A Perfectionist Defense of Free Speech

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A Perfectionist Defense of Free Speech A PERFECTIONIST DEFENSE OF FREE SPEECH Jonathan K. Miles A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy December 2009 Committee: Daniel Jacobson, Advisor David Jackson, Graduate Faculty Representative Fred D. Miller Jr. Steven P. Wall Ellen F. Paul © 2009 Jonathan Miles All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Daniel Jacobson, Advisor This dissertation presents a perfectionist argument for viewpoint neutral free speech. It is argued that developed states ought to maintain or adopt the Viewpoint Neutral Principle: As a matter of public morality, any public institution is disqualified from intentionally aiming to hinder the expression of any viewpoint by suppression except for purposes of temporary censorship to prevent clear, present, and imminent danger. This principle allows for regulation but does not allow for censorship due to objectionable viewpoints. After demonstrating how the standard justifications for free speech are not sufficient for the viewpoint neutral principle, I construct a Millian self-development argument drawing from the oft neglected justification of freedom of speech in On Liberty. Mill argues that a person is not deserving of confidence in his opinion unless he has engaged in certain practices of justification for his own opinions. These practices are the only way to acquire the intellectual virtue of justified belief-forming, and censorship undermines these practices. Furthermore, the intellectual virtue of justified belief forming informs moral virtues which include dispositions to express praise or blame. Censorship can undermine and, in some cases, make impossible the practices of justification. If the state engages in viewpoint specific censorship of public speech, it undermines the individual pursuit of justified opinion to the extent that it hinders critical reflections, adjustment, and exposition of opinions. After explicating the argument itself, I apply the justified opinion argument to one contemporary example. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under the auspices of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations has passed articles 7/19 and 7/20. These resolutions violate the viewpoint neutral principle. It is argued that developed nations should reject these resolutions in order to preserve (among other things) intellectual virtue. iv If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. Justice Robert H. Jackson, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette v DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated to the countless Chinese Christians who have been imprisoned or killed for the crime of sharing ideas. It is also dedicated to the thousands driven from their homes in the Orissa region of India for defying the national religion. …και επλυναν τας στολας αυτων και ελευκαναν αυτας εν τω αιματι του αρνιου vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank the members of my committee for their instruction and wisdom. I especially want to thank Dan Jacobson for directing this new argument by instilling in me a love for the classical arguments of Mill. My thanks also go to Fred D. Miller for deepening my respect for Aristotle and for teaching me how to imitate good writers. Steve Wall nurtured my peculiar perfectionist bent. Ellen Paul deserves thanks for hours of discussion about the law and first amendment jurisprudence. I have benefitted from countless conversations and critiques by Fred Miller’s dissertation group. Virtually everyone in the Bowling Green Philosophy Department has suffered through some fragment or another of my argument. Special thanks go to Leanne Kent, Corwin Carr, Ben Dyer, Noah Levin, Kari Dyer, Terrence Watson, and Peter Jaworski. They not only listened to but challenged every premise. The argument is better for their generosity. The mistakes are all mine. Special thanks also goes to Jan Narveson for patiently arguing the general rights strategy with me. I must also thank two organizations for funding my graduate education. Without the Humane Studies Fellowship from the Institute for Humane Studies and the Earhart Fellowship from the Earhart Foundation, this project would never have been completed in a timely manner. Special thanks go to Ben Dyer for formatting wizardry and Microsoft alchemy. Finally I could not have done any of this without my wife, Stacie Botsay Miles. It was once said that Ginger Rogers could do everything Fred Astaire could do, only backwards and in high heels. Stacie has struggled through the ups and downs of this project as much as I have only she did it while giving birth and then raising a toddler. She is more precious than jewels, the heart of her husband trusts her, and her children will call her blessed. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................................................................iii DEDICATION .................................................................................................................................................v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..........................................................................................................................vi TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................................vii CHAPTER 1 EXPRESSION, RIGHTS, AND THE PUBLIC SQUARE.............................................1 1.1 Philosophical Questions of Free Speech.............................................................................................1 1.2 Expression in the Public Square...........................................................................................................4 1.3 Viewpoint Neutrality ..............................................................................................................................9 1.4 The General Rights Strategy................................................................................................................12 Conclusion....................................................................................................................................................26 CHAPTER 2 SPECIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY...........................28 2.1 The Viewpoint Neutral Principle and its Justification.....................................................................29 2.2 Two Problems for Any Special Rights Justification.........................................................................30 2.3 Four Justifications for Viewpoint Neutrality ....................................................................................38 Tentative Conclusion..................................................................................................................................50 CHAPTER 3 PRACTICES OF JUSTIFICATION AND HUMAN FLOURISHING.....................52 3.1 The Practices of Justification ..............................................................................................................53 3.2 Proposition 1 .........................................................................................................................................63 3.3 Proposition 2 .........................................................................................................................................75 3.4 Proposition 3 .........................................................................................................................................79 Conclusion....................................................................................................................................................84 CHAPTER 4 THE PRACTICES OF JUSTIFICATION AND STATE ACTION...........................85 4.1 Prolegomena..........................................................................................................................................86 4.2 JOA and Neutralism.............................................................................................................................89 4.3 The JOA and Perfectionism................................................................................................................96 4.4 Proposition 4 .........................................................................................................................................97 4.5 Proposition 5 ...................................................................................................................................... 109 4.6 Proposition 6 ...................................................................................................................................... 110 4.7 Proposition 7 ...................................................................................................................................... 116 4.8 Proposition 8 ...................................................................................................................................... 120 Conclusion................................................................................................................................................. 120 CHAPTER 5 THE PRACTICES OF JUSTIFICATION AND THE COSTS OF CENSORING PERNICIOUS SPEECH .............................................................................................................................122
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