The Causes and Effects of Leaks in International Negotiations
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International Studies Quarterly (2019) 00,1–16 The Causes and Effects of Leaks in International Negotiations Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqz048/5544868 by McGill University Libraries, [email protected] on 02 September 2019 M ATTHEW C ASTLE Victoria University of Wellington AND K RZYSZTOF J. PELC McGill University International negotiations are founded on secrecy. Yet, unauthorized leaks of negotiating documents have grown common. What are the incentives behind leaks, and what are their effects on bargaining between states? Specifically, are leaks offensive or defensive: are they intended to spur parties to make more ambitious commitments, or are they more often intended to claw back commitments made? We examine these questions in the context of trade negotiations, the recurring form of which affords us rare empirical traction on an otherwise elusive issue. We assemble the first dataset of its kind, covering 120 discrete leaks from 2006 to 2015. We find that leaks are indeed rising in number. Leaks are clustered around novel legal provisions and appear to be disproportionately defensive: they serve those actors intent on limiting commitments made. The European Union (EU) appears responsible for the majority of leaks occurring worldwide. Using party manifesto data to track changing ideological positions within the EU, we find that the occurrence of leaks correlates with opposition to economic liberalization within the average EU political party. Moreover, leaks appear effective in shifting public debate. We examine trade officials’ internal communications and media coverage in the wake of a specific leak of negotiations between Canada and the EU. A given negotiating text attracts more negative coverage when it is leaked than when the same text is officially released. In sum, political actors leak information strategically to mobilize domestic audiences toward their preferred negotiating outcome. Introduction salient. What are the motivations for these targeted leaks, and what effect do they have on bargaining outcomes? Leaks Much of politics is designed to be hidden from public view. can have profound effects on bargaining: a single leak in Citing commercial interests, national security, or diplomatic the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) practice, governments purposefully keep a significant part negotiations is largely to blame for having turned public of their activity from their own audiences. But the walls of- opinion against the deal. At a time when global integration ten prove porous: private information gets leaked. This may is increasingly politicized, what can a better understanding be especially true during times of political upheaval and of leaks reveal about the politics of international negotia- discord. tions? The answer, we argue, shares much in common with The administration of US President Trump, for instance, explanations behind the White House leaks. has been plagued by leaks. Investigations into leakers have Far from being independent, one-off events, our claim reportedly tripled compared to the prior administration.1 In is that leaks during international negotiations are strategic September 2017, National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and that this makes them analytically tractable. We begin proposed a government-wide crackdown on unauthorised by striking a distinction between offensive and defensive leaks. disclosures not only of classified information, but also of Offensive leaks occur when a party leaks information to get controlled unclassified information. Tellingly, this antileak the opposing negotiating party to concede to more, as when memo was itself leaked to the press.2 Leaks from the bringing to light an opposing party’s intransigence. Defen- Trump administration reveal a divided White House. As one sive leaks take place when the leaked information is meant seasoned Republican strategist suggests, “Trump’s White to hinder negotiations, as when revealing a position or con- House is not leaky because of a few bad apples. The no. 1 cession that will prove unpopular. Both types of leaks aim reason why it leaks is because his team lacks unity ...many of to mobilize domestic audiences in order to place political the leaks are about the very staff infighting that is causing pressure on negotiators. Offensive leaks seek to spur; defen- the leaks.”3 sive leaks seek to spoil. In both cases, they are a means for The international setting is proving just as porous. In dissatisfied individuals to bring the outcome of negotiations international negotiations, especially, leaks of draft texts, closer to their own ideal by mobilizing a sympathetic audi- chapters, or negotiating positions have become increasingly ence, either foreign or domestic. We use these insights to try and predict the occurrence of Matthew Castle is a Lecturer in International Relations in the School of leaks in the empirical setting that has witnessed the great- History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations at Victoria Uni- est number of discrete leaks in recent years: international versity of Wellington. Krzysztof J. Pelc is an associate professor and William Dawson Scholar in the trade negotiations. No major trade accord has been ne- political science department at McGill University. gotiated without its share of leaks, though there is signif- Authors’ note: We thank participants at APSA 2016 Annual Meeting and sem- icant variation in the number and extent of those leaks inars at McGill University for most helpful comments, and Brianna Brown and by agreement. We collect a comprehensive record of all Sean Nossek for excellent research assistance. the leaks of documents in trade negotiations over the last 1Savage and Sullivan (2017). decade, from 2006 to 2015, amounting to 120 discrete cases 2Yglesias (2017). 3Conant (2017). of leaked documents. Because trade negotiations deal with Castle, Matthew, and Krzysztof J. Pelc. (2019) The Causes and Effects of Leaks in International Negotiations. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1093/isq/sqz048 © The Author(s) (2019). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] 2 The Causes and Effects of Leaks in International Negotiations recurring issues, these data offer us unprecedented insight but not others, they may increase the odds of mobilization into the motives behind, and the effects of, leaks in bargain- against an agreement that could, in aggregate, benefit the ing between states. median voter. In this way, leaks do increase transparency of Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqz048/5544868 by McGill University Libraries, [email protected] on 02 September 2019 The results are striking. First, the data confirm that the the negotiating process, but they may also end up blocking number of leaks is indeed increasing over time during the socially beneficial reforms. last decade. Secondly, from descriptives of the leaked doc- uments alone, we find that the European Union (EU) ap- A Theory of Leaks in International Negotiations pears responsible for the majority of leaks occurring world- wide. And the frequency of those leaks is also increasing, The Role of Secrecy even accounting for the number of EU trade negotiations. 5 This suspicion is consistent with widespread beliefs about International negotiations are founded on secrecy. Parties how the structure of the EU and its emphasis on trans- keep their positions from one another and jealously guard parency within the negotiating process make it especially the offers and demands made during negotiations from 4 their respective domestic audiences until a final outcome is prone to leaks. 6 We further test this belief by turning to party-manifesto reached. Most plainly, each party in a negotiation stands to data. The occurrence of leaks attributable to the EU appears gain if it can keep its allowable set of bargaining outcomes highly correlated with opposition to economic liberalization private, so that it may appear more intransigent than it is within the average EU political party: more left-leaning posi- and extract greater concessions from the opposing side. But tions among European parties make leaks significantly more secrecy does not only help one party at the expense of the likely. We also find that as the divide between Right and Left other; it may also increase the odds of a deal being reached. Of the welfare-enhancing reasons for secrecy in negotia- increases, so does the incidence of leaks. As in the domestic 7 setting, when European politics are more polarized, leaks in tion, issue linkage may be the most common. Governments international negotiations grow more common. rarely negotiate a single issue on a one-dimensional spec- We also derive expectations over the content of leaks. trum, like a buyer and a seller bargaining over the price Most leaks are targeted; they do not contain an entire of a house. Most often, a number of issues are linked to- agreement, but some small portion of it. What explains gether, such that concessions that matter to one side can be which parts of negotiated agreements get leaked? Reason- exchanged against different concessions that matter to the ing through the incentives underlying leaks, we argue that, if other. Governments may agree to give in on one issue, if leaks are strategic denouncements, they should target those they can secure some sizeable advantage in another. In this way, the odds of achieving agreement increase when many areas where they will be most effective in shifting debate. 8 As a result, we expect to see more leaks in the “unsettled” issues are combined. But if each concession is made known areas of the international trade and investment regime, in as soon as it is offered, domestic interest groups will mobi- lize against the deal before it can be proven to be welfare- which past agreements have yet to establish clear expecta- 9 tions about how issues will be regulated. enhancing in aggregate.