Semiannual Guide to Expert Witnesses
November 2005 / $4
EARN MCLE CREDIT State Federal versus State Disability Lines Law page 31 Los Angeles lawyer Paul J. Watford discusses the commerce clause and the Rehnquist Court page 24
PLUS
Allocating Repair Costs page 14 Lemon Law Arbitrations page 19 Trademark Law and the Internet page 38
November 2005 Vol. 28, No. 9
FEATURES
24 State Lines BY PAUL J. WATFORD The Supreme Court’s evolving commerce clause jurisprudence seems to have taken a U-turn in Raich
31 Challenging Barriers BY EVE HILL AND SHEILA KHAN-VARIBA Unlike the Americans with Disabilities Act, California law allows parties to seek damages for discrimination by private businesses
Plus: Earn MCLE credit. MCLE Test No. 142 appears on page 33.
38 Search Terms BY STEVEN D. ATLEE AND BRIAN F. MCMAHON The lawful use of trademarks in search engines may ultimately hinge on evolving standards of “initial interest confusion”
45 Special Section Semiannual Guide to Expert Witnesses The magazine of The Los Angeles County LosAngelesLawyerBar Association DEPARTMENTS
10 Barristers Tips 85 Computer Counselor Working with court-appointed attorneys in Useful legal Web sites for California probate matters lawyers BY JOHN F. L. POMEROY BY NANCY A. KAISER
14 Practice Tips 88 LACB Foundation The allocation of repair obligations in form 2004-2005 Fund Drive Results leases BY WALTER R. ZAGZEBSKI 92 Closing Argument The unmasking of a legal urban legend 19 Practice Tips BY DAVID HAZELKORN Handling Better Business Bureau vehicle claims 87 Classifieds Cover photograph by Tom Keller BY MICHAEL B. RAINEY 90 Index to Advertisers
91 CLE Preview TOSHIBA digital copier, a law office's best friend! LosAngelesLawyer VISIT US ON THE INTERNET AT www.lacba.org/lalawyer E-MAIL CAN BE SENT TO [email protected] EDITORIAL BOARD Chair R. J. COMER Articles Coordinator JACQUELINE M. REAL-SALAS ELAINE R. ABBOTT JERROLD ABELES DANIEL L. ALEXANDER HONEY KESSLER AMADO ETHEL W. BENNETT CHAD C. COOMBS ANGELA J. DAVIS KERRY A. DOLAN GORDON ENG DANIEL A. FIORE JOSEPH S. FOGEL STUART R. FRAENKEL MICHAEL A. GEIBELSON AIMEE H. GOLD TED HANDEL JEFFREY A. HARTWICK STEVEN HECHT KATHERINE M. HIKIDA ROXANNE HUDDLESTON LAWRENCE J. IMEL SCOTT KLOPERT JOEL T. KORNFELD JOHN P. LECRONE HYACINTH E. LEUS JOHN C. MCBRIDE PAUL MARKS SEAN MORRIS ELIZABETH MUNISOGLU RICHARD H. NAKAMURA JR. DENNIS PEREZ GARY RASKIN DAMON RUBIN COPYFAX COMMUNICATIONS SVITLANA E. SANGARY offers "NEW LACBA Member KURT L. SCHMALZ DAVID SCHNIDER Benefit." Automatic 30% Off GRETCHEN D. STOCKDALE KENNETH W. SWENSON on all models of new TOSHIBA CARMELA TAN BRUCE TEPPER Copiers that Copy, Fax, Print PATRIC VERRONE and Scan to E-mail. MICHAEL WISE STAFF Publisher and Editor AUTOMATIC 30% DISCOUNT SAMUEL LIPSMAN Quick and Easy - No Pricing Battle! Senior Editor LAUREN MILICOV LIMITED TIME PROMO Senior Editor FREE Print and Scan Enabler for ERIC HOWARD Art Director Networking Printing and Scanning! LES SECHLER Director of Design and Production SPECIAL LEASE PATRICE HUGHES 0 Down - 0 Interest Lease Advertising Director Includes All Service and Supplies. LINDA LONERO Turn Key! Account Executive MARK NOCKELS FULL REPLACEMENT WARRANTY Marketing and Sales Coordinator It Runs Right Always or It's Replaced! TAL EDELSTEIN Advertising Coordinator WILMA TRACY NADEAU Administrative Coordinator MATTY JALLOW BABY
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Attorney # 4B2AV005 CA License #0795465 LOS ANGELES LAWYER IS THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 261 S. Figueroa St., Suite 300, Los Angeles, CA 90012-2533 Telephone 213.627.2727 / www.lacba.org ASSOCIATION OFFICERS: President EDITH R. MATTHAI President-Elect JudgmentsEnforcedJudgmentsEnforced CHARLES E. MICHAELS Senior Vice President GRETCHEN M. NELSON Vice President Law Office of Donald P. Brigham DANETTE E. MEYERS Treasurer 23232 Peralta Dr., Suite 204, Laguna Hills, CA 92653 DON MIKE ANTHONY P: 949.206.1661 Assistant Vice President F: 949.206.9718 MICHAEL E. MEYER Assistant Vice President [email protected] AV Rated ALAN K. STEINBRECHER Assistant Vice President LINDA D. BARKER Immediate Past President JOHN J. COLLINS Executive Director STUART A. FORSYTH Associate Executive Director/Chief Financial Officer BRUCE BERRA Associate Executive Director/General Counsel W. CLARK BROWN BOARD OF TRUSTEES GEORGE F. BIRD JR. DANIEL S. BISHOP JOHN M. BYRNE PATRICIA EGAN DAEHNKE ANTHONY PAUL DIAZ STACY L. DOUGLAS JEFFREY W. ERDMAN ANTONIO J. GONZALEZ TOMAS A. GUTERRES MITCHELL A. KAMIN NANCY KNUPFER ROBERT N. KWAN JENNIFER ALTFELD LANDAU ELISHA FARA LANDMAN DAVID A. LASH ROCCO J. LIBERIO CINDY J. MACHO ELAINE W. MANDEL PATRICK MCNICHOLAS ELLEN A. PANSKY MICHAEL JAMES PEARCE CHRISTOPHER Q. PHAM SUSAN KOHN ROSS ALICE A. SALVO DEBORAH C. SAXE KIM TUNG JOHN D. VANDEVELDE ROBERT G. VAN SCHOONENBERG GAVIN HACHIYA WASSERMAN ERIC A. WEBBER JULIE K. XANDERS AFFILIATED BAR ASSOCIATIONS BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASSOCIATION BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES, INC. CENTURY CITY BAR ASSOCIATION CONSUMER ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES CULVER/MARINA BAR ASSOCIATION EASTERN BAR ASSOCIATION GLENDALE BAR ASSOCIATION IRANIAN AMERICAN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION ITALIAN AMERICAN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION JAPANESE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION OF GREATER LOS ANGELES JOHN M. LANGSTON BAR ASSOCIATION JUVENILE COURTS BAR ASSOCIATION KOREAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAWYERS' CLUB OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY LESBIAN AND GAY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES LONG BEACH BAR ASSOCIATION MEXICAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PASADENA BAR ASSOCIATION SAN FERNANDO VALLEY BAR ASSOCIATION SAN GABRIEL VALLEY BAR ASSOCIATION SANTA MONICA BAR ASSOCIATION SOUTH ASIAN BAR ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SOUTH BAY BAR ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, INC. SOUTHEAST DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA CHINESE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION WHITTIER BAR ASSOCIATION WOMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES
6 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005
From the Chair BY R. J. COMER
hy did you become a lawyer? “To help people,” many have answered— some of them honestly. “To make money,” a few confess—all of them honestly. Litigators sometimes claim that they love to argue. Few W lawyers say that they thought becoming a lawyer would make them happy, but an expectation of happiness lay beneath all the ostensible reasons for becoming a lawyer. The “pursuit of happiness” ranks right up there with the other unalienable rights of life and liberty. Yet, attorneys are notoriously unhappy. Perhaps the Declaration of Independence should have included an explanatory footnote that the pursuit of happiness is alienable from some classes of people—such as lawyers and failed screenwriters, and especially lawyers who are also failed screenwriters. Admittedly, some lawyers are deeply fulfilled by representing deserving clients on meaningful cases. How many of those lawyers do you know? Contrary to pop- ular cliché, the money some lawyers make does buy happiness, for a time. Purchased happiness, however, loses value faster than a new house sliding down a hill, because we quickly get used to the money. Our families get used to our money. Our kids really get used to our money. And soon it’s not about having money, it’s about making money. At this point, for many lawyers, what was once a calling slips past being a career and becomes merely a job. None of this is news. In her 2004 book Lawyer, Know Thyself, Susan Swaim Daicoff provides a survey of studies done over two decades showing that attorneys suffer from diagnosable depression at a rate that is at least twice the rate in the general popula- tion. Attorney dissatisfaction manifests itself in substance abuse, legal malpractice, pro- fessional incivility, medical complications attributable to stress, and family problems. Daicoff suggests adapting one’s professional life to fit the not-very-endearing per- sonality traits that she claims lawyers tend to have in common. By contrast, the manda- Professional tory CLE sections on stress management typically accept without question that prac- ticing law is stressful. Instead of sympathizing with your secret desire to transform Arbitrator your in-box chores into a Burning Man festival, CLE providers typically offer relaxation techniques that are about as useful as a horse expert providing emergency and Mediator management during a hurricane. The bottom line is that sometimes, oftentimes, being a lawyer just blows. Should we, therefore, abandon all hope ye who enter here? Yes. So long as we think prac- Steven Richard Sauer, Esq. ticing law should bring happiness, we are bound to be dissatisfied. Steven Richard Sauer, Esq. Having abandoned that pesky rascal hope, we can now pursue satisfaction as a scientifically attainable outcome of practicing law. This year Emory University neu- roscientist Gregory Berns, in his book Satisfaction: The Science of Finding True “He is truly a master Fulfillment, distinguished satisfaction from happiness because achieving satisfaction requires us to engage in activities that present us with novelty and challenge. in his art.” According to Berns, the neurotransmitter most associated with pleasure, dopamine, is released when we encounter and overcome something novel and challenging. A lawyer can easily create a professional rut by remaining too long in the comfort Settled over 5,000 Federal zone of what that lawyer knows and does well. We are in demand. The work becomes and State Litigated Cases routine as the demands increase exponentially. Then we feel overwhelmed. So we work harder at the same old thing until we have dug a deeper, increasingly boring hole. Thus, the “feel good” goal of our profession should be finding evermore novel and challenging ways to practice law within our areas of expertise and focus. Consider teach- 323.933.6833 ing a CLE course in your practice area. Defense attorneys might consider taking on a plaintiff’s case—very selectively, of course. Here’s an idea: Write an article for Los Angeles Fax 323.933.3184 Lawyer magazine. Satisfaction awaits. ■ E-mail [email protected] R. J. Comer is a partner at Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP, where he specializes in land use law and municipal advocacy. He is the chair of the 2005-06 Los Angeles Lawyer Editorial Board. 4929 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 740 Los Angeles, CA 90010
8 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 Shouldn’t your practice guide be more in touch with the times?
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LexisNexis, the Knowledge Burst logo and lexis.com are registered trademarks of Reed Elsevier Properties Inc., used under license. It’s How You Know is a trademark of LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. Matthew Bender is a registered trademark of Matthew Bender Properties Inc. AL7993 © 2005 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Barristers Tips BY JOHN F. L. POMEROY
Working with Court-Appointed Attorneys in Probate Matters
PROBATE MATTERS OFTEN INVOLVE parties who lack, or are asserted either in favor of or against the continued service of the PVP. If the to lack, the mental capacity to make financial decisions or personal PVP has recommended against your client’s position, and the matter care decisions. In these situations, courts typically appoint an attor- is ongoing, you may get better results in the future if that PVP is no ney to represent the allegedly incapacitated party. These attorneys, longer involved. taken from the Probate Volunteer Panel,1 are referred to as PVP counsel. Attorneys whose work involves conservatorships, guardian- Role of the PVP ships, or any other proceeding in which the capacity of a party is at The PVP counsel performs several functions. The primary function issue will encounter PVP counsel. Attorneys may encounter PVP of a PVP is to represent the interests of the client. After that, how- counsel in other situations as well, because a court may appoint a PVP ever, the PVP also acts as the “eyes and ears of the court.” This role in one of various roles in a matter in which the court determines that was so described by Judge Thomas Stoever, who recently retired such an appointment is necessary to protect the interests of a party from the probate department in the Central District. The PVP reports or an estate. to the court on the condition of the client and on the person’s wishes Working with PVP attorneys presents challenges and opportu- regarding a pending matter. In some cases, this overlaps with the duties nities. Among the challenges are determining how the PVP fits into of the court investigator. For example, when a petition for appoint- the overall picture: Is the PVP an ally? An adversary? An extension ment of a conservator is pending, the proposed conservatee will of the court? While the matter proceeds, how may the relationship likely be visited separately by a court investigator as well as a PVP, with the PVP be conducted so as to best serve the client? If the PVP who separately report to the court. is opposed to the client’s position, how can an attorney work around The PVP also recommends to the court how to rule on a pending the PVP? petition. The PVP’s assistance to the court in resolving a matter, PVP attorneys are appointed and discharged upon order of the however, remains the PVP’s secondary duty after representing the best court. If there is a significant estate, the PVP’s fees are paid out of the interests of the client. This recommendation carries great weight. For estate. In general, a PVP counsel is appointed whenever there are ques- this reason alone, you should treat the PVP well. tions as to a party’s capacity. This occurs most often in conservator- The PVP’s recommendation is usually provided to the court in the ship matters and in the various matters that can be described as form of a written report as well as an appearance at the relevant hear- conservatorship substitutes (for example, petitions for approval of a ing. The preparation of the report is often the most important func- transaction when a party is asserted to lack capacity and petitions tion of the PVP. To prepare that report, the PVP reviews the evidence, related to healthcare decisions). PVP counsel will always be appointed speaks with parties, and visits with the client. There are a number of to represent a proposed conservatee when a petition for appointment ways that an attorney can assist the PVP in preparing that report, pri- of a conservator of the person or estate is pending or when a sub- marily by ensuring that evidence and witnesses are available. stituted judgment petition is pending. In matters that substitute for In contested matters, the PVP may be called upon to assist in res- conservatorships, a PVP counsel will be appointed to represent the olution, including engaging in negotiations and even mediation with person who is asserted to lack capacity. PVP counsel are sometimes the opposing parties. Finally, in unusual cases in which the PVP appointed in guardianship of the estate proceedings but rarely in determines that the client is in danger of either physical harm or immi- guardianship of the person proceedings. Appointment may also be nent loss of assets, the PVP may commence proceedings on behalf of made in any other case in which the court determines that it would the client. The PVP may, for example, seek the appointment of a con- be in the best interests of any party or estate. servator, removal of a conservator, or orders protecting the client’s For example, a recent guardianship of the estate matter involved assets from dissipation. a dispute between parents over how to manage the significant income The manner in which you should work with the PVP depends earned by the minor. On an attorney’s recommendation, the court on the circumstances. As with all probate matters, the situation appointed a PVP counsel for the minor while the guardianship peti- changes dramatically when a matter becomes contested. In addition, tion was pending because of danger that the minor’s estate would be the circumstances depend on which parties are involved and who dissipated. Had the estate been smaller, the appointment likely would has retained counsel. When working with the PVP, it is important not have been made. to see the attorney as an extension—the eyes and ears—of the The appointment lasts while a particular petition is pending, and court. Although the PVP will advocate a position before the court the PVP is often discharged upon resolution of the pending petition. (and you should be prepared to advocate a contrary position if nec- In some matters, however, the PVP will stay on after the petition is essary), the PVP may also assist the court in deciding the pending determined, particularly if disputes between the parties remain, or if matter. In a contested matter, you may even find that the PVP is hav- another petition will soon be filed about which the court would pre- fer a report from the PVP who is already familiar with the matter. Upon John F. L. Pomeroy is a Los Angeles attorney with practice experience in determination of a petition, you may have the opportunity to argue estate planning, conservatorships, and guardianships.
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51525_LA_Lawer.indd 1 10/4/05 12:52:32 PM ing too much contact with one party, to such an extent that a judge may consider it ex parte. If you treat the PVP as an adver- David L. Ray sary, however, you may later find that the Saltzburg, Ray & Bergman, LLP PVP’s recommendation to the court is not in Partnerships and Corporate Dissolutions line with your client’s wishes. For this rea- Government Enforcement Receivership Actions son, the PVP should be treated with respect. Receivership In uncontested matters in which you rep- Partition Actions/Marital Dissolution resent the petitioner, your goal is for the PVP to do two things: report that there are suffi- cient factual grounds for the relief that you TEL (310) 481-6700 e-mail: [email protected] • www.srblaw.com seek and recommend approval of your peti- FAX (310) 481-6707 12121 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 600, Los Angeles CA 90025 tion. You should provide the PVP with as much information as needed and make all parties to the matter and all documents and other sources of evidence available. Initially, you may find that the PVP has not received all pleadings. It is good practice to send the PVP copies of all pleadings immediately upon appointment. In many cases, the appoint- ment happens a short time before the hear- ing. The PVP will be appreciative if, thanks to the pleadings you provided, he or she has an extra day or two to work on the matter. For the same reason, it is important to be responsive to requests from the PVP. If the matter is contested, you may need to be more persuasive with the PVP, while remaining deferential and respectful. This can be a tricky balance. You should try to move the PVP to your client’s position and against the position taken by an adversarial party. Having a PVP on your side can make matters easier for your client. You may find that the PVP takes positions, in opposition to an adversary, that your client would otherwise take. In effect, the PVP can fight your battle for you and allow your client to save capital for a different dispute. On the other hand, if the PVP opposes your client’s position, you may find yourself arguing at a hearing against opposing counsel and the PVP. This is an uphill battle, and your client may best be served with a settlement that leaves as little as possible for the court to decide. Working with a PVP provides an attorney with less experience in probate matters good opportunities for education. Attorneys on the panel have years of experience in the field and are appointed by the court because they are respected. With regard to the mat- ter at hand, the PVP may educate you about solutions that you had not considered. More generally, you may also learn new proce- dures or approaches that you can apply to other matters. The bottom line is that you should treat the PVP with the professional courtesy that you would provide to a colleague and the def- erence that you would provide to a judicial officer. ■
1 See generally LOS ANGELES SUPER. CT. R. 10.173, and app. E.
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The Allocation of Repair Obligations in Form Leases
NATURAL DISASTERS such as earthquakes and mudslides are an ever-present risk in California. When they happen, landlords and ten- ants in leased property are often left fighting over who is required to pay the repair bills and government-mandated upgrades. Before 1994, the terms of a typical net lease expressly provided that a tenant was required to pay for all repairs to leased property, regardless of whether the tenant was big or small, regardless of the length of the lease or amount of rent paid under the lease, and regardless of the cost. Thus, when an earthquake or hazard damaged leased property, many small tenants faced repair bills that were huge in comparison to the rents paid under their leases. The California Supreme Court sought to remedy this problem in Hadian v. Schwartz1 and Brown v. Green2 by creating a judicial balancing test that allowed certain tenants to escape onerous repair burdens despite express lease terms to the contrary. This balancing test forced courts to look at the total repair cost in comparison to the total rents payable under the term of the lease and the length of the lease, among other factors, to decide whether the landlord or tenant should pay the cost of repair. However, it opened the door for protracted litigation because neither landlords nor ten- ants could rely solely on the terms of their leases to determine who was required to repair leased property. The appellate courts have not 6) The likelihood that the parties anticipated the application of the curtailed the uncertainty created by this balancing test because there particular law or order involved.4 is no reported court of appeal decision that gives additional guidance.3 In Hadian, the tenant leased a very small space to operate a bar In an apparent attempt to respond to this test and restore confi- and cabaret. The lease was for three years at $650 per month with dence that their leases would be applied according to their terms, the one five-year option to renew at a $800 per month, which the ten- AIR Commercial Real Estate Association amended its form net leases ant exercised. During the five-year option period, the city issued an twice—once in 2001 and again in 2004—to make the provisions deal- order requiring a seismic upgrade of the property. The cost of the ing with code compliance and repair obligations more tenant-friendly. upgrade was more than $30,000. The supreme court held that the land- But neither the 2001 nor the 2004 AIR Multi-Tenant Net Leases fore- lord was required to make the repairs despite the fact that the express close the possibility of litigation under Hadian and Brown; instead, terms of the lease imposed the burden on the tenant. they create new ambiguities that raise the likelihood of litigation. In applying that six-factor test, the court found that the repair cost However, adopting a more simple and streamlined approach to the amounted to about 150 percent of the amount of the total lease pay- language of form net leases may provide landlords and tenants with ments under the initial three-year lease term and nearly half the total more confidence that the language of their form leases will be applied lease payments under the extended term. The initial lease was also a by the courts without alteration. relatively short-term lease. As a result, the court decided that the first two factors weighed in the tenant’s favor. The court decided that the The Supreme Court Balancing Test third factor also favored the tenant because the landlord stood to gain In Hadian and Brown, the California Supreme Court developed a six- far more benefit over the life of the repairs than the tenant. Further, factor test to invoke when deciding whether the tenant or landlord because the repairs were structural in nature and the tenant’s busi- should pay for government-mandated repairs and upgrades, even when ness suffered as a result of the repairs, the court decided that the fourth a lease expressly provides that the tenant must pay for all repairs: and fifth factors favored the tenant. Finally, because the tenant was 1) The ratio of the total cost of the repair to the total rent payments unsophisticated and did not contemplate incurring the repairs at required for the term of the lease. issue, the court determined that the sixth factor also favored the ten- 2) The length of the lease. ant. As a result, the court held that the tenant could not be required 3) A comparison of the benefit of the repairs to the lessee versus the to incur the costs of the repairs. reversionary benefit to the landlord. 4) Whether the repair is structural or nonstructural. Walter R. Zagzebski is a partner with Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP, and 5) The degree to which the lessee’s use and enjoyment of the premises practices real estate litigation. He thanks his colleagues Kenneth Feingold,
RICHARD EWING will be interfered with during the repair. Damon Rubin, Marc Epstein, and Sander Zagzebski for their input.
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By contrast, in Brown, the tenant operated modification, remediation of hazardous sub- tion formula does not apply unless a replace- a large furniture business and was the sole ten- stances, or any other type of upgrade to the ment is required because the repair cost is ant of the leased property. The tenant entered property mandated by the Applicable greater than 50 percent of the replacement into a 15-year lease with a total of $5 million Requirements. In the 2001 form, the landlord cost. Does this mean that the tenant must pay in rent paid over the term of the lease. During absolutely warrants that the property was the entire cost for all Capital Expenditures the lease term, public officials inspected the in compliance with the Applicable Require- that are less 50 percent of replacement cost, property and determined that asbestos had ments at the time each improvement was just as the tenant would be required to do begun to flake in one area of the leased prop- made. The tenant is advised to inspect the with utility costs under Paragraph 7.1(d)? erty, requiring a repair and cleanup costing property and is given six months after the Or, was it the intention of the 2001 and 2004 $250,000. The repair cost was only 5 percent commencement of the lease to notify the forms to skip the 50 percent triggering lan- of the rent paid under the lease, and the lease landlord if the property does not fully com- guage in Paragraph 7.1(d) and assume that the was relatively long term. Therefore, the court ply. If the tenant notifies the landlord, the allocation formula applies to all Capital Ex- decided that the first and second factors landlord is required to make any necessary penditures made necessary by changes to the weighed in the landlord’s favor. The court repair at its expense. Otherwise, the tenant Applicable Requirements that are not caused considered the third factor, a comparison of must make the repair.5 In the 2004 form, the by a tenant’s special use? This ambiguity benefits, to be neutral. There was substantial landlord’s absolute warranty is replaced by a leaves the door open for the courts to apply time remaining on the lease, thus providing warranty limited to the best of the landlord’s Hadian and Brown. the tenant with substantial benefit of the knowledge,6 meaning that the landlord is Second, the 2004 form has created a new repair. But the court also recognized a rever- only required to repair property for prior problem with the change from an absolute sionary benefit to the landlord because the noncompliance if it had knowledge that the warranty of the landlord’s prior compliance repair would permanently remove an envi- property did not comply. to a warranty limited to the best of the land- ronmental hazard from the property. The Under both the 2001 and 2004 forms, if lord’s knowledge. Under the 2001 form, if a court considered the fourth factor to be in the the Applicable Requirements change when the repair became necessary because the property tenant’s favor because the repair at issue was tenant is in possession, requiring a Capital was not in compliance as warranted, the structural. The court found the fifth factor to Expenditure, the following two rules apply: landlord was forced to incur the costs of the be in the landlord’s favor because the tenant 1) If the required expenditure is caused by a repair, assuming the tenant gave proper notice. was able to mitigate the effects of the repair specific and unique use by the tenant, a change Otherwise, the the tenant had to bear the on its business by closing off the affected in the intensity of the tenant’s use, or the cost. There was no possibility of a third portion of the property and continuing oper- tenant’s alteration of the premises, the tenant option. But under the 2004 form, it is unclear ations with little disruption. The court also must either cease the changed use or pay for which party is responsible when the property considered the sixth factor to favor the land- the repair (with some minor exceptions).7 was not in compliance with the Applicable lord because, although there was no evidence 2) If the required expenditure is not caused Requirements at the time each improvement that the parties contemplated the exact repair by a tenant’s specific or unique use, such as was made, but the warranty was not breached at issue, the tenant was an experienced lessee a seismic upgrade, the parties shall “allocate because the landlord had no knowledge. who fully understood the terms of commer- the obligation to pay for the portion of such Nothing in Paragraph 2.3 addresses who cial leases. In weighing the factors, the court costs reasonably attributable to the premises must pay for these repairs. Even Paragraph required the tenant to incur the cost of the pursuant to the formula set out in Paragraph 2.3(b), the section that makes reference to the repair. 7.1(d).”8 cost-sharing formula in Paragraph 7.1(d), The Hadian and Brown balancing test Paragraph 7.1 addresses which party must does not apply because by its terms it only resulted in a rule of thumb that big anchor pay for general repairs and maintenance to the applies when the Applicable Requirements tenants with sophisticated management were property, such as maintaining heating and have changed during the tenancy. Thus, generally required to undertake substantial ventilation, boiler and pressure valves, and Paragraph 7, which addresses general repair repair obligations, while smaller, short-term, any other type of utility equipment.9 Para- burdens, apparently applies. unsophisticated tenants could likely escape graph 7.1(d) states that if any utility equip- Paragraph 7 imposes a general repair bur- even potentially small repair burdens. As for ment covered by Paragraph 7.1 cannot be den on the tenant but also provides that the the numerous tenants who fell in the middle, repaired at a cost that is less than 50 percent landlord must keep the “foundations, exterior the court created uncertainty and the likeli- of the amount it would cost to replace it as walls, [and] structural conditions” in good hood of protracted litigation. new, the item shall be replaced and the repair.11 Thus, when the landlord does not replacement cost prorated between the par- breach its warranty for noncompliance under The New AIR Cost-Sharing Formula ties with the tenant’s share equal to 1/144th the 2004 form, it appears that if the mandated After Hadian and Brown, the AIR forms the total cost times the number of months repair is structural the landlord must incur the were amended in 2001 and 2004 to create a remaining on the lease.10 entire cost, and if the repair is nonstructural new approach to allocating repair burdens. Both the 2001 and 2004 forms are vul- the tenant will have to pay the entire cost. This The repair burdens under the new forms nerable to judicial redrafting under Hadian all-or-nothing approach raises the risk that a were addressed in two separate lease provi- and Brown. First, the language in Paragraph court would apply Hadian and Brown, allow- sions: Paragraph 2.3, addressing legal com- 2.3 that attempts to incorporate the cost- ing smaller tenants to escape repairs that are pliance, and Paragraph 7, addressing main- sharing formula in Paragraph 7.1(d) is onerous in comparison to the rent they pay. tenance and repairs. ambiguous. It would seem that the drafters Finally, the cost-sharing allocation for- Paragraph 2.3 of the 2001 form provides intended that the allocation formula of mula expressed in Paragraph 7.1(d) is not tied a definition of “Applicable Requirements” Paragraph 7.1(d) apply to all capital expen- to the factors that the supreme court found which essentially includes every type of law, ditures other than those involving prior non- most important in Hadian and Brown and ordinance, code, or order that could possibly compliance for which the landlord breached thus remains vulnerable to judicial revision. affect the property. It also defines “Capital its warranty. But the express language of If the tenant in Hadian had been subject to Expenditure” as every type or alteration, Paragraph 7.1(d) provides that the alloca- the 2001 or 2004 form (and assuming that the
16 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 cost-allocation formula in Paragraph 7.1(d) 2.3(b), which addresses all other Capital 2 Brown v. Green, 8 Cal. 4th 812 (1994). applied despite its ambiguity) the tenant’s Expenditures, should be amended to include 3 Lower court decisions that have cited Hadian and share of the repair cost would have been language similar to the following: Brown have not relied upon, expanded upon, or pro- vided any further guidance for applying their balanc- $15,550 (a total repair bill of $34,450.26 The cost of any Capital Expenditure or ing test. See, e.g., SDC/Pullman Partners v. Tolo Inc., divided by 144 and multiplied by the 65 repair (other than a Capital Expend- 60 Cal. App. 4th 37 (1998) (holding that a lease term months remaining on the lease). That is a iture or repair involving a breach of requiring a tenant to clean up all toxic substances did pretty stiff bill for a tenant that was paying warranty or the tenant’s special use not require a tenant to clean up soil that had minimal $650 per month in rent and had just exercised as set forth above) shall be allocated toxicity and was not subject to a clean-up order). The court of appeal relied on Hadian and Brown solely for a renewal option at $850 per month for five between the landlord and tenant with the proposition that the circumstance surrounding a years. It is likely that the supreme court would the tenant’s share of the cost being lease must be examined to determine the scope of lease have struck down this repair burden. either the total cost or an amount obligations. For these reasons, even when the 2001 and equal to 5 percent of the total amount See also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. L.A. Mart, 2004 forms are used, courts are likely to of rent payable under the entire term 68 F. 3d 370 (1995), in which a landlord obtained engi- neering reports recommending seismic upgrades to look to Hadian and Brown to resolve disputes of the lease (excluding unexercised leased property. The property was in compliance with between landlords and tenants regarding gov- options), whichever is less. all statutory laws and was not subject to a repair ernment-mandated repairs. This means that The exact percentage used in the above order. The landlord demanded that the tenant make and the likelihood of protracted litigation con- paragraph can, of course, be negotiated pay for the recommended upgrades, the tenant refused, tinues to exist. However, it is possible to between the parties. The landlord, however, and the landlord sued, claiming the tenant was respon- overcome the danger of judicial intervention should be advised not to demand too high a sible for the upgrades under Hadian and Brown. The court of appeal ruled against the landlord and distin- by creating a cost-sharing formula that focuses percentage, or a court may find it over- guished Hadian and Brown, holding that in both of on the factor the supreme court found most reaching and strike it down. The parties can those cases there was a government-mandated repair important in Hadian and Brown—the ratio also negotiate other factors, such as the extent order. of the cost of repair to the total rent paid or of the landlord’s warranty of existing com- 4 Brown, 8 Cal. 4th at 830-33. 5 to be paid under the lease. If the tenant’s pliance and repairs and upgrades caused by 2001 AIR Multi-Tenant Net Lease [hereinafter 2001 Lease] ¶¶2.3, 2.4 (on file with author). share of a repair obligation is reasonable in the tenant’s use. If landlords and tenants 6 2004 AIR Multi-Tenant Net Lease [hereinafter 2004 comparison to the lease payments, it will adopt this approach to allocating repair bur- Lease] ¶2.3, available at http://www.airea.com/Forms most likely be upheld. Paragraph 2.3(a), dens, the likelihood of protracted litigation _PDF/Multi-Tenant-Lease%20Net%2005.PDF. which requires the tenant to pay for all and the risk of a court rewriting the lease 7 2001 Lease, supra note 5, ¶¶2.3(a), (c). 8 Capital Expenditures made necessary by the should be minimized. ■ Id. at ¶2.3(b). 9 Id. at ¶7.1(a). tenant’s special use of the premises, should 10 Id. at ¶¶2.3(b), 7.1(d). withstand judicial scrutiny. But Paragraph 1 Hadian v. Schwartz, 8 Cal. 4th 836 (1994). 11 2004 Lease, supra note 6, ¶7.1(a), (b).
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18 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 Practice Tips BY MICHAEL B. RAINEY
Handling Better Business Bureau Vehicle Claims
A CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY MAY at some time represent a client in a for repair, if the manufacturer has conspicuously disclosed the pro- Better Business Bureau (BBB) arbitration for a vehicle alleged to be visions of the Lemon Law and provided a contact address, the con- defective. The requirements of California Civil Code Section 1793.22, sumer must notify the manufacturer of the need for the repair. commonly called the Lemon Law, are of primary importance in this The second category of nonconformity is defined as service on the representation. When representing a client in a Lemon Law arbitra- vehicle for the “same nonconformity” that requires four or more tion, counsel should build the case around the requirements and repairs. Like the first category of more serious or potentially fatal educate the client as much as possible regarding the legal standards defects, if the manufacturer met its notice responsibility, the consumer of a Lemon Law arbitration. When these standards are met, the has the responsibility to put the manufacturer on notice of the repair. client is prepared, and the typical defenses presented by the manu- Finally, under either category, the vehicle must be out of service facturer’s representative are adequately addressed, counsel may feel for a cumulative period of 30 days. This period is measured in cal- more confident of a successful resolution. The Lemon Law, formally known as the Tanner Consumer Protection Act, applies to new vehicles registered in California. A new There are three critical components or elements that give rise to a vehicle is one primarily used for personal or household transportation; a business vehicle with a gross vehicle weight of less than 10,000 rebuttable presumption a new vehicle is a lemon. These elements pounds (as long as the buyer/lessee does not have more than five other vehicles registered in California); the chassis, cab, and propulsion are time/mileage, the number of attempts to repair and the time part of a motor home; dealer owned vehicles; demonstration vehicles; other vehicles sold with a new car warranty; and new purchased the vehicle has been out of service, and materiality of the defect. or leased vehicles.1 The Lemon Law does not apply to off-road vehicles, the part of a motor home primarily used for human habitation, or vehicles that have been endar days and is not required to be consecutive. abused. Examples of abuse would be street or off-road racing, seri- Material defect. As Civil Code Section 1793.22(e)(1) states, the ously overloading a vehicle, and avoiding necessary maintenance. nonconformity must adversely affect the “use, value, or safety of the There are three critical components or elements that give rise to vehicle.” The critical element of materiality is usually the most dif- a rebuttable presumption a new vehicle is a lemon. These elements ficult to prove. Plastic body trim that is out of alignment, for exam- are time/mileage, the number of attempts to repair and the time the ple, is not material. A failed antilock braking system or failed engine vehicle has been out of service, and materiality of the defect. If the clearly is. consumer meets the statutory criteria of Section 1792.22, he or she Minor body defects, rattles, squeaks, and interior defects routinely is entitled to a presumption that the vehicle is defective. If the man- do not qualify. However, in one case, a vehicle was presented to the ufacturer cannot rebut the presumption, the consumer is entitled to dealer on numerous occasions for a squeak. At every presentation, a replacement vehicle or refund of the purchase price minus the rea- the dealer carefully inspected, analyzed, and repaired the vehicle. One sonable use expense.2 time the dealer replaced a right control arm. The next time it replaced Time/mileage. The statutory period of the presumption is 18 the left control arm. On another occasion it found chafing brake lines. months or 18,000 miles, whichever occurs first. The time runs from The vehicle was out of service for 37 days in one year. The defect was the date of delivery, which is usually on the sales contract or parts order not considered material in the BBB arbitration, but when counsel if the car was purchased with cash. If the last repair event comes brought suit, the manufacturer offered to repurchase the vehicle.4 toward the end of the statutory time period, the statute is satisfied if The defect must be the primary reason for returning the vehicle. the vehicle enters the repair facility before the deadline of 18 months The squeak in the example, one should note, appeared to be only a or 18,000 miles. The crucial date is the date the vehicle enters the repair symptom of a number of defects. Often, whether the BBB arbitrator facility. sees the defect as material may depend upon the persuasive power of Number of attempts to repair. There are two general categories counsel. The gravity of some dangerous defects may not be obvious. of nonconformity.3 The first category of nonconformity is a condi- tion that is likely to lead to death or serious bodily harm. The man- Michael B. Rainey is an attorney in Woodland Hills and a professor at ufacturer or its agent, usually a dealership, has two or more oppor- Pepperdine University. His practice focuses on mediation and arbitration, tunities to fix the vehicle. In conjunction with presenting the vehicle including products, real estate, personal injury, and transactions.
Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 19 For example, if the alleged defect is that the the vehicle to the manufacturer or its agent Camry brake problems. This file is 62 vehicle stalls at inopportune times, it may for the requisite number of times and it has pages long from 1997-2004 Toyota require explanation as to why this problem been out of service for the required days; Camrys. Many have resulted in acci- adversely affects the use, value, or safety of and the nonconformity adversely affects the dents. My question is why are these the vehicle. The car may stall on train tracks use, value, or safety of the vehicle. vehicles still on the road? Why hasn’t or on a busy freeway. Assuming counsel has prepared the proper the NHTSA recalled these vehicles? If Once the consumer meets the statutory cri- BBB paperwork, on the date of the arbitra- I were GM, Ford or Chrysler I would teria, the vehicle is presumed defective and the tion, the consumer will have to show the be asking the NHTSA if Toyota is manufacturer has the burden to rebut the BBB a valid driver’s license, vehicle registra- exempt from recalls. Do you want presumption. tion, and proof of insurance. It is probable the your family riding or driving in these arbitrator and/or the manufacturer will want vehicles? Steering problems, brake sys- The Arbitration Process to take a test drive. For all parties, it is impor- tem failures.…If you or someone you The BBB is separate from the California tant to have proof of current license, vehicle know has had brake problems and Department of Consumer Affairs and is a ownership, and current insurance. Toyota denies any problems[,] have private business entity that engages in treaties The first step—the statutory period—is [that person] print out this file and and agreements with dealers and manufac- adequately proven by presenting the arbi- present it to Toyota. turers to provide arbitration. There is no cost trator and manufacturer with copies of the The author of this message provides the for the consumer. If he or she prevails, the sales contract to indicate the date of delivery. full report. The following is an example of the manufacturer is bound by the award. If the Photos of the odometer, repair orders, or information contained therein: consumer loses, he or she has alternatives. making the vehicle available to the arbitrator Make: Toyota In conjunction with the process of notifi- can establish the mileage. This is usually the Model: Camry cation required under Civil Code Section easiest element to prove. Year: 1998 1792.22, the claimant can also request a sep- The next element is proof of the duration Complaint Number: 745143 arate BBB hearing. The claimant can handle and notice to the manufacturer. Copies of SINCE BUYING MY TOYOTA IN the case by himself or herself or engage coun- the repair order or orders, in chronological APRIL OF 1998, I HAVE NEEDED sel. The claim can be processed in several order, with a summary of the number of days TO REPLACE THE BRAKES AND ways. The consumer or counsel can call the the car was out of service will be required for ROTORS 3 TIMES. I STILL CON- BBB Auto Line at (800) 955-5100. A claim the consumer to prove the time the vehicle TINUE TO HAVE SCREECHING can also be processed online at http://www.dr was out of service. The consumer will also AND GRINDING NOISES. I HAVE .bbb.org/autoline/caprocess.asp. The BBB have to provide evidence that he or she put BEEN TOLD BY TOYOTA DEAL- can also be contacted in writing at BBB Auto the manufacturer on notice. A copy of the let- ERSHIPS THAT THIS NOISE HAS Line, 4200 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 800, ter should suffice. BEEN A NOTED PROBLEM. I FIND Arlington, VA 22203-1838. The last element—showing that the non- THIS TO BE UNACCEPTABLE FOR The arbitration process can involve both conformity adversely affects the use, value, A “NEW” CAR, I BOUGHT A NEW parties presenting their cases in person, but and safety—is often the most difficult. The CAR TO AVOID MAKING REPAIRS there are alternatives. The consumer can consumer has purchased an expensive com- AND I HAVE MADE MORE ON request to present his or her statement and evi- modity. When the consumer discovers a THIS TOYOTA AND ITS BAD dence by phone or in writing. If the con- defect, he or she does not want to be placated. BREAKS THAN I WOULD HAVE sumer appears in person, the manufacturer He or she does not want to be told the man- SPENT ON KEEPING MY USED has the choice of appearing in person, by ufacturer has a range in which the vehicle can RODEO. I MEAN WITH REGULAR phone, or in writing. If the consumer chooses be conforming.5 The consumer wants action. MAINTENANCE CHECK, OIL the phone, the manufacturer is restricted to The consumer wants redress. These desires do CHANGE, CAR PAYMENTS, $200 the phone or writing. If the consumer chooses not translate, however, into a legal require- BRAKE JOBS EVERY 8 TO 12 to present his or her case only in writing, ment that a car be replaced. MONTHS, THIS IS RIDICULOUS. I the manufacturer is likewise limited to pre- In order to show the problem is a statu- HAVE ALSO HAD PROBLEMS senting its case in writing. When one of the tory nonconformity, counsel may have to do WITH CLUNKING NOISES COM- parties does not appear in person, the BBB some research. Online research on the ING FROM MY FRONT SUSPEN- Arbitration Rules, which are available online, Highway Data Loss Institute (HDLI), the SION, ESPECIALLY IF I GO OVER A require the arbitrator to provide a speaker National Highway Traffic Safety Administra- ROUGH ROAD. FOR A COMPANY phone or conference call so all the parties can tion (NHTSA), and Google can yield infor- THAT HAS A REPUTATION FOR effectively participate in the hearing. mation. A number of very valuable Web sites SUPERIOR CARS, THIS HAS BEEN The consumer presents his or her case, yield highly valuable information. For exam- A DISAPPOINTING FIRST BUY AS rests, and then the manufacturer presents its ple, http://www.theautochannel.com/news I FIND THE CAR TO HAVE A VERY, case. The key to a successful resolution is /recalls, http://www.internetautoguide VERY POOR BRAKING SYSTEM how the consumer or his or her counsel pre- .com/auto-recalls/index.html, and http:/ AND SUSPENSION. FROM READ- sents the facts. /groups.msn.com/ToyotaOwnersUniteforReso ING YOUR TECHNICAL BUL- lution are all sites worthy of bookmarks for LETINS, THERE HAS BEEN 90 The Consumer’s Presentation research into how a given defect affects the REPORTED COMPLAINTS ON The statutory presumption arises when the use, value, or safety of a motor vehicle. The THE BRAKES.… consumer or the consumer’s counsel has MSN group site requires the researcher to Another helpful source is a skilled shown the three criteria called for in Section join. This takes time, but the information mechanic or a dealer. Often they will provide 1793.22. They are that the new vehicle falls available is tremendous. One excerpt from the you with copies of the manufacturer’s notices, within the claim period; the consumer has put site, for example, concerns brake defects: intercompany repair messages, or recall the manufacturer on notice and has presented Please see attached file on Toyota notices.
20 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005
There have been “secret” problems regard- — LEMON LAW SPECIALISTS — ing which customers were informed only when they presented their vehicles for repair. We have obtained recoveries totaling millions of ✔ Automobiles These problems are difficult, but not impos- dollars for defective and unsafe vehicles. We ✔ Motorcycles sible, to uncover. A good example from the enjoy a superb success rate and obtain speedy and ✔ Motor Homes late 1980s involved the alleged self-accelera- ✔ full recoveries without litigation in nearly all cases. Boats tion of the Nissan 280ZX and 300ZX. The NHTSA complaint file contained numerous Delsack & Associates is known for experience, positive relationships with manufacturers, claims. The first paragraph of Nissan’s and speedy and satisfactory settlements. answering letters expresses sympathy for the DELSACK & ASSOCIATES, P.C. person’s plight and explains how this is the 1801 CENTURY PARK EAST, SUITE 2400, LOS ANGELES CA 90067 “first incident of this nature” concerning the model.6 PH (310) 475-1700 • FAX (310) 475-1799 • E-MAIL [email protected] WEBSITE www.lemonlawspecialists.com Finally, it can be very helpful to know about cars. Sometimes the danger of a defect may not be obvious to a person who is unfa- miliar with the mechanical and electrical operations of cars. The customer and coun- sel must consider how to present the claimed defect so that it falls within the statutory definitions. Anyone presenting a Lemon Law claim should be completely familiar with the various codes that are found on the repair orders. Often, a visit to a local dealer (even the dealer that did the work) can help deci- pher the codes. It is a worthwhile exercise.
The Manufacturer’s Presentation The manufacturer’s representative may pre- sent his or her case by phone or in person. A local service manager or mechanic may also be present as a live witness. At the hearing, the manufacturer’s representative may exam- ine the local service manager or mechanic. The client’s attorney must assume that the repre- sentative and witness are very well prepared. Depending on the relationship among the SERVING THE COMMUNITY consumer, the dealership, and its employees, THROUGH YOUR BETTER the service manager or mechanic may be BUSINESS BUREAU friendly and willing to talk to counsel before the hearing. At this stage of the proceeding, the witness is not usually represented by counsel, so there is no ethical violation to talk Successful completion of a one and a half-day to the witness. A conversation at this time can training will qualify you to become a volunteer be crucial. If counsel carefully probes and arbitrator for the BBB AUTO LINE program and actively listens, he or she can glean a great deal other consumer/business disputes for your local of information. Counsel can sense whether Better Business Bureau. Training sessions are this witness will be hostile. Counsel can also being held throughout the state of California as ask the witness about his or her feeling as to early as November 2005 and continuing into the whether there is a real problem with the car year 2006. or if the heart of the problem is nothing more than one customer’s dissatisfaction. If the Applications can be completed online at former scenario seems more likely, probe for www.dr.bbb.org and click on Training. some facts. If the latter does, try to determine the basis for the opinion: What does this or that repair code mean? How many other Please call 1.800.334.2406 ext. 374 or e-mail vehicles has the witness worked on with the [email protected]. BBB certified arbitrators are same or similar problem? What was done offered an honorarium of $100 for each while the vehicle was in the shop? Frequently, completed BBB AUTO LINE case they hear. the witness will give valuable information that can be helpful in the hearing. Do not make the witness become recalcitrant by being too aggressive. Counsel should also consider the ramifications of what happens
22 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 after the arbitration. If counsel takes an information all goes to show what a great and arbitrator. That way, all can follow the aggressive stance against the witness and the vehicle the consumer has purchased. testimony without the distraction of passing consumer loses the arbitration, where will The manufacturer’s representative will a document around the room. Third, the he or she get the vehicle serviced? then call his or her witness—typically, the manufacturer is given the opportunity to The consumer should understand that service manager or mechanic. The represen- cross-examine the witness. Fourth, when the whether appearing by phone or in person, the tative will introduce the work orders. His or consumer finishes his or her case, the manu- manufacturer’s representative will be pol- her job is to show how diligently the dealer facturer presents its defense. Finally, when ished and professional at the arbitration. The worked on the vehicle and that the problems both sides rest, the arbitrator will give them representative has the technical expertise of were normal. This is why it is important for the opportunity to give a closing argument. a large corporation at his or her disposal and the consumer to have read and understood all In the closing statement counsel for the can muster statistics, copies of all repair the repair orders, including the repair codes. consumer client may reiterate the statutory orders, and a number of persuasive stories. If the manufacturer’s witness dismisses elements, then specifically connect the testi- The consumer and counsel will need some the seriousness of the problem, cross-exam- mony and evidence to each element to show help to offset this technological asymmetry. ination should concentrate on how the defect that the burden of proof has been met. The First, counsel should usually not attempt to diminished the vehicle’s use, value, and safety effectiveness of this last step of the arbitration go head-to-head with the manufacturer’s rep- as viewed by a reasonable person or the gen- process is a function of prearbitration prepa- resentative, who, as a practical matter, is an eral public. Counsel may even ask the witness ration. It is a usual tactic for the manufac- expert with unlimited resources. The con- if he or she would take the vehicle on a busy turer’s representative to restate the statistics sumer’s attorney also should be prepared for highway with his or her family. This may and information showing how the model of the manufacturer’s representative to shower make the allegation of defect or poor repair vehicle that the defective one came from is the the arbitrator with statistical data such as, personal. The witness may become so defen- greatest ever made. This is not relevant, but “The manufacturer has assembled 1,234,587 sive that he or she becomes adversarial. In the the arbitrator often allows it without com- models of this vehicle in 17 countries in the process, the witness may inadvertently com- ment. The manufacturer’s representative will world. This vehicle has been badged as X in promise his or her credibility and objectivity. usually close by trying to show the consumer North America, Y in South America, and Z did not prove the case. It is predictable the in Europe. There have been no recalls and no Preparing the Client defense will focus on the defect, trying to governmental actions against any of the Many consumers are emotional when it con- show it was not material, because the other badged vehicles.” cerns their vehicles. This emotional relation- elements are generally easier to establish. Most of this information will be irrelevant ship can play havoc with their objectivity. Unless very gifted, the consumer is not to the particular case at hand; however, the Counsel’s best tactic is to thoroughly educate likely to be able to compete on the same statistical display is very influential. In essence, the client about the Lemon Law. Counsel technical level as the manufacturer’s repre- the manufacturer is attempting with this should explain what the presumption in Civil sentative. It is also unlikely the arbitrator argument to make the car’s failings statistically Code Section 1793.22 means and take time can work at that heightened technical level insignificant. The consumer’s attorney should to fully inform the client how important it is either. It is incumbent upon the consumer or not try to win a numbers-quoting contest to show that the defect is material. Once the counsel to make the case simple, straight- with a manufacturer’s representative. Instead, client understands the factual and legal forward, and within the Lemon Law criteria. the facts concerning the particular car in requirements, counsel must outline the plan Materiality of the alleged defect is the question, whether or not they are part of a to gather the necessary evidence. Achilles heel of the typical Lemon Law case, larger pattern, may be what ultimately mat- Most owners do not maintain complete and building a solid foundation of material- ters under the law. vehicle service records. It is not a good idea ity is the most crucial part of a Lemon Law Another tactic that manufacturer’s repre- to rely on the consumer’s recollection regard- arbitration. Although the BBB arbitration is sentatives sometimes rely on, especially if the ing the number of times the vehicle was pre- a helpful forum for the consumer, it requires vehicle is not top of the line, is to imply that sented for repair or how long it was kept in adequate evidentiary showing. The BBB is a if the consumer had purchased the top-of-the- the shop. Consequently, it is absolutely nec- business funded by businesses, and it is not line model, he or she would not have had the essary to get copies of all work orders. An prone to distributing the assets of its partic- alleged problems. It is common for the man- attorney should not even consider filing for ipants without an adequate showing. ■ ufacturer to take the position that if the con- a BBB arbitration until he or she has a com- sumer had purchased a more expensive plete history of the allegedly defective vehi- 1 See CIV. CODE §1793.22(e)(2). model, it would have had better construction, cle. Counsel must assume that the manufac- 2 Civil Code §1793.2(d)(2)(C) provides the statutory insulation, or electronics. The consumer’s turer will have all relevant documents. formula. The variables may be any significant modifi- cations (sound system, new tires, or mechanical repairs attorney can call attention to the obvious Next, counsel should educate the client on or upgrades). The manufacturer will also credit license, flaw in this argument. the arbitration process. It can be confusing to title, registration, and sales and use tax. It is likely the arbitrator has previously someone who has never participated in an 3 Civil Code §1793.22(e)(1) defines “nonconformity” dealt with the manufacturer’s representative arbitration. It can be productive to do some as what substantially impairs the use, value, or safety and anticipates dealing with him or her in the role-playing. The BBB arbitration generally of the new motor vehicle to the buyer or lessee. This future. It is common for the arbitrator to adheres to the traditional arbitration mode of is also referred to as a “material defect.” 4 Griffey v. Chevrolet, GM offer Mar. 18, 2005 Service show deference to the manufacturer’s repre- question and answer. Request/File Number 1-239874049 (VIN- sentative. The consumer’s counsel should First, both parties are given an opportu- 1G1JH52FX47172523) (2005). therefore be prepared to object and to be nity to present an opening statement. Second, 5 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2314(2)(d), war- overruled. The consumer’s counsel may ask the consumer presents his or her case-in-chief ranty of merchantability. To be merchantable, “goods” the representative how any of the statistics with witnesses, evidence, and exhibits. It is may “run, within the variations permitted by the agree- ment, of even kind, quality and quantity within each presented or comments offered are relevant, prudent to make sufficient copies of any unit and among all units involved.” for example, but should be prepared for a exhibits. Usually four copies are sufficient: one 6 See NHTSA Investigation PE85-08 and 85-029, response to the effect that the cumulative each for the witness, counsel, other party, 1976-87 280Z & 300Z Recall, 87V-090.
Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 23 by Paul J. Watford State Lines Redefining the reach of the COMMERCE CLAUSE may be one of the important legacies of the Rehnquist Court
eshaping the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence ruling that effectively nullifies California’s medical marijuana statute. may be one of the central legacies of William Rehnquist’s The Raich decision calls into question the notion, widely accepted until tenure as chief justice, particularly over the course of the now, that the Rehnquist Court has initiated a dramatic realignment past decade. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Court of the legislative powers held by Congress and those reserved to the issued a series of decisions that curtailed the power of states. RCongress to legislate under the commerce clause1 and shielded states The commerce clause delegates to Congress the power “[t]o reg- from the enforcement of federal mandates.2 These decisions have led ulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several many to credit the Rehnquist Court with bringing about a funda- States….”5 Although the clause would eventually become a major mental shift in the balance of power between the states and the fed- source of federal legislative authority, it played only a limited role in eral government. defining the size and scope of the national government for the first Recent decisions, however, suggest that it is still too early to tell century following the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. Its prin- how lasting a legacy the Rehnquist Court has left in this area. In the cipal purpose was to ensure that Congress had the power to prevent latest case pitting state sovereignty interests against the commerce individual states from erecting trade barriers that would hinder the clause powers of Congress—Gonzales v. Raich,3 which was decided formation of a unified national market, and most of the early com- last term—the Court dealt a decisive defeat to those advocating merce clause cases that reached the Supreme Court arose in precisely stronger protection of states’ rights.4 In Raich the Court held that appli- cation of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to the intrastate Paul J. Watford is a partner at Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, where he special- cultivation and possession of marijuana for medicinal purposes does izes in appellate litigation. From 1995 to 1996, he served as a law clerk to U.S. not exceed the authority of Congress under the commerce clause, a Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. DENNIS IRWIN
24 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 that context.6 In these cases the Supreme Court was asked to inval- ulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity idate state laws that allegedly discriminated against interstate com- were regulated.”21 merce.7 Thus the authority of Congress to enact legislation of its own Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. They noted under the commerce clause was not at issue. that the objective of Congress in passing the act was to reduce the The first significant exercise of the “affirmative” commerce clause prevalence of school violence, which lowers educational attainment powers of Congress did not come until late in the nineteenth century, among students and thus poses a substantial threat to economic with the enactment of laws such as the Interstate Commerce Act in productivity and commerce generally.22 The majority, however, found 18878 and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.9 For the next half cen- the act’s effects on interstate commerce too attenuated to satisfy the tury, the Supreme Court struggled to develop a workable standard demands of the commerce clause.23 for determining which legislative enactments fell within the power of The Court’s decision five years later in United States v. Morrison24 Congress to regulate interstate commerce and which did not. The suggested that Lopez might have marked the beginning of a dramatic Court started from the premise that, because the Constitution created reassessment of the Court’s commerce clause jurisprudence. In a national government of enumerated powers, the authority granted Morrison, the Court struck down a provision of the Violence Against to Congress pursuant to the commerce clause had to be meaningfully Women Act that allowed victims of gender-motivated violence to bring constrained. Otherwise, the Court feared, “there would be virtually a civil suit against the perpetrators in state or federal court.25 The Court no limit to the federal power and for all practical purposes we should split 5-4 along the same lines as in Lopez, with the chief justice have a completely centralized government.”10 Acting on that concern, again writing for the Court. The majority rejected the extensive find- the Court showed no hesitation in striking down federal laws on the ings Congress had compiled to show the substantial effect violence ground that the legislation in question exceeded Congress’s author- against women has on the national economy.26 According to the ity under the commerce clause.11 majority, the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women By all accounts, however, the Court’s efforts to develop a coher- Act, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act, did not regulate commer- ent doctrine for limiting the scope of the commerce clause powers of cial conduct. Instead, the Court held, the Violence Against Women Congress were unsuccessful. The Court initially attempted to distin- Act addressed noneconomic acts of violence that had no connection guish between “production” or “manufacturing” and commerce with interstate commerce and were therefore beyond Congress’s and held that Congress had no authority to regulate activities on the power to regulate under the commerce clause.27 production side of the line—that is, prior to the point when goods enter the stream of commerce.12 When that distinction proved Medical Marijuana unworkable in subsequent cases, the Court abandoned it and adopted Lopez and Morrison set the stage for the next major test of the instead a test that attempted to distinguish between “direct” and “indi- Rehnquist Court’s apparent shift toward pre-New Deal conceptions rect” effects on interstate commerce. Under this test, those activities of the commerce clause authority of Congress. That test came last term that had merely indirect effects on interstate commerce fell outside in Raich,28 which involved a conflict between California’s desire to Congress’s power to regulate.13 But in time that test, too, proved legalize medicinal marijuana use and the federal government’s inter- unworkable. est in establishing a uniform national drug policy. Finally, in 1937, under pressure from President Franklin Roosevelt The respondents in Raich were California residents who sought to uphold the major legislative components of the New Deal, the Court to use marijuana for medicinal purposes in compliance with backed away from its earlier attempts to confine Congress’s commerce California’s Compassionate Use Act,29 an initiative measure passed clause authority within narrow channels. Beginning with NLRB v. by California voters in 1996. The Compassionate Use Act authorizes Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,14 the Court issued a series of the cultivation and possession of marijuana for medicinal purposes decisions upholding legislation that significantly expanded the size and pursuant to a doctor’s recommendation.30 The federal Controlled power of the federal government.15 The Court ultimately adopted a Substances Act, however, classifies marijuana as a Schedule I controlled test for assessing the constitutionality of legislation enacted under the substance and renders essentially any possession of marijuana illegal commerce clause that asked only whether Congress had a rational basis under federal law. The CSA reflects the judgment of Congress that there for concluding that the regulated activity “substantially affects” are no currently acceptable medical uses of the drug.31 The respon- interstate commerce.16 dents in Raich argued that Congress lacked authority under the commerce clause to extend the CSA’s reach to their intrastate culti- Guns and Gender-Motivated Violence vation and possession of marijuana for medicinal use in compliance For almost 60 years after Jones & Laughlin, the Supreme Court did with state law. They argued that the CSA, as applied to those activ- not strike down a single federal law on the ground that the enactment ities, was therefore unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit accepted exceeded Congress’s authority under the commerce clause. This this argument, relying on the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions in period of more relaxed commerce clause scrutiny saw the Court sus- Lopez and Morrison. tain the validity of a wide range of federal legislation that is now largely To the disappointment of medical marijuana advocates, as well as taken for granted, such as the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of those who hoped Raich would further limit the commerce clause pow- 1964 prohibiting racial discrimination in hotels, restaurants, and ers of Congress, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court in a 6- other places of public accommodation.17 3 decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens. The majority was The tide appeared to turn in 1995, however, in United States v. composed of the four dissenters in Lopez and Morrison—Justices Lopez.18 In that case, by a 5-4 vote, the Court struck down the Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—and two defectors from the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which prohibited possession of Lopez/Morrison majorities—Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice a firearm within 1,000 feet of any public, parochial, or private Kennedy joined the opinion of the Court in full without setting forth school.19 Writing for the majority, Rehnquist explained that the separate views of his own. Although Scalia authored an opinion Gun-Free School Zones Act did not regulate commercial or eco- concurring only in the judgment, he appeared to articulate an even nomic activity; it simply banned possession of a firearm within close broader view of Congress’s authority under the commerce clause than proximity to a school—an activity that had nothing to do with com- that embraced by the majority. merce.20 Moreover, the majority noted, the act was not “an essen- Given the ostensible similarities between Lopez and Raich, the tial part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the reg- immediate question confronting the Court was how the purely
26 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana differed in any mate- The majority in Raich held that the respondents stood in the rial respect from the purely intrastate possession of a gun in Lopez. same shoes as the farmer in Wickard. Although the respondents’ own Indeed, the respondents in Raich seemed to have a stronger hand, given intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana did not have a sub- that they were acting in compliance with an otherwise valid state law. stantial effect on interstate commerce, the majority held that Congress The defendant’s possession of a gun on school grounds in Lopez con- had a rational basis for concluding that, in the aggregate, these activ- stituted a violation of applicable state law, and thus the case did not ities could have a substantial effect on the interstate market for mar- involve a clash between competing state and federal interests.32 The ijuana.39 That conclusion would be open to question if the relevant effect of rejecting the commerce clause challenge by the respondents subclass of regulated conduct had been defined narrowly to include in Raich was the nullification (or at least a substantial undermining) only the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for med- of California’s policy judgment concerning a matter within a core area icinal use in compliance with state law, as the respondents urged.40 of state sovereignty— There was no evi- the protection of the dence in the record health and welfare of demonstrating the the state’s citizens. impact, if any, that an Despite the strong exemption of this state sovereignty inter- small subclass of ests at stake in Raich, activities from the the majority had lit- CSA’s reach would tle difficulty rejecting likely have on the the arguments ad- interstate market for vanced by the respon- marijuana.41 But the dents and the dis- majority avoided this senters. The majority problem by defining noted initially that the the relevant subclass challenge asserted by of regulated conduct the respondents in more broadly—name- Raich regarding the ly, possession of lo- application of the cally grown mari- CSA differed from the juana for personal use facial challenges as- of any kind.42 Ex- serted in Lopez and empting all personal Morrison.33 In Raich, use of marijuana from no one disputed that the CSA’s general ban, the CSA was a valid the majority con- exercise of Congress’s cluded, would clearly commerce clause pow- have a substantial ers. The respondents effect on the interstate contended only that, market for mari- given the purely in- juana.43 trastate nature of their Although there are activities, Congress similarities between had no authority to Raich and Wickard, sweep those activities the parallels between within the reach of the CSA.34 Moreover, unlike the legislation at issue the two cases are by no means perfect. The purpose of the regulatory in Lopez and Morrison, which regulated a single class of activities, scheme at issue in Wickard was price control, and it was thus easy the CSA’s ban on the cultivation and possession of marijuana was to see how allowing an exemption for intrastate activities that sig- arguably part of a larger regulatory scheme whose overall effective- nificantly reduced demand for wheat sold in the interstate market ness would be thwarted if particular subclasses of activities were would thwart the achievement of the broader regulatory objective. exempted from its scope.35 It is far less clear that the same can be said for the narrow exemp- After noting these distinctions, the majority concluded that Raich tion from the CSA sought by the respondents in Raich. The CSA’s pur- was controlled not by Lopez and Morrison but by Wickard v. pose is to ban the interstate market for marijuana altogether. If a state Filburn,36 in which the Court upheld federal restrictions on wheat pro- decides in limited circumstances to authorize possession of mari- duction as applied to a small farmer who grew wheat that was used juana that is not intended for the interstate market at all, it is diffi- solely for personal consumption. In Wickard, the Court declared that cult to argue that this state action undermines the entire regulatory Congress’s power under the commerce clause extends to purely objective of the CSA. intrastate activities if those activities, in the aggregate, will have a sub- Thus the real conflict in Raich concerned the differing state and fed- stantial effect on interstate commerce.37 That test was met in Wickard, eral policy judgments as to whether medicinal use of marijuana should the Court held, because the regulatory scheme at issue was designed be permitted. The federal government, despite a long-running campaign to stabilize the price of wheat by limiting output, and exempting all by advocates of medical marijuana, has refused to remove marijuana wheat produced for home consumption would undermine the gov- from Schedule I under the CSA, reflecting the judgment of federal ernment’s regulatory objective: “[Home-grown wheat] supplies a policymakers that marijuana has not yet been shown to have any need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by legitimate medical uses.44 The citizens of California have made the pre- purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat in this sense cisely opposite policy judgment, declaring that marijuana does have legit- competes with wheat in commerce.”38 imate and acceptable medicinal uses in certain circumstances.45
Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 27 This conflict between state and federal Power Volvo South Bay EXPERIENCED PSYCHOTHERAPIST legislative policies formed the principal basis INDIVIDUAL, COUPLE & FAMILY THERAPY for Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Raich. She argued that California’s Compassionate Use Lowest prices in town. Act was an exercise of the state’s core sover- • Anger Management eign power to “define criminal law and to pro- Scheduled maintenance for • Depression 36 months/36,000 miles FREE tect the health, safety, and welfare of [its] on new 2005’s. • Relationship Conflict citizens.”46 She questioned whether the fed- • Parenting eral government should be permitted to FREE AIRFARE FOR • Effective Communication occupy this realm to the exclusion of the EURO DELIVERY! states. In O’Connor’s view, the federalism Call John Sonne at (310) 325-3255 CALL 310.550.7818 concerns that had animated the Rehnquist for details and to schedule a Court’s decisions in prior cases provided a test drive. ELAINE VERCHICK, MA, MFT fully sufficient justification for construing (Lic.# MFC 33928) narrowly the commerce clause powers of Congress in this instance: “We enforce the ‘outer limits’ of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority not for their own sake, but to pro- tect historic spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal encroachment and thereby to maintain the distribution of power fun- damental to our federalist system of govern- ment.”47 As the outcome in Raich reflects, these federalism concerns were simply not strong enough to hold together the five-jus- tice majority that had successfully defended state sovereignty interests from federal intru- sion during much of the Rehnquist Court’s tenure.
Post-Raich Developments Following the Court’s decisions in Lopez and Morrison, advocates relied on those cases to attack a surprisingly diverse array of federal enactments as exceeding Congress’s commerce clause powers, and lower courts were at least somewhat receptive. In the wake of Raich, however, whatever momen- Your attendance at this program NITA’S BUILDING TRIAL tum Lopez and Morrison had generated for will qualify for one credit toward SKILLS PROGRAM curtailing the commerce clause powers of the NITA Advocate Designation Congress seems to have been halted. At the January 2–8, 2006 listed on LexisNexis® Martindale- very least, Raich will likely cause lower Hubbell®. Loyola Law School courts to proceed with more caution as they Los Angeles, California NITA estimates this program to ponder further commerce clause challenges provide 46.0 CLE credit hours, to federal legislation, a result perhaps fore- Learn from the best trial lawyers, of which 2.0 hours will apply to shadowed by the cases the Supreme Court judges, and law professors. This legal ethics. NITA is a State Bar of disposed of immediately after issuing its deci- hands-on, intense program will California MCLE approved provider. sion in Raich. enhance your skills in: In a closely watched case from the Fifth • Case analysis Scholarships and interest-free Circuit, a developer asserted a commerce payment plans are available. clause challenge to the Endangered Species • Jury selection Act on the ground that Congress had no • Communication To register or for more authority to extend the act’s coverage to sev- • Opening statements information call: eral species of small insects that have no commercial value and live entirely within a • Direct and cross-examination 800-225-6482 single state.48 Relying on Lopez and • Examination of lay witnesses Morrison, the developer argued that Congress • Impeachment and rehabilitation lacks authority to regulate species with no conceivable connection to interstate com- • Introduction of evidence and merce. One week after its decision in Raich, demonstrative exhibits National Institute for Trial Advocacy however, the Supreme Court denied the devel- • Closing arguments E-mail: [email protected] • www.nita.org oper’s petition for certiorari without a single dissent. The case had been viewed by many as the next logical battleground in the fight
28 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 over the proper scope of Congress’s com- merce clause authority.49 In another closely watched case, the Ninth Circuit relied on Lopez and Morrison to reverse a criminal conviction for possession of a homemade machine gun.50 Because the machine gun had not moved in interstate commerce, and because the mere possession of the gun could not be said to “substan- tially affect” interstate commerce, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the application of fed- eral firearms laws in the case exceeded Congress’s commerce clause powers. The Supreme Court vacated that decision and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Raich. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a federal criminal conviction for production and possession of child pornography in a case involving a defendant who took sexually explicit photographs of underage girls and kept them at his home. Relying on Lopez and Morrison, the Eleventh Circuit held that “purely intrastate, noncommercial production and possession of child pornography” falls outside the regulatory authority of Congress under the commerce clause.51 The Supreme Court vacated that decision as well and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Raich. As even this small sampling of cases reflects, the commerce clause powers of Congress remain highly relevant to the fed- eral government’s ability to regulate a wide range of conduct. The Supreme Court’s deci- sions construing the power of Congress to “regulate Commerce…among the several States” thus continue to have considerable importance, despite the somewhat arcane nature of the subject. Raich has left the direc- tion of the law very much in flux in this area, and the current changes in the Court’s com- position only add to the uncertainty. It may be that following the intervening events of September 11, Raich signals a shift away from the curtailment of Congress’s commerce clause powers that began in Lopez and Morrison. This type of shift would not be without historical precedent. In the late 1930s the Court responded to the exigen- cies created by the Great Depression by relax- ing the limits it had earlier placed on Congress’s authority to legislate under the commerce clause. A post-September 11 world, in which many have called for the national government to assume a more dominant role, may similarly influence the direction the Court’s commerce clause jurisprudence takes in the years ahead. ■
1 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 2 See, e.g., Board of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528
Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 29 U.S. 62 (2000); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (upholding National Labor 40 Id. at 2224 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). U.S. 44 (1996). Relations Act). 41 Id. at 2208; id. at 2226 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 3 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 2195 16 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). 42 Id. at 2212. (2005). 17 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart 43 Id. at 2206-07. 4 Advocates of greater state autonomy also suffered a of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 44 Schedule I drugs “are categorized as such because of defeat in last term’s Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. __, (1964). their high potential for abuse, lack of any accepted med- 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005). In Granholm, the Court inval- 18 Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. ical use, and absence of any accepted safety for use in idated state laws that permitted in-state wineries to ship 19 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(25), 922(q)(1)(A). medically supervised treatment.” Id. at 2204; see directly to consumers but precluded out-of-state winer- 20 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F. 3d ies from doing so. The Court held that these conced- 21 Id. 1131, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1994). edly discriminatory state laws were not saved by the 22 Id. at 623-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 45 This term, the Court will confront another conflict Twenty-first Amendment, which grants states signifi- 23 Id. at 565-66. between differing federal and state policy judgments. cant control over the regulation of liquor within their 24 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The subject this time is assisted suicide. The case borders. 25 42 U.S.C. §13981. involves federal efforts to block the implementation of 5 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3. 26 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15; see id. at 628-36 Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 6 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205. (Souter, J., dissenting). 368 F. 3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted sub 7 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 27 Id. at 617-18. nom. Gonzales v. Oregon, 125 S. Ct. 1299 (2005) 8 The Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). 28 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (No. 04-623). 9 The Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). (2005). 46 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 10 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 29 HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§11362.5, 11362.7- 47 Id. at 2220 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935). 11362.9 (2005). 48 GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F. 3d 622 (5th 11 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 30 HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11362.5(d). Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2898 (2005). (1936) (invalidating law that prohibited unfair labor 31 21 U.S.C. §812(c); see Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2204, 49 The Court was presented with a somewhat similar practices in the coal industry); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 2211. commerce clause challenge in Solid Waste Agency of 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating law that banned 32 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, shipment of goods in interstate commerce that had 33 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). The case focused on whether pro- been manufactured using child labor); Adair v. United 34 Id. at 2204-05. visions of the Clean Water Act could be applied to non- States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating law that pro- 35 Id. at 2210. navigable, intrastate bodies of water that provided tected membership in labor unions). 36 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). habitat for migratory birds. The Court held that 12 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 37 Id. at 127-28 (“That appellee’s own contribution to Congress never intended to extend the Clean Water Act 1, 12 (1895) (“Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not that far, thereby avoiding the need to decide whether is not a part of it.”). enough to remove him from the scope of federal reg- Congress had exceeded its authority under the com- 13 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 548. ulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together merce clause. 14 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 with that of many others similarly situated, is far from 50 United States v. Stewart, 348 F. 3d 1132 (9th Cir. (1937). trivial.”). 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005). 15 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 38 Id. at 128. 51 United States v. Smith, 402 F. 3d 1303, 1315 (11th (1942) (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act); Jones & 39 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206-07. Cir.), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005).
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30 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 MCLE ARTICLE AND SELF-ASSESSMENT TEST By reading this article and answering the accompanying test questions, you can earn one MCLE credit. To apply for credit, please follow the instructions on the test answer sheet on page 33.
by Eve Hill and Sheila Khan-Variba Challenging Barriers
California’s more California has prohibited discrimination inconsistencies have led to disparate results on the basis of disability for over 30 years1 in cases alleging disability discrimination, through such laws as the Fair Employment specifically in the context of claims about and Housing Act (FEHA),2 the Unruh Civil physical access and academic testing. Rights Act,3 and the Blind and Other Phy- The first challenge in applying the laws expansive definition sically Disabled Persons Act.4 As other juris- prohibiting disability discrimination is to dictions develop antidiscrimination laws of determine who is entitled to protection by for- their own, California continues to aggres- mulating an appropriate definition of a “dis- sively prohibit discrimination, including dis- ability.” Fortunately, a wealth of case law ability discrimination. shows that courts have done just that. The of disability Federal law—including the Rehabilitation cases have centered on whether the protected Act of 1973,5 the Fair Housing Amendments group should be 1) large, with the court Act of 1988,6 and the Americans with focusing the legal inquiry on whether the Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)7—embodies plaintiff was treated unfairly, or 2) small, principles similar to those found in California with the court focusing on whether the plain- provides protection law on the issue of disability rights. However, tiff is so significantly limited in his or her federal law has taken an approach funda- abilities that a reasonable accommodation mentally different from California’s regard- is justified. The U.S. Supreme Court has inter- ing the redress of disability discrimination, preted the federal Americans with Disabilities specifically in the definition of what consti- Act8 to protect a limited class of people with for more people tutes a “disability.” disabilities: those whose impairments “sub- Moreover, while federal law preempts stantially” limit major life activities.9 state laws that provide lesser protection from discrimination, state laws that exceed federal Eve Hill is the executive director of the Western Law requirements remain in force. As a result, Center for Disability Rights. Sheila Khan-Variba than federal law the application of disability discrimination is an in-house counsel in the Fox Group Legal laws has varied from state to state. These Department.
Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 31 In Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.10 the impairment is limiting. California thereby plaintiff encountering disability discrimination Supreme Court held that the ADA only pro- avoids the Catch-22 that federal law imposes may pursue damages under either the Unruh tects people whose physical or mental impair- on people with disabilities—mitigate an Act or the Blind and Other Physically ments currently (that is, at the time of the impairment and lose protection, or do not Disabled Persons Act, both of which pro- alleged discrimination) limit a major life activ- mitigate and lose the ability to perform a hibit the same forms of discrimination cov- ity substantially. The court reasoned that if a job. Therefore, employees in California may ered by the ADA. person was using mitigating measures—such take their medication, for instance, and still The ADA does not provide for damages as glasses, hearing aids, or medication—to be considered persons with a disability under for discrimination by private businesses.23 reduce the effects of his or her impairment at the law. However, under federal and California law, the time of the alleged discrimination, the Under California law, discrimination on a prevailing plaintiff may recover his or her limitation caused by the impairment should the basis of minor impairments is considered reasonable attorney’s fees.24 be balanced against the mitigating measures. irrational and thus prohibited. On the other In California, when access violations are Thus the plaintiffs in Sutton, whose vision hand, the complexity and expense of the unremedied, damages are available based on impairment was rectified by glasses, were accommodations required for the disability statutory liability and the doctrine of con- not substantially limited in the major life must be proportional to the severity of the dis- tinuing violations.25 Under this doctrine, a activity of seeing, and United Airlines was free ability. Thus, California law attempts to focus person who is deterred from seeking access to exclude them from its employment appli- on the fairness of the treatment to which the because of a known physical access barrier is cant pool without further consideration. person is subjected, not on limiting the size deemed to have been denied access. Therefore, Federal courts have interpreted the “sub- of the protected class. This is the same a business may be held liable for each time stantial limitation” requirement narrowly to approach that is used in the context of race that person is deterred.26 However, this does exclude people whose impairments can be and gender civil rights laws. Those laws do not mean that the person with a disability is treated to some extent by medications or not consider how female or male a person is, entitled to $4,000 in damages for every day equipment.11 Courts have applied the Sutton or how much minority ancestry he or she of an architectural barrier’s existence. interpretation to exclude from ADA protec- has. They instead focus on the discrimination Some businesses argue that the availabil- tion people with a variety of mitigated impair- and its causation. ity of statutory damages and attorney’s fees ments such as diabetes,12 depression,13 and Some businesses argue that California’s has led to a rash of claims concerning barri- epilepsy.14 seemingly boundless definition of a disability ers that businesses would have fixed volun- Many argue that this limitation is neces- permits employees and patrons to sue based tarily if they had been given notice. These sary to prevent the granting of unnecessary upon policies that are not intended to harm claims often seek only monetary compensa- civil rights protection to people who do not people with disabilities. And they further tion, without demanding that the barrier have “real” disabilities—such as people who argue that the burdens of disability discrim- actually be removed. Neither Title III of the are slightly near-sighted and wear contact ination litigation on businesses and the courts ADA nor California disability rights laws lenses or people who have backaches that cannot be justified. However, these argu- require prefiling notification or the exhaustion are controlled by pain medication. They posit ments seek to supplant the balance the of administrative remedies for suits over that businesses and employers need to be California Legislature has struck to prevent access to businesses. Thus, a person with a dis- protected from lawsuits and expensive discrimination on one hand and stymie friv- ability who encounters a barrier to access is requests for reasonable accommodation by olous lawsuits on the other.17 While suits not statutorily required to inform the business people with minor impairments. Others dis- containing claims of disability discrimina- (or any government agency) about the vio- agree, contending that the substantial limi- tion may pose incidental burdens on busi- lation before filing suit and recovering dam- tation requirement can go too far. In their nesses and the judicial system, significant ages. However, there is a developing judicial view, people with depression who respond obstacles must be overcome before plaintiffs trend under both the ADA and California law well to medication could be refused a job can prevail in these suits. These hurdles prin- to require notification by imposing limita- because of their depression, even if it has no cipally are causation and available damages tions on recovery. relevance to job performance—a refusal with and, absent significant discrimination, they Some courts have limited the recovery of a discriminatory basis. Employers could argue often make it impractical to bring suit in the attorney’s fees in situations in which a prefiling successfully that people with medically treat- first place. notice is not given to the offending business. able depression do not have a disability and In Doran v. Del Taco, Inc.,27 although the are not protected by the ADA because their Damages for Discrimination plaintiff was a prevailing party, and notifi- impairment is not substantially limiting when Another major difference between the ADA cation is not a prerequisite prior to filing a they take their medication. Disability advo- and California law is the availability of dam- lawsuit, the federal district court determined cates argue that this type of irrational exclu- ages for victims of discrimination by busi- as an exercise of its discretion that “no attor- sion is exactly what the disability rights laws nesses. Both Title III of the ADA18 and neys’ fees are recoverable in the absence of a should address and forbid. California law require places of public accom- pre-litigation unambiguous warning notice A few years ago, the California Legislature modation (which include most private busi- and a reasonable opportunity to cure the amended the Fair Employment and Housing nesses that are open to the public) to remove ADA violation.” Similarly, in Graham v. Act to make clear that California’s defini- physical barriers to access—such as steps, DaimlerChrysler Corporation,28 the Cal- tion of “disability” diverges from that in the heavy doors, and narrow aisles—or to pro- ifornia Supreme Court held that plaintiffs ADA.15 Under California law, a person is vide alternate means of access. The Unruh must engage in a reasonable attempt to set- considered to have a disability if his or her Civil Rights Act19 provides for either $4,000 tle their dispute with the defendant before lit- impairment limits a major life activity. Proof statutory damages or up to three times actual igation in order to recover fees as a private of substantial limitation is not required.16 damages.20 Similarly, the Blind and Other attorney general. Moreover, California does not consider mit- Physically Disabled Persons Act21 provides for Other courts and defendants have sought igating measures, such as medication or hear- $1,000 statutory damages or up to three the protections of the restrictions on vexatious ing aids, when determining whether a person’s times actual damages.22 In most cases, a litigants, which traditionally are used to curb
32 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 MCLE Test No. 142 MCLE Answer Sheet #142 CHALLENGING BARRIERS
The Los Angeles County Bar Association certifies that this activity has been approved for Minimum Name Continuing Legal Education credit by the State Bar of California in the amount of 1 hour. Law Firm/Organization
1. The federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) pre- 12. Both California law (the Unruh Civil Rights Act and Address empts state disability rights laws to the extent they pro- the Blind and Other Physically Disabled Persons Act) vide lesser protection than the ADA. and Title 3 of the ADA allow parties to recover damages City True. for disability discrimination by private businesses. State/Zip False. True. E-mail False. Phone 2. California law has provided disability rights pro- tections for over 30 years. 13. The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides damages in the State Bar # True. sum of up to treble actual damages or statutory dam- False. ages of $4,000 per violation. INSTRUCTIONS FOR OBTAINING MCLE CREDITS True. 1. Study the MCLE article in this issue. 3. The ADA is the first federal law to outlaw disability False. 2. Answer the test questions opposite by marking discrimination. the appropriate boxes below. Each question True. 14. A private business can be liable for a violation of has only one answer. Photocopies of this answer sheet may be submitted; however, this False. the California disability rights laws each time a person form should not be enlarged or reduced. with a disability is deterred from access to the business. 4. The ADA, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court True. 3. Mail the answer sheet and the $15 testing fee ($20 for non-LACBA members) to: in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., protects people with False. physical or mental impairments that can be mitigated Los Angeles Lawyer by medication or devices such as glasses or hearing aids. 15. The ADA requires people with disabilities to notify MCLE Test P.O. Box 55020 True. private businesses of any violations before filing a law- Los Angeles, CA 90055 False. suit. Make checks payable to Los Angeles Lawyer. True. 5. The Sutton decision interpreted the ADA as pro- False. 4. Within six weeks, Los Angeles Lawyer will return your test with the correct answers, a hibiting discrimination on the basis of a disability, rationale for the correct answers, and a even if the disability only existed in the past. 16. The district court in Molski v. Mandarin Touch certificate verifying the MCLE credit you earned True. Restaurant held that the only factor in deciding whether through this self-assessment activity. False. a person with a disability is a vexatious litigant is 5. For future reference, please retain the MCLE whether he or she has filed more than 300 lawsuits. test materials returned to you. 6. It is difficult for people with mitigated impairments— True. such as diabetes, depression, and epilepsy—to be False. ANSWERS protected from discrimination under the ADA. Mark your answers to the test by checking the True. 17. In Turner v. Association of American Medical appropriate boxes below. Each question has only one answer. False. Colleges, the superior court held that California law should be applied to accommodation requests made ■ ■ 7. Mitigating measures under the ADA include med- by California examinees sitting for the Medical College 1. True False ications as well as equipment. Admission Test. 2. ■ True ■ False True. True. 3. ■ True ■ False False. False. 4. ■ True ■ False ■ ■ 8. The ADA does not apply to private businesses. 18. California has played a leading role in the early 5. True False True. development of disability discrimination law. 6. ■ True ■ False False. True. 7. ■ True ■ False False. 8. ■ True ■ False 9. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act ■ ■ (FEHA) was amended in 2000 to adopt the same defi- 19. Courts in states other than California generally 9. True False nition of disability contained in the ADA. have interpreted their state laws to define disability in 10. ■ True ■ False True. the same way as the ADA. 11. ■ True ■ False False. True. 12. ■ True ■ False False. 13. ■ True ■ False 10. The California disability rights laws apply to a nar- rower group of people than the group protected by the 20. The Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Blind and Other 14. ■ True ■ False federal ADA. Physically Disabled Persons Act, like FEHA, are designed 15. ■ True ■ False True. to regulate employer-employee relationships. 16. ■ True ■ False False. True. 17. ■ True ■ False False. 11. FEHA protects people whose impairments limit, 18. ■ True ■ False but do not substantially limit, a major life activity. 19. ■ True ■ False True. 20. ■ True ■ False False.
Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 33 pro se plaintiffs who file multiple, frivolous began enacting its laws in this area 30 years made and a plaintiff nevertheless files suit, the lawsuits against the same defendant. Recently ago and since the ADA went into effect 15 business could be permitted to offer evidence courts have taken the position that a person years ago. They also note that the number of of the modifications as mitigation of the with a disability who files numerous com- people with disabilities who abuse the dis- alleged violation. plaints over access barriers may be considered ability laws are very few. Business advocates a vexatious litigant if he or she seeks com- respond that repetitive lawsuits are simply Disability Law and Standardized Testing pensation for similar injuries and resolves or extortion attempts that do not further the The differences between California and fed- drops many of the cases without litigation. In goals of the disability rights laws but unduly eral law have now extended beyond employ- Molski v. Mandarin Touch Restaurant,29 the interfere with the legitimate conduct of busi- ment and physical barriers. Recently, a plaintiff filed a suit claiming the defendant’s ness activities. California court ruled that California’s broad inaccessible restroom caused him injury. Legislators have attempted to address this definition of “disability” also applies in the Because the plaintiff had filed over 300 suits perceived problem through legislative pro- realm of standardized testing. In July 2005, a number of California stu- dents (along with the International Dyslexia Disability rights advocates argue that restrictions for Association and the National Disabled Students Union) filed a lawsuit against the vexatious litigants in the context of disability Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) claiming that they should be afforded additional time to take the Medical discrimination litigation unduly restrict the ability of College Admission Test (MCAT) as a rea- sonable accommodation under state law.31 In Turner v. Association of American Medical people with disabilities to enforce access laws that Colleges, the students claimed that their var- ious disabilities—including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and dyslexia—affect the businesses have been ignoring since California began conditions, manner, and duration necessary for their completion of the MCAT.32 The plaintiffs are seeking accommodations for enacting its laws in this area 30 years ago and since their disabilities. At issue in this lawsuit is the AAMC’s the ADA went into effect 15 years ago. eligibility criteria for testing accommoda- tions. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the AAMC’s use of the ADA “substantial against different defendants for access prob- posals that would require claimants to notify limitation” analysis instead of California’s lems in the several years prior to this suit businesses in advance of filing suit and pro- “limitation” disability standard when review- and had filed 13 suits claiming similar injuries vide businesses with an opportunity to fix the ing accommodation requests made by against other defendants for the same four-day identified problems.30 The proposals, however, California examinees. The plaintiffs argued period of the claim in this case, the court have been drafted so broadly that they would that the AAMC’s failure to provide accom- found that he was a vexatious litigant. The excuse businesses not just for access barriers modations violates their civil rights guaran- Molski court considered five factors: 1) the but also for intentionally excluding people teed by California law. This echoes the posi- plaintiff’s history of litigation, 2) his motive with disabilities, such as through a blanket tion of many disability rights advocates. The in pursuing the lawsuit at issue, 3) whether “no pets” policy that is used to exclude blind plaintiffs also maintained that because the the plaintiff was represented by counsel, 4) persons with service dogs. MCAT is not designed to measure reading or whether the plaintiff had caused unneces- These proposals also have failed to rec- writing speed but instead assesses reasoning sary expense to other parties or posed an ognize that federal and California law impose skills, analytical abilities, and knowledge of unnecessary burden on the courts, and 5) affirmative obligations on businesses to make scientific topics, extra time would not com- whether other sanctions would sufficiently their facilities accessible. Like health and promise the predictive validity or integrity of protect the parties. safety laws, OSHA requirements, and other the exam. Without the requested accommo- In finding that plaintiff Molski was a vex- civil rights laws, disability laws do not defer dations, the plaintiffs claimed that they can- atious litigant, the court relied primarily on compliance until after a complaint is filed. The not demonstrate their knowledge and skills by the plaintiff’s history of filing lawsuits and statutes also do not require the person with their performance on the MCAT. found that his motive was a bad faith desire a disability to educate a business about pro- The plaintiffs asserted claims under to extract cash. The court also found that the hibitions against disability discrimination California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act33 and plaintiff’s lawyer acted in bad faith by advis- after a violation, thereby acting as an access the Blind and Other Physically Disabled ing defendants not to defend themselves. The consultant. Still, many businesses fail to com- Persons Act34 but none under the ADA. The court sanctioned Molski and his attorney by ply with access laws despite the many years Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Blind and requiring them to request court approval that they have been in existence. Other Physically Disabled Persons Act are before filing any future complaints. A more palatable approach for businesses public accommodations laws and, unlike Disability rights advocates argue that and people with disabilities may be a leg- FEHA, are not designed to regulate employer- restrictions for vexatious litigants in the con- islative response to the Del Taco and Daim- employee relationships. Nevertheless, both text of disability discrimination litigation lerChrysler decisions. This would involve an statutes expressly invoke FEHA’s more expan- unduly restrict the ability of people with dis- increase in statutory damages when notice of sive definition of “disability.”35 abilities to enforce access laws that busi- a violation is given and a business fails to In an interim ruling, the court concluded nesses have been ignoring since California make its facility accessible. If modifications are that the AAMC should apply California’s
34 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 disability laws when considering testing requested extra time to take the exam because accommodations for California examinees she has dyslexia and attention deficit disor- Legislative Intent. who do not qualify as “disabled” under the der. Thereafter, she sued the NBME for dis- You probably seldom ADA.36 Testing organizations and other pub- ability discrimination, alleging both state and need it. lic entities will, no doubt, challenge this rul- federal claims.39 The court held that the ing on the grounds that it compromises the denial of the plaintiff’s accommodation But when the need does arise, uniformity and predictive validity of stan- request was not discriminatory. In reaching it can be crucial to winning dardized exams. They also will argue, as did its conclusion, the court was persuaded by your case. the AAMC, that testing conditions will be many of the same arguments advanced by the anything but uniform if public entities are AAMC in the Turner case in California. Tracking down sources of information can be a frustrating and time consuming process. required to apply different state disability Specifically, the court emphasized that the When legislative history is important to your discrimination laws to examinees from dif- NBME’s procedures are designed to ensure case it can be very cost effective to engage our ferent states instead of a uniform standard that individuals with “bona fide” disabili- professional expertise to research the history that comports with the ADA. ties receive accommodations and that those and intent of the statutes or administrative Arguably, the court’s ruling creates an without disabilities do not gain an unfair enactments at issue in your case. uneven playing field for MCAT examinees advantage when sitting for the exam.40 It When you call, you can explain what with similar mental or physical limitations further noted that if the NBME departs from you need, or tell me your situation and I can residing in different states. However, the its procedure, including its use of the ADA’s make suggestions on possible approaches. court acknowledged that the scores of exam- substantial limitation test, it would alter the You can draw on my years of experience, so inees whose disabilities are accommodated substance of its work or “product” because you will know what is likely to be available on your topic. You will get a precise quote pursuant to California law could be “flagged” the resulting scores would not be guaran- for the cost of the project. When you in some way. But this solution, while seem- teed to reflect each examinee’s abilities accu- authorize us to proceed, the report will be in 41 ingly leveling the playing field, may do more rately. your office on the date you specify. harm than good by singling out those who In Massachusetts, a medical student with received an accommodation for discrimina- attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and a JAN RAYMOND tory treatment when scores are reviewed for learning disability was refused a preliminary LEGISLATIVE HISTORY & INTENT admissions purposes. Thus a victory for exam- injunction requiring the NBME to grant her Toll Free (888) 676-1947 inees seeking accommodations may be tran- extra time on a medical licensing examina- Fax (530) 750-0190 ■ E-mail: [email protected]. sitory and may ultimately result in under- tion.42 The district court noted that because www.naj.net cutting the ADA’s objectives, which focus on the state public accommodation statute pro- State Bar #88703 placing persons with disabilities on an equal vides the same kinds of protections as the footing with others rather than doling out ADA, the ADA standard is applicable to the special privileges. plaintiff’s federal and state claims.43 Nevertheless, Congress allows states to Accordingly, the court applied the ADA’s provide more expansive protections than substantial limitation standard, determined IMMIGRATION those contained in the ADA.37 And the court that the plaintiff was unlikely to show that in Turner acknowledged that the task of she was disabled, and ultimately denied the applying a plethora of state disability laws to plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. examinees located in various states may prove A district court in Ohio reached a similar burdensome. However, the court held that the result in a case involving a medical student logistical nightmare painted by the AAMC did with a reading disorder and a generalized 44 LAW not outweigh California’s interest in pro- anxiety disorder. Applying the ADA’s dis- tecting its disabled citizens. This result was in ability standard, the medical student failed to TASOFF & TASOFF part due to the recognition that the applica- prove that his reading disorder substantially tion of different state disability laws is no limited his ability to learn and thus did not FOUNDED 1949 more burdensome on standardized test orga- warrant extra time for the completion of his ● Certified Immigration Law nizations than the complex task national written exams.45 Specialists (SBC BLS) employers face when adhering to a variety of In West Virginia, a student who claimed state labor and employment laws. to have a learning disability sued his college ● Employment & Family Based: Other decisions involving testing accom- for its failure to provide him with reasonable “Green Cards” modations reveal that the disability discrim- testing accommodations.46 In addressing the “Work Permits” (E, H, I, O–Visas) ination statutes in states other than California plaintiff’s claims under the ADA and state law, U.S. Citizenship generally are consistent with the ADA. Thus the district court applied the ADA’s disabil- ● courts situated outside California typically ity standard and also relied upon Department Over 55 Years of Experience defer to the ADA’s requirements when deter- of Justice regulations that described disabil- ● Focus on Business, Professional & mining whether a denial of accommodations ity as “[a]ny mental or physiological disorder Institutional Immigration is lawful or not. such as…specific learning disabilities.”47 The For example, in a case decided by the court granted the college’s summary judg- Second Circuit Court of Appeals, a former ment motion, concluding that the student medical student claimed that the National failed to show that he had a specific learning www.tasoff.com Board of Medical Examiners (NBME) dis- disability. Also, the court emphasized that criminated against her when it denied her the accommodation requests made by the 818.788.8900 16255 VENTURA BOULEVARD, SUITE 1000 accommodation request.38 After twice failing student, including taking exams orally and ENCINO CA 91436-2302 the medical licensing examination, the student receiving extra credit for passing scores,
Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 35 would have given him an unfair advantage over nondisabled students or would have Anita Rae Shapiro lowered the standards for course study at the college.48 SUPERIOR COURT COMMISSIONER, RET. In Minnesota, an unsuccessful candidate PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION for teacher certification sued the state board alleging that its refusal to waive the math PROBATE, CIVIL, FAMILY LAW portion of a standardized licensure test was PROBATE EXPERT WITNESS discriminatory.49 The plaintiff was diagnosed with two learning disabilities, dyslexia and TEL/FAX: (714) 529-0415 CELL/PAGER: (714) 606-2649 E-MAIL: [email protected] dyscalculia. Applying the ADA’s disability http://adr-shapiro.com standard to the plaintiff’s state disability dis- crimination claims, the district court deemed FEES: $300/hr the candidate’s accommodation request unrea- sonable and granted summary judgment in favor of the state board. It is fitting that California, which played a leading role in the early stages of the devel- opment of disability discrimination law, once again finds itself apart from the rest of the nation in this area. For the sake of people with disabilities and the businesses with which they interact on a daily basis, hopefully it will not take a span of 30 years and sub- stantial litigation for the courts to settle what is and is not a disability and what accom- modations are required to prevent discrimi- nation. ■
1 1973 Cal. Stat. 2498, 2598, ch. 1189, §1. 2 The Fair Employment and Housing Act, GOV’T CODE §12926.1. 3 The Unruh Civil Rights Act, CIV. CODE §§51 et seq. 4 The Blind and Other Physically Disabled Persons Act, CIV. CODE §54. 5 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§791- 794d. 6 The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§3601 et seq. 7 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§12101 et seq. 8 42 U.S.C. §§12101 et seq. 9 Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 480 (1999). 10 Id. 11 Id. at 482-83. 12 Anyan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 F. Supp. 2d 228, 244 (S.D. N.Y. 2002), aff’d, Anyan v. Nelson, 68 Fed. Appx. 260, 2003 WL 21523167 (2d Cir. 2003); Sepulveda v. Glickman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 186, 191 (D. P.R. 2001). But see Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F. 3d 916, 929 (7th Cir. 2001) (treated diabetes may still limit ability to metabolize food). 13 Swanson v. University of Cincinnati, 268 F. 3d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 2001); Cooper v. Olin Corp., 246 F. 3d 1083, 1091 (8th Cir. 2001); Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F. 3d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 1999); Robb v. Horizon Credit Union, 66 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (C.D. Ill. 1999). 14 Brunke v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 344 F. 3d 819 (8th Cir. 2003); Arnold v. City of Appleton, Wis., 97 F. Supp. 2d 937, 949 (E.D. Wis. 2000). 15 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 1049, §5 (SB 2222; AB 2222). 16 GOV’T. CODE §12926.1. 17 Compare CIV. CODE §52(a) and CODE CIV. PROC. §128.7. 18 42 U.S.C. §§12181 et seq. 19 CIV. CODE §§51 et seq. 20 CIV. CODE §52. 21 CIV. CODE §54.
36 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 22 CIV. CODE §54.3. ATTENTION ALL LAWYERS — Wheeled File Cases 23 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE • Designed to carry your heavy files and books MANUAL §III-8.2000 (Nov. 1993). Top grain leather file to and from the courtroom 24 42 U.S.C. §12205. case for only $139.95 • Padded compartment for laptop computers 25 See CIV. CODE §338; Kramer v. Regents of the Univ. plus S&H of Cal., 81 F. Supp. 2d 972, 977-78 (1999); Richards • Three brass combination locks v. CH2M Hill, 26 Cal. 4th 798 (2001). Ultimate in • Three position telescopic handles 26 See Lentini v. California Ctr. for the Arts, 370 F. 3d , • Size 18”L x 10”W x 16”H 837, 847-49 (9th Cir. 2004) (The plaintiff established convenience sufficient evidence that she was deterred from attend- ,and • We also carry PVC material file utility cases for only $99.95 plus ing a performance at the facility by showing that the S&H of $19.95 plaintiff previously had attended events there and great look! would have gone back but for the violation.); see also Botoson v. Fitzhugh, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1051-52 (D. To order, call 714-928-3742 or fax your order to 714-779-8645 Cal. 1998) (holding that if a person is deterred from Or e-mail us at [email protected] going back on a daily basis to a facility, deterrence alone suffices to establish a claim for actual damages). 27 Doran v. Del Taco, Inc., 2005 WL 1389270 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 28 Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 553, 577 (2004). See also Tipton-Whittingham v. City of L.A., 34 Cal. 4th 604, 608 (2004) (To recover private attorney general fees, a plaintiff must reasonably attempt to settle before litigation.). 29 Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 926-27, 934, 937 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 30 See, e.g., AB 20 (2005); SB 855 (2005) (Cal.). 31 Turner v. American Ass’n of Med. Colleges, No. RG 04166148 (Alameda County Super. Ct. (Cal.), Feb. 18, 2005) (The plaintiffs erroneously identified the name of the defendant in their complaint.). The MCAT is a timed, standardized entrance exam used by medical schools nationwide. It is regarded as a reliable predic- tor of a candidate’s success in medical school and on the United States Medical Licensing Examination (com- monly referred to as the “national boards”) required for medical licensure. 32 Two of the named plaintiffs in the Turner case, Andres Turner and Brendan Pierce, have dropped out of the lawsuit. Their respective accommodation requests were approved by the AAMC shortly after the case was filed. As stated in the complaint, Pierce has been diag- nosed with dyslexia and attention deficit hyperactivity today disorder. Turner has been diagnosed with an unspec- File court documents ified learning disability. 33 CIV. CODE §§51 et seq. throughout California. 34 CIV. CODE §54. 35 CIV. CODE §§§51, 52, 54; GOV’T CODE §§12926(i)(1), 12926(k)(1). 36 Turner, No. RG 04166148 (order granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication). 37 42 U.S.C. §12201(b); see 42 U.S.C. §12189. 38 Powell v. National Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 364 F. 3d 79 (2d Cir. 2004). 39 The court did not address the plaintiff’s state claims because they were not the subject of her appeal. Id. at 81. Now, you can file your documents with the click of a button to 40 Id. at 89-90. any of 170+ state courts. To place an order, register at 41 Id. 42 Baer v. National Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, No. Civ. A. www.onelegal.com. Then, upload or fax your documents to us 05-10724-GAO, 2005 WL 1027289 (D. Mass. May 3, and we’ll guarantee delivery!* With millions of successful filings 2005). 43 Id. at *3 n.1. since 1990, rely on the recognized leader in online court filing. 44 Brown v. University of Cincinnati, No. C-1-04-164, 2005 WL 1324885 (S.D. Ohio June 3, 2005). 45 Because the court granted summary judgment to the university on the plaintiff’s federal claims, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state claims. Id. at *16. 46 Dubois v. Alderson-Broaddus Coll., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 754, 758 (N.D. W.Va. 1997). 1-800-938-8815 [email protected] 47 Id. at 758. 48 Id. at 760-61. © 2005. One Legal, Inc. *Guarantee subject to certain terms. See website for details. 49 Jacobsen v. Tillmann, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D. Minn. 1998).
Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 37 by STEVEN D. ATLEE and BRIAN F. McMAHON
SEARCHThe use of trademarked terms by Web search pages has challenged traditional boundaries of trademark protection
TERMSAS INTERNET COMMERCE has become a more engines. For example, a business may contract ments are readily met in most instances, and prominent part of everyday life and busi- with a search engine company to ensure that they have not warranted substantial treat- ness, it has become increasingly important for links to its Web site are prominently dis- ment in case law.4 The likelihood of confusion companies to ensure that their Web pages played nearby the actual search results. This element, however, is frequently litigated. get noticed.1 Businesses have devised all sorts would seem a perfectly appropriate business To determine likelihood of confusion, var- of strategies to gain visibility on search engines strategy in order to maximize the effectiveness ious circuits employ some type of multifactor and place links to their sites in front of users. of a search engine’s capabilities for the ben- test, commonly referred to by the name of the Some Webmasters have gone so far as to efit of that business. Problems, however, may seminal case in that circuit.5 In the Ninth download invisible copies of dictionaries arise under the Lanham Act if the search Circuit, courts determine the likelihood of onto their Web sites in the hopes of attract- term just happens to be another’s trademark. confusion by examining the Sleekcraft factors, ing users who insert any cognizable word Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must an eight-factor test first employed in 1979 in into a search engine’s query box. Others have prove five elements in order to succeed on a employed a strategy known as “stuffing,” claim of trademark infringement: 1) the plain- Steven D. Atlee is a partner in the litigation depart- which lists particular words many times in the tiff possesses a protectable mark, 2) the defen- ment of Latham & Watkins LLP and specializes in Web site’s HTML for the sole purpose of dant uses this mark, 3) the defendant uses this litigation of intellectual property, unfair competi- increasing the relevancy of the business’s Web mark in commerce, 4) the mark is used “‘in tion, and class action matters. Brian F. McMahon site in response to particular search terms.2 connection with the sale, offering for sale, dis- is an associate with Latham & Watkins in Los In addition to such unsavory methods, tribution, or advertising’ of goods and ser- Angeles and specializes in intellectual property there are more scrupulous techniques avail- vices,” and 5) the defendant’s use of the mark litigation. They would like to acknowledge the able, such as buying sponsored ads based is likely to cause confusion.3 In the context of assistance of Latham & Watkins summer associate upon certain key words from the major search trademark use in cyberspace, the first four ele- Michele Lorbieski. KEN CORRAL
38 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats.6 The test is a isfied that the mark is sufficiently famous, a public [was] likely to be somehow confused pliant one, and courts are free to determine plaintiff may obtain relief if further showings about the source or sponsorship of West which factors warrant the most serious con- are made that “the defendant is making com- Coast’s moviebuff.com Web site—and some- sideration depending on the facts in each mercial use of the mark in commerce; the how to associate that site with Brookfield.”15 case. Thus, if five factors weigh in favor of the defendant’s use began after the plaintiff’s The court began its Sleekcraft analysis by defendant, but the three most important mark became famous; and the defendant’s use addressing the domain name issue, conclud- weigh in favor of the plaintiff, courts can presents a likelihood of dilution of the dis- ing that a likelihood of confusion did exist suf- conclude that a likelihood of confusion exists. tinctive value of the mark.”11 Because the ficient to support plaintiff’s request for a pre- Also, courts need not consider every factor, reach of the FTDA is “quite narrow” and liminary injunction.16 It then turned to the use and they are free to create additional factors applies only to a “limited category of trade- of trademarks in metatags. Acknowledging if the need arises.7 In general, courts will marks,” plaintiffs may have greater success in that “all eight likelihood of confusion fac- look to the following: 1) similarity of the attempting to show a likelihood of confusion tors…with the possible exception of pur- conflicting designations, 2) relatedness or under the Lanham Act.12 chaser care…apply here as they did in [the] proximity of the two companies’ products or analysis of domain names,” the court services, 3) strength of the plaintiff’s mark, 4) The Lanham Act in Cyberspace expressed its view that while any confusion marketing channels used, 5) degree of care The Ninth Circuit first applied the likelihood resulting from metatag use was “not as great”
likely to be exercised by purchasers in select- of confusion Sleekcraft factors to cyberspace as in the domain name context, such confu- ing goods, 6) defendant’s intent in selecting in 1999 in Brookfield Communications, Inc. sion was still actionable as “initial interest its mark, 7) evidence of actual confusion, v. West Coast Entertainment Corporation.13 confusion.” The court reasoned: and 8) likelihood of expansion in product The plaintiff, which was “founded in 1987 for Web surfers looking for Brookfield’s lines.8 the purpose of creating and marketing soft- “MovieBuff” products who are taken If a plaintiff cannot meet its burden in ware and services for professionals in the by search engine to “westcoastvideo showing a likelihood of confusion, relief is not entertainment industry,” had been using the .com” will find a database similar necessarily precluded. Under the Federal “MovieBuff” mark since 1993, had received enough to “MovieBuff” such that a Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), a plaintiff California state trademark registration in sizeable number of consumers who may seek injunctive relief (and in some cases 1994, and had received federal trademark were originally looking for Brookfield’s damages) if another party wrongfully uses the registration in 1998. The defendant, which product will simply decide to utilize plaintiff’s famous trademark.9 The rigorous was then one of the nation’s largest video West Coast’s offerings instead. requirement that the mark be famous, how- rental store chains, had been using the plain- Although there is no source confusion ever, renders the analysis of a claim of dilu- tiff’s yet-to-be federally registered trademark in the sense that consumers know they tion under the FTDA quite dissimilar to a “MovieBuff” as both a domain name are patronizing West Coast rather than claim for infringement under the Lanham (Moviebuff.com) and as a metatag since Brookfield, there is nevertheless ini- Act. To begin with, courts will look at a vari- 1996.14 After determining that the plaintiff tial interest confusion in the sense that, ety of factors, including those expressly pro- was the senior user (and therefore deeming the by using “moviebuff.com” or vided by statute, to determine whether the mark protectable under the Lanham Act), “MovieBuff” to divert people look- mark is sufficiently famous to warrant pro- the court went on to examine whether, ing for “MovieBuff” to its Web site, tection under the FTDA.10 If the court is sat- through the defendant’s use of the mark, “the West Coast improperly benefits from
Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 39 the goodwill that Brookfield devel- will be confused as to the source, identity, or Identification of the manufacturer or sponsor oped in its mark.17 sponsorship of the advertiser’s product.’”20 of the good or the provider of a service. And As a result, West Coast was preliminarily Given the threshold for invoking the defense the wrong protected against was traditionally enjoined from using Brookfield’s marks as a of nominative use, however, it is of little equally limited: Preventing producers from domain name and in metatags.18 value in instances in which confusion is likely. free-riding on their rivals’ marks.”23 The The circumstances in Brookfield, how- A defendant who intends to assert the court identified “a class of cases where the use ever, can be viewed quite differently from nominative use defense when confusion is of the trademark does not attempt to capi- the use of trademarks to generate banner likely must make three showings, first artic- talize on consumer confusion or to appro- advertisements on pages of search engine ulated in New Kids on the Block v. News priate the cachet of one product for a differ- results. While the Brookfield opinion focused America Publishing, Inc.: ent one.” This class of cases, in which use of on the consumer’s plausibly likely initial con- First, the product or service in question the mark is merely nominative, “lies outside fusion, given the growing sophistication of must be one not readily identifiable the strictures of trademark law.” Concluding Internet users in the past few years, it may be without use of the trademark; second, that the defendants could not possibly refer that banner advertisements do not necessar- only so much of the mark or marks to the New Kids on the Block without par- ily confuse today’s Internet user even momen- may be used as is reasonably necessary ticularly naming them, that the defendants did tarily.19 Most Internet users today are suffi- to identify the product or service; and not use the mark in question beyond what
ciently savvy to recognize and distinguish third, the user must do nothing that was necessary for identification, and that the among Web sites and advertisements of com- would, in conjunction with the mark, defendants did nothing to suggest sponsorship peting companies. Moreover, even if there suggest sponsorship or endorsement or endorsement, the newspapers were not were any confusion stemming from the use of by the trademark holder.21 liable for any claim of trademark infringe- another’s trademark, such use quite possi- In New Kids, various newspapers had ment.24 Rather, their use was merely nomi- bly could be protected as a “nominative” or established long-distance toll numbers in native. “fair” use. order to gather data to determine which Kid Whether the nominative use defense may was most popular. The plaintiff filed several be successfully employed in the context of Nominative and Fair Use Defenses claims, among which was a claim for common generating Internet banner advertisements Generally, nominative use of a trademark law trademark infringement. The district will depend greatly on the facts of each case. occurs when a party refers to a mark as a mat- court granted summary judgment in favor For instance, the Ninth Circuit recently ter of incidental use. Probably the most preva- of the defendants on First Amendment refused to extend nominative use to protect lent form of nominative trademark use is grounds, but on appeal, a desire to avoid the the defendants’ use of plaintiffs’ trademarks comparative advertising, in which a business constitutional issue caused the Ninth Circuit in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Com- uses another’s trademark only for purposes of to examine whether the plaintiff had viable munications Corporation.25 There, citing making truthful product comparisons. More claims in the first instance.22 New Kids on the Block, the court concluded thoroughly stated, “The use of a competitor’s In addressing the trademark infringement that because other words besides the plaintiffs’ trademark for purposes of comparative adver- issue, the court began with the purpose of trademarks were available to identify the tising is not trademark infringement ‘so long trademark law: “Throughout the develop- goods or products sold, the defendants’ use as it does not contain misrepresentations or ment of trademark law, the purpose of trade- of “playboy” and “playmate” ran “afoul of create a reasonable likelihood that purchasers marks remained constant and limited: the first requirement for nominative use.”26
40 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 This rationale may have wide application: sion.”30 This conclusion was consistent with language.36 Furthermore, the court concluded In many instances, given the breadth of the Ninth Circuit precedent, which previously that this marketing activity was conducted in English language, it will be difficult for a had prohibited reliance on any fair use defense good faith. As a result, no Lanham Act lia- defendant to claim that the only word avail- if there exists a likelihood of confusion. In KP bility would follow. able to identify a good in a search term hap- Permanent Make-Up, the Supreme Court pens to be the trademark of a competitor. overruled this line of cases, reasoning that “it Application to “Adwords” Whether use of a competitor’s trademark is only when a plaintiff has shown likely con- In Government Employees Insurance Com- in search terms constitutes a fair use, however, fusion by a preponderance of the evidence that pany v. Google, Inc.,37 an insurance com- is a different matter. Until recently, defen- a defendant could have any need of an affir- pany, Geico, sued two Internet search engine dants in the Ninth Circuit could not rely on mative defense.”31 Therefore, the fair use companies, Google and Overture, alleging the defense of fair use if the plaintiff could defense may now be invoked even in those several claims, including trademark infringe- show that there was a likelihood of confu- instances in which likelihood of confusion is ment under the Lanham Act.38 The defen- sion.27 For this reason, some courts have not manifest.32 dants were engaging in a practice whereby it even addressed the issue.28 The defense is In order to assert the fair use defense, one would “sell advertising linked to search terms, now available, however, as the Supreme Court must comport with the requirements of the so that when a consumer enters a particular recently overruled the Ninth Circuit in KP Lanham Act itself. Generally, a party may use search term, the results page displays not
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impres- another’s trademark if it is used to describe only a list of Web sites generated by the sion I, Inc.29 the defendant’s product, and such use is done search engine program using neutral and In KP Permanent Make-Up, the parties “fairly and in good faith.”33 For example, in objective criteria, but also links to Web sites were both sellers of permanent makeup, a Wonder Labs, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble of paid advertisers.”39 Geico claimed that product comprising an injectable solution Company,34 the plaintiff alleged, among other this practice, when using Geico’s trademarks used to disguise injuries and blemishes. At things, that under the Lanham Act the defen- as search terms, constitutes trademark issue was whether the term “microcolor,” a dant was infringing its trademark, Dentist’s infringement. The defendants countered with federally registered trademark of the defen- Choice, a brand it used to market its tooth- a motion to dismiss, claiming, among other dant, could be used by the plaintiff to describe brushes. things, that their use of the mark was not a the plaintiff’s own products. In the suit for The defendant, in marketing its Crest use in commerce as contemplated by the declaratory judgment, the U.S. District Court brand of toothpaste, had been referring to its Lanham Act and that their use of the mark for the Central District of California granted own product as “the dentists’ choice,” and did not involve displaying the mark to con- summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding therefore asserted the defense of fair use.35 sumers, and no consumer confusion could that such use of the trademark was a fair The court concluded that Proctor & Gamble result from such use.40 The court denied the use. The court did not reach the issue of was indeed protected by the doctrine of fair motion: whether there was a likelihood of confusion use because the defendant was using the The complaint clearly alleges that under the Lanham Act. On appeal, the Ninth phrase in its “primary sense,” not as a trade- defendants use plaintiff’s trademarks to Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding mark “to identify the source of the prod- sell advertising, and then link that that “it was error for the District Court to uct”; the Crest mark always accompanied advertising to results of searches. Those have addressed the fair use defense without the descriptive phrase; and the phrase was links appear to the user as “sponsored delving into the matter of possible confu- often followed by modifying or explanatory links.” Thus, a fair reading of the com-
Los Angeles Lawyer November 2005 41 plaint reveals that plaintiff alleges that defendants have unlawfully used its $EPOSITIONS IN 3ACRAMENTO trademarks by allowing advertisers to bid on the trademarks and pay defen- ,IVE .OTE V 6IDEOCONFERENCING V 6IDEOGRAPHY dants to be linked to the trademarks.41 #ONFERENCE ROOMS SEATING TO The court continued, “Where keyword placement of banner advertising is being sold, MINUTES FROM THE !IRPORT advertising is being sold, the portals and &REE