Opposed Bill Committee Oral evidence: City of London Corporation (Open Spaces) Bill

Tuesday 15 November 2016

Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 15 November 2016.

Listen to the meeting (morning sitting and afternoon sitting)

Members present: Melanie Onn (Chair); Kevin Hollinrake; Julian Knight; Marie Rimmer.

Appearing in public session: On behalf of the promoter:

James Cornwell, Counsel; Alison Gorlov, Parliamentary Agent for the Bill; Paul Double, City Remembrancer and Parliamentary Agent for the City of London Corporation; Sue Ireland, Director of Open Spaces for the City of London Corporation; Paul Thomson, Superintendent of Epping Forest. Petitioners:

Richard Turney, Counsel for the Kennel Club; Ed Hayes, Kennel Club, Petitioner.

10.32 am

1 CHAIR: Welcome, everyone. This is the Opposed Bill Committee for the private Bill being promoted by the City of London Corporation. Our role is to listen to the arguments brought before us by the Promoter on the one hand and the Petitioner on the other and to decide to approve the Bill as it now stands, disapprove it in its entirety as need unproven, or approve it subject to amendments. 2 I will begin with some housekeeping. Please can I ask that everyone turns off all their mobile devices before we start? If the bell rings for a Division in the House, the Committee will suspend for approximately 15 minutes. Please will everyone speak up and speak clearly, for the benefit of the Hansard reporters and anyone in the room who may be hard of hearing? If there is a fire or other alarm, please follow the instructions over the loudspeaker or from the staff in the room. 3 I hope that by now, the Promoters and Petitioners have seen a copy of the provisional running order. We plan to begin with the Promoters’ introduction to the Bill, followed by their case for clause 12. We will then hear the case for the petition. At each stage, there will be the opportunity for witnesses to be questioned, cross-examined and re-examined. The Committee is then likely to withdraw in private to take a decision on clause 12 and the petition. 4 Once that has been dealt with, we will take the remainder of the Bill, which appears to be unopposed. We have a scheduled break between 1 and 2 o’clock this afternoon and hope to conclude no later than 5 pm. Are there any questions before we begin proceedings? 5 I call Counsel on behalf of the Promoter to introduce the Bill. It would be very helpful to us if you could set the scene a little and outline the overall purpose of the Bill. 6 JAMES CORNWELL: That is what I propose to do. I will set out an introduction to the Bill in very broad terms. I will then call the first of my witnesses, Sue Ireland, who will provide some more factual information on the background to why the Bill is needed. I then propose to focus in on the clause that is opposed, clause 12. Again, I will make some brief introductory remarks about the legal context and framework for that, and then I will go to Ms Ireland, who will provide some evidence as to why that particular clause is required, and so on. 7 I should say that we have three potential witnesses here. We have Ms Ireland, who is Director of Open Spaces for the City of London Corporation; Paul Thomson, who is the Superintendent of Epping Forest; and Paul Double, who is the City Remembrancer and Parliamentary Agent for the City of London Corporation, who will only be required for proving the preamble at the end of proceedings. They are all sworn. 8 The underlying purpose behind this Bill is to seek to clarify and increase transparency in relation to various powers that the City of London Corporation has. The Corporation is what is known as a corporation by prescription, which means it has existed since 1189 and it is to be presumed that it was

incorporated before that date. It is a common law corporate body, rather than one that has been created by statute, so it can do many of the things that an individual person can do, such as purchasing and holding land. 9 Like any individual, the Corporation is subject to Acts of Parliament and may indeed attain extra powers that an individual would not have through legislation including private Bills, such as the present one. The Corporation has a long history of doing that, promoting Bills addressing a wide range of areas. 10 In the 19th century, Parliament placed local government on a statutory footing, creating local authorities broadly as we see them today; however, that did not apply in the City of London. Rather than creating a new local authority—a district council or a unitary authority—in the City, Parliament conferred various powers and duties that would normally be conferred on a local authority on the Corporation as it existed as a corporate body. 11 Today the Corporation has a number of hats. With one hat, it acts in many ways as the local authority for the City of London—the Square Mile—but it also has a number of roles outside that. For example, it owns and maintains a large quantity of open spaces, which are the subject of the present Bill, outside the City of London; it also owns and maintains the Guildhall School of Music and Drama, and runs three independent schools. Those functions, as I say, lie outside the Corporation’s local authority role. 12 This Bill is primarily concerned with matters that lie outside the City of London and that lie outside the Corporation’s local authority role. The underlying purpose is to try to bring some modernity to the rules and laws that govern the open spaces that the Corporation owns and maintains outside the City. At present, those are governed on a number of bases. The Corporation acts as a normal landowner, but there are also various private Acts of Parliament that have been passed over the years. 13 One of the purposes is to try to deal with cases where there are inconsistencies between the various bits of legislation; to clarify where there are gaps in the powers the Corporation has, or where there is uncertainty as to whether it can properly exercise its powers, either legislative or in common law; and to address modern challenges such as antisocial behaviour and the demand for public events in open spaces—demands that perhaps did not exist in the 19th century. With that broad introduction, I call Ms Ireland, my witness, who will be able to explain in a bit more detail the underlying purpose behind the Bill. 14 Ms Ireland, you have already been sworn. Please will you confirm your role in the Corporation? 15 SUE IRELAND: My name is Susan Jean Ireland and I have been the Director of Open Spaces for the City of London Corporation since April 2008. I have worked in the parks and landscape management sectors for some 38 years, with 20 years’ senior management experience. I also chair Parks for London and am a board member of The Parks Alliance. 16 JAMES CORNWELL: Could you briefly explain to the Committee how the Corporation came to look after open spaces and green spaces outside the City? 17 SUE IRELAND: The City Corporation’s involvement in open spaces dates back to the 1870s when it was an early advocate of the importance of protecting

common land and green space against encroachment of urban development. At the same time there was also an increasing recognition of the need to preserve open air facilities in and around the capital for healthy exercise and recreation for Londoners. The City Corporation decided to use its capacity as a common law corporation to purchase land in support of this aim. 18 Early efforts focused on Epping Forest, where the Corporation bought up land and led a lengthy legal process to assert ancient rights of common and to protect against threatened development. Those efforts were successful and in 1878 Parliament passed an Act entrusting the forest to the management of the Corporation as conservators. 19 Also in 1878, the Corporation obtained a separate Act allowing it to acquire and manage further open spaces within 25 miles of the City for purposes of public recreation. 20 The City Corporation could have purchased land simply as a common law corporation without parliamentary authorisation. Among the reasons for obtaining parliamentary powers to support the acquisitions were to give the Corporation the ability to regulate the land and to ensure that it was conserved for public benefit. The 1878 legislation therefore enables the Corporation to manage and regulate the open spaces, for instance through byelaws, and guarantees that the spaces will be preserved in perpetuity for public enjoyment as relatively natural and open environments. 21 JAMES CORNWELL: You have explained the position in 1870s. How has that changed in subsequent years? 22 SUE IRELAND: Under this legislation, the Corporation gradually acquired a number of commons and other spaces in and around the Greater London area. Significant examples include Coulsdon Common, Burnham Beeches and Queen’s Park. Another important acquisition was Hampstead Heath, which the Corporation volunteered to take on in 1989, following the abolition of the Greater London Council. Hampstead Heath is largely governed by its own legislation dating from 1871, similar in many ways to the Corporation’s own legislation of 1878. 23 Today, the open spaces managed by the Corporation cover about 11,000 acres and attract an estimated 23 million visits each year. The Corporation’s open spaces department has 350 staff and a net budget of £19 million, making the Corporation one of the country’s leading providers of open spaces. The spaces include a number of different types of landscape ranging from ancient woodland and wood pasture to scrub, acid grassland, chalk downland, marsh and heathland, as well as lakes, reservoirs and ponds. They include a wide variety of important wildlife habitats, sites of special scientific interest and national nature reserves, as well as scheduled monuments and historic landscape designations. They offer a wide range of formal recreational facilities, including football, rugby, tennis, swimming and athletics, as well as informal activity such as cycling, dog walking and fishing. 24 JAMES CORNWELL: Will you briefly explain to the Committee the governance arrangements in relation to such open spaces? 25 SUE IRELAND: The principal executive body of the City Corporation is the Court of Common Council, which consists of 125 members elected to

represent the City of London’s wards. The court discharges most of its work through committees. There are three committees responsible between them for overseeing these open spaces; each currently meets six times a year. At officer level, the Director of Open Spaces—myself—has overall responsibility for directing the Corporation’s open spaces work, and is assisted by four superintendents, each of whom has responsibility for the day-to-day management of particular open spaces or groups of spaces. 26 JAMES CORNWELL: What arrangements, if any, are in place for consultation with users of these areas? 27 SUE IRELAND: For nearly all of the open spaces outside the City there is also a consultative committee or group, which enables us to take soundings about management issues from a range of stakeholders, including local community groups and national organisations such as the Open Spaces Society. Epping Forest is the only large space currently not covered by such an arrangement, as local representation has traditionally been provided by verderers elected in the forest parishes, but work is under way to strengthen and broaden local consultative arrangements through putting in place a consultative group similar to those which exist for other spaces. 28 JAMES CORNWELL: Can I ask about the funding of the open spaces by the corporation? Broadly speaking, where does the money come from for that purpose? 29 SUE IRELAND: The funding for this is what is known as our City’s Cash funding. 30 JAMES CORNWELL: Is that public money from taxation? 31 SUE IRELAND: No, it is money that the Corporation has from its property portfolio. The income from that portfolio supports not only our open spaces but the schools that you mentioned earlier. 32 JAMES CORNWELL: Thank you. You have set out the background. Perhaps we could move on to the reason why the Bill is being promoted. Can you briefly explain the need for this legislation? 33 SUE IRELAND: Since the 1870s, the Corporation has obtained legislation granting further powers in relation to the open spaces outside the City, largely to do with the services and facilities that we can provide to the public. Hampstead Heath is also covered by a set of management powers inherited from the Greater London Council. Largely, however, the open spaces outside the City remained governed by the legislation laid down in the 1870s. 34 The way in which public open spaces have been run has of course developed considerably since that legislation was passed a century and a half ago. For instance, the range of land management techniques has expanded and organised events have become more varied, including, for example, open-air cinema evenings. Refreshment facilities now attract greater investment, and those seeking to invest need in return some security in the facility, which is not provided by the length of lease currently permitted. There have arisen over the years a number of practical issues that were not anticipated by the original legislation: for instance, requests to bury water pipes or the need to co-ordinate with the local councils about the road network.

35 There are therefore a number of areas where the current legislation is silent or out of date. This leaves the Corporation in a position of uncertainty about what it can do in reliance on its position as landowner, while acting consistently with the statutory constraints. Therefore, we considered that there was a good case to seek an up-to-date set of express powers reflecting the way in which the open spaces are managed today, while maintaining the overarching duties to conserve their natural aspect and public purpose. This will aid certainty and transparency both for us and for others interested in the open spaces. The new powers are largely intended to provide a clear basis for the way in which the management of the open spaces has already evolved. They are not intended to bring about any change in the basic principles on which the open spaces are managed. 36 JAMES CORNWELL: Are there any other purposes behind the legislation? 37 SUE IRELAND: We have identified modest opportunities to generate additional revenue for the benefit of the open spaces without detracting from their purpose as a place of public recreation. The open spaces are run as charities and any revenue they generate of course goes directly to the benefit of the space concerned. In the current climate, resources to undertake public interest activities generally, not least open spaces, are highly constrained in the public sector. It is important that other organisations, such as the Corporation, make the most effective possible use of their resources so that their contribution is maximised. 38 JAMES CORNWELL: The particular clause we are going to be dealing with relates to antisocial behaviour. Can you explain what, if any, additional needs there are for legislation relating to antisocial behaviour with respect to the open spaces? 39 SUE IRELAND: Like any public place, the open spaces can attract problems of antisocial behaviour, which if carried on by only a small number of persons can significantly affect the enjoyment of other visitors. Keeping order in the open spaces has always been an important part of the City Corporation’s role. The 1870s legislation gave the Corporation what were then very strong powers in this respect by allowing it to make byelaws setting out rules of acceptable behaviour and to appoint its own constables to police them and prosecute offenders. 40 The law has moved on considerably since then. Byelaws are often seen as outdated and generally attract low penalties in court. The last couple of decades in particular have seen the development of a range of new tools to tackle antisocial behaviour and low-level offending. These tools are widely available to police forces, local authorities and other bodies with enforcement responsibilities. The Bill offers the opportunity to bring the City Corporation’s enforcement powers up to date by incorporating some of them, such as fixed penalty notices and community protection notices. 41 JAMES CORNWELL: Before promoting this Bill, what steps, if any, were taken to consult with the community and users of these open spaces? 42 SUE IRELAND: The open spaces outside the City serve a number of local communities, as well as visitors from further afield, and are highly valued by those who use them. Many users of the open spaces are well informed about

their history and legal status and take a keen interest in management issues. The City Corporation was well aware of the need to take a transparent and consultative approach to developing proposals for new legislation, so the first step was to publish a discussion paper setting out the reasons why we thought changes were needed and the broad nature they were likely to take. This attracted around 40 responses. We then had a series of detailed meetings with local community groups, particularly in Hampstead Heath and Epping Forest, which are the two open spaces where local interest in management issues is at its highest. We also kept the Corporation’s consultative committees and groups fully informed at each stage of the development of the proposals. 43 This consultation activity demonstrated broad recognition of the need to rationalise and update the legislation, in particular with respect to the City Corporation’s management powers. Broad support was also displayed for additional powers to deal with those carrying out antisocial behaviour in the open spaces. On the other hand, concerns were expressed in some quarters that the Bill might enable greater commercialisation of the open spaces, for instance, through an extended power to grant leases, a formal power to hold events or the introduction of licences for commercial activity. 44 In the light of these concerns, we engaged in detailed discussions with local groups to see how they could be allayed. We shared early drafts of the Bill’s provisions, canvassed views and modified our proposals to incorporate additional limitations and safeguards; for instance, the need to develop policies for the exercise of the new powers in consultation with local groups. In response to feedback, we have also agreed to develop a new permanent consultative mechanism to give local people and other interested groups an ongoing say in the management of Epping Forest, which is the only large open space outside the City currently without a dedicated consultative group. The result of this engagement is that all local groups have either positively supported or decided not to object to the Bill as deposited. 45 We exchanged correspondence with the Open Spaces Society, which initially voiced caution about the proposals but was satisfied on sight of the final version of the Bill. MPs and local authorities for the open spaces have been kept informed of the proposals. 46 JAMES CORNWELL: Madam Chair, that concludes the first stage of our case, which is the broad introduction to the underlying purpose of the Bill. I do not know whether anyone has any cross-examination or questions on this part of the case. 47 CHAIR: Counsel for the Kennel Club, are there any questions you would like to put to Ms Ireland? 48 RICHARD TURNEY: Thank you, but as things stand I do not propose to ask any questions of witnesses. I will raise a hand if I do want to for any of the witnesses. 49 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Ms Ireland, you mentioned the relationship between the property portfolio and the City’s Cash account. Do you know the level of that Cash account at the moment, in total? 50 SUE IRELAND: No, I do not.

51 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: I read with interest that it was £1.3 billion. Does that sound about right? 52 SUE IRELAND: I genuinely do not know. I tend to focus on the resources we have to manage the open spaces. 53 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: I just wondered whether you were expecting a crisis or something, because that sounds like quite a lot of money. You mentioned that any surplus was reinvested in the parks. Is it principally the surplus that is reinvested in the parks, or is there any other allocation of central funds that you may have that you invest in the parks to improve them? 54 SUE IRELAND: There are both revenue and capital funds. The Corporation funds and supports ongoing maintenance as well as, obviously, the restoration of buildings and property. Like others, we seek grant funding from the Heritage Lottery Fund and so on for some of the work we do. We also get a small amount of grant funding for stewardship work; because we graze a lot of our forestry, we are entitled to stewardship funding. 55 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: But do you ever call on your central funds to carry out some of those capital projects in the parks you manage? 56 SUE IRELAND: Yes, we do at times. At other times we are expected to find it from within the work. A good recent example would be on Hampstead Heath, where we have large raised reservoirs. The dam walls on the reservoirs were beginning to move and there was concern about the potential risk to members of the public. As a result, we spent well over £20 million—probably nearly £25 million. Working with the community —it has been a five-year project to help them understand why we needed to do the work. There was a lot of resistance originally, and the suggestion that we should not be doing it—in fact, we even went through judicial review with some of the groups concerned—but the work has just finished and we will be having a celebration of that next week. 57 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: That money came from the City’s Cash, rather than from other sources. 58 SUE IRELAND: Yes. 59 CHAIR: I have a question about the consultation process. In the entirety of the discussions and consultations over the plan to petition, how many do you think responded, including all the individual members of groups? 60 SUE IRELAND: Goodness me! I think I need notice of that question. We had online consultation, we had group meetings with members of the public from different sites and we had individual meetings with smaller groups. 61 CHAIR: Would you estimate hundreds or thousands of respondents? 62 SUE IRELAND: In total, we must have been getting into the thousands. 63 MARIE RIMMER: You raised the opportunity for additional revenue funding and tidying that up in this Bill. Do you envisage doing anything different from what is happening now to raise that revenue? 64 SUE IRELAND: No, it is largely doing the sorts of things we do now. As I mentioned, there are groups who feel very worried that we might be planning to put on very large scale events. The sites are not appropriate for very large scale events. For example, people like having café facilities, but the way things are at

the moment means we cannot get someone to invest in the facility because they can only have a three-year agreement with us. The quality of the facilities cannot be part of any agreement with someone who is operating that café. 65 MARIE RIMMER: Is there a café there now? 66 SUE IRELAND: There are cafés on most of our sites, and often more than one. 67 CHAIR: Are there any further questions from the panel? No. Counsel, are there any other points you wish to make with regard to clause 12 specifically? 68 JAMES CORNWELL: That is what I was going to move on to next. Clause 12 is a provision that deals with antisocial behaviour. I should note that the clause now being promoted, as set out in the Bill, is amended to clarify that the power being sought is not in relation to the Corporation’s functions as a local authority. I propose to set out a basic explanation of what the provision is legally intended to do and then turn to Ms Ireland to deal with the factual position as to why the clause is needed. 69 Essentially, the clause gives the Corporation, in its role managing the open spaces outside the City, the power to impose community protection notices. Those were introduced under section 43 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. They are one of a suite of measures now available to deal with antisocial behaviour. Under section 43(1), an authorised person—I will explain what that means in a second—“may issue a community protection notice to an individual aged 16 or over, or a body, if satisfied on reasonable grounds” that “the conduct of the individual or body is having a detrimental effect, of a persistent or continuing nature, on the quality of life of those in the locality” and that “the conduct is unreasonable.” That is directed at a particular individual. 70 The condition for the notice to be imposed is that a relatively high threshold must be crossed. There has to be conduct that is detrimental, persistent or continuing in nature—not a one-off incident—and unreasonable. The notice “imposes any of the following requirements on the individual or body issued with it: a requirement to stop doing specified things; a requirement to do specified things; a requirement to take reasonable steps to achieve specified results.” For example, under the first instance one could have a notice to require someone to stop taking drugs in a particular area. A requirement to do a specified things would be, for example, to remove property that is causing a nuisance, such as if someone was playing loud music from a property close to or in the area concerned. The requirement to take reasonable steps does not necessarily achieve the outcome, but steps are taken. 71 That power is subject to the requirement that the conditions imposed are reasonable. They must be directed at one of two potential ends: either preventing the detrimental effect referred to in subsection (1) from continuing or recurring, or reducing that effect. There are, then, reasonably tight conditions in terms of both the threshold and the sort of requirements that must be imposed. 72 As I said, the power is granted to an authorised person, as defined in section 53 of the 2014 Act, which says: “A community protection notice…may be issued by…a constable…the relevant local authority”—as defined, for these purposes, in subsection (2)—or “a person designated by the relevant local

authority for the purposes of this section.” 73 For the purposes of a community protection notice, “‘the relevant local authority’ means the local authority (or, as the case may be, any of the local authorities) within whose area the conduct specified in the notice has, according to the notice, been taking place.” There is, however, a further condition: “Only a person of a description specified in an order made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of subsection (1)(c) may be designated under that subsection.” 74 The current position is that a constable—that is, a police officer—may impose a community protection notice, as may the local authority or someone designated by the local authority. So far, the Secretary of State has made an order that housing providers, as defined in section 20 of the 2014 Act, are specified for these purposes and may be designated by a local authority. I shall return to housing providers when we move on to the petition. 75 Further conditions apply to the making of a community protection notice. There must be a written warning to the individual in advance, as found in section 43(5), and the notice must identify the conduct at issue, as stipulated in section 43(7). When a notice has been imposed, there is also a right of appeal to the magistrates’ court. That can be based on a number of grounds, including that the conduct did not take place, did not have a detrimental effect, was not persistent or continuing in nature, or was not unreasonable. There can also be an appeal on the basis that the requirements imposed or the period of time for which the individual is required to comply are unreasonable; because there is some other error or defect in relation to the notice; or, indeed, because it was issued to the wrong person. There are wide-ranging potential grounds for appeal. 76 The breach of a community protection notice is an offence punishable by a fine up to level 4 on the standard scale, which is currently £2,500, but that is subject to a reasonable steps provision—the defence is that the individual has taken reasonable steps to comply with the notice or has a reasonable excuse for not doing so. 77 As matters currently stand, the Corporation can impose community protection notices within the City, as a local authority, but outside the City, where it is not acting as a local authority, it does not currently have that power. In theory, the Corporation could go to the Secretary of State and ask to be specified for the purposes of section 53(4) of the Act and then seek to be designated by local authorities in the relevant areas. 78 As Ms Ireland will address in a minute, there are some practical difficulties with that. I think 11 local authorities cover the open spaces that the Corporation has responsibility for outside the City. In the case of several local spaces, they fall within different local authority areas. For example, Epping Forest falls under four different local authority areas. The purpose behind clause 12 is to give a clear and express statutory power for the Corporation to have this enforcement power over its open spaces as a consistent power that applies across its open spaces, without the need to trouble local authorities and without any fear of inconsistency in the approach that local authorities might take in granting them. 79 At this point I will turn back to Ms Ireland. As I have explained, the Secretary of State can specify that a person is eligible for designation. Referring

to paragraph 27 [of SIs proof],1 what contact has the Corporation had with the Home Office about this particular clause? 80 SUE IRELAND: The Home Office confirmed in the course of these discussions that it had no objection to the principle of the City Corporation's obtaining the power to make community protection notices in its non-local authority capacity as a custodian of open spaces. The Home Office was made aware of the Kennel Club’s petition, but did not make any suggestion that the Freedom of Information Act should be applied to the power sought. 81 JAMES CORNWELL: Moving on to paragraph 31 of your proof, could you briefly summarise the existing enforcement powers that the Corporation has in relation to its open spaces outside the City? 82 SUE IRELAND: Policing antisocial behaviour in the open spaces has been an important part of the Corporation’s job from the beginning of its involvement. The 1870s legislation gave the Corporation the power to make byelaws and to enforce them through its own constables. Byelaws are in place for all of the open spaces and they are policed by the Corporation’s staff, mainly through words of advice and formal warnings, but in serious cases through prosecution. In the two largest spaces, Hampstead Heath and Epping Forest, the Corporation retains its own bodies of constabulary, which can exercise powers of arrest if necessary. 83 More recently, the Government has given the Corporation the power to make public spaces protection orders. These enable general controls on behaviour to be imposed with greater procedural ease than byelaws, but only where there is objective evidence of a serious problem which needs tackling. This power was introduced in 2014, alongside community protection notices, and is usually available only to local authorities. The Government can, however, designate other bodies with byelaw-making powers to give them the power to make public spaces protection orders. The City Corporation was designated in 2015 and is the only body so far to have been designated. In order to be designated, the Corporation had to satisfy the Government that the power was in keeping with its existing enforcement responsibilities and would be exercised appropriately. 84 The City Corporation is the body with day-to-day responsibility for the open spaces, including policing the byelaws, and therefore it makes sense for the Corporation to take the lead where possible in tackling antisocial behaviour and low-level offending in the open spaces. Local authority powers do still apply in the open spaces, but local authorities have less of a presence on the ground, and in the current climate are very stretched for resources to devote to enforcement activity, especially where the land is the primary responsibility of another body. Relying on local authority powers can also be administratively complicated where, as in the larger open spaces, the spaces cross local authority boundaries. 85 JAMES CORNWELL: Could you briefly explain to the Committee the current approach that the Corporation takes to enforcement in its open spaces? 86 SUE IRELAND: The City Corporation recognises the need for a proportionate approach to ensuring acceptable behaviour on the open spaces.

1 Correction by Promoters. To provide clarification.

Its efforts are strongly focused on education and advice. The vast majority of enforcement incidents are dealt with by way of words of advice or written warnings, with formal action such as a prosecution reserved for cases of serious or repeated offending. 87 For example, in 2015-16, the Hampstead Heath constabulary gave 907 formal warnings and undertook 15 prosecutions. In Epping Forest in 2015, the forest keepers conducted 7,764 advisory conversations, gave 384 formal warnings, and successfully concluded 12 prosecutions. 88 JAMES CORNWELL: Could you give some examples of the kinds of antisocial behaviour the Corporation has had to deal with? 89 SUE IRELAND: Community protection notices would complement and be in keeping with the City Corporation’s existing powers of enforcement. They enable restrictions to be targeted against specific individuals who have a track record of misbehaviour. We expect to use those powers only in a few serious cases, where an individual is causing persistent harms or annoyance and where other interventions have proven ineffective. They could also be helpful in protecting City Corporation staff, some of whom live on site with their families, from abusive behaviour. 90 For example, there was a case at Highgate Wood where a member of the public was abusive to staff almost on a daily basis. Sometimes that included racial abuse, which prosecution under the byelaws would not have effectively reflected. Eventually, we had to work with the local authority to pursue an antisocial behaviour order against the individual concerned. That was a lengthy process and was challenging for both the local authority and the Corporation. That would now be more difficult, as antisocial behaviour orders have been replaced by civil injunctions, which require court action. In Epping Forest— I wondered if you wanted to bring the superintendent in at this point. 91 JAMES CORNWELL: There are some examples in relation to Epping Forest. Perhaps we could bring Mr Thomson in at this point to deal specifically with Epping Forest. Mr Thomson, could you briefly explain to the Committee what your role in the Corporation is? 92 PAUL THOMSON: I am the superintendent of Epping Forest. I am responsible for 90 staff, looking after London’s largest open space. 93 JAMES CORNWELL: Could you briefly give some examples of cases of antisocial behaviour that you have had to deal with in Epping Forest? 94 PAUL THOMSON: Certainly, yes. Staff resident in lodges for the best performance of duties have faced antisocial behaviour by individuals who use the cover afforded by the lodge fencing and gardens as places to smoke class B drugs, such as cannabis. While initial penalties are usually a cannabis warning or a penalty notice for disorder, a CPN may be a more appropriate penalty if the drug-taking has interfered with the private right to respect for family and private life. 95 Similarly, Epping Forest also has certain areas that have become known for the regular occurrence of sexual activity. In line with current police practice, a degree of tolerance is exercised where that activity is carried out discreetly and privately. However, there have been cases where couples or groups have,

on occasion, behaved in a way that is likely to offend or upset members of the public in the vicinity, and have risked discouraging visitors in the affected part of the forest. It is possible to prosecute under the byelaws for indecent and disorderly conduct, but a community protection notice could be a more effective remedy as it covers future, rather than past, behaviour, and does not require a prosecution to be undertaken. 96 JAMES CORNWELL: Returning to Ms Ireland, could you explain or summarise why community protection notices would be more advantageous than current enforcement tools? 97 SUE IRELAND: Community protection notices would enable such cases to be addressed by the Corporation through prompt and targeted measures. For example, we would be able to require people to refrain from using abusive language or, in a particularly serious cases, bar them from a particular area for a given length of time. We would proceed cautiously in exercising the powers and only use them as a last resort. The legislation gives a right of appeal to the magistrates’ court if it were to be argued that a restriction we had imposed was unjustified. 98 JAMES CORNWELL: The petition is brought by the Kennel Club. To what extent, if any, are community protection notices anticipated to be used in relation to dogs and dog owners? 99 SUE IRELAND: Problems with dogs are not among the main reasons for our decision to seek the powers of community protection notices. Controls on dogs are currently dealt with by a mixture of byelaws and dog control orders, and in future will probably be addressed through public space protection orders. Only if an identifiable individual was guilty of persistent rule-breaking or antisocial behaviour, through a failure to properly control the dog, would the Corporation consider making a community protection notice. We do not have any current examples of this that come to mind. 100 JAMES CORNWELL: You have already explained to the Committee the overall consultation approach that has been taken by the Corporation in relation to the Bill. Could you explain briefly what, if any, consultation and response there was in relation specifically to what is now clause 12? 101 SUE IRELAND: The consultation that took place before the Bill was produced provided broad support for strengthening the City Corporation’s enforcement powers. It was made clear that the Corporation was considering measures targeted at individuals who repeatedly misbehaved. As already noted, extensive discussions with local groups and other stakeholders took place as the Bill was developed, and MPs and local authorities were also made aware of the proposals in the Bill. No objection has been made to the proposal to seek community protection notice powers, other than the Kennel Club’s petition. 102 JAMES CORNWELL: As matters stand, could you explain what information is made available to the public in relation to the exercise by the Corporation of its enforcement powers in relation to its open spaces outside the City? 103 SUE IRELAND: As the open spaces outside the City are not managed in the Corporation’s capacity as a local authority, none of the existing enforcement powers, including byelaws and public space orders, is subject to the Freedom of

Information Act. The City Corporation has none the less always been mindful of the need for transparency about its enforcement role. Every two months, the superintendents of the open spaces update the Corporation’s management committees on enforcement action, including the type of misconduct involved and the nature and outcome of the City Corporation’s response. For instance, the committees are made aware of the number of byelaw prosecutions, the specific offences involved and the amount of fine imposed. That information is set out in written reports, which are published on the Corporation’s website. The Hampstead Heath constabulary also publishes an annual report describing in detail its activity over the previous year. 104 We do receive a number of freedom of information requests relating to open spaces outside the City, sometimes including matters of enforcement. Even though the Freedom of Information Act does not apply, we always try to respond helpfully to such requests. Often, that is just a matter of pointing people in the right direction to where information is already available. Officers are accountable to the Corporation’s committees and report regularly on a wide range of management issues, generally in public session. Reports to those committees are published on the internet. Therefore, there is already a wealth of detail in the public domain about our management of the open spaces. Where information is requested that is not public, the practice of the open spaces department is to disclose it unless there is good reason not to do so—for instance, if it includes confidential or personal information or would take excessive time or cost to put together. 105 JAMES CORNWELL: The Corporation has obviously received the Kennel Club’s petition. What, if anything, has the Corporation sought to do in response to that petition? 106 SUE IRELAND: In response to their petition, we have offered to formalise the publicity arrangements so far as they concern community protection notices. Our proposal was to publish a protocol setting out the circumstances in which we might make a community protection notice and an annual report about the use of such notices. That report would cover the number of notices issued, the conduct in relation to which they were issued, the requirement imposed by the notices, the number of fixed penalty notices issued for failure to comply with a notice, the amount of fixed penalties received, and the number and outcome of any prosecutions undertaken for breach of a notice. That is the sort of information that the Corporation would anticipate putting in the public domain anyway, as officers would be expected to report it publicly to the Corporation’s committees. 107 We also offered to consider any suggestions that the Kennel Club might have as to additional categories of information that it would be appropriate to disclose or any additional ways in which it could be made available. The Kennel Club has not responded with any suggestions. 108 JAMES CORNWELL: Focusing now on the petition, which seeks to make the power to issue community protection notices subject to the Freedom of Information Act, what is the Corporation’s view of the desirability of that proposal? 109 SUE IRELAND: Our view is that it is inappropriate to apply the Freedom of Information Act to areas of activity that are not within the City Corporation’s

local authority functions and are therefore outside the current scope of the Act. None of the Corporation’s existing functions in relation to the open spaces outside the City is subject to that Act. They include the important enforcement functions of making and policing byelaws and public space protection orders. There is no good reason why community protection notices should be treated any differently, especially given that not all bodies that can make community protection notices are subject to freedom of information. 110 The Kennel Club’s case is curious, as restrictions affecting dog owners are far more likely to be dealt with through general rules in the form of byelaws or public space protection orders than through community protection notices targeted at individuals. As already noted, the Corporation can already implement these general measures without being subject to the Freedom of Information Act, although as a matter of policy and practice it would always do so in an open way. Given that the Kennel Club has declined to engage in discussion about the sort of information that it wishes to obtain, it is difficult to see what practical benefit it anticipates that the Freedom of Information Act would bring over and above the publication regime we have already offered and anyway expect to put in place. The club would not usually be entitled to obtain information about individual cases even if the Freedom of Information Act applied, as this would be personal data, which is generally exempt from the Act. On the other hand, the recipient of a notice would be able to obtain information about it under the Data Protection Act, and would be able to pass it on to the Kennel Club if he or she so wished. It is also worth noting that a community protection notice must identify on its face the reason why it has been issued. 111 JAMES CORNWELL: Chair, I have some submissions to make summing up the case in relation to clause 12 in the petition, but perhaps before I do your colleagues might have questions, or Mr Turney might have cross-examination. 112 RICHARD TURNEY: Again, Chair, I am not proposing to cross-examine; I think I can deal with it all by submissions. CHAIR: Thank you. Members of the panel, any questions?

113 JULIAN KNIGHT: I have a few questions. You mentioned figures for and recordings of antisocial behaviour. Have you seen any uptick in this antisocial behaviour? Obviously you have given us the most recent figures, but how does that compare with five or 10 years ago? 114 SUE IRELAND: I am going to ask the Superintendent to talk first about Epping Forest. 115 PAUL THOMSON: Certainly. There are certainly increasing difficulties with antisocial behaviour in a number of areas, particularly fly-tipping and some public behaviour incidents. We are seeking to address those in partnership with the police and antisocial behaviour officers in local authorities. 116 JULIAN KNIGHT: Has there been an uptick in the past five to 10 years, basically, that requires these greater powers? 117 PAUL THOMSON: Certainly a number of local authorities are utilising them. We have worked in partnership with local authorities to take on dog control orders across all our four local authority areas to cover Epping. We would like to pick up those additional responsibilities as well.

118 JULIAN KNIGHT: What is the main antisocial behaviour problem you are combating at present? 119 PAUL THOMSON: Certainly fly-tipping would be a major issue for us. There are some other issues. We have 12 public sex environments, and that creates problems in some areas. We also have issues with people seeking legal highs particularly in the forest, which can add to a character of misbehaviour. 120 JULIAN KNIGHT: Sue Ireland, you said the FOI is inappropriate, as it is not within your local authority remit, and yet you want to impose these orders and fines outside your local authority area. Do you see any double standards in that? 121 SUE IRELAND: What we are providing is sufficient information to people. We are not being treated any differently from others. If you think about some of the other agencies that similarly manage large areas of land, they do not have to respond to freedom of information, so if we were to have to, we would be singled out and be different from those. 122 JULIAN KNIGHT: You are asking, though, for relatively exceptional powers in that respect. 123 SUE IRELAND: But I suppose that there are not many organisations like ourselves that manage 11,000 acres of open space, which is all open to the public 365 days of the year. 124 JULIAN KNIGHT: Do you have a better argument than, “It doesn’t happen elsewhere”, in terms of the Freedom of Information Act? Do you have a better argument than this is inappropriate because, basically, no one else has to do it? Is there anything specific in terms of costing, manpower, or any sort of onerous activity that comes about from having the Freedom of Information Act imposed in that way? 125 SUE IRELAND: I cannot think of anything to add to that at the moment. 126 CHAIR: May I follow up on the Freedom of Information Act point? If the intention would be to publish the information annually, what difference would being subject to FOI make in practice? 127 SUE IRELAND: Sorry, could you ask the question again? 128 CHAIR: You said that you intend to publish information in relation to CPN issuance anyway, so what difference do you think being subject to FOI would make to your practice? 129 SUE IRELAND: It is about the amount of time and resource it takes to deal with those sorts of thing. Sometimes, as I explained in my notes, people ask for information that is there already, and you can point them in the right direction. Once you get into freedom of information, you have to go through a series of processes, which can be quite time-consuming. 130 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Do you accept, though, that the Freedom of Information Act is there for a purpose; that its provisions have a purpose behind them; and that without the extra clauses you are willing to add to the Bill, people would have fewer rights to access information than if the local authority had been the issuant of that notice? 131 SUE IRELAND: Yes.

132 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: You do accept that. To follow on from the Chair’s previous question, would someone who receives one of these notices have any fewer rights now that you are willing to put those extra provisions in the Bill? 133 SUE IRELAND: I do not see how you would have any fewer rights. 134 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: May I ask a question of the Counsel? Mr Cornwell, you said that the Corporation being specified as a designated person would be complex because you would have to deal with a number of different local authorities. But if you were designated by the Secretary of State, would that not be universal across those local authorities? 135 JAMES CORNWELL: No, there is a two-step process. The first condition is that the Secretary of State has to specify that either the particular body or a group of bodies are eligible for designation, and then in each local authority area the local authority has to designate. Of course, local authorities may take different views. Practically, because in this case there has been no objection from any of the local authorities, one local authority may simply take more time to deal with it than another, and we then potentially get a mismatch across the open spaces that the Corporation deals with. More particularly, in cases like Epping Forest you might have one area where the power is already in place because local authorities got on and designated, whereas in another case they have not got there yet. We of course are all aware of the resource issues facing local authorities. 136 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Did you have to go through that process for the powers under the public space protection orders? 137 JAMES CORNWELL: No, that is simply an order made by the Secretary of State. 138 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: That does not require any further consent. 139 JAMES CORNWELL: No. I think there has to be some consultation, but there is a one-step process. 140 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: So that process is one step, rather than two. 141 JAMES CORNWELL: Yes. 142 MARIE RIMMER: You issue this information annually now on CPNs. Exactly what do you issue? 143 SUE IRELAND: There is a committee report. In fact, because these things are happening and need to be kept up to date, when we have our committee meetings, the superintendents have a report that brings the committee up to date. They will give the committee an update on positions at that time. Then, on an annual basis, a report is produced that summarises the actions. We could provide you with examples of those reports. It covers the number of staff that are on duty during the period of time, and it explains the nature of the incidents that they dealt with and how those compare with the work that we are doing. They look at their work in terms of the objectives that we have set. Then they provide details about each of the types of case, so they are summarised in groups. 144 MARIE RIMMER: Does it give you the number of people that are issued to?

145 SUE IRELAND: Yes. 146 MARIE RIMMER: If that is different to the number of orders that are issued, would it identify “Marie Rimmer with five notices”, or “this lady with five notices”, and dates? 147 SUE IRELAND: Quite a lot of what we do is dealing with byelaws, so it will explain the difference between byelaws. If somebody had been involved in more than one incident, that would be clear, yes. 148 MARIE RIMMER: Do you realise what happens with freedom of information? 149 SUE IRELAND: Yes, I quite regularly— 150 MARIE RIMMER: So it is the background to the information, as well, that would be— 151 SUE IRELAND: Yes. 152 CHAIR: It was mentioned, Mr Cornwell, that there are methods of appeal where CPNs are believed to be issued incorrectly. How accessible are those appeal mechanisms to the ordinary member of the public? For example, is there a cost implication to accessing those appeals? 153 JAMES CORNWELL: Not that we are aware of. The right to appeal to the magistrates’ court is there on the face of the primary legislation. I am just looking to see whether the notice itself has to actually specify that there is a right of appeal. Yes, it does. Under section 43(7), the notice itself has to explain the effects of sections 46 to 51. That includes 46 as the provision dealing with appeals. The notice itself has to explain that there is a right to go to the magistrates, so the person receiving it will be told that when they get the notice. It is the magistrates’ court, so obviously that is a court, but it is the lowest level that is used to dealing with litigants in person, if that is the circumstance. 154 We are not aware of any cost implications; obviously if someone wishes to instruct representation, they can do so, but these are matters that are likely to be pretty much factual disputes about what someone did, and it would be for the magistrate to take a view whether that was unreasonable conduct. 155 CHAIR: Do you anticipate that the Corporation would instruct lawyers to defend its issuance of a CPN? 156 SUE IRELAND: It would depend on the circumstances. 157 JAMES CORNWELL: It would depend on the circumstances. Normally we would not expect to, but obviously if the case was particularly complex there might be reason to do so. 158 CHAIR: But there are no examples of that ever having happened? 159 JAMES CORNWELL: We do not yet have the power. 160 CHAIR: But with the current anti-social behaviour orders that has never happened? 161 SUE IRELAND: If they instructed a solicitor, we would instruct a solicitor. 162 CHAIR: You mentioned that the Corporation and the manner in which it currently deals with issues that arise: with words of advice and education. I

wonder whether a concern would be that increasing the potential powers available would perhaps make words of advice and education less favourable as an option, in terms of working with members of the public, and there would be an increased reliance on the issuance of CPNs, because they are prompt, immediate and relatively easy to issue. Would you accept that that is a danger? 163 SUE IRELAND: I accept that it is a potential risk, but if you just look at the scale of the number of figures I was quoting, in terms of the number of discussions that we have with people—informal even, before we get to formal— you will see that we spend a lot of our time doing that, because at the end of the day we want people to enjoy our spaces. That is what they are there for. So the vast majority of what we do doesn’t get us anywhere near even formal discussions. 164 CHAIR: In the incident where racial abuse has been levelled at a member of Corporation staff, would it not be appropriate to report that to the police rather than potentially issue a CPN? 165 SUE IRELAND: In this particular case that we were talking about, which was in Highgate Wood, the police were involved in the process. It was just that it took such a long, long time to deal with. I am talking about months and months of time, and staff had to go through some very difficult times in that process. I can think of other examples of racial abuse that staff have to put up with. It is not a priority for the police to deal with it. I have often— 166 CHAIR: You would forgive me if I say that would be the case for every citizen in the country if they were reporting a matter related to that kind of abuse. 167 SUE IRELAND: Yes. 168 CHAIR: With some of the activity that you referenced, Mr Thomson, about the drug-taking and the sexual activity in public spaces, why would the Corporation not pursue prosecution as a method of absolute deterrence over and above a CPN? I am unclear as to why CPN would be preferable to prosecution. 169 PAUL THOMSON: Because the focus is on future activity and the CPN is a way of restricting people’s access to that space to recommit the offence, and where we have seen evidence of persistent offending CPNs are a far more appropriate penalty in actually stopping people coming and doing the thing again than it would be in terms of simply taking straightforward prosecution. Under the byelaws, I cannot prosecute for drug-related offences anyway, so I would have to rely on the police and, as I said, these offences—class B drugs—will not be taken particularly seriously by the police. 170 I am very concerned for my staff, who I am putting in harm’s way, as it were, by obliging them to live in the forest to fulfil their duties, so a CPN in my view would be a very sensible approach to managing future behaviour and restricting future behaviour. 171 CHAIR: On the issue of future behaviour, particularly in relation to fly- tipping, are people who are fly-tipping—I am thinking about my own local authority area and I think that fly-tippers are fly-tipping because they get away with it—being caught currently? How many are being caught currently? 172 PAUL THOMSON: We have had 15 successful prosecutions this year; I

have 80 prosecutions under way at the moment, both for the fly-tippers and under the duty of care of the householders who have assigned fly-tippers this waste. We are increasing our prosecution level around that issue, but again a CPN would be useful if we have persistent fly-tippers who are coming again and again to a site, and we can demonstrate that that is often the case, so at the end it would be useful— 173 CHAIR: Forgive me for interrupting. Would that not just assist in an easy prosecution—being able to demonstrate that a CPN has been issued, perhaps a fly-tipper returns frequently, but to different areas, for example, of Epping Forest? Perhaps repeated CPNs are issued, which then assists in the prosecution that you are already undertaking? 174 PAUL THOMSON: We are undertaking prosecutions, but I think it would be a useful additional power to say to people that they may well be prosecuted but they will also be restricted from returning to the forest to commit the same offence again, particularly where we can demonstrate that they have fly-tipped on more than one occasion. 175 CHAIR: Where do you think they might move on to if they are no longer fly-tipping in Epping Forest? 176 PAUL THOMSON: There is always an issue of displacement, and we work in a partnership with a number of local landowners who are all working together to try to prevent fly-tipping on public or private land, so there is an issue about diligence. There is always an issue about displacement. 177 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Mr Cornwell, this thing about an authorised person, which I think you said had to be a constable, local authority or a designated person—that is correct, isn’t it? What is the process for designating a person? That is the Secretary of State, is that correct? 178 JAMES CORNWELL: First, the Secretary of State has to make an order under section 53(4) specifying that either a particular type of body or a specific body can be designated. Then it is a matter for each local authority making a designation. That would involve the body that wants to be designated going to the local authority and asking to be designated. The local authority will then have to decide whether that is appropriate. 179 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: But the Secretary of State has not made that designation in this case to you, has he? 180 JAMES CORNWELL: No, he has not been asked. The Secretary of State is aware that we are seeking this power and has not objected. 181 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: But you are not going to seek this power from the Secretary of State, are you? 182 JAMES CORNWELL: No, because we are seeking it through a private Bill, which will provide a consistent position across the Corporation’s open spaces without troubling local authorities to have to go through the process of designation. 183 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: I am all for that, but obviously we have got to act legally here. Under section 53(4), if it says you have to be a constable, local authority or a designated person, and you are not one of those three, how can

this possibly be legal? 184 JAMES CORNWELL: This would be primary legislation deeming the Corporation to be a designated person without requiring the local authority to go through the designation process. 185 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Does the Act give us the opportunity to do that? 186 JAMES CORNWELL: Yes, that is what we are asking you to do. 187 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: It is not clear in the Act that it does give us that opportunity. 188 JAMES CORNWELL: The wording is, for the purposes of the relevant part in relation to an open space, that the Corporation is to be treated as, “a person designated by the relevant local authority” under section 53(1)(c). So Parliament will be deeming— 189 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: But does it not require the Secretary of State to make that designation in the Act, rather than Parliament? 190 JAMES CORNWELL: No, the Secretary of State does not designate; the Secretary of State says which bodies a local authority may designate. This clause, if enacted, will skip straight to the outcome of section 53(1)(c) and deem the Corporation to be designated for these purposes. 191 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: So you are saying that the Act does not require the Secretary of State to make that designation. 192 JAMES CORNWELL: No. 193 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: It simply opens the possibility of Parliament making that designation. 194 JAMES CORNWELL: Yes. As the 2014 Act is currently in force, the designation is by local authority but the local authority can only designate a body that has been specified by an order under section 53(4). This clause, if enacted, would be primary legislation that, as it were, short-circuits that approach and does not actually require the local authority to designate. Therefore, the requirement for the Secretary of State to make any specifying order under section 53(4) does not bite, as it were. There has been a to-ing and fro-ing with the Home Office about the precise way in which this clause should be drafted to achieve the effect that is intended. This is the end product of that process. 195 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: I thought they simply said to you that they have no objections. That’s not the same as being specified, is it? 196 JAMES CORNWELL: No. I’m not saying that the Secretary of State has somehow specified it, but the Secretary of State certainly hasn’t objected and doesn’t consider that there is any problem with the proposal. 197 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: So you contend that there is no requirement for the Secretary of State to specify. 198 JAMES CORNWELL: No. 199 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: You believe that? 200 JAMES CORNWELL: Not if this provision is enacted.

201 CHAIR: Are there any further questions? Thank you. Counsel, would you like to take the opportunity to make your final remarks on that point? 202 JAMES CORNWELL: Let me sum up on clause 12 and deal with the petition. As we have seen, the Corporation has a range of enforcement powers in relation to its open spaces outside the City. It has the byelaws that it can make and enforce, and it currently also has public space protection orders. It seeks for Parliament, through this Bill, to give it a further power to impose community protection notices, which are particularly useful, as Mr Thomson indicated, because they deal with future behaviour. 203 It is not a punishment for an offence that has been committed, as would be the case with a prosecution for a byelaw offence. They deal with cases where a person has crossed the relatively onerous threshold set out in section 43—they are causing significant detrimental effect to the quality of life of the community, and that detrimental effect is continuing. It is primarily focused on preventing future conduct, which byelaw prosecutions may not do. They deal with historic offences that have taken place. The notice provides for a focused and reasonable set of steps to address that conduct. Indeed, if they don’t provide reasonable steps, the order should not be made and it would be successfully appealable to the magistrates’ court. 204 We do say that this is a step that Parliament should make through this private Bill. There would be real practical difficulties if the Corporation had to go to various local authorities to seek designation. It could end up with an unsatisfactory patchwork of areas that are and are not subject to the power to make community protection notices. It is efficient and appropriate that Parliament uses this Bill as an opportunity to give the Corporation this power across its open spaces outside the City. 205 Turning to the petition, in my submission the starting point needs to be the Freedom of Information Act, which defines what a public authority is for the purposes of that Act. Of course, it is only public authorities that have duties to provide information to requesters under the Act. They are defined in section 3(1) of the Act: “‘public authority’ means…subject to section 4(4), any body which, any other person who, or the holder of any office which…is listed in Schedule 1, or…is designated by order under section 5, or…a publicly-owned company as defined by section 6.” The only relevant one of those is subsection 1(a)(i): “is listed in Schedule 1”. 206 Parliament has made a deliberate choice in the Freedom of Information Act and specifies the Corporation as a public authority for the purposes of the Act to a limited extent. Paragraph 9 of part 2 of Schedule 1 says “The Common Council of the City of London, in respect of information held in its capacity as a local authority, police authority or port health authority” is a public authority. It is only in relation to those functions. 207 The consequence of that is in relation to all other management functions of the open spaces outside the City, where the Corporation is not acting as a local authority, a police authority or a port health authority and is not a public authority for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act. That includes the enforcement powers that it already has, in particular its powers to make and enforce byelaws. When it exercises those powers, it is not a public authority and is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act.

208 Similarly, when it exercises the power that it has recently been given to make public space protection orders, the Corporation is not a public authority for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act. Requests for information in relation to those functions will not be dealt with under the Act. 209 It is against that background that the petition needs to be seen. It is seeking something that is, in many ways, quite anomalous. The power to issue community protection notices would be the only one of the Corporation’s functions outside the City that would be subject to freedom of information requests, so it would be an anomalous position. 210 The petition suggests that, as a matter of course, a body that is granted the power to issue community protection notices under section 53 of the 2014 Act will be subject to the Freedom of Information Act. That is simply not the case. Police forces—i.e. the constables—are, and local authorities are, but there is no requirement on the face of the 2014 Act that a body that is designated by a local authority under section 53(1)(c) is a public authority for the purposes of the Act. 211 Indeed, the order that the Secretary of State has made which specifies housing providers as being eligible for designation means that various bodies that are not necessarily public authorities will be eligible to be designated and therefore to make community protection notices. The definition of a housing provider in section 20 of the 2014 Act is “a housing trust…a housing action trust…a non-profit private registered provider of social housing…in relation to Wales, a Welsh body registered as a social landlord”, and “any body…that is a landlord under a secure tenancy within the meaning given by section 79 of the Housing Act 1985”. 212 CHAIR: May I interrupt you? Would those organisations that might not have an arm’s length management arrangement with local authorities but might have contracted services with them be subject to freedom of information? 213 JAMES CORNWELL: Potentially. It would need to be decided, on the basis of fact, whether the information they held was held on behalf of the local authority. 214 CHAIR: Well, for the contracted services, it would be for the purpose of the local authority, would it not? For example, Willmott Dixon or Balfour Beatty might be responsible for issuing parking penalty notices. 215 JAMES CORNWELL: Well, it is potentially held on behalf of the local authority, but there are a number of cases that the Information Commissioner— and indeed the first-tier tribunal—has considered where precisely that issue has arisen. It will depend on the case-by-case factual analysis of whether the information is really being held by that body—the contractor—or whether it is being held by the contracting body. There may be cases where a contractual relationship between a local authority and housing provider leads to information being deemed to be held by a public authority for the purposes of the Act. But that will not necessarily be the case by any means in relation to the bodies listed in section 20 of the 2014 Act. 216 So, in my submission, the premise of the Petitioner’s argument is flawed. There is no limit on the power either of the Secretary of State to make orders under section 53(4) or of local authorities to designate by reference to bodies

that are public authorities for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act. So that premise of the argument, in my submission, is flawed. 217 As I have said, the way the Freedom of Information Act works is to define a list of particular public authorities—there is a very long list in Schedule 1 to the Act. It does not take a functional approach, looking at particular functions, which is the approach that the Kennel Club seek to adopt. 218 It is also to be noted that were the Corporation to take the approach of going to the Secretary of State and asking for an order under section 53(4) and then seeking to be designated by local authorities, that would in no way change its status under the Freedom of Information Act. It would still be the case that it was not a public authority in respect of these non-local authority functions that it was discharging in relation to the open spaces outside the City. So that is another anomaly in the case for the petition. 219 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: May I ask you a question? I am still stuck on this authorised persons issue. I do not know if you have got the Act there in front of you— 220 JAMES CORNWELL: Yes, I have. 221 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Under 53(4), which you were quoting at the time—I will wait for you to get to the relevant section—it talks about authorised persons and it says, “Only a person of a description specified in an order made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of subsection (1)(c)”, which is the designation of a person, “may be designated under that subsection.” 222 JAMES CORNWELL: The effect of the proposed clause 12 is essentially to bypass that provision because it deems the Corporation to be designated without a designation process needing to be gone through by the local authority. I fully accept that where a designation process by the local authority needs to take place, that is limited to two bodies that have been identified by the Secretary of State in an order under section 53(4). 223 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: This legislation has been debated on the Floor of the House. Members may have asked a specific question about the ability to designate somebody as an authorised person. It says that the Secretary of State has to make that designation, and you are asking us to make that designation ourselves. Isn’t that contravening both the spirit and the letter of the Bill? 224 JAMES CORNWELL: If the Bill is enacted, it will be primary legislation. We do not accept that it would be contrary to section 53(4). 225 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Really? It does not say that there is any other body that could make that designation in section 53(4). It is quite clear, is it not? If I was a Member looking at this and debating it in Parliament, I would pretty much think that it was an issue for the Secretary of State, rather than one for a Bill Committee. 226 JAMES CORNWELL: If the Bill is enacted, Parliament will have effectively carried out a designation. It will be deeming the Corporation to be designated an authorised person under section 53(1)(c). As I have said, the form of words in the amended clause 12 has been consulted on with the Home Office on behalf of the Secretary of State—

227 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: And they said they had no objections, as you said earlier, but that is not quite the same thing as— 228 JAMES CORNWELL: I am not saying that there is some sort of deemed order under section 53(4); I am saying that certainly from the point of view of the Secretary of State, it does not appear that there is any objection. 229 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: I am not implying for one moment that there is. 230 CHAIR: I think the Committee will consider this when it comes to its private deliberations. It was right to ask the question. Marie Rimmer would like to ask one more question, if that is acceptable. 231 MARIE RIMMER: Counsel, can you tell me when the plan to tidy clause 12 and the text for doing so was first disclosed to the Petitioners? 232 RICHARD TURNEY: If I can assist, we were notified of the change last [Monday].2 MARIE RIMMER: Thank you. 233 JAMES CORNWELL: Yes, I believe it was provided by the House authorities. 234 CHAIR: Would you like to continue to sum up, and then we will move on to the petition? 235 JAMES CORNWELL: I made the point that even if the Corporation was to take the route of seeking a designation from a local authority, that would not change the fact that it is not a public authority for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act. You have also heard evidence from Ms Ireland about the steps that the Corporation already takes in relation to transparency with the enforcement powers it already has. A recipient of a community protection notice will be told the reasons for it on the face of the notice. They will then potentially have rights under the Data Protection Act to make the subject access request to the Corporation as data controller to provide their personal data. 236 As Ms Ireland has explained, the Corporation already provides reports to committees responsible for open spaces that detail the overall picture in relation to information enforcement action over the period covered. Those reports are all made public on the internet. On a non-statutory basis, the Corporation’s practice is to seek to be as helpful as possible and provide information where it can do so without taking on an excessive burden. 237 Extending the Freedom of Information Act to these functions would, in my submission, be inappropriate both because it would entirely cut across the way in which the Corporation’s functions have been dealt with so far in relation to that Act and because it would place additional burdens on the Corporation. It would be under an obligation to deal with any request and would need to have in place internal complaint and review procedures and would potentially have to deal with complaints to the Information Commissioner and then on to the first- tier tribunal and so on. So it would be an onerous additional burden, over and above the non-statutory discretionary approach it already takes to try to be as transparent as possible.

2 Correction by Petitioners: Word amended to correct factual error. This previously read “Tuesday”.

238 I have two points in relation to the questions that have been directed at me. The first is in relation to the timing of the amendment. 239 RICHARD TURNEY: I do not take issue with the timing of the amendment. The rules allow a Filled Bill to be served within that time limit, so they are what they are. 240 JAMES CORNWELL: Indeed, it has been pointed out to me that as early as 29 July the Corporation highlighted to the Kennel Club its intention to make an amendment to this effect. 241 The second point is in relation to the questions about specification by the Secretary of State under section 53(4). My instructions are that if the Committee felt it necessary to do so, we would be prepared to accept an amendment to make clause 12 subject to any specification by the Secretary of State under section 53(4) if that addressed the concern. Our primary position is that that is unnecessary because there is no conflict, but if the Committee feels it necessary to do so we will be very happy to consider an amendment to that effect. 242 CHAIR: Are we at the end of your summing up, Counsel? 243 JAMES CORNWELL: Yes, unless there is anything else I can assist with. 244 CHAIR: Thank you very much. We will move on to the petition. May I ask the Counsel for the Petitioners now to present the petition? Mr Turney, I understand that you do not plan to call any witnesses but that you may have some additional documentation that you wish to share with the Committee. Is that correct? 245 RICHARD TURNEY: That’s right. I have two notes, produced for the purposes of saving time. The first is what I will say and the second is a brief note from the Kennel Club as to its reasons behind the petition. I shall pass the notes to the Committee. 246 First, could I say at the outset, Madam Chair, that, as you have noticed, I do not propose to call Dr Hayes, who is the Kennel Club’s public affairs officer, but he is here and he is sworn, so if questions arise that are beyond my competence I will ask him to come up and answer them. Please do interrupt me as I deal with the petition. 247 I will start with my outline submission and will then drop into the statement from the Kennel Club. I do not propose to read that in full, but I will pick out some points. The Petitioners are the Kennel Club, together with six individual recreational users of the City of London’s open spaces. Those open spaces form valuable amenity land that is enjoyed by many, including dog walkers. 248 The Kennel Club was established in 1873. The Committee will probably know of its role in the registration of dogs and so on, but beyond that there is a dog owners group that is known as KC Dog, which has approximately 5,000 members. That was established to monitor and keep dog owners up to date about dog-related issues, including restrictions on access for dog walking and so on. It is under that limb of the Kennel Club’s work that we are petitioning. 249 We have a single issue: should the City of London Corporation be subject to the Freedom of Information Act in respect of the exercise of the powers that it

asks Parliament to it in clause 12 of the Bill? The Kennel Club says that it should. The City argues it should not. There is no dispute that the Bill before the Committee would allow the City of London to issue CPNs and that it would not be subject to any duty to disclose information to those requesting it about how it exercises those powers. The mechanism for that I have set out in paragraph 3 of my note. Clause 2(4) says that the Corporation is acting other than in its capacity as a local authority, and the Freedom of Information Act uses the same language, so we are outside the Freedom of Information Act. 250 For the avoidance of doubt, we do not say that the City should be prevented from issuing community protection notices. We try to make a modest request, which is only that the exercise of that power should be subject to FOI. It is simply that; we have not said the power should not exist at all. 251 Can I pick up a couple of points about community protection notices? My learned friend went through some of the provisions, but I note in addition to those that the powers for a magistrate in a prosecution for a breach of a CPN include forfeiture of property, and there are powers for fixed penalty notices to be issued. It is not simply a matter coming before a court; it could be dealt with by way of a fixed penalty notice, if there was an alleged breach of a CPN. 252 I note at paragraph 5 the statement that has been prepared by the Kennel Club. I do not propose to read all of it, but may I pick out a few points and leave the rest with the Committee for its deliberations? The first paragraph is an introduction to the Kennel Club. I have already dealt with that. The second paragraph explains the role that the Kennel Club takes in monitoring local proposals that affect the ability to exercise dogs, or indeed that restrict dog owners in where they can go and enjoy exercising and walking their dogs. The next paragraph says: “We pro-actively recommend that local authorities make greater use of CPNs”—we do not oppose them at all in principle—“as these allow the irresponsible individuals to be targeted, without penalising the majority. They also allow authorities the capacity to address the underlying problem behaviour”, such as by sending dog owners to dog training classes. 253 I note that the Kennel Club has for some time been reviewing the antisocial behaviour measures that are used in respect of dog walking. It has carried out some quite detailed investigations, including through making freedom of information requests to find out how powers are used. It is that transparency that the Kennel Club seeks to maintain through the petition. 254 May I note a couple of points on the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014? In the last paragraph on the first page of the statement, we simply note that in the final stages of the passage of that Act through Parliament there was a debate on whether parish councils should have similar powers to make CPNs. It is telling how the Government Minister in the other place referred to this: “CPNs are a powerful tool and, as such, there needs to be some control over the number of organisations that can issue them in order to maintain consistency. As I said, a breach of a CPN is a criminal offence and one needs experienced practitioners in their use. We believe that local authorities, as defined in Clause 53, are the right bodies to undertake this role. As with public spaces protection orders, we do not believe that parish councils should be able to hear them.” 255 We acknowledge that that Act provided the City of London with the power

to issue CPNs in respect of its role as a local authority—the City of London Corporation can issue CPNs within the City of London. If it did so, the exercise of those powers would be subject to FOI; it would be behaving as a public authority. For the discrepancy that is put forward on the other side, there is actually an equal discrepancy the other way. The City of London, within the City, would be subject to FOI for those notices. As soon as they were in Epping Forest or Hampstead Heath, they would not be subject to FOI. 256 We note that the decision making for issuing a CPN is fairly flexible. There is a discretion accorded to the decision maker as to how to frame the CPN and what behaviour to target, so there is room for interpretation here. If we are thinking about consistency across the piece, you have to ask how that can be scrutinised. How are these powers being used in respect of dog walkers in Epping Forest, compared with dog walkers elsewhere in a normal local authority area? We say that sort of scrutiny is important. 257 I note the penultimate paragraph on the second page: “As a direct result of the evidence base collected by campaigners, partially through Freedom of Information requests, the Home Office has made the decision to amend the statutory guidance on the use of anti-social behaviour tools, including CPNs.” The Minister in the other place, Baroness Williams, confirmed that the guidance will be reviewed “to see how we can strengthen it to ensure proportionality in the use of the powers and accountability, which is very important.” That is the focus of the petition. 258 The last paragraph states: “We believe that this is another clear indication of the importance of transparency regarding the use of these powers. Even following any amendments to the statutory guidance it will likely be left to NGOs”—such as the Kennel Club—“and others to continue to monitor the use of these tools.” 259 Over the page, the final four paragraphs of the note from the Kennel Club state: “At present, on the open spaces that are included in the Corporation’s Bill, officials from the respective local authority, police officers and police community support officers could issue a CPN to a dog walker”—or others. “The use of these powers would be relatively transparent”—because they are subject to FOI—“and interested parties could request information on how many CPNs have been issued, why”—and so on. 260 It continues: “Should the…Bill be passed without amendment, then officials from the Corporation of London could issue CPNs on the listed open spaces without any scope for public scrutiny. This means a scenario could arise whereby an official from the Corporation could be on site with a local authority official or police officer, and dependent on which official issued a CPN to an individual”, that would determine whether or not we could obtain information about the use of that power. 261 It continues: “The ability to access this information provides not only the ability to scrutinise the usage of CPNs but also would enable the Kennel Club, and others, to uncover and share best practice with other bodies of the use of these powers. The Kennel Club therefore proposes that for the sake of consistency, transparency and fairness the Corporation of London should be subject to Freedom of Information requests specifically in regard to the use of CPNs…and that this is an important safeguard for both dog walkers and other

users”. 262 I am going to return to my note, if I may. I list a series of points in paragraph 6, and I will just elaborate on a few issues to address what has been said before. The first point is that the City is asking Parliament, and the Committee is scrutinising on behalf of Parliament, for powers that other private landowners do not have. It is as simple as that. They are not available to general private landowners. The power has potential criminal consequences for users of the City’s open spaces, and the use of that power, we say, should be subject to public scrutiny. 263 Can I just pick up a few more points there? You heard about the history of the City’s ownership of these spaces. It is quite clear that they have been owned and used for the public benefit. This is not an act of benevolence in letting people use these spaces—they have been recognised in statute as being public open spaces for the use of the public at large. In that context, I just question how the City can say, “We should be treated differently, in terms of information provision, in this area from what would be the case if we were talking about a public open space within the Square Mile.” 264 The next point is that the public scrutiny provided by the Freedom of Information Act has assumed a central importance in public accountability since its enactment. It is clear that the ability to request information has substantially increased the accountability of all levels of government. There is no good reason not to have such accountability here. May I just develop that? I fully accept, because I advise public authorities more often than I do others, that freedom of information can be an uncomfortable burden on a public authority, but that does not reduce its importance. I will add that the role of NGOs is particularly important. The Kennel Club perhaps has a lower profile than some others, but Members will be well aware of circumstances in which NGOs have exposed wrongdoing, inconsistency or arbitrariness through freedom of information. We are simply asking for that measure to be available. 265 I pose this question: who will scrutinise the reasonableness of the City’s use of these powers if that is not done through organisations such as the Kennel Club asking questions? Of course, the point is that we do not know what question we will have to ask or what information we will need, because this is a new power being granted to the City of London. We simply cannot contemplate what circumstances may arise in which a probing request has to be made, but it should be allowed to be made. 266 If the same power were exercised by the City in respect of the land within the City of London—I have touched on this point already—the exercise of that power would be subject to freedom of information. I just say that there is no principled basis for distinguishing between the same body within the City of London and outside it. The flipside, of course, is that a local authority in Epping Forest would also be subject to freedom of information. If we are looking at consistency across the piece, which my learned friend wants to major on, we say that the inconsistency so far as the public at large are concerned is introduced by their drafting, not by our proposed amendment. Yes, there will be an inconsistency for the City of London, in terms of their own view about where FOI extends. I perfectly accept that. They prefer the situation in which their use of the open spaces is not subject to FOI. But it depends whether you view

consistency as a point of public interest or of the interest of the City of London as a corporation. 267 I then deal with the designation of bodies. I note in 6(d) that it is possible to designate bodies, but as a matter of fact, it is only housing providers that have been capable of designation. Mr Hollinrake’s question is apt, because he exposes the two-stage process. The Secretary of State says, “This class of people can be identified,” but then a local authority, which is accountable and subject to FOI, decides which provider should be able to issue a CPN, and you can be quite clear that if some rogue registered provider started to use CPNs inappropriately, the local authority would withdraw that designation. What is being done here is a once-and-for-all legislative designation. There is no scope for withdrawal or future scrutiny. It would have to be amended by primary legislation; someone would have to introduce a Bill in the House to change the designation that is sought. 268 Although the City has a special status in law, I say that is not a good reason to extend its powers without imposing corresponding duties of accountability. It is right to say that there is a long-standing history of powers over the open spaces concerned, but of course the 19th-century Acts that brought that in were in a context in which freedom of information was not even dreamed of. It now has central importance, and I say as a point of principle that if the City of London is going to have more powers—powers with criminal consequences—in respect of open spaces outside London, it should be subject to 21st-century principles: freedom of information. 269 The Kennel Club has sought to persuade the City to provide for the application of the Freedom of Information Act to the clause 12 power. Indeed, we met with the City of London—I was at the meeting—but the City has simply refused to accede to this. It has said it will publish information, but beyond that has refused to accede to this. It simply does not wish to have that scrutiny. To be frank, this makes the Kennel Club more concerned about the absence of a freedom of information provision. Why is it that the City of London does not wish to have that scrutiny? 270 Can I touch on the publication of material? We welcome what was said by the witnesses about the publication of material, but it does not answer the full question. Material that is in the public domain of course does not have to be disclosed under a freedom of information request, so if someone said, “Can I have the number of CPNs issued last year?” and that was in a published document, the City of London would respond and say, “That’s in a published document.” It is the more probing question that we want to cater for, and as I say, we cannot anticipate what it might be. 271 Can I also deal, please, with the burden on the local authority—on the City of London? There is a burden with any freedom of information request, but this is a Corporation that already has the necessary mechanisms for dealing with it. I assume it has, for example, information officers, because it is a local authority so far as its London functions are concerned, so it will be receiving freedom of information requests, I suspect, on a weekly if not daily basis. It has the mechanism in place to deal with those, and I question whether that burden is a true burden or not. 272 Can I pick up two more points, please, in addition to what I have set out

in my note? First, in response to Mr Hollinrake’s questions to my learned friend, I simply say this on section 53(4). This is a direct sidestep of that designation process. I have already explained the benefits of a two-stage process. This sidesteps that. It is something that it is legally possible to do; whether it is appropriate to do so is a completely different matter. 273 The next point is this. It is said that it is curious that the Kennel Club seek to pursue this argument on CPNs when in fact dog walkers are more likely to be penalised under byelaws. I accept that, but we say that is a problem. It is a problem that we cannot scrutinise the way in which dog walkers are penalised by the City of London. The fact that there are existing measures that cause a problem does not mean that the problem should be perpetuated through giving new powers that are not subject to FOI. 274 I am sorry; I am just going to check whether there is anything else to raise. I am reminded that, under the Freedom of Information Act, there are processes of designation for what might not ordinarily be considered public authorities. There is not a hard and fast line for which body is subject to FOI and which is not. For example, I am told that the Association of Chief Police Officers is now subject to FOI. The legislative regime does not have the bright line that the City of London says it does between the City of London as a local authority and the City of London as a private Corporation. That is why we say in these circumstances, looking at the powers sought and the context of these public open spaces, this is more like the kind of power that should be subject to FOI, and we invite the Committee to take that broader view as to the scope of FOI. 275 I have taken it very quickly, but I hope that by so doing I have kept vaguely within my time limit. Is there anything that I can assist the Committee with? 276 CHAIR: Do Members want to ask questions before we invite Counsel for the Promoter to respond to the Petitioner’s submission? 277 JULIAN KNIGHT: I have a question. Just to boil this down, what is the Kennel Club’s primary underlying fear in terms of the use of CPNs? How do you think the use of FOI will help? 278 RICHARD TURNEY: The primary fear is that they are used too aggressively to combat behaviour which is on the margins or simply not antisocial. If I give the example of the work done by the Kennel Club on the public spaces protection orders, the Kennel Club’s work and investigations’ FOI requests exposed one local authority that had used such orders to ban all dogs from a public open space. Now, put aside the interests of dog walkers. On proper scrutiny, it transpired that that included guide dogs. 279 Now, there is always a risk, when you grant a power, that it will be used in an over-zealous way. We know, and we have heard from Ms Ireland, that it is unlikely that the City of London will do so, but that does not mean that you should not legislate for the circumstances in which they do and you should not subject them to scrutiny. It is that over-zealous enforcement that really is the driving force behind this petition. 280 JULIAN KNIGHT: In the instance you just mentioned about a local authority that had used it—these notices are effectively to ban dog walking.

281 RICHARD TURNEY: Yes. 282 JULIAN KNIGHT: What was the result from your exposure of that through FOI? 283 RICHARD TURNEY: Shall I ask Dr Hayes to come forward? He has dealt with this. He has already sworn. As I said earlier, this is Dr Hayes. He is the public affairs officer from the Kennel Club and has been dealing with all the background to this. 284 ED HAYES: At this stage, we launched our report and summarised all our findings just within the last month, and we are addressing the Home Office as described earlier. The guidance is going to be updated. We have met with the Local Government Association to ask them to tell their members effectively whether it is appropriate to use these orders to ban assistance dog use in public spaces. And at the moment there are ongoing discussions with the local authorities. 285 I would say the legal test for introducing a public space protection order is essentially the same as for the community protection notice. They came to the same conclusion—persistent and continuing activity which is detrimental to the quality of local life—and enforce these bans. They came back to us and said, “No, we are not exempting assistance dogs. This applies to everybody,” which we do not believe is appropriate. We are using the FOI to expose this and hopefully get them to change the order and allow assistance dog users to access all the public spaces that any other individual would be able to do. 286 JULIAN KNIGHT: The FOI itself is just the mechanism, really— 287 ED HAYES: Yes. 288 JULIAN KNIGHT: You mentioned as well, Counsel, that basically the City had refused to accede to this but you did not really expand on the reasoning they gave to you in that meeting. 289 RICHARD TURNEY: It is much the same reasoning as you have heard today; in fact, it is almost exactly the same. I think it might be worth saying that it was a helpful meeting but it simply exposed the fact that we were diametrically opposed. I recognise that this is a fairly narrow point and Members have to deal with far weightier matters on a day-to-day basis, but this is the forum in which to decide this matter. We discussed it, I think, for probably 45 minutes or an hour and we found that the positons were as you see them today. We say “FOI”; they say, “not FOI”. That was where it was left. 290 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Mr Turney, you used an example of three different people stood in the same park who could each issue CPNs—the local authority, a constable and a designated person—one of whom would not be covered by the FOI. You could use the parallel with a social housing provider, which I think is the argument you have been given by the City of London Corporation. What do you say to that? 291 RICHARD TURNEY: Two points. First of all, the designation of the social housing provider is through the local authority—it is my point about the two- stage test—so if a registered provider misbehaves using those powers, the recourse really is through the local authority. The second point is that the registered provider is itself regulated through other means: through—I need to

be reminded—the Housing Regeneration Act 2008. I might actually add a third point, which is the Chair’s point, which is that of course where the registered provider is providing social housing on behalf of the local authority, it would be subject to FOI in any event. 292 So yes, I recognise that you could have a circumstance where a registered provider serves a notice and is not subject to FOI. Query: does that mean that you should take same approach for the City of London in respect of open spaces outside the City of London? I will not die in the ditch on the point of principle; I just say that it is the right remedy in this case. 293 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: The suggested compromise that was in the letter of 29 July—I do not know if it is contained elsewhere—contains not just a high- level opportunity to get this information; it is quite detailed in terms of the different circumstances in which you might get access to the information, that you might look for in a certain situation. Is it not comprehensive enough? 294 RICHARD TURNEY: It is very welcome and it is helpful. It goes back to my point that you do not know what the question is that you need to ask, therefore you cannot say whether the information that is proposed to be published under a discretionary publication scheme—which of course could be amended over time—is the information you will actually need on the facts of a particular case or a particular series of cases. 295 As I have said, publication is a defence to the provision of the information under FOI. If a request is made and it is in that publication scheme, no further action would need to be taken by the City of London. If it is not in that publication scheme, they should consider the request. Of course, they can still rely on all the exceptions for disclosing the information. If it is needed for an impending prosecution, of course they would say, “We withhold it.” If it was privileged legal advice, they would withhold it. Those rules would all still apply if the clause was amended as we suggest. 296 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: On that point, is it not true that if we required this to be included on the face of the Bill, it could not be amended. You said “discretionary”—compromise on a discretionary basis—but if we insisted this be included on the face of Bill then that could not be amended. 297 RICHARD TURNEY: You are quite right, sir. I do not think it right that in the letter it was being suggested by the City that they wish to include that as a provision of the Bill, but it may be that that is a proposal that they put forward. 298 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: If it was, would you accept it? 299 RICHARD TURNEY: It goes back to my primary point: it does not go far enough because it does not cater for the situation which we cannot tell you what it is—for the situation where you need to ask the difficult, awkward question. 300 ED HAYES: May I add to that? As we stated, the Home Office is reviewing its guidance at the moment. They may introduce a new requirement or guidance on which we might want to ask a question. Until that guidance is produced, we don’t know what the question might be in relation to that guidance. If we agree to a prescribed list of information at this point, it might be that we then want to amend it—not to take information away but to add information to the list which might be relevant on the basis of Government changes.

301 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Change to guidance on the Freedom of Information Act? 302 ED HAYES: Sorry—guidance on the use of community protection notices. 303 CHAIR: Why do you think it is only the Kennel Club that is objecting to this? We have heard that there have been thousands of respondents. Presumably, park users and open space users are equally diverse and yet it is only the Kennel Club that seeks to amend the Bill as it has been presented. 304 ED HAYES: For a start, very few NGOs are really operating in this sphere—looking at open spaces and FOI around the use of these powers. Also, the original clause was quite confusing for people. It has been amended now to make it clear that City of London will not be acting as local authority for that space, but as originally worded, people might have read it and said, “The City of London acting as a local authority for this space will be FOI-able”. It is actually only from reading the previous clauses in the Bill that it becomes apparent, and also from knowing the background and having seen previous requests being turned down. 305 CHAIR: As the Petitioner, have you been contacted by any other interested parties who are willing to support your submission? 306 ED HAYES: We have had discussions with other organisations, such as the Manifesto Club who are quite regularly active on the Anti-social Behaviour Act. 307 RICHARD TURNEY: May I add on the point about the interpretation? It is right to note that the meaning of the clause, at least as originally drafted, can only be understood if you read clause 12, clause 2(4), plus the schedule to the Freedom of Information Act. That is how you know that you cannot make an FOI request. Dr Hayes knows that, and clearly other NGOs may know it, but it terms of the general public, I suspect that one needs to have a bit of familiarity with the regime to spot the issue. 308 CHAIR: Are there any further questions? Counsel for the Promoter, do you have any comments or questions? 309 JAMES CORNWELL: I go back to the point about consistency. It again needs to be emphasised that there is a fundamental difference between the Corporation’s historic role, dating back to the 12th century, as a common law corporation that holds land and the role it subsequently gained in respect of the City as a local authority. That is reflected in the way the open spaces, which are run under the first function, are paid for: not through public money but through income and so on and investments. That is reflected in the Freedom of Information Act. Parliament has taken a view as to the extent to which the Corporation should be subject to freedom of information. All that the Corporation is asking is that that be consistently applied in this case. With the greatest respect to the Kennel Club, they are asking for a departure from that in relation to a particular point. 310 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Sorry, you will have to explain that again; I did not understand it. 311 JAMES CORNWELL: They are asking for one small bit of the Corporation’s powers outside London when it is not acting as a local authority to

be subject to freedom of information. It will remain the case that all its other functions that it carries out when it is not acting as a local authority in the City will remain outside the scope of the Freedom of Information Act. In my submission, that is inconsistent and confused. 312 Mr Turney gave the example of three different people potentially being involved in instances of antisocial behaviour: a constable, a local authority officer and an officer of the Corporation. He said in two of those cases the exercise of those powers would be subject to freedom of information and one of them would not, and that that was odd. 313 I would say there is also an inconsistency if the Kennel Club’s amendment is allowed. One could have the situation in which you have one officer of the Corporation dealing with an incident of antisocial behaviour in an open space outside the City; they could seek to prosecute for breach of byelaws and that would not be covered by the Freedom of Information Act. It may be that if a public space protection order has been in place they could seek to enforce that; that would not be subject to the Freedom of Information Act. But if they also sought to impose a community protection notice, that would be subject to the Freedom of Information Act. In my submission, that is a stranger inconsistency than the one that Mr Turney refers to. 314 I again make the point that there is nothing inherent in the 2014 Act that those who are designated should be subject to the Freedom of Information Act. The Kennel Club’s objection is to the way in which Parliament has drafted Schedule 1 to the Freedom of Information Act to restrict and limit the way in which the Act applies to the Corporation. 315 It is not the case that the Corporation has sought to avoid scrutiny, as was suggested by my learned friend. The Corporation has set out, in its 29 July letter, steps that it is prepared to take on publication to ensure transparency in relation to exercise of the community protection notice functions, repeated by Ms Ireland in her evidence. I am instructed that the Corporation would be willing to make an undertaking to this Committee to implement such a scheme. 316 The Corporation is not concerned about transparency. It is quite happy to be transparent. What it is concerned about is an inappropriate application of the Freedom of Information Act into areas that have not previously been covered by the Act. If necessary, indeed, if an undertaking is not sufficient and if the Committee feels it necessary to put the scheme as set out by the Corporation in its 29 July letter into the Bill, as repeated by Ms Ireland in her evidence, we are content for that to be done. 317 My final point, looping back to the point about consistency, is that it is not just a question of internal consistency in relation to the way in which the Corporation discharges its functions. That will be affected if freedom of information legislation were applied in relation to this particular function, but it is also the case that other landowners, including bodies that operate and control land under local Acts of Parliament—for example, conservators, such as the Conservators of Wimbledon and Putney Commons or of Ashdown Forest, or the Malvern Hills Conservators. They are not treated as public authorities under the Freedom of Information Act, and the treatment to date of the Corporation has been consistent with that approach. Allowing the Kennel Club’s amendment, as suggested in its petition, would change that.

318 Unless there is anything else that I can assist you with, those are my submissions as to why the petition should be dismissed. 319 CHAIR: Does Wimbledon Common operate in a similar fashion to the Corporation of London? Does it have a local authority element to it as well? 320 JAMES CORNWELL: It is a separate body of conservators. I think there are representatives of the local authority that sit on it, but it is a separate body. It does not wear lots of hats like the Corporation does. 321 CHAIR: Thank you. Any final comments? 322 RICHARD TURNEY: May I just say something? I know the final word is for my learned friend, but that was a new point on the conservators. My understanding is that those bodies do not have CPN-making powers. Certainly there is no scope for that designation. 323 JAMES CORNWELL: I was not suggesting that they did. I was speaking simply in terms of the Freedom of Information Act. 324 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Mr Turney, you mentioned social housing providers and how doing work for a local authority automatically brings them under the Freedom of Information Act provisions. By what device does that happen? 325 RICHARD TURNEY: If I said “automatically”, I did not mean that. You would have to consider what function they are providing. If they are discharging a duty that is on the local authority, then in the discharge of that duty they are clearly subject to FOI because they are stepping in to provide—it is the contracted-out service point, as opposed, for example, to providing intermediate housing to members of the public under another obligation. 326 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: You say it is different in this case. Why? Could you not argue the same for the City of London Corporation, in terms of looking after the parks and other local authority areas, and of discharging responsibility? 327 RICHARD TURNEY: If there is that distinction here, then it is a distinction without a difference, because if you are looking at the way in which the City of London regulates its open space in the City versus the way in which it regulates its open space in Epping, the two are—in so far as members of the public are concerned—the same thing. 328 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Yes. In terms of this other point—to Mr Cornwell again—you talked about inconsistency, but isn’t the inconsistency around the fact that the Freedom of Information Act only applies to information held in its capacity as a local authority in its own area? Isn’t that the inconsistency? 329 JAMES CORNWELL: That is the way in which Parliament has chosen to extend the Freedom of Information Act to the Corporation. It is an approach which, in my submission, entirely has a rational basis, because it reflects the difference between the Corporation as a common law corporation of long- standing—which does all sorts of things that a local authority does not do, when it is spending, essentially, its own money for public benefit—and where it is performing the functions of a local authority given to it by statute, or indeed those of a port, health or police authority. So it is an inconsistency, but it is one that arises for a logical reason. In so far as you can have consistency of

inconsistency, it is that. KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Thank you.

CHAIR: The Committee will now go into private session to consider the cases it has heard regarding clause 12 and the petition. Will the parties and the members of the public now withdraw? We will reconvene at 2 o’clock.

12.56 pm

The Committee deliberated in private.

2.05 pm

On resuming—

330 CHAIR: I can announce that, subject to decisions yet to come on the Bill as a whole, the Committee has decided to accept new clause 12 only if it is amended to include the imposition of a duty to comply with the Freedom of Information Act 2000. 331 The precise wording of the clause will be drafted by the Clerks and circulated subsequently, prior to its being finalised. Now we will come to the remainder of the Bill, which is unopposed; it has not been explicitly petitioned against. Therefore the petitioners may or may not wish to remain for the afternoon sitting. 332 RICHARD TURNEY: I am grateful. I think we will withdraw, if that is acceptable to the Committee. CHAIR: Thank you very much for your time this morning. 333 May I ask Counsel for the Promoter to present the case for the remainder of the Bill? 334 JAMES CORNWELL: Thank you, Ms Onn. We have already dealt with the overall case for the Bill at the beginning of the proceedings, so if I may take the clauses in turn: clause 1 simply deals with citation. 335 Clause 2 provides for a number of definitions that are applied elsewhere. In particular, I point out that the definition of “the Corporation” is in the same form that is used in various pieces of legislation—various private Acts. “Amenity” is defined, for the sake of clarity, to include visual appearance, but almost certainly would be taken to include that anyway. “Authorised officer” is defined in a way that is modelled on the definition in the London Local Authorities Act 2004, but is modified so that the authorised officer must be under the control of the Corporation, rather than merely acting under arrangements with the Corporation; so the intention is to provide extra assurance that the enforcement functions will not be, as it were, contracted out without the Corporation retaining proper control over their use. 336 Subsection (2) defines “open space”; that is to be read with clause 3. Subsection (3) deals with the fact that, technically speaking, when acting in relation to Epping Forest the Corporation is acting in its capacity as the conservators of Epping Forest. That is made clear. MARIE RIMMER: Sorry, I am profoundly deaf. I cannot hear you.

CHAIR: Whispering doesn’t help. Could you start again on subsection (3)?

337 JAMES CORNWELL: Subsection (3) deals with the fact that technically speaking, the Corporation when it is acting in respect of Epping Forest is acting in its capacity as conservators of Epping Forest. Clause 2(3) makes that clear. Clause 2(4) is simply declaratory of the fact that when the Corporation is acting in relation to an open space outside London, it is not acting in its capacity as a local authority. That does not change anything; it is simply declarative of the correct legal position. Unless there are any questions on clause 2, I will move on to clause 3.

338 CHAIR: Are there any questions from the panel on that point? No. 339 JAMES CORNWELL: Clause 3 deals with the application of the Act. Clause 3(1) defines the open spaces to which the Act applies: Epping Forest, Highgate Wood and Queen’s Park, Hampstead Heath, Ashtead Common and various other commons. It also identifies the relevant pieces of legislation under which the Corporation acts or under which the relevant land has been vested in the Corporation. As you will note, those are all outside the City of London. 340 Clause 3(2) deals with a more limited application of the Act to certain other open spaces—namely, Bunhill Fields, which is immediately next to the City but not actually in it, and any garden, ornamental ground or churchyard in the City of London that the Corporation manages for purposes of public recreation under the Open Spaces Act 1906 or any local enactment. Those are known as City gardens; [some of them]3 are not owned by the Corporation, but the Corporation manages them. In relation to those, more limited provisions of the Act apply—only sections 4(2), 6, 7, 8 and 10, dealing with leases, events, utilities and commercial activity. The more limited application is [in part]4 because the Corporation does not actually own these pieces of open space and is simply managing them. 341 I note that “garden, ornamental ground or churchyard” is considered the best definition to capture the open spaces within the City, and there are various statutory precedents for use of the term “ornamental ground or garden”. “Churchyard” is added because a number of the significant open spaces and City gardens are in fact churchyards—for example, St Paul’s churchyard. 342 In relation to those properties that are not vested in the Corporation and that are simply managed by it, various powers may only be exercised with the consent of the landowner and may not give a power to the Corporation to grant a lease or easement. That is simply reflective of the fact that it is not the owner of the land. Clause 3(4) extends the enforcement powers under the Act to the deer sanctuary adjacent to Epping Forest, which the Corporation does not hold or manage pursuant to statute. It simply owns and manages that as a private landowner. For that reason, the enforcement powers are applied through the Bill. 343 Moving on to clause 4, this is merely intended to declare that various statuses and rights are not intended to be affected by the Bill, and to preserve existing legal relationships and the relationship between specific management powers that the Corporation already has under existing legislation or at common law and its general duties, particularly in relation to preservation of the natural aspect of the open spaces. 344 Similarly, clause 4(2) declares that nothing in the Bill is intended to affect “any power of the Corporation other than under this Act” or to prevent “the operation of any private right in respect of an easement or covenant affecting an open space”. Again, it preserves existing rights. Subsection (2)(c) confirms that

3 Correction by Promoters. Words amended to correct factual error. This previously read “they are not owned by the Corporation…”

4 Correction by Promoters. Words added in to correct factual error.

nothing in the Bill is intended to affect planning powers under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, and so on. 345 I have gone fairly quickly though those introductory provisions and, if there are no questions, I will move on to the general powers and to the substance of the Act. 346 Clause 5 deals with land management and its intention is to set out an express statutory power relating to land management. Along with that statutory definition and the land management techniques that are currently used by the Corporation in the open spaces, there are a number of existing statute powers under, for example, the Epping Forest Act 1878 and the Corporation of London (Open Spaces) Act 1878, but they are quite limited in their strict interpretation. For example, they are confined to trees, pollards and underwoods and in other areas the Corporation must rely on implied power to act pursuant to its general duty of preservation of the open spaces or under its powers as a normal private landowner. There are also potential difficulties in relation to existing statutory powers and the Corporation’s duty to protect vegetation. That is why a more comprehensive and clear statement of those powers is set out under clause 5. 347 CHAIR: May I ask a question specifically about the grazing and management of the animals on the land? Does the Bill confer additional powers to the Corporation to intervene on those animals and are they owned by anyone? I am thinking about the comments about clause 3 and the deer sanctuary, and the potential damage to trees from deer. Will there be changes in the method of management of those animals? JAMES CORNWELL: Ask the man who might know—Mr Thomson.

348 PAUL THOMSON: The issue regarding the deer sanctuary, first and foremost, is that we maintain a sanctuary of 120 acres for a particular race of fallow deer that are common to the forest. We have a herd of very sooty-coated, melanistic fallow deer that we can trace all the way back to James I. They were a gift from the king of Denmark. The herd is kept within that sanctuary so the deer don’t damage the forest. I hope that clarifies that one. 349 On the issue of the grazing, the Bill does not confer any additional rights. It clarifies in law the advice we have already had. The difficulty is that the history of the forest is based on commoners exercising their right to graze cattle and pigs in the forest. On the whole they do not do that now. We sponsor graziers instead, but what we are seeking in this is permission to remove the excess material that is not grazed, and which technically belongs to the commoners. We have powers as the landowner to take what commoners don’t want. We felt it would be helpful to clarify that process, and particularly to speak to commoners once a year on a formal basis to understand whether they will seek to exercise their rights or not. When we are clear that they are not going to exercise their rights we will remove the excess material. 350 CHAIR: How are people identified as commoners? I do not know how that works. 351 PAUL THOMSON: It is not established in the Act, it is established in case law subsequent to the Act. There is the 1641 perambulation of the forest. Prior to maps, people did a written, walked description. Every commoner is taken

from inside that perambulation, which is now articulated on a map. If you own or occupy half an acre of land within the perambulation, you are a commoner of the forest. 352 CHAIR: And they have all been consulted on this point? 353 PAUL THOMSON: All the existing commoners that we are in contact with have. There is a wider hinterland of people we are not in contact with. We are taking steps to compile, effectively, a register of electors, as it were—a register of commoners. At the moment we have a formal list and we are in contact with all those individuals on the formal list. CHAIR: Thank you. I do not have any other questions.

354 JAMES CORNWELL: That is clause 5. Clause 6 is in relation to the letting of buildings. I think it has already been touched on by Ms Ireland in her evidence this morning. There are two essential purposes behind the provision, dealing with leases and licences. The first is to extend the length of time for which the leases of cafés and such like can be granted. At the moment, under the various existing powers, there are different times specified for the maximum period for a lease. Currently, they are generally limited to three years, which is being found to be insufficient to attract operators willing to come and invest in facilities in order to maintain standards. Obviously, they need to have a period in which they can recover the cost of any investment. The limited tenure is a particular problem in relation to small operators. It is proposed that the limit be extended to 15 years, or exceptionally, to 21 years. The definition of exceptional circumstances is set out in subsection (4). Again, it refers back to the necessity to secure investment. 355 The second purpose is to deal with the letting of buildings that have become surplus to requirements of the open spaces. As Ms Ireland stated this morning, there are properties that were built in order to house staff of the Corporation who worked on the land. That is increasingly no longer a model that is needed, and so lodges are potentially redundant. This is a provision to allow those to be leased to generate income that can then be used to provide further maintenance of the open spaces, subject to that not detracting from the public purposes for which the open spaces are to be kept. I should emphasise that these are merely powers. The Corporation does not have to grant leases of 15 years—or in exceptional cases 21 years—but it will have the power to do so if it considers it necessary in the particular case. It will still be permitted to grant leases of a shorter period. 356 Taking the provisions in a little more detail, clause 6(1) deals with lettings and clause 6(2) deals with redundant buildings. That is intended to allow for residential letting within the general constraints on alienation that apply to the land that has been vested in the Corporation, and also to deal with the fact that as a rule of general law, land cannot be used, where it has been acquired under statute, for a purpose that is not ancillary to or for the purposes for which it was obtained. 357 MARIE RIMMER: Are you saying that a building that is there now that is possibly being used for offices or something like that could be adapted for use as a residential property, or residential property could be built in its place?

358 JAMES CORNWELL: The primary purpose is to deal with residential property that is no longer needed, but I am not sure about— 359 PAUL THOMSON: We have a range of buildings and structures. For instance, at Epping Forest, we have 119 buildings spread across the forest. About 50 of those are residential dwellings, and we do not need all those 50 buildings to house staff now. They are based on the needs of forest keepers 120 years ago, when we did not have cars or whatever. There is an opportunity to raise income for the charitable trust by letting some of those residential dwellings, but we would also be looking to let some buildings for commercial purposes. 360 CHAIR: Is there any limitation to the scope of those commercial purposes? Perhaps this is going outside the scope of the petition. 361 JAMES CORNWELL: It is always subject to—if one looks at clause 6(2), “the Corporation may let the building to another person, or permit another person to occupy it, for the purpose of any use that will not cause material injury to the amenity of the open space.” There is that constraint. It cannot conflict with the fundamental purpose for which the open space is being held. 362 MARIE RIMMER: We could have restaurants in there, then. 363 JAMES CORNWELL: Yes, but restaurants are already specifically dealt with under (1). As Ms Ireland said this morning, there are already cafés at all the open spaces, and I think in relation to some, her evidence was that there are several cafés. 364 MARIE RIMMER: Does any of this conflict with them remaining there? 365 JAMES CORNWELL: No. 366 MARIE RIMMER: Are they let? 367 JAMES CORNWELL: Yes, they are all let. All it does in relation to cafés is extends the maximum period for which the Corporation can grant leases. It does not affect the existing leases that are in place. 368 PAUL THOMSON: If I may, Chair, it would also give the opportunity to provide additional facilities, such as cycle hire, stabling and livery. There is an opportunity to provide even more services to our visitors. 369 MARIE RIMMER: It is the character I’m interested in. 370 CHAIR: On the wording, that it will “not cause material injury to the amenity”—is the amenity the open space surrounding it or is the amenity the property itself? What would constitute a material injury to whatever “the amenity” is intended to mean? 371 JAMES CORNWELL: It is the amenity of the open space, which includes, as we have seen in clause 2, the visual appearance. What is material will obviously be a matter of judgment, ultimately—potentially planning judgment— for the local authority or planning inspector if there was a planning inquiry. 372 PAUL THOMSON: It is designed to stop us from giving noisy, industrial enterprise lettings and things like that. It has to be lettings that are going to be sympathetic to the open space and are not going to injure it. We are not going to have vehicle maintenance or construction or various activities like that going

on site. It is going to be complementary activities. 373 MARIE RIMMER: I recall Counsel saying that extension of the leases up to 15 years, or possibly 21 in exceptional circumstances, would be advantageous to small operators. It could be more advantageous to large operators. What I am particularly interested in—I will come straight to the front with this—is character. I think it is important that we retain character in these areas that the public enjoy. I have never been to any of these places, but I would hate to think the lovely little cafés and individual niches are spoiled by the introduction of masses of Neros and Costas and things like that. It is the character that I think is very, very important. Is there any detriment to those individual places being affected by this? 374 Café Nero and Costa have got a lot of money in their back pockets. I am sure they would love to get in there, and I have no objection to them getting in there, as long as the individuals can remain there. I am concerned that an individual—“Marie Rimmer Café”—after three years the lease is up, and I may not get that, because we are going to 15 years and you will attract the big ones. I want to have some way of not detracting from getting a fee to help the Corporation with their finances and management, but not losing character. Is there anything? Maybe it’s a discussion I should have later, Chair. 375 CHAIR: The reassurances probably need to come now. 376 PAUL THOMSON: I am happy to reassure the Committee that we are undertaking public consultations at the moment about the social value of the facilities, as well as their potential to provide refreshments. Certainly, many of our visitors favour local family arrangements for cafés and restaurants, where people know those individuals. That is something we are trying to take into account, in terms of the consultations. In terms of the length of the lease, it benefits neither sector—large commercial enterprises or smaller enterprises. It is to give people certainty around the investment they need to make. To give you an example of a refurbished café restaurant in Chingford recently, £80,000 was spent on a three-year lease. You will not see a return on £80,000 in three years. 377 MARIE RIMMER: I understand that. 378 PAUL THOMSON: We are all working co-operatively with the tenants to make sure they get a longer term. This arrangement would allow us to see tenants making greater investments in the properties and raising them up to a standard that they cannot afford to do on a three-year lease. 379 MARIE RIMMER: Do they have a tenancy right, the people on three years? 380 PAUL THOMSON: We have a mix. Many of the three-year licences are outside the Landlord and Tenant Act. Some of our longer leases are under the Landlord and Tenant Act. Clearly, that will be a discussion or negotiation on each individual letting. 381 JAMES CORNWELL: I should perhaps point you in particular to clauses 5 and 6, which require the Corporation to have regard to the desirability of ensuring that the service or facility to which a lease relates is provided to a satisfactory standard throughout the duration of the lease, and also the consultation requirement under clause 6(6): “Before granting a lease under

subsection (1), the Corporation must consult such persons or bodies as it thinks appropriate (which must include any committee or group established by statute for the purpose of consultation about the management of the open space).” So on the face of the statute it requires consultation before the power in relation to provision of service or facilities is exercised. 382 CHAIR: Is the clause saying that the Corporation must consult such persons or bodies as it thinks appropriate sufficient to protect against the over- commercialisation of park spaces? 383 SUE IRELAND: As I described earlier, we have this wide range of consultative committees and consultative groups, and we do consultation online. So there is a range of ways and techniques we use—we have workshops and things. What the superintendent was explaining also relates to the fact that we have actually set up working groups from that consultation process and used those working groups to help us through the process. So we do not just consult once and walk away; they are engaged in the whole process. So I would say I have never worked for an organisation in an open space situation that does consultation as thoroughly as we do. 384 The other thing, perhaps just to add to Marie’s request: I appreciate that you have not seen our spaces. The cafés are all of different characters. In Epping Forest some of them were originally teahouses where people would have come and spent their afternoon. Others are little units which are nothing much more than portakabins. At different times there have been different provisions in the forest and different communities like those different provisions. This not about stopping them; this is about enabling them to be more useful to the communities that they serve. 385 MARIE RIMMER: So it does not prevent them from maintaining that original character if they so wish. 386 SUE IRELAND: Absolutely. We might extend them, because the space needs to be bigger because of the number of people. 387 MARIE RIMMER: You have allayed my fears. 388 JAMES CORNWELL: Moving on to clause 7, this provides for an express power in relation to facilities for events. Again, this is really intended to give a clear legal basis for that which is already done by the Corporation under various statutory powers and indeed its common law powers as the landowner. The idea again is to strike a balance, allowing for events that are going to be useful and valuable to the community without undermining the underlying purpose for which the open spaces are held. 389 Subsection (1) defines what an event means. These are “a ceremony, celebration, entertainment or similar occasion; or…a conference,”—and here there is a small amendment: the word “an” should be inserted—“exhibition or the making of a film.” That definition is intended to encompass all the kinds of events that are currently carried out or which it is envisaged might appropriately be carried out. 390 CHAIR: There is no provision for any kind of sporting activities in there. 391 SUE IRELAND: Because we already do everything sporty, from—

392 CHAIR: It does not need to be specified within here at all, in terms of provision of facilities? 393 SUE IRELAND: We are already providing every form of sporting activity that there is, from cricket to swimming. 394 PAUL THOMSON: We feel that the sporting activities fall more clearly into the public recreation and enjoyment provision within the Act. Events are less certain, and that is why we have sought to clarify that. 395 SUE IRELAND: People want to get married in some of these lovely buildings. It is about wanting clarity on that. 396 JAMES CORNWELL: Subsection (2) provides for various things that the Corporation may do, pursuant to holding such events as defined. It permits the Corporation to temporarily use or permit others to use the land, as well as to make arrangements to provide equipment, facilities or services for the purposes of events. 397 Paragraph (c) states: “so far as appears to the Corporation to be necessary in connection with an event, restrict or authorise others to restrict access temporarily to an area of land forming part of the open space”. The purpose behind that is that there will be some events, such as a wedding or concert, where it would be necessary to exclude people who were not attending. Connected to that is paragraph (d). Again, there is an amendment here, so it now reads: “charge for permission or provision given or made under paragraph (a) or (b) or charge or authorise others to charge for admission to an area to which access is so restricted”. That allows for charging for attendance at events, so that such events can contribute financially to the upkeep of the open spaces in which they take place. 398 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: May I interrupt? There are some amendments in this Filled Bill, compared with the previous one. I think the clause on charges only related to paragraph (c) in the previous version, and now it relates to all three paragraphs—(a), (b) and (c). 399 JAMES CORNWELL: In its unamended form, it specifically related to paragraph (c), on the power to restrict access. But the intention was certainly always to allow for charging in relation to potentially all the activities under subsection (2). The amendment is simply intended to correct an omission. 400 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: It is a drafting error, basically. 401 JAMES CORNWELL: Yes, it was a drafting error. It is really a clarificatory amendment, rather than anything of substance. 402 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: Because that does effectively bestow new powers. 403 JAMES CORNWELL: They were arguably powers that already exist for the Corporation under common law as landowner. This is trying to bring out on the face of legislation in express form powers that arguably already exist and to make clear and put beyond doubt powers that we would say are already there, somewhere. 404 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: If they are powers that you have now—Sue Ireland said earlier that you are simply doing here what you do already—why is it necessary to put this in the Bill?

405 JAMES CORNWELL: There are two points. One is that because you have this patchwork of statutory powers arising from some fairly ancient legislation and mingling with common-law rights and powers that the Corporation has simply as landowner, the idea is to provide a clearer, easier-to-understand framework that deals expressly with the kinds of modern activity that are taking place and makes it clear that those powers apply and work with the kinds of things that you need to be doing in the modern world. 406 The idea is also to iron out potential inconsistencies between powers that arise under one of the statutes—the different areas are operated under a range of statutes. You have one in relation to Hampstead Heath. You also have Epping Forest and so on. It is so that you have consistency across all the Corporation’s open spaces. 407 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: So it is formalising. 408 JAMES CORNWELL: It is formalising, tidying up and providing transparency and consistency. 409 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: If we didn’t allow paragraphs (a) and b), what would be the effect on the Bill and your ability to raise revenue? 410 JAMES CORNWELL: We would then fall back on having to identify common-law powers or powers under the specific legislation that applies to specific open spaces. 411 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: So you would carry on as you are now, basically. 412 JAMES CORNWELL: We would carry on, but— 413 SUE IRELAND: It would help us in terms of dealing with members of the public. It would provide clarity so that we could say to them, “This is what you can do. This is what we can help you with. This is as far as we can go.” 414 CHAIR: May I ask why you chose to submit this as an amendment rather than a separate provision, given that it is quite a significant extension beyond the original Bill? 415 JAMES CORNWELL: The answer is that it was not really seen as an extension. It was seen as merely a further clarification of the powers—primarily common-law powers—that the Corporation already has. 416 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: I think that in clause 7(2)(c) and (d) there was the phrase “a restricted area”, and then the charges related to the restricted areas, not to the areas in paragraphs (a) and (b). That was probably just a clumsy bit of wording. 417 JAMES CORNWELL: Yes, it should have been— 418 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: So the provisions in the clause were all in there as they are now, with just the word “restrict” and then “restricted” in paragraph (d). 419 JAMES CORNWELL: It was always intended to be a provision that allowed for charging for holding events on the open spaces and the matters ancillary to that, such as provision of equipment, facilities and so on. 420 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: The Committee, though, may categorise it as a provision that bestows new powers on the Corporation, rather than another way

of doing this—using an additional procedure. 421 JAMES CORNWELL: Under its common-law powers, the Corporation could grant a licence to use part of an open space and levy a charge for that. As I have said, it was thought sensible to try to put that on a clearer basis. If someone asked, rather than having to poke around in common-law provisions and say, “We’re exercising our power as landowner,” there could be one straightforward answer based on legislation. 422 PAUL DOUBLE: If it is helpful, the linkage with clause 7(2) is intended to apply to subsection (3), which puts in place a consultative mechanism linked to a policy. The scheme is that you provide this as a package, and that is subject to a consultation requirement linked to a policy, so it rationalises the basis of the City’s exercise of these powers and links it to the existing consultative machinery, as Sue Ireland said, for these open spaces. 423 JULIAN KNIGHT: Who are you consulting with? 424 SUE IRELAND: The consultative networks that I was describing before. Hampstead Heath is formalised and constituted, and we are about to set one up for Epping, and we have got groups for Burnham Beeches and the commons— those are the groups and organisations. We also have a range of contacts that we communicate with on these consultations, so we would use all our network of consultation. We basically take it through the consultation committees and their views are then reported to the management committee for confirmation or not. Management committees listen very carefully to the views of the consultative committees. 425 JULIAN KNIGHT: And will you be consulting with them about what actual events will be chargeable? If we have these consultative committees—you said before that you wanted to provide greater clarity through this law. Are there many instances when members of the public are informed of a charge, as at present, when they say to you, “Do you have the right for this charge”, and so on? Is that a common question they ask? 426 SUE IRELAND: Yes. 427 PAUL THOMSON: It is a question that is asked from time to time. For instance, we have just had a very large fireworks display on one of our sites, which involved four or five days of setting up, and some people will challenge the temporary restriction on access. Why does it take four or five days? It is because there is a lot of organisation going into a large, public fireworks display, with all the infrastructure that is needed. So it is about explaining to people why there have to be temporary restrictions to enable support for events. 428 JULIAN KNIGHT: So it is not the people who are trying to hire the space. You are talking about the general public, effectively, who are saying, “Why is my park area closed for four or five days?” 429 PAUL THOMSON: Or part of my park—why is there a temporary restriction on part of the park? 430 JULIAN KNIGHT: So you therefore want to say, “Actually, it is due to this Act that we are allowed to do this”, rather than, “It’s just our decision.” 431 PAUL THOMSON: It is due to providing an entertainment, and it is giving

people a rationale about why that is being done. We will also have enquiries from people about whether they can hire parts of the forest or any one of our open spaces. Having a policy sitting behind this will set out clearly areas where, following consultation, it is appropriate to have entertainments and events, and areas where it will not be appropriate. 432 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: I think the difficulty—perhaps you can help with this—is not with what this is setting out to do; it is with what our ability is to act as a Committee. I am told that we can look at detailed amendments proposed by the promoters, provided that they would not have the effect of extending the powers set out in the Bill. The original Bill seemed quite clear that (d) only related to (c) and not to (a) and (b) in those subsections, which you subsequently changed. 433 JAMES CORNWELL: I think it goes back to the point I made, which was that ultimately this is not conferring any power on the Corporation that it does not already have; it is just providing a different and clearer basis for it. I accept that there is an amendment, but it is one that simply reflects the existing powers that the Corporation has, albeit largely under the common law as a landowner. I would say that it is not an amendment that is introducing a new power that the Corporation does not have. 434 KEVIN HOLLINRAKE: I accept that, but that is not the difficulty we have. 435 JAMES CORNWELL: I accept that. The reason the amendment has been put forward is so that it better aligns with the existing legal framework. 436 Before we move on from clause 7, it is perhaps worth pointing out subsection (4), which sets out the matters that the policy referred to needs to deal with. It deals with matters such as having regard to “the character and local environment of the open space” and the event not causing “material injury to the amenity of the open space or significant impairment to the public enjoyment of the open space” and “limiting the frequency and duration of events”. 437 Clause 8 deals with the grant of rights for utilities. The Corporation receives a number of requests from utilities to lay infrastructure, such as underground pipes and wires, through open spaces. Utility providers generally have compulsory powers to carry out works, even on land that does not belong to them. There is a question as to whether such powers can properly be exercised where the land in question, as in this case, is statutorily protected and held by another body under statute. 438 Generally, the Corporation has tried to take a voluntary approach and agree acceptable terms for the installation of infrastructure using its common- law powers as landowner. Those would typically involve provisions in relation to reinstatement and protection of the amenity, or indeed contribution to the running costs of the open space. 439 As I said, so far that has been done on the basis the Corporation’s rights as landowner, but again it has been thought preferable to put that on a statutory basis. That is why we have clause 8, giving express power to enter into agreements with utility providers, subject to an express legal duty to safeguard “the amenity of the open spaces”. It is hoped that that will avoid disputes with undertakers and allow for everybody to move forward in a productive way. That

is what clause 8 is intended to do. 440 CHAIR: The intention is for the Corporation to take all responsibility for the establishment of contracts with electricity providers, utilities, communications and so on, in order that work can be undertaken once it can be properly co-ordinated and the environment set right. Would the lessees of properties within the open spaces take on any responsibilities for those utilities? 441 JAMES CORNWELL: No, it is simply trying to put on a statutory basis the common-law powers that the Corporation has exercised in relation to its own land, allowing infrastructure to be placed, usually under it. 442 CHAIR: For them to say yes or no to an event organiser, for example? 443 JAMES CORNWELL: This would not be for an event organiser; this would be from utility providers, such as Transco in relation to gas or National Grid in relation to electricity. 444 CHAIR: I see. I was looking at it in the context of events or lettings of buildings, but no, it is to those bigger agencies. 445 JAMES CORNWELL: Yes. As I said, they often have statutory compulsory powers they can exercise against landowners if they wish to and those can be subject to appeal and compensation and so on. The Corporation is trying to deal with matters in a reasonable way, by agreement, using its powers as landowner. This makes it clear that it has that power to enter into such agreements, but it also makes it clear that that has to be exercised to ensure that the terms and conditions necessary to avoid material injury to the amenity are imposed on any such agreement. So it puts that protection of the amenity of the open spaces in place on an express statutory basis when entering into such agreements. 446 CHAIR: Is that necessary? 447 JAMES CORNWELL: We would say it is because there is a debatable issue about the extent to which compulsory powers can be used by utility undertakings in relation to land that is protected under other legislation. That is the case with these open spaces. Rather than reaching a point where that has to be tested, this is trying to provide a clear statutory basis for the Corporation to try to avoid such disputes by reaching an agreed position. If there is no agreement, ultimately the utility companies could seek to exercise their compulsory powers. 448 CHAIR: It does not put the Corporation in an unnecessary position of potential conflict with those companies? 449 JAMES CORNWELL: No. It provides a clearer basis so that the Corporation can clearly point to the powers it is exercising vis-à-vis the undertaking, if the undertaking question is there. If third parties say, “How have you got power to allow this power cable to be laid?”, the Corporation can say, “It is section 8 of the 2016 Act”, or whenever this is passed. 450 PAUL THOMSON: I think it will help us. At the moment, we often get into quite difficult situations where power companies are obliged to use their compulsory powers to gain access. It will be more helpful to us to be able to offer, within the context of the protected environment of the Act, a statutory power so that we can accept their infrastructure in our ground on terms that are

reasonable and considerate to both parties. It is going to be very helpful: it will reduce conflict and, most importantly, get those services to the surrounding communities that our open space serves. 451 CHAIR: Could you give me an example of that, just to help me understand? 452 SUE IRELAND: Thames Water? 453 PAUL THOMSON: Yes, we had a very large desalination pipeline that was a large east London project serving Beckton, and it involved digging new sewers all the way through London. Epping Forest was a relatively cheap dig compared with digging up roads, so we were happy with that work. However, it involved considerable disruption over a period of 18 months and we had to oblige the water authority to serve us with compulsory powers when we would have been happy to negotiate with them to accept that. Because it was such a large-scale project, our management committee felt that was the only way forward when we did not have clear power to offer access to our land. Again, it had some concomitant issues because public access to some areas of the public open space was restricted for some time. A clear way of doing this and doing business with the utility companies would be a sensible way forward for all concerned. 454 JAMES CORNWELL: Moving on to clause 9, that in a sense has a similar purpose in relation to highways, and again is to provide a formal basis for co- operation with local authorities about roads in the vicinity of open spaces. This is a particular issue in relation to Epping Forest, which because of its size is criss- crossed by a number of major and minor highways. Clause 9 allows the Corporation to “enter into an agreement with a highway authority or traffic authority about the exercise of their respective functions as they relate to an open space,” and provides for various matters that such an agreement can deal with. It could, for example, be an agreement to install speed bumps on a road across an open space or provide bus stops on the edge of an open space to allow people to access the open space. 455 I should say that there is statutory precedent for the various matters that are referred to in clause 9(2). There is also provision for an agreement to deal with the restriction or regulation of traffic and dedication to the public of roads or paths. Again, this is a power in relation to which the Corporation would have to “have regard to the amenity” of the open spaces and the interests of those using them, and indeed the “interests of inhabitants of the locality…and other persons using the highways in that locality.” The clause provides a clear statutory basis for co-operation and sets out mandatory matters that the Corporation must have regard to. 456 Unless there is anything else on clauses 8 and 9, I will move on to clause 10. This provides for a licensing scheme for the purposes of controlling activities in an open space where those are carried on for gain. The principal examples of such activities that the Corporation is currently aware of include professional dog walkers and fitness trainers who, as it were, set up camp and provide fitness training to people on an open space. There is no objection in principle to such activities taking place, subject to two important points. One is that such activities should not take place to too great an extent or without due consideration of other users, in such a way that they give rise to nuisance and annoyance. An example might be a professional dog walker who is simply

walking too many dogs to be able to control them properly. The other is that it is appropriate that those making use of a public resource such as an open space for profit should make some contribution to the running costs of the open space. 457 Clause 10 provides for a power to set up a licensing scheme. An activity would be specified under the licensing scheme. “Where an activity is specified…the Corporation may grant a licence for the carrying on of that activity,” and a person “who, without reasonable excuse, carries on a specified activity without a licence…or in contravention of the terms…of such a licence” would commit an offence and be “liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 2 on the standard scale,” which is £500. 458 The details of what has to go into such a scheme are set out in the Schedule to the Bill. They include matters such as “the date on which the scheme takes effect”; “the activities to which it applies”; “the terms and conditions to which a licence for each specified activity is subject”, and any fees; making provision for variation and revocation of the licensing scheme; and consultation. Before the licensing scheme is imposed, varied or revoked, “the Corporation must consult such persons or bodies as it thinks appropriate”. 459 The Corporation is given the power to charge an applicant for a licence a fee “sufficient to cover the reasonable administrative costs incurred in connection with such applications” and to “charge such fee for a licence as the Corporation considers is an appropriate contribution towards the costs incurred by the Corporation in connection with the open space.” The intention is for it to be self-financing—the licence covers its own costs—and for it to make some contribution towards the second of the purposes that I identified: i.e. the upkeep of the open spaces. 460 There is provision as to the information that must be provided to the Corporation, and as to grounds for refusal of a licence if a person is not considered a “fit and proper person” or if the activity would cause annoyance, restrict access or materially injure the amenity of the open space. Again, that goes to the first of the purposes—protection of the open spaces and avoiding annoyance and inconvenience to other users. 461 There is provision for the licence to be subject to such terms and conditions as are specified; for a power to revoke the licence for breach; and for a power to seek a review, by a committee of the Corporation, in a case where a licence application has been refused or a licence has been revoked. 462 CHAIR: Can I interrupt your line of thought? Is there already facility for a fine to be imposed, as is provided for in clause 10(4)? Does the Corporation already have that power? 463 JAMES CORNWELL: No, that is new. 464 CHAIR: It would be introducing an entirely new power to the Corporation. 465 PAUL THOMSON: We have partial powers under existing byelaws for very specific commercial activity, such as plying for trade with donkeys, or commercial photography; but we do not have that enshrined as a general understanding of commercial activity. So we have some powers already, within the byelaws, but we cannot— 466 CHAIR: You have a power to fine.

467 PAUL THOMSON: We can, yes; there is a fine on level 1 at the moment. 468 CHAIR: What is level 1? 469 PAUL THOMSON: It is £200. 470 JAMES CORNWELL: I should point out that the default position is that the person does not have a right, strictly speaking, to access open spaces for the purpose of carrying out commercial activity, in any event; so someone who is accessing open space to carry out commercial activity for profit is in theory acting as a trespasser and, in theory, the Corporation could enforce against the person as a trespasser. That is the starting point. The provision is putting the access for such commercial purposes on, as it were, a regularised footing. 471 CHAIR: So say I set up my own business as a keep-fit guru—imagine that, if you will—and I decide to use the park facilities, generate a group of interested parties and use the beautiful surroundings of Epping Forest, which seems to be our go-to place, for all the health and mental wellbeing assets which come with that. I charge £7 per person for an hour of my exercise wisdom. Currently, that is something the Corporation could fine me for, as a trespasser undertaking a commercial activity. 472 JAMES CORNWELL: We could not fine, but technically we could get an injunction against you to get you to desist. 473 CHAIR: Would that ever be an intention of the Corporation? 474 SUE IRELAND: The only times we have had issues in that sense is where—it would not just be you as an individual. The example I am thinking of at the moment is Hampstead Heath, where we have had a lot of commercial dog walkers because other sites have banned or stopped them. They can potentially become a nuisance to the users, because there are just too many of them. It is about trying to allow an appropriate level that does not spoil the site for other users. 475 PAUL THOMSON: There are two things. Certainly we would like to make income, and at £7 an hour you would be a very cheap fitness guru. CHAIR: I have thousands of followers.

476 PAUL THOMSON: We might have a problem with that. Fundamentally, wanting to take some share of the profit is interesting, but more important for us is being able to license the activity. Some boot camps now want to bring tractor tyres, sledgehammers and all sorts of things on to the site as aids, and they are subtly changing the environment as a result. The ability to license that sort of activity would be an important part of our continuing management and regulation of the open space. 477 CHAIR: Is it anticipated that a cost will be associated with the licensing? 478 SUE IRELAND: Yes. 479 CHAIR: And the fee is likely to be determined by the Corporation. 480 JAMES CORNWELL: Yes, the fee would be determined by the Corporation and set out in the licensing scheme. 481 CHAIR: We do not have that before us.

482 JAMES CORNWELL: That would be made under the powers in section 10 and the schedule. 483 MARIE RIMMER: Local authorities—or at least some of the ones that I was in—manage open spaces, and we did it under licences. Why are we going a different way? Why is the Corporation not following what local authorities do in managing their open spaces? Why are you choosing to go this way? 484 SUE IRELAND: Because we were started with different legislation. We have the Epping Forest Act and the Hampstead Heath Act. Each of our sites has its own legislation, which is therefore different, so we want one that covers the lot. 3.18 pm

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

3.33 pm

On resuming—

485 CHAIR: Counsel for the Promoter, would you like to continue? I am intent on getting this matter concluded by 5 o’clock with consideration by the panel. If we could all bear that in mind in our contributions, I would be grateful. 486 JAMES CORNWELL: Yes. I will pick up at clause 11. This would give the Corporation a power to impose fixed-penalty notices where an officer has reason to believe that the person has committed one of a variety of offences in an open space. Those offences are: breach of a byelaw; breach of section 10(4) of this Act in relation to a licensing scheme; breaches of horse riding and access restrictions in Epping Forest, and littering offences. 487 The key point about fixed-penalty notices is that they afford an opportunity for a person to make a payment without being prosecuted. If they dispute the allegation made or if, for any other reason, do not wish to make the payment, they do not have to but then the Corporation may proceed with a prosecution. But where there is essentially no dispute, it allows both parties to resolve the matter without the time and costs of going to the magistrates’ court. It is aimed at low-level offending, and is intended to further the Corporation’s ability to be custodian of the open spaces. It is one of the more modern enforcement tools that have become available in recent times. 488 The corporation is best placed to deal with these minor matters because its officers will be present in the open spaces, and it allows such things to be dealt with without involving the police or local authorities. The maximum amount of the fixed-penalty notice would be a specified amount. It would be prescribed by the Corporation, but cannot exceed £100. We see that in subsection (7)(b). 489 In considering this power, it should be remembered that the Corporation already has the power to make and enforce byelaws, if necessary, through prosecution in the magistrates’ court. It also has the power to appoint constables in relation to officers with constabulary power and, indeed, it now has the power to make public spaces protection orders. This is a further measure to deal with low-level antisocial behaviour and offending, and would fit in well with the Corporation’s existing powers.

490 We have already dealt with clause 12 this morning. Clause 13 deals with something of an anomaly in that there is a gap in the Corporation’s enforcement armoury because, in theory, byelaw offenders can refuse to give their name and address to the Corporation’s officers, which obstructs the Corporation in its ability to enforce without involving the police. 491 Clause 13 would deal with that gap, and give a power to require a name and address to be provided where an authorised officer has reason to believe that a person has committed an offence in an open space with a view to doing one of various things: serving a summons; issuing a fixed-penalty notice; or issuing a community protection notice. A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to provide that information will have committed a criminal offence and be liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. 492 CHAIR: What is level 3 on the standard scale? 493 JAMES CORNWELL: £1,000. 494 CHAIR: So simply for failing to provide your name and address, a fine of £1,000 could be imposed by the Corporation. 495 JAMES CORNWELL: Up to £1,000. That would be a matter for the magistrates’ court. 496 CHAIR: Will somebody of no fixed abode find themselves caught by that? 497 JAMES CORNWELL: Presumably they would state the fact that they have no fixed abode, or they would have a reasonable excuse for not providing that information in that they do not have an address. Either way, they should escape liability. One cannot provide an address that one does not have. 498 Moving on, clause 14 is one of those provisions that is intended to give express statutory effect to the powers that the Corporation already has under common law, but which are somewhat uncertain in nature. It deals with the removal and disposal of unauthorised items that have been abandoned in open spaces. Currently, the Corporation has to exercise its powers as a landlord to remove such items, but is then subject to common law duties of bailment in relation to the storage of such items. 499 Such duties are potentially somewhat unclear, so the intention here is to give an express statutory power to remove items, to keep them for a period of 14 days to allow the owner to retrieve them, and then for the Corporation to have the power to dispose of them in such manner as it sees fit. A particular problem that is being addressed here is abandoned cars, which are obviously unsightly and, indeed, potentially dangerous. That is clause 14. It is obviously directed at maintaining the amenity of the open spaces. Clause 15 is a technical clause. Two of the open spaces—Ashtead Common and Stoke Common—are ones that the Corporation had not acquired when the powers under the City of London (Various Powers) Act 1977 came into force, and it extends those powers to those two open spaces. They relate to the provision of facilities for the public in open spaces. 500 The final clause, clause 16, deals with the power of the Corporation to appear in court, through an officer, to prosecute or defend or to appear in proceedings. There is a power for local authorities, under section 223 of the Local Government Act 1972, to appear in legal proceedings through an officer.

This provision would create a similar power, and would deem that power to apply where the Corporation is acting other than in its local authority capacity. In principle, the authority, when it appears in court, has to appear through counsel. That is the general rule in the absence of statutory powers. This power would address that gap. Just to conclude, it has been pointed out that we have had no Government Department reports objecting to, or raising any comments on, any of the unopposed clauses. That concludes the Promoter’s case on the unopposed clauses. 501 CHAIR: Thank you. Do members of the Committee have any questions they would like to put? No? Order. The Committee will now go into private session to consider the case it has heard regarding the remainder of the Bill. Please will the parties and members of the public withdraw? 3.43 pm

The Committee deliberated in private.

4.54 pm

On resuming—

502 CHAIR: Order. I can announce that the Committee has decided to agree the Filled Bill and the manuscript amendments contained within it, with the exception of clause 12, as discussed previously, and any consequential amendments. 503 Before we conclude proceedings today, I invite the promoters to formally prove the preamble. 504 JAMES CORNWELL: Are you Paul Double? 505 PAUL DOUBLE: I am. 506 JAMES CORNWELL: Are you the Remembrancer of the City of London Corporation? 507 PAUL DOUBLE: I am. 508 JAMES CORNWELL: Have you read the preamble to the Bill? 509 PAUL DOUBLE: I have. 510 JAMES CORNWELL: Is it true? 511 PAUL DOUBLE: It is. 512 CHAIR: Thank you all very much for your attendance today. I thank the witnesses for answering our questions so fully. The work of the Committee has now been concluded and the Committee will adjourn. 4.55 pm

Committee rose.