Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments

Ukraine in Crisis WP Challenges of Developing a New Political Culture

Steffen Halling and Susan Stewart S

Ukraine is currently experiencing its worst crisis since obtaining independence in 1991. Violent escalation in costing dozens of lives, separatist endeavours in Crimea and instability in the eastern provinces result not only from Russia’s irre- sponsible great-power politics, but also from an elite prioritising its own self-interest. ’s corrupt and increasingly authoritarian regime was merely the most extreme expression yet of a political culture dedicated to serving special interests with no heed to good governance. With popular hopes of meaningful political change already dashed once after the Orange Revolution, how Ukrainian politicians handle their power now and in the future will be absolutely crucial.

In view of the broad economic and security- ferent challenge to external actors than related implications of the Crimea crisis would the case of a disagreement over the for the post- states and the European specifics of planned reforms. In Ukraine a Union, it is easy to lose sight of domestic substantive dimension has yet to be intro- political developments in Ukraine. While duced into politics. To date politics has the Ukrainian government can plausibly been shaped more by intrigues and special claim that other concerns must take a back interests than by genuine debate about seat for the moment, the ruling elite is in different societal models or the potential fact already establishing particular forms consequences of signing the Association of power. Both Brussels and Ukrainian civil Agreement with the EU. society actors should follow domestic devel- In many respects Ukraine is still stuck opments very carefully in order to prevent where it was at the beginning of the trans- a continuation of harmful patterns dating formation phase in 1991. In some ways the back at least to the presidency of Leonid situation has even worsened. This is true Kuchma (1994–2005). not only for the quality of political actors, The key to a genuine new beginning in but also for the efficiency and relevance of Ukraine lies with its political elites, who the still Soviet-style bureaucracy. Whenever must fundamentally change their attitudes fundamental political choices have had to both power and society. The circum- to be made, such as drafting or amending stances also represent an essentially dif- the constitution or electoral legislation, the

Steffen Halling is Project Associate in SWP’s and Eurasia Division SWP Comments 18 Dr. Susan Stewart is Deputy Head of SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division April 2014

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elite has generally served the short-term only the Fatherland Party and Svoboda political needs of individuals or small were represented in the new cabinet (along- groups and paid scant attention to the side a number of unaffiliated ministers). country’s long-term interests or to develop- The composition of the government is ing an understanding of the public good. problematic for two reasons. Firstly, Vitali Laws have been manipulated or selectively Klitschko’s Ukrainian Democratic Alliance applied in order to satisfy special interests for Reform (UDAR) is not on board, suggest- and shut out opposition figures. Instead of ing a growing rift between UDAR and the gradually improving the efficiency and pro- Fatherland Party. This rift has been further fessionalism of administrative structures, manifested by Klitschko’s decision to with- they have been abused for private ends. draw from the presidential race and give This is why it is now vital to establish a his support to (see below, culture in (and elsewhere) that p. 3). It also reflects a fundamental weak- facilitates and fosters substantive debate. ness of UDAR, which is not well-established Its purpose must be to prepare and initiate in the regions and apart from Klitschko has public-minded reforms in core areas. The no well-known figures who could have filled government needs to demonstrate its wil- significant cabinet posts. Parliamentary co- lingness to seek compromise and operate operation between the former opposition inclusively. Given that this would represent parties is thus already crumbling. a rupture with their previous socialisation Secondly, and much more problematic and experience, it will be an enormous with respect to establishing a new more challenge for Ukrainian politicians. The inclusive political culture, the government current elite is under pressure to make includes virtually no representative figures hasty decisions, on which the international with whom the mass of citizens in the east- community also insists. But in the present ern and southern regions could identify. phase the process counts for as much as Presenting the nominated ministers to the the outcome. In the past, severely defective Maidan before the vote in parliament repre- decision-making processes often had deci- sented a strong message to the east and sive and negative repercussions on out- south that the interests of those who failed comes. That applies both to law-making and to accept the Maidan movement were going to executive decision-making. If the new to be ignored. Three ministers come direct- leaders fail to eliminate these deficits in the ly from the ranks of that movement: Oleh first phase of their rule, there is a danger Musiy for health, Yevhen Nyshchuk for cul- that they will revert to the old problematic ture, and for youth and behaviour patterns. sport, whereby the latter two undeniably lack political experience and expertise. Furthermore, the right-wing nationalist Domestic Political Developments in Svoboda initially supplied three ministers, the Post-Yanukovych Phase for defence, agriculture and ecology, as well When Viktor Yanukovych fled from office as one of the three deputy prime ministers. at the end of February 2014, the Ukrainian (The defence minister, Ihor Teniukh, has parliament had no option but to respond since been replaced by Mykhailo Koval, who rapidly. After Yanukovych failed to keep has no party affiliation.) Svoboda was able the promises made in the agreement nego- to capitalise on good results in the 2012 tiated with the participation of three EU parliamentary elections and its presence on foreign ministers on 21 February 2014, op- the Maidan. However, its electoral success position leaders felt released from any obli- stemmed largely from its ability to mobilise gations they had undertaken in the same a protest vote that was equally dissatisfied context. Instead of the “government of with the government and the opposition. national unity” laid down in the agreement, Since entering parliament Svoboda’s popu-

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larity has fallen steadily. Even its leader e.g. the composition of local election com- and presidential hopeful missions. currently enjoys only very weak support A free and fair election would be an im- (between 1 and 3 percent depending on the portant sign that the political culture is poll consulted). Right-wing extremists and changing, and leaving behind the Yanu- ethno-nationalist currents are almost in- kovych era in which elections were increas- discernible in Ukrainian society. ingly manipulated. However, the first acts It remains unclear why the government of the Ukrainian parliament after the over- calls itself “transitional” and how long it throw were not auspicious. During the will actually remain in office. After the re- process of deposing Yanukovych, the con- instatement of the constitution of 2004, a stitutional impeachment process was new government will not automatically have grossly abridged. Leading representatives of to be formed following the presidential elec- Ukrainian civil society have already flagged tion planned for 25 May, although this may other violations of parliamentary proce- in fact occur. And while early parliamen- dure, such as the dismissal of serving judges tary elections have been discussed, no deci- by parliament. A recently passed law on sion about holding them has been taken. lustration proceedings for judges has been A total of 23 candidates have now de- criticised by human rights organisations clared their intention to run. According for being overly broad in its reasons for to the latest polls Poroshenko, an oligarch allowing lustration and thereby opening who publicly supported the Maidan pro- to the door to politically biased decisions. tests (and is known as the “chocolate king” The government is also in the process of for his confectionery empire) has the most resuming old patterns of behaviour. Repre- support, followed by , sentatives of the Yanukovych regime have leader of the Fatherland Party, and Serhiy been summoned for questioning by the Tyhypko, who in recent years has led a prosecutor general, and some detained, moderate section of the apparently for political reasons. One of focused on economic issues. He is running these is . However, he has independently as a result of the decision of not been prevented from running for presi- the Party of Regions to nominate Mykhailo dent. His close confidant Hennadyj Kernes, Dobkin, former governor of the the mayor of Kharkiv, is kept under house region, as its presidential candidate. Current- arrest at night but allowed to carry out his ly Tymoshenko and Tyhypko are battling mayoral duties during the day. More troubl- for second place in the polls, while Dobkin ing is an incident in which three members has only low support. Much can change of the Svoboda Party used violence to force before the election date, but currently most the head of the national television super- observers believe the main contest will be visory body to resign, supposedly for allow- between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko. The ing pro-Russian material to be broadcast central government faces an uphill struggle (see also below). How the General Prosecu- to guarantee sufficient stability for properly tor (also a member of Svoboda) deals with conducted elections in all the regions (with the investigation will be a test of whether the exception of Crimea, which is already both the procuracy and the Svoboda Party beyond its control). Although Ukraine has are able to handle conflicts in a profession- already acquired a great deal of experience al manner. in holding elections, and Ukrainian civil society is well-equipped for the tasks of election monitoring, the new Central Elec- The Role of the Oligarchs in the tion Commission is still inexperienced and New Power Structure past OSCE reports suggest that certain A symbiotic relationship between economy aspects of the electoral law are problematic, and politics characterises Ukrainian politi-

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cal culture, which is largely shaped by the parliamentarians they controlled and special interests. Under conditions of wide- in media reporting. At the same time, the spread corruption and inadequate rule events of past weeks also demonstrate that of law, the reciprocal interdependence the oligarchs’ political allegiances are fluid. of economy and politics is regulated by In fact, the collapse of Yanukovych’s inter- patron-client relationships. A particular nal power base can also be attributed to role here falls to the oligarchs, whose the defection of individual oligarchs. But relevance has both political and economic fading loyalty to one regime did not mean implications that must be factored into that they were willing to renounce their the equation. political influence. Instead their political Oligarchs are businesspeople whose positioning is guided by cost-benefit cal- great wealth permits them to exert in- culations. One core question concerning fluence on the political system and its future developments is thus how the rela- decision-making processes to further their tionship between the political and eco- own advantage. As a rule this occurs infor- nomic elites will evolve. mally, for example through control of The new government’s immense de- groups of parliamentarians and by funding pendence on the loyalty of the oligarchs, political parties. But control of the mass especially in the eastern parts of the coun- media (which become particularly relevant try where it possesses precious little influ- at election time) is also an integral com- ence, was revealed immediately after it ponent of the oligarchs’ power resources. took office. In order to calm the situation Although the oligarchs do contribute to and rebuff external destabilisation moves, the political process by influencing differ- two oligarchs were entrusted with the gov- ent camps, they simultaneously erode the ernorships of Dnipropetrovsk and . transparency of decision-making procedures Ihor Kolomojs’kyj and Serhij Taruta were and manipulate democratic institutions. recruited on the basis that securing terri- The oligarchs have succeeded in estab- torial integrity and national unity lay in lishing monopoly structures and bringing the interests of both sides. But this depend- entire production chains under their con- ence on the oligarchs undermines the trol to achieve higher profits than they freedom of choice and credibility of the would under conditions of fair competi- political leadership and obstructs the tion. Alongside their influence on the po- fundamental transformation of the politi- litical and legal environment, their privi- cal system. Nonetheless, and despite great leged access to state resources has also scepticism, in the current crisis situation proven especially lucrative in relation to the population appears to tolerate the privatisations and public procurement. direct inclusion of oligarchs in matters of Because the oligarchs prioritise short-term government. profits over long-term modernisation, past reform processes advanced only to the extent that they matched their interests. The Ruling Elite and In this context it is especially difficult for Regional Differences small and medium-sized enterprises to Developments in Crimea have shown operate profitably. By influencing the deci- Ukrainians and outside actors just how sive underlying conditions for business salient regional differences can become. activity, the oligarchs also have an impact One reason the situation was able to esca- on Ukraine’s attractiveness to investors. late so rapidly was because Ukrainian Most of the oligarchs backed Yanukovych politicians have spent the past 23 years to the end and supported his authoritarian playing up regional differences for the sake and repressive leadership style. That was of electoral advantage, and have failed to clearly evident in the voting behaviour of work towards an overarching Ukrainian

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identity. Although more than two decades However, many Ukrainian politicians of living in a shared state have engendered appear oblivious to the need for persuasion a certain form of common identity, there in the eastern regions. Not only, as already is still a vast gap between foreign policy outlined, is the new government less than orientations in the eastern and western inclusive, but one of the very first decisions regions. Of course east and west are both by parliament after the overthrow of Yanu- internally heterogeneous, and the conven- kovych was to revoke an amendment to the ient east-west scheme also neglects the cen- language law recognising Russian (and the tral regions, which occupy an intermediate languages of other ethnic minorities) as position both in linguistic/cultural terms an official language at the regional level. and with respect to foreign policy attitudes. Although Acting President Oleksandr The events in Crimea not only underline Turchynov declined to sign the measure, ’s determination to hold the vote itself had already sent a negative onto levers of influence in Ukraine, which message to the numerous Russian-speaking leads him to seek to destabilise the new inhabitants of the east and south. On 5 government in Kyiv at any price. They also March 2014 the national parliament regis- make it abundantly clear that Ukrainian tered a draft law on accession to NATO. politicians have made woefully inadequate Such a law would strongly polarise the efforts to foster national cohesion and are country, where attitudes to NATO are dia- now paying the price for their failure. It metrically opposed in east and west. These was thus possible to inspire many inhabi- and other proposals (such as banning tele- tants of Crimea with the prospect of a vision channels broadcast from Russia or closer relationship with , and even temporarily closing the border to Russia) that of annexation to Russia. only heighten the mistrust of those who Thus one of the foremost priorities of feel excluded by the new rulers and feed the new Ukrainian government must be resentments that Russia can exploit to to convince the population in the east and mobilise parts of the population for its own south of the country that it also represents ends. This in turn increases the likelihood their interests. That would be a step on of a creeping Russian intervention in the the road to a political culture in which wil- eastern provinces. lingness to communicate and to compro- mise plays an important role. Now that the Russian occupation has made the situation Channelling Civil Society Protest in Crimea too unstable, such attempts The protests that erupted in Kyiv at the end should be directed instead in particular of November 2013 demonstrated the impor- towards the eastern regions bordering Rus- tance and influence of Ukrainian civil soci- sia. They differ significantly from Crimea: ety. The protest movement still remains Firstly, they are more Ukrainian in both present with its general demands for rule of linguistic and cultural respects. Secondly, law, transparency and . After the they have no significant tradition of sup- removal of the Yanukovych regime, it seeks port for independence or accession to above all lasting change in the country’s Russia (although the majority do desire dominant political culture. close relations with Russia, including join- The general level of protest potential ing its customs union with Belarus and within society and the capacity to mobilise Kazakhstan). Such preferences are certainly opposition groups – both characteristic of instrumentalised by Russia, by Russian the country’s pluralism – already distin- media and in direct intervention by Russian guished Ukraine from other countries in activists on the ground, as the recent occu- the region. But the Maidan protest move- pation of governmental buildings in Kharkiv, ment stands out from the classical post- Donetsk and demonstrates. Soviet electoral revolutions of the kind

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Ukraine itself experienced almost ten years take the significance of the protest move- earlier in the course of the Orange Revo- ment into account and concede greater lution. The “” movement ini- influence and responsibility to civil society. tiated by students and intellectuals origi- But both forms of direct participation in nally sought a specific change in govern- executive power structures by the Maidan ment foreign policy: the signing of the EU- movement are also associated with prob- Ukraine Association Agreement, which had lems of legitimacy. come to be seen as a symbol of modernisa- The Maidan phenomenon has tempo- tion and progress. It only gradually turned rarily eclipsed the classical distinction into a resistance movement against the between parliamentary opposition and Yanukovych regime after the state security government in Ukraine’s competitive organs attempted to violently suppress it. authoritarian political system. The political In the end the movement even reached landscape has become foggier. The protest the eastern and southern regions, with the movement’s demand for a “reboot” of the effect of fostering both national cohesion political system with lustration to guaran- and the emergence of a civic, i.e. politically tee the integrity of the political leader- based identity. Both the concrete demands ship will maintain grassroots pressure on of the protesters and the instruments the ruling elite and contains potential for deployed to achieve them generated their further protests. This potential is already own momentum: The protests grew mas- being realised to some extent, for example sively in response to intensifying state when parts of the Maidan movement repression, while their trajectory also demanded a criminal investigation against reflected the heterogeneity of the move- a Svoboda deputy who took the law into his ment. own hands and forced the head of the state From the outset the established opposi- television supervisory body to write a letter tion parties Fatherland, UDAR and Svoboda of resignation. The key question concerns found it difficult to dispel the protesters’ the future relationship between civil soci- mistrust and gain a foothold on the Maidan. ety and the elite. There is a need to clarify Fractures in the interdependent relation- how greater and more effective civil society ship between parliamentary opposition and participation can be ensured, and whether civil society were exposed whenever con- the elite in fact desire such participation at crete decisions about actions to be taken all. In all events, achieving more transpar- needed to be made. Regular public meet- ency will be decisive. ings (veche councils) served as venues for forming opinion and legitimised the activities of the opposition leadership. Options for Germany and the The newly founded Maidan People’s Union European Union brings together established politicians Supporting Ukraine presents external and activists and represents a formalised actors with a dilemma. On the one hand, attempt to find a binding framework for Ukraine’s economy is heading for collapse the heterogeneity of the protest movement and requires immediate assistance. And and lend it influence and representation. the Crimea crisis has created a series of Maidan representatives who gained popu- additional problems, not all of which the larity in the course of the protests were also European Union is in a position to respond included in the new government, partially to. On the other hand, there is a consider- as a response to the pressure of “the street”. able danger that the new Ukrainian leader- The establishment of a national guard in- ship could revert to old habits. The flood of tegrating members of the self-defence units support it has received could easily give the that emerged in the course of the protests ruling elite the impression that the West can also be understood as an attempt to places virtually no conditions on the assis-

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tance provided, or that the danger pres- suspension of the rules laid down in the ented by Russia’s intervention divests it Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. Visa-free of the necessity to observe any such con- travel would apply for a limited period that ditions. How can the European Union and would only be extended if the remaining Germany stabilise Ukraine economically steps required under the action plan are and at the same time persuade the Ukrain- implemented. ian elite to improve its governance? With respect to the Association Agree- The developments described above show ment it would make sense for Ukraine to that a reversion to the previous political formulate proposals on the sequence in culture in Ukraine is all too likely. Some which reforms and harmonisation with EU indicators already point in that direction, standards are to occur. That would force but it is still too early to speak of a stable key figures in the Ukrainian elite to address trend. Germany and the European Union the question of priorities for the country’s have many possibilities to counteract the future development. EU officials could consolidation of such a trend, and thus monitor the process in order to ensure that © Stiftung Wissenschaft und to avoid a repetition of the trajectory that it reflects the needs of large parts of the Politik, 2014 followed the Orange Revolution. population rather than individual prefer- All rights reserved It will be important to provide the sup- ences. But the limited capacities of the These Comments reflect port offered to Ukraine in stages. In the Ukrainian administrative apparatus will solely the authors’ views. initial phase immediate aid should be sup- need to be taken into consideration. Agree- SWP plied without tough conditions in order to ments on priorities and capacities should Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ensure a minimum of stability. But it must ideally be reached before the economic part German Institute for be made clear that after this short phase of the agreement is signed. Such a process International and Security Affairs funding flows and conditions placed on would convey to the Ukrainian elite that it other forms of support will be strictly bears primary responsibility for implemen- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 monitored. That will protect the European tation, and thus significantly strengthen 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Union from accusations of double stan- its sense of ownership. That would create Fax +49 30 880 07-100 dards. At the same time, and even more a good starting point for moving on to www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] importantly, it will help the new ruling the second phase, in which the European elite to develop a more responsible style of Union’s monitoring and control capacities ISSN 1861-1761 governing. In the medium and long term would have to be effectively and consistent- Translation by Meredith Dale this contribution will be just as important ly deployed. (Updated English version of as the financial assistance already in the In this second phase the European Union SWP-Aktuell 15/2014) pipeline. If Germany and the European should cooperate closely with Ukrainian Union pursue this approach they can count civil society actors from all parts of the coun- on the support of large parts of Ukrainian try, who will quickly recognise if the elite civil society, which will take a close interest fall back into old habits. Joining forces in in the activities of the new rulers. this way will enhance the likelihood that During the first phase clearly encourag- real change in the political culture of the ing signals should be sent not only to Ukrainian elite can be achieved. the elite but also to Ukrainian society. The courageous contribution of those whose persistent protests toppled an extremely corrupt regime deserves acknowledgement, but the positive message should be directed to all Ukrainian citizens. It could consist in offering Ukraine an explicit perspective of EU accession. More tangible would be visa- free entry for short trips to the European Union, perhaps in the form of a temporary

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