPs attested to the growing relationship between the parliament and the Court of Audit, as MPs have been increasingly sending requests to the CoA to conduct studies or clarify the CoA’s reports on the government’s fiscal performance. In Lebanon, the relationship between the parliament and the CoA is very weak. The parliament has hardly ever discussed the CoA’s reports in their plenary or committee sessions during the period studied. However, the committees in the Lebanese HoR actively summon members of civil society to share their opinion and expertise on issues under discussion, including the budget. This could be a step in the right direction towards encouraging diagonal accountability, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Diagonal and social accountability can serve to bolster rather

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than replace horizontal accountability. MPs benefit from the participation of citizens and groups in terms of their knowledge and expertise they may possess as well as building public pressure on government to respond to parliament’s requests.

Form of Government and Accountability: Consociationalism and Accountability, an Oxymoron

Existing scholarship recognizes the effect of contextual factors on parliament’s power vis-à-vis the executive. The usual suspects identified in this research are the form of government, political parties, and social legitimacy attained by the legislature or the public trust in it (Olson and Mezey, 1991; Olson and Norton, 1996; Pellizzo and Stapenhurst 2014). This chapter presented evidence on the crucial role that political parties can play in supporting the parliament’s oversight role, as well as the type of parties that are best equipped to provide this support. Parliament’s social legitimacy in both countries remains low as evidenced by Ellen

Lust’s (2009) research, which relies on public opinion surveys focusing on people’s perceptions of parliament and state institutions in the MENA region. Therefore, any variance in parliamentary oversight capacity observed could not have resulted from a change in parliament’s social legitimacy given that it has remained low.

The analysis in this chapter concentrated mainly on factors internal to parliament.

However, anecdotal evidence from my interviews highlights the effect of the form of government on parliamentary power, particularly in the case of Lebanon, which is a consociational democracy. The executive power-sharing formula in a consociational democracy takes the form of a grand coalition cabinet comprising all major parties. Critics of consociational democracy warn of its negative effects on parliamentary opposition, the parliament, and quality of democracy in general (Lawson, 1993). Critics also argue that consociationalism can deepen existing social divisions and result in continuous instability (Hudson 1988; Reynolds, 2005).

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In Lebanon, the political polarization and gridlock, as well as episodes of civil violence have exerted a heavy toll on the functioning of the parliament, and disrupted the parliament’s ability to hold general assembly sessions during the period studied (1992-2012).107 Data analysis and interviews revealed that Lebanon’s parliament capacity to question the government and hold it accountable was limited. This capacity appears to be limited even when compared to another parliament in the region with similar levels of democratic development. The majority, if not all of the MPs interviewed, believed that the consociational nature of governance weakens the role of a parliamentary opposition, and hence the parliament’s oversight capacity. Most parties, or at least their allies, are represented in the government. MPs thus have less of an incentive to hold their parties or their allies accountable. MP Antoine Zahra summarized the problem of consociationalism as follows:

Accountability in Lebanon is impossible. The confessional consociational system creates an inherent problem of accountability. Everyone agrees to be part of the game and not to raise questions or hold the other accountable under the pretense of stability. The result is corruption and loss of confidence in the political elite, who continue to get re-elected due to the confessional clientelistic relation between them and their constituents. (MP Antoine Zahra, personal communication, August 2014).

The above statement hints at another problem: the absence of vertical accountability. The election and re-election of MPs over the years along confessional-clientelistic lines have eroded horizontal accountability. The incumbency rate is high in the Lebanese parliament, with the percentage of MPs elected for the first time ranging between 37%, 30% 44% and 30% in the

1996, 2000, 2005 and 2009 parliaments respectively. High incumbency rates are usually a favorable attribute of parliaments as it indicates that there is a core group of MPs from each party

107 Between the end of November of 2006 and May 2008, the parliament held less than five general assembly sessions as a result of the series of political crises that the country witnessed. The general assembly sessions were resumed following the “Doha Agreement” in May 2008, which ended the political strife and resulted in an agreement on the election of a new President (see Chapter 2 for more details on the political context during this period). 189

who have experience in parliamentary affairs and can guide the fellow MPs. However, in the case of Lebanon, political leaders lost the incentive to show their constituents that they are working to protect and advocate for public policies that affect constituents’ quality of life, be it taxation, education or health. The series of political crises that Lebanon witnessed since 2005 only served to deepen social cleavages and confessional loyalties, further weakening any existing vertical accountability.

The nature of this type of MP-constituent relationship rooted in confessionalism and clientelism not only demotivates MPs from attempting to engage in parliamentary work, it limits their ability to do so. Even reform-minded MPs who have a history with civil and social engagement, find themselves stretched as they try to carry their legislative and oversight responsibilities, and at the same time be active in their constituencies, and respond to their constituents’ immediate requests and needs. The nature of this relationship is particularly aggravated in rural areas where family and clan ties run deeper, and where government services are weaker, “I spend the majority of my time solving problems and addressing requests of my constituents that I cannot say no to, I have little time to be a real legislator” (MP Nawar Al

Sahili, personal communication, August 2014).

Last but not least, it is important to note that the nature of social relations in Lebanon affects the nature of the executive-legislative relationship. Most of the MPs interviewed said that they call the minister or relevant administration directly when they need information rather than address a formal question. They also use their party channels and contacts to facilitate the relationship with the executive. This informality contrasts to the formality of the executive – legislative relationship observed in Morocco, which is more institutionalized, and regulated through the appropriate channels of the parliament’s bureau and the ministry of parliamentary

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affairs. This informality in the case of Lebanon could partially explain the lower numbers of questions addressed, where questions become tools for accountability rather than for gathering information.

The findings of this chapter regarding the effect of consociationalism on parliamentary power and its ability to hold the executive accountable can complement the research in this field.

Scholars studying the effect of the form of government on executive-legislative relations focused on the three major types of political systems, the presidential, parliamentary, and semi- presidential systems (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Olson and Mezey, 1991; Pellizzo and

Stapenhurst 2014). However, they do not dwell on the effect of consociationalism as a system of governance, possibly due to the fact that only a handful of democracies around that would qualify as consociational democracies. Findings of this research indicate that consociationalism in deeply divided societies significantly limits the parliament’s capacity to hold the executive accountable since MPs are hesitant to hold their parties or their allies represented in the government accountable. Furthermore, consociationalism coupled with deep ethnic divisions can result in the erosion of vertical accountability, which decreases the incentives for MPs to show their constituents that they are advocating for them and scrutinizing the government’s policies and projects that affect their lives. Explaining these horizontal and vertical accountability in terms of the agency theory discussed at the beginning of this chapter could help clarify why accountability and consociationalism can be contradictory. In the case of horizontal accountability, the parliament, which is the principal in this relationship, possesses the tools

(such as questions) but not the incentive to hold the executive (the agent) accountable. Similarly, in the case of vertical accountability, the voters (the principals in this relationship) possess the tools (such as elections) to hold the parliament (the agent) accountable. However the agent (i.e.

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the electors) lack the incentive to hold their representatives accountable as a result of confessional and ethnic loyalties.

Conclusion

This chapter focused on understanding parliament’s de facto capacity to hold the executive accountable. It argued that the availability of legal tools parliaments can use to hold the executive accountable is a necessary but not sufficient condition to ensure government’s answerability to the parliament. Governments have and do in fact ignore parliament’s requests in the past, as evidenced by the low response rate to parliamentary questions in Morocco. The chapter argued that other variables have a significant effect on parliament’s de facto oversight capacity. These include the role political parties’ play in parliament, particularly opposition parties, and the nature of those parties. Larger parties that are connected with their constituents and are institutionalized were more capable of supporting the oversight function of their MPs.

These parties were able to provide much needed technical expertise to their MPs and facilitate their relationships with their constituents and the media. Furthermore, MPS cited peer-to-peer learning among members of the party as crucial, especially when faced with demanding tasks, such as scrutinizing the budget. The support MPs receive from their party gains salience in light of limited parliamentary resources. This chapter argues that parliament’s organizational capacity is a major determinant of MPs ability to carry out their oversight work. Findings of this chapter indicate that while both the Lebanese and Moroccan parliaments have gradually institutionalized, the resources, particularly staffers, remain sparse, which negatively impacts the oversight power of the parliament.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is about the roles that the majority and opposition play in holding the executive accountable. The general wisdom in

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parliamentary scholarship is that the government rules in parliament through its majority and the opposition opposes. In both countries, the opposition played an important role in overseeing the government, whether through questioning or overseeing the budget. However, in the case of

Morocco, a country transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy, both the opposition and the majority were active in questioning the government, which was appointed by the King. MPs addressed an increasingly large number of questions to the government, even in cases where the

King had appointed the Prime Minister from the party that had won the most votes in the parliamentary elections (such as the 1997, 2007, 2011 parliaments). While the previous chapter fused the executive with the persona of the King given his vast legislative authorities, this

Chapter only considers the parliament’s ability to hold the Cabinet accountable, since the King according to the constitution cannot be held accountable. It could explain why the majority was active in questioning the governments that it headed or participated in over the years.

Finally, this chapter suffers from many limitations and caveats that suggest the need for future research. These are discussed in detail in the concluding chapter.

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Summary of Research Findings and Implications

This dissertation aimed to answer four main questions about parliaments: How do we conceptualize parliamentary power? How do we measure it? Why does it change? And has it changed in some of the countries in the Arab region? The last question is of particular importance given that Arab parliaments have been largely understudied and dismissed as window dressing used by authoritarian regimes to prolong their rule. The dissertation relied on two case studies, that of the Lebanese and Moroccan House of Representatives, to answer these questions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the evidence presented in the chapters indicates an increase in the power of the two parliaments over time. The findings of this dissertation warrant future research of Arab parliaments, from Bahrain to Algeria, to better understand these institutions. How they developed and continue to develop under less than ideal conditions, such as authoritarianism and continued political and civil unrest.

The dissertation argued that parliamentary power is a two-dimensional concept. The first dimension constitutes de jure powers delegated to parliament by the laws of the country, including the constitution. The second dimension is parliament’s de facto ability to act on the powers granted by these laws. The distinction between the two dimensions is crucial to better understand how and why parliaments develop the way they do. The causal mechanisms that may lead to a variance in one dimension of parliamentary power are not necessarily the same for the second dimension. For example, political junctures that occur during democratic transition such as a revolt or a regime change often require the negotiation of a new social contract between the state and society, and the different social actors. Such events can result in drafting or amending

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the constitution, which in turn can positively or negatively affect the powers granted to parliament. In addition, while the constitutional powers are necessary for a parliament to carry out its different functions, these powers on their own are not sufficient to ensure that the parliament acts. Other variables are at play influencing the ability of parliaments to carry out their functions, such as the types of parties represented or the resources available, as discussed below. The approach adopted in this research differs from the majority of research in the field, which often conflates the two dimensions when studying executive legislative relations and parliamentary institutions. Considering both dimensions of parliamentary power as well as the factors that influence them will allow scholars to arrive at more comprehensive theories about parliamentary institutions.

To understand change in the de jure power of parliaments, this dissertation studied constitution making in two Arab countries, Lebanon and Morocco. Scholars often viewed constitution making in the Arab region as antic tactics resorted to by authoritarian regimes in order to solidify their rule (Brown, 2003). Contrary to this belief, this dissertation argued that constitution-making processes presented pacting moments, during which the different political groups negotiated their access to power. At the heart of these negotiations were the powers granted to the parliament. And while not all constitutional moments were unidirectional in terms of democratic development, the parliaments in the two case studies did gain de jure powers over time. Attributing this development solely to the regimes reduces the agency of the contenders, and minimizes their role in furthering the democratization process and empowerment of the parliament.

The main argument presented is that the variance of the de jure power of parliaments is related to the nature of the constitution making process itself. The hypothesis put forward in

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Chapter 3 highlights this argument; that is an inclusive constitution-making process positively impacts the de jure powers granted to parliament by the constitution. Inversely, a constitution- making process that is completely controlled by an existing regime or a single powerful group, without the representation of other groups in the process, will result in a decrease of the parliament’s powers. The underlying logic driving this argument is that the more contenders there is, the more likely the regime and the contenders will need to compromise to reach power sharing arrangements, which guarantees future access to decision making to the different groups.

Since the parliament is one of the few state institutions that can offer a platform for political participation to a diverse group of actors elected by the people, the contenders will want to increase its powers. To test this hypothesis, I created the de jure Power Index to measure parliament’s powers, and I also conducted a content analysis of all constitutions and constitutional amendments adopted in Lebanon and Morocco since the establishment of the modern state.

The results of the analysis provide evidence to support the stated hypothesis. The findings contribute to scholarship on constitution making through an exploration and theorizing on the relationship between the constitution making process and the range of powers granted to the parliament. It addresses a gap in the scholarship; since previous research surveyed in the chapters focused on constitution making, decision making around selection of a political system, and the executive-legislative relationship. Another contribution of this dissertation is that it addresses the need that for accurate measurements of parliamentary power, which is also expressed by Arter

(2007). The de jure Power Index presents a more fine-tuned measurement of parliamentary power, capturing the different dimensions of parliamentary power (legislative, oversight, autonomy, etc.) as stipulated in the constitution.

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The dissertation suggests that the de facto power of parliament, mainly its ability to carry out its legislative and oversight functions, is determined by three major variables: the nature of the executive-legislative relationship, the organizational capacity of the parliament, and the role and types of political parties represented within it. The analysis relied on two original datasets of all laws initiated or passed by parliament and questions addressed to the government in Lebanon during the time period of 1992-2014 and in Morocco from 1997-2016. Additionally, the author conducted more than forty interviews with parliamentarians, ministers, and parliamentary staffers, among others. The main findings indicate that both parliaments have gradually increased their de facto power over time in terms of their ability to initiate laws, question the government, and oversee the public budget, despite the negative impact of the relationship with the executive.

In Morocco, an executive, closely aligned with a powerful king, dominated parliament, and succeeded in centralizing the lawmaking role. The executive also succeeded in avoiding the parliament’s questions, despite the latter having the constitutional powers to hold the executive accountable. This situation exemplifies how having de jure powers does not necessarily imply having de facto powers. However, despite the negative role played by the executive, the parliament’s capacity to initiate laws and question the government increased over the years. This is an example of why de jure power is necessary, but not sufficient.

In Lebanon, the consociational nature of governance diminished the parliament’s legislative and oversight de facto powers. Parliamentarians argued that because of consociationalism, parties in parliament were less likely to amend draft laws submitted by the government, given that the majority of the parties represented in government were in agreement about these laws. Also members of parliament were less likely to hold their parties or their allies represented in government accountable, which weakened the role of the parliamentary

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opposition. This is one of the main reasons explaining the vast difference in the oversight performance of the parliaments in Lebanon and Morocco. Even if one is to account for the difference in terms of the number of members between the two houses (Morocco’s HoR is three times the size of the Lebanese HoR), the difference in terms of the HoR’s capacity to question the government is huge. For example, the Moroccan HoR addressed more than eleven thousand oral questions in the 2011 parliament alone, compared to around a total of 500 questions addressed by the Lebanese HoR between 1992 and 2014. However, the capacity of the Moroccan

HoR itself has also increased significantly over time despite the continued negative role of the executive, which raises the question of what other variables are at play affecting the parliament’s capacity, which resulted in this variance.

Previous scholarship alludes to the importance of the organizational capacity of parliaments, but does not theoretically tie it to the powers of the parliament. Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation present evidence of how increased organizational capacity can improve the power of the parliament. Organizational capacity is defined as the function of the degree of institutionalization of the parliament and the human and material resources available to it. The

Lebanese and Moroccan HoRs have gradually increased their organizational capacity within the last two decades. They developed their organizational structures, increased the number of staff, and introduced ICT to increase the efficiency of the parliament’s work. Parliamentarians and staffers interviewed attested to the positive impact these developments had on the capacity of

MPs to carry out their legislative and oversight functions, even though this capacity remains limited in comparison to more developed parliaments.

The chapters also argued that the parliament’s capacity to carry out its legislative and oversight functions hinges on the presence of large, cohesive, and institutionalized political

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parties that are closely connected to their constituents. Parties in the Arab region have historically faced several challenges, including the authoritarian conditions they operate in, their personalistic tendencies to be ‘top heavy’ and formed around charismatic leaders, their weak internal governance, and the fragmentation of the political party scene (Messara, 1996;

Suleiman, 2004; Echtay, 2002). Yet, despite their weaknesses, these parties continue to be the gatekeepers of elected political office. And once elected, they behave as legislative cartels, shaping policies though controlling who gets elected to positions of power within the parliamentary institution (such as committee chairs) and ensuring discipline within their ranks.

Both parliaments witnessed a slow shift towards a smaller number of groups represented in parliament. For example the Moroccan House of Representatives went from having sixteen parliamentary groups in the 1997 parliament to eight parliamentary groups in the 2011 parliament. Even in Lebanon, where parties continue to be aligned with strong confessional leaders, the influence of local notables somewhat decreased as they joined the ranks of stronger parties to guarantee a seat in the parliament. Parliamentary groups have also gradually shifted from loose electoral alliances to more cohesive groups with institutionalized practices, such as periodic meetings and administrative structures to support their MPs. Finally, one of the attributes, distinguishing parties better able to support their MPs, is the level of connectedness of the parties to the constituents. Parties with a strong connection their constituents were those with larger constituent bases, and were active in their districts and embedded in the society (for example, parties with ties to active civil society organizations). These parties were able to act as a mediator between the constituents and the MPs, on the one hand conveying the people’s needs and demands to MPs, who then voiced these demands in the laws they initiated and the questions they asked. In addition, parties taking up this role decreased the time MPs needed to spend with

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their constituents, which freed them to be more engaged in parliamentary work. These parties were also better equipped to support their MPs with resources and expertise MPs needed to effectively conduct their work.

This dissertation adopted a parliament-centric approach to studying parliamentary power, which departs from other scholarship in the field with an exclusive focus on executive-legislative relationship. It presented a more comprehensive understanding of the scope of parliamentary powers. For example, the majority of the scholarship surveyed in the chapters focused mainly on the policy making power of parliament and paid little or no attention to its ability to hold the executive accountable. Parliamentary accountability is an area that is surprisingly understudied, given its importance to democratic governance. The parliament’s capacity to oversee the executive, particularly in transitioning democracies, can contribute to holding powerful executives accountable for their actions and/or abuse of power, as well as ensures that executive policies correspond to the people’s needs and demands. It thus warrants further research from scholars studying parliaments.

This dissertation also indirectly addressed the representation function of parliament and its impact on parliament’s capacity. Both parliaments studied have shifted from being less representative to more representative over the years. As Chapter 2 demonstrates, this shift was the result of the liberalization process that increased freedom and fairness of the elections, and the election of parties, especially the opposition, to parliament. Chapters 4 and 5 focused on the effect of the entrance of new parties to parliament and the impact they had on its legislative and oversight capacities.

The case selection allowed for control for some exogenous factors that can impact parliaments, including cultural norms, the role of the military, and the level of economic

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development. However, one factor that was not addressed in detail is the impact of political stability on parliaments. The reason why this dissertation did not dwell on the impact of political stability is the assumption that liberalization and democratization processes can be marred by episodes of instability. Since this research focuses on parliaments in transitioning democracies, the objective was to understand how parliaments develop despite this instability and unfavorable conditions. The effect of instability was evident in the case of Lebanon, in particular, where continuous political crises and outbursts of civil unrest and violence witnessed since 2005, affected the parliament. However, despite these crises, parliamentarian’s capacity to initiate laws and participate in the budget process increased and the parliament was able to further develop its organizational structure.

This research attempts to answer the question of how and why parliamentary institutions develop in the context of transitioning democracies. This question was driven by a normative incentive, which is the hope that the research findings will help scholars, practioners and political actors better understand parliaments and contribute to their development and strengthening, especially in the Arab region. I expect the findings on the de jure power of parliament to be generalizable to other countries and regions, since the theory should hold true regardless of the conditions surrounding the constitution-making process. Simply put, more actors represented in the constitution-making process implies greater need for power sharing arrangements, therefore, actors are more likely to push for increasing the powers of parliament since it is a platform for participation of a diverse group of actors.

The findings related to the de facto powers of parliament on the other hand should be generalizable at least to the countries in democratic transition with active political parties and comparable resources to the cases studied. This implies that the theory presented on the factors

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determining parliamentary power may not be suited to explain the case of some of the Arab Gulf countries for instance that do not have political parties and that have abundant financial resources given that they are upper income countries (these countries include the United Arab Emirates,

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman). However, based on my work in parliamentary strengthening projects in Tunisia, Jordan, and Iraq among others in the region, I expect my theory can explain changes in parliamentary power in many other countries, in particular within the Arab region, since these countries share similar conditions as the case studies presented. For example, my initial findings from capacity assessments of the Tunisian and Jordanian parliaments indicate that my theory holds true in these countries. MPs and Staffers I interviewed in both countries reiterated the same causes that affect their ability to carry out their work, namely the role that parties play in parliament and the support they get from their parties, the impact of the organizational capacity of the parliaments, and the parliament’s relationship with the executive.

Both parliaments have also witnessed some development in their de facto abilities. For example, the 2010 Jordanian HoR addressed double the number of questions to the government as compared to the 2007 parliament. It also established the Integrity, Transparency and

Investigation Committee in 2014, which has the authority to oversee public institutions. By 2016 this committee had launched two investigative subcommittees on issues of corruption in the public sector. The Tunisian parliament, which was recently elected in 2014 following the

Jasmine revolution, established an ad-hoc committee for overseeing the public budget and fighting corruption. Both parliaments were in the process of adopting development strategies to improve their capacity, which included increasing the number of staff and material resources available to them, as well as enhancing the parliament’s transparency (such as allowing citizens

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and groups to attend plenary sessions and to submit petitions to the parliament). Last, but not least, recent elections brought new groups to parliament.

This dissertation presents a good first step towards more thorough research on parliaments in the Arab region. It suffers from many caveats and limitations that will hopefully be remedied in future research projects. These limitations and areas for future research are discussed below.

Limitations and Future Research

This dissertation adopts an elite-focused approach towards understanding the variance in parliamentary power. Change in parliamentary power is attributed to change in the political players and possible exogenous shocks to the institution. However, this study does not consider the impact of voters’ pressure on the choices and performance of MPs. For example, MPs may be moved to amend or reject a draft law or investigate the executive for a case of misconduct if the voters mobilize or strongly voice their opinions about a specific law or case. Therefore, future research may benefit from studying the instances of strong voters preferences and their impact on parliament’s de facto power.

Parliaments do not operate in a vacuum and are influenced by ongoing socio-political developments. Democratic transitions usually provide a larger margin of freedom for civil society, political parties, social movements and the media. This dissertation does not claim that these factors do not influence the overall power of the parliament, but it chooses to open the black box of parliaments and hone in on the processes and players within them. It addressed some of these exogenous variables briefly, such as the dependence of MPs on the media to pressure the government when needed. It also touched upon the growing role of civil society

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groups in the work of parliament whether by attending hearings or advising parliamentarians on public policies. The experience of civil society’s engagement with parliament is still relatively recent in the region, confined to the past few years. However it is a growing trend and merits further research in the future.

The legislative power of parliament is partly determined by the presence or absence of the executive decree power, which is the laws that the executive can issue without having to be adopted by the parliament. Chapter 3 found that the executive in both countries had decree powers. However, I did not address the impact of this decree power on parliament’s lawmaking capacity in this dissertation. The reason behind this omission is due to data limitations. At the time of completing this research, this data was not readily available for either country and collection was not feasible given time limitations. Therefore, the dissertation focused on the laws initiated by the parliament and those submitted to it by the government. However, future research should seek to quantify the executive’s decree powers, to determine to what extent is it used, and in what cases does the executive choose to use it to pass legislation without the approval of parliament.

This dissertation also showed that the Lebanese and Moroccan HoRs capacity to initiate laws gradually increased over time. However, it does not discuss the importance of the laws initiated nor the parliament’s ability to shape major public policies. For example, Chapter 4 did not measure the ‘importance’ of the laws, in terms of how many people affected or their political and socio-economic implications, which is important for better understanding of parliament’s capabilities as suggested by Loewenberg and Patterson (1979) and Arter (2007). An initial review of the titles of the bills proposed shows a large array of subjects and with varying degrees of importance, from issues as mundane as changing a village’s name to proposing freedom of access

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of information laws, which increases government transparency and contributes to democratic consolidation. It would be fruitful for future research to study the parliament’s capacity to initiate or amend “important” laws in particular.

This dissertation showed an increase in parliament’s capacity to question the government and hold it accountable. However, one limitation of this research is that it did not dwell on the effectiveness of this activity: What were the results of this oversight activity? Who was held accountable? Did the government change its behavior in response to the parliament’s oversight role? Did it affect the level of corruption for example? Stapenhurst and Pelizzo (2014) demonstrate that oversight activity does not necessarily imply oversight effectiveness, which is influenced by both parliamentary activity and exogenous factors such as level of democracy, social trust and the role of the media. Future research on parliaments, especially in the MENA region, should therefore address these questions, focusing on the effectiveness of parliament’s oversight role.108

The effect of professionalization on the de facto capacity of parliament as discussed by

Barkan (2009) was briefly examined in chapters 4 and 5, but was not fully explored. Chapters 4 and 5 examined such factors as incumbency and the professional and educational background of

MPs, which affects their capacity to effectively carry out their functions. Initial findings show that the educational levels of MPs in Lebanese HoR only slightly increased, with the percentage of MPs with a college degree increasing from 91% in the 2000 parliament to 97% in the 2009 parliament.109 In Morocco, there was a more noticeable increase of MPs with a university degree

108 Ogul, for example, defines parliamentary oversight as the behavior of legislators that results in impact on executive behavior; thus even if the parliament engages in oversight activity such as addressing a question, it is not considered to have overseen the government unless the government responds to the question and take the necessary action (Ogul, 1976, p.11).

109 Statistics provided the General Secretariat, House of Representatives, Lebanon.

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from 56% in the 1997 parliament110 to 72% in 2011 parliament.111 Chapters 4 and 5 showed that professionalized MPs, particularly in absence of strong parties, played an important role in bolstering the parliaments’ legislative and oversight capacity. However, this role diminished as stronger parties entered parliament. Nevertheless, the correlation between MPs professionalization and the parliament’s capacity to exercise its powers merits additional future research.

This dissertation briefly argued that the weak relationship between parliament and other oversight bodies, such as the Supreme Audit institutions, weakened the parliament’s capacity.

This dissertation did not study the capacities of these institutions and how they in turn affect the parliament. For example, stronger SAIs can help the parliament better oversee the government.

Modernized approaches to public finance adopted by the government can improve MPs’ capacity to scrutinize the budget and oversee government spending.112 Therefore, studying the impact of changes in other institutions on parliament should be another area for future research.

A final area for future research is the impact of parliamentary openness and transparency on parliamentary power. The Lebanese and Moroccan HoRs, along with other parliaments in the region, have taken steps towards enhancing their openness and transparency.

Parliaments broadcast their sessions on public media and publish their proceedings on their websites. They have also become more present on social media platforms. These steps are likely to increase citizens’ engagement with the parliament in the future, and can possibly remedy the

110 Parliamentary Proceedings of the Moroccan House of Representatives. Annual Publication. (1999)

111 Statistics provided the General Secretariat, House of Representatives, Morocco.

112 A line item budget for example, without supporting socio-economic impact reports are difficult for MPs to scrutinize and assess, while program based budgeting that are linked to medium term expenditure frameworks and government’s macro-policies provide MPs with a better understanding of the budget, and enable them to better scrutinize it.

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lack of public trust suffered by parliaments across the region. The global and regional rise of parliamentary monitors provides another potential avenue for increased transparency and accountability. By 2011, there were over 191 parliamentary monitoring organizations (PMOs), monitoring more than 80 national parliaments worldwide, according to a global survey published by the World Bank (WB) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) (Mandelbaum, 2011).

These PMOs serve a dual function: On the one hand, they provide voters with easy access to information about the performance of their representatives through publication and dissemination of data on MPs’ attendance rates and policy positions, among others; and on the other hand,

PMOs bring important issues debated in parliament to the attention of the constituents and can therefore, result in building public pressure on the government to act. In the MENA region, civil society organizations launched PMOs in several Arab countries, including Lebanon and

Morocco.113 Future research will need to examine the impact of parliamentary openness on parliamentary power in the region.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this dissertation sought to achieve three goals: The first is theoretical, and focuses on conceptualizing parliamentary power and identifying the causal mechanisms that result in its variation, particularly in the context of transitioning democracies. The second is methodological, focusing on how to measure such variation. And the third is political, aimed at

113 In Lebanon, an ngo (Nahwa Al-Muwatiniya) launched the “Lebanese Parliamentary Monitor” in 2006. Their website published reports on MPs and policy issues discussed in parliament (https://www.facebook.com/pg/Lpmonitor/about/?ref=page_internal). In Morocco, Simsim NGO launched “Nouabook” in 2014. Nouabook provides an interactive platform for citizens and MPs, where citizens can address their petitions and questions to their MPs, and MPs can involve their constituents in policy dialogue (http://www.nouabook.ma/ar/).

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determining whether parliaments in the Arab region developed despite the continued democratic deficit.

Despite its many limitations, this dissertation succeeds in demonstrating that some parliaments in the Arab region have moved beyond the rubberstamp role commonly attributed to them. The lack of data and the difficulty of accessing parliamentary institutions and their members have discouraged scholars in the past from studying these parliaments. This dissertation will hopefully lay the ground-work for multiple future research projects. It is my hope that the findings of this research provide insights to academics studying institutions and democratization, political actors, and practitioners who are working on strengthening the capacities of parliaments. For without strong functioning parliaments, countries across the Arab region have less of a chance of ending the democratic deficit and moving towards better governance.

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APPENDIX A

LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE OF PARLIAMENTS

Table 9: Legislative Performance of the Moroccan HoR by Parliamentary Group

Opposition Block Number of % of /Majority Member Seats114 Bills 1997-2002 Opposition Constitutional Union (UC) 19 13.5% Majority Renewal and Democratic Progress Block 14 4.60% (Progressive Socialist Party) Opposition Constitutional and Democratic Popular 9 2.80% Movement (Justice and Development later) Majority Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) 8 16.9% Majority National Rally of Independents (RNI) 7 15.5% Majority Istiqlal Block (P.I) 6 9.5% Majority Democratic Forces Front 4 4.00% Opposition Moroccan Authenticity and Social Justice 3 11.70% Coalition Coalition 3 Opposition Democratic and Social Movement (MDS) 2 9.80% Majority Coalition of Majority Groups 2 Opposition Coalition of Opposition Groups 1 Majority National Popular Movement (MNP) 0 5.80% Opposition Democratic Action Party 0 4.00% Majority Organization of Democratic and Popular 0 1.20% Action 2002-2007 Opposition Justice and Development Party (PJD) 25 12.9% Majority USFP 24 15.4% Majority PI 19 14.8% Majority Democratic Forces Front (FFD) 11 3.7% Majority Democratic Alliance Block 7 6.8% Majority United Socialist Left Party (PGSU) 6 0.9% Opposition Constitutional Union and Democratic Block 5 8.6% Majority Movement Block 4 13.8% Majority National Rally of Independents (RNI) 4 12.6% Majority Democratic Union (UD) 2 3.1%

114 The percentage of seats that each parliamentary group holds was calculated according to their memberships during the years 1997, 2002, 2007, 2011. The major groups did not witness significant change in the numbers of their members over the years. Members of smaller groups on the other hand were more fluid as they either defacted from existing groups or joined new ones.

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Coalition Coalition 5 Democratic and social Movement (MDS) 0 2.2% Freedoms Alliance (ADL) 0 1.2% Reform and Development Party (PRD) 0 0.9% Liberal Party (PML) 0 0.9% Democratic Party for Independence (PDI) 0 0.6% Environment and Development Party (PED) 0 0.6% Citizenship Forces Party (PFC) 0 0.6% National Ittihadi Congress (CNI) 0 0.3% Independents 0 3.1% 2007-2011 Majority Socialist Union of Popular Forces (U.S.F.P) 23 12.6% Opposition Justice and Development Party (PJD) 21 14.5% Majority Istiqlal (P.I.) 19 16% Majority Movement Block 17 9.8% Majority Democratic Progressive Forces Front 12 6.8% Majority National Rally of Independents (RNI) 4 12.0% Majority Constitutional Union 4 8.3% Coalition 3 Majority Modernity and Authenticity Block 2 15.4% Independents 0 2.50% Opposition Renaissance and Virtue Party 0 0.30% Democratic Left Alliance 0 1.20% 2011-2016 Majority Justice and Development Party 36 27.1% Opposition Socialist Union of Popular Forces (U.S.F.P) 34 10.9% Maj/Opp115 Istiqlal Party 33 15.4% Opposition Modernity and Authenticity Block (PAM) 23 12.4% Coalition Coalition of blocks 20 Majority Movement Block 18 8.4% Majority Progressive Democratic Block 8 5.3% Maj/Opp116 National Rally of Independents (RNI) 6 14.2% Majority Constitutional Union 2 5.8% Centrist Centrist Alliance Block 1 0.5%

115 Istiqlal Party was in the majority until October 2013, then they joined the opposition. They submitted fourteen member bills while they were in the majority and nineteen member bills when they moved to the opposition.

116 RNI was in the opposition until October 2013, then they joined the majority. They submitted three member bills when they were in the opposition, and another three when they became majority.

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Table 10: Legislative Performance of the Lebanese HoR by Parliamentary Group

Majority Block Bills % of /Opposition117 Initiated Seats118 1992-1996 Coalition 36 Majority Liberation Block (Tahrir) 19 13.3% Majority Metn and Jbeil MPs 15 4.7% Independents 14 22.7% Opposition Saving and Change (Inqath wal Taghyeer) 9 7.0% Majority Struggle Front (Jabhat al Nidal) 5 9.4% Majority Islamic Jamaaa 2 2.3% Majority Armenian MPs Block 2 4.7% Majority Waad Party 2 1.6% Majority Zahle MPs 2 3.1% Opposition Loyalty to Resistance (Wafaa lil 1 9.4% Moqawama) Majority Tripoli MPs Block 1 5.5% 1996-2000 Majority Liberation and Development Block 44 15.6% (Tahrir wal Tanmia) Coalition 41 Independents 18 18.8% Majority Struggle Front (Jabhat al Nidal) 6 8.6% Majority Loyalty to Resistance (Wafa lil 5 7.0% Moqawama) Majority National Solidarity Block (Tadamun 3 12.5% Watani) Opposition National Decision Block (Al Qarar Al 3 1.6% Watani) Majority Northern Metn Block 2 3.1% Majority Syrian Social Nationalist Party Block 2 3.9% (SSNP)

117 As stated above, parliamentary opposition was not present in the Lebanese parliament until 2005. Therefore the column for Majority/Opposition was left empty for the years 1992-2005.

118 The percentage of seats that the groups have are those during the years of 1992, 1996, 2000, 2005, and 2011. For the last parliament the number of seats of each parliamentary group in 2011 was used rather than 2009 (the year that the parliament was elected) given that the groups witnessed some change in 2011. The bulk of the bills were initiated after 2011, therefore using the 2011 composition of parliament more accurate. There were seven member bills submitted in 2010, the affiliation of the MPs who submitted them was calculated according to their 2011 membership in the parliamentary groups.

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Majority/Opposition119 Beirut Decision (Qarar Beirut) 2 7.0% Opposition Armenian MPs Block 0 5.5% Majority Development and Change Block (Inma' 0 6.3% wal Taghyeer) Opposition/Majority120 Saving and Change (Inqath wal taghyeer) 0 1.6% Majority Waad Party Block 0 2.3% Majority Kesrwan MPs Block 0 3.9% Majority Arab Baath Socialist Party 0 1.6% Majority Islamic Jamaaa 0 0.8% 2000-2005 Coalition 136 Majority Resistance and Development Block 57 14.1% (Moqawama wal Tanmia) Majority National Struggle Front (Jabhat Nidal 35 11.7% Watani) Independents 31 21.9% Majority Dignity Block (Karama) 31 13.3% Majority Hizbullah 21 9.4% Majority Dignity and Renewal Block (Karama wa 12 3.9% Tajadod) Majority Western Beqaa MPs Block 8 2.3% Opposition Armenian MPs Block 4 1.6% Majority Populist Block (Kutla Shaabiya) 4 1.6% Majority Arab Baath Socialist Party Block 4 2.3% Majority North MPs Block (Nowab Shmal) 4 6.3% Majority Metn Agreement Block (Wifaq Matni) 3 2.3% Majority Syrian Social Nationalist Party Block 3 3.1% (SSNP) Majority Populist Decision (Qarar Shaabi) 3 2.3% Majority Tripoli Coalition Block (Takatol Trabolsi) 2 2.3% Majority Lebanese Phalanges Party (Kataeb) 0 1.6% 2005-2009 Coalition 70 Opposition Development and Liberation (Tanmia Wal 49 11.7% Tahrir) Majority Future Block (Mustaqbal) 37 25% Opposition Free Patriotic Movement 33 11.70%

119 Was the majority until Salim El Hoss was appointed Prime Minister in December 1998.

120 Was in the opposition until Salim El Hoss was appointed Prime Minister in December 1998 then moved to the majority.

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Majority National Struggle Front and Democratic 14 14.1% Gathering (Jabhat Al Nidal Al Watani Wal Liqa Al Democrati) Independents 12 7.8% Opposition Loyalty to Resistance (Wafa' Lil 8 10.9% Moqawama) Opposition Arab Baath Socialist Party Block 4 0.8% Opposition Populist Block (Kitli Shaabiyi) 4 3.1% Majority Tripoli MPs (Takatol Trabolsi) 3 3.1% Majority Lebanese Forces 3 3.9% Opposition Armenian MPs 2 1.6% Majority Democratic Renewal (Tajadod Democrati) 1 0.8% Majority Lebanese Phalanges Party (Kataeb) 1 2.3% Majority Democratic Left (Yasar Democrati) 0 0.8% Opposition Syrian Social Nationalist Party Block 0 1.6% (SSNP)

2009-May 2014 Coalition 100 Opposition Free Patriotic Movement (Tayyar watani 46 14.1% horr) Opposition Development and Resistance Block 39 10.2% (Tanmia wal Tahrir) Majority Future Block (Mustaqbal) 36 20.3% Majority Lebanese Phalanges Party Block 20 3.9% Majority Independents121 20 9.4% Majority Lebanese Forces Block 17 3.9% Opposition Loyalty to Resistance Block (Wafa lil 11 9.4% Moqawama) Majority National Struggle Front (Jabhat al Nidal 12 5.5% Al Watani)122 Majority Armenian Agreement (Tawafoq Armani) 6 3.1% Opposition Baath Socialist Party 5 1.6% Majority Zahle MPs (Nowab Zahle) 4 3.1% Opposition Zgharta MPs (Lobnan Horr Mowahad) 2 3.1% Opposition Syrian Social Nationalist Party 2 1.6% Majority Free Patriotics (Wataniyoon Ahrar) 1 0.8% Majority Free Decision (Al Qarar Al Horr) 1 0.8%

121 Most of the independent MPs supported the majority even if they did not belong to a parliamentary groups.

122 Number of seats reflects that of 2011 after the National Struggle and Democratic Alliance block dissolved.

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Majority National Agreement (Wefaq watani) 0 1.6% Majority Unity Block (Al Tadamon) 0 1.6% Majority Michel El Morr Block 0 1.6% Majority Islamic Jamaa (Jamaa Islamiya) 0 0.8% Opposition Armenian MPs Block 0 1.6% Opposition Mountain’s Unity (Wehdet Al Jabal) 0 3.1%

214 APPENDIX B

PARLIAMENTARY STRENGTHENING PROJECTS IN LEBANON SINCE 2010

Table 11: Overview of Parliamentary Strengthening Projects in Lebanon Since 2010

Organization Project Budget Timeframe Major Focus Areas European Support to € 1, 700 000 June 2014 – Provide support in the following areas: Commission – Parliamentary June 2016 - Law-making process ENPI. Development in - Parliamentary Oversight Implemented by Lebanon 123 - Research and Policy Analysis Capacity consortium led by - Institutional Role the International Management Group UNDP – Lebanese Technical Support to US$ January 2011 - Increasing the participation of CSOs in Parliament the Lebanese 510,000(parlia – December parliamentary work. Parliament 124 ment 2016 - Producing knowledge products about several US$360,000, human rights issues. UNDP - E-Library database on experts and studies. contributed - Launching the Lebanese Parliamentary Internship US$150,000) program. Arab Inter- Arab Institute for N/A July 2011 - Conducting training and responding to requests for parliamentary Parliamentary Present assistance from Arab Parliaments. Union / Training and Legislative Studies125

123 Support to Parliamentary Development in Lebanon. TAS Europrojects. Available at: http://www.taseuro.com/en/ict/item/24-support-to-parliamentary- development-in-lebanon

124 Technical Support to the Lebanese Parliament Factsheet. UNDP. Beirut, 2014. Available at: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/Governance/FactSHeets/Parliament%2077103_Factsheet%20Sept%202014.pdf

125 Arab Parliamentary Institute website: http://arabparliamentaryinstitute.org/background/

European Union - Supporting €625,000 2011–2013 - Establish an Advisory Unit to provide technical Implemented by Democracy in (500,000 expertise to parliamentary committees. Support the Westminster Lebanon126 contributed by included peer exchanges between MPs from the UK, Foundation for EU) Lebanon, and between technical staff from Democracy Parliament and SAI. Westminster Supporting £142000 2016-2017 - Strengthen the effectiveness of Parliament in Foundation for committees (WFD Core carrying out its core functions to legislate and to Democracy (core- funding) oversee through increased committee support and funded establishing a model approach to committee work. programme) -Strengthen parliamentary staff services -Young people’s participation in inclusive political process and democratic practices will be supported by increasing trust between Parliament and youth and helping the parliament to better interact with youth, a key demographic. The Westminster 2009- 2012 Consortium The TWC programme in Lebanon aims at (TWC) strengthening the capacity of the parliamentary Programme led by officials and at increasing the medium of WFD cooperation and exchange of experience between the Lebanese and UK MPs in the field of parliamentary reporting, Human Rights, financial oversight and parliamentary procedures. Lebanese Contracting 2010 The Speaker appointed several experts to provide Parliament Technical Experts technical expertise needed.

126 Supporting Democracy in Lebanon. WFD / EU PROGRAMME 2011-12, Westminster Foundation for Democracy. Available at: http://www.wfd.org/upload/docs/EU-Lebanon%20website.pdf The European Union supports the Lebanese Parliament (01/02/2011), EU. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110131_en.htm

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APPENDIX C

ORGANOGRAM OF MOROCCAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2014)

Figure 6: Moroccan HoR – Organogram (2012)

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APPENDIX D

ORAL QUESTION ADDRESSED BY THE LEBANESE AND MOROCCAN HORS

Table 12: Moroccan HoR: Distribution of Oral Questions by Parliamentary Group

1997-2002127 2007-2011 2011-2016 Opp/ Block # of Oral Opp/ Block # of Oral OQ Opp/ Block # of Oral OQ Maj Questions Maj Questions Answered Maj Questions Answered Maj Istiqlal (P.I.) 736 Opp Justice and 1313 405 Maj Justice and 4262 897 Development Development Party (PJD) Party Maj Socialist Union 605 Maj Istiqlal (P.I.) 778 501 Opp Socialist Union 2066 441 of Popular Forces of Popular (USFP) Forces (U.S.F.P) Maj National Rally of 546 Maj Socialist Union 693 386 Opp Modernity and 1359 422 Independents of Popular Forces Authenticity (RNI) (U.S.F.P) Block (PAM) Opp Constitutional 544 Maj Modernity and 671 338 Maj/ Istiqlal Party 1223 575 Union (UC) Authenticity Opp128 Block Opp Moroccan 468 Maj Movement Block 627 361 Maj Movement 586 245 Authenticity and Block Social Justice Maj Democratic 436 Maj Constitutional 428 336 Maj Constitutional 462 199 Alliance Union Union Maj Renewal and 349 Maj Democratic 376 210 Maj/ National Rally 803 409 Democratic Progressive Opp129 of Independents Progress Block Forces Front (RNI)

127 Data on oral questions answered by the government in the 1997 HoR was not available at the time this research was drafted.

128 Istiqlal Party was in the majority until October 2013, then they joined the opposition.

129 RNI was in the opposition until October 2013, then they joined the majority. 218

Maj Democratic 244 Maj RNI+PAM 168 135 Maj Progressive 253 130 Forces Front Democratic Block Opp Democratic 241 Maj National Rally of 140 136 Centrist Alliance 121 50 Action Party Independents Block (RNI) NA Different groups 206 Democratic Left 28 19 Opp Labor Party 33 20 Alliance Opp Constitutional 184 Labor Party 18 7 and Democratic Popular Movement (Justice and Development later) opp Democratic and 167 Independents 5 0 social Movement (MDS) Maj Organization of 93 Democratic and Popular Action Maj Coalition 5 Opp Coalition 9 Independents 4 Total 4837

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Table 13: Lebanon Parliament: Oral Questions 1992-2012

Majority/ Block # of Questions & Majority/ Block # of Questions & Opposition Interpellations Opposition Interpellations 1992-1996 1996-2000 Opp Saving and Change (Inqath wal 56 Maj Independent 68 Taghyeer) Opp Independent 30 Opp Beirut Decision (Qarar Beirut)130 47 Maj Loyalty to Resistance (Wafaa lil 19 Opp Armenian MPs Block 40 Moqawama) Maj Armenian MPs Block 14 Maj Liberation and Development 32 (Tahrir wal Tanmia) Maj Independent 10 Maj Loyalty to Resistance (Wafa lil 28 Moqawama) Maj Metn and Jbeil MPs 6 Opp Saving and Change (Inqath wal 24 taghyeer)131 Maj Islamic Jamaaa 4 Opp Independents 22 Maj Struggle Front (Jabhat al Nidal) 4 Opp National Decision Block (Al Qarar 17 Al Watani) Maj Zahle MPs Block 3 Maj Struggle Front (Jabhat al Nidal) 14 Maj Liberation Block (Tahrir) 3 Coalition 2 Maj Zgharta MPs 2 Maj Development and Change (Inma' 2 wal Taghyeer) Maj Keserwan MPs 2 Maj Kesrwan MPs Block 1 Maj Bcharre MPs 1 Maj Syrian Social Nationalist Party 1 Block (SSNP) Maj Tripoli MPs Block 1

130 Qarar Beirut moved from the majority to the opposition in December of 1998, after Salim El Hoss replaced Rafiz Al Hariri as Prime Minister. In this table it is coded as the opposition since forty six out of the forty seven questions and interpellations that were addressed by the block were submitted after it joined the opposition.

131 Similarly, the Saving and Change block, which moved from the opposition to the majority in 1998, was coded as opposition since all the questions and interpellations it addressed were during its time in the opposition. 220

2000-2005 2005-2009 Maj Independent 20 Maj Future Block (Mustaqbal) 6 Maj Hizbullah 24 Opp Loyalty to Resistance (Wafa' Lil 6 Moqawama) Opp Armenian MPs Block 20 Opp Development and Liberation 5 (Tanmia Wal Tahrir) Maj Resistance and Development Block 14 Independents 5 (Moqawama wal Tanmia) Opp Independent 10 Opp Populist Block (Kitli Shaabiyi) 5

Coalition 10 Opp Free Patriotic Movement 2 Maj National Struggle Front (Jabhat Nidal 9 Maj National Struggle Front and 2 Watani) Democratic Gathering (Jabhat Al Nidal Al Watani Wal Liqa Al Democrati) Maj Populist Block (Kutla Shaabiya) 8 Opp Arab Baath Socialist Party Block 1 Maj Dignity Block (Karama) 7 Maj Democratic Renewal (Tajadod 1 Democrati) Maj Dignity and Renewal Block (Karama 6 2009-2012 wa Tajadod) Maj Tripoli Coalition Block (Takatol 6 Maj Lebanese Forces Block 13 Trabolsi) Maj North MPs Block (Nowab Shmal) 3 Maj Future Block (Mustaqbal) 7 Maj Populist Decision (Qarar Shaabi) 2 Independent 5 Maj Western Beqaa MPs Block 2 Opp Free Patriotic Movement (Tayyar 4 watani horr) Maj Syrian Social Nationalist Party Block 1 Maj Zahle MPs (Nowab Zahle) 4 (SSNP) Maj Free Decision (Al Qarar Al Horr) 1 Maj Lebanese Phalanges Party Block 1 Opp Loyalty to Resistance Block (Wafa 1 lil Moqawama)

221

Table 14: Morocco HoR: Oral Questions by Sector 2007-2016

2007-2011 2011-2016 Sector Questions Answered Sector Questions Answered Interior (has jurisdiction over 735 192 Interior (has jurisdiction over 4136 1569 municipal affairs and national municipal affairs and national security) security) Education 495 255 Education 2779 1936 Agriculture 431 195 Transportation, Equipment, and 2636 2425 Logistics Health 416 299 Prime Minister's Office 2023 1414 Transportation, Equipment, and 415 193 Health 1938 1863 Logistics Economy and Finance 306 115 Water and Environment 1890 1592 Housing and Urbanism 260 157 Agriculture and fisheries 1455 929 Water and Environment 192 109 Housing and Urbanism 1177 524 Justice 189 106 Women and Social development 1020 887 Employment 185 133 Economy and Finance 823 594 Energy and Natural Resources 176 136 Industry and Trade 801 686 Youth and Sports 173 106 Justice and civil liberties 800 681 Economic Affairs 164 124 Youth and Sports 748 675 Industry and Trade 156 108 Religious Property (Awqaf) 724 546 Foreign Affairs 153 83 Energy and Natural Resources 667 405 Social Development 149 103 Higher education and research 561 212 Public Sectors 121 64 Employment and Social affairs 555 416 Religious Property (Awqaf) 116 69 Culture 384 97 Moroccan Diaspora 82 52 Governance and public affairs 325 248 Communications 80 62 Tourism 285 249 Tourism 74 50 Administrative Reform 247 193 222

Culture 71 37 Executive Relationship with 246 173 Parliament and CSOs Parliament-Executive 52 17 Foreign Affairs 158 73 Relationship Foreign Trade 33 14 Communications 138 111 Artisanal crafts and industry 29 17 Artisinal crafts and industry 105 384 Prime Minister's Office 23 1 Moroccan Diaspora 96 58 Local Development 22 16 National Defense 79 67 Government's General Secretariat 4 1 Budget 30 1 Government's General Secretariat 24 15 Foreign Trade 10 8

Table 15: Lebanon HoR: Questions by Sector 1992-2012

Sector 1992 1996 2000 2005 2009 Total

Finance 12 56 25 3 3 99

Interior and Defence (Municipal affairs, 23 38 20 3 11 95 security and defense)

Health 4 39 5 7 1 56

Telecommunication 9 19 16 1 3 48

Justice 13 10 12 5 5 45

223

Economy and Development 12 20 11 0 0 43

Public Works 8 16 8 3 3 38

Energy and Natural Resources 9 19 2 0 3 33

Prime Minister 5 11 2 5 4 27

Social Affairs (displaced, gender, social 14 7 4 2 0 27 security, population)

Education 6 9 9 1 0 25

Environment 6 9 6 1 0 22

Agriculture 3 13 4 1 0 21

Transportation 6 12 1 1 0 20

Administration Reform 10 6 0 0 0 16

Media 1 14 0 0 0 15

Foreign Affairs 2 4 7 0 2 15

Labor 1 11 0 0 1 13

Trade 2 4 3 0 0 9

224

Culture and Tourism 5 0 3 0 0 8

Executive Legislative Relation 1 1 3 0 0 5

Industry 3 0 0 0 0 3

Postal service 0 3 0 0 0 3

Youth and Sports 0 1 1 0 0 2

225

226

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