The French Presidency of the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean: Forced Europeanisation? a M A
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The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership The French Presidency of the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean: Forced Europeanisation? a m a Eduard Soler i Lecha This article will examine France’s return to the fore- r o Mediterranean and Middle East Programme Coordinator n front of Mediterranean policy and will argue that the a CIDOB Foundation, Barcelona ‘forced Europeanisation’ of the French initiative must P be understood in the context of Franco-German ten- France assumed the Presidency of the EU in the sec- sions. It will then highlight the outcome of the two ond semester of 2008, promising to galvanise Euro- major Mediterranean events that took place during Mediterranean relations. Within the framework of a the French Presidency: the Paris summit in July and 9 0 0 presidency that made energy, the environment, immi- the Marseilles ministerial meeting in November. Finally, 2 . d gration, agriculture, security and defence its top con- and by way of conclusion, it will seek to define the e M cerns, three priorities were set in the sphere of the legacy of the French Presidency and identify which Mediterranean: the launching of the Union for the aspects will continue to shape the course of Euro- Mediterranean (UfM), the advanced status of Morocco Mediterranean relations in years to come. and the strengthening of relations with Israel, taking into account the evolution of the conflict in the Middle 1 6 East. Rediscovering the Mediterranean 1 Of all of these points, the one to generate most atten- tion was the launching of the UfM. The previous year, France is unquestionably a major power in the Med- in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy had proposed the creation iterranean. Geographical proximity, history —in some of a Mediterranean Union, which stirred both inter- cases, such as Algeria, painful—, population flows est and unease in different capitals on both shores and all manner of economic interests make France a of the Mediterranean. One of the main criticisms key actor in the region and, in particular, in the Western levied against Sarkozy’s initial proposal was that it Basin. This notwithstanding, as Hayète Cherigui has strayed from the idea of a common European noted in his work on France’s Mediterranean policy, approach, encouraging the renationalisation of Med- the formulation of a Mediterranean policy worthy of iterranean policy instead. This was particularly wor- the name, one that goes beyond traditional Arab risome coming from a country that would soon assume policy and stresses the creation of initiatives for region- the rotating Presidency of the EU Council. Would al cooperation, is relatively recent and can be traced Mediterranean policy be a harbinger of a weakened back to the nineties. commitment by France to the need for the EU to Since then, France has been a member of the ‘Medit- act with a single voice on the international stage? erranean lobby’ within the EU, calling for more atten- Euro-Mediterranean relations were not the only tion to the region, with special emphasis on the need sphere where France, in its role as President, faced to strengthen political dialogue, preserve the Partner- the challenge of staking out a common position for ship logic and engage in ambitious cooperation in the EU-27. For instance, its presidency began with the spheres of justice and home affairs. Of course, one crisis in the neighbourhood of the EU (the it has had to share its leadership with other Medit- Russian-Georgian war) and ended with another (the erranean countries (in particular, Spain), with non- Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip). In the search Mediterranean countries that are increasingly inter- for consensus, alliances with the EU’s largest coun- ested in what is going on in the region (above all, tries play an especially important role. Germany, but also Nordic countries, such as Sweden and Finland) and with the European Commission As Dorothé Schmid has correctly noted, the hackles (which has played a dominant role in driving and raised by Sarkozy’s initial proposal show that France developing the Barcelona Process). Its inability to may remain a major player in the Mediterranean, but impose its hegemony, as well as the disappoint- it can no longer act alone. Indeed, it was precisely ment stemming from the poor results of the Euro- this desire to act alone that gave rise to Germany’s Mediterranean Conference in Marseilles in 2000, misgivings. This apprehension was further compound- have, until recently, prevented France from becom- ed by the fact that this lukewarm attitude toward ing more involved in the Mediterranean agenda. Europe was hardly new and was moreover being pro- In full campaign mode, the then-candidate Nicolas jected just prior to France’s assumption of the EU Sarkozy gave his famous Toulon speech in February Presidency. Would France choose to use its presi- 2007. Three months later he repeated his pledge to dency to benefit its own national interest? How would a implement what was then called the Mediterranean such an attitude affect the health of the Franco-German m a r Union in his speech celebrating the results of the axis? o n a elections. This renewed interest in Mediterranean Despite occasionally divergent interests and regard- P issues was not a mere pet project of Sarkozy’s. Among less of the political stripes of their leaders, Berlin his closest advisors (such as Henri Guaino), but and Paris have, for decades, tended to promote also in several French academic and economic cir- major decisions at the European level jointly in what cles, there was a consensus, on the one hand, that is known as the ‘Franco-German axis’. Sarkozy’s 9 neither France nor Europe could afford to ignore their proposal for a Mediterranean Union entailed a break 0 0 2 neighbours to the south and, on the other, that France with this tradition: not only was there no coordina- . d e should be leading the effort. tion with Germany, but that country was moreover M The French rediscovery of the Mediterranean awoke excluded from an initiative that seemed to embrace interest and expectations, as well as a certain appre- a logic based on spheres of influence. Were the hension, among its European and Mediterranean part- sponsors aware of the effects of this decision? ners. For actors such as Spain or the Commission, According to Sylvie Goulard, it is troubling whether 2 this was due to the extent to which the initiative was it was simply a poor calculation or an intentional 6 1 seen as an attack on the Barcelona Process and as break. undermining their leadership in the field. For many Whatever the case, the German government, led central and northern European countries, it was by Chancellor Merkel, repeatedly expressed its dis- because the initial proposal excluded them from the satisfaction. After months of increasingly frosty rela- new design. For Turkey, it was because the propos- tions between Merkel and Sarkozy, on 3 March 2008, al was presented as an alternative to accession. Finally, they reached a compromise whereby Germany would for some Arab countries, it was because they viewed support the launching of the Union for the Medit- France’s return to the Mediterranean as an attempt erranean (with the innovations it entailed), but with- to re-establish its hegemony. in the framework of the Barcelona Process. The so-called ‘Hannover compromise’ paved the way for the recovery of the Franco-German motor and the The Mediterranean and re-Europeanisation of a controversial initiative. the Franco-German Axis The concerns that surfaced on both sides of the The Results of the Paris Summit Mediterranean soon became varying degrees of pres- and Marseilles Ministerial Conference sure to modify the French proposal to make it accept- able. In 2007, Spain and Italy ensured that what Seven Euro-Mediterranean meetings were held dur- would henceforth be known as the Union for the ing the French Presidency. Two of them deserve spe- Mediterranean would not contradict but rather would cial attention due to their importance in defining the complement the Barcelona Process, that it would future of the UfM: the Paris summit and the Foreign not be tied to Turkey’s accession process and that Affairs ministerial meeting in Marseilles. In addition the Commission would be involved. However, it to these meetings, ministerial meetings were also was German pressure that ultimately brought about held on trade, industry, employment, health and water. a more acute restructuring of the proposal in 2008. In other words, although attention was centred on defining the structure of the UfM, activities contin- the role of the Arab League, prevented further progress ued to be conducted under the Barcelona Process. in the months between Paris and Marseilles. Just a few days after assuming the Presidency of the Council, France hosted the Summit for the Mediterranean. On 13 July, the leaders of the coun- The Marseilles Declaration tries of the EU and of the southern and eastern was a veritable balancing act Mediterranean countries, as well as observers from and exercise in ambiguity that several multilateral organisations, met in Paris. The summit served as the starting gun for the UfM and substantially affected the issue was viewed by analysts and commentators as a major of the Secretariat diplomatic success, the result of the intense and ongoing involvement of the French president at the a m a meeting. The agenda for the ministerial meeting in Marseilles, r o n This involvement not only translated into a very high held on 3 and 4 November, was packed. A solution a level of attendance and representation, but also a had to be sought to the issue of the Arab League’s P series of bilateral encounters facilitated by the sum- participation, the headquarters and structure of the mit, such as those held between the Presidents of new permanent Secretariat had to be chosen and Lebanon and Syria or between Ehud Olmert and additional details had to be provided on how the UfM Mahmud Abbas or the talks between Syrians and would operate.