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Khobar Towers' Aftermath: the Development of Force Protection

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Khobar Towers' Aftermath: the Development of Force Protection Khobar Towers’ Aftermath: The Development of Force Protection Major Thomas W. Murrey, Jr. In the past twenty years, terrorist attacks claimed the lives of over 300 Department of Defense- affiliated personnel.2 However, the recent high-priority emphasis on force protection did not occur until after the 1995 and 1996 terrorist attacks against American military forces in Saudi Arabia. On 13 November 1995, a car bomb exploded near the Riyadh headquarters of the Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM/SANG), killing five Americans and injuring thirty-five others.3 Less than eight months later, on June 25, 1996, terrorists conducted a more devastating attack on United States Air Force personnel living in the Khobar Towers4 complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. A fuel truck loaded with 20,000 pounds of explosives killed nineteen Air Force members and wounded hundreds of others.5 Afterwards, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry declared that "the Khobar Towers attack should be seen as a watershed event pointing the way to a radically new mind-set and dramatic changes in the way we protect our forces deployed overseas from this growing threat."6 This "watershed event" has led to a number of new developments in how the military exercises its force protection responsibilities. Although there is almost no new statutory authority regarding force protection, numerous new agreements, directives, and instructions have been either completed or revised. Because the greatest force protection emphasis is placed on protecting troops when they are in foreign countries, this article will address the legal aspects of force protection for Department of Defense personnel located overseas. BACKGROUND Prior to the Khobar Towers bombing, military members rarely heard the words "force protection". "Anti-terrorism" was the expression used to describe the measures taken to prevent terrorist attacks. After Khobar Towers, the term "force protection" became familiar to every military member located overseas. In every operational mission that takes place today, force protection is an overriding concern that often dictates how the mission is performed, where military personnel live, and how military personnel conduct themselves on and off duty. Force protection is not a synonym for "anti-terrorism". Instead, force protection is a larger effort designed to provide comprehensive security for military members, with "anti-terrorism" being a subset of force protection.7 The Department of Defense definition of force protection is: "the security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism (antiterrorism and counterterrorism), physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs."8 The most important phrase in this definition is "the security program designed to protect." The very first issue in establishing a force protection program is determining who is responsible for establishing and administering this "security program designed to protect". For personnel located overseas, the responsibility belongs to either the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of State The Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act of 1986 directs the Secretary of State to develop and implement policies and programs to provide for the security of United States Government operations of a diplomatic nature, to include the protection of all government personnel on official duty abroad.9 Although the term "all government personnel" can include military personnel, the statute goes on to specifically exclude "personnel under the command of a United States area military commander".10 The "area military commander" refers to the combatant commanders of the combatant or unified commands.11 Because these commanders are assigned a geographically specific "area of responsibility" (AOR), they are also referred to as "geographic commanders" or "geographic CINCs".12 However, this does not mean that the "geographic CINC" is responsible for all military personnel stationed in a foreign country. Numerous Department of Defense personnel located or operating in foreign countries are not "under the command of a United States area military commander". According to 22 U.S.C. 4802, the Secretary of State has the force protection responsibility for these individuals, not the area military commander. These personnel are often assigned to a United States embassy in organizations such as the Marine Security Guard Detachment, Defense Attaché Office or the Office of Defense Cooperation. The Secretary of State does not have to perform this force protection mission by himself. Through the use of inter-agency agreements, other federal agencies must support the Secretary of State, to the maximum extent possible, in his effort to protect United States government personnel.13 However, the Secretary of State may agree to delegate operational control of his security and protection responsibilities of other federal agencies to the heads of those federal agencies.14 In a foreign country, the chief of mission15 acts on behalf of the Secretary of State for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees.16 Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Defense is responsible for establishing Department of Defense (DoD) policies and assigning responsibilities for implementing the DoD Force Protection Program.17 From the Secretary of Defense, various specific responsibilities flow down through the Under Secretaries of Defense, the Secretaries of the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and eventually reach the geographic CINCs.18 For DoD personnel overseas, the geographic CINC is the most important link in the DoD force protection chain. As mentioned above, the geographic CINC has the force protection responsibility for all personnel under his command.19 Although the Secretary of Defense remains at the top of the responsibility pyramid, DoD policy is that force protection is the responsibility of anyone in a command position.20 For personnel overseas, the geographic CINC is responsible for the success or failure of the force protection program. Ensuing Confusion For force protection purposes, the applicable statute recognizes two categories of Department of Defense personnel stationed overseas: those who are the responsibility of the chief of mission and those who are the responsibility of the geographic CINC. The geographic CINC has force protection responsibility for DoD personnel directly under his command and the chief of mission is responsible for everyone else, with the proviso that the Secretary of State may agree to delegate force protection responsibility to the Secretary of Defense.21 As simple as the arrangement sounds, there were several problems with this approach. In some countries, there were disputes between the Department of State and the Department of Defense over who had force protection responsibilities for certain Department of Defense organizations. In the case of some countries, no one had a list of all the Department of Defense organizations actually stationed within the country,22 making it difficult to identify who had force protection responsibility for whom. In Spain, the American Embassy’s "1995 Annual Report of DoD Elements Under COM Authority" listed a total of sixty DoD military and civilian personnel who were the force protection responsibility of the chief of mission.23 The American Embassy in Madrid conducted a recount, this time counting all DoD personnel who were not under the command of the "area military commander", or geographic CINC. By using the correct counting method, the number of DoD personnel for whom the chief of mission had force protection responsibility rose from what was originally thought to be sixty to 962.24 A Secretary of State message to all diplomatic and consular posts addressed this confusion.25 The message stated that because the Secretary of State, and by extension the chief of mission, "has ultimate responsibility for the protection of all United States government employees who are not clearly repeat clearly the authority of an area military commander, it is crucial that you be completely familiar with the situation in your country of assignment."26 After Khobar Towers, the need to address these issues in a new Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of State and the Department of Defense became obvious. The first step was a Memorandum of Understanding on the security of DoD elements and personnel on the Arabian Peninsula. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense signed this agreement on September 15, 1996, less than three months after the attack on Khobar Towers.27 The second step was a universal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Department of State and the Department of Defense, signed on December 16, 1997.28 THE MOU FOR THE ARABIAN PENINSULA One of the findings of the Downing Commission29 was that the current division of responsibility for force protection in the 1992 Department of State and the Department of Defense Memorandum of Understanding did not adequately support American forces in countries with a large American military presence.30 In the case of Saudi Arabia, some forces fell into a "seam", where neither the chief of mission nor the geographic CINC exercised force
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