Asymmetric Warfare at Sea Thomas G

Naval War College Review Volume 64 Article 7 Number 1 Winter

2011 Asymmetric Warfare at Sea Thomas G. Mahnken

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Recommended Citation Mahnken, Thomas G. (2011) "Asymmetric Warfare at Sea," Naval War College Review: Vol. 64 : No. 1 , Article 7. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/7

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ASYM MET RIC WAR FARE AT SEA The Naval Battles off Guadalcanal, 1942–1943

Thomas G. Mahnken

ur ing the six months be tween August 1942 and Febru ary 1943, the wa ters Daround the is land of Guadalcanal wit nessed an almost constant strug gle be tween the Japa nese and Amer ican na vies. The campaign in cluded more than a half-dozen ma jor battles, many of which occurred at night. Although the U.S. Navy en joyed a tech no log i cal ad van tage over the Im pe rial Jap a nese Navy, in - cluding its widespread adoption of radar, it lost all but one of the campaign’s ma jor en gage ments. The Guadalcanal campaign demon strates that technol ogy alone is no guaran tor of vic tory. In or der to ex ploit ad vanced tech nol ogy, mil i tary or ga ni za tions must first de velop ap pro pri ate op er a tional con cepts and or ga ni za tions. The Jap - anese navy possessed a coher ent tacti cal system for night fight ing, a system that gave it a tremen dous advan tage over the U.S. Navy de spite the latter’s wide - spread use of radar. Both sides suffered from faulty in tel ligence and poor com- muni ca tion through out the cam paign, yet Japa nese forces pre vailed in battle after battle, be cause their concepts gave them a su perior awareness of the tacti cal sit u a tion. Thomas G. Mahnken is currently Jerome E. Levy Chair The Guadalcanal cam paign is highly rel evant to - of Eco nomic Ge og ra phy and Na tional Se cu rity at the Na val War Col lege and a visit ing scholar at the Philip day, as the U.S. Navy once again fo cuses its at tention Merrill Center for Stra tegic Stud ies at Johns Hopkins on the west ern Pacific. First, the ser vice be lieved be- Univer sity’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Inter na - fore the start of the Pacific War, as it ap parently does tional Studies. Dr. Mahnken served as the Deputy As - sis tant Sec re tary of De fense for Policy Plan ning from to day in planning a strat egy to influ ence China, that it 2006 to 2009. He serves as a commander in the Navy enjoyed a de cisive ad vantage. In the event, it was sur- Reserve. prised by an adver sary who was at least as skill ful in

Naval War College Re view, Win ter 2011, Vol. 64, No. 1 sea bat tles as it was dur ing all of 1942. Second, the

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cam paign dem on strates that tac ti cal com pe tence and tech nol ogy are both key con stit u ents of com pe tence in bat tle.

THE PRE WAR MIL I TARY BAL ANCE The Ameri can and Japa nese navies that clashed dur ing World War II were simi - lar in a num ber of im portant respects. Because the United States and Japan saw each other as their most proba ble ad versaries in the years lead ing up to the war, their na vies came to re sem ble each other. Each planned to fight a war at sea that would culmi nate in a de cisive fleet engage ment be tween bat tleships. Such simi - lari ties, however, masked impor tant differ ences in the tactics and technol ogy of the two forces. Whereas the U.S. Navy planned to conduct day light battles, the Impe rial Japa nese Navy em phasized the tac tics and weap ons needed to conduct night sur face en gagements. This ap proach would give the Japa nese a con sider - able ad vantage over the Ameri cans dur ing the Guadalcanal campaign. Ge og ra phy dic tated that any war be tween Japan and the United States would pri marily be mar i time. The length of sea lines of commu ni cations in the Pacific meant that the side op erat ing nearer its home waters would enjoy a con sid erable ad vantage. Al though the expanse of the Pacific would render a Jap anese at tempt to seize Hawaii or at tack the west coast of the United States unten a ble, it would also compli cate Amer i can ef forts to cross the Pacific. The award of Ger many’s ter ri tories in the Mar shall, Caroline, and Mariana Is lands to Japan at Versailles and Washing ton’s agreement not to fortify its island posses sions further as part of the Washing ton Naval Agreement compounded the diffi culty of the task. Ja- pan thus enjoyed a signif i cant geographic advan tage in the Central and western Pacific. In the words of the U.S. Joint Army and Navy Board, The posi tion of Ja pan is such as to form a contin u ous strate gic barrier of great strength cover ing almost the entire coast of East ern Sibe ria and of China, while the po si tion of its Man date forms a bar rier of con sid er able depth be tween the United States and the Philip pines. The geographic strength of Ja pan is its inte rior po sition as regards to its out ly ing posses sions, its inte rior po sition with regards to East ern Asia, and its in su lar ity.1 Al though Ja pan en joyed a con sid er able geo graphic ad van tage, the eco nomic bal ance fa vored the United States, which possessed an economy nine times larger than Japan’s. 2 More over, while the United States enjoyed a di verse and ro- bust indus trial infra struc ture, Japan’s was much more limited. In 1940, for ex - ample, the United States pro duced sixty-one mil lion met ric tons of ingot steel, com pared to 7.5 million tons for Japan. 3 Whereas the United States was largely self-suf ficient in key resources, Japan depended heavily on for eign sources of raw ma teri als. Tokyo im ported 55 percent of its steel, 45 percent of its iron, and

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all of its rub ber and nickel.4 In deed, ap proxi mately 80 per cent of its crude and re fined oil stocks came from the United States.5 Whereas Japan re ceived much of its war-support ing ma teri als from the United States, Amer ica had no such de - pend ence on Japan. As the Joint Board put it, “The United States is eco nomi cally strong and well able to prose cute war against Japan, while Japan is exposed to pre car ious eco nomic condi tions in such a war through her vul nera bil ity to eco - nomic disrup tion of her indus trial life.”6 Sev eral sec tors of Jap a nese in dus try made con sid er able strides be tween 1918 and 1941. By 1937, for ex ample, Japa nese dockyards were building more than 20 per cent of the world’s ships, second only to Great Brit ain’s.7 Tokyo also devel oped a substan tial air craft indus try, first through licensed pro duc tion of for eign engines and airframes and then by manu factur ing a number of increas ingly capa ble indig e nous designs. 8 By the out break of the Pacific War, Japan was pro ducing mil- i tary aircraft as good as or better than those of its Western coun terparts. 9 Although the Japa nese econ omy was much smaller than that of the United States, Japan’s armed forces en joyed much greater ac cess to their nation’s re - sources than did the Ameri can armed forces. Japa nese defense ex pendi tures rose steadily throughout the 1930s.10 In 1934, for exam ple, de fense spending ac - counted for nearly 44 per cent of the na tional budget, compared to nearly 18 per - cent for the United States. Arms pro curement accounted for nearly two-thirds of the Japa nese gov ernment’s spending on du rable goods dur ing the 1930s.11 The inter war na val arms-limi ta tion re gime constrained the size and shaped the compo si tion of both the Ameri can and Japa nese na vies. The 1922 Wash ington Na val Agreement limited the United States to eigh teen battle ships and bat tle cruis ers total ing 525,000 tons and al lowed Japan ten bat tle ships and bat tle cruis - ers total ing 315,000 tons. The treaty was de signed to give Japan suffi cient strength to de fend itself without threaten ing U.S. posses sions in the Pacific. It for bade the construc tion of cap ital ships dis placing more than thirty-five thou - sand tons and mounting guns in excess of sixteen inches. It allowed the United States to possess car ri ers total ing 135,000 tons and Japan eighty-one thou sand tons and ei ther to con vert two ships dis placing thirty-three thou sand tons or less to car ri ers. While the agreement did not constrain overall ton nage of cruisers, it limited their dis placement to ten thousand tons and main ar mament to eight-inch guns.12 The United States would re tain enough naval power to protect its posses sions in the Pacific but not enough to challenge Japan in its home wa ters. The 1930 London Naval Agreement completed the Washing ton treaty’s arms-lim i ta tion frame work, es tab lish ing ton nage lim its for cruis ers, de stroy ers, and subma rines. It allowed Japan to build 70 per cent of the cruiser and de stroyer

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ton nage of the United States, and ac corded it par ity in sub marines. It limited light cruisers to six-inch ar mament, destroy ers to 1,850 tons and 5.1-inch ar mament, and subma rines to two thousand tons.13 The possi bil ity of a war with Japan domi nated U.S. na val planning dur ing the inter war pe riod.14 Planners expected that Japan would seize Amer ica’s posses - sions in the Far East at the out set of a war, forc ing the United States to fight its way across six thousand miles of ocean to re claim them. The U.S. Navy spent the inter war pe riod try ing to solve the op era tional problems as soci ated with a trans- pacific na val cam paign. As early as 1928, war games at the Na val War Col lege, in Newport, Rhode Island, showed the balance in a war be tween the United States and Japan shifting in Tokyo’s favor. Over time, the growth of Japa nese naval power forced the U.S. Navy to mod ify its plans: orig inally en vision ing a rapid transpa cific lunge as the best way to relieve the Philip pines, in 1935 it had adopted a strategy that foresaw the need to wage a long and incre men tal cam - paign through the Japa nese-held is lands of Micro ne sia.15 U.S. na val doc trine em phasized the need to win command of the sea by de - feat ing an enemy fleet in a deci sive bat tle. The battle ship was the center piece of the inter war navy. In part, this was a by-product of the domi nance of the “gun club” of bat tle ship ad mi rals and cap tains. It was also a re flec tion of the fact that the bat tle ship was the best way to transport firepower across the Pacific and bring it to bear upon the Japa nese fleet. Bat tle ships were able to strike their tar - gets with greater ac cu racy and at longer range than smaller sur face combat ants or subma rines fir ing tor pe does. Air craft of the day lacked the pay load to do se ri - ous dam age to capi tal ships. As a re sult, the U.S. Navy judged that its bat tle ships had the great est op por tunity to sink the battle ships that formed the core of the Jap a nese fleet.16 Other sur face combat ants sup ported the bat tle line: cruisers acted as scouts and protected it against air and surface attack, while de stroyers guarded it against subma rines and tor pe does. Subma rines conducted re con - nais sance and at tacked en emy com bat ants.17 The U.S. Navy initially used aircraft carri ers as scouts and spotters for the bat - tle fleet. It also looked to them to protect the bat tle line against air attack. Be gin - ning in the late 1920s, however, it be gan to exper i ment with us ing air craft car ri ers as the core of an inde pend ent striking force. In Fleet Problem IX, of 1929, the car rier Saratoga launched two success ful strikes against the locks of the Panama Canal. Dur ing Fleet Problem X the fol low ing year, inde pend ent car rier groups op er ated against bat tle ships.18 It was not un til the destruc tion of much of the U.S. bat tle fleet at Pearl Har bor, however, that the U.S. Navy as a whole re- luctantly accepted the in de pendent use of car rier air power. Amer i can na val tac tics em pha sized day light gun nery bat tles be tween cap i tal ships. Navy reg u lations called on units to de ploy in a single tightly spaced https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/7 4 Mahnken: Asymmetric Warfare at Sea MAHNKEN 99

column, which would gain a tac ti cal advan tage over an adver sary by bring ing all of its guns to bear across the en emy’s axis of approach, “cross ing his T.” Ships would open fire at ten thousand yards, a distance that the navy judged to be out- side the range of enemy tor pe does and opti mum for its own guns.19 The U.S. Navy pos sessed some of the world’s best warships. Its battle ships were fast and well protected. Amer ican cruisers sacri ficed speed and ar mor protec tion to stay within the ten-thousand-ton limit pre scribed by the Wash ington Na val Agreement while maintain ing the abil ity to wage a transpa cific campaign.20 U.S. subma rines were among the best in the world but were armed with tor pe does with de fective deto na tors and with speeds, ranges, and warheads mark edly in fe rior to those of the Jap anese. 21 Funds for na val research and de velop ment were scarce be fore World War II. Research on new technol ogy took second place to maintain ing and improv ing ex ist ing equip ment.22 De spite fund ing lim i ta tions, the Na val Re search Lab o ra- tory de signed, and Amer ican compa nies pro duced, a family of capa ble sur face- search and fire-control ra dar models in the years be fore World War II.23 The Navy’s first sur face-search radar was installed on the de stroyer Leary in 1937. The next year, the navy in stalled the XAF search-radar proto type on the bat tle - ship New York for op era tional testing dur ing its 1939 fleet maneu vers in the Ca- rib bean.24 The XAF became the proto type for a family of long-range air-search sets deployed aboard U.S. warships be ginning in 1941 and used throughout much of the war. Over the next two years, the navy installed an improved version of the XAF, the CXAM, on all Ameri can car ri ers, six battle ships, five heavy cruis - ers, and two light cruisers. 25 The navy also de ployed fire-control radar that allowed surface combat ants to attack targets at night.26 The ser vice fielded the CXAS proto type, fol lowed by the FC and FD contin u ous-track ing radars designed to control both main-battery and an ti aircraft fire. By Pearl Harbor, the navy had taken de livery of ten FC and one FD systems. 27 As a re sult, the United States had oper a tional ra dar systems that al lowed its ships to iden tify approach ing en emy air and sur face forces and to direct fire against them at night and in all weather. The Japa nese navy, for its part, placed su preme faith in the de cisive fleet en- counter as the ulti mate ar bi ter of na val power. The Wash ington Na val Agree- ment’s ban on new bat tleship construc tion forced it to re consider its heavy empha sis on cap i tal ships and seek ways to off set the U.S. Navy’s quan ti ta tive ad- vantage. As a result, it adopted a tac ti cal system that empha sized the contri bu- tion of cruisers and de stroy ers. Be cause the U.S. Navy enjoyed a 30 per cent ad vantage in tonnage, Japan for - mu lated a strat egy of “in ter cep tion-at tri tion op er a tions” (yogeki zengen sakusen) to wear down the Ameri can battle fleet before anni hilat ing it in a de cisive battle.

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At the outset of hostil i ties, the Japa nese navy would destroy the U.S. Asi atic Fleet and oc cupy the Philip pine Islands and Guam. It would then sor tie sub marines into the east ern Pacific to moni tor the movements of the re lief force and harass it on its voyage west ward to re cover the Amer i can pos ses sions. Naval aircraft based in the Marshall, Mariana, and Caroline Islands would join the bat tle as soon as U.S. ships steamed into range. When the Japa nese fleet had re duced the Amer i cans to par ity or less, it would seek a deci sive bat tle near Japa nese home waters. An advance body of cruisers and destroy ers supported by fast battle ships would conduct a night attack using salvos of long-range tor pe does to weaken and confuse the enemy. At daybreak, the Japa nese commander would throw the full weight of his battle line against the Amer ican fleet in a bid to anni hi late it.28 The Japa nese navy sought to improve the quality of its fighting forces to off set the U.S. Navy’s quan ti ta tive su pe ri or ity. The navy lead er ship be lieved that the toughness, morale, and fighting spirit of the Japa nese fight ing man would give a marked ad vantage in a war with the United States.29 To hone their skills, Japa - nese forces trained ten months out of the year in ex er cises that were ar du ous and some times fa tal.30 Be cause ex er cises empha sized combat at night and in poor weather, crews learned to op erate effec tively under even the harshest of con di tions. A second way the Japa nese navy sought to ne gate the U.S. Navy’s quanti tative and tech no log i cal ad van tage was by de veloping a unique tac ti cal sys tem em pha- sizing long-range gunnery, tor pedo fir ing, and night op era tions. The Japa nese na val staff be lieved that its ability to de feat the Amer ican fleet re quired ships that could out range op po nents. Strik ing U.S. ships from be yond their ca pabil ity to re turn fire would allow the Japa nese force to inflict damage without taking losses of its own. The navy there fore expended consid er able ef fort to increase the range and accu racy of its gunnery, culmi nat ing in the de sign of the Yamato-class bat tle ships.31 By the mid-1930s, for exam ple, the Jap anese navy believed that its main-force units had a range advan tage of between four and five thou sand me ters over their Amer i can coun ter parts. With the advent of Yamato, the Japa nese Na val Staff College es ti mated that Japan’s battle ships could track the Amer ican fleet at forty thousand me ters (21.5 miles) and open fire at ap - proxi mately thirty-four thou sand me ters, more than three times the preferred U.S. combat range.32 The navy also de veloped the Type 93 oxy gen-pro pelled tor pedo, also known as the Long Lance, a weapon with a larger war head, greater speed, and lon ger range than contem po rary Ameri can and Brit ish mod els. The weapon was very large, with a weight of 2,700 ki lo grams (nearly three tons), a di am e ter of sixty-one centi me ters (twenty-four inches), a length of some nine meters, and a pay load of nearly five hun dred kilo grams (over a thou sand pounds) of https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/7 6 Mahnken: Asymmetric Warfare at Sea MAHNKEN 101

explo sive. The tor pedo was ca pa ble of speeds up to forty-eight knots and ranges up to forty thousand me ters. Fu eled by high-pressure oxy gen, it left vir tually no wake.33 In the mid-1930s, the navy equipped all eighteen of its heavy cruisers, some light cruisers, and destroy ers from the Hatsuharu class on with launch ers for the Long Lance. Be ginning in 1938, it re con structed the light cruisers Oi and Kitakami as “tor pedo cruisers,” car ry ing forty and thirty-two tor pedo launchers, respec tively. 34 The Japa nese navy also perfected a tacti cal system for night fight ing.35 In 1924, it be gan to form dedi cated night-attack units composed of de stroyer squadrons led by light cruisers. In 1929, the Combined Fleet cre ated a night- battle force un der the con trol of a heavy-cruiser-squadron commander. 36 In contrast to Ameri can tactics, which called for ships to de ploy in a single col umn, Japa nese ships formed multi ple short columns, often with destroy ers posi tioned ahead of the main force to pre vent ambush. On de tect ing the enemy, the Jap a- nese de stroy ers would close, pivot, fire tor pe does, and then turn away.37 To ex - ploit the char ac ter is tics of the Long Lance, the Japa nese navy de vel oped the tactic of long-distance concealed fir ing (enkyori ommitsu hassha), which called for cruisers to launch be tween 120 and two hun dred of the tor pe does at a dis - tance of at least twenty thousand me ters from the enemy battle line.38 Only af ter the tor pe does had been launched would ships re sort to gunfire, and when they did they would min i mize use of searchlights, to pre vent en emy ships from spot- ting them.39 Such tactics could be extremely effec tive. Dur ing the bat tle of the Java Sea, Japa nese tor pedo attacks dealt Allied forces a se vere defeat. 40 Dur ing the Solomons cam paign, Japa nese tor pedo bar rages hit their tar gets as much as 20 percent of the time.41 The Japa nese navy’s doc trine and training pro duced a cadre of offi cers and enlisted men who were skilled in night tor pedo combat. The navy trained sailors with su perior night vision to be look outs. Equipped with power ful special ized binoc u lars, they could de tect a ship at eight thousand me ters on a dark night.42 Many of the navy’s top offi cers were tor pedo experts, includ ing admi rals Nagumo Chuichi and Ozawa Jisaburo. At the out break of the war, most tor pedo craft were un der the command of quali fied experts. As Rear Admi ral Tanaka Raizo later wrote, “My di vision command ers and skip pers were bril liant tor pedo experts, and from top to bot tom the train ing and disci pline of crews was flaw - less. Op er ational orders could be conveyed by the sim plest of signals, and they were never mis un der stood.”43 U.S. na val in tel li gence un der stood the Im pe rial Jap a nese Navy’s em pha sis upon night combat. The Office of Naval Intel ligence’s monograph on Japan noted that

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the Japa nese Navy places great empha sis on training for night oper a tions. The Jap a - nese are of the opinion that, at night, many of the disad van tages of having infe rior materiel disap pear and that spirit and mo rale—in which they believe they excel— com bined with training and the ability to co oper ate and coor dinate will give them a decided ad van tage over an en emy fleet.44 More over, war games held at the Na val War Col lege dem onstrated the dev as tat - ing effect of night tor pedo attacks. During one such game, two ORANGE (Japa - nese) night attacks resulted in the loss of a BLUE (Amer i can) bat tle ship and air craft car rier, damage to two more bat tle ships, and loss of or damage to twelve heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and thirty-one destroy ers.45 Despite these warnings, the U.S. Navy remained largely unpre pared for night combat. Its 1934 War In struc tions warned, “At night the supe rior or equal force risks forfei ture of its su pe ri or ity or equality of its most valuable as set, its coor di - nated hit ting power.”46 However, the navy lacked the doc trine and orga ni zation neces sary to conduct oper a tions at night. It concen trated upon defen sive combat at night, in stark contrast to the Japa nese navy’s em phasis upon offen sive op er a tions.47 Dur ing the 1920s the Jap anese navy, like its Amer ican counter part, planned to employ carrier aircraft for air defense of the bat tle fleet, for re connais sance, and as a means of wear ing down the U.S. fleet in prepa ra tion for a major sur face engage ment. In the 1930s, however, naval air doc trine be gan to shift away from aerial scout ing and re connais sance and to ward the idea of using aircraft to attack enemy fleet units. By the middle of the de cade, a pre emp tive strike upon the enemy car rier force had be come the focus of naval air ex er cises.48 In April 1941, the Japa nese formed the First Air Fleet, to central ize control of the car rier force and to sepa rate car rier avia tion from land-based naval air force.49 Japan’s naval shipbuild ing indus try grew to matu rity in the de cades before World War II. Before 1915, Brit ish yards built most of the Japa nese navy’s ships. By the late 1920s, however, Japa nese shipyards be gan to launch a se ries of innovative ship de signs.50 Faced with the Wash ington Naval Agree ment’s ban on cap i tal-ship con struc tion, the Jap a nese de voted con sid er able ef fort to achieving quali ta tive supe ri or ity over the United States. As one for mer naval construc tor noted, Japan “labored to pro duce vessels that would, type for type, be in divid u ally su perior to those of the hypo thet ical enemy, even if by a single gun or tor pedo tube or by a single knot of speed.”51 Japan built cruis ers that were fast and heavily armed. They were de signed to be all-purpose ships, a substi tute for the battle ships the Washing ton Naval Agreement limited. Unlike their counter parts in the U.S. Navy, for ex ample, Jap- anese cruisers mounted tor pedo tubes. The seven-thousand-ton Furutaka class,

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for exam ple, was armed with six eight-inch guns and twelve twenty-four-inch torpedo tubes. Jap anese de stroy ers were the larg est and most power ful in the world. The units of the Fubuki class, built be tween 1926 and 1931, were the most advanced of their day. With a 390-foot length and offi cial dis placement of 1,680 stan dard tons, they were consid er ably larger than their Ameri can and British counter - parts. More over, they were armed with six five-inch guns mounted in weath er - proof housings and eigh teen twenty-four-inch tor pe does ar ranged to al low rapid salvo fire.52 Whereas Ameri can de stroy ers were de signed to per form a mix- ture of de fen sive and offen sive missions, Japa nese ships were opti mized for at - tack. De stroyer flo til las, po si tioned ahead of the van or abaft the rear of the main fleet, were to break through an enemy screen and attack the main body of the fleet to sink, cripple, or confuse as many capi tal ships as possi ble. Japa nese de signs tended to pack too much arma ment, speed, and protec tion into small hulls. Cruiser and destroyer de signs often suf fered problems with struc tural integ rity. Indeed, the navy had to re con struct the ships of several classes to im prove their seaworthiness. Lim ited tech no log i cal re sources and fis cal strin gency forced the Jap a nese navy to fo cus its re search and de vel op ment ef forts upon tech nol o gies as so ci ated with its con cepts of op er a tions. These fields in cluded op tics, il lu mi na tion, and tor pe does, where Japan led the United States. However, it trailed in oth ers. Com- muni ca tion among aircraft was one short fall: Japa nese air borne ra dio was un re - liable and prone to inter fer ence. As a re sult, fighter pilots often re lied upon hand semaphore or pre ar ranged sig nal flares to co or dinate their action. Ra dar was an other weak ness. Ja pan con ducted lit tle re search or de vel op ment on radar be fore the outbreak of the Pacific War. Offi cial indif fer ence, hap haz ard mo bi li za tion of sci en tific tal ent, and an ab sence of interservice co op er a tion fur - ther de layed its intro duc tion. As a re sult, the navy had no search or fire-control ra dar at the out set of the war.53 It pro duced radar sets dur ing the war, but they were rel a tively un so phis ti cated and suf fered from low power.54 High-qual ity man power was es sen tial if Ja pan was to off set the quan ti ta tive su peri or ity of the U.S. Navy. The armed forces were a respected part of soci ety, and mil i tary ser vice was popu lar. The navy was manned mostly by volun teers, and reenlistment rates were high. As a re sult, the navy maintained a cadre of sea- soned vet er ans.55 It also trained hard, fol low ing a seven-day work week.56 On the other hand, the Jap anese na val offi cer corps dis played a num ber of seri ous weaknesses, in clud ing the ab sence of in de pend ent judg ment in the av er age of fi cer, lack of as ser tive ness, and a pro mo tion sys tem that em pha sized se nior ity over ca pa bil ity.57

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THE GUADALCANAL CAM PAIGN The Guadalcanal campaign was the first sustained series of bat tles between the Amer ican and Japa nese na vies. Be ginning one month after the United States turned back Japan’s at tempt to in vade Mid way, the in va sion of Guadalcanal was the first Amer i can ef fort to re oc cupy Jap a nese ter ri tory. The cam paign rep re - sented a clash be tween fleets trained and equipped to exe cute very differ ent tacti cal systems. U.S. command ers were of ten un able to trans late their advan tage in ra dar tech nol ogy into an un der stand ing of the tac ti cal sit u a tion. Jap a nese units, by contrast, repeat edly achieved a high level of tacti cal situ a tional awareness —not be cause they possessed su perior technol ogy but because they had a coher ent system of night-fighting tactics. The campaign be gan with the Jap anese oc cupa tion of Tulagi, near the south - east cor ner of the Solo mon island chain, on 2 May 1942, for use as a seaplane base. In mid-June, the Japa nese dis patched a force of some two thousand engi - neers and labor ers to neighbor ing Guadalcanal to build an airfield. 58 By occu py - ing the is lands, they would be able to disrupt the sea lines of commu ni cations con nect ing the United States and Austra lia. The is land also rep re sented a step ping- stone to ward Aus tra lia. The Amer i cans learned of the Jap a nese oc cu pa tion of Tulagi and Guadalcanal, and on 2 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to launch Op er a tion WATCHTOWER to re cover the islands. Vice Admi ral Robert L. Ghormley, commander of the South Pacific Area (COMSOPAC), was given com - mand of the effort. Vice Admi ral Frank Jack Fletcher led an expe dition ary force that included three of the navy’s four air craft car ri ers, the bat tle ship North Carolina, and a force of cruisers and destroy ers. Rear Admi ral Richmond Kelly Turner commanded the amphib i ous force, which included Major General Alex - ander A. Vandegrift’s 1st Marine Divi sion, embarked upon fifteen transports. 59 On 7 Au gust, eleven thousand Marines landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi, taking the Japa nese de fend ers by sur prise. By evening the Guadalcanal inva sion force had over run the de fend ers and oc cupied the unfin ished airfield. Two days later the Marines wrested control of Tulagi from the Jap anese. Al though Fletcher had promised to remain in the area for forty-eight hours, he with drew to the southeast on the after noon of 8 Au gust due to concern over the pos sibil ity of an air at tack. Vice Admi ral Mikawa Gunichi, commander in chief of the newly formed Eighth Fleet of the Impe rial Japa nese Navy’s Outer South Seas Force, at Rabaul, was re spon sible for dis lodg ing the U.S. force. Mikawa’s fleet consisted of the heavy cruis ers Chokai, Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, and Furutaka; the light cruisers Tenryu and Yubari; and the destroyer Yunagi. Mikawa planned to launch a night attack on the Guadalcanal in vasion force, breaking through the enemy screen and sinking Turner’s transports. 60 https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/7 10 Mahnken: Asymmetric Warfare at Sea MAHNKEN 105

Suspect ing a Japa nese re sponse to the assault, on 8 Au gust Ameri can and Aus tra lian pa trol air craft re con noi tered the wa ters around Guadalcanal. An Aus tralian aircraft spotted Mikawa’s force but in cor rectly re ported that the column included three cruisers, three de stroyers, and two seaplane tenders. An- other sighted the force as it headed south through the Bougainville Strait but incor rectly identi fied it. No air craft patrolled New Georgia Sound, the av enue through which Mikawa’s force ad vanced. Amer ican radio intel ligence in ter - cepted a mes sage from Mikawa stat ing that he was plan ning to attack an en emy convoy near Guadalcanal, but ana lysts did not decrypt the message until 23 Au - gust.61 Pos sess ing in ac cu rate and con flict ing in tel li gence, there fore, Turner con - cluded that a Japa nese sea plane-tender force was somewhere to the north. He assumed—rea son ably, though incor rectly—that such a force would not make a night attack. Three groups of ships pa trolled the west ern entrance of the sound be tween Florida and Guadalcanal Islands, where Turner’s trans ports lay at an chor. The Northern Force, composed of three heavy cruisers and two destroy ers, blocked the western approaches of the sound. The Southern Force, consist ing of three heavy cruisers and two destroy ers, was stationed to pre vent the Japa nese from enter ing the sound be tween Cape Esperance and Savo Island. The East ern Force, of two light cruisers and two de stroy ers, cov ered the eastern approach to the sound. Two destroy ers equipped with ra dar, Blue and Ralph Talbot , formed a picket line to the northwest. None of these vessels spotted Mikawa’s column as it steamed southeast through in ter mit tent squalls on a dark, humid night. The Japa nese ships passed un seen through the radar picket and entered the sound south of Savo Island. Mikawa, aboard Chokai, spot ted the silhou ettes of the Ameri can cruiser Chi cago and the Austra lian cruiser Can berra of the Southern Force and opened fire, first with tor pe does and then with guns. The ships, il lumi nated by flares dropped from Mikawa’s floatplanes, took heavy fire. Two tor pe does and more than twenty-four shells struck Can berra, which was barely able to fire two tor pe does and sev eral shells be fore stop ping dead in the water, aflame and sinking. A tor - pedo severed part of Chi cago’s bow, and a shell knocked off part of its foremast. The ship’s com mand ing of fi cer com pletely mis cal cu lated the lo cation of Mikawa’s force, steer ing his ship away from the battle, and failed to alert the North ern Force. Mikawa’s col umn next swung left around Savo Island and headed for the Northern Force. Al though the engage ment had been go ing on more than five minutes, the North ern Force was completely unaware that it was under attack until the heavy cruiser Aoba il lu mi nated the cruiser Quincy with its searchlights. The cruiser Astoria, hit amidships by one of Chokai’s eight-inch shells, burst into

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flames. Quincy and Vincennes also sustained heavy damage. With burn ing ships sil hou ett ing the Amer i can force, the Japa nese turned off their search lights, mak - ing it dif fi cult for the Ameri cans to lo cate them. The North ern Force’s screen ing de stroyer, Wil son, chased what ap peared to be an enemy ship for some time, only to discover it was the de stroyer Bagley of the South ern Force. The force’s other de stroyer, Helm, never sighted any enemy ships. Af ter savaging the North ern and Southern Forces, Mikawa elected to re tire rather than at tack ing Turner’s ex posed trans ports. His ships had ex pended their tor pe does and were scattered. He was also concerned about ex posing his force to day light air attack, un aware that Fletcher’s car ri ers were too far to the south to strike his ships. As Mikawa withdrew, his ships encoun tered and dam aged Ralph Tal bot. He left behind four Al lied cruisers sunk or sink ing and two destroy ers and one cruiser damaged. The U.S. Navy’s losses included 1,023 killed and 709 wounded, its worst defeat since the War of 1812. The occu pa tion of Guadalcanal marked only the begin ning of the campaign. The bat tle for the island went on for almost half a year, exact ing heavy tolls upon both sides. Nei ther the Amer icans nor the Japa nese proved willing to give up Guadalcanal, nor was ei ther strong enough to defeat the other. The Japa nese be - lieved that the is land had to be rein forced and held, while the Amer i cans had to elimi nate the Japa nese army units there and sup ply and re inforce the Marine gar ri son. In this cam paign the U.S. forces, al though they en joyed techno logi cal su pe ri - or ity, lacked con ti nu ity of lead er ship. No Amer i can of fi cer ever com manded the same force in more than two battles. As a re sult, there were few oppor tu ni ties to in cor po rate les sons into op er a tions. In deed, the navy re peat edly em ployed tactics that put it at a con sider able dis advan tage in night en gagements. The Japa - nese navy not only possessed a coher ent tacti cal system for night combat but also enjoyed much greater conti nuity of command. As a re sult, it was able to use combat expe ri ence to mod ify and improve upon its pre war doc trine. The Japa nese be gan launching fre quent air raids on Guadalcanal from Rabaul. Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters, oper at ing at the very edge of their perfor mance en - ve lopes, escorted long-range bombers on missions against the island’s airstrip, dubbed Henderson Field by the Amer icans. Rear Admi ral Tanaka’s 2nd De stroyer Squad ron also be gan mak ing night time runs down “the Slot,” the chan nel be - tween Santa Isabel and New Georgia Islands, to land small de tachments and bombard the air field. These mis sions, known as the “Tokyo Express,” were a con stant fea ture of the Guadalcanal campaign. Dur ing one of these runs, on the night of 21–22 Au gust, a tor pedo from the de stroyer Kawakaze struck the destroyer Blue, which had to be scut tled. Although Blue pos sessed an SC sur face-search ra dar, the Jap a nese look outs spot ted the Amer i can de stroyer first.62 https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/7 12 Mahnken: Asymmetric Warfare at Sea MAHNKEN 107

At his fleet’s an chor age at Truk, Admi ral Yamamoto Isoroku be gan to pre pare for a major battle against the U.S. Navy. His plan called for the Combined Fleet to es cort a con voy car ry ing Gen eral Kawaguchi Kiyotake’s 35th Bri gade to Guadalcanal. It would also attempt to engage and defeat Al lied naval forces so as to remove the threat to fu ture rein force ment attempts. Yamamoto’s plan called for Admi ral Nagumo’s carrier force, un der the protec tion of Rear Admi ral Abe Hiroaki’s Vanguard Force, to strike Allied sur face combat ants. Nagumo’s air - craft, together with the Van guard Force and Vice Admi ral Kondo Nobutake’s Support Force, would then mop up any survi vors. On 23 August, the Combined Fleet sor tied from Truk. The next day, it met Fletcher’s Task Force 61 in the bat tle of the Eastern Solomons.63 Fletcher had re - ceived reports indi cat ing that Japa nese car ri ers were nearby, but he had not believed them. More over, at mo spheric con di tions ham pered ra dio re cep tion throughout the battle, compli cat ing his abil ity to control his task force. The bat - tle opened when air craft from the small car rier Ryujo struck Henderson Field. Warned by coast watch ers, the Marines deci mated the attack ers. Air craft from En ter prise and Saratoga located and struck Ryujo, which sank that evening. Mean while, the car ri ers Shokaku and Zuikaku launched a counter strike against the Amer ican car rier force. Al though En ter prise sus tained three bomb hits, it suf fered no hull damage. A sec ond Jap anese at tack failed to locate the task force, due to a pilot’s plotting error. Spared further damage, Fletcher with drew to the south with his carri ers. An Ameri can PBY flying boat spotted Rear Admi ral Tanaka’s convoy car ry ing the Yokosuka 5th Special Landing Force in the early morn ing hours of 25 Au - gust.64 Aircraft from Guadalcanal and B-17 bombers from the is land of Espiritu Santo surprised the convoy, damag ing the light cruiser Jintsu and the trans port Kinryu Maru. A second wave of B-17s bombed the destroyer Mutsuki as it at - tempted to rescue troops from the dam aged transport. Tanaka found the air at - tack so intense that he withdrew his remain ing ships to their anchor age in the Short land Is lands. Over the next two months, each side tried to re inforce its gar ri son on Guadalcanal. The Japa nese army brought in troops from China, the Dutch East Indies, and the Phil ippines. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, for its part, de cided to commit a reg i ment of the Americal Divi sion to de fend the island. At night, Tanaka’s Tokyo Express brought in sup plies, bom barded Henderson Field, and at tacked U.S. na val forces. Dur ing day light hours, aircraft from Guadalcanal dom i nated the sea around the is land. None the less, Japa nese planes from Rabaul launched bombing raids on the is land almost daily; dur ing Sep tem ber, for ex- ample, they flew an aver age of twenty-nine missions per day.65 U.S. Marine F4F Wildcats and Army Air Forces P-40 Warhawks were no match for the Ze ros.

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Moreover, the army was reluc tant to al locate P-38 Lightnings to the South Pa- cific. Marine avia tors, often cued by coast watch ers, employed hit-and-run tactics to inflict heavy ca sual ties on the Japa nese. On the night of 11–12 Octo ber, Japa nese and Amer ican rein force ment con - voys clashed in the battle of Cape Esperance.66 The Japa nese force, commanded by Rear Admi ral Goto Aritomo, consisted of three heavy cruisers and two de - stroy ers es cort ing two sea plane car ri ers and six de stroy ers with a con sid er able part of the Impe rial Japa nese Army’s 2nd Divi sion embarked. Goto planned to bombard Henderson Field with the guns of his cruis ers and destroy ers while also land ing the 2nd Di vision to re inforce the Japa nese gar ri son on the is land. Ly ing in wait was Rear Admi ral Norman Scott, who sought to derail the Tokyo Express while de liver ing the 164th Reg iment of the Americal Divi sion to Guadalcanal. Scott’s force in cluded the air craft car rier Hor net, the new bat tle ship Wash ing ton, and a force of cruisers and de stroy ers. Scott had stud ied pre vious engage ments with the Japa nese and had care fully trained his force in night-fighting tactics. His prepa ra tions paid off in the ensu ing bat tle. Goto was unaware of the presence of the Amer ican fleet as he steamed to ward Guadalcanal. By contrast, long-range air re connais sance gave Scott accu rate in - tel ligence re garding the posi tion and advance of the Japa nese force. He did not, however, fully exploit its advan tage. The light cruiser Hel ena de tected Goto’s force with its SG surface-search radar at a range of fourteen nauti cal miles but failed to report its lo cation for nearly twenty min utes, until it was within six nau ti cal miles of Scott’s ships. As the fleets closed to two and a half miles, Hel - ena’s command ing offi cer asked permis sion to open fire. Scott misin ter preted the re quest and un knowingly gave the go-ahead. Hel ena’s fire took both the Jap - anese and the rest of the Ameri can force by sur prise. Dur ing the ensu ing engage - ment, Scott’s force sank the cruiser Fubuki and badly damaged Furutaka and Aoba. One shell struck Aoba’s bridge, killing Goto and most of his staff. The Jap- anese force withdrew, cov er ing its re treat by pouring heavy fire on the cruiser Boise. Both the Japa nese and the Ameri can con voys landed their troops on Guadalcanal. The bat tle was one of the few night engage ments the Japa nese lost. Only con fused commu ni cations among Scott’s ships kept the battle from be- com ing a Jap a nese di sas ter. With its 2nd Divi sion on Guadalcanal, the Japa nese high com mand de ter - mined to re capture the island. Begin ning 13 Oc tober, the army and navy launched a co ordi nated attack on Henderson Field. During the day the field was attacked by bombers and shelled by howit zers that had been landed dur ing the battle of Cape Esperance. That night, the bat tle ships Kongo and Haruna fired some nine hun dred shells on the air field. The next night Mikawa’s cruisers joined the fray, fir ing 752 eight-inch rounds onto the island, fol lowed by 926 https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/7 14 Mahnken: Asymmetric Warfare at Sea MAHNKEN 109

heavy-cal i ber rounds the fol low ing eve ning.67 Although the situ ation at the air - field was desper ate, the Marines held. Indeed, the few air craft that sur vived the bombard ment, backed by B-17s fly ing from rear bases, sank six of Tanaka’s sup - ply ships. On 22 Octo ber, the Japa nese launched a ground offen sive designed to en velop the airfield. After four days of bit ter fighting, it halted without hav ing dislodged the Marines. With the army’s fail ure to re cap ture Guadalcanal, Yamamoto made an other attempt to destroy U.S. na val forces sup port ing the island. He dispatched sev eral task forces from Truk, includ ing a battle ship force and the car ri ers Shokaku, Zuikaku, Zuiho, Junyo, and Hiyo.68 Yamamoto faced a new group of Amer ican command ers. Admi ral Chester Nimitz had found Ghormley wanting and replaced him with Vice Admi ral Wil - liam F. Halsey as COMSOPAC; Rear Admi ral Thomas C. Kinkaid took Fletcher’s place as car rier commander. Kinkaid’s Task Force 16 included the car rier En ter - prise and a sup port force composed of the bat tle ship South Da kota, heavy cruiser Portland, an ti air craft cruiser San Juan, and eight de stroyers. Rear Admi ral George D. Murray’s Task Force 17 included the car rier Hor net, heavy cruis ers Northampton and Pensacola, an ti air craft cruis ers San Diego and Ju neau, and six destroy ers. The Japa nese outnum bered the Ameri cans in warships, tonnage, and aircraft, but the Amer i cans possessed the advan tages of Henderson Field and su - pe rior in tel li gence in for ma tion. Al lied aircraft first sighted the Combined Fleet at sea on 13 Oc tober. These flights lo cated four differ ent forces, three of which were a car rier group, a scout - ing force of cruis ers and destroy ers, and a battle ship force sent to bombard Henderson Field. Air craft spotted the task force again on 15, 22, and 24 Oc tober. As a re sult, the Ameri cans possessed an ac curate view of the basic tac ti cal dispo - sition of the Japa nese force.69 The two fleets met in the battle of the Santa Cruz Islands on 26 Oc tober. 70 The en gage ment be gan when two pi lots from En ter prise lo cated and attacked the un - sus pect ing light car rier Zuiho. One bomb pene trated its flight deck, forcing it to re turn to Truk for re pairs. The Jap anese, however, had learned some of the les- sons of Midway. Although the Amer i cans struck first, the Japa nese this time were able to launch two waves of planes in the time it took the Amer icans to launch one. The first Japa nese at tack wave concen trated upon Hor net, caus ing damage that left the car rier dead in the wa ter; subse quent attacks sank it. The second wave struck En ter prise. That car rier, however, equipped with newly installed anti aircraft guns, took only two hits and remained in service. The Japa nese did not escape Hor net’s air group, which dis cov ered and at - tacked Shokaku, hit ting its flight deck with four thou sand-pound bombs. Such dam age had been suffi cient to sink car ri ers at Mid way, but the Japa nese had now

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learned to secure ordnance, drain gas oline lines, and keep fire hoses at the ready. As a re sult, while the carrier’s flight deck was disabled and commu ni cations were lost, its engines remained func tional and its hull intact. Hor net’s second attack struck the Vanguard Force, crippling the heavy cruiser Chikuma and dam aging the destroyer Teruzuki. The U.S. Navy sustained heavy damage, with a car rier and a de stroyer sunk and an other car rier, bat tle ship, heavy cruiser, and an ti aircraft light cruiser dam - aged. With the loss of Hor net, En ter prise be came the only carrier ca pable of stag - ing aircraft bound for Guadalcanal. The Japa nese had also suf fered ex ten sive losses, with three carri ers damaged and a heavy cruiser and two destroy ers damaged. During the battle, the Amer icans had been handi capped by poor commu - nica tion: they had possessed all the infor mation they needed to make a suc cessful strike, but the right peo ple had not re ceived it. On the other hand, the grow ing an ti air craft de fenses of U.S. com bat ants had pre vented fur ther dam age. In the months to come, the navy would fur ther increase the anti air craft ar mament of its ships. Be tween Au gust and No vem ber, the two sides car ried out mas sive troop build ups on Guadalcanal. On 7 Au gust there were ten thousand Amer i cans and 2,200 Japa nese troops on the island. By 12 Novem ber, twenty-nine thou sand Amer i cans faced thirty thou sand Jap a nese.71 In early No vember, U.S. in tel ligence began detect ing prepa ra tions for another Japa nese attack. The Japa nese planned to launch heavy air craft strikes and a na val bom bardment be fore land - ing rein force ments on the island. On 9 Novem ber, Ameri can intel li gence inter - cepted and de crypted Yamamoto’s op era tions or der for the attack. 72 Halsey dis patched Rear Admi ral Dan iel J. Callaghan’s Support Group of five cruisers and eight destroy ers to meet the Japa nese. On 13–15 No vember, the two fleets met in the na val battle of Guadalcanal.73 The Bombard ment Force, under Abe (now a vice admi ral) had passed through an intense tropi cal storm as it steamed south toward Guadalcanal on the night of 12–13 Novem ber. His force in cluded the bat tleships Hiei and Kirishima, a light cruiser, and six destroy ers. The ships’ guns were loaded with antipersonnel high-explo sive shells, with which to bombard Henderson Field; their ar mor- pierc ing shells for sur face engage ments were stored at the back of the mag azines. When the destroyer Yudachi spot ted the Amer ican force, Abe or dered his ships to re load their guns with ar mor-pierc ing rounds, a pro cess that took eight minutes.74 Soon af ter, the light cruiser Hel ena’s sur face-search radar de tected the Jap anese force. The cruiser sent Callaghan contin u ous contact reports, but these were only par tially intel ligi ble, be cause the group’s voice cir cuits were con - gested. As a result, the Japa nese managed to fire the first shot. Shell fire and tor - pe does from Hiei and the destroyer Akasuki knocked out the cruiser At lanta and https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/7 16 Mahnken: Asymmetric Warfare at Sea MAHNKEN 111

killed Admi ral Scott. As the bat tle con tin ued, the Amer i can force took heavy gun and tor pedo fire at close range. The stern of the cruiser Port land was almost blown off, San Fran cisco was badly damaged, and Callaghan was killed. Hiei soon attracted the atten tion of the Ameri can ships, however; gunfire rid dled the battle ship’s topside, and fires broke out across its deck. Blinded by his flagship’s fires and un able to de termine the dispo si tion of his forces, Abe or dered his ships to with draw. The Japa nese lost two de stroy ers dur ing the battle. Hiei, lacking a work ing rudder, sank the next day af ter sus tain ing heavy dam age from U.S. aircraft from Guadalcanal and En ter prise. De spite the loss of Hiei, Yamamoto was de ter mined to land the 38th Divi sion on Guadalcanal. To support the landing, Mikawa sor tied a bombard ment force con taining the heavy cruis ers Suzuya and Maya from the Shortlands an chor age. On the night of 13–14 No vember, the ships poured 1,370 rounds onto Hen- derson Field but failed to knock it out.75 The next morn ing, Amer ican planes struck the force, sinking the cruiser Kinugasa and dam aging three other cruis ers and a de stroyer. Yamamoto planned to bombard Henderson Field one more time be fore land - ing the 38th Divi sion. He or dered Admi ral Kondo’s Strike Force, re inforced by Abe’s sur viv ing ships, to shell the air field. Radio intel ligence warned the Ameri - cans in suffi cient time for Kinkaid to de tach Rear Admi ral Wil lis A. Lee’s battle - ship force, which included Wash ing ton and South Da kota, to meet the Japa nese. The fi nal phase of the bat tle of Guadalcanal was the first bat tle ship ac tion of the Pacific War. Ex pect ing op posi tion, Kondo had de ployed a screen of cruisers and de stroy ers around his bombard ment force. The screen spotted the Amer i - can battle line and be gan stalking it. Wash ing ton’s ra dar de tected the Japa nese screen and opened fire, forcing the Japa nese to withdraw. Wash ing ton and South Da kota then engaged the Japa nese task force. South Da kota, however, soon expe - ri enced a power fail ure that knocked out its tac ti cal ra dios and ra dar and sep a - rated it from the rest of the force. De spite sustain ing forty-two large-cali ber hits, it contin ued steaming at full speed. Wash ing ton, in turn, locked onto the battle - ship Kirishima and smothered it with gun fire from its sixteen-inch main bat tery. Kirishima burst into flames and be gan to sink. The cruis ers Takao and Atako and the light cruiser Nagara also sus tained dam age that forced them to re turn to Ja- pan for repairs. Be sides the badly damaged South Da kota, Lee lost three destroy - ers in the melee. The sur face battle over, every Amer ican air group within range pounced upon Tanaka’s convoy. Land-based aircraft from Guadalcanal and Espiritu Santo and En ter prise’s air wing sank all but four of the trans ports. Those ships that sur vived caught fire and beached. Air craft from Henderson Field contin ued to bomb and strafe the remnants of two regi ments and one battal ion of infan try

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and a reg i ment of en gi neers—some two thou sand men out of ten thou sand that had embarked. 76 In the weeks that followed, the ships of Tanaka’s 2nd De stroyer Squadron con - tinued to make runs to Guadalcanal at night, with sup plies in rubber ized metal contain ers lashed to their sterns. The crews cut the sup plies free off Tassafaronga Point, where they drifted ashore or were brought in by swim ming soldiers. The navy also used subma rines to re sup ply Guadalcanal. De spite these ef forts, the condi tion of the Japa nese army con tinued to worsen; disease and malnu tri tion took their toll. Vir tu ally every one was on the verge of star vation. The sick rolls grew, and even the healthy were exhausted. The Ameri can situ ation, by contrast, improved in Decem ber as fresh Marine and army units re lieved the orig inal Ma- rine de tach ments af ter four months of duty. By 9 De cember, twenty-five thousand Japa nese faced forty thousand soldiers on the island. The Marines enlarged Henderson Field, and the navy built a tor pedo-boat base on Tulagi.77 In late No vem ber, Halsey re ceived in tel li gence in di cat ing that Yamamoto was pre paring to launch another attempt to re inforce Guadalcanal. Halsey dispatched Rear Admi ral Carleton H. Wright with a force of cruisers and de stroyers to stop him. Wright was de termined not to re peat the mistakes Ameri can com- manders had commit ted in past en gagements. To en sure that his forces would spot the enemy before they them selves were sighted, he placed a ship equipped with improved sur face-search radar in each cruiser group. To avoid confu sion in the heat of battle, he reserved the use of commu ni ca tion cir cuits for or ders and estab lished a set of unam big u ous commands. He also abandoned the standard single-col umn attack for mation in favor of tactics better suited to night combat. Upon engag ing the enemy, Wright’s destroy ers would launch a massive tor pedo attack and then peel off to al low his cruisers to fire on the enemy ships. Instead of us ing searchlights, which would be tray their lo cations, his ships would rely upon flares dropped from floatplanes to illu mi nate their quarry.78 As it turned out, Wright faced not another force attempt ing to land more troops on Guadalcanal but Tanaka’s flo tilla on one of its runs to bring food and ammu ni tion to the exist ing Japa nese gar ri son. The two met on 30 No vember, in the bat tle of Tassafaronga.79 The SG radar aboard the cruiser Min ne ap o lis de - tected Tanaka’s screen at a range of thir teen miles, but Wright waited four minutes before ap prov ing a tor pedo attack. By the time his de stroy ers launched their tor pe does, they were fir ing on the Japa nese from astern. The veteran Tanaka would not al low the Ameri can force to ambush him. In - deed, he had trained his crews to wheel and fire tor pe does if surprised. The de - stroyer Takanami, closest to the U.S. force, launched a salvo of tor pe does but im me di ately drew fire from Wright’s force and sus tained fa tal dam age. The remain der of Tanaka’s destroy ers re leased their cargo contain ers and par al leled https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/7 18 Mahnken: Asymmetric Warfare at Sea MAHNKEN 113

the Amer ican ships. The Japa nese launched nearly fifty tor pe does, some of which tore into the U.S. cruiser line, sinking the cruiser Northampton and bat - ter ing Min ne ap o lis, New Or leans, and Pensacola. To make things worse, Wright’s two rear-guard de stroy ers took friendly fire be cause they lacked the task force’s recog ni tion code. Tassafaronga was the most success ful tor pedo attack of the war and a text - book ex ample of night fight ing. Tanaka not only de liv ered sup plies to the troops on Guadalcanal but dealt a crush ing blow to a supe rior Amer ican force. By avoiding the use of search lights and employ ing tor pe does instead of guns, his force made itself diffi cult for the Amer icans to locate and engage. Even after the bat tle, the U.S. Navy was unsure of the size and compo si tion of the Jap anese force.80 The battle also exposed Amer i can weaknesses. For one thing, Wright’s force had been thrown together un der inex pe ri enced leader ship. Nor could the U.S. Navy’s tech no log i cal ad van tage com pen sate for poor night-fight ing skills. Indeed, the use of radar caused U.S. ships to train all their heavy guns on the clos est Jap a nese ship, Takanami, leaving the others untouched. Despite Japa nese vic to ries at sea, however, the condi tion of the fifteen thousand Jap anese troops on Guadalcanal contin ued to worsen. Much of the force was at the point of starva tion, and ma laria was ram pant. Even the healthy were prac ti cally in ef fec tive due to ex haus tion. On 31 De cem ber, the Jap a nese Im pe- rial Gen eral Head quar ters de cided to evac u ate Guadalcanal. U.S. in tel li gence de tected the buildup for the op era tion but misin ter preted it as prepa ra tions for an other of fen sive.81 The evac u ation oc curred over three differ ent nights between 2 and 8 Febru ary, but the Amer i can forces on Guadalcanal were un aware that no Japa nese remained on the is land un til the after noon of 9 Febru ary.82 The Guadalcanal campaign marked a turn ing point in the Pacific War. It improved the strate gic posi tion of the United States in the southwest Pacific. By oc - cu py ing Guadalcanal and its air field, the United States could control the sea lines of com mu ni ca tions to Aus tra lia. The cam paign also ex acted a con sid er able toll upon the Japa nese. By its end, Japan had lost two-thirds of its 31,400 troops on the is land. The United States, by contrast, had lost fewer than two thou sand of the ap proxi mately sixty thousand Marines and soldiers it had deployed. While the Japa nese navy was the clear vic tor in many of these bat tles, it could not afford to pay the price in ships that the United States could. The campaign also deci - mated the strength of Japan’s elite corps of na val avia tors. In try ing to hold Guadalcanal, Japan con sider ably dimin ished the fight ing power of its fleet. By the time it was de cided to with draw from Guadalcanal, Japan’s naval strength had been so eroded that it was unable to stop the subse quent Ameri can advance north toward the home is lands.

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TRANS LAT ING IN FOR MA TION AD VAN TAGE INTO TAC TI CAL SUC CESS The Guadalcanal cam paign shows that tech no log i cal su pe ri or ity does not in ev i - tably yield vic tory. Instead, the weapon systems, doc trine, and orga ni za tion of op posing forces inter act, in ways that are often complex. The campaign also demon strates the impor tance of situ a tional awareness and friction in warfare. Fi nally, the case shows that technol ogy may be employed un der op er a tional con- ditions pre vi ously unfore seen by its de velop ers. Vic tory lies with the force that is better able to adapt its weapon systems to lo cal condi tions. Through out the cam paign, Amer i can forces en joyed a marked tac ti cal advan - tage over the Japa nese dur ing day light hours. Be cause the United States con - trolled Henderson Field, Amer ican air craft were able to domi nate the seas around the is land. More over, ra dar gave U.S. command ers an advan tage in car - rier battles in open waters. During the battle of the Eastern Solomons, U.S. air-search radar de tected the approach ing Japa nese air strike at a dis tance of eighty-eight miles, giv ing Fletcher suffi cient time to launch fifty-three fight ers with full fuel tanks to meet the in coming at tack. It also al lowed Amer i can air control lers to vec tor fighters to attack the Japa nese force without fear of be ing am bushed by Jap a nese fight ers.83 Rather than contest ing U.S. supe ri or ity dur ing the day, the Japa nese navy chose to conduct the major ity of its op era tions at night. Indeed, it saw night combat as an asym met ri cal strategy to circum vent the strength of the U.S. Navy. It pos sessed a coher ent tacti cal system for night fight ing as well as weapon systems opti mized for such op era tions, and it had conducted de cades of re alis tic train ing to hone its skills. Radar gave U.S. forces the means to de tect, track, and tar get Japa nese sur face forces before they spotted the Amer icans. Yet the United States proved unable to exploit its advan tage in radar tech nol ogy during the cam paign. First, ra dar tech - nol ogy had yet to ma ture.84 The sets de ployed aboard U.S. ships had lim ited range and res o lu tion. More over, in ter pret ing ra dar re turns took con sid er able skill. Early sets could provide a gen eral view of objects in the vi cin ity of the ob - serv ing ship or an ac curate range and bear ing to any one object but not both si- multa neously. As a re sult, it was easy for a commander to lose sight of a rap idly chang ing tac ti cal sit u a tion. Sec ond, the navy had not de veloped tech niques to exploit the poten tial of radar. Instead, it treated radar as an overlay to op era tional concepts de signed for day light en gage ments between cap i tal ships. Nor did the navy pos sess ade quate tac tics for tor pedo de fense. In bat tle af ter battle, U.S. forces deployed in lines that offered little protec tion against Japa nese tor pedo barrages. The navy was

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also slow to learn from its mistakes, a trend magni fied by the fre quency with which it re placed its tac ti cal command ers. Fi nally, the geog ra phy of the theater lim ited the effec tive ness of ra dar. The U.S. Navy had de vel oped ra dar in antic i pation of bat tle on the high seas. Be cause many of the Guadalcanal campaign’s battles took place in confined waters sur - rounded by moun tain ous is lands, Amer i can ra dar op er a tors of ten had lim ited warn ing of the approach of en emy ships. Islands or heavy rain squalls often ob - scured re turns from sur face ships. Indeed, surface-search radar rou tinely failed to de tect destroy ers in confined wa ters be yond five thou sand yards.85 In each of the campaign’s battles, the side that pos sessed a supe rior awareness of the tac ti cal sit u ation pre vailed. It was, in other words, the ability to col lect, in - terpret, and act upon in forma tion rather than technol ogy that marked the dif - fer ence be tween vic tory and de feat. Jap a nese na val com mand ers were usu ally able to discern the loca tion and dispo si tion of U.S. forces faster and more ac cu- rately than their adver sar ies. They also acted upon that infor mation more rap- idly and ef fec tively than their Amer i can coun ter parts. Be cause the Japa nese navy had de veloped and reg u larly prac ticed concepts for night combat, its command ers and their crews pos sessed a common frame of refer ence. This tacti cal system usually gave the Japa nese a consid er able advan tage in situ a tional awareness over the Ameri cans, while long-range weaponry like the Long Lance tor - pedo gave them the ability to translate their infor mation ad vantage into tac ti cal suc cess. Dur ing the battle of Savo Island, for ex ample, Mikawa Gunichi managed to identify and engage Kelly Turner’s war ships before they spotted his force. More over, be cause Turner had di vided his forces, Mikawa was able to de feat them piecemeal. The com manders of the Ameri can and Aus tralian ships, by contrast, had little un derstand ing of the bat tle as it un folded. In the few instances where U.S. forces obtained supe rior situ ational awareness, they were vic to ri ous. At Cape Esperance, Nor man Scott’s ships mauled Goto’s re inforce ment force, largely because the Ameri can commander was able to achieve surprise and pre vent the Jap anese from employ ing their pre ferred concept of battle. Still, though the U.S. force had a tremen dous infor mation ad - vantage over the Japa nese, Scott used his radar and radio poorly. As a re sult, he failed to achieve what should have been a complete victory. Never again in the cam paign would the Ameri cans catch the Japa nese so unpre pared. Just as the campaign il lustrates the value of situ ational awareness, it also dem- onstrates the endur ing impor tance of “fric tion.” In his master work of strate gic the ory, On War, Carl von Clausewitz de veloped the concept of fric tion to encom - pass the multi tude of “fac tors that dis tinguish real war from war on pa per.”86 These in clude the effects of danger, combat’s demands for physi cal exer tion,

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im per fect or un cer tain in for ma tion, chance, sur prise, the phys i cal and po lit i cal limits of force, and unpre dictabil ity stemming from inter ac tion with the en emy. By and large, there is an in verse re lation ship be tween fric tion and sit u ational awareness: the higher the level of general friction one side expe ri ences, the lower its situ a tional awareness. 87 Friction influ enced the outcome of nearly every battle in this campaign. The ter rain and weather of the the ater of oper a tions af fected the course of many of the clashes. Both sides were plagued by imper fect and inac curate in tel ligence through out the cam paign, increas ing the po tential for sur prise. More over, both ex pe ri enced com mu ni ca tion prob lems that mul ti plied the op por tu nity for mis - un der stand ing. Amer i can forces in par tic u lar of ten over loaded tac ti cal voice cir cuits, de grad ing com mu ni ca tion be tween ships. Be cause the Jap a nese gen er - ally did a better job of miti gat ing the effects of fric tion, they nearly al ways pre - vailed in battle. In the months that fol lowed the cam paign, the U.S. Navy began to learn from its defeats. Study ing the battles off Guadalcanal closely, Commander Arleigh Burke blamed Ameri can losses on insuf fi cient drill in night combat. In the spring of 1943, Rear Admi ral A. Stanton Merrill be gan to train his de stroyers in that disci pline. At first, they trained dur ing the day, simu lating night op era tions. As his force be came more skilled, he shifted to training at night, un der harsh con di tions.88 The navy also de vel oped more ef fec tive op er a tional con cepts and or ga ni za - tional ar range ments for night combat. It be gan de taching de stroy ers from cruis - ers to al low them to employ to full effect the offen sive power of their tor pe does and guns. At the same time, Burke de veloped new tac tics for destroyer combat. He split his destroyer squadron into two mutu ally support ing divi sions. Instead of deploy ing in long lines, as they had dur ing the Guadalcanal campaign, they be gan to op erate in compact di visions of three to four ships each. Upon making contact with the en emy, one divi sion would close, fire its tor pe does, and turn away. When the first salvo of tor pe does hit and the Japa nese be gan re turning fire, the sec ond di vision would attack from another direc tion. Burke be lieved that the tac tic would be well suited to the Solomons, be cause the islands them- selves would pre vent the Jap anese from de tect ing his destroy ers before they opened fire.89 It was a brilliant inno va tion, one that capi tal ized upon the geog ra- phy of the theater—as the Japa nese had been doing all along. Finally, the navy de veloped meth ods to use ra dar more effec tively. Over time, the ra dar plot—the room that contained the scope dis play ing con tacts from the ship’s ra dar—be came the lo ca tion where in forma tion from radio and look outs was cor re lated. The combat infor mation center (CIC), as it was to be known, thus became the hub of tacti cal de cision making aboard ship. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/7 22 Mahnken: Asymmetric Warfare at Sea MAHNKEN 117

The com bi na tion of im proved tac tics and or ga ni za tion came to gether when Amer ican and Japa nese destroy ers met in the battle of Vella Gulf on 6–7 August 1943. Dur ing the bat tle, the six destroy ers that consti tuted Fred er ick Moosbrug- ger’s Task Group 31.2 used Burke’s tac tics to deadly effect. Moosbrugger’s sur face- search radar de tected the Japa nese before they became aware of the presence of U.S. com bat ants. In deed, U.S. de stroy ers launched tor pe does three min utes be fore the Jap anese force sighted the Amer icans. Moosbrugger’s force sank three Jap a- nese destroy ers and escaped unscathed. 90 Amer i can forces also en joyed con sider able success at the bat tle of Em press Augusta Bay.91 The setting for the battle was in many ways remi nis cent of that be fore Savo Island: Merrill’s cruisers and destroy ers had been assigned to protect the Marine landing at Cape Torokina on Bougainville, much as Kelly Turner’s force had been respon si ble for protect ing that on Guadalcanal. This time, however, U.S. scout aircraft pro vided ex tremely ac cu rate re ports on the approach of Vice Admi ral Omori Sentaro’s cruiser and de stroyer force. The Japa nese, by con - trast, op erat ing in poor visi bil ity and with no radar, had no idea of the size and compo si tion of the force they faced. Merrill used his sit u ational-aware ness ad - vantage to fire a salvo of tor pe does before the Japa nese force knew it was un der attack. As a re sult, Merrill sank one light cruiser and damaged another, while sinking one de stroyer and damag ing two others. The U.S. Navy re peated its suc cess at the bat tle of Cape Saint George, which was to be the last sur face battle in the Solomons.92 During the battle, Burke’s two destroyer di visions won a deci sive vic tory over five destroy ers at tempting to re - inforce the Jap anese gar ri son on Buka. Burke’s force spot ted the Jap anese force first and launched its first tor pedo salvo before the Jap anese knew they were un - der attack. Em ploy ing the same tac tics that had yielded vic tory at Vella Gulf, Burke’s force sank three de stroy ers while sustain ing no casu al ties. The na val bat tles off Guadalcanal il lus trate viv idly that tech no log i cal su pe ri - or ity does not guaran tee vic tory. At the out break of World War II, the Jap anese navy lacked sur face-search and fire-con trol ra dar. It had, however, de veloped and prac ticed a coher ent tac ti cal system for night com bat. The United States, by contrast, possessed radar but had yet to de velop concepts and orga ni za tions to exploit its poten tial fully. As a re sult, the Japa nese won vic tory af ter vic tory against the Amer i cans. It was not un til af ter the cam paign that the U.S. Navy learned how to combine ra dar with new con cepts and orga niza tions; when it finally did, the result was deadly for the Japa nese. The U.S. Navy pre ferred engage ments be tween op posing bat tle lines in the open sea. There, radar would allow the Ameri can fleet to spot its oppo nent at long range and smother him with pre cise—and lethal—gun fire. Dur ing the Guadalcanal campaign, however, the navy found itself op erat ing in condi tions

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mark edly differ ent from those en visioned by pre war strat e gists. Radar was of little use in battles waged in confined wa ters bounded by moun tainous is lands. It was not until Arleigh Burke and Stanton Merrill de veloped con cepts and orga ni - za tions that suited lo cal con di tions that the navy be gan to take advan tage of the pos si bil i ties of ra dar.

NOTES

1. Joint Board to Sec re tary of the Navy, “Blue- bomber was gen er ally su pe rior to con tem po - Orange Joint Esti mate of the Situ a tion,” 11 rary Amer i can de signs. Jan u ary 1929, JB 325, ser. 280, Joint Board 10. Boyd, “Jap a nese Mil i tary Ef fec tive ness,” p. Records, Record Group [hereaf ter RG] 225, 137. National Archives [here after NA], p. 5. 11. Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” pp. 2. David Kahn, “The United States Views Ger- 97–98. many and Japan in 1941,” in Know ing One’s En e mies: In tel li gence As sess ment be fore the 12. Harold Sprout and Marga ret Sprout, To ward Two World Wars, ed. Er nest R. May (Prince - a New Or der of Sea Power: Amer ican Naval ton, N.J.: Prince ton Univ. Press, 1984), p. Power and the World Scene, 1918–1922 (New 476. York: Green wood, 1969), pp. 302–11. 3. David C. Ev ans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: 13. Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Har bor: The Strat egy, Tac tics, and Tech nol ogy in the Im pe - Fail ure of the Sec ond Lon don Na val Confer - rial Japa nese Navy, 1887–1941 (Annapolis, ence and the On set of World War II (Cam- Md.: Naval In stitute Press, 1997), p. 18. bridge, Mass.: Har vard Univ. Press, 1974), pp. 2–3. 4. Carl Boyd, “Jap a nese Mil i tary Ef fec tive ness: The Interwar Period,” in Mil i tary Ef fec tive - 14. The best accounts of U.S. planning for a war ness, vol. 2, The Inter war Years, ed. Allan R. with Ja pan are Ed ward S. Miller, War Plan Millett and William son Murray (Boston: Or ange: The U.S. Strat egy to De feat Ja pan, Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 143. 1897–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval In stitute Press, 1991), and Louis Mor ton, “War Plan 5. Alvin D. Coox, “The Ef fective ness of the Jap- Orange: Evo lu tion of a Strategy,” World Poli - a nese Mil i tary Es tab lish ment in the Sec ond tics 11, no. 2 (Jan u ary 1959). World War,” in Mil i tary Ef fec tive ness, vol. 3, The Sec ond World War, ed. Millett and 15. Michael Vlahos, “War Gaming, an En forcer Murray (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. of Stra te gic Re al ism: 1919–1942,” Na val War 19. Col lege Re view 39, no. 2 (March–April 1986), pp. 10, 13. 6. Joint Board, “Blue-Orange Joint Es ti mate of the Sit u a tion,” p. 10. 16. George W. Baer, One Hun dred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stan ford, 7. Rich ard J. Samuels, “Rich Na tion, Strong Ca lif.: Stan ford Univ. Press, 1994), p. 136. Army”: Na tional Se cu rity and the Tech no log i - cal Transfor ma tion of Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: 17. War In struc tions, United States Navy, FTP 143 Cor nell Univ. Press, 1994), p. 97. (1934) [here af ter FTP 143], World War II Command File, Chief of Naval Op era tions, 8. See Robert C. Mikesh and Shorzoe Abe, Jap a - box 108, Op er a tional Ar chives, Na val His tor- nese Air craft: 1910–1941 (Annapolis, Md.: ical Center [hereaf ter OA/NHC], pp. 11–13. Na val In sti tute Press, 1990). 18. Baer, One Hun dred Years of Sea Power, pp. 9. The Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter was supe - 140–43. For a re cent ex am i na tion of the rior to any U.S. fighter at the out break of the fleet-problem pro gram, see Al bert A. Nofi, To war, and the Nakajima B5N Kate torpedo Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet

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Prob lems, 1923–1940 (New port, R.I.: Na val Navy, vol. 1, Stra te gic Il lu sions, 1936–1941 War Col lege Press, 2010). (Ox ford, U.K.: Clar en don, 1981), p. 294. 19. Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tac tics: Theory and 30. Spector, Ea gle against the Sun, p. 46. Prac tice (Annapolis, Md.: Naval In stitute 31. Hirama, “Jap a nese Na val Prep a ra tions for Press, 1986), p. 119. World War II,” p. 72. 20. Ron ald H. Spector, Ea gle against the Sun: The 32. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 262. The U.S. Amer ican War with Ja pan (New York: Ran- Navy believed that it would be at a dis advan - dom House, 1985), p. 20. tage in engage ments beyond twenty-one 21. Tor pedo test ing was un re al is tic and eval u a - thousand yards. See Gen eral Tac ti cal In struc - tion in ad e quate. More over, tor pedo pro duc- tions, United States Navy, FTP 142 (1934) tion was geared toward small-scale [here af ter FTP 142], World War II Com - manu fac ture, not mass produc tion. See mand File, Chief of Naval Op era tions, box Buford Rowland and William B. Boyd, U.S. 108, OA/NHC, p. 239. Navy Bureau of Ord nance in World War II 33. A subsurface version of the weapon, the Type (Washing ton, D.C.: U.S. Govern ment Print - 95, was adopted in 1935. An ae rial ver sion of ing Of fice [here af ter GPO], 1953), pp. 90–91. the weapon, the Type 94, was also devel oped. 22. Ibid., pp. 20–21. In 1940, an im proved ver sion be gan to be in - 23. On the de vel opment of radar in the U.S. stalled on Japa nese de stroy ers. Jiro Itani, Navy, see David Kite Allison, “The Ori gin of Hans Lengerer, and Tomoko Rehm-Takahara, Ra dar at the Na val Re search Lab o ra tory: A “Jap a nese Ox y gen Tor pe does and Fire Con- Case Study of Mission-Ori ented Research trol Systems,” in War ship 1991, ed. Robert and Devel op ment” (PhD diss., Princeton Gar di ner (Annapolis, Md.: Na val In sti tute Uni ver sity, 1980); Louis A. Gebhard, Evo lu- Press, 1991), pp. 121–33. See also John tion of Na val Ra dio-Elec tron ics and Con tri bu - Bullen, “The Japa nese ‘Long Lance’ Torpedo tions of the Na val Re search Lab o ra tory and Its Place in Naval History,” Im pe rial War (Wash ing ton, D.C.: Na val Re search Lab o ra- Mu seum Re view, no. 3 (1988), pp. 69–79. tory, 1979), chap. 4; and Rowland and Boyd, 34. Hansgeorg Jentschura, Dieter Jung, and Peter U.S. Navy Bu reau of Ord nance in World War Mickel, War ships of the Im pe rial Jap a nese II, chap. 17. Navy, 1869–1945, trans. An tony Preston and 24. During the exer cise, the equipment detected J. D. Brown (Annapolis, Md.: Na val In sti tute aircraft at nearly fifty miles and the splashes Press, 1992), p. 106. caused by surface-fired pro jectiles at up to 35. For an overview of Japa nese night-fight ing eight miles. See James L. McVoy, Virgil tactics, see Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, pp. Rinehart, and Prescott Palmer, “The Roose - 273–81. velt Re sur gence (1933–1941),” in Na val En gi - 36. Hirama, “Jap a nese Na val Prep a ra tions for neer ing and Amer i can Seapower, ed. Randolph World War II,” p. 67. W. King (Bal ti more: Nau ti cal and Avi a tion, 1989), pp. 192–95. 37. Hughes, Fleet Tac tics, p. 119. 25. Gebhard, Evo lu tion of Na val Ra dio-Elec tron ics 38. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 270. and Con tri bu tions of the Na val Re search Lab o - 39. Paul S. Dull, A Bat tle His tory of the Im pe rial ra tory, p. 183. Jap a nese Navy (1941–1945) (Annapolis, Md.: 26. Rowland and Boyd, U.S. Navy Bureau of Ord - Na val In sti tute Press, 1978), p. 60. nance in World War II, pp. 413–14, 422–23. 40. Ibid., pp. 76–88. 27. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 394. 41. Hughes, Fleet Tac tics, p. 120. 28. Rear Adm. Yoichi Hirama, JMSDF (Ret.), 42. Dennis Warner and Peggy Warner, with “Jap a nese Na val Prep a ra tions for World War Sadao Seno, Di sas ter in the Pa cific: New Light II,” Na val War Col lege Re view 44, no. 2 on the Bat tle of Savo Is land (Annapolis, Md.: (Spring 1991), p. 64. Naval In stitute Press, 1992), p. 55. 29. Ar thur J. Marder, Old Friends, New En e mies: 43. Vice Adm. Raizo Tanaka, with Roger Pineau, The Royal Navy and the Im pe rial Jap anese “Japan’s Losing Strug gle for Guadalcanal,”

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part 1, U.S. Naval In stitute Pro ceed ings 82, 56. Hirama, “Jap a nese Na val Prep a ra tions for no. 7 (July 1956), p. 698. Jap a nese names are World War II,” pp. 66–67. given with sur name first. 57. Marder, Old Friends, New En e mies, pp. 285– 44. “Night Training and Op era tions,” ONI Re- 87. port 261, 18 Oc to ber 1934, 907-3000, box 77, 58. Dull, Bat tle His tory of the Im pe rial Jap a nese ONI Monograph Files, RG 38, NA. Navy, p. 182. 45. Capt. R. B. Coffey, “Tacti cal Problem V- 59. Vice Adm. George Carroll Dyer, USN (Ret.), 1933-SR (Op er a tions Prob lem IV-1933- The Am phib ians Came to Con quer: The Story SR),” 16 Jan u ary 1934, RG 4, Na val His tor i cal of Ad miral Richmond Kelly Turner (Washing - Collec tion, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., ton, D.C.: GPO, 1971), vol. 1, pp. 290–93. p. 25. 60. This account of the battle of Savo Island is 46. FTP 143, p. 37. taken from Dull, Bat tle His tory of the Im pe rial 47. The U.S. Navy’s 1934 Gen eral Tac ti cal In - Jap a nese Navy, pp. 187–96, and Bruce Lox ton structions, for exam ple, described evasion as and Chris Coulthard-Clark, The Shame of the pri mary form of night tor pedo warfare. If Savo: Anat omy of a Na val Di sas ter (Annapo - eva sion proved un suc cess ful, the Amer i can lis, Md.: Naval In stitute Press, 1994). com mander would em ploy de stroy ers, cruis- 61. Spector, Ea gle against the Sun, p. 193. ers, and—if nec es sary—bat tle ships to de stroy en emy destroy ers before they closed to firing 62. Dull, Bat tle His tory of the Im pe rial Jap a nese range. FTP 142, pp. 143–44. Navy, p. 196. 48. See Minoru Genda, “Evolu tion of Aircraft 63. Ibid., pp. 197–208. Car rier Tac tics of the Im pe rial Jap a nese 64. Tanaka, “Japan’s Losing Strug gle for Gua - Navy,” in Air Raid: Pearl Har bor! Rec ol lec tions dalcanal,” part 1, pp. 693–94. of a Day of In famy, ed. Paul Stillwell (Annap - 65. John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The olis, Md.: Naval In stitute Press, 1981), pp. Se cret His tory of Amer i can In tel li gence and the 23–27. Jap anese Navy in World War II (New York: 49. Hirama, “Jap a nese Na val Prep a ra tions for Ran dom House, 1995), p. 375. World War II,” p. 70. De spite these changes, 66. Dull, Bat tle His tory of the Im pe rial Jap a nese the Jap anese navy did not consider the carrier Navy, pp. 215–21. as the prime combat ele ment of the fleet. It was not until March 1944 that the Japa nese 67. Prados, Com bined Fleet Decoded, p. 379; Vice navy would create the First Mobile Fleet, a Adm. Raizo Tanaka, with Roger Pineau, “Ja - true carrier task force, to which all other fleet pan’s Losing Strug gle for Guadalcanal,” part units, in clud ing bat tle ships, were con sid ered 2, U.S. Naval In stitute Pro ceed ings 82, no. 8 sub or di nate. Ev ans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. (Au gust 1956), pp. 815–16. 501. 68. Hiyo suffered a fire in its engine room shortly 50. Marder, Old Friends, New En e mies, p. 296. there af ter and had to with draw. 51. Quoted in ibid., pp. 296–97. 69. Prados, Com bined Fleet Decoded, p. 382. 52. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 228. 70. Dull, Bat tle His tory of the Im pe rial Jap a nese Navy, pp. 227–35. 53. The first air-search set was installed on board the battle ship Ise in May 1942. The navy was 71. Ibid., p. 238. un able to produce an ef fective fire-control 72. Prados, Com bined Fleet Decoded, p. 391. radar during the first two years of the war. 73. Dull, Bat tle His tory of the Im pe rial Jap a nese Ibid., pp. 414–15. Navy, pp. 237–49; Tanaka, “Ja pan’s Los ing 54. Norman Fried man, Na val Ra dar (Greenwich, Strug gle for Guadalcanal,” part 2, pp. 820–22. U.K.: Conway Mar i time, 1981), pp. 96–97. 74. Dull, Bat tle His tory of the Im pe rial Jap a nese 55. Boyd, “Jap a nese Mil i tary Ef fec tive ness,” p. Navy, p. 239. 139. 75. Ibid., p. 243.

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76. Ibid., p. 247. 86. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. 77. Ibid., p. 254. Mi chael Howard and Peter Paret (Prince ton, N.J.: Prince ton Univ. Press, 1976), p. 119. 78. Russell Crenshaw, The Bat tle of Tassafaronga (Bal ti more: Nau ti cal and Avi a tion, 1995), pp. 87. Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Fric tion and 25–29. Fu ture War, McNair Paper 52 (Wash ing ton, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1996), 79. Dull, Bat tle His tory of the Im pe rial Jap a nese pp. 32, 94–95. Navy, pp. 255–60; Tanaka, “Ja pan’s Los ing Strug gle for Guadalcanal,” part 2, pp. 825–27. 88. E. B. Pot ter, Ad mi ral Arleigh Burke (New York: Ran dom House, 1990), pp. 63, 75. 80. Crenshaw, Bat tle of Tassafaronga, p. 88. 89. Ibid., pp. 83–84. 81. Prados, Com bined Fleet Decoded, p. 395. 90. Dull, Bat tle His tory of the Im pe rial Jap a nese 82. Dull, Bat tle His tory of the Im pe rial Jap a nese Navy, pp. 278–79. Navy, p. 259. 91. Ibid., pp. 288–90; Pot ter, Ad mi ral Arleigh 83. Hughes, Fleet Tac tics, p. 116. Burke, pp. 95–98. 84. See Crenshaw, Bat tle of Tassafaronga, chap. 92. Dull, Bat tle His tory of the Im pe rial Jap a nese 10. Navy, pp. 294–95; Pot ter, Ad mi ral Arleigh 85. Warner and Warner, Di sas ter in the Pa cific, Burke, pp. 103–106. pp. 103–104.

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