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KRITERION | Journal of Philosophy
KRITERION JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Volume 33, Issue 3 2019 Clara Goebel: A Hybrid Account of Scientific Progress: Find- ing Middle Ground Between the Epistemic and the Noetic Accounts 1 Brian Lightbody: Letting the Truth Out: Children, Na¨ıve Truth, and Deflationism .................................................17 Pawe l Pijas: Towards a Unified Interpretation of Bernard Williams's Philosophical Projects ................................43 Michael Samhammer: Relative to What? { Interpretation with higher-place predicates ...........................................75 Giuseppe Flavio Artese: Conference Report: SOPhiA 2019 . 105 EDITORIAL KRITERION { Journal of Philosophy is a forum for contributions in any field of analytic philosophy. We welcome submissions of previously unpublished papers, not under consideration for publication anywhere else. Submissions are reviewed in double-blind peer review mode. Con- tributions should meet the following conditions: (1) The content must be philosophical. (2) The language must be intelligible to a broader readership. (3) The contribution must contain a traceable argumentation. The length should be between 4000 and 8000 words. Only contributions in English (preferred) and German are accepted. IMPRESSUM Editors-in-Chief: Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Alexander Gebharter Editorial Board: Albert J. J. Anglberger, Laurenz Hudetz, Christine Schurz, Christian Wallmann E-Mail: [email protected] Web: http://www.kriterion-journal-of-philosophy.org Indexing: KRITERION { Journal of Philosophy -
Comments on Sider's Four Dimensionalism
Sally Haslanger MIT Department of Linguistics and Philosophy [email protected] 12/30/03 Comments on Sider I. Introduction Congratulations to Ted on the APA Prize. Ted’s book Four Dimensionalism is an impressive piece of work, and it is an honor to be included in this session. The book is a paradigm of systematic work in analytic metaphysics. It demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of a variety of debates over time, persistence, material constitution, as well as a sensitivity to background issues concerning methodology in metaphysics. It is a significant accomplishment. I’ll start by giving a very brief summary of Sider’s position and will identify some points on which my own position differs from his. I’ll then raise four issues, viz., how to articulate the 3-dimensionalist view, the trade-offs between Ted’s stage view of persistence and endurance with respect to intrinsic properties, the endurantist’s response to the argument from vagueness, and finally more general questions about what’s at stake in the debate. I don’t believe that anything I say raises insurmountable problems for Sider’s view; and in fact, I’m sure he’s in a better position to defend his view more convincingly than I’m able to defend mine. However, there is plenty worth discussing further. Sider defends what he calls “four dimensionalism,” but we should start by being clear how he understands this position.1 He defines “four dimensionalism” as “an ontology of the material world according to which objects have temporal as well as spatial parts.” (xiii) So the thesis of four-dimensionalism Sider is interested in is a thesis about objects and their parts. -
Anjan Chakravartty SCIENCE, METAPHYSICS, and the PHILOSOPHY of SCIENCE June 4 14:00 – 14:30 Macleod 214
Anjan Chakravartty SCIENCE, METAPHYSICS, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE June 4 14:00 – 14:30 MacLeod 214 Subsequent to the transition from the era of natural philosophy to what we now recognize as the era of the modern sciences, the latter have often been described as independent of the major philosophical preoccupations that previously informed theorizing about the natural world. The extent to which this is a naïve description is a matter of debate, and in particular, views of the relationship between the modern sciences and metaphysics have varied enormously. Logical positivism spawned a distaste for metaphysics within the philosophy of science which lasts to this day, but in recent years, a renaissance in analytic metaphysics has been embraced by a growing number of philosophers of science. Those moved by distaste commonly subscribe either to a minimalist Humean metaphysic, or to a quietism about metaphysical questions generally, and often maintain that such stances are operative in scientific practice itself. Those moved by attraction contend that metaphysical investigations into the natures of things like properties, causation, laws, and modality, are required in order to interpret descriptions of the world furnished by our best scientific theories, and often suggest that metaphysical commitments with respect to issues such as these likely play a significant role in scientific theorizing itself. In this paper, I will attempt to enumerate the philosophical presuppositions separating these approaches to scientific knowledge, and consider some prospects for their resolution. Andrea Charise Location, location, location: Cultural technologies of brain mapping in Victorian science and modern neuroimaging June 3, 15:45-16:15 MacLeod 254 In this paper, I discuss the conceptual linkages between recent trends in neuroimaging technologies of “brain mapping” and the enormously popular nineteenth-century pseudoscientific practice of phrenology. -
Understanding Perspectivism
This impressive collection is essential reading for appreciating the inevi- table contextualities of scientific knowledge. It explores how notions of “perspective” can illuminate the epistemic upshot of the sciences and how they are situated in their history, practices, representations, and sometimes competing aims, provocatively advancing debates about realism, pragma- tism, explanation, and modeling in the process, all through a wealth of cases from physics, biology, neuroscience, and medical science . —Anjan Chakravartty, University of Miami An excellent collection of essays on a topic rapidly establishing itself as an important interpretive programme in philosophy of science. One of the volume’s many merits consists in showing the diversity and versatil- ity of perspectivism while illustrating common features among its differ- ent varieties. The reader is thus provided an enormously rich foundation for evaluating the role of perspectivism in understanding science and its practices . —Margaret Morrison, University of Toronto Perspectivism is a fruitful metaphor for imagining alternatives to tradi- tional realism in philosophy of science. Massimi and McCoy have gath- ered ten essays which show how perspectivism is illuminating in areas such as molecular biology and measurement theory, and also explore the relationships between perspectivism and other recent accounts including pragmatism, structural realism, pluralism, and scientific modelling. There is an excellent balance of established and emerging scholars in the field. This volume is a superb, cutting-edge text to use in an advanced graduate seminar . —Miriam Solomon, Temple University Understanding Perspectivism This edited collection is the first of its kind to explore the view called perspectivism in the philosophy of science. The book brings together an array of essays that reflect on the methodological promises and scientific challenges of perspectivism in a variety of fields such as physics, biology, cognitive neuroscience, and cancer research, just for a few examples. -
2005 Bulletin
Volume 13 U N I V E R S I T Y OF P I T T S B U R G H B U L AUGUSTL E T 2005I N NOTES FROM THE DIRECTOR 22. It was a great pleasure for Rutgers University) and I joined me to be involved in both. forces to organize a conference October 1-3 celebrating the During my eight years as Cen- contributions of our dear friend ter Director I have had the great Allan Gotthelf to the under- pleasure of working with standing of the philosophy and Gereon Wolters of Konstanz science of classical Greece. The and Peter Machamer of Pitts- program and pictures of the burgh (and their committees) event can be found on the on four Pittsburgh-Konstanz Center's web site among the Colloquia. May 26-30, 2005 Archived Events. Allan is cur- was our seventh, held in rently Visiting Professor of His- BULLETINBULLETIN Konstanz, as is fitting, given tory and Philosophy of Science that one of the architects of this thanks to a fellowship provided Table of Contents warm, multi-faceted coop- by the Anthem Foundation for erative venture, Jürgen the Study of Objectivism. 3 Visiting Fellows 2004-05 Jim Lennox Mittelstrass, retires this year. 6 In Memoriam: Ernst Mayr For the first time the event was October 12-14 we once again 7 Anjan Chakravartty he completion of my staged in the historic heart of co-sponsored the Nagel Lec- second (and final!) Konstanz, in the city's Cultural tures, organized every two years 8 In Memoriam: Eduardo H. -
Corey Nathaniel Dethier Coreydethier.Com [email protected]
Corey Nathaniel Dethier coreydethier.com [email protected] Areas of interest AoS Philosophy of Science (particularly Climate Science), Epistemology AoC Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of Statistics, Environmental Ethics Positions held 2021- Postdoctoral Fellow, Leibniz Universit¨atHannover F 2020 Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Notre Dame Education 2020 Ph.D. Philosophy, University of Notre Dame | M.A. History and Philosophy of Science, University of Notre Dame Dissertation Multiple Models, Robustness, and the Epistemology of Climate Sci- ence Committee Anjan Chakravartty (co-director), Curtis Franks (co-director), Don Howard, Wendy Parker (external), Hannah Rubin 2015 M.A. Philosophy, Tufts University 2012 B.A. with High Honors, College of Social Studies, Wesleyan University Publications in press \The Cooperative Origins of Epistemic Normativity?" Erkenntnis. | \Climate Models and the Irrelevance of Chaos." Philosophy of Science. | \How to Do Things with Theory: The Instrumental Role of Auxiliary Hypothe- ses in Testing." Erkenntnis. 2021 \Forces in a True and Physical Sense: From Mathematical Models to Meta- physical Conclusions." Synthese 198.2: 1109{22. 2018 \William Whewell's Semantic Account of Induction." HOPOS 8.1: 141-56. Papers in preparation (under review; drafts available on request) | On accuracy-dominance arguments for probabilism. | On agreement in modeling and experimental contexts. | On interpreting the probabilities found in IPCC reports. | On the calibration of climate models. | On science and the norm of assertion. 1 | On supposition and statistics. | On uncertainty and climate model ensembles. | On uncertainty about initial conditions and uncertainty about laws. | On the use of statistics in climate modeling. | On the value of agreement in climate modeling. Recent Presentations 2021 [delayed] \Climate Models and the Irrelevance of Chaos," 27th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. -
CLMPS 2011 Program
CLMPS 2011 Program Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science Congress Secretariat (Eds.) Program CLMPS 2011 General theme Logic and Science Facing New Technologies 14th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science Nancy, July 19–26, 2011 (France) Contents Welcome Address1 Committees3 Executive Commitee of DLMPS.......................3 General Program Committee.........................3 Organizing Committee.............................5 Official Program8 Typographical Note...............................9 Overview...................................... 11 List of Sections.............................. 13 Plenary Lectures and Special Sessions.................... 15 IUHPS – Joint Commission Symposium ................. 19 Program by Day 21 Tuesday 19.................................... 23 Wednesday 20................................... 24 Thursday 21.................................... 26 Friday 22...................................... 31 Saturday 23.................................... 37 Monday 25..................................... 42 Tuesday 26.................................... 47 Program by Sections (including Chairs) 51 A1. Mathematical Logic............................ 53 A2. Philosophical Logic............................. 55 A3. Logic and Computation.......................... 61 B1. Methodology and Scientific Reasoning................. 63 B2. Ethical Issues in the Philosophy of Science............... 70 B3. Historical Aspects in the -
David Lewis on Persistence1 Katherine Hawley University of St Andrews
David Lewis on Persistence1 Katherine Hawley University of St Andrews David Lewis takes a clear stance on persistence: Next, persistence through time. I take the view that nothing endures identically through time. (Except universals, if such there be; their loci would coincide with relations of qualitative match, would indeed constitute these relations, so they would commit no violations of Humean Supervenience.) Persisting particulars consist of temporal parts, united by various kinds of continuity. To the extent that the continuity is spatiotemporal and qualitative, of course it supervenes upon the arrangement of qualities. But the continuity that often matters most is causal continuity: the thing stays more or less the same because of the way its later temporal parts depend causally for their existence and character on the ones just before. So the spatiotemporal boundaries of persisting things, for example people, can supervene on the arrangement of qualities, provided that causation does. (Lewis, 1986b, xiii) To persist is to exist at more than one time, to transcend the momentary. How do things achieve this? We might answer with talk of thermodynamic stability, molecular bonds, photosynthesis, the porcupine’s spines, German manufacturing standards, legal protection of ancient monuments, or the uncanny ability of children to extract care from their parents. In Lewis’s terms, such answers explain the existence of spatiotemporal and qualitative continuities over time in causal terms, by reference either to the causal mechanisms which directly underpin such continuities, or to their preconditions and external circumstances. Explanations may differ according to the kind of object in question: German washing machines and yew trees are both long- lasting, relative to other types of appliance or tree respectively, but the reasons for their longevity are quite different. -
Redalyc.What Can Cognitive Science Tell Us About Scientific Revolutions?
THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia ISSN: 0495-4548 [email protected] Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea España BIRD, Alexander What can cognitive science tell us about scientific revolutions? THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia, vol. 27, núm. 3, 2012, pp. 293- 321 Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea Donostia-San Sebastián, España Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730820003 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative What can cognitive science tell us about scientific revolutions?∗ Alexander BIRD Received: 29.6.2012 Final Version: 30.7.2012 BIBLID [0495-4548 (2012) 27: 75; pp. 293-321] ABSTRACT: Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which it drew on the results of cognitive psychology. These naturalistic elements were not well received and Kuhn did not subsequently develop them in his published work. Nonetheless, in a philosophical climate more receptive to naturalism, we are able to give a more positive evaluation of Kuhn’s proposals. Recently, philosophers such as Nersessian, Nickles, Ander- sen, Barker, and Chen have used the results of work on case-based reasoning, analogical thinking, dynamic frames, and the like to illuminate and develop various aspects of Kuhn’s thought in Structure. In particular this work aims to give depth to the Kuhnian concepts of a paradigm and incommensurability. -
The Powerlessness of Necessity’ in Noûs 44:4 (2010) 725–739
Schrenk, Markus (2010) ‘The Powerlessness of Necessity’ in Noûs 44:4 (2010) 725–739 THE POWERLESSNESS OF NECESSITY MARKUS SCHRENK ABSTRACT This paper concerns anti-Humean intuitions about connections in nature. It argues for the existence of a de re link that is not necessity. — Some anti-Humeans tacitly assume that metaphysical necessity can be used for all sorts of anti-Humean desires. Metaphysical necessity is thought to stick together whatever would be loose and separate in a Hume world, as if it were a kind of universal superglue. I argue that this is not feasible. Metaphysical necessity might connect synchronically co-existent properties—kinds and their essential features, for example—but it is difficult to see how it could also serve as the binding force for successions of events. That is, metaphysical necessity seems not to be fit for diachronic, causal affairs in which causal laws, causation, or dispositions are involved. A different anti-Humean connection in nature has to do that job. My arguments focus mainly on a debate which has been the battleground for Humean vs. anti-Humean intuitions for many decades— namely, the analysis of dispositional predicates—but I believe (but do not argue here) that the arguments generalise to causation and causal laws straightforwardly. (ca. 7,200 words) ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank the participants of various workshops who have listened and commented on earlier versions of this paper and especially Helen Beebee, Alexander Bird, Andreas Hüttemann, Francis Longworth, Albert Newen, Samir Okasha, Johannes Persson, and Robin Stenwall. I am most grateful to Stephen Mumford and his Nottingham Metaphysics group, including Rani Lill Anjum and Charlotte Mattheson, who have patiently listened to and criticised earlier versions of the paper. -
REVIEW ANJAN CHAKRAVARTTY a Metaphysics for Scientific Realism
Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 62 (2011), 443–451 REVIEW ANJAN CHAKRAVARTTY A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. pp. xvii + 251, £47.00 (hardback) ISBN-10: 0521130093 Downloaded from ISBN-13: 978-0521130097 Sungho Choi http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/ Philosophy Dept., Kyung Hee University Seoul, Republic of Korea [email protected] Scientific realism has been at the heart of contemporary philosophical discus- sions regarding the intellectual enterprises collectively called ‘science’. Very at University of Notre Dame on August 24, 2016 approximately, it is the view that we are entitled to accept our best scientific theories at face value, as providing a literally true description of reality, ob- servable or not. Though this view may seem commonsensical at first glance, it has invited numerous powerful criticisms from skeptics with the result that there is a growing agreement among philosophers that it now requires con- siderable refinements and careful metaphysical backing. The thought is that scientific realism must be considerably refined such that what is susceptible to realist commitment is carefully circumscribed; and, further, that it is in need of metaphysical support that involves suitable clarifications of metaphysical no- tions like causation, properties, laws of nature, kinds, and so on, which sci- entific realists often make recourse to in their defense. This is a tremendous task, which is squarely tackled by Anjan Chakravartty’s A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism. The book, whose goal is to supply the requisite metaphysical machinery for scientific realists and thereby tell us how to be a sophisticated scientific realist, divides into three carefully coordinated parts. -
Katherine Hawley [email protected]; +44 1334 462469; University of St Andrews, St Andrews, KY16 9AJ, UK (Full Version, Last Updated June 2015)
CV – Katherine Hawley [email protected]; +44 1334 462469; University of St Andrews, St Andrews, KY16 9AJ, UK (Full version, last updated June 2015) 2008-present Professor of Philosophy, University of St Andrews. 1999-2008 Lecturer, then Senior Lecturer, University of St Andrews. (Spring 2003 Gillespie (Associate) Professor, College of Wooster, Ohio.) 1997-1999 Sidgwick Research Fellow, Newnham College Cambridge. 1994-1997 Ph.D., University of Cambridge (graduated June 1998). 1993-1994 M.Phil., History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge. 1989-1992 B.A. Hons., Physics and Philosophy, University of Oxford. Major Responsibilities 2014 Deputy Chair of Philosophy REF panel 2009-2014 Head of School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies, University of St Andrews 2005-2010 Editorial Chair, Philosophical Quarterly 2008 Member of Philosophy RAE panel (For other editorial work, committee service and responsibilities, see below.) Grants and Prizes Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship, 2014-16 (£94,445) Local PI for Marie Curie Initial Training Network 2009-2013 (value to St Andrews around £153K). AHRB Research Leave award 2004 (£13,153). Philip Leverhulme Prize 2003 (Research prize of £50,000) British Academy Joint Activities grant (£4,500 to fund collaboration with philosophers at the University of Western Washington during 2003-5). Authored Books Trust: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012) (121 pp.) How Things Persist, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2001) (xi + 221 pp.) Selections reprinted in Haslanger and Fay (eds.) Persistence, MIT Press (2004). Co-Edited Books The Admissible Contents of Perception, edited with Fiona MacPherson, Oxford: Wiley- Blackwell (2011). Re-issue of Philosophical Quarterly special issue 59.236, with a new introduction sole-authored by FM.