Social Mobilization in a Fragmented Society

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY

CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN LEBANON 2005 & 2011 COMPARED

Final Thesis Master of Political Science - International Relations • Graduate School of Sciences • University of Amsterdam (UvA), the Netherlands • Written by Anne Wehkamp • completed December 2012 • Supervised by dr. Reinoud Leenders • Second Reader dr. Charlotte Hille

Social Mobilization in a Fragmented Society Contentious politics in Lebanon. 2005 and 2011 compared

Master’s thesis written by Anne Wehkamp

Student’s number 10248900

Supervisor: dr. Reinoud Leenders

Master’s programme ‘International Relations’

Graduate School of Social Sciences

University of Amsterdam

2012

Content

Acknowledgements ...... 5

List of abbreviations ...... 6

Preface ...... 7

Introduction ...... 9

Content ...... 13

1. Social movement theory and fragmented societies ...... 16

1.1. Political process and culture and cognition in social movement theory ...... 17

1.2. Social movements in the Middle East ...... 23

1.3. The dynamics of a fragmented society ...... 27

1.4. The comparative method and social mobilization ...... 29

1.5. Further considerations, limitations and practicalities ...... 30

Conclusion ...... 33

2. Historical Background – Fragmentation in Lebanese society ...... 34

2.1. Sectarianism from an historical perspective ...... 34

2.2. Fragmentation and foreign involvement in a fragile state – Syria’s presence ...... 39

Conclusion ...... 41

3. The Independence Intifada ...... 43

3.1. From opposition in politics to the political street ...... 44

3.2. Branding March 14 – networks in mobilization ...... 49

3.3. The role of emotions in mobilization ...... 53

3.4. One single movement? The role of (collective) identity in March 14 ...... 57

3.5. What happened next – Foreign involvement and dreams being shattered ...... 59

Conclusion ...... 61

4. The 2011 anti-sectarian protests...... 63

4.1. Lebanese developments between 2005 and 2011 ...... 63

4.2. The Arab uprisings of 2011 ...... 65

4.3. The evolution of the 2011 anti-sectarian protests ...... 69

4.4. Organisational aspects of the 2011 anti-sectarian mobilization ...... 72

4.5. The role of emotions ...... 75

4.6. Why did large scale mobilization fail to occur? ...... 79

Conclusion ...... 84

Conclusion ...... 86

Findings ...... 86

Suggestions for further research ...... 89

Relevance ...... 91

Bibliography ...... 93

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank dr. Reinoud Leenders for his support during the writing process of this thesis and of my academic development in general. Although he has been ready to give me as much support and advice as needed, he also gave me enough space to explore the complex country of Lebanon for myself. I am grateful for his understanding of my extracurricular activities during this writing process and the contacts he provided during the one week seminar in Lebanon, organized together with the Dutch Institute in Lebanon. I am also grateful for the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Lebanon for giving me the chance to explore Lebanon’s many characteristics and to meet people that gave me new inspiration and insights. I would further like to thank Sana and Malak for providing me with contacts within the movements. I would also like to thank Alex for keeping an eye on me during my fieldwork, for Miriam for discussing the content of my thesis with and my other friends both in Lebanon and in the Netherlands who supported me during the writing process of this thesis.

Most grateful am I for my father Herman and his enduring generosity and support throughout my studies.

I would like to contribute this thesis to my mother, Hannie Wehkamp. She taught me to be grateful, to have respect and to love. The best mum anyone could ever hope to have.

List of abbreviations

CCT – cultural and cognitive theory

PPT – political process theory

SMT – social movement theory

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

U.S. – United States of America

Preface

The start of a master’s thesis or research in general usually is an idea of an interesting theme or idea. The result of this idea is living in a country, talking with people and trying to unravel how problems you encounter in your research may be solved. The start of my thesis was different. Although my scholarly interest has always been focused on the Middle East, the start of this research was an internship at the Royal Netherlands Embassy in

Lebanon. Knowing that I would spend half a year in this country, I had to find a topic that takes quite some time to grasp. A topic on which you can read a lot, but that you will only understand fully by living in the country.

When writing this thesis, I time and time again got confirmed that I picked such a topic: fragmentation in

Lebanon.

As this thesis will show, fragmentation in Lebanon is based on different sectarian, political and social identities of people living in the country. You are not only a Lebanese citizen, but additionally you can be a

Lebanese Sunni, Shia, Christian or part of a smaller sectarian group in Lebanon. Within these sects, you can

“pick” your own political leader. As a Christian, you can follow Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, or

Samir Geagea’s Lebanese forces, dependent on your stance on Lebanon’s neighbours, the area you live in, or the leader that your history and family chose for you to follow. You can be part of the March 8 or March 14 movement, but there is also the less chosen option to be a secular Lebanese that does not want to have anything to do with these sectarian structures in society. Sometimes you are forced to live by your sect however, for example if you want to work in civil service positions or the political office, in which employment is dependent on the religious balance. People living in Lebanon have a lot of different identities. Some are chosen voluntarily, but most are being decided by birth. Daily life is structured around Lebanese fragmentation.

The capital of Lebanon Beirut is geographically fragmented, with areas where mainly Christian, Sunni, Shia or

Palestinian people live. This geographical fragmentation of Beirut was coloured by its history.

This short impression of Lebanese fragmentation hints at the influence of people’s identities on the stability of the country. Although my background in Cultural Anthropology helped me to structure and to make sense of Lebanese fragmentation, the topic needed to be narrowed down. The current unrest in the region compared to the relative stability in Lebanon made me want to grasp what makes Lebanon a peculiar case.

Although the easy answer for current the relative stable situation in Lebanon (especially for Lebanese 7

standards) is that there is no authoritarian dictator that needs to be removed, there are also factors that may foster mobilization. Still a quarter of its population lives in poverty, and “the fact that indignation and resentment exist among the Lebanese – the majority of the Lebanese – does not warrant debate” (Abbas &

Yaakoub 2011: 208). That the Lebanese are able to mobilize is shown in their history. Martyrs’ square has been filled with Lebanese protestors more than once, the last major protest in 2005. This thesis looks into the dynamics of mobilization in 2005 and compares this with the absence of large scale mobilization in the context of the Arab uprisings. It will be largely based on academic articles, but newspapers, conversations with

Lebanese friends, interviews and non-participant observation during a protest in Martyrs’ Square served as inspiration for this research as well.

Although this thesis aims at presenting fragmentation as objectively as possible, findings of my fieldwork are often highly subjective. Politics is overly present in Lebanese society, which means that respondents have strong opinions and make strong claims, dependent on “their fragment” in Lebanese society.

Their claims are often made with the interest of their own group. When a respondent of one of the interviews saw that I was trying to see how shared his opinions were and how they relate to actual events, he told me that

“to understand Lebanese politics, you have to speak to non-Lebanese people”. Although I aimed in this research to be as complete in my observations as possible, I make no pretence that I discovered all aspects of mobilization in Lebanese fragmented society. This thesis presents the view of Lebanese society from a new- comer to Lebanese affairs, trying to discover what is beneath the surface with very few presumptions. In a society were politics is omnipresent, this proved to be a benefit.

- Anne Wehkamp

Beirut, Lebanon 2012

Introduction

The assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri of Lebanon on February 14 2005, and the sharp controversies this caused, provided an opportunity for thousands of people to gather at Martyrs’ Square in Beirut. On March

8, 2005, a demonstration orchestrated by Hizbollah mobilized around half a million people. Protesters taking part denounced international meddling and praised the Syrian role in Lebanon. To counter this demonstration, on March 14, 2005 over one million protesters gathered at the same Martyrs’ Square expressing their dissatisfaction with current political events and calling for the Syrian forces to withdraw from Lebanese territory. These events formed the so-called March 8 and March 14 blocs, each consisting of a coalition of political parties.

Almost six years later, on February 7, 2011, another protest was taking place in Beirut. But instead of the masses of people that demonstrated in 2005, this time only a few hundred people mobilized to show their dissatisfaction with the sectarian political system and foreign influence in the country. The context of the Arab spring seemed to be an opportunity to mobilize by creating a sense of momentum as the political systems in other countries in the region seemed receptive to reform and people in the region increasingly gave agency to their emotions of discontent. Although Syrian troops left Lebanon, there had been little improvement in the satisfaction of Lebanese with the state of political affairs. The 8 March and 14 March movements were still active with the latter not convinced of the total exclusion of Syrian influence. The sectarian political system still had its pitfalls. The major underlying structures in society appeared to be still in place, but the outcomes in terms of mobilization were different. What changed in the motivation for people to mobilize?

This thesis explores how social mobilization takes shape in the fragmented society of Lebanon. By comparing two instances of mobilization, the main question: “How do (non)structural conditions influence the propensity for social mobilization in the fragmented society of Lebanon?” will be answered. Sectarianism in

Lebanon may form “a form a nexus of power that can restrict social mobilizations”, but may also “have the ability to ignite them” (Hermez 2011: 529).

But what may be gained by studying two events of protest one of which did not really work out? There should be a point in conducting research, whether it is done for an intrinsic value of knowledge or to have an effect on the world being studied. Social science should identify factors that can cause the spark in 9

revolutionary contexts (Dupont & Passy 2011: 2-3). There is no protest that occurs spontaneously. One should ask how people who have different values bind together. To explain what factors influence social mobilization, it is therefore also needed to study instances of mobilization that did not have impact. When investigating factors of success for social mobilization, one cannot only look at the successful instances of mobilization, e.g. cases of large scale mobilization preferably succeeding in their goals, but one should also look at why some instances failed. Only selecting cases of success will result in little explanatory value. Barbara Geddes (1990:

132) showed that indeed, “the only things that can actually be explained using a sample selected on the dependent variable are differences among the selected cases”. The population of which a researcher selects its cases should reflect nothing more and nothing less than the complete range of phenomena that her or his findings can bear upon. This thesis made the choice to select one case of mobilization that did not succeed.

Unsuccessful instances of mobilization are rarely investigated, because they seem to little effect on the social world out there. Geddes however showed that it is relevant to reflect on the entire population. By also studying an unsuccessful case, this thesis tries to contribute to mobilization studies.

John Gerring refers to the concept of “relevance” in the context of academic research as having

“significance to the lay citizens of the world” (Gerring 2012: 70).1 Showing the relationship between fragmented societies and social mobilization may prove insightful for decision- and policy makers in fragmented societies for mobilization is able to influence their work, but also for people living in fragmented societies themselves: whether they want to boost the protest they are participating in or whether they are outsiders that want to make sense of what is going on. The significance of this research is to provide answers to more general questions on fragmentation and mobilization through applying it on two cases. Especially with regard to the role of collective identities in mobilization, generalizable empirical research seems lacking: scholars that use the term collective identity take for granted its existence without offering compelling evidence that this phenomenon exists “outside the minds of the social movements analysts” (Hunt & Benford

2004: 441). Most empirical research on collective identity is limited in their scope. If we understand how certain conditions influence social mobilization in these two cases and can give more general conclusions, then

1 This is part of the trend to link research with necessary social consequences, as if science has no intrinsic value of its own. This is also reflected in John’s Duffield (2001:94) question regarding the relevance of research: “how can the policy community profit from the exercise?” Besides having an aim directed to the outside world, the analytical relevance of this thesis should not be forgotten. 10

the door is open to a more understanding of the relation between fragmentation and mobilization in other cases. Other fragmented countries in the Middle East and North African region such as Cyprus, Turkey, Iraq and

Iran experienced political mobilization along ethnic lines as well, whether society was fragmented along the lines of clans, tribes, language and/or religion (Fearon 2006: 855). Ideally, the general conclusions would also be useful for cases of mobilization in fragmented societies outside the region, such as in protest in Sub-Sahara

Africa in which each country on average has 8.2. ethnic groups that are greater than 1% of the population, and in which fewer than half of the countries have an ethnic majority group (idem: 853). The results of this research may then for instance help answering the question whether segregation leads to heated sentiments and a stronger degree of mobilization, be it within their own groups. Caution in aiming at general conclusions is necessary, however, for the findings are only based on Lebanese society. As the fragmented society in Lebanon is more often seen by scholars of the Middle East as peculiar or an exception to general political theories (Hrair

Dekmejian 1978: 252), this thesis tries to show how Lebanese mobilization has the potential to add new insights on social movement theory of fragmented societies in general.

Before reading this research, some clarification on the use of the main concepts is needed. The concept of a “fragmented society” refers to the separation in society based on sex, class and often on ethnicity.

The focus in this research is on the latter, although class also will prove to be a factor in the two cases of fragmentation under study. The concept of “ethnicity” may be described as “an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves as culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular interaction” (Eriksen 2002: 12-3). An ethnically fragmented society can be based on political, organisational as well as on symbolic groups. Ethnicity becomes politicized “when political coalitions are organized along ethnic lines, or when access to political or economic benefits depends on ethnicity” (Fearon 2006: 854). Besides being referred to as a fragmented society, Lebanon is also characterized as a sectarian society. Sectarianism may be defined as follows: (a person) strongly supporting a particular religious group, especially in such a way as not to be willing to accept other beliefs. So where fragmentation is a more general concept that can refer to any kind of separation between ethnic groups that may also accept each other´s way of thinking, sectarianism implies setting aside other religious groups and not being able or willing to accept other beliefs. Sectarianism is a result of religious fragmentation in Lebanon and often goes hand in hand with a society in which ethnicity is politicized. Sectarianism should be seen as a specific variant of

ethnic differentiation in which there is more tension between the fragments. The character of fragmentation, I will argue, is one of the many variables that influences mobilization.

The comparative framework will make use of social movement theory (SMT), an interdisciplinary approach that tries to explain aspects of mobilization. Within SMT there are two main perspectives that are of help in this comparison: Political process theory (PPT), which focuses on structural explanations of the appearance of social movements or on the ‘when’ rather than explaining why and how social movements appear, and cultural and cognitive theory (CCT), which emphasizes the dynamics between structure and agency and the social contexts. These two complementary approaches are chosen in order to capture both the agency and structure involved in the fragmented society of Lebanon. Both agency and structure are needed in order to understand social mobilization in a fragmented society. A fragmented society involves competing identity formations, and confrontations with the other. Before delving into social movement theory in the next chapter, a few words on the fragmented society of Lebanon are needed. How fragmentation takes shape in Lebanon will be further discussed in the second chapter of this thesis.

Fragmentation in Lebanon takes shape along several ethnic divisions. These ethnic divisions in society are reflected in the “geographical distribution” of Lebanese land and in the political affiliations of Lebanese people. Lebanese identify themselves and act along these lines relative to their social surroundings. However, fragmentation also influences the way people can act as well.2 A Christian Lebanese Beiruti is not often found living in Beirut’s Shia neighbourhoods. The Lebanese central bank - or any other governmental institution - must balance the religious backgrounds of their employees. Indeed, the clearest dividing line in Lebanese society is associated with religious identification (Abul-Husn 1998: 14).

The largest religious groups in Lebanon are Sunni, Shia, Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Druze and Greek

Catholics groups. Often the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and smaller Christian groups are taken together and being labelled “Christian”3. The Sunni and Shia groups are less often taken together and labelled

“Muslim”, possibly because of the size of the two large groups and the absence of smaller religious Islamic

2 For an overview of the different affiliations of Lebanese sects towards the Lebanese state, see Haddad (2001). 3 The classification of sects inside Lebanon is not always as straightforward. The classification of Christian Lebanese should for instance also take into account political and militant divides within the Maronite sect to understand what is going on. Additionally, taking the Christian group as a whole blurs the relation between Christian groups in Lebanon as well, with some groups being more closely aligned than others (Haddad 2001: 133). 12

groups. Besides these communities just listed, there are also smaller sectarian groups living in Lebanon.

Although sectarian identification in Lebanon is strong, there are differences to the extent members of sectarian groups relate themselves to their group identity. Hermez (2011: 535) showed that “it is not simply sectarianism that plays a role in the making of state and selfhood”, but that indeed, “the politics of sectarianism get moulded in ways to suit the various powers”. Therefore, the moulding of sectarianism can be better understood by taking other identifications into account, such as an alliance to the 8 or 14 March movements.

The sectarian identification dividing lines may be crossed to meet other identifications, such as political stance towards a certain subject, or daily life activities, such as being a mother. According to Thomas

Hylland Eriksen (2002: 31), individuals have many statuses and many possible identities, and it is an empirical question when and how certain identities become the most relevant. When analyzing social mobilization in a fragmented society one should not a priori take the degree of fragmentation that the subjects experience for granted since levels of fragmentation differ per person and per experience. Cultural and cognitive theory adds a less fixed perspective on mobilization in fragmented societies to political process theory.

The next section will give an overview of the research framework and content of this thesis.

Content

To explore how (non)structural conditions influence the propensity for of social mobilization in the fragmented society of Lebanon, the first chapter of this thesis will proceed with a theoretical and methodological framework capturing the relation between social mobilization and social fragmentation. This is done with the aim to build an informative framework in which to place the findings of my research. Through investigating previous social movement theory, it will appear that the use of a combination of both structural social movement theories as well as non-structural theories is likely to capture the dynamics of social movements in fragmented societies. Since this thesis focuses on mobilization in Lebanon, the history of mobilization in the

Middle East is taken into account as well. This makes it possible to place the results of this research in a broader (historical) context and add to the more general SMT. From a more methodological perspective, the next section will then explore Lijphart’s comparative method as a strategy for viewing mobilization in a comparative perspective. Since Lebanon’s fragmented society plays a key role in this research, this chapter also explores the connections between dynamics of fragmented societies to social movement research. The 13

argument is made that fragmented societies shape identities and structures that influence the propensity for social mobilization. The concluding part of the chapter will portray other methodological considerations, limitations and practicalities of the thesis, for example by giving attention to ethnographic research, the approach taken to conduct fieldwork for this research.

The second chapter will give a general introduction to the history of fragmentation in Lebanese society. The goal of this section is to make clear how (sectarian) segregation took shape in this society and its political system. As this thesis does not aim at providing a complete historical background, the chapter will focus on how fragmentation took and takes shape in Lebanese society, influenced both by long term structural processes and short term instances of change. In order to understand social mobilization, it is needed to know how society is composed. The chapter also discusses Lebanon’s more recent history coloured by Syria’s involvement after the Ta’if agreement. It shows increasing Syrian pressures on Lebanese society, which provided the backdrop to the 2005 independence intifada. This overview will lead the way to an analysis of two cases of mobilization in the third chapter. Here, I will discuss the Beirut Spring of 2005. In the fourth chapter I will discuss mobilization in the context of the Arab uprisings in 2011.

The Beirut Spring of 2005 may be labelled as a successful4 case of mobilization: successful because a large part of the Lebanese population was involved, either by participating or by being an opponent. This chapter will therefore also discuss the role of the pro-Syrian demonstration held on March 8, which formed an impetus for anti-Syrian Lebanese to respond. The focus on the anti-Syrian movement allows for more depth in the analysis. It will link the analysis to topics discussed in the theoretical chapter: the role of networks, organisational structures, emotions, perceptions and (collective) identity. The protests in the 2005 independence intifada created a sense of unity among those going to Martyrs’ Square on March 14. Lebanese fragmented society made that March 14 wanted to respond to what happened on March 8, it shaped the

4 To state that the mobilization of 2005 was more successful than that of 2011, or to make statements on their general success in relation to instances of mobilization in the region, one needs to have a standard on which the degree of success or failure of social mobilization can be measured. I measure the degree of success of mobilization in terms of the number of people and the period of time people mobilized. Besides that, one should also take into account the feelings of attachment of people to the movement and its goals. Where there many people who joined because their friends did as well? How critical were the people with regard to the movement’s goals? And how destined were they to see the change taking place that they were protesting for?

organisation and networks of the March 14 movement itself, the dreams and expectations of Lebanese who mobilized, the creation of a common identity and the feeling of disappointment that followed March 14 2005.

Five years from then, as mass mobilization commenced throughout the region, “the political landscape of the Arab world began its most dramatic transformation in half a century” (Heydemann & Leenders 2011:

647). Lebanon would not remain unaffected by these events. Just as in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, people unsatisfied with the current political situation of their country gathered at the main square of Beirut, but in this case their actions involved fewer people, did not last long and did not seem to have any significant impact. The internal differences within the anti-sectarian movement combined with discourse of disenchantment and the loss of hope prevented the anti-sectarian movement to reach the same heights as the 2005 movement.

Both chapters will make use of the theoretical framework offered in the first chapter. Applying insights of political process theory and cultural and cognitive theory provides answers to the main question. Relating to

PTT, it will focus on state structures in 2005 and 2011, the regional environment and foreign involvement, the institutional provisions for participation in place at the time, the stability of the political alignments, influence of elite alliances on government, and networks. Academic literature, news articles and policy briefings are able to provide some important insights in the structures at play. This research also investigates how people perceived these structures. CCT investigates the influence of customs, beliefs, values, symbols and rituals in mobilization (Johnston & Klandermans 1995: 3). This information is largely available through academic literature, blogs or internet pages such as Facebook. The use of ethnographic fieldwork develops “as intimate an understanding as possible of the phenomena investigated” (Eriksen 1995: 24).

The conclusion answers the main question “How do (non)structural conditions influence the propensity for social mobilization in the fragmented society of Lebanon?”. It will compare and analyze the two findings of the two previous chapters through looking at both structural and non-structural aspects of mobilization by giving an overview of the findings. It will then proceed with suggestions for further research and a reflection on the relevance of the findings of this thesis.

The next chapter will make a start in finding out which conditions matter through elaborating on the theoretical and methodological framework that helps answering the main research question.

1. Social movement theory and fragmented societies

This chapter will explore the dynamics and propensity for social mobilization in fragmented societies, such as

Lebanon, by offering a theoretical framework. This is done in multiple steps. The first step is to investigate social movement theory research. The relation between political process theory and cultural and cognitive theory in particular becomes clear with the help of the work of major scholars in the field. Social movement theory (SMT) offers tools to analyze mobilization, although these tools are not often adjusted to fit the regional peculiarities that influence mobilization. This does not necessarily mean that all SMT theories are western- biased, but rather that some studies have the tendency to take the world as a constant on which every theory should work the same. General social movement theories should be complemented with theories that take regional peculiarities into account. Since mobilization does not follow the same paths across the world but instead is influenced by regional and local factors, these contexts must be considered in order to expose a more narrowed down view of the agency and structure of mobilization. The following step is to use Lijphart’s comparative method as a strategy for viewing mobilization in a comparative perspective. Next, the dynamics of fragmented societies will be linked to social movement research. Fragmented societies shape identities and structures that influence the propensity for social mobilization. The concluding part of this chapter will show how these characteristics can be relevant from a social mobilization theorist’s point of view. Why would one study two instances of mobilization one of which only had limited effects? It will also show other considerations, limitations and practicalities involved with conducting ethnographic research.

The goal of this chapter is to link social movement theory with relevant theories on dynamics in fragmented societies, to understand how (non)structural conditions influence the propensity for mobilization in fragmented societies. Lebanon’s fragmented society is more often seen by scholars of the Middle East as peculiar or an exception to general political theories (Hrair Dekmejian 1978: 252). This thesis tries to demonstrate how Lebanese mobilization can be part of a general theoretical framework.

1.1. Political process and culture and cognition in social movement theory

Since social movement theory is closely linked to the concept of social movements, it is necessary to give a short definition of what social movements exactly are. Especially when trying to use both structural and agency oriented approaches and applying them to a relatively understudied subject area such as fragmentation, it is needed to be precise on what exactly is being discussed. Each approach within SMT will conceptualize the concept of a movement differently. Trying to focus not too much on political structures, nor too much on agency and identity relating processes, the definition of a social movement should be as “neutral” as possible.

The goal of Mario Diani’s (1992) article “the concept of social movement” is exactly this: trying to define social movement in such a way that synthesis between more structural and agency approaches in social movement theory is possible.

This research will make us of the following definition:

A social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity. (Diani 1992: 13.)

According to Diani (1992: 17), this definition involves the necessary components of social movements: networks or relations between a plurality of actors; collective identity and the presence of conflict. Therefore it can be used in a design focused on the interplay between structure and agency in social movement theory, represented by political process theory and cultural and cognitive theory.5

As the more structural component of SMT, political process theory focuses on explanations of movement’s success and failure rather than on the internal organization of social movements themselves

(Duboc 2011: 62). “The emphasis tends to be on longer cycles of mobilization and decline and on factors external to movements that can constrain and shape movement outcomes” (Schaefer Caniglia & Carmin 2005:

5 Additionally, the concept “non-movement” as proposed by Bayat (2010: 14) gives a more informal character to mobilization, describing situations in which millions of people who remain fragmented in their organization unintentionally act for a common cause through the unintended consequences of daily practices. There is no common identity as a group and the organization of mobilization lacks structure. It could be the case that the people who joined in 2005 as a group to display their dissatisfaction with the current political situation are now protesting on a more individual basis, for example by means of not giving out their votes on election day. This would become apparent in the Lebanese elections of 2013.

204). Focal points of PTT research are institutional provisions for participation; stability of political alignments; elite access and alliances; elite conflict; and the level of repression. Indeed, structural metaphors dominated the field of study on social movements: “Insurgents must find ‘cleavages’ among elites; ‘windows’ of opportunity must open for them; participants are recruited through ‘networks’; social movement organizations compete in a social movement ‘industry’; the right frames must be discovered to express cultural meanings”

(Jasper 2004: 1).

Goodwin and Jasper (1999) argue that PPT has two major weaknesses: a strong bias in favour of metaphors of structure, and an incapability to reach agreement on the definitions of its basic concepts.

Structural factors are emphasized more readily than elements of agency. These scholars (1999: 47) show that

PPT theorists tend to reify culture, “instead of conceptualizing (and analyzing) culture as a ubiquitous and constitutive dimension of all social relations, structures, networks, and practices”. PPT scholars should recognize that cultural and strategic processes define and create the factors usually represented as

“structural”.

This study argues that structural processes in mobilization should not be forgotten, but instead should be complemented by studies that focus on agency in mobilization rather than structure. Since structure and agency are mutually influential in daily life, persuasive analysis should take both into account. Economic, social or political structures influence the way people respond, dependent on their personal identities and cultural surroundings. This goes beyond the black box theories “that seem to suggest that movements wondrously appear out of social structural conditions” (Hunt & Benford 2004: 438). The first step in analyzing mobilization is a dialectic relationship between the individual and its surroundings. Besides framing mobilization in the social and cultural context, there will be an emphasis on identity construction and emotions to provide more insight in Lebanese fragmented society. As this chapter will show, investigating the role of fragmentation in a society necessarily means delving into people’s perceptions of themselves, their group, and of the others. Participation in social movements frequently involves an enlargement of personal identity for participants and offers fulfilment and realization of the construction of the self (Oberschall & Kim 1996: 63).

Gradually, PPT scholars recognized that their theory was lacking the other more discursive side of the story. Six years after the publication of Goodwin and Jasper’s article, Schaefer Caniglia and Carmin (2005: 204)

showed that later political process scholars did not limit their attention to structural factors alone, but extended their reach to include cultural and social contexts as factors that attenuate movement dynamics.

By making use of “an interpretative lens” cultural and cognitive theory of social movements is able to show the fluent character of mobilization and to emphasize agency in explaining why social mobilization occurs

(Schaefer Caniglia & Carmin 2005: 205). The changing character of fragmentation in a society can be explained by looking at how people construct their identity. As already shown, fragmentation can refer to a division of society along sectarian lines, but also for example along the lines of political affiliation. Fragmentation is based on certain identity constructions. Since people may have different identities at the same time, society can be split along different lines of fragmentation. Instead of seeing identities as relatively fixed as PPT does, cultural and cognitive theory brings a more fluent perspective on mobilization in fragmented societies. The main argument of CCT is that “movements arise and work within social and cultural contexts that are ripe with meaning. Participants are motivated to join movements, at least in part because they resonate with their personal values and beliefs” (idem: 205). The cognitive elements such as values, beliefs and ideas, show how a sense of unity is constructed, being composed of individual identities.

The concept of identity can thus be a useful tool to understand the role of personal values and beliefs.

Identity refers to the “state of mind that includes a view of self, attitudes, lifestyles, and experiences shared with others which is publicly recognized and labelled, and which is usually associated with role, membership, and/or category, though not concretely anchored in social structure” (Obesrschall & Kim 1996: 64-5). This is related to the concept “feeling of belonging”. Sofia Hamaz and Ellie Vasta (2009) describe this concept as feelings of community, home, acceptance and affiliation in and to spaces and places. It is “a complex social process which for many entails multiple affiliations across space and place, as well as multiple identities and expanded identities” (Hamaz & Vasta 2009: 22). People have ‘multiple belongings’ that stretch beyond the bounds of the nation-state (Hamaz & Vasta 2009: 7), to for example a certain fragment in society or to a social movement.

The membership of a group of people with a certain identity, for example a religious or class identity, consequently creates out-groups: people who do not belong to the same group as you do. “Political identities include boundaries, relations across the boundaries, relations within the “us” and within the “them,” plus accumulated meanings assigned to the boundaries and relations (Tilly & Tarrow 2006: 2). Distinctions between

group members and the out-group create fragmentation. This fragmentation influences mobilization, as Hunt and Benford (2004: 432) show when they state that collective identities6 in social science are seen as “both a necessary precursor and product of movement collective action”7. This way, cultural and cognitive theory is able to link fragmentation to characteristics of social movements.

Individuals are connected to social movements through framing. Problems are articulated in a certain rationale that makes that people of certain groups identify with these issues (Schaefer Caniglia & Carmin 2005:

205). The communication of a common public identity explains why people join social movements. The strategies of social movements are being framed in the same discourse. Organizations select tactics based on functional criteria such as familiarity, perceived efficacy, and the messages they want to communicate to the public (idem: 206) and their own group. Identities cause subconscious actions and behaviour (Oberschall & Kim

1996: 65). When established in-group identities do not correspond to or are confronted by structural realities in the world “out there” that negatively affects group members, social action is likely to occur. Since the 1960s, collective identities are increasingly seen as a premise for social action to occur since a “strong identification with a collectivity makes participation on behalf of that collectivity more likely” (Hunt & Benford 2004: 437).

This way, the understanding of the idea of different collective identities that people have helps to understand why mobilization occurs in one year, and stays absent in the other.

The discourse and communication of a social movement gives a tool to study the internal dynamics of a social movement. Cultural and cognitive theories’ emphasis on agency and the individual shows that change in mobilization should not only be sought for outside the movement. This would neglect “large categories of change, particularly the agency of members” (Baylouny 2011: 163). In line with CCT, Anne Marie Baylouny

6 Hunt & Benford (2004: 434-441) give an historical overview of the use of the concept collective identity in classical and contemporary social sciences, which they define as “a shared sense of ‘we-ness’. Insights of how a collective feeling of belonging to a certain common identity can affect society can be found at Karl Marx’s concept of collective class consciousness as a necessary condition for his revolution. Emile Durkheim argues that a collective identity can lead to collective representation, in which the collective has become a living ‘object’ that lives, thinks, feels and acts. Acts against the collective representation become personal. Lastly, from a Weberian perspective, collective identity comes from various sources, be it class, status or party. Collective action requires the development of collective identification. “From the 1960s onward collective identity as a concept replaced class consciousness as the factor that accounts for mobilization” (Hunt & Benford 2004: 437). Within this movement, identity was thought to influence the way opportunities are being perceived and used. 7 The concept of identity has been used to explain the emergence, trajectories and impacts of social movements, to analyse grievance constructions and framing processes, motivations for participation, activists’ tactical choices, life-course outcomes and emotions (Hunt & Benford 2004: 433). 20

argues that a lot of mobilization takes place in the informal everyday spheres of life, for example through watching television. She argues that the development of the Hizbollah owned television station al-Manar, in which there seems to be a softer stance against American influence, are due to the central role of women in the organization (idem: 164). Internal dynamics in the movement can change its direction, since movements depend on their memberships’ approval (idem). The growing importance of women for Hizbollah is reflected in the space and progressive stance that they are allowed to take in its broadcasting. “Women have taken advantage of their importance and pushed the boundaries” (idem: 178). The discourse of al-Manar shows the internal dynamics of the movement. However, although Hizbollah communicates its progressive stance in the media, the framework of a religious party and militia remains intact (idem). This study shows again the importance of taking into account the group members of social movements.

These cognitive aspects have consequences for the role of culture in mobilization. The values emphasized by the cognitive aspect of this theory are moulded into the broader culture of the group via institutionalization and routinization (Johnston & Klandermans 1995: 9). Culture is being consumed by the group members through public discourse, persuasive communication and the raising of consciousness. There can be for example a “culture of protest” within a certain group, which lowers the threshold of mobilization.

Through networks of meaning, active attempts by members to persuade others, and through discussions among participants, a collective consciousness or culture is being created (idem: 10). Culture is seen as “a stock of knowledge that allows a person to perform as a competent member” (idem: 13).

However, collective action is more than “just a matter of political consciousness” (Gamson 1995: 89).

People may join protests without making the conscious choice to do so. As Reinoud Leenders (2012a: 430) states: social mobilization may be caused by other conditions, such as “dense social networks involving clans, labor migration, cross-border movements, and crime”. People may join a protest because other members of the in-group did, because of the social position of the particular person, or because joining would lead to other social benefits.

While combining aspects of PTT and CCT, Katheleen Blee and Ashley Currier (2005: 130-1) demonstrate that the rise of social movements could be seen at three important arenas, in which social movements develop sets of characteristics: interpersonal, organizational and ideological. The interpersonal characteristics of a social movement reflect the interpersonal ties among participants and between participants

and outsiders. “The relationships of friendship, antagonism, love and betrayal – a group’s “economy of affection” – can unite a social movement or hasten its collapse” (Blee & Currier 2005: 130). These interpersonal relations affect the collective identity present in the movement. The interpersonal relations may be manipulated for this reason. This may be done by the organization of the movement or by some of its members. The interpersonal strategies may thus be uneven within groups and change over time (idem).

Secondly, research on the arena of organizational characteristics shows that the homogeneity or heterogeneity within movements influences the movement’s outcomes (idem: 131). The legitimacy of the leadership of the movement is given by its members, and therefore will strengthen or weaken by the membership’s approval of choices taken. As also shown above, not all members of social movements make the conscious choice to do so.

There are also members of the movement that are not “members in the organizational sense”, and who might just be “superficially and sporadically engaged by struggle” (idem: 131). Finally, the arena of ideological characteristics refers to research done on the connection of group beliefs to the concerns of members, potential recruits and audiences. This arena can be subdivided in research that show that “a major ideological task confronting social change groups is the need to define some aspect of current social life as problematic”, and studies that argue that “social movement groups try to create an expectation that a problem can be remedied through collective action, thus creating a foundation for solidarity and collective identity” (idem:

131).

Besides looking at research done on how social movements grow, for a comparative perspective it is also interesting to see why movements demobilize. This may give us clues on why the major part of the anti- sectarian movement in 2011 stopped organizing protests. Pascal Menoret (2011) showed how internal aspects of political movements influence their strength. Internal power relationships or a lack of a clear group identity can cause members to break with the movement. In the case of Menoret’s (2011: 60) research, disengagement of members of political movements in Saudi Arabia was not caused by repression of the government (macro- structure) but was rather “triggered by mismanagement and subsequent exhaustion of militant and human resources”.

Demobilization may also take place because the members do not feel engaged with the causes of the movement anymore. The term “social fatigue” is used by Duboc (2011: 62) to describe the “weariness of individuals who feel alienated from their social and political environment and do not engage in debates on how

to bring about an alternative to the status quo”. The informality of networks can represent an opportunity of exit, “enabling actors to keep their level of engagement minimal and thereby facilitating phasing down their activism” (Duboc 2011: 65). Duboc (2011: 68) demonstrates that both structural and non-structural factors,

“such as internal divisions within communist organizations, the failure to articulate a political goal, and individuals’ social and intellectual networks and affiliations” also shape the practice of the movement.

Demobilization is in her view not a structural problem of the organization itself as Menoret argues, but is being caused by the way individuals experience participation in a movement. Yet, the dichotomy between mobilization and demobilization is not as strict as it may seem. By showing how Egyptian intellectual activists in the 1960s and ‘70s framed their participation in political organizations and social movements, the option of the middle road becomes apparent. Duboc (2011: 62-3) speaks of a decentred notion of activism, “meaning that the centre of gravity of activist practices has been challenged and restructured”.

This section showed the insights provided by cultural and cognitive social movement theory. Political process theory’s emphasis on structure however should not be forgotten. Opportunity matters. “Changes in the broader political structure and climate may open and close the chance for collective action to have an impact” (Gamson 1995: 89), and may be seen as a driving factor for mobilization to start with. The next section will focus on the regional environment of Lebanon, the Middle East and North Africa. Changes in regional structures have an impact on local level events, and to understand how mobilization does or does not take place in Lebanon, it is good to know the regional history of mobilization and the role of a general social movement theory as opposed to a theory solely focused on the Middle-East and North Africa as a peculiar region.

1.2. Social movements in the Middle East

Social movement theory as a field of study has almost solely been applied to western contexts. Only in the last ten years, when studies on social movements became mainstream, this sub-field of social science has become internationalized (Beinin & Vairel 2011: 2). Studies on mobilization are now being applied to other regions, such as to the Middle East and North Africa. The emphasis of peculiarity pushed the Middle East and North

Africa back to the margins of social science.

Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel (2011: 3) argue in favour of an approach in which Islamic activists are considered “as ‘normal’ social actors having resources, strategies, and practices that are comprehensible using the tools of social science”. Indeed, the regional aspects should be seen as complementary to general social movement theories rather than mutually exclusive. Making use of general SMT concepts does not mean that concepts such as Islam, or nation, or class do not need to be contextualized and localized. Since concepts in social science are “produced in relation to a socio-historical context, they are not automatically reproducible from one case to another” (Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel 2011: 8). The networks that SMT focuses on can only be grasped if the social aspects of power relations are being revealed. Additionally, if one would disregard the aspect of context (be it rational or regional) in studying social movements, one would also disregard the fact that “political struggles offer opportunities for learning and experimentation” (idem: 13). The history of protest should be taken into account. One scholar who investigated mobilization in the Middle East from a historical perspective is Asef Bayat (2002; 2010).

Bayat (2002) explores the nature of grass-roots activism in the region to defend livelihoods and pursue social developments. Activism in the Middle East takes many forms (Bayat 2002: 3): it is complex, diverse and dynamic (2002: 3). The degree to which individuals feel the incentive to let themselves be heard depends on the subtext of a society’s structure, which varies from country to country. Country specific factors “such as the extent to which the educational system is an effective force for change”, shape the form of social mobilization

(UNDP 2002: 119). In general, Bayat distinguished six different forms of activism in the Middle East: urban mass protest, trade unionism, community activism, social Islamism, NGOs and quiet encroachment8. The focus of this thesis is on the first form, urban mass protest, for the protests under study are carried out in the centre of the capital of Lebanon: Beirut. That these protests were carried out in an urban setting is not a coincidence.

In another work Bayat (2010: 11) demonstrates that contentious politics are primarily produced and expressed in urban settings. “When people are deprived of the electoral power to change things, they are likely to resort to their own institutional clout [...] to bring collective pressure to bear on authorities to undertake change.” When institutional power is lacking, as is the case in Lebanon, the street becomes the arena to show discontent. Besides offering an alternative place to go to, urban protest also functions as a place to express

8 Quiet encroachment refers to direct actions of individuals and families to acquire the basic necessities of their lives in a quiet and unassuming, illegal fashion. 24

grievances, enlarge solidarities and hereby enlarge the in-group, which also shapes patterns of protest. The shared expressions of public opinion in public spaces is what Bayat (2010: 12-3) labels the political street.9

The results of these protests in the Middle East were mixed. At times, governments in de Middle East responded with measures of repression, but at others they gave in a little to the demands of the protestors.

Heydemann and Leenders (2011: 649) show that both civil society and regimes learn from previous experiences of themselves and in the region. Regime strategies “should be seen as complex, multilevel games involving regimes, publics, and external actors, in which regimes develop strategies that aim to affect the strategic calculus of citizens, allies, and adversaries [...]”. Consequences of these riots should not be seen as fixed or predictable but rather as dependent on context. When states lose control and become vulnerable, street politics has the potential to develop in large scale mobilization (Bayat 2010: 74).

Writing in 2010, Bayat (2010: 75) argues that large scale mobilization is rather uncommon in the

Middle East as compared to other regions. Only under revolutionary conditions: in times of crisis; in times of war; or when the state is totally absent, social mobilization may occur. The absence of large scale social protest may also be caused by the weakness of cooperation at the level of the community. Social networks are largely based on kinship or ethnicity. Other communities remain “largely causal, unstructured and paternalistic” (Bayat

2010: 75). Another reason for the absence of large scale mobilization has to do with the social contract of the

9 The dynamics of the political street are apparent in the urban protests in the 1980s, when urban riots expressed discontent with some aspects of neo-liberal policies implemented in the Middle East, such as the austerity policy measures taken to reduce state deficits. During the civil war in Lebanon, Lebanese citizens joined to stage “a massive demonstration in Beirut against the drop in the value of the Lebanese pound” (Bayat 2002: 4; Bayat 2010: 68-9). Trade unions to represent workers in the Middle East disappeared at decolonization, when labour organizations were integrated in the political system. In 2010 only Jordan, Morocco and Lebanon still had independent pluralist unions (Bayat 2010: 71).Due to stricter control of the governments in the Middle East, the amount of protests decreased in the 1990s (idem: 69). This coincided with ordinary people moving away from tolerance of the regime. Roel Meijer (2009: 198) demonstrates the case of the Egyptian al-Jama’a al Islamiyya movement that fits the pattern as described by Bayat. Whereas the movement started as a loosely organized group of students, a more formal organization of the movement appeared in 1977, and really took shape after 1979. Next to national influences on the movement, the Iranian revolution of 1979 inspired the organization. From now on, (violent) revolution was seen as a strategy in order to achieve the formation of a certain practice (Meijer 2009: 198). By establishing social, educational and health services, the Jama’a succeeded in gaining popularity among Egyptian citizens. However, in the late 1980s the Jama’a movement “increasingly came into conflict with the state” (Meijer 2009: 207). The insights of Meijer demonstrate that the ideological development of social movements in relation to their sense of reality is crucial to understand them (Meijer 2009: 217). The movement developed not only due to external circumstances, but also through tendencies within the movement: in this case “from a strong Salafi tendency [...] to a phase in which the Jama’a were forced to give reality and the general good more room” (idem).

state with the lower and middle classes of society. Because there is little sense of collective identity, “many people still look at the states as the main source of protection” (idem: 76).

After the 9/11 events, the political street revived as a concept, “despite the Middle East’s regimes’ continuous surveillance of political dissent” (idem: 14). Street politics was based on nationalistic and anti- imperialistic concerns. The developmental state of the Middle East was in a deadlock (idem: 27). According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2002: 1), the main two challenges faced by the Middle

East in the new millennium are the pursuit of freedom from fear and freedom from want. These challenges are caused by “significant deficits in Arab countries with respect to key elements of human well-being: civil and political freedoms, the status of women in society, and access to knowledge. The Middle East was seen as being at a crossroads, facing the choice between a continuation of doing nothing, or constructing institutional arrangements that can transform “the huge potential of Arab integration into a reality” (idem: 32).10

During the 2011 Arab uprisings, large scale social mobilization across communities in the “region that used to be characterized by passiveness and stability” proved to be possible (Aarts, Van Dijke, Kolman, Statema

& Dahhan 2012: 34). Although many experts characterized the situation in Arab states as unsustainable

(Laipson 2011: 4), no academic specialist on the Middle East predicted “the timing and the extent of the region- wide upheavals in the Arab world that began in December 2010 and continue today” (Gause 2011: 11). The causes of these protests are complex, and cannot be grasped by only looking at the claims for fundamental rights and democracy (Powell 2012: 208). Being fed up with corruption, the incompetence of the regimes and the lack of jobs, people in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria took the streets. Hazem Kandil (forthcoming) demonstrates reasons for mobilization of the middle class in Egypt. The state alienated this class by their economic liberalization policies, staggering unemployment and no trust in future developments, resulting in mass scale protests. These protests inspired activists in Lebanon to mobilize against the sectarian regimes. “The strategy, building from revolutionary movements elsewhere, was to mobilise people with the help of social

10 Arab countries progressed in the level of political participation. Freedom of expression and association has increased over the last twenty years (UNDP 2002: 109). This could be considered as a part of authoritarian learning. More open, flexible governance in the Middle East are elements of the upgrading of regimes. This can be seen in the growth of access to media, telecommunications technologies, and the internet (Heydemann 2007: 19). They confront the demands made by for example UNDP-reports on democratization and market- based economic reforms, but nonetheless still use coercion as an important component of their policy (idem: 2). By manipulating identity categories Arab regimes were able to stay in power. Indeed, they employed “divide and role tactics by accentuating existing divisions, be they tribal, sectarian, or the divide between secular and Islamic politics” (Baumann 2011: 510). 26

network sites, such as Facebook, and to ensure that nodes of activity spread beyond Beirut [...]” (Hermez 2011:

527). Until the time of writing, this has not been the case.

This thesis will analyze the Lebanese 2011 protests as compared to those in 2005 by making use of the comparative method. This comparative framework shows the differences and similarities between the two instances of mobilization in relation to Lebanese fragmented society.

1.3. The dynamics of a fragmented society

The first step of this research is to investigate the degree of social fragmentation in 2005 and in 2011. The word degree is not meant to indicate a fixed measurement of social fragmentation but rather is used to refer to the social dynamics of fragmentation at play in 2005 and 2011. These are not fixed and measurable in a quantitative manner, but should be studied in terms of relativity towards each other by investigating different aspects of fragmentation.

Indicators of social fragmentation can be based on social, cultural or economic fragmentation. To analyze fragmentation in Lebanon, ethnographic fieldwork was conducted in 2012. However, these results will not be able to explain on its own the degree of fragmentation at play in 2005 or 2011. Critical reading of news paper and academic articles provided the recent historical information needed to grasp the degree of fragmentation of the two times under study. Academic scholarship on social fragmentation gives indications on how to measure fragmentation.

For instance, Simon Haddad (2002) conducted a quantitative analysis on cultural diversity and sectarian attitudes in Lebanon. His research was focused on group consciousness and inter-group interaction to measure the degree of fragmentation. The degree of group consciousness indicates how people relate themselves to a certain fragment and perceive themselves as distinct from other groups (Haddad 2002: 294).

Group consciousness has three dimensions: group cohesion, group solidarity and satisfaction with group membership. Relating survey questions are for example “how attracted do you feel to your sect?”, “I believe that my sect can serve this country better than any other sect”, and “I am particularly proud of being a member of my sect” (idem: 298). Secondly, inter-group interaction was also studied to understand fragmentation.

Relating questions refer to the confidence levels towards other groups, or to what degree respondents feel comfortable interacting with members of other groups (idem: 301). 27

Arend Lijphart (1981: 355-6) gives four criteria on how to measure degrees pluralism. Pluralism is a necessary condition for fragmentation. The criteria are part of an ideal type. “All societies deviate from the ideal type, and the degree to which they deviate can be used as an indication of their degree of pluralism”

(Lijphart 1981: 356).

First, Lijphart states that “it must be possible to identify exactly the segments into which the society is divided”. In Lebanon, this may seem like an obvious question: one would automatically think of the sectarian divides. However, other divides exist as well, such as the division between the 8 and the 14 March movement.

When conducting fieldwork, a useful interviewing technique may be to “ask for explanations of what seemed obvious to the interviewee. Asking about the obvious could elicit the categories that interviewees took for granted, and could yield surprising results” (Suleiman & Anderson 2007: 5). One advantage as an inexperienced researcher is that this technique is more a necessity than a technique that is consciously applied. Secondly,

Lijphart (1981: 356) states that “it must be possible to state exactly the size of each segment, that is, how many people belong to the segments”. When taking as an assumption that the segments are based on sects, In the case of Lebanon, stating their exact size is problematic. The last official counting dates from 1932. However, there are estimations that can hint at the exact size of each group. Third, in a plural society, there must be

“perfect correspondence between segmental boundaries and the boundaries between the political, social, and economic organizations”. If Lebanon would be a fragmented society, Maronite, Shia and Sunni sects would have their own political parties, hospitals, schools, and labour unions. To a certain extent, it is possible to link organizations in Lebanon to certain fragments, but the dividing line is not always strictly applied: mixed organizations exist as well. The final criterion is that loyalty towards the political parties (part of the third criterion) should be constant. This will be shown in little or no change in the voting support of the different parties from election to election. “In a perfectly plural society, an election is a segmental census” (Lijphart

1981: 356). This criterion is problematic because of the lack of knowledge on the size of the fragments.

The comparative ethnographic approach of this thesis makes these criteria to a certain extent subjective and perhaps even arbitrary. The degree of pluralism present in Lebanese society depends on the data of analysis: the answers given by respondents and the literature. These criteria may be used as a tool to measure the respondents’ feelings of belonging to his/her fragment. Subjective results gives us insight in the cultural and cognitive aspects of fragmentation and show how subjects perceived fragmentation in Lebanon.

1.4. The comparative method and social mobilization

This thesis does not use a methodology of clear cut steps that result in an answer. Instead, it uses the comparative method as a guideline for theoretical reasoning. Arend Lijphart (1971: 683) defines the comparative method as “a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables, not as a method of measurement”.11 It is not a specialized technique, but rather a strategy. Comparative political research in relation to studies of social movements is often used to “investigate the impact of national political characteristics or important historical changes on social movements” (Della Porta 2002: 290).

The two variables being compared in this case are social fragmentation and social mobilization both in

2005 and in 2011, by keeping other variables as constant as possible. Studying mobilization in a comparative manner does not allow for any statistical manipulation. The relatively small distance in time between 2005 and

2011 would mean that contextual influences are relatively limited. However, meantime developments, such as the Hizbollah-Israeli conflict, make that these instances of mobilization are influenced by other social factors.

These developments should be taken into account to guarantee the reliability of this research. Most comparative studies in social movements stress the historical peculiarities of each country or past experiences that influences the variables involved12 (Della Porta 2002: 293).

This indicates one of the main problems of the comparative method, namely that there are too many variables, and only a small number of cases to be compared (Lijphart 1971: 685). Charles Ragin (2004) distinguishes larges N, variable oriented research, from small N, case study approaches. Large N studies take one or a small number of variables across a very large number of cases. Case oriented research on the other hand latter examines many aspects of each case. In case-oriented research, the specifics of each case are relevant for this may uncover patterned diversity. “Cases often deviate from common patterns, but these deviations are identified and addressed” (Ragin 2004: 138). Additionally, accounting for every case is impossible, since one cannot explain all the variation. “There is simply too much randomness in human affairs” to permit for these “deterministic explanations” (idem: 136). This thesis shows that case oriented research can make use of different variables as well. The comparative method compares a small number of cases in depth,

11 Italics in original. 12 The historical framework of this thesis is presented in chapter 2. 29

but still makes use of variables in order to show a relation between social fragmentation and social mobilization. At the same time, this approach allows for deviation from the expected results of these variables.

Another advantage of using the comparative method in this approach is that it can show the influence of culture. If one takes as a premise that the major structural processes, such as the political system or the availability of networks, stayed the same in Lebanon in 2005 and 2011, differences between these two instances of mobilization may be explained by other factors, such as cultural changes, becoming stronger or weaker. Intra-national comparisons “can shed lights on the relationship between the relevant variables by analyzing the variance of structural variables and movement types” (Kitzinger 2002: 8). Caution is needed however, since there is a time gap of six years that must be taken into account. Other political structures might have changed. One could argue for example that there was a greater opportunity to mobilize in 2005 than in

2011. Nevertheless, using the comparative method may add new insights on the relation between structure and agency.

1.5. Further considerations, limitations and practicalities

The aim of this thesis is to provide insights on mobilization in fragmented societies, in the hope that the findings of this research are applicable or may provide knowledge on social movements in other fragmented societies as well. However, social movements have a volatile character, being influenced by a broad range of variables (Kitzinger 2002: 10). Goals, tactics, group identity, cultural influences, regional influences, and political opportunity are all components of this research. These variables differ per situation. It is difficult to match the characteristics of the instances of mobilization under study with other instances of mobilization. This research may provide for insights on the relation between fragmentation and social movements, but should not be generalized without caution.

More practical matters are relating to the conduction of ethnographic fieldwork. As this chapter showed, this thesis will use a comparative method in analyzing the mobilizations of 2005 and 2011. This method as described by Lijphart is not a clear recipe. It does not offer a list of steps or a technique, but rather provides a framework to structure research. That is why an ethnographic method of fieldwork is carried out to show how to discover aspects of mobilization that may be compared. Ethnographic fieldwork has three aims: it describes customs and traditions, institutions, the structure, or what people say they do; it gives a description 30

of daily life or people, or how they carry out the customs and traditions; and finally it aims at recording typical ways of thinking and feelings associated with culture (O’Reilly 2005: 8).

One aspect crucial for good ethnographic fieldwork is to spend enough time in the field. This research is based on a fieldwork period of six months. Preferably, the amount of time spend in the field would be longer, in order to become part of the daily routine; to have time to learn and understand as an insider does; and to have time to guide the research in other directions (idem: 12). Ethnographic fieldwork is an inductive enterprise. Theory should emerge from the data (idem: 21). Hypotheses should develop out of ethnographic fieldwork, to prevent restrictions and distortions in thought (idem). This theoretical framework therefore does not offer any hypothesis. It has shown possible relationships between social movement theory and fragmented societies, by showing for example how identity constructions in movements and society can interact, but it does not make any predictions. This is a conscious choice, to avoid taking up a pair of glasses and being blind for what’s going on besides the a priori made predictions. This does not mean that a literary research before going to the field is unnecessary, for it provides a coherent argument that leads to the description of a proposed study (idem: 35). Since ethnographic fieldwork aims at coming as close to the daily worlds of people as possible, it is important to investigate the role of the researcher. Researchers are not objective tools (idem:

222), but are being shaped by their cultural history, thoughts and interests. This makes a certain degree of interpretation of phenomena required (idem: 103).

Non-participant observation13 during one demonstration at Beirut’s central square enlarged the ability to grasp the points of view of the people under study (idem: 96). In most ethnographic research settings, participating research can only be done after trust is gained from the respondents and one becomes part of the group it is observing. For the respondents it was clear that I was an outsider. The answers given to me during this demonstration should therefore not be taken on face value. From a practical point of view, it was not possible to become part of certain groups. This was not so much caused by the limitation of language, since most people in Lebanon speak French or English as a second language besides their first and natural language

13 Participant observation is a key element of the ethnographic method. Through participation in rituals the researcher can gain insight in the point of view from the subject under research (O’Reilly 2005: 96). The concept of non-participant observation is used to describe a situation in which the researcher does not actively take part in the ritual itself but rather is mere observing how others are performing the ritual. Here, the emphasis is more on the element of observation than on participation. During the observation I was not carrying flags or expressing slogans. I used non-participant observation in order to gain insight in the experience of a demonstration. 31

Arabic. Most Lebanese are suspicious of outsiders. “Especially when people were talking about their personal experiences” (Suleiman & Anderson 2007: 5), answers given are often highly subjective. On the one hand this was no problem since part of the research is to investigate feelings and emotions of protestors. Yet, it also created the impression that people were less genuine in their answers than they would be to fellow Lebanese.

As one Lebanese scholar told me during an interview: people were happy to show me a picture of beautiful

Lebanon, rather than to show what was going on behind the surface. One way to overcome this was to show my knowledge on Lebanese society and to take a Lebanese Arabic language course. However, these solutions are not sufficient, which is the reason why I choose to complement ethnographic data with scholarly research and articles in news papers. During this research I also kept track on the virtual aspects of mobilization, mainly through Facebook. The strategy of those who protested in 2011 was to enlarge the in-group with the help of social network sites, this aspect of mobilization needed to be involved as well. Most Facebook pages are in

Arabic, but with the help of translations checked by Lebanese friends, this still gave me an impression of what was going on online.

Finally, the instances of mobilization in 2005 were performed by two different groups, what would become the anti-Syria 14 March movement and the pro-Syria March 8 movement. The focus in this research is on the former. This is done for several reasons. First, the tumultuous months of February and March started and ended with anti-Syrian protest, in which pro-Syrian protests on March 8 mainly formed a reaction than a protest favouring Syrian involvement as such. Additionally, a focus on different aspects of the March 14 movement bears more fruits. Rather than staying on the surface and investigating both parts of the 2005 mobilizations, this research goes more in depth by investigating only one. An investigation of the anti-Syrian protest covers a larger time span, making it more suited for investigation of the growth of the movement and thus be better able what conditions (in addition to the March 8 protest) made the anti-Syrian movement grow over time. Thirdly, another aspect for analyzing March 14 in greater depth than March 8 is that it was composed of multiple fragments, more so than the pro-Syrian movement, making it also possible to investigate the aspects of an internally fragmented movement. On a more practical side, there is more accessible information (in English) on the structural and non-structural aspects on the March 14 movement than on the

March 8 movement. Additionally, it proved to be difficult to find respondents that participated and actively memorized March 8. The focus on the March 14 rather than March 8 movement does not mean that the role of

the latter remained untouched, for indeed it certainly was of influence in the structural and non-structural elements of mobilization in the March 14 movement, as will be shown in the third chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the use of the main concepts in this research. It demonstrated that social movement theory could be subdivided in an approach that emphasizes the more structural elements of mobilization (political process theory) and an approach that focuses more on the elements of agency in mobilization (cultural and cognitive theory). Since the elements of structure and agency are mutually influential in daily life, this thesis takes both into account through elaborating both on networks, organization and opportunities as the role of individual and collective identities and emotions. These variables give insight in the growth and demobilization of social movements. It also became clear that country or region-specific factors can indicate the tradition of mobilization. Social movements are capable of learning and adjustment.

In order to demonstrate the role of fragmentation in Lebanon, this chapter also provided a discussion on the measurement of social dynamics of fragmentation at play in Lebanese society in 2005 and 2011. The comparative method provides a strategy to compare two different points in time along various variables.

Mobilization in Lebanon is approached as a case study that makes use of different variables provided for by social movement theory. Yet, the methodological framework is not without limitations. Although the aim is to provide general conclusions, the results of this case study should not be generalized without caution. Ideally, this research would be repeated in other similar cases to increase the validity of this research.

The next chapter of this thesis will provide a historical background, to show how fragmentation takes shape in Lebanese society.

2. Historical Background – Fragmentation in Lebanese society

Lebanon is something special, unique, and therefore the Lebanese are special and unique. What has made Lebanon unique are many things: that it has eighteen recognized religious communities but that none can impose its will on the rest, requiring all to compromise, the country’s openness to both East and West, its large Christian population when compared to than in other Arab countries; and the quality of its educational system and culture. (Young 2010: 8.)

The goal of this chapter is to make clear how fragmentation takes shape in the society of Lebanon by presenting a short historical overview. It will start by discussing the major developments of state formation and agreements ratified with regard to Lebanon to understand the development of the sectarian divisions. An analysis of society as this thesis does should start on the state level to understand the framework that shapes society. This discussion will focus on the role of sectarian tensions, external penetration and the weakness of the state. Instead of providing a complete historical background, this chapter uses a historical framework to show how the fragmented society of Lebanon became as it is of today and how Lebanese society coped with these fragmentations. In order to answer the question “How do (non)structural conditions influence the propensity for social mobilization in the fragmented society of Lebanon?” one has to discover why fragmentation makes Lebanon a peculiar case. The first step to this end is to analyze the historical, social and cultural context that shapes networks, opportunities and the idea of a collective identity. Social movement theory does not transcend cultural differences completely since people’s behaviour is influenced by their surroundings. Lebanese surroundings are characterized by fragmentation. Analyzing fragmentation in Lebanon gives the background in which to place the propensity for mobilization.

2.1. Sectarianism from an historical perspective

The Lebanese fragmented society does not only involve religious backgrounds of Lebanese citizens, but is also

“structured” along political, class or social lines, which will become clear after reading this framework.

Fragmentation shaped the Lebanese state. “The social and political history of Lebanon has experienced outbursts of civil strife and violence” caused by its precarious democracy and grievances of dominant groups in society (Khalaf 1987: 45). However, sectarian division will appear to be most present. As Ralph Crow (1962:

489) stated in his in 1962 published Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese Political System, “any explanation of 34

Lebanese politics will be incomplete unless the role of religious attitudes and organizations are taken into account.”

Crow was not the first scholar to acknowledge this, and will not be the last. Lebanese history is being defined by its engagement with the problem of sectarianism. Historians, political scientists, anthropologists and legal scholars have employed “numerous conceptual and methodological approaches to examine, diagnose and propose treatments for the problem of sectarianism, and these approaches, moreover have changed over time” (Weiss 2009: 142). The historical overview presented in this chapter fits within the time scheme of the post late 1990s studies, in which sectarianism is being situated in a historical context. The period from the late

1990s until now is marked by more critical analysis of the cultural, social and institutional underpinnings of

Lebanese sectarianism (idem: 143). This can for example be seen in Simon Haddad (2009: 402)’s statement in

Lebanon: From Consociationalism to Conciliation: “Any understanding of contemporary Lebanese politics needs to take account of its historical origins.” In this paradigm, sectarianism is no longer studied to seek a cure for

Lebanese political problems, but rather to show the consequences it has for the system. By making use of social scientific methodologies the effects of Lebanese sectarianism are shown (Weiss 2009: 150).

One of the effects of Lebanese sectarianism in social life and in the political system is the degree of political and social stability: “Political culture and social structure are empirically related to political stability”

(Lijphart 1969: 208). The degree to which political institutions and processes recognize the role of religious communities and the needs of society, influences the way sects are responded upon.

The basis of sectarianism in the political institutions may be traced back to the Ottoman Turks, who introduced confessionalism to the Lebanese political system (Haddad 2009: 402). The confessional political system continued when the French proclaimed the state of Greater Lebanon in 1920. According to Picard

(1996: 63), the establishment of Greater Lebanon did not create a reality of a state. Origins were contested, there were plural political cultures active, and people were only loyal to their local environment. During this period, the last official census was held. In 1932 it was estimated that Christians (of which the Maronites were the largest group) exceeded the non-Christians (mainly represented by Sunni’s and Shia) by a 6 to 5 ratio

(Haddad 2009: 402). When the allied forces occupied the territory in 1941, the French promised Maronites independence. This was achieved in 1943 (idem: 403), when pro-Lebanon and pro-Arab parties mobilized in demonstrations for independence (Picard 1996: 68).

From independence in 1943 and until 1975, Lebanon has been a relatively stable state “with a political and economic system that was the envy of many” (Najem 2012: 1). The two “founding documents” of the

Lebanese state are the formal constitution and an informal14 understanding called the “National Pact”

(Traboulsi 2007: 109). The constitution established a consociational democracy15 in the political system. The formal organization of government reflected the religious structure of society (Crow 1962: 489). Maronites had

“political primacy”: the president of the republic would always be from this community (Picard 1996: 70). This position entailed exceptional powers, such as initiating legislation, veto legislation, and to call for new elections

(Traboulsi 2007: 110). As a head of state, the president was made “unaccountable for his actions during office”.

The National Pact supplemented the constitution by confirming the power-sharing formula among the different communities, defining the identity of the state as a “country with an Arab profile that assimilates all that is beneficial and useful in Western civilisation”, and refuting colonialism “to reassure traditional Syrian phobias”

(idem).

The two founding texts of the new republic and the way they were read would cause a great part of

Lebanon’s future conflicts (Traboulsi 2007: 111). Paradoxically, the intention of creating two texts was to reconcile opposing views within the country over matters of identity and foreign policy and to “stabilize expectations among sects by defining the manner in which power was to be distributed” (Haddad 2009: 403).

Yet due to the different historical backgrounds of Lebanese communities, reaching consensus on fundamentals was not possible (Haddad 2002: 292). Indeed, “each sect held its own independent institutions and political aspirations” (idem). Although the premiership and the speakership for parliament were reserved for Sunni and

Shia, respectively, the greater amount of power in place for the Maronites would increasingly become a matter of dispute.

With the growing demographic weight of Muslim society in Lebanon from 1943 onward, Maronites were asked to give concessions to Muslim demands for more power. Growing tensions led to civil strife in

14 There is disagreement among scholars on the (in)formality of the National Pact. Picard (1996: 69) for example calls the National Pact, “tacit, but formal”. However defined, scholars agree that the National Pact was, in relation to the constitution, a more informal agreement. 15 Consociationalism is a form of power-sharing in government involving guaranteed group representation. According to Lijphart (1969; 1981)´s consociational model, in divided societies such as in Lebanon, which also have very few overlapping memberships and loyalties, pressures toward moderate attitudes are absent and conflict is more likely. Political stability then depends on moderation. When elites make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation, a degree of political stability can be reached. Stability in this context is expected to hold lesser degrees of social mobilization. 36

1958, “demonstrating the feebleness of the internal equilibrium and further deepening Christian-Muslim cleavages” (Haddad 2009: 403). These widening cleavages were further influenced by resurgence of Arab nationalism, Palestinian military build-up in the country, the distribution of wealth and Lebanon’s foreign policy orientation (idem: 404). On these issues there were “as many opinions as there were Lebanese” (Picard 1996:

97). Tensions exploded in 1975, resulting in a civil war that would last for fifteen years. Internal divisions prevented intergroup dialogue, prompting foreign intervention (Haddad 2002: 292). Damascus repeatedly tried to stop the conflict, partly so to prevent any other regional powers, such as Israel, Iraq or Saudi Arabia, from gaining influence (Haddad 2002: 293).

Under Syrian sponsorship the “Document of National Understanding”16, known as the Ta’if agreement, was ratified by Lebanese parliamentary deputies in 1989. It set off a huge improvement in the state’s security conditions. It facilitated the reconstitution of the Lebanese Army and the state’s control over most of the country’s territory, putting an end to the reign of total lawlessness (Leenders 2012b). Although the agreement brought modifications in terms of the allocation of political power, it did not change the fundamental sectarian character of Lebanon: sectarian proportionality and social cleavages remained, be it in another balance (Picard

1996: 156; Traboulsi 2007: 244; Najem 2012: 122). Or, as Haddad (2002: 293) states: “The accord ended sectarian violence in Lebanon but failed to promote cooperation among Lebanese groups and also to restore the country’s sovereignty”. Collective cultural identities are celebrated, group particularities defended (Picard

1996: 157). The political elites of Lebanon continued or even increased their reliance on confessionalism for political support and legitimacy (Leenders 2012b), as was also reflected in the adjusted Constitution.17 All was arranged to prevent resentment over the hierarchy in the political system by ensuring that none of the main centres of power (the presidency, Cabinet and Parliament) would predominate (idem). The 6 to 5 ratio in favour of Christians, was changed to a 5 to 5 with Christians and Muslims being equally represented. The executive powers of the Maronite president were being diminished in favour of the Council of Ministers. The role of the parliament and its speaker were being upgraded.

16 Translation stems from its original Arabic name Wathiqat al-wifaq al-watani 17 The constitution stated that during a period of transition political confessionalism should provide the basis for proportional representation in key public institutions. This included the Council of Ministers and the Parliament. It applied to all high ranking positions in the public administration (Leenders 2012b). 37

According to Tom Najem (2012: 43-7), the Ta’if agreement led to three long-term connected implications of the civil war. To start, the war caused Lebanon to lose its effective authority as a state. Since the political system was still based on confessionalism, and since the strong sense of separate identity present in the confessional backgrounds that shape Lebanese society, the political system was unable to compromise.

Secondly, the demographic changes in the country made that power-sharing arrangements were largely seen as illegitimate. Finally, foreign elements, largely represented by Syria, penetrated and destabilized the system by intentionally keeping it weak.

Arend Lijphart’s (1969; 1981) concept of consociational democratic systems and their major conditions for success is explanatory to understand the weakness of the Lebanese political system. Lijphart (1969: 216) defines a consociational democracy as a “government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy”. This construction becomes successful if elites have the ability to accommodate divergent interests, to transcend cleavages and to join in common effort with other elites, to commit to the maintenance of the system and finally to understand the perils of political fragmentation (Lijphart 1969: 216). With the ratification of the Ta’if accord, the power of the president was being diminished, in favour of the prime minister, the cabinet, the parliament and its speaker. The post-1990

Lebanese political system was also known as “the troika system” in which the Maronite President, the Sunni

Prime Minister, and the Shia Speaker of the House all have roughly equal powers.

The confessional background of these actors was influenced by the strong identification in society of people with their own confessional group. “Functionally, for the Lebanese, the religious community is his nation: that is the people to whom he belongs and with whom he identifies” (Crow 1980: 40). This feeling is enhanced by the fact that citizens have no opportunity for representation outside the confines of their sect, which prevents a state-citizen relationship from occurring (Choucair-Vizoso 2008: 115; Haddad 2001: 131).

Common understanding and effort to maintain the system was low, which may be explained by the lack of a common national identity, which “coincides with sub-cultural or sub-national communal identification”

(Haddad 2002: 304). Indeed, Haddad (idem) states that national unity is a pre-requisite for democracy. “People must first consent to live together in order to avoid civil war, and second, ensure the presence of effective bases for mobilization, such as political parties that cut across ethnic lines.” Sectarian tensions caused a

“confessional oligarchy” to appear, which prevented modern institution building, which is again reflected in

everyday life. Lebanese society is confronted with the absence of coherent policies in “all aspects of Lebanese life, from inadequate implementation of rules and regulations, to the illegal exploitation of natural resources, to chaotic urban and rural development” (Choucair-Vizoso 2008: 119).

2.2. Fragmentation and foreign involvement in a fragile state – Syria’s presence

Lebanon’s history is coloured by “foreign battles” fought on Lebanese ground. This is partly due to its fragmented character. “Its sectarian divisions offer rich opportunity for meddling; in turn, foreign interference awakens the worst fears and instincts of rival groups” (International Crisis Group 2005: 8). One of the main sources of foreign meddling and increasing tensions in Lebanon has been the Baathist regime in Syria. The sectarian political system was heavily influenced by Syrian presence in the country18. Syrian presence commenced in 1976, as a peacekeeping force, invited by mainly Christian Lebanese citizens. During the war,

Syria incorporated the fragmented Lebanese system. It began to use the cleavages to its advantage, and eventually controlled the presidency, the judiciary and the intelligence apparatus (Choucair-Vizoso 2008: 119).

When the war was over, Syria’s influence over the Ta’if implementation process was not limited to “assisting” with security issues, but also involved designing the new founding texts (Najem 2012: 52). The constitutional reforms of Ta’if changed the Lebanese political system. Nearly fifty agreements were signed between Lebanon and Syria, including the Lebanese-Syrian treaty of Brotherhood of 1991 (Leenders 2012b). Although the Tai’if agreement reflected the full assistance of Syrian forces in restoring the Lebanese state for a maximum of two years after which redeployment would follow, their involvement would stay apparent until 2005. This was mainly due to the ambiguity of the Ta’if agreement, which did not stipulate an exact time frame and level of

Syrian presence in the country.

Arguably, there were two motivations for Syria to be involved in Lebanese affairs. It could use their influence in Lebanon in the negotiations on the Syrian-Israeli conflict, by arguing their influence over anti-Israeli

18 The three long term influences – the weak state, sectarian tensions and foreign infiltration – can all be seen in the growth of the Party of God, Hizbollah. In absence of a strong state, to provide for social, political or economic security, Hizbollah created these resources for their own community18 and formed in a way the “actual power on the ground” (Obeid 2010: 335). That a Shia movement decided to provide for their own community, shows the strong feelings of belonging and identification within the group, rather than to the state. This was also made possible by sponsoring of Iran and military support from Syria (International Crisis Group 2006: 1). 39

Hizbollah. In return for keeping Hizbollah in check, Syria could use Lebanon as a means of exchange in return for the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War, influence in Lebanese affairs would strengthen the geo-political position of Syria (Najem 2012: 56). Syria’s role in Lebanon is being shaped both by Syria’s ambitions, but also by the weakness of the Lebanese system, that made intervention possible

(Choucair Vizoso 2008: 119).

Lebanese decision-making or Lebanese policy corresponded to Syrian preferences in virtually every respect, which caused opposition but also support for Syrian presence. For instance, Lebanese political factions that accepted the Ta’if accord, were able to participate in political affairs, whereas others who had their doubts on Syrian involvement were challenged at entering the political process (Fakhoury-Muehlbacker 2008: 5). The

Syrian involvement increasingly formed another source of fragmentation in Lebanon. In return, Syrian presence simultaneously manipulated and kept under wraps underlying sectarian tensions in Lebanon (International

Crisis Group 2005: 1). Not only security matters, but the whole Lebanese state was entrusted to Syria’s officials

(Traboulsi 2007: 246). Syria influenced which Lebanese politicians came into power, in order to keep them

“under check”. “For most of the post-1990 period, the most significant obstacle to a stronger Lebanese state was posed by Syria’s desire to keep the Lebanese government weak” (Najem 2012: 44). This was made possible by Lebanese “sectarian fabric, feeble state institutions, reliance on patronage and enmeshment in corruption” that “enable and encourage the outside interference on which so many of its leaders depend” (International

Crisis Group 2005: 1). Domestic and foreign roots come together in a Lebanese crisis, in which it is risking to lose its balance (idem).

The instances of mobilization under study were highly influenced by the political situation that appeared after the accord of Ta’if. Reinoud Leenders (2012b) describes besides Syrian involvement in the

Lebanese system of political settlement, four other also interrelating features. First, until 2005, the political process was chronically incapable of generating decisions, characterized by the battles of competence between the “three presidents” of the Lebanese system and its emphasis on fragmentation of elites (zu’ama) and along confessional communities. Furthermore, the system was dominated by a troika of the President, Prime Minster and Speaker of Parliament and its partitioning of the spoils, privileges and resources of public office (idem:

131). Finally, the arrangements of the Ta’if accord were not respected, and there was support for political elites was extremely weak, exposing them to confessionalist strategies and narrow, local agenda’s (idem).

Successive events caused tensions to rise after Ta’if. In 2000, geo-political balances changed when

Israeli-Syrian negotiations collapsed, Hafez al-Assad died and George W. Bush got elected as president. U.S. understanding for Syrian support for Hizbollah and its presence in Lebanon decreased (International Crisis

Group 2006: 3). From 1990 until 2000, Syrian presence had been seen by the international community as a stabilizing factor, even though tensions between proponents and opponents of Syrian presence grew. Within the new discourse, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 155 in September 2004. It called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces out of Lebanon.

At the mean time, Syria was still involved in Lebanese politics by trying to keep one of what it considered as its “puppets” - President General Emile Lahoud - in power, even though that would require an amendment of the constitution. After hearing about this planned decision of Bashar al-Assad’s, and despite his efforts to prevent this from happening, Hariri came under (Syrian) pressure to accept this decision. Not accepting it would mean the end of his reconstruction plans and his political career as a whole. One day after the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1559 calling for free and fair presidential elections in Lebanon and called upon remaining foreign forces to withdraw from the country (UNSC 2004), “the Lebanese parliament dutifully approved the constitutional amendment” and Hariri could begin his “diplomatic battle against resolution 1559” (Blanford 2009: 107-8).

After the decision was taken, Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri resigned. This caused political activist across the political spectrum to join in December 2004 and in February 2005 to demand the withdrawal of

Syrian troops in Lebanon (Choucair-Vizoso 2008: 120). Tension was building up in the country. The direct cause for mass demonstrations in March 2005 was the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri at the centre of Beirut, which released an accumulation of frustration by Lebanese residents. Thousands of people gathered in the streets to protest in what became to be called the Beirut Spring.

Conclusion

This chapter made clear how fragmentation takes shape in Lebanese society and how this has come about. The

Lebanese society is religiously, socially and politically fragmented. This fragmentation shaped the Lebanese state. Of these divisions, sectarianism is most present. This study fits in the current post-1990 academic

tradition by having a more critical analysis of the cultural, social and institutional underpinnings of Lebanese sectarianism.

The main message that this chapter gives is the existence of a lack of a national feeling of belonging, or a national collective identity. From the establishment of the state of Greater Lebanon, there were plural political cultures active and the idea of being a state was fragile. This was not done away with after Lebanese independence in 1943. Lebanese pluralism would colour the country’s history. The power of Maronnites in the political system was increasingly put to question due to growing demographic weight of Muslim society, which in the end led to a civil war that would last for fifteen years. The Syrian sponsored Ta’if accord ended sectarian violence but did not lead to cooperation among the different groups in society, a common national identity, a stronger state, or to the restoration of the country’s sovereignty. Throughout its history, Lebanese sectarian divisions offered opportunity for foreign meddling on Lebanese ground. Syria became the “main meddler” after the Ta’if agreement. Anti-Syrian sentiments in Lebanon grew especially after 2000, which in the end would lead up to massive pro- and anti-Syria demonstrations in 2005.

This overview provides the historical context to frame the instances of protest of 2005. By showing the contexts in which people mobilized as well as their personal stories, the next chapter will investigate how

(non)structural conditions influenced the propensity for social mobilization in the fragmented society of

Lebanon with regard to the 2005 independence intifada.

3. The Independence Intifada

This chapter will analyze the 2005 mobilizations focused on the climax on March 14, which is referred to as the

Beirut Spring, Independence Intifada or Cedar Revolution19. One reason why March 14 grew to the extent that it did was because it was a reaction to the March 8 movement reacting against the anti-Syrian protests. March

14 wanted to make it clear that their supporters were fed up with the political situation. This cycle of action and counteraction means that discussing the networks, organizational aspects and emotional and identity aspects of one movement necessarily involves touching upon what happened on the other side of the stage.

The focus on the March 14 movement in this chapter therefore also means touching upon the mobilization on

March 8 to see the dynamics of counter-mobilization. Yet to make let this analysis go more in depth, the choice was made to focus only on the March 14 movement.

There are several reasons why this research focuses on March 14 rather than March 8. First, the tumultuous months of February and March started and ended with anti-Syrian protest, in which pro-Syrian protests on March 8 mainly formed a reaction than a protest favouring Syrian involvement as such. An investigation of the anti-Syrian protest covers a larger time span, making it more suited for investigation of the growth of the movement and thus be better able what conditions (in addition to the March 8 protest) made the anti-Syrian movement grow over time. Another aspect for analyzing March 14 in greater depth than March

8 is that it was composed of multiple fragments, more so than the pro-Syrian movement, making it also possible to investigate the aspects of an internally fragmented movement. On a more practical side, there is more accessible information (in English) on the structural and non-structural aspects on the March 14 movement than on the March 8 movement. Additionally, it proved to be difficult to find respondents that participated and actively memorized March 8.

19 The term “Cedar Revolution” was coined by the U.S. Bush administration, to prevent the term intifada, which was thought of as having uncomfortable associations with Palestinian suicide bombers. According to Blanford (2009: 156) the term shows little understanding of the sensitivities surrounding Lebanon’s national symbol, for the Cedar has been used in the past by nationalist Christian militias during the war. Besides hinting at an outsider’s perspective, the term Cedar Revolution may also be used to make the actual event look more significant as when the term “independence intifada” is used. The word intifada means revolt but may also be used to describe a situation of convulsion. Many Lebanese were therefore also using the term Cedar Revolution, for they had the feeling that “what was taking place at Martyrs Square was the possibility of a revolution, an opportunity for a metamorphosis of their society into something more modern, where a citizen could be a citizen, not the factotum of a religious community [...]” (Young 2010: 4). 43

The goal of this chapter is to understand how structural and non-structural conditions influenced the propensity for this case of social mobilization in the background of Lebanese fragmented society. As this chapter will show, fragmentation shaped the organisation and networks of the movement, the dreams and expectations of Lebanese who mobilized, the creation of a common identity and it shaped the feeling of disappointment that followed March 14 2005. Through discussing the major topics in social movement theory as presented in the first chapter, this chapter shows that one can only understand the growth of the movement by looking at Lebanon’s fragmented background.

Many of those Lebanese that participated look back at March 14 with a feeling of crushed hopes of unity in Lebanon. It was an event that involved most Lebanese sects: Sunni’s that resented the death of their leader, Christians arguing for Syria’s departure and Shia Lebanese as the great outsider and opponent that needed to be responded to. The large scale mobilization of mainly Shia Lebanese on March 8 had to be topped.

However, there were also people present who just wanted to attend in order to have a look at what was going on. After reading this chapter, it should become clear that fragmentation shaped mobilization in March 2005 in both structural and non-structural ways. First however, it is needed to give an overview of major developments after Rafiq Hariri’s assassination February 14, 2005.

3.1. From opposition in politics to the political street

Arguably, the start of the mobilization in 2005, although limited in scope, was in late 2004 when

Lebanese politicians revolted against the extension of Lahoud’s tenure as president of Lebanon.20 Opposition

20 One can also take a more longer term approach, and argue that Lebanese resistance to Syrian presence started already in the end of the 1980s during Ta’if negotiations. At this time, Christian leader Michel Aoun carried on his “liberation war” against Syrian influence in Lebanon, in which “hundreds of thousands of demonstrators surrounded the presidential palace in Baabda in December 1989” (Jaafar & Stephan 2009: 169). That the movement did not achieve its goals was mainly caused by the lack of an overall strategy, its limited nature and the fact that only Christians were involved in the movement (idem: 170). In April 2000, the twenty fifth anniversary of the Civil War, supporters of Aoun (who was at the time at exile) gathered again in response to Bashar al-Assad’s reliance on Lahoud, the exclusion of mainstream political elites, and signs that American support for Damascus supposedly had weakened, to demand Syrian troops to leave Lebanon. Or, even going further back in time one may also argue that the divisions are part of Lebanese history. According to Paul Tabar, associate professor Anthropology at the Lebanese American University of Beirut specialized in Lebanese nation-building, the March 8 and March 14 movements have always existed in Lebanese history, yet were shaped as a division between pro-Western and pro-Arab Lebanese citizens. The division in society in favour or against Syrian involvement should not be seen as something new, but rather as something that was present throughout the country’s history (interview with the author, November 16, 2012). 44

forces met at Beirut’s Bristol Hotel between December 2004 and February 2005, and formed what would later be known as the Bristol Gathering21. This coalition demanded a total withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and may therefore be seen as the backbone of the anti-Syrian movements in Lebanon (Jaafar & Stephan 2009:

171).

Hariri was not part of the core of Syrian opposition, realising that “Syria was an ineluctable fact of life for Lebanon and that maintaining strong, healthy relations was of crucial importance to Lebanon’s stability and future prosperity” (Blanford 2009: 115). However, there should be limits to the amount of influence that Syria had in Lebanese affairs. Hariri and the rest of the Bristol Gathering were not alone in being unsatisfied with the involvement of its eastern neighbour. Whereas the sky was filled with fireworks showing the celebration of

Lahoud’s supporters, tension arose in parts of Lebanese society that were against Syrian presence and that saw in the prolonging of President Lahoud’s tenure continuing repression. The day on which it became clear that

Lahoud’s tenure was prolonged was the start of a deep political Lebanese crisis that helped pushing Syrian forces out of the country in a matter of months (Leenders 2012b).

On October 20, 2004 Rafiq Hariri resigned as Prime Minister, hoping to sweep the parliamentary elections of May 2005 with his Bristol coalition partners. Although agreeing with Ta’if, Hariri did not see himself as an opposition figure since he disagreed with resolution 1559. Yet his political rejection of Lahoud’s prolonged tenure had made him the symbol of Syrian opposition (Blanford 2009: 116). His importance became clear after the huge bomb blast that killed Hariri and 22 others near the St. George Hotel in the centre of Beirut on the 14th of February 2005.

Although the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is until the day of writing still investigating what happened on February 14, initially Syria was widely blamed for Hariri’s death, and not only by the Christian opposition.

Or, in Nicholas Blanford’s (2009: 140) words: “Hariri’s death was shattering 15 years of sullen Sunni acquiescence to Syrian rule in Lebanon. Like an aircraft carrier altering course in the ocean, the Sunni community was turning with an inexorable momentum into outright opposition”. Growing numbers of people gathered at the Koreitem, Hariri’s office and residence, demanding for Syria to leave the country. The following

21 The official name for the Bristol Gathering was the “Committee for the Defense of the Constitution and the Defense of the Republic”. The Bristol Gathering included those parties in Hariri’s bloc: the Qornet Shehwan coalition, the Progressive Socialist Party of Walid Jumblatt, the Democratic Leftist Parties, members of the banned Lebanese Forces and exiled members of Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement (Choucair 2005). 45

three days Beirut’s streets would remain mostly empty, with schools being closed and most people staying at home: not only in order to mourn but also out of security reasons.

These empty streets would be filled on February 16, when tens of thousands Christians and Muslims attended the silent march leading from Koreitem to Beirut’s Martyrs’ square where Hariri’s funeral would take place. The event became more than a funeral. It was a demonstration against Syrian presence in the country in which different groups in society were involved. The feeling of having a mutual enemy created a sense of belonging to a common community.

Glamorous Maronite women, wearing chic black dresses and sporting designer sunglasses, chatted in French and held aloft pictures of Hariri. Next to them stood Muslim women in white headscarves and full-length gowns whose husbands at midday kneeled on the road to pray. Christian students chatted to their Muslim and Druze counterparts; turbaned Shiite clerics stood next to Christian priests. (Blanford 2009: 146.)

Besides creating a feeling of community among different sects in Lebanon, Hariri’s assassination also created a strong feeling of a momentum and determination for Lebanese in different sects to get Syria out of the country. The Lebanese opposition to Syria took the street in what they labelled the “Independence Intifada”, calling for the government to resign and for Syrian troops to withdraw from Lebanon. Ignoring government warnings on the dangers of public protest, exactly one week after Hariri’s assassination, around 25,000 people gathered in front of the St. George Hotel. With the growing number of people going to these demonstrations, the Independence Intifada grew as a concept as well.

Three days after this demonstration, Syria’s deputy foreign minister announced that Syrian deployment would limit itself to the Bekaa Valley. This was not seen as enough. Many tents were placed at

Martyrs’ Square and formed the so-called “Camp Freedom”, which would become a symbol of the

Independence Intifada. Protests followed on February 26 and 28. At this time, no party flags were in sight any more. “From now on the only flag at the demonstrations would be the national flag and the red and white motif of the ‘independence intifada’” (Blanford 2009: 154). The movement had grown to tens of thousands of

Lebanese, the government had resigned, and daily Lebanese newspaper An Nahar wrote that February 28 was a “celebration of national unity, democracy and free will” (idem: 157).

Although there was a large sense of unity among those involved with the protest on March 14, one should keep in mind that there were also groups in Lebanon that did not attend these protests. These people

were not as emotionally involved with the euphoric feeling of change as other Lebanese. The first group of people that did not attend were those who had other things on their minds. As Haroud, a Christian security guard from an Armenian background who worked at the time at An Nahar22 time told me: “I could see that it was busy. There was a lot going on. But we experienced a lot before, and I don’t like politics. Besides, I had to work, I had to do my job. I only follow family and work.” The largest group missing in the described unity however were the Lebanese Shia, but Christians and some Sunni people could also be found staying at home.

Shia supporting Lebanese Shia parties Hizbollah and Amal feared that with Syria leaving the country, the

Americans would enter resulting in the abandoning of the Iran – Syria – Lebanon anti-Israel axis (Blanford 2009:

158). It was also feared that the strong opposition invited international demands for the disarmament of

Hizbollah under Resolution 1559 (Safa 2006: 33).

After holding a low profile for a while, Hizbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah announced that a counter- protest would be held on the 8 of March. It would be a “demonstration of support and gratitude to Syria for ‘all the sacrifices’ it had made for Lebanese ‘unity and integrity’” (Blanford 2009: 160). Besides paying tribute to

Syria, the demonstration was also meant to denounce Resolution 1559 and to emphasize that Hizbollah expected “to be consulted on any deal regarding a new government” (Safa 2006: 33). The mobilization that followed would form the beginning of the March 8 Movement, consisting of Nasrallah’s Hizbollah, the Shia party Amal led by Speaker of Parliament Nabi Berri, and the Christian party Free Patriotic Movement of Michel

Aoun. The March 8 mobilization created the beginning of labels for two political groups: the label March 8 for those Lebanese in favour of Syrian involvement, and March 14 for those that wanted to stop Syrian meddling in

Lebanese affairs. It was estimated23 that on March 8 between 500,000 to 1,5 million people came to the centre of Beirut to show their disagreement with the display of anti-Syrian sentiment. Shia followers of Hizbollah but also pro-Syrian Christians attended the demonstration. As Nasrallah instructed to leave party flags at home, the centre of Beirut was coloured again by Lebanese flags. This time, the flag was used again to show their unity

22 An Nahar is one of Lebanon’s major Arabic-language daily newspapers. Its editor-in-chief Gebran Tueni was a fierce critic of Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs. He was well known for the front-page letter he wrote in 2000 addressed to future Syrian Leader Bashar al Assad (Tueni 2000). On March 14 2005 Gebran Tueni gave a speech in which he emphasized Lebanese unity in opposing Syria: “In the name of God we, Muslims and Christians, Pledge that united we shall remain to the end of time to better defend our Lebanon” (original Arabic version to be heard at www.gebrantueni.com). After being elected to parliament in the May 2005 elections, Tueni was assassinated on December 12, 2005. 23 The first estimation of half a million was made by several sources in the media reporting on the demonstration. The Lebanese Government estimated the 1,5 million turnout (Blanford 2009: 160). 47

and pro-Lebanese sentiment, but now in response to the Lebanese flags shown at anti-Syrian demonstrations.

Lebanese national sentiment was framed through sectarianism.

One person present during the 8 march protest was Hassan, a business student working both as at the office of Al-Manar24 and as a taxi driver. He told me that during the demonstration he was wearing the

Lebanese flag as well. When I asked him why he did so, he responded while raising his voice: “Of course, because I loooove Lebanon”. When I asked him what flag he had worn if Nasrallah had not instructed his followers to wear the Lebanese flag, he started laughing, and looked away. No answer was given. Although

March 8, just as March 14, wanted to present a feeling of unity, both movements consisted of people relating to a particular party. “Nobody could disguise the stark fact that Lebanon was a country divided, not united, over the broader issue of international influence on Lebanon, be it Syria or the West. That the division fell along sectarian lines – generally the Shiites versus the rest – only exacerbated the tension and sense of unease”

(Blanford 2009: 161). That the March 8 movement consisted mainly of Shia Lebanese arguably caused the anti-

Syrian opposition to react to the extent that it did. Or in other words, the sectarian tensions in Lebanese society quite possibly created the counter-mobilization of several fragments joining together for a common goal.

On March 14, the organizers of the Independence Intifada responded with one of the largest political mobilizations Lebanon has ever seen: it was the accumulation and climax of one month of protesting, located at Martyrs’ Square. This was the event where you had to be on that particular day. It was the event that people around you talked about. The one million people that gathered at Martyrs’ Square had a dream of a different future. They were fed up with the current situation in Lebanon. It was a reaction against March 8. March 14 was payback motivated by sectarian assertion (Young 2010: 53).

Not even one month after the protests, the last Syrian troops left Lebanon on April 6. Although few

Lebanese are convinced that Syrians influence in the country is over, this step was a huge victory for the March

14 movement demonstrating against Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs. This was the beginning of a new era, yet not necessarily for the better. Frictions based on fragmentation and internal issues between the

Lebanese, that where to an important degree ignited by outside forces, turned violent. This effectively put the country’s recovery on hold (Leenders 2012b).

24 Al-Manar is the television channel of Hizbollah. 48

3.2. Branding March 14 – networks in mobilization

One could argue that a successful form of mobilization is characterized by a growing number of people joining the movement, resulting in the involvement of large parts of society. If this would be the decisive criteria, the mobilizations on March 8 and March 14 could be labelled successful. In the case of Lebanon in 2005, most people in society were involved, be it in what would become two different movements. The anti-Syrian relatively small scale, spontaneous protests after Hariri’s death evolved to protests focused more on the accused of the assassination: Syria, and less on Hariri itself. These small scale protests “quickly developed into an organized, broad based opposition movement” (Jaafar & Stephan 2009: 169). This fuelled the Shia opposition to react with a large scale mobilization on March 8, organized mainly by Hizbollah. A sectarian counter-counter reaction followed on March 14. Answering the question “How do (non)structural conditions influence the propensity for social mobilization in the fragmented society of Lebanon?”, means that the organisational aspects of social mobilization should be investigated to gain insight in the growth of the movements. As this section will demonstrate, one aspect of the growth of the March 14 movement was its organisation that branded the movement as something uniting Lebanese along different sectarian lines, ignoring, and thereby responding to, the Shia part of Lebanese society.

One aspect or variable of the growth of movements as mentioned in the theoretical chapter by Blee and Currier (2005) are the organisational characteristics. Although one may get the impression that growth of the March 14 movement came naturally after Hariri’s death, this does not mean that there was no organization behind the protest. There was a strategy involved in letting the movement grow. This can be seen by two linked aspects (Young 2010: 36). First, there was an organization behind the movement that organized for banners, the speakers, the slogans and the media-attention. Second, the organisation of the movement, and those involved in the early stages consisted of merely the same kind of people: middle and upper class

Christians. These people had the time and the money to be involved. It also included a lot of students.

“Universities sold the Syrian Brand, which created a sense of awareness on what could be done” (interview of

Young with the author, November 21, 2012). Youth actively involved in protests after February 14 created their own culture as well. “Youth-led activism seemed suddenly capable of playing a significant role in instigating broad social and political change. Young people felt empowered to demand a more democratic, transparent, freer, united Lebanon” (Saad Khalaf 2009: 167).

The movement created its own symbols, with red and white flags and scarves symbolizing the blood of

Hariri’s martyrdom (Blanford 2009: 153), although party flags could be seen as well. “People were thinking through the protests, its colours, aims and catchphrases” (Young 2010: 36). A relatively small group who worked on the Independence Intifada organized the practicalities of the mobilization. The intifada was branded as a unifying mobilization, Lebanese from different sects together going against a common enemy. This would create a feeling of togetherness among participants.25 That the branding of the project was successful, as will be shown below, may have been caused by the fact the whole campaign was all ready before Hariri’s assassination. The campaign was originally meant for the 2005 elections, but the assassination of Hariri proved to be the spark to light on the campaign earlier (idem: 38). Hariri’s assassination was seen as an opportunity to relate to many people. Another part of the successful organisational aspect was their use of modern media.

The peaceful narrative they created was easily picked up by international media. The strong relations of Rafiq

Hariri with the West and with Arab leaders had earned him worldwide credit. “As the Arab world’s traditional power broker, Saudi Arabia saw Hariri’s murder as a strike against one of its own and insisted that Beirut and

Damascus should spare no effort in revealing the full truth behind the assassination. It was with strong Arab and international support, then, that the protesters pressed their demands” (Safa 2006: 32). The organisation behind the anti-Syrian protests emphasized that violence should not be used during mobilizations. Through spreading their opinion, the movement let others decide on what happened on the event through opinion pieces (Young 2010: 47). National media was also involved in the hype. Fashion magazines made editorials on the protest, framing it as a fashionable event: something that you had to be part of.

Christian Gahre (2009) argues that the renewed organized character of the movement was mainly caused by a small group of prominent individuals in the movement that he calls identity entrepreneurs. “These key players were a collection of informally networked organizers, mobilizers, and communicators” (Gahre

2009: 277). What the members of this group had in common was that they were born into a high social class, they were highly educated in prestigious institutions, and often had spent time abroad. To them, confessional cleavages were less important than social divisions (idem: 278). This gave them a sense of legitimacy as

25 As discussed in chapter one, the communication of a common public identity may explain why people join social movements. Furthermore, the strategies of social movements are being framed in the same discourse. Organizations select tactics based on functional criteria such as familiarity, perceived efficacy, and the messages they want to communicate to the public (Schaefer Caniglia & Carmin 2005: 206) and their own group. Identities cause subconscious actions and behaviour (Oberschall & Kim 1996: 65). 50

representatives of a common project. Eli Khoury, one key identity entrepreneur in the protests, showed the way he had been contemplating to rouse the Lebanese populace to shake off what they viewed as a Syrian occupation for the elections in spring 2005. Hariri’s assassination was seen as an opportunity that had to be seized (idem: 281). He convinced the partners in the election campaign to start mobilizing now:

The symbol was “Independence 05”. The line was “kulluna lil watan”, which is the national anthem, which means all of us [for the nation], and we all wore red and white, because these are the colours of the country, the flag. And it caught up like fire. We wanted a civilized message. We wanted to show the world that we are civilized, peaceful people. (Eli Khoury in Gahre 2009: 281.)

The preparations of Eli Khoury made that the ground work for further demonstrations was already done. The people that increasingly showed up at the demonstrations were not well-prepared. Mobilization took many efforts. “Beyond these individuals it only took form in the aftermath” (interview with Michael Young,

November 21, 2012).

Eli Khoury’s election campaign team was not the only group involved in trying to mobilize the

Lebanese after Hariri’s death. Several other groups were involved as well. The post-Hariri mobilization was impulsive. There were those who demanded an international tribunal, and others that had started after the funeral with a petition for the resignation of the government. As Nora Jumblatt26, one of the main organizers of the event, recalls: “It is very strange how these things came out randomly and spontaneously” (in Gahre 2009:

285). After the first protests were held, the sense of agency that was experienced by these identity entrepreneurs grew:

There was an emotional impetus and recognition of a moment of opportunity the actors drew on considerable and financial resources; there were spontaneous actions that were quickly linked through informal networks; and civil society rather than the political establishment took the initiative. (Gahre 2009: 286.)

The identity entrepreneurs working on the Independence Intifada increasingly came to know each other. The backgrounds of these people involved were pooled together, which resulted in knowledge exchange in the fields of event management, branding, fund raising and public relations (Gahre 2009: 287). Other links were easily found since most people involved had the same upper class background, and had shared identities

26 Nora Jumblatt is the wife of Walid Jumblatt, the Druze head of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). Walid Jumblatt strongly opposed Syrian presence in Lebanon. 51

“based on the dynamics of self-making in history-making” (idem: 291). On February 19, a large meeting was held that resulted in a common plan of the professionalization of the movement. Thanks to the professional, social, and family networks of those involved, this plan quickly reached top politicians. As shown by Johnston and Klandermans (1995: 10) the meaning of these networks created a collective consciousness. With the constant networking going on among the identity entrepreneurs, the networks became increasingly interconnected, founded on a common objective: to get Syria out.

One result of the professionalization of the movement was that the intifada was branded along national lines. There was an insistence on a unified message and image. “The Independence Intifada is an evocative instance of how enduring struggles and contentious practices directed at managing a national territory climaxed in nationalist fervor through flourishing networks of mobilization in a charged urban public space” (Gahre 2009: 295). According to the identity entrepreneurs, national sentiments should no longer only be held by Christians, but rather by all in society. This could not hide the fact that the majority of people that joined the protests in the early days were Christians from the educated middle class. That the protest took place in the middle of a working day was not a problem for them. “While most of those present at Hariri’s funeral were Sunni Muslims, in the month between the funeral and the great demonstration of March 14, when the Sunnis again came out in massive numbers, the spontaneous thrusts of the intifada were kept largely alive by Christians” (Young 2010: 36-7). This hints at the sectarian character of the Independence Intifada.

Christian attention went out to anti-Syrian protest, while attention of the Sunni’s was drawn more to Hariri’s

Mausoleum. The mostly Shia mobilization may have sparked the anti-Syrian Sunni to join the independence intifada. At the same time, it was a sense of overcoming these sectarian divisions in the movement that made the dream of the Independence Intifada that strong.

The organisational aspects of the mobilization on March 14 were not visible to all who came to the centre of Beirut on that particular time. It was the sense that you had to be there on that moment, because something big was going to happen. It would be a day of national unity. People heard about it from their friends, family or from the media. As George, a Christian man in his thirties who does not want to be involved in politics told me: “It was everywhere. You could not escape it”. So he and his friends went as well. This is in line with Anne Marie Baylouny’s (2011: 163) finding that mobilization takes place in the informal every day spheres of life. Indeed, also the networks behind the organization were not well known among all people who

mobilized. As shown in the first chapter, these are members of the movement that were not “members in the organizational sense”, but people who just were “superficially and sporadically engaged by struggle” (Blee &

Currier 2005: 131). Not all credit should be given to the organisational aspects of March 14: “Networking by identity entrepreneurs – young, resourceful, politically connected people who considered themselves outside of the political establishment, yet espousing a governmental belonging to Lebanon – made the Independence

Intifada possible, but emotions made it happen” (Gahre 2009: 300).

3.3. The role of emotions in mobilization

Structural conditions such as the availability of networks that “organize” the mobilization are not the only factor that influenced the propensity for mobilization in fragmented Lebanon. Also more non-structural and less easy to pin down aspects of mobilization affected the amount of people that mobilized. Some of these may be captured under the label of “emotions”. It will become clear below that whereas those who mobilized on

March 8 were motivated by feelings of resistance and support of Hizbollah, on March 14 there was also a sense of common identity and community among followers of different parties that pushed people to the square. It was a feeling of being united as Lebanese.

Fragmentation in Lebanon takes place in people’s perceptions of themselves and of others. The mobilization after Hariri’s death was influenced by the perceptions people had of sectarianism and the possibility of being united as one, but also the perceptions people had on their common enemy, Syria. As shown in the theoretical section, “participants are motivated to join movements, at least in part because they resonate with their personal values and beliefs” (Schaefer Caniglia & Carmin 2005: 205). Involving the role of emotions in analyzing what happened in 2005 shows that on March 14 beliefs constructed a sense of unity, although being composed of individual identities. Public discourse raised the consciousness of this unity. This feeling of being united and of having a dream was lacking among the followers of March 8, which joined mainly out of feelings of resistance.

In conversations with pro-Syrian Lebanese, feelings of resistance were often overshadowed by pragmatic motivations for Syrian support. Conversations reflected a dependent relationship, a sense that

Lebanon needed Syria. Not only in the political sphere but also economically: Lebanese – Syrian trade was seen as important for lower middle class Lebanese. People were also motivated to join out of loyalty for their 53

political party. It was estimated that 90 percent of all demonstrators were motivated to join the protest on

March 8 out of support for Hizbollah (Saad Ghorayeb 2008). “As such, the main impetus behind the massive

Hizbollah-organized demonstration on March 8, 2005 was the defense of Hizbollah's role as a resistance movement against Israel, a role Syria had safeguarded and enshrined in the Taif Accord of 1989. Support for

Syria was therefore synonymous with support for the resistance” (idem).

Feelings of resistance became identical to the preservation of the Shia political identity, transcending divisions inside the Shia community. Whereas an underlying cause of the dominant feeling of resistance was directed at Israel, it only came to the forefront as a reaction against the anti-Syrian demonstrations following

Hariri’s assassination. As Haddad (2007: 32) already demonstrated, disarming Hizbollah would antagonize the majority of Shia in Lebanon and lead for them to side by the party and challenge Lebanese authorities to that end. The anti-Syrian protest could lead to this disarmament. March 8 may thus be seen as a counter- demonstration fuelled by feelings of resistance against the organized protests of what would become the

March 14 movement. There was no sense of euphoric unity among several groups, but rather within one group, namely Hizbollah, attracting followers of other parties as well. Within one week time however, this large scale demonstration would be succeeded by an even larger demonstration of Lebanese that wanted Syrian troops out.

As already became clear, the growth of the March 14 movement after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri should not be seen as incidental, but rather as resulting from increasing tensions within Lebanon and its relations with Syria. These tensions caused Sunnis to side with Christians and Druze in a demonstration that involved a quarter of the Lebanese population. Although most Lebanese did not plan to take part in the intifada, “indignation was their first impulse when Hariri was killed” (Young 2010: 5). After the smaller scale demonstrations following Hariri’s assassination, the large scale demonstration held by pro-Syrian Lebanese had to be topped. Indeed, the large scale demonstration held on March 8 was one reason why the demonstration on March 14 could grow to the size it did. People had enough of Syria, they felt united in their dreams of a better future for Lebanon, and this was the time to make it happen.

Many protestors saw the mobilization on March 14 as a revolution. It was thought that it would create a huge turnaround in Lebanese political affairs. Participants had the idea that the movement was uniting

Lebanon. One of those participants is Mohamed. Mohamed is a Shia journalist from the southern city Sour that

joined because he thought it was an event for all Lebanese to join together. With a communist background, he thought that March 14 could help Lebanon further. In general, those who went to Martyrs’ Square “evinced a strong sense of agency reinforced by cross-confessional solidarity, a strident belief in the agencies of civil society and collective mobilization” (Gahre 2009: 279). That besides those individuals present to see what was going on, the movement consisted of different sects that all joined in for their specific interest, was less taken into consideration. There was a feeling of momentum. This would be a day as never before. As Issam, a thirty- something old public sector worker from Beirut recalls (interview with the author, November 12, 2012):

The movement could grow based on reactions and feelings. People came from very far places, from all over the country. There were traffic jams to get into Beirut. They were stuck in traffic, but they came because they believed. There was a revolutionary spirit of change. Without Hariri this would never have the same impact. People had enough.

This feeling was also felt by Sana, a Christian women from Mount Lebanon in the beginning of her forties

(interviews with the author, August – November 2012). Sana’s quote makes clear that mobilization came in her case from the bottom up. She went because her colleagues went as well, and not because a political leader told her to do so. What the below quote also shows is that this euphoric feeling of momentum was only short-lived.

It was seen as a turning point. The first time that all people came together. When we went down we saw it. But when we look back it was all a lie. Had I known, I would not have gone. Our group consisted of around 25, thirty people, all people working at the government. We were Christians and Muslims. Although we were free to go, some people stayed in the office. We entered from next to Virgin27, but it was very crowded. We had to push our way to the centre of the square. I sat on concrete wall, so that I could still see it all. It was sunny and I was with my friends. I believed that day that something special was about to happen, not because of the organization of the movement, but because it was all around. Yet, it was felt only during that particular day. As soon as we went home, the feeling disappeared.

Within March 14, there was a feeling of euphoria to join and to agree on a common message. The strong sense of a common goal created a feeling of belonging towards each other. According to Imad Salamey (interview with the author, November 21, 2012), associate professor at the American University of Beirut and specialized in Lebanese populist sectarianism and urban sustainability, it was not a dream of being united per se. “The dream was to have a country without Syrian tutelage. To be independent. This feeling did not appear out of nowhere: “Emotions are the driver of human behaviour. Those who mobilized were emotionally inspired of the possibility of building a country and to go against foreign intervention” (idem).

27 “Virgin” refers to the Virgin book store located at the western side of Martyrs’ Square. 55

This does not represent the complete story, however. Mobilization is not always ideologically motivated, but is also influenced by everyday life circumstances. For Michael Young (2010: 53), the majority of the people that gathered at Martyrs’ Square “was there because no one could escape March 14, a day, like

Martyrs Square itself, that was whatever you wanted it to be”. This stigma was caused by the previous events of the month, the increasing media attention and the political crisis in which the country was at the moment.

People wanted to be part of the dream of a different Lebanon: a Lebanon without Syria.

What Lebanon should look like after Syria’s departure or what their revolution should bring was disputed. “There was no consensus on what should replace the system’s pluralistic immovability” (Young 2010:

56). This was caused by the different fragments that present on Martyrs’ Square on March 14. All participants agreed that Syria had to go, but other priorities or the way this would take shape varied. According to Michael

Young (2010: 53), the sense of March 14 being a revolutionary day was not legitimate. The movement indeed was not revolutionary “for in the end very little about the day was new”. Paul Tabar (interview with the author,

November 16, 2012) argued along the same lines that Lebanese society has always been divided in a pro- western and a pro-Arab population. The March 14 could be seen as one form of pro-western mobilization, as there were many in the past. This was not the way the day was perceived, though. The feeling of momentum and unity was the dominant emotion felt.

Even the euphoric emotions within March 14 were fragmented. The emotions of Christians were different from those of Muslims. Christians were part of the core of Lebanese against Syrian occupation before

Hariri’s assassination: “People reacted in a sectarian way. Since it was believed that Syria was behind the assassination of the Sunni leader, the event pushed them to demand Syrian withdrawal. Sunnis were brought in line with the aim of the Christians. However, there was agreement on the message” (Young, interview with the author, November 21, 2012). In personal conversations, some Christians told me that they would go and protest, even if Hariri was not assassinated. George, a Christian man from Byblos working as a private driver for example told me that “It was needed. My friends went as well. Even if Hariri would not have been killed, we would go to demand Syria’s leave”. This was a peculiar expression, because many believed that without Hariri’s assassination, the March 14 would never be this big. The underlying tensions present in Lebanese society against Syrian occupation needed a spark, an opportunity. For Lebanese Christians Hariri’s assassination may have formed not the prior reason for people to mobilize, but it may be questioned if the anti-Syrian election

campaign scheduled for spring 2005 would have reached the same amount of people. Hariri drew the Sunni’s and Christians in society closer together.

3.4. One single movement? The role of (collective) identity in March 14

The way the movement was perceived by people in Lebanon was relating to their identity, which is formed by the cultural and social context they live in. As demonstrated in the second chapter, Lebanon is fragmented along many lines. Consequently, there are many conflicting identities as well. Interpersonal relations affect the collective identity present in the movement. The interpersonal relations may be manipulated for this reason.

This may be done by the organization of the movement or by some of its members. The interpersonal strategies may thus be uneven within groups and change over time (Blee & Currier 2005: 130). The growth and collapse of movements is dependent on the interpersonal relationships and the sense of a collective identity.

During the protests in 2005, the idea of national sentiment in Lebanon was used by leaders of fragments to their own benefit: “Nationalist practices of the Independence Intifada, ostensibly intended to unite Lebanon, were supported by and promoted ideas of a domestic other that was presumed to hold a vision for Lebanon that was irreconcilable with that projected by the Independence Intifada” (Gahre 2009: 278). It increasingly became clear that people joined the March 14 mobilization for their own gains rather than fighting for the gains of the collective.

The internal divisions within the March 14 movement were already noticeable during the month of protest following Hariri’s assassination. The signature location of the movement during the demonstrations,

Martyrs’ Square in the centre of Beirut, reflected the different interests of its followers. On the western side of the square were Hariri’s El Amin mosque and his mausoleum, in the centre of the square was the tent city, and in between was an open space. Some people only came to mourn at Hariri’s mausoleum. Their presence

“didn’t mean that those who came to pay their respects necessarily came to partake of Martyrs Square’s other activities” (Young 2010: 30). Similarly, those who mobilized in the centre of the square for political demands did not necessarily feel that much connected to Hariri’s death. As shown above, besides people mobilized that mobilized for these goals, especially on the day March 14 itself, there were also many who joined because they wanted to be part of the event. People who went to the square because their friends did so as well, but who did not connect themselves to the political goals of the movement. 57

The feeling of resentment converged different interests among different groups within the movement, not only on the ground, but also on the political level. It showed that in a state as fragmented as Lebanon, “the pursuit of common goals the fractured Lebanese will create unexpected alliances” (Young 2010: 5). Rather than pragmatist however, Hilal Khashan28 (interview with the author, November 6, 2012) describes the Lebanese political system as opportunistic. Pragmatism serves the common interest, whereas opportunism describes a situation in which political leaders make choices based on their own interest. This opportunism clearly came to the fore in the turbulence that followed after Rafiq Hariri’s death. This particular incident meant that the

“Sunnis and Druze joined forces with the recalcitrant Christians, so that each community, for reasons of its own

– reasons based principally on their sectarian reading of Lebanese politics and society – shared a desire to end

Syrian hegemony” (Young 2010: 248).

So what you see in March 14 is a difference in the direct reason of demonstration and the dreams that people linked to this opportunity. People who gathered wanted Syria out, but at the same time made expectations on what should happen if Syria left. The struggle over independence necessarily needed to involve the question of the identity of the state. The agreement among those who gathered at the first issue was creating a sense of unity, while the idea of what should happen next was shattering people apart. This was partly caused by the opportunistic approach of the identity entrepreneurs. The sense of unity that the identity entrepreneurs were aiming for was deliberately created in order to strengthen the claim that Syria should leave. As Blee and Currier (2005: 131) already showed, “social movement groups try to create an expectation that a problem can be remedied through collective action, thus creating a foundation for solidarity and collective identity”. The idea of creating a collective identity on the basis of nationalist sentiments proved very fragile. The idea of national unity in Lebanon is disputed. Khashan (interview with the author, November 6,

2012) disagrees with the idea of the existence of national unity in Lebanon. For an idea of national unity to be present, you have to have a common history and a general consensus of the future, which is lacking in

Lebanon. History in Lebanon is based on sects. As explained in the second chapter, for Lebanese the religious community is the nation: the feeling of belonging to a state is less present. The only unity that existed among the protestors was a clear common goal. The sense of a collective identity should thus be described as “a

28 Hilal Khashan is a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut and a leading Palestinian- American scholar of the Middle East. He is specialized in Lebanese politics, religious activism and Shia ethnic revival. 58

convergence of confessional interested united by opposition to Syrian hegemony over Lebanon” (Blanford

2009: 157). This should not hide the fact that there were also people present at Martyrs’ Square who wanted to do away with this sectarianism.

The fragmented character of March 14 became clear when Syrian forces left Lebanon. Historically,

Lebanon has served as “the surrogate field for battles waged by others” (International Crisis Group 2005: 8).

Syria has made use of these sectarian divisions by meddling in Lebanese affairs, which consequently awakened the fears and instincts of rival groups. Rather than dissolving these tensions, he departure of Syrian troops in

Lebanon only increased the emphasis on division in Lebanon. When the common enemy of the March 14 movement left the country, there was nothing more in common in the group, and mutual identification of group members quickly disappeared. The various fragments that formed the March 14 collective now had to search for a way to keep working together. The disappearance of a common goal consequently led to opportunistic practices. “Or, as an influential member of parliament put it, ‘we have moved into a new house.

But no one yet knows who will take which room. Everyone wants to get the best one, and this led to sectarian squabbling. We have to find a way to divide the house in which there is space for all’” (idem: 1). The new found house soon proved to be very fragile. Fractions in the Syrian opposition soon were discovered. Christian leader

Michel Aoun “swiftly capitalized growing Maronite resentment over Sunni assertiveness in the wake of Hariri’s death” (idem: 13).

3.5. What happened next – Foreign involvement and dreams being shattered

It was not just the Lebanese politicians that struggled with the new political situation. In line with Lebanon’s history, outside forces meddled in Lebanese affairs. After Syria left the country, Lebanon came under increased international interest because of the increasing hostility in the region and to prevent Jihadi Islamists from turning to Lebanon (International Crisis Group 2005: 15). Besides UN involvement, a core group consisting of the U.S., UK, France, Italy, The European Union, Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the world Bank, coordinated

Lebanon’s political and economic future and reviews a reform program that would “set the stage for international assistance” (idem: 9). The regional context of the Independence Intifada created growing sectarian tensions as well. The outside involvement of Iran colliding with the Shias in Lebanon and of Arab states with Sunnis heightened sectarian tensions to 1990-levels. 59

Besides emphasizing the sectarian divides in Lebanese society, the events in 2005 also led to greater divisions in society on other fragments. According to Paul Tabar (interview with the author, November 16,

2012), there were sleeping divisions in Lebanese society before 2005. Family, class or regional divisions in

Lebanese society, that used to be less important than sectarian divisions, were activated after the 2005 demonstration when Syrian troops left Lebanon. Since Syrian presence in the country affected so many people’s livelihoods, the 2005 mobilization and its consequences awakened these divisions and enlightened new tensions in the country. “The post-2005 period in Lebanon, while it exposed the paradoxical liberalism at the heart of the country’s political and social system, also highlighted the system’s profound defects, particularly its remarkable ability to breed division [...] The society retained its diversity, but also saw its liberal tendencies on all sides wilt amid growing violence as its diversity turned to discord after the Syrian departure”

(Young 2010: 6, 248).

An often heard sentiment among Lebanese citizens is that the post-2005 system was coloured with opportunistic tendencies. Although Lebanese who identify themselves with the March 14 coalition still think that something needs to be done against continuing Syrian presence in the country, most would not protest again on Martyrs’ Square. As Noor, a young Lebanese woman who plans to work in Saudi Arabia, told me:

“Back then, we had a dream. When Syria left the country, the political leaders started working for themselves.

All leaders now give themselves money, our leaders increased their salaries. They are there for their own benefit, not for us. The country has a huge debt, and people have no work.” As a pharmacy student who went to college for seven years, the maximum salary she would gain in Lebanon would be around $1200. In combination with living expenses in Lebanon, this amount is fairly little. In Saudi Arabia, Noor would be able to earn three times as much as in Lebanon. She did not believe that anything would change in the Lebanese political situation soon. This feeling does not stand on its own. There seems to be little faith in the Lebanese political system. Protesting against the political situation seems useless, as the political leaders within the

March 14 movement cannot seem to strong block that they used to be.

Although some argue that the Syrians left because of international - mainly U.S. - involvement in

Lebanese affairs (Fakhoury 2011: 6), it remains a fact that after the March demonstrations Syrian troops left the country. With their departure on April 6, Lebanon was to enter a new era, although few Lebanese were convinced that Syria’s influence in the country was over. What would follow was the collapse of the March 14

movement by March 8, constant political stagnation, increasing foreign involvement, rising tensions between the Sunni and Shia population, a series of assassinations, and the Hizbollah – Israeli July War in 2006. These events had effects on the mindset of people, as the next chapter will show.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated the context, the ways of protest, the organization and networks, and the role that emotions and (collective) identity played during the 2005 mobilization and its aftermath.

Protesting against the common enemy Syria created a sense of unity within the March 14 movement.

This was not an unintended consequence: behind the March 14 was a network of upper-class people, branding the demonstration with civil society unity. Rafiq Hariri’s assassination formed the opportunity to get mainly

Christians and Sunnis united on a common goal. This cannot hide the fact that the March 14 movement was internally very fragmented, which consequently shattered the dream of unity as soon as Syria left the country.

This is in line with the argument of Blee & Currier (2005: 131) that the heterogeneity within movements influences the movement’s outcomes (idem: 131). The legitimacy of the leadership of the movement is given by its members, and therefore will strengthen or weaken by the membership’s approval of choices taken. In the fragmented society of Lebanon, it was the dream of being united that caused emotions of euphoria: being united in their will to get Syria out. That large parts of society were uninvolved on March 14 did not do away with this sense of unity, but rather made it stronger. March 14 could be seen as a counter movement against the demonstration held on March 8. Both the structural conditions, like networks and the assassination of Hariri, but also non-structural conditions, such as the dreams and the feelings of momentum and collective identity, all played a part. Together, these were the conditions that made large scale mobilization in 2005 possible.

What is present in these conditions is the role of the fragmented society. Fragmentation shaped the organisation and networks of the movement, the dreams and expectations of Lebanese who mobilized the creation of a common identity and the feeling of disappointment that followed March 14 2005. So, in order to capture what was going on that day, you need to involve the concept of fragmentation.

The next chapter will analyze the role of emotions, organisational aspects, opportunities and identity in trying to mobilize in 2011. In the context of the Arab uprisings in the region, Lebanon stayed “on hold”, as Hilal

Khashan phrased it. How this could be and what other factors played a role in mobilizing will be explained. At least one element in this comparison would have at least as much influence as in 2005: Lebanon was still characterized by fragmentation.

4. The 2011 anti-sectarian protests

This chapter will give an overview of the 2011 anti-sectarian protests by addressing the role that opportunity, organisational aspects, emotions and identity played in trying to create large scale protest that in the end did not take place.

The main claim of the protesters in 2011 was not against authoritarianism as in the rest of the region, but against the sectarian regime. This happened in a country in which most Lebanese follow their communities of sects (Abbas & Yaakoub 2011: 208). The initiative for mobilization was taken by those who rejected sectarianism. But even among this group, there seems to have been “a sense of loss about who to blame and how one should direct one’s indignation and resentment” (idem). Only a few thousand people gathered to show their resentment in a society where a resentful political discourse by all kinds of sectarian and political parties is omnipresent. The 2005 independence intifada left a feeling of disenchantment relating to the act of mobilization: people reflected a loss of hope that real change is possible. Although Syrian involvement urged people to mobilize in 2005 because there was a sentiment that something had to be done, the need for change was not so much felt in 2011.

It will become clear that Lebanese fragmentation and people’s sectarian identity combined with organizational and state structured aspects could be seen as major reasons why the 2011 protest did not grow and largely demobilized after around four months. At the end of this chapter, the question “how do

(non)structural conditions influence the propensity for social mobilization in the fragmented society of

Lebanon in the context of the 2011 anti-sectarian protests?” will be answered.

4.1. Lebanese developments between 2005 and 2011

After Syrian troops left Lebanon, another layer of fragmentation was added to Lebanese society. Two antagonistic nation-building projects for a post-Syrian Lebanon pulled the country in two opposite directions

(Fakhoury 2011: 4): the March 8 and the March 14 alliances, with the latter being pro-Western, in favour of demilitarization of Hizbollah and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon that investigates the death of Hariri, while the former opposes these positions and looks east for its support. 63

The establishment of the March 8 and March 14 movements was not the only change between 2005 and 2011. Although space limitation prevents me from elaborating on the events between 2005 and 2011,

Lebanon did not stay quiet during these years. While reading this chapter, one should thus keep these other developments in mind as a blurring factor in the comparison between the 2005 and 2011 instances of mobilization. Comparative political research in relation to studies of social movements is often used to

“investigate the impact of national political characteristics or important historical changes on social movements” (Della Porta 2002: 290). Between the years 2005 and 2011 Lebanon has seen many changes, which makes it hard to claim a certain causal relationship. Although there is no major direct causal link between mobilization of the independence intifada of 2005 and the 2011 anti-sectarian mobilisation, the independence revolution left its trace in Lebanese society.

One major event after the independence intifada was the Israeli-Hizbollah conflict of July 2006, covering the South of Lebanon, the North of Israel and the Golan Heights. The over one month-long lasting conflict killed around 165 Israeli citizens and over 1000 Lebanese and displaced many more, damaged Lebanese infrastructure and made parts of Southern Lebanon inhabitable. The United Nations Resolution 1701 ending the conflict called for the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanese territory, the enlargement of the UNIFIL29 mission and the disarmament of Hizbollah. The last agreement has so far not been executed and still forms a source of major discussion in Lebanon as of today. The following year, the Palestinian Nahr al-Bared refugee camp formed the new source of tension. Large parts of the camp were destroyed and around 400 people were killed.

In 2008, Hizbollah seized West-Beirut after the government’s decision to shut down Hizbollah’s telecommunication network. This was followed by clashes between those in favour of the government and the opposing militias. On May 21, 2008, the Doha agreement ended this conflict. Between 2006 and 2008 there were protests against the March 14 government as well. The Doha agreement announced a government of national unity that would be installed in November 2009. This was the beginning of a period in which Lebanon was “on hold”: waiting for a new conflict to arise (Hilal Khashan, personal interview with the author, November

6, 2012).

29 The abbreviation UNIFIL represents the “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon”. UNIFIL was created in March 1978 to help the government of Lebanon restore authority in its territory after the withdrawal of Israeli forces. 64

In December 2010, Tunisian fruit seller set himself on fire on a central square in Tunisia, setting in motion situations of tumult in the Arab region. The year 2011 would be marked by protest. In this context, the anti-sectarian movement of Lebanon tried to mobilize as well, but did not succeed in gathering the same amount of people as in 2005, let alone as compared to other Arab uprisings in 2011.

4.2. The Arab uprisings of 2011

The expression of a feeling of cumulated frustration by fruit seller Mohammad Bouazizi in December 2010 would have effects that he could have never had foreseen himself. After he set himself on fire in a public square in Tunisia, this would be the beginning of uprisings in Tunisia, followed by instances of mobilization throughout the region. The frustration of Bouazizi would evolve in what would often be labelled the “Arab

Spring”, in which thousands and thousands of people in the Arab regions took the streets.

Although causes for the uprisings in 2011 are overly complex, academics agreed that it resulted from a long term accumulated feeling of dissatisfaction and a set of triggers to these grievances (Aarts et al. 2012: 48).

The results of these mass mobilizations in the region differed per country. Where the leaders of Egypt, Libya and Yemen were overthrown by popular protests, other countries such as Bahrain, Saud Arabia, Morocco or

Jordan the populations did not succeed in causing a downfall of their regime.

This revolutionary spirit was not limited to the Middle East. “The Protester” was awarded “Person of the Year 2011” by Time Magazine (2011), hinting at the wave of revolutionary spirit crossing the globe.30 This wave was seen as exceptional: “Protests have now occurred in countries whose populations total at least 3 billion people, and the word protest has appeared in newspapers and online exponentially more this past year than at any other time in history (Time Magazine 2011). Lebanon would not remain unaffected.

The goal of this section is not to show that the same processes were in place in Lebanon as in other countries in the region that experienced mass mobilization, which one would have a very difficult time in arguing in favour of. The causes of the uprisings may only be found at “systemic complexities that are the core

30 The revolutionary spirit of which Time Magazine (2011) claimed that it was present around the world took many shapes. In the United States of America it was shaped by the economic crisis, with the group Occupy Wall Street was the first of many Occupy movements across the world. In Mexico, India and Chile citizens mobilized against crime and corruption. Taking into account Fukuyama’s “end of history” prediction, these spirits of protests that resulted in mass scale mobilizations across the globe were unexpected (Time Magazine 2011). 65

of the turmoil in the Middle East” (Aarts et al. 2012: 22), in which Lebanon with its political system forms a peculiar case. Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, Lebanon’s political culture has little in common with other countries. Rather, the goal is to show how these events in the region affected Lebanon.

One argument that often has been made in relation to the influence of the Arab uprisings of 2011 on neighbouring countries is that a so-called “domino effect” was taking place (idem: 50). The first chapter showed that activism in the Middle East before 2011 was rather uncommon when compared to other regions, but not totally absent. It took many forms, was complex and dynamic and could be expected under revolutionary conditions, in times of crisis or in the absence of the state. For many scholars, the Arab uprisings therefore came as a complete surprise. That a great amount of people in Tunisia took the streets was something uncommon. When these street protests in Tunisia that led to the downfall of its leader Ben Ali were followed by the successful ousting of Mubarak, “there was a clear expectation that a domino effect would occur: one successful revolt against an oppressive regime successively toppling the next one” (idem). The forced resignation of Ben Ali showed many other Arabs that change was possible. “Suddenly in Egypt people were no longer afraid to take to the streets, and similar protests were taking place all over the region” (idem:

49).

This domino-effect, at least in the short term, seems overestimated (idem: 51). Writing in the end of

2012, many regimes are still in place. Leaders in countries such as Morocco or Bahrain admitted to political reform. Revolutionary spirits in these countries calmed down. The extent to which the anti-sectarian protests of 2011 can be solely attributed to the Arab uprisings in the region is debatable, as Tamirace Fakhoury (2011: 8) argues: “Even prior to the Arab revolts, anti-sectarian ‘counterpublics’ that do not represent the two hegemonic 14 or 8 March Coalitions have been pressing for a secular society31 based on meritocracy.” 32

On the other side, one cannot deny the small scale effects of the Arab uprisings on countries in the region and beyond. Lebanon did not remain unaffected by the revolutionary spirits that lit the revolutionary

31 Italics in original. 32 The protests of 2011 were not the first anti-sectarian protests held in Lebanon. Even after Hariri’s assassination, there were activists going against the political situation in Lebanon. The Laïque Pride movement for example has organized yearly marches in Beirut against the secular system from 2010 onward. Walking the streets to protest is not uncommon in Lebanon. Its civil society is “one of the most vibrant in the Arab world” (Abdel-Latif 2007), but the effects of the campaigns are often limited because of the structural foundation of the Lebanese political system that strengthens communal ties. The anti-sectarian protests grew significantly in the context of the Arab uprisings, as this chapter will show. 66

lights of people living in the region. As activist Bassel Abdullah (interview with the author, November 26, 2012) told me: the direct reason for small scale organisations to join the anti-sectarian demonstrations were the 2011

Arab uprisings. Indeed, one reason for anti-sectarian mobilization was this feeling of opportunity crossing the region. Lebanese people who did not mobilize took note of what was happening around them as well.

A national random sample opinion survey conducted among 324 Lebanese from various sects in

January 2012, a few months after the 201 sectarian protests were held, reflects Lebanese attitudes on the ongoing regional events around them. That parts of the Lebanese society felt involved was largely due to the escalation of the Syrian uprisings in a grand scale conflict that affected the livelihoods of many Lebanese, but also due to the sectarian character of the Lebanese state: “respondents displayed a sectarian perception of the positive or negative role of foreign involvement in the events of the Arab Spring, reflected the political- sectarian divisions in Lebanese society” (Salamey 2012). For instance, the survey found that trust given to powerful actors in the Middle East and North Africa region was dependent on sect. Greater trust was given to those entities that they perceived as most closely resembling their sectarian views. The support of Iran to

Hizbollah and Amal, the two major Shia parties, resulted in more positive views of the role of that country for

Shia Lebanese.33 This survey shows that the Arab uprisings are very well able to upset the sectarian balance in

Lebanon (idem). Besides having an effect on the sectarian balance, the Arab uprisings in the region also caused the spread of the revolutionary spirit going against the (sectarian) system as such.

One way in which this spread could be noticed was through the use of particular protesting symbols used in Arab uprisings. Taking the symbols of the first country to protest Tunisia, protesters from other countries used their symbolism for their own particular goals. If one slogan coloured the Arab region in 2011, it was “The people want to bring down the regime”34, sometimes adjusted to fit the demands of the protestors in one particular country. The slogan could be heard in Tunis, and later also in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria,

Sudan, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon.

33 This was not the only case in which sectarianism influenced the results of the survey. Another example on how Lebanese sectarianism influenced Lebanese perception of the regional uprisings appears when respondents are being asked for the causes of the Arab uprisings. Mostly Sunni Muslims emphasized the lack of political freedom by Arab youth, while most Shia Muslims cite external conspiracy as the main cause. The two countries that all sects could agree on where the United States and Israel, and the results were not positive. All showed a “strong dislike for the role of the United States in both the Arab Spring and the United States and Israel in MENA region affairs (Salamey 2012). ال نظام إ س قاط ي ري د ال ش عب :The original slogan in Arab reads 34 67

The negative framing of this slogan hints at one major aspect that made mobilization in Lebanon different from that in most other countries in the region: the negative framing could be used to reject as one group the status quo of authoritarianism. There was no authoritarian regime ruling Lebanon. Furthermore, the alternative to authoritarianism in other countries was clear: people demanded a say in the political situation.

The Lebanese people already had a say in politics, but their opinions were diffuse and largely based on

Lebanese fragmented society. In the context of the uprisings in the Arab region, “the concept or notion of “the people” has gained reconsideration as being a mass of variant and differentiated powers, interests and groups that form and crystallize around one identity, one will and one goal”: it overruled religious, sectarian tribal and ethnic interests in order to create a sense of national belonging (Traboulsi 2011: 15-6).

This unity among masses of people is not present in Lebanon, nor is there a shared idea on how the political future of the country should look like. Although protesters in Lebanon in their attempt to emulate the uprisings had quite a similar slogan, chanting: “the people want to bring down the sectarian regime”35 (Hermez

2011: 527), the 2011 movement was unable to reach to the masses. In the fragmented society of Lebanon, framing your claims in the negative, such as other Arab countries did, was not enough. “In Lebanon, authority is not centralized” but rather “distributed among fiefdoms defined by sectarian zoning. We cannot suffice with rejection and with the negative. The curse of our sectarian political system forces us to define what we really want – or in other words, define the positive and affirm our needs” (Abbas & Yaakoub 2011: 209). To do this in a unitary manner or in such a large scale protest as compared to the 2005 mobilizations proved to be impossible. To get a clear idea on why this is the case, the next section will give an overview on the anti- sectarian revolutions of 2011.

35 Besides the use of this minimally adjusted original slogan from the Arab uprisings, Lebanese politicians also made their own versions by adjusting the text but keeping the same melody. Members of Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement for example said “Allah, Lebnan, Aoun, ou bas (God, Lebanon Aoun and that’s it)” while members of the 8 March opposition sang against the 14 March government “Asfar, akhdar, laymouneh, badna ntyyer el hkoumeh”, listing the party colours of the bloc followed by “we want to overthrow the government”. The Arab uprisings in the region were thus not only taken by those protesting against the regime, but also by the followers of political parties that were part of the Lebanese political system themselves. 68

4.3. The evolution of the 2011 anti-sectarian protests

The year 2011 started with political tumult at the governmental level in Lebanon. After continuous warnings by

Hizbollah against the accusations made against the party by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Lebanese

National Unity government collapsed on 12 January 2011. The resignation of the Lebanese government did not trigger the anti-sectarian protests as much as it contributed to the sense that change was needed in the

Lebanese sectarian system. At the same time, uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt already led to the elimination of their former leaders while in large scale demonstrations the population in Libya was trying to accomplish the same. As Bouchra Saab (interview with the author, November 2012), one of the organizers of the 2011 anti- sectarian protests, said:

In the context of the Arab Spring, people started boiling. We also needed change. Citizens should not be seen as subjects of sects, but as real citizens. Citizenship is a basic Human Right, which we deserve. Because of the context we were heard. Now, for the first time, there was a new state of mind. The Arab Spring helped people to move to the streets.

The 2011 protests that started the following month were relatively small in scale. Through media attention the movement became known among parts of Lebanese society, which made that the amount of people joining these mobilizations grew over time. “The strategy, building from revolutionary movements elsewhere, was to mobilise people with the help of social network websites such as Facebook, and to ensure that nodes of activity spread beyond Beirut, the capital city” (Hermez 2011: 527). Direct connections were made with what happened in the rest of the region. “They declared that they were mo less capable of bringing down their own regime, and that protests leading to civil disobedience was the right way to do it – not violence and not joining the parliament to change the system from within” (Idriss 2012). As secular activist Bouchra Saab (interview with the author, November 26, 2012) explained, the movement wanted to distance itself from politicians: “It needs to come from the people. Even if we could change it through political means, this is not what we want.”

The first demonstration of the anti-sectarian movement was held on February 27, 2011. This was a relatively small-scale protest, with around two to three thousand people marching Beirut demanding the fall of the sectarian system and the instalment of a secularist political system through shouting their consciously chosen slogan “the people want the fall of the sectarian regime”. Connections were made with the protests in the region. As protester Rahshan Saglam (in Reuters 2011a) recalled: “We are here to bring down the sectarian

system in Lebanon because it is more of a doctoral system than dictatorship systems themselves”. Leaflets with demands for a secular, civil, democratic, socially just and equal state were handed out during the march. The route chosen was the old demarcation line in Beirut, which separated the Muslim from the Christian parts of the city during its civil war, also known as the Green Line. The protesters ended their march through singing the national anthem of Lebanon, and then dispersed peacefully before the beginning of the evening.36

Media attention on the protests proved to be both a disadvantage and beneficial to the movement.

On the more positive side, media attention on the protest that Sunday made the anti-sectarian movement known at a larger public in Lebanon. As shown in the theoretical sector, mobilization often takes place in the informal everyday spheres of life, for example through watching television (Baylouny 2011). New initiatives were taken to follow up on the event. The following days sit-ins were held the in the Sanaye district of Beirut where the Ministry of Interior is located, and in the Southern city of Saida. These sit-ins were not part of any action plan, but happened rather spontaneously. The second protest was planned on Sunday, March 6. Prior to this anti-sectarian protest a conference was held at the UNESCO Palace in Beirut “to coordinate activities for the campaign” that at this point had sparked the interest around the country (Daily Star 2011a). From Mount

Lebanon people walked on foot to Beirut. This time again, the mobilization has been promoted by Facebook groups aiming at toppling the sectarian regime. Around 8 thousand people showed up (Reuters 2011b).

On the down side, media attention also created an image on the protests that was beyond the anti- sectarian movement’s control. Most media stations are owned by political parties, which meant that “images on TV did not reflect what actually happened” (interview of the author with Bouchra Saab, November 26,

2012). Organizers of the march have been “cautious about being seen as receiving support from traditional political leaders and groups” (Daily Star 2011a). Both during interviews with organizers of the event, as in news papers, those involved with the anti-sectarian movement tried to sketch an image of being held back by those in power. One organiser of the mobilization, Ali Dirani, told Lebanese newspaper Daily Star(idem) that politicians tried to meet with the organisers because they are getting anxious about the anti-sectarian

36 That same evening, the fragmented politics of Lebanon came again to the fore as the March 14 movement issued a statement rejecting the current state of political affairs: “The way the national unity cabinet was toppled and the atmospheres of intimidation ... created by the March 8 camp during the process of parliamentary consultations and designation have confirmed our doubts that the March 8 camp is pressing on with its coup” (YaLibnan 2011). 70

campaign37. This image is confirmed by Bassel Abdullah (interview with the author, November 26, 2012), lawyer and General Director of the “Civil Society Movement”, one of the sub-movements participating in the anti-sectarian demonstrations:

Politicians do everything to perpetrate their power. Each sect in Lebanon has its own media: its own radio, newspapers and television channels. We don’t have anything. Through these channels they tried to take over. Some Shia said that we are part of March 14. Berri38 said that he was with us, and in this way hijacked the movement. But we are not politicians! People are scared that we serve the interests of the other. Christians are afraid we are serving the Muslims. Independence doesn’t exist, let alone trust.

In order to earn trust from potential followers of the anti-sectarian movement, the organisation needed to prove its independence from the ruling regional powers.

That it was hard to keep fragmentation in Lebanon out of the picture was shown in the Sidon sit-in.

The six tents at Sidon’s Martyrs Square at night formed the place for discussions and debates between protesters and the public. This sit-in angered several secular political groups that have called for a secular system in the past. As the Daily Star (2011b) wrote on the 10th of March:

The sources say that this has angered the several groups with a following in Sidon, and more specifically, the Popular Democratic Party, a small, elite leftist group established in the 1960s, and one that is separate from the mainstream Lebanese Communist Party. The sources say that the PDP was angered by not being contacted by the organizers of the sit-in. (…) Meanwhile, the LCP has backed the sit-in, but political sources say that this has taken place quietly – in order to satisfy the organizers’ demand of “no political parties,” and also to avoid alienation people in the city who are religious conservatives.

The climax of the anti-sectarian movement came on the third pro-secular mobilization on March 20. It was considered “the largest march beyond the two sectarian blocks” (Idriss 2012). Although the amount of

37 Besides meeting with those involved, politicians are also accused of trying to scare their usual supporters by making them aware of the potential negative consequences of joining the anti-sectarian movement. According to Paul Tabar (interview with the author, November 16, 2012) Lebanese regard the political system as a zero- sum game. If you want to run the risk of demonstrating for a secular system, then you might also run the risk that your opponents in the political system take your share of the pie, and that you end up with nothing. Politicians noticed this, and adjusted their approaches to the system accordingly. Antoine Andraous, deputy head of the mainly Sunni Future movement for example stated that Christians will pay the price if the political sectarianism is cancelled: “Most of the participants in Sunday’s demonstration were from Amal Movement... the Communist Party and some enthusiastic young [people] including some Christians. Hizbollah and Amal are the last ones who have the right to talk about sectarianism [...] Hizbollah, Amal and the Shia sect will be the first to benefit on the day when [political] sectarianism is cancelled” (Now Lebanon 2011). 38 Nabih Berri is the Shia leader of the Lebanese largely Shia party Amal.

25,000 people is most often mentioned in the media, according to organizer Bouchra Saab (interview with the author, November 26, 2012) around 30 to 40 thousand people came to protest on that particular day, while emphasizing that this is a huge amount of people for an organization not capable of portraying itself in the media. Again, the demand was for a secular political system in Lebanon.

What became more apparent with this large amount of people present is that several other claims were made as well. People were mobilizing to ask for women’s rights; civil marriage; the rejection of the death penalty; a new heritage system; a new voting system; the improvement of women’s rights in general; a different educational system: what seemed to be one demand appeared to be a demand built up by numerous other sub-demands. The anti-secular movement actually consisted of multiple movements, as the next section will explain. The large number of groups involved could not prevent participants in the movements to have the idea that they were part of something bigger crossing the Arab region: “For a moment it appeared that the

‘Arab Spring’ might spread to Lebanon, and change the unchangeable. However, after several more smaller rallies, the anti-system movement withered and the winds of the Arab Spring passed without an conspicuous change in Lebanon” (Beshara 2012: 2).

Indeed, after a small last instance of mobilization on June 26, the anti-secular movement faded away.

The last planned march in April was cancelled “due to considerations over Palm Sunday, “which it was feared would curb Christian participation, but the decision was extended to an indefinite halt with the date of the next protest left undecided” (Daily Star 2011c). The latest anti-sectarian demonstration was cancelled because of a religious holiday, marking the end of demonstrations held by the coalition of anti-sectarian movements. One could argue that a reason for the lack of growth in the movement was its organisational structure.

4.4. Organisational aspects of the 2011 anti-sectarian mobilization

Whereas in 2005 there was an organisation of identity entrepreneurs along with many people that heard that something was going on and therefore joined the protests, both the organisation and the feeling of momentum and unity seemed lacking at the largest share of Lebanese society in 2011. While countries in the region were uniting against their common target, the anti-sectarian movement in Lebanon was clearly made up on several organisations that each had their different interests: “Demands were too broad and fragmented” (Hermez

2011: 532). 72

Around 20 to 30 civil society movements joined together to end the sectarian regime in Lebanon. “Its organizers included leftist and secularist political groups, NGOs, gender and sexual preference collectives, and many independent activists”39 (AbiYaghi 2012). Each group had its own ideas on what should happen if with the future secular government. Nehmat Badredinne, one of the campaign’s spokespersons, mentioned to

Lebanese newspaper Daily Star that “we are people who differ from each other, and we might find ourselves

[suited to joining] this or that [Facebook] group, but all of us aim to topple the sectarian regime and leave our differences aside” (Daily Star 2011a). Leaving differences aide proved harder than expected, though. Not all participants in the protest could agree on what should happen after the sectarian regime would have been toppled. Each organisation joining the movement had their own perspectives on how the secular system should take shape. This could also be noticed in the framing of the demands of the protestors: Some wanted the future Lebanese state to be a secular state40, while others preferred to use the term “civil state”41, in order not to antagonize potential newcomers to the movement who associate secularism to atheism (Idriss 2012).

Similar to the protestors of the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Egypt, the Lebanese protest movement is active on the Internet as well. “One of the activists noted that the campaign is trying to leave the realm of Facebook and concentrate efforts on the logistics of organizing demonstrations. “Division won’t infiltrate into the movement, no matter how many groups on Facebook there are, we are one group now on the ground,” said Rawad Shami. “Committees are being created all over the country in order to simplify communication and the mobilization [needed for] demonstrations. We’re trying to have less activity and news on Facebook; we need more privacy.” (Daily Star 2011a). Bassel Abdullah (interview with the author, November

26, 2012), Director of the Civil Society Movement said that the mobilization in 2011 through Facebook was not their normal strategy: they wanted to reach long term change by infiltrating the educational system in Lebanon to make people aware of the problem that the country faces. “It was not a failure, because the problems got

39 Among the anti-secular movement were the following organisations: the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections, Path Assembly (Kam3iyat Massar), Towards Citizenship (Nahwa el Mouwatana), Lebanese Association for the promotion of transparency, Lebanese Physically Handicapped Union, Civil Society Movement, Skills Assembly (Maharat), Lebanese Center for Civic Education, Youth Association for the Blind, Network of Arab non-governmental development, Shaml, Mothers not Violent (Umahat La 3onfiyat), Alternative society (Link SIlat Wasl), Joint Effort (Jehd Moushtarak), Jana Center and KAFA movement, an organisation comprising several other women’s associations and organisations. 40 Dawlah ‘almaniyyah 41 Dawlah madaniyyah 73

known. Now we need to work on more feasible changes. It was not realistic to change the system through protest. We had no civil TV to support us; it was something we tried out in the context of the Arab Spring”.

The first Facebook42 page and the one that is most well known to protest in favour of the fall of the sectarian regime, and that carries the same name on their Facebook page, has over 21 thousand followers.

Their mission statement as listed on their website goes43:

The Lebanese people also deserve to live in dignity and to overthrow the corrupt sectarian system. We have the right not to be governed by thieves, political feudalism or sectarian feudalism. We, the people, educated ourselves and we have struggled and sacrificed and we deserve a system that expresses our ambitions. We ask for a system that is flawless from sectarianism, racism, and all forms of repression and ensure freedom of the country and people’s dignity and social justice. Enough negativity, weakness: the authority is in the hands of the people. The people are the ones who have the final say… united people are invincible! Equality... Freedom… social justice.

Although this statement makes use of unifying language (“We, the people...”), this cannot hide the fact that the anti-sectarian movement was internally divided.

One consequence of this plurality of organisations working on the movement is that they had fewer resources at their disposal. “These demonstrations differed significantly from confessional mobilizations such as 14 or 8 March demonstrations – as participants organized their own logistics and transportation and funded themselves through individual contributions, rather than being organized and facilitated by political patrons”

(AbiYaghi 2012: 22). Bouchra Saab (interview with the author, November 26, 2012) gave the lack of resources as one reason why the movement so far had only limited effects. Since work in the movement goes on voluntary basis, most of the people joining the movement have been young upper-class Lebanese. In 2005,

“most people were there for emotional reasons. They did not think of the real reasons, it was spontaneous. We don’t address emotions. Every sect can address their own tribe, we are working with nothing”. According to

Michael Young (interview with the author, November 22, 2012) however, the Lebanese were not ready to

ال ش عب ‘ :The original name of the movement in Arabic, to be found at www.facebook.com/lebrevolution is 42 .’ال طائ في ال نظام ا س قاط ي ري د ال ل ب نان ي 43 The translation is a rough version of the original Arabic text, approved by a native Arabic speaker: الشعب اللبناني يستحق ايضا أن يعيش بكرامة و أن يسقط النظام الطائفي الفاسد. يحق لنا اال يحكمنا اللصوص و االقطاع السياسي أو الطائفي. نحن شعب تعلم و تثقف و ناضل و ضحى و نستحق نظاما يعبر عن طموحاتنا. نظام منزه من آفات الطائفية و العنصرية و كل اشكال القهر و القمع و يسهر على حرية البالد و كرامة الشعب و العدالة االجتماعية. كفانا سلبية و تخاذل.... السلطة للشعب و الشعب هو من يحسم.... الشعب المتحد ال يهزم! مساواة.. حرية..... عدالة اجتماعية 74

reject sectarianism in 2011. Only part of the middle class was, namely those who had enough time at their disposal to spend it working on a voluntary basis for the movement.

This section made clear that what united the activists was that all believed in secularism as the final goal. This proved to be a factor that led to the fragmentation of the anti-sectarian movement and the fading away of the anti-sectarian protests. As could be read in the theoretical chapter, internal aspects of political movements influence their strength. Internal power relationships or a lack of a clear group identity can cause members to break with the movement (Menoret 2011). Different ideas on how the future Lebanese state would look like was not the only (internal) obstacle that the movement had to deal with, as the final section of this chapter will show. Before we discuss reasons why this protest did not come to a success, it is needed to discuss more non-structural reasons why people did not felt the need to join in 2011. What role did emotions play in the anti-sectarian mobilization?

4.5. The role of emotions

Where in 2005 there was a strong feeling of being united against a common foe, in 2011 the feeling of binding

Lebanese among a common goal – the abolition of the sectarian system - did not convince as many people.

Although sectarianism was something binding many Lebanese, not many people felt the urge to protest against the political system. One argument that has been made in the theoretical section is that the context in which mobilization takes place may form an opportunity for people to mobilize. As shown above, Lebanese society got affected by the uprisings in the region, but for most Lebanese this did not result in a feeling of binding with the movements goals. A closer look at discourses in place in Beirut in 2011 that hint at shared emotions in

Lebanese society makes clear how this is the case.

In general, two discourses on the Arab uprisings appeared that coloured the protests. Tamirace

Fakhoury (2011: 7-8) labels the first discourse as a feeling of momentum. Here, “the uprisings are perceived by sections of the Lebanese population as an opportune time to press for political reform” (Fakhoury 2011: 7).

This was/ contrasted by a discourse of disenchantment. As could be read above, many Lebanese who participated in the 2005 independence intifada felt that their efforts were useless. “This is due to the conviction that Lebanon’s political system is change resistant and blocks through sectarian deal making the accession of young and new elites to the political process” (idem: 8). The perception that the Lebanese political 75

leaders and state institutions are corrupt is omnipresent in Lebanese society (Leenders 2012b), and this did not go away after the 2005 independence intifada. The feeling of momentum has been explained in the previous chapter. To understand this discourse of disenchantment it is good to look at the role of emotions of Lebanese youth during the 2011 protests.

In the context of the Arab uprisings in 2011, it is often claimed that the “youth” was at the forefront of mobilization. In their overview of academic texts on the Arab uprisings, Paul Aarts et al. (2012: 26) state:

“Scores of fairly well educated youth were expecting to do better than previous generations, but found themselves lacking in serious opportunities. (…) It is these factions of educated youth, often referred to as the

“youth bulge” that has been labelled by many analysts as a crucial factor in the revolts” (Aarts et al. 2012: 26).

Research by Charles Harb (2010: 12) shows that just as other countries that experienced the Arab uprisings, the Lebanese youth is very well educated. His survey under 1200 Lebanese youth showed that 41.4% owns a university degree, regardless of gender, sect or religion (idem). This makes the Lebanese youth one of the most educated populations in the region (idem: 17). Frustration can be felt among Lebanese youth because it has become increasingly difficult to find a job. Yet, what makes the Lebanese case different from countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya is the social contract in place between the authoritarian regimes and its citizens, which is not apparent in Lebanon. In the former case, the population’s loyalty could be bought with

“the gains made from exploiting a state’s natural resources and making sure to improve socio-economic conditions of its population” (Aarts et al. 2012: 31). This social contract created a feeling of mutual dependency between the population and its citizens. This feeling of a common national identity is lacking among Lebanese citizens.44

The concept of Lebanese national identity is fragmented: each class has its own perception of the ideal

Lebanese state. Coming across strong identifications with the Lebanese state does not necessarily mean that there is one nationalist sentiment in Lebanon. Herb’s survey among Lebanese youth showed that, Lebanese

44 The lack of attachment of Lebanese citizens to their state is reflected in the high intentions of the Lebanese youth to emigrate, “indicating that high education levels are not utilised adequately by authority” (Harb 2010: 13). Fragmented feelings of national belonging are apparent in Harb´s investigation of sectarian prejudice among Lebanese youth. The respondents’ warmth and acceptance towards members of other sects resulted in an average of 67% of acceptance, but with a large standard deviation (SD= 19.7) (idem: 14). “Arab identification was lower than Islamic identification in both Sunni and Shia groups. There is a significant difference between sects and regions. Specifically, Maronite Christians identified with their family, friends and profession significantly more than both Sunni and Shia Muslims. Sunni and Shia participants scored significantly higher than Maronite Christians on Arab identity and higher than all other sects on Islamic identity” (idem: 13). 76

youth identifies itself most strongly with the family, “closely followed by national identification.

Sectarian/religious identification comes third” (Harb 2010: 15). When interviewing Lebanese people in Beirut, regardless of sect, they first and foremost saw themselves as Lebanese citizens, with their political bloc (8 / 14

March) and sect in a second or third place.45 According to Khashan (personal interview with the author,

November 6, 2012), these responses should not be taken at face value. Although Lebanese flags are present in the streets and during demonstrations, these flags are mainly a tool to give the impression of legitimacy of the fragment’s claims, and not a symbol of nationalist sentiment. “Lebanese people use the Lebanese flags because their leaders tell them to do so” (idem). Feelings of nationalism are formed by a common history, which is lacking in Lebanon. As Paul Taber (personal interview with the author, November 16, 2012) stated: the

“Lebanese identity is sectarianism”.

While portraying this feeling of disenchantment, Issam, a thirty-something year old from Beirut, described the Lebanese system as still being in tribal times:

Now nothing happens. This is because Lebanon has a tribal background. There is always a leader, and there are always followers. Every sect has its own leader that the members will follow. Now there are still leaders, but Rafiq Hariri had more impact than Saad Hariri. Loyalty to the party, that I would like to call tribe, comes first. The chief is in command. There is no loyalty for the country.

Common attachment to the country as an entity of land should not be confused with a common feeling of national identity at society at large. The feelings of attachment to Lebanon are framed through sectarianism.

Lebanese youth shows a “blatant bias towards one’s sect”, regardless of their gender, confession or region, when asked if they were proud to belong to their sect, or if their sect could serve Lebanon better than any other sect (Harb 2010: 14). The leadership of these sects was often done by individuals who have regarded themselves as better than the system, “which hardly ever seems to satisfy their aspiration to be great men”

(Young 2010: 249).

Although Fakhoury (2011) states that in Lebanese society both a discourse of momentum and a discourse of disenchantment were present, students in Roseanne Saad Khalaf’s (2009: 162-75) creative writing workshops at the American University of Beirut mainly expressed the latter. She argues that only in the safe

45 “These identity patterns reflect the wider culture in which family dynamics and inter-communal relations dominate the identification process, with little space for individual differentiation or political affiliations” (Harb 2010: 15). 77

house of the class, students showed their “real feelings” toward Lebanon. The young and educated Lebanese had clear ideas on what Lebanese citizenship should be like, namely that it should be based on democratic rights and responsibilities rather than privilege and entitlement. The quotations of student’s work show the lack of trust and hope:

Lebanon has killed my sense of belonging and stolen my hope”; “We must live up to the expectations of the family, the community, our religious sect, and political party but I have no intention of doing so”; “I feel ashamed to be Lebanese because Lebanon is a country that lives on lies covered with more lies. Everything is wrong about the government, and I see nothing here that encourages me to cling to even a shred of hope”; “All our dreams are just delusions because politicians in Lebanon used us to achieve their own ends”; “If I stay here, religion will be the determining factor and certainly not my qualifications.

However, different from one might expect but in line with the disenchantment discourse, at the same time the students “have no intention of reversing ineffective practices, improving state institutions, or creating a stable, just and forward looking society by speaking to a larger political discourse” (Saad Khalaf 2009: 171). As two students wrote: “Apathy becomes the key to survival and resilience an acceptable and conditioned way to live”, and “In order to survive we must accept the fact that our government, when not too busy going for each other’s throats, does not care about Lebanese citizens”. These presents of Lebanese students illustrate how after the Cedar Revolution the youth felt lacking in opportunity.

These were emotions felt by Lebanese youth. Besides feelings of disenchantment, Joseph (interview with the author, October 28, 2012), a Christian upper-class male at the end of his twenties, argued that it is not only the youth that feels disenchanted. Lebanese in general are afraid and too angry to go again and protest:”The people who are capable of changing the situation don’t do it anymore. In 2005 it was a completely different situation, the people united, sects did not matter. Now, sects matter more than before”.

Finally, one last emotion that should be discussed is that of dignity, relating to the zero-sum game that will be described below. Sami Hermez (2011) sees dignity “to play a meaning-making role for people, where meaning is drawn from both an individual and collective sense of dignity, and where the boundary between individual and collective perhaps depends on the extent to which the person in Lebanon is relationally dependent on their community” (Hermez 2011: 528). The relationship between leaders of Lebanese communities and their followers is reciprocal: on the one hand the followers get access to social services dependent on their sectarian background. The Lebanese who do not receive benefits from their political parties

“cast their vote for them and defend them diligently in social settings because ideas and positions of a party, or leader, provide a sense of meaning and fixity in their lives” (idem: 532). In return for their vote, political leaders give them protection, but also symbolic capital in the form of a feeling of dignity (idem: 534). According to

Hermez (2011), the 2011 mobilization was all about dignity. The demands for more dignity during the 2011 regional uprising “produced an emotion in Lebanon that was used by activists to counterpoise the political sectarianism of the state, and to attempt to subvert the major political parties” (Hermez 2011: 531).

This was one reason why the 2011 mobilization did not succeed to grow to involve large parts of

Lebanese society. The anti-sectarian movement tried to give people a sense of dignity within the entire country and state-system, but followers of the movement had no guarantee that their trust would be returned with a dignified life. It was hard for people to break away from old relationships that protected them. This way, sectarianism is used by political powers to stay in power through exchanging dignity for loyalty. The patron- client relations present in the Lebanese political system are brought forward by the reliance on sectarian categories in society. As read in the theoretical chapter, identities of people can give away personal values and beliefs, in which identity refers to the “state of mind that includes a view of self, attitudes, lifestyles, and experiences shared with others which is publicly recognized and labelled, and which is usually associated with role, membership, and/or category” (Obesrschall & Kim 1996: 64-5). Giving your membership away to an idea that would change your identity, needs a lot of trust. It is thus not strange that “people rely on sectarian categories in determining political allegiances (among other things) because the political system itself takes advantage of sectarian identifications” (Hermez 2011: 529). The anti-sectarian movement could not find any space to break this relationship.

Besides failing to create a new reciprocal relation between the followers and the secularists based on dignity, there are other reasons why Lebanese people did not join in 2011. The next section will discuss other explanations why large scale mobilization did not occur in 2011.

4.6. Why did large scale mobilization fail to occur?

The above has already hinted at some reasons why large scale mobilization failed to happen. Indeed, both structural reasons - such as the lack of media influence and other (financial) resources, unwanted political interference and a weak organisational structure of the anti-sectarian movement - and more non-structural 79

reasons such as feelings of disenchantment, feelings of the lack of opportunities with the youth and the sectarian based feelings of nationalism held back large scale mobilization. One should therefore be cautious to list a sole reason why the 2011 anti-sectarian protests did not get a foothold on Lebanese soil, since there appear to have been many. What will become clear next through an explanation of why did so few people felt inspired to join the 2011 anti-sectarian protests, is that the issue of Lebanese sectarian society is always looming in the background.

As could be read in the previous section, the anti-sectarian movement was internally divided, creating too many views on the direction and demands of the movement. Besides this aspect, the movement was suffering from more internal problems as well. Samah Idriss (2012) lists four internal obstacles within the anti- sectarian movement that may have lead to the decline of the number of people mobilizing. Besides the internal differences on the issue how a secular Lebanese state would take shape, there was the discovery that it was harder to let the Lebanese regime fall than expected: “it could be viewed as the oldest and most stubborn of all

Arab regimes” (Idriss 2012), mainly because leadership of the Lebanese system was shared and the sectarian system was entrenched in society through a complicated sectarian network of medical, educational and economic institutions. Additionally, the movement was internally divided on two important issues in Lebanon: the status of Hizbollah’s arms and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. And finally, when the Syrian uprisings escalated, it “was the last straw that broke the back of the secular camel” (idem). While part of the movement wanted to link their protest as part of the broader Arab uprisings in the region, others within the movement tried their best to distance themselves from what was going on in their neighbouring country. Together, these four internal differences made it difficult to unite the different anti-sectarian movements for one common goal, and thereby strengthening their claims. In time, internal differences resulted in a two way split in the anti- sectarian movement. The first anti-sectarian camp believed that accumulated reforms would lead to radical change, whereas the second argued that a more revolutionary approach was needed to effect reform or bring down the whole system (AbiYaghi 2012). The division within the anti-sectarian movements on the way in which they should mobilise was one reason that larger scale protest stayed away.

Besides the internal struggles of the anti-sectarian movement, it also suffered from external intrusion, such as the involvement of sectarian and secular parties with the movement’s activities. Those behind the 2011 mobilization often blamed politicians for hijacking the movement, and used this as an excuse for the lack of

trust from Lebanese society in the anti-sectarian goals. One effect of the involvement of outside political parties was that the divisions within the two camps of the anti-sectarian movement coalition became stronger

(AbiYaghi 2012: 22). When the 2011 mobilization did not result in the transcending of the sectarian political system, it was easy to point the finger to the sectarian system itself and the movement’s failure to approach it.

Michael Young (2010: 247) while referring to earlier anti-sectarian protests argues that finger pointing at

Lebanese politicians is too simplistic:”The leaders had little yearning to move beyond sectarianism, true, but that was never probable in the first place. As the leaders knew, from seeing it day in and day out, they retained their legitimacy because sectarianism retained its own, whatever its many faults, so that the idealists [...] became invisible in a system they could not comprehend.”

The Lebanese various sects blurring the Lebanese political landscape made it difficult to rally against one common bully and possibly even harder to address a common identity while fighting for a common cause as one community. “In Lebanon power and authority are fragmented, which means that there is not centre to rally against. [...] The 2011 demonstrations to bring down the sectarian system failed basically because the

‘collective’ opposition to the system was no match to the sectarian and fractured identities that dominated the

Lebanese political terrain, and still do” (Beshara 2012: 3-4). Although the movement was inspired by uprisings in the rest of the region, the sectarian system made Lebanon a peculiar case. Adel Beshara (2012) provides three reasons to explain that the Arab uprisings in the region did not have any significant effect in Lebanon.

This gives an explanation for Lebanese not capturing the opportunity of the Arab uprisings to mobilise themselves as well.

Firstly, the conditions that were present in the region that lead to mass mobilization are not present in

Lebanon: there is no oppressive regime, no disillusionment with the system and there are democratic processes that can check the powers of other groups in society, and there is the possibility of public discussion

(Beshara 2012: 2-3; Young 2010: 13).46 Secondly, “there is a widespread feeling among many Lebanese that, well before the start of the Arab Spring, their country had already experienced its own ‘Spring’ in 2005”

46 Besides not having a political system of absolute rule, the Lebanese state is also different from other states because of the strength of the sectarian system. “The Arab state has almost everywhere become a vessel for absolute rule, and many of the region’s regimes have demonstrated the acute degradation of their political orders by establishing republican monarchies. Lebanon is not the only sectarian society in the Middle East; but it is the only one where the estate is less powerful that the religious communities” (Young 2010: 13). 81

(Beshara 2012: 4). There was a sentiment that Lebanon was the originator of the Arab Spring.47 This could be seen in three characteristics of Lebanon’s Independence Intifada “that have been replicated in the Arab uprisings of 2011” (idem). Just as in 2005, in the Arab uprisings of 2011 there is a demand to replace instruments of repression, a resort to foreign partners to counterbalance the system in place and a tendency to question the achievements of the protests in their aftermath. Due to the Independence Intifada of 2005 and the disenchantment that followed, Lebanese people had the sense that it they moved past the dream of large scale mobilization, with the main source of Lebanese political problems already gone (idem: 5). Thirdly, Beshara

(2012: 5-6) notes that up until the outbreak of violence in Syria, there were neither geographical nor political links between Yemen, Tunisia, Libya or Egypt. Lebanese people were wary of the political uncertainty coming from the uprisings and the growing power of the political Islam shown in the successes of the Muslim

Brotherhood. This was reflected in the refusal to include political Islam by the March 8 and March 14 movements (idem).48 Together, these factors are able to explain why the Arab uprisings were not viewed by most Lebanese as a window of opportunity to mobilize.

The Arab uprisings in the region may have caused one other remarkable aspect of the 2011 anti- sectarian mobilization. Outside international interference hardly played a role in the anti-sectarian protests.

With the region in tumult, not all international eyes were directed at Lebanon. When asked for the influence of foreign powers, Bassel Abdullah (interview with the author, November 26, 2012) said that embassies sponsored workshops given by the Civil Society Movement, one organisation involved in the anti-sectarian protests, but that this happened only every now and then. Small scale mobilization did not trigger outside interference to the same extent as in 2005.

47 Michael Young (interview with the author, November 22, 2012) argues that there are a lot of similarities between what happened in 2005 and what was happening during the Arab uprisings in 2011. First, just as during the Arab uprisings, the protestors in Lebanon in 2005 captured a central public space. Just as Tahrir Square became a symbol of Egyptian mobilization, Martyrs Square was captured in 2005. Secondly, just as the security apparatus didn’t decide to intervene with force and break down the protests in Egypt and Tunisia, in Lebanon the security services largely stayed in the background as well. 48 Indeed, this is only true for the situation up until the violent uprising started in Syria. The situation in Syria directly affects Lebanon. Now, a distinction in approaching the Arab uprisings between the approach of March 8 and March 14 became clear, where the latter is even supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. The March 14 movement claimed that the Syrian uprisings was their own 2005 Cedar Revolution through stating that there is “no March without February and no Spring without March”, arguing that there would be no Arab uprisings without the Cedar Revolution” (Idriss 2012). On the other hand, March 14 never supported the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen. March 8 is more supportive of the Syrian regime. “

As shown in the theoretical section however, the success of mobilization is not only dependent on the internal organisational structures behind the movement, outside interference or windows of opportunity such as the Arab uprisings that need to open. Emotions played a role as well. The movement needed to capture a feeling of belonging from the Lebanese to bind them to their secular goals. This feeling of belonging goes together with a feeling of trust in what the movement stands for: the secularisation of Lebanese society. This trust proved to be lacking.

Most Lebanese still identify themselves to some sort of fragment, be it sect, political grouping (being affiliated with the 8 or 14 March movement), or region. Where in 2005 people joined because they felt that as a united nation they could make a decision, this mobilization did not go together with risking their security blanket, that is to say being protected by your own sect. Doing away with sectarianism in Lebanon requires

Lebanese to believe that as soon as you give up your share of the Lebanese power pie, another party will not eat the share you just gave away for common benefit. The institutionalization of sectarian identities and sectarianism in Lebanese society caused that “security for each of the communities has been equivalent to a zero-sum game and securing sectarian identity continues to be the main referent” (Beshara 2012: 2).

The institutionalisation of sectarian identities in Lebanon makes it unlikely that this zero-sum game will soon be done away with. Sectarianism forms a large part of the explanation of why the anti-sectarian protests did not get a foothold in Lebanon. “A revolution against sectarianism in Lebanon would entail a change of political culture and institutions. It would presuppose first and foremost a new political consciousness marked by an all-encompassing commitment to deconfessionalization, otherwise any project proposed or imposed by a

Lebanese party to desctarianize the system would acquire confessional tones [...] desectarianizing the legacy of sectarianism in geographical spaces, political processes and educational institutions is a potentially far-reaching process” (Fakhoury 2011: 11). For many Lebanese this proved to be one step too far. “The existence of a

‘fractured’ society, epitomized by the ‘darkness’, could be then adjudged to be a critical ‘de-motivator’ in sparking a popular (and unified) uprising [...] With such dynamics in place it is hardly a surprise that the winds of the Arab Spring have eluded Lebanon. Its social identity(ies) is informed by ever-widening cleavages and continues to be marred by a memory of suffering and a fear of the ‘other’” (Sen 2011).

Conclusion

After presenting this evaluation of the 2011 anti-sectarian protests in Lebanon, it now becomes possible to answer how (non)structural conditions influenced the propensity for social mobilization in the fragmented society of Lebanon in the context of the 2011 anti-sectarian protests.

Although in practice there is not always a clear line of demarcation between structural conditions to boost mobilization from non-structural conditions, this chapter has made clear that both need to be taken into account to understand what limited to propensity for social mobilization in 2011. As seen in the theoretical framework, more structural reasons taken from PPT emphasize longer cycles of mobilization and decline and factors external to movements that can constrain and shape movement outcomes, but also on organizational aspects and networks. The movement suffered from internal differences, making it harder to press for a common claim. Several sub-claims were made by the organisations making up the anti-sectarian movement.

Additionally, the movement had a lack of resources. Participants in the movement had to work on voluntary basis, and there was no money available for a clear media campaign. Members argued that the sectarian system prevented them from portraying themselves in the media. The movement did use Facebook, but each organisation within the larger anti-sectarian movement had its own page, listing their particular demands. The sectarian media also let to political interference, hijacking the anti-sectarian movement for their own political sectarian interests.

On the other hand, there are also more non-structural reasons hinting at reasons for limited propensity for social mobilization felt at Lebanese society. Lebanese experienced feelings of disenchantment with the current system. The independence intifada made Lebanese feel that change was not easily achieved in

Lebanon. The uprisings in the region did not spark feelings of momentum because those feelings where already stirred and disappointed in 2005. People felt that the 2005 independence intifada did not change the basic political structures in Lebanese society: the creation of a feeling of unity was lost only days after the big protests. This made that the anti-sectarian perception that certainly was present in Lebanese society were not set in motion. The Lebanese youth felt disenchanted as well. The ability to find a well paid job was limited, just as their feelings of national belonging to the state. In general, Lebanese nationalism is coloured by sectarianism. The sectarian based feelings of nationalism created a lack of trust in the anti-sectarian movement and may have been another reason why large scale mobilization did not occur.

There is not one answer to the question how (non)structural conditions influenced the propensity for social mobilization in the fragmented society of Lebanon in the context of the 2011 anti-sectarian protests; rather there are many. What is clear after is that Lebanese fragmented society played a role in mobilization.

Fragmentation shaped the anti-sectarian movement, although not on sectarian lines. Internal differences in the movement made that members were demonstrating for their own particular goals besides arguing for a secular regime. Sectarian structures made it difficult for the movement to squeeze their way into the social and political system. The role of fragmentation in mobilization becomes even more apparent when taking into account people’s emotions and perceptions of fragmentation. Communities in Lebanon served as security blankets of people’s identity. The feeling of insecurity of the future combined with a feeling of disenchantment because of Lebanon’s history in mobilization in 2005 made it hard for the anti-sectarian movement to gather enough people to protest. For only a few Lebanese fragmentation served as a negative driving force, to be able to show what they do not want, and to reach this through the downfall of the sectarian regime.

In the Conclusion I will compare the conclusions of the investigations of, respectively, the 2005 and

2011 protest and answer this thesis’ main query into how (non)structural conditions influenced the propensity for social mobilization in the fragmented society of Lebanon.

Conclusion

How do (non)structural conditions influence the propensity for social mobilization in the fragmented society of

Lebanon?

This goal of this thesis is to provide new insights to the relationship between social fragmentation and social mobilization, and in this way contribute to social movement theory – all in reference to and based on a case study of Lebanon. In order to do so, the main question of this thesis raised will be answered by combining and comparing the findings on the 2005 and 2011 cases. As already stated above, differences between the 2005 and 2011 mobilizations cannot solely be contributed to the mobilization in 2005, since there were many developments in the mean time that may have influenced the 2011 mobilization. Part of the comparative method is to make use of different variables offered in the theoretical framework. The chosen variables are the ones most often used both by more structural and non-structural analysis on social movements. This way, the intra-national comparison is able to shed light on the relationship between variables by analyzing the variance among variables and movement types.

The next section will give a brief overview of the variables discussed relating to the 2005 and 2011 protests and demonstrate how fragmentation influenced this particular variable in the propensity for social mobilization.

Findings

The findings of both chapters made clear that the two movements under study are different types of movements. It is now also possible to conclude that the 2005 mobilization was more successful than that of

2011. Although after the climax on March 14 no further protests were held, the 8 and 14 March movements consist until the day of today in Lebanese political life. There are still anti-sectarian protests held in Lebanon, but most organisations that made up the anti-sectarian movement and participated in 2011 do not participate anymore. These movements are less destined to see change right away and did away with mobilization as a useful tool for policy change. The mobilization of 2005 could also be seen as more successful because most of

Lebanese society was involved, or at least heard about what was going on in one way or the other. In short, 86

2005 was more successful because it lasted longer, there were more people involved, and those who were involved were more destined to see the results. These differences are reflected in the variables derived from social movement theory that are being used in this research.

Opportunities

Political process theorists point at opportunities that need to appear in order to spark a successful mobilization.

In 2005, the assassination of Rafiq Hariri formed an opportunity for the majority of Christians in Lebanon to include the Sunni share of Lebanese society in their anti-Syrian protests. It is doubtful if the protests could include this large share of society if it wasn’t for Hariri’s assassination, which brought together several parts of

Lebanese society in mobilizing against Syrian presence in their country, and other major parts of society to protest in favour of Lebanese presence. But whereas in 2005 the opportunity was captured by Lebanese people and the organization behind the protests mainly played a facilitating role, in 2011 the main opportunity to mobilize – the uprisings in the region – was seen by the organization as a moment to mobilize and to gather more people to join: it was a top-down process. Arguably, the fact that Rafiq Hariri was a symbol of the

Lebanese Sunni sect made that this opportunity was more personally felt by people than the 2011 anti- sectarian protests. Sectarianism is part of people’s identity, and sectarian leaders are part of sectarianism. The regional uprisings in 2011 did not directly confront as many people, even though these uprisings were very well capable of affecting the sectarian balance of the country. The way opportunities were perceived was shaped by sectarianism.

Organisational aspects and the role of networks

The 2005 organization behind the independence intifada already had most of their branding ready before

Hariri’s assassination. The so-called “identity entrepreneurs” were part of the Lebanese upper-class, which meant that they had the networks, resources and time to spend on the mobilization. The organization worked to create a sense of unity among its followers. Protesting against a common enemy worked well to achieve this goal. The March 8 movement, which was mainly organized by Hizbollah, formed their opponent, or the out- group. This 2011 anti-sectarian movement was not able to create this kind of unity, mainly because the movement itself was internally fragmented. The demand for a secular state was covering the particular

demands of the organizations making up the anti-sectarian movement. Additionally, whereas the organizers in

2005 had networks, media and resources to support them, this was not available to those behind the anti- sectarian protests. The lack of resources was blamed on the sectarian system, which prevented the movement to build valuable networks and make use of media. Interference by politicians out of their sectarian interest made people scared of joining the movement. There was a lack of trust coming from their reciprocal relation with the sectarian regime. In short: The inclusion in fragmented society made it easier for the organizers in

2005 to bring together many people whereas the exclusion from this system prevented the 2011 secularists from reaching the masses.

The role of fragmented identity

National identity in Lebanon is coloured by sectarianism, which illustrates the strength of fragmented identity in the country. During the 2005 mobilization the feeling of fragmented identity was not as strong as in 2011.

Lebanese people were more occupied with the Syrian presence in their country since that affected their livelihoods in a more direct manner. In the fragmented society of Lebanon, it was the dream of being united in favour of/against a common foe that caused emotions of euphoria. That parts of society were uninvolved on

March 8 and March 14 did not do away with this sense of unity, but rather made it stronger. After the Syrians left Lebanon, there was more space again for sectarian identifications, which made it more difficult for the anti- sectarian movement to mobilize people for anti-sectarian goals. The dream of possibly being united as

Lebanese was shattered, creating a discourse of disenchantment. Although members of the anti-sectarian movement were striving towards the same secular state, this could not prevent a weak collective identity within their movement. Additionally, for many Lebanese the feeling of belonging to their sects was too strong, and doing away with sectarianism was one step too far.

The role of emotions

In 2005 there was a discourse in Lebanese society of momentum and euphoria. Lebanon was boiling after

Hariri’s assassination. However, even these euphoric emotions within March 14 were fragmented. Although

Lebanese people going to Martyrs’ Square expected a feeling of unity, in reality most members of each sect experienced the day differently. Christians were more focused on Syrian withdrawal than were the Sunni’s who

gave more attention to the death of Hariri. Moreover, the protest on March 14 could be seen as a counter- mobilization to the mainly Shia Lebanese protest on March 8. After the pro-Syrian movement showed that their fights in the persistence of Shia political identity through resisting any change in the political situations, this counter-mobilization was followed by a feeling of momentum by anti-Syrian Lebanese that now was the time to join together. The lack of unity in the movement only became clear after Syrians left. This produced a feeling of disenchantment among Lebanese, losing hope that the divided country would be united again. This feeling of disenchantment together with a lack of trust caused by fragmentation may explain partially how the

2011 anti-sectarian movement stayed so small.

This overview explained how (non)structural conditions influenced the propensity for social mobilization in the fragmented society of Lebanon. Through looking at both structural and non-structural aspects of mobilization, it appeared that fragmentation shaped the movements and the instances of mobilization in Lebanon. In line with Hunt and Benford (2004) this thesis showed that collective identity serves as a precursor and product of movement collective action. This way, cultural and cognitive theory is able to link fragmentation to characteristics of social movements. Yet, these findings need to be framed as well through political process theory in order to understand the reflection of mobilization in the more structural elements of mobilization. Using only either one of these approaches will limit one’s understanding of social mobilization. In short, fragmentation shaped accessibility to resources to let the movement grow and influenced people’s risk- analysis of joining the movements. The character of the movement is therefore a factor to take into account when analyzing social movements in fragmented societies, for fragmentation can either be a push or a pull factor, dependent on the character of the movement.

How these conclusions help to build a strong more generally applicable theory will be discussed next by giving suggestions for further research.

Suggestions for further research

The general conclusion that fragmentation in society plays a role in mobilization, either by boosting mobilization if the movement is part of the fragmented system or preventing large scale mobilization to occur

if the movement does not incorporate the fragmented system, needs additional testing. Evidently, that this has been the case in Lebanon does not automatically mean that it will be the case in other countries or pertaining other movements as well. This research has made a start in a better understanding of the relation between fragmentation and mobilization. The investigation of other cases that could help with developing this theory are for example instances of mobilization in other fragmented countries in the Middle East and North Africa region such as Cyprus, Iraq, Iran and Turkey. These countries experienced political mobilization along ethnic lines as well, whether society was fragmented along the lines of clans, tribes, language and/or religion. With regard to Turkey for instance, it would be interesting to see how the strong presence of nationalist sentiments in the country influences Kurdish mobilization. After applying the results of this thesis to the region, the cases could be expanded to other regions in the world to see how the hypothesis on the influence of fragmentation in the propensity of mobilization holds there as well.

Ideally, the general conclusions would also be useful for cases of mobilization in fragmented societies outside the region. In the U.S. fragmentation is combined with a strong feeling of belonging toward the country. How do movements cope with this fragmentation, and what are the effects? Anthropological research or Lijphart’s measurements for pluralism can help to investigate to what degree fragmentation has become politicized. In states with high degrees of politicized fragmentation such as in Sub-Sahara Africa, this research may for instance help predicting the role of events that spark political protest. It may also add to studies on ethnic mobilization. This type of mobilization often starts with a critical number of people taking the decision to gather and express their demands in whatever way. In these situations “leaders decide to speak for ‘their’ ethnic group, thereby making the abstract idea of ethnic belonging a somewhat more tangible reality, and engage the members of this group into political action” (Vermeersch 2011: 1). Where ethnic mobilization studies are merely focused on ethnic groups as such, the added value of this study is to approach fragmentation as a contextual factor.

Besides testing the results of this thesis in other cases to strengthen its claims, there is also the need to strengthen this study as such. One aspect is key: the involvement of the March 8 movement. To bring more depth to this research the same variables as applied to investigation of the March 14 and anti-sectarian movement should be applied to the mobilization of March 8. Additionally, it would also be interesting to see how they constructed their out-group: the March 14 movement. Rather than treating the March 8 movement

as a somewhat fixed variable as this thesis does for the reasons given above, internal aspects of this movement should be taken into account to a greater extent to get a more complete picture of what was going on in 2005.

The development of the March 8 movement itself may provide additional insights in the relationship between fragmentation and mobilization in Lebanon during that period in time and strengthen or weaken the claims made in this research.

Additionally, a more in depth investigation of the international context may provide additional insights as well. It will show how geopolitics influenced mobilization in 2005 and 2011. Whereas the international community was very much involved with the 2005 developments in Lebanon, it seems to be the case that they were too occupied with the rest of the region in 2011 to focus on the small scale protest in Lebanon. How did this affect mobilization in the two cases?

Besides giving sources for additional research, this research is relevant for other reasons as well.

Relevance

Besides having academic relevance for mobilization theorists, this study also aimed to have relevance to “lay citizens of the world”. The conclusion that fragmented society matters in the way structural and non-structural influence the propensity for social mobilization may prove fruitful for decision and policy makers that are based in fragmented societies. When additional further research shows that the conclusions of this thesis also hold for other fragmented societies, this conclusion may expose predicting factors of social mobilization. Gaining insight in the relationship between the fragmentation and mobilization also gives a means to cope with these events in whatever way: Policy makers may use this research to know what factors play a role in mobilization in order to cope with escalation, participants might find the results insightful to attract more members.

Not much work is done to understand how mobilization takes shape in societies that are characterized by fragmentation. Yet “social movement research thrives because analysts continue to develop theoretical ideas and engage in spirited debate over concepts and ideas” (Klandermans & Staggenborg 2002: xiii). To link social movement theory to theories on fragmentation, this thesis will explore an uncovered territory of research. It goes beyond studies that show how ethnic groups mobilize (see for example Horowitz 1985), and

instead sees fragmentation as a contextual factor.49 Against this background, answering the main question will make a modest contribution to social movement theory.

The results of this research may also be useful for Lebanese people. Street politics “is becoming a routine political instrument favoured by all sides, a substitute for institutional, constitutional procedures"

(International Crisis Group 2006: 16). Understanding protests in Lebanese society may be rewarding for it may find a way to deal with the political street. But possibly more significant for Lebanese people is that this research may also show that under favourable circumstances, Lebanese people may feel inclined to unite together, which in the end may strengthen linkages between communities and in this way lead to a Lebanon that is stable rather than “on hold”.

49 During the 2011 anti-sectarian protests, mobilization was inspired and influenced mobilization, but was not mainly caused by ethnic groups mobilizing for group benefit. Mobilization for group benefit could be more seen during the 2005 independence intifada. However, during interviews it appeared that Lebanese also went down to Martyrs’ Square because there was a feeling of momentum and being united with Lebanese from other fragments. Different communities rallied together against a common goal, although one cannot deny that fragmentation certainly played a role in mobilization. 92

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