The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Literature

Swarthmore College Works Philosophy Faculty Works Philosophy 2009 The Oxford Handbook Of Philosophy And Literature Richard Thomas Eldridge Swarthmore College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy Part of the Philosophy Commons Let us know how access to these works benefits ouy Recommended Citation Richard Thomas Eldridge. (2009). "The Oxford Handbook Of Philosophy And Literature". The Oxford Handbook Of Philosophy And Literature. 3-18. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195182637.003.0001 https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/38 This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INTRODUCTION RICHARD ELDRIDGE I said, “we were not stocks and stones”—’tis very well. I should have added, nor are we angels, I wish we were,—hut men cloathed with bodies, and governed by our imaginations;— and what a junketing piece of work of it there is, betwixt these and our seven senses__ For my hobby-horse, if you recollect a little, is no way a vicious beast; he has scarce one hair or lineament of the ass about him—’Tis the sporting little filly-folly which carries you out for the present hour—a maggot, a butterfly a picture, a fiddle-stick—an uncle Toby’s siege—or an any thing, which a man makes a shift to get a stride on, to cater it away from the cares and solicitudes of life—’tis as useful a beast as is in the whole creation—nor do I really see how the world could do without it. —Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman As these two epigraphs from Tristram Shandy eloquently indicate, human beings are complicated animals who are freighted with imaginations that range beyond the senses; they use their imaginations both to escape from life and to find lines of direction and interest within it. Certain exercises of imagination can seem fruit less and strange, yet also compelling and necessary for forming and maintaining substantial commitments. Both literature (both its production and the critical study of it) and philosophy as disciplines have often been seen (sometimes by each other) as embodying either 4 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE AS FORMS OF ATTENTION Strange fruitlessness or compelling necessity—sometimes both. As early as Plato’s Ion, literary works and their authors were cast as divinely inspired, but wayward, uninformed by craft, and useless for the serious business of life. As early as Aristo phanes’ Clouds, philosophy is seen as comically pretentious and ridiculous. With the steady separation of modern science from natural philosophy since the seven teenth century, this impression of philosophy as comical has only widened. Both literary writers (along with many of those who study them) and phi losophers (and those who study them) have long insisted, with considerable force, that they are attending seriously to life, not escaping from it. Whatever their wild varieties of form, the texts that are produced by philosophical and literary writ ers differ significantly from mere lists of otherwise unassociated words and from sonic word play alone. Some forms of attention and discipline seem to control both philosophical and literary production, even while imagination (beyond sensation, measurement, and calculation) remains central, while which forms of discipline and why and how they control production remain unclear and deeply contested. In contrast with the focus on material actualities that is typical of the natural sciences (however mediated that focus is by imagination), philosophy and litera ture as forms of attention focus more on human commitments and passions. At its most abstract and general, philosophy undertakes to specify ideal commitments, or the commitments that it would be most effectively worthwhile to have, even if their fulfillments remain contingent and interruptible. The effort is, inter alia, to specify justice as an ideal form of social life, or morality as an ideal form of personal and immediate interpersonal comportment, or a practice of inquiry as an ideal form of cognitive engagement with the real, or ideal success in formal arrange ment. Yet any such effort at least runs a risk of being fantastically ad hoc and empty in relation to empirical details of present material circumstance that remain, in part, hindrances not so easily assimilated to pursuits of the ideal. Tyrannical, sec tarian domination may in turn result from attempting to put fantastic ideals into actual practice. Hence, close attention to material circumstances and passions for their own sakes seems necessary to correct abstract ideal theorizing that is always possibly premature. Philosophy seems to need correction by literature’s attention to how any commitments might in particular be lived, if it is to avoid comic irrel evance and the rationalization of domination. Literature, in contrast, focuses on the particular in the universal, undertak ing to track what is most likely to come, tragically or comically, of the bearing of particular passions in circumstances that remain always in part intractable. This literary form of attention runs the risk, however, of seeing human beings as caught up only and always in pieces of good or bad luck, failing to discern any genuine universals that human beings might well pursue. Human life may be presented as one damn thing after another, without any clear possibilities either of fruitful emplotment or of evident connections among distinct human lives. Unilluminat ing particularism is as least a possible fate of close attention to material circum stances and passions, a possible fate that it becomes increasingly difficult to avoid INTRODUCTION 5 in the wake of the modern disenchantment of nature. Samuel Beckett, for example, favors a form of literature that consists in “the expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express” (1965:13). If that is what literature in the end amounts to, then it will be impossible to define, even provisionally and gesturally, and it will become instead a thing of refusals of meaning and resistances to it. As Jacques Derrida puts it, “It’s the most interesting thing in the world, maybe even more interesting than the world, and this is why, if it has no definition, what is heralded and refused under the name of literature cannot be identified with any other discourse. It will never be scientific, philo sophical, conversational” (1992; 47). Yet if it affords only stuttering, without gen- eralizable meaning of any kind, then the point of the literary work is desperately unclear, however subjectively important it is felt to be by certain isolated intellec tuals. Hence, literature seems to need correction by philosophy’s efforts to trace universals and to discern and specify ideal forms of commitment, if it is to avoid particularistic emptiness and collapse into light entertainment at best, insignifi cant word play at worst. In fact, both philosophy and literature at their bests have engaged with each other to develop forms of attention to human life and to human commitments and passions while avoiding both empty idealism and empty particularism. Phi losophy has its particular initiating perplexities and its forms of the emplotment of the progress of an implied protagonist, including at least dialogues, confessions, summas, meditations, essays, treatises, tractates, critiques, phenomenologies, manifestoes, postscripts, genealogies, and investigations, among others. Litera ture has its forms of appeal to general philosophical terms, as it undertakes to treat the particularities with which it engages, however sotto voce, as significant instances of some more general idea, concept, or theory of the human; emplot ment of the plausible is impossible without some more general concept of the probable or necessary. As Asja Szafraniec usefully remarks, “ [Ljiterature does not exorcise the universal from itself but negotiates an intersection of the singular and universal within itself as a singular work” (2007: 57). Hence, each form of attention—philosophy and literature—both negotiates with and resists the other, engages with and excludes it. If we focus abstractly on philosophy’s concern with ideal, general commit ments and literature’s attention to particulars as objects of passion, then we might develop something like the following table of oppositions: Philosophy Literature Universality Particularity Reason (Particularized) Imagination Ideal Symbolic Order Primary Process Detachment Engagement Insight Emotion 6 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE AS FORMS OF ATTENTION Such an abstract set of oppositions has some point in revealing patterns of mutual contestation. But we would do well to remember also that there are, always, engage ment and negotiation as well as resistance and repudiation. When we attend to how simultaneous engagement and contestation have been played out, we find Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle not quite wholly displacing and killing off Homeric epic, Pin daric Ode, and Sapphic lyric; the modern novel not quite wholly displacing and killing off theological or rationalist philosophy; artistic modernism not quite dis placing and killing off more thematized and emplotted philosophy and literature; analytical philosophy not quite displacing and killing

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