A QUESTION OF TREASON? CONFEDERATE GENERALS AND U.S. ARMY POST NAMES By Michael A. Hill A THESIS Submitted to Adams State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of M.A. in United States History April 2013 i ABSTRACT A QUESTION OF TREASON: CONFEDERATE GENERALS AND U.S. ARMY POST NAMES By Michael A. Hill This thesis explores the process by which present-day U.S. Army posts came to be named for Confederate officers of the Civil War through an examination of U.S. Army regulations dictating how and for whom installations are to be named as well as surveying the history of each of the current posts named for a Confederate officer. By searching Army regulations, published histories, and newspaper articles the attitudes of local communities and military leaders are ascertained so as to better understand how men who rebelled against the United States are now honored by the Army through one of the most selective means available. This thesis concludes that while financial concerns played an immediate role in the introduction of Army posts to Southern communities, the spread of Lost Cause mythology and its acceptance by U.S. military leaders, especially after the Spanish-American War, created an atmosphere that encouraged the Army to honor those who had been viewed as traitors only one generation prior. ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS As with any project, this one was completed with more than a little help from many important people. I would like to thank the faculty of the Department of History, Government, and Philosophy at Adams State University. All have been more than accessible and, without fail, willing to offer their time and assistance. In particular I acknowledge a tremendous debt of gratitude to Ed Crowther. When I began searching for a thesis topic he pointed out to me that what I had originally thought to be a simple question asked in his Civil War and Reconstruction course would serve as a fine research topic. He then graciously agreed to serve as the chair of my thesis committee and never failed to keep me focused and on track. I must also thank Kristin Svendsen of the Military Documents section of the Pentagon Library. Her aid in obtaining the many Army Regulations and various War Department memos was truly invaluable. Without her assistance this thesis could not have been completed. Finally, I offer my most heartfelt thanks and admiration to my wife, Mena. She has always encouraged me and maintained the stability of our family, carrying far more than her share of the load – I cannot express how thankful I am for her support and strength. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 2: Remembering the Civil War ......................................................................... 13 Chapter 3: Naming U.S. Army Posts .............................................................................. 23 Chapter 4: The Confederate Posts .................................................................................. 33 Fort Benning ...................................................................................................... 33 Fort Bragg .......................................................................................................... 37 Fort Lee ............................................................................................................. 39 Fort Gordon ....................................................................................................... 41 Fort A.P. Hill ..................................................................................................... 43 Fort Hood .......................................................................................................... 45 Fort Polk ............................................................................................................ 47 Fort Rucker ........................................................................................................ 49 Chapter 5: The Union Posts ........................................................................................... 57 Chapter 6: Conclusion ................................................................................................... 72 Notes ............................................................................................................................. 84 Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 96 iv Chapter 1 – Introduction On November 5, 2009, United States Army Major Nidal Hasan walked into a Soldier Readiness Center1 on Fort Hood, Texas, and opened fire on the approximately three hundred soldiers and civilians inside. After killing thirteen and wounding thirty, Hasan was engaged by two Department of the Army Civilian Police officers, Kimberly Munley and Mark Todd,2 who shot Hasan four times, bringing to an end a shocking attack on American soldiers – by an Army officer no less – on a seemingly secure U.S. Army post. Hasan survived and is still waiting to be tried on thirteen counts of premeditated murder3 and thirty-two counts of attempted premeditated murder.4 If convicted Hasan faces possible execution. Of course this was hardly the first time U.S. soldiers have attacked and killed their fellow Americans. United States history is replete with examples of military personnel, or former military personnel, who have, for whatever reason, turned against their nation, its defenders, or its leaders; Lee Harvey Oswald, Timothy McVeigh, and Benedict Arnold are among the most infamous. While it is probable that Maj. Hasan will rank among those at the top of any such list, there is a great deal of irony that his crime occurred on an Army post that is named in honor of another such man – John Bell Hood – who, along with his fellow Confederate officers, is often viewed as merely an honorable adversary rather than as a traitor or criminal. Hood graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1853, served as an officer in the infantry and cavalry, and was even offered the position of Chief of Cavalry at West Point, but resigned his commission in 1861 in order to join the Confederate cause. When his native Kentucky did not secede from the Union, Hood offered his services to the Confederate government as a Texan and was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Confederate Army. By March 7, 1862, Hood had been promoted to brigadier general and placed in command of the Texas Brigade of the Army of Northern Virginia.5 Hood’s rise continued, and on July 17, 1864, he was elevated to command of the Army of Tennessee.6 During his time as the commander of the Army of Tennessee, Hood’s forces would be battered by Union General William Tecumseh Sherman, who inflicted nearly 30,000 casualties upon the Army of Tennessee, while Hood, in turn, managed to inflict only 10,000 casualties upon Sherman’s forces.7 Hood was responsible, therefore, for the death or wounding of nearly 40,000 Americans, or nearly one thousand times the number Maj. Hasan was responsible for. Furthermore, this number includes only those who were killed or wounded when Hood was an army commander; thousands more would have to be counted when one considers his time in subordinate commands. After the Civil War, Hood moved to Louisiana, where he worked in the cotton and insurance businesses until he died of yellow fever in 1879. Hood and his fellow Confederate officers, besides some inconveniences Reconstruction caused for former high-ranking Confederates, never suffered any consequences for what many at the time considered treason.8 It is risky, to say the least, to compare Nidal Hasan to John B. Hood. Civil War buffs, Confederate supporters, Lost Cause adherents, and perhaps even professional historians may protest the direct comparison of Maj. Hasan and Hood as well as the implied comparison of Maj. Hasan to other Confederate officers, perhaps most provocatively to Robert E. Lee. Many Confederate officers simply followed their states into secession, many might argue. The leaders of the Confederate armies, these same apologists may argue, believed they were acting within the legal framework of the 2 Constitution and certainly did not see themselves as acting in any kind of criminal or treasonous manner. And finally, many may argue that when the Confederate armies fought against the United States it was within the accepted rules of war that existed in the nineteenth century and came only after years of political wrangling. While these arguments are not necessarily wrong, they do not negate the comparisons between Confederate leaders and Maj. Hassan.9 Hood himself did not follow his state into secession. While Kentucky was certainly a contentious area during the Civil War, it never seceded. On May 16, 1861, the legislature of Kentucky passed a resolution stating, “That this state and the citizens thereof shall take no part in the Civil War now being waged … and that Kentucky should, during the contest, occupy a position of strict neutrality.”10 Hood, in effect, seceded twice, first from his state and then from his country. Such loyalty to the Southern cause may have served, and may continue to serve, to endear him to his fellow Confederates, but, unlike the cases of men such as Lee or John Brown Gordon, leaves little room for arguments of state loyalty. Any argument concerning the beliefs of the legality of secession is of little value as well. To be certain, Confederate leaders believed