Tion of Political Coalitions, and Spiralling Corruption

Kenya

Gabrielle Lynch

Dominant issues in 2016 were electoral management, the formation and consolida- tion of political coalitions, and spiralling corruption. Although not scheduled until 8 August 2017, the forthcoming polls overshadowed political debate and activities during the year. Opposition leaders pushed for electoral reforms and new commissioners for the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, and mooted a National Super Alliance, and the ruling Jubilee Alliance sought to establish a new Jubilee Party. The forthcoming elections also fuelled corruption, as incumbents and aspirants at all levels – from those running to be members of county assemblies up – sought to fund their campaigns, and devolution continued to provide new opportunities for accumulation. Unprecedented corruption – in the context of high levels of inequality, costs of living and salaries for elected officials – constituted a source of popular frustration and anger, and strained (already tense) relations between the government and prominent civil society organisations and the media. Relations with these key actors were then further undermined by the government’s use of a history of ethnic violence within the country, and of an ongoing external threat from al-Shabaab (the radical Islamist group based in neighbouring Somalia), to insist upon the need for unity and cohesion in the interests of stability and development.

Domestic Politics

The Jubilee Alliance and the principal opposition coalition – the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) – maintained a combative relationship. In particular, opposition leaders blamed the government for spiralling corruption and economic hardship, and claimed that it was getting ready to rig the 2017 election; while the Jubilee Alliance criticised the opposition for being overly critical and dismissed it as divisive and desperate. This context ensured that an array of government policies and projects became mired in a war of words, as was exemplified in an exchange between President Uhuru Kenyatta and Hassan Joho, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) deputy and governor of Mombasa, in January over the government’s decision to sell land titles to squatters at the long-disputed Waitiki farm in Kwale through individual government loans of KSh (shilling) 182,000. According to the government, this decision embodied their commitment to address histori- cal land injustices. However, it was rejected by the opposition, and Joho called on people to refuse to pay, arguing that the government should simply clear the loans, as it had done for some coffee farmers in central Kenya. In this context, and under the leadership of Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka, CORD insisted on the need for electoral reforms and the removal of all Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) commissioners. This campaign drew upon a sense (particularly prevalent in opposition strongholds) that the 2007 and 2013 elections had been stolen, as well as upon revelations of corruption in the Interim Independent Electoral Commission of Kenya (which had been superseded by the IEBC in 2011), and claims that preparations were afoot to manipulate the 2017 polls. The latter included rumours that a National Youth Service (NYS) registration drive was being used to add young Kenyans to the electoral register without their knowledge; that foreigners were being registered along the Somalian and Ugandan borders; and that a by-election for the Kericho County senatorship in March was rigged in favour of the government’s preferred candidate. In their bid to push for reforms, CORD organised a series of protests in Nairobi and a number of other cities and smaller towns across the country during April and May, which culminated in violent confrontations between demonstrators and secu- rity forces. The clashes included the use of police batons against protestors outside the University of Nairobi’s main campus by General Service Unit (GSU) officers and the fatal shooting of two men in Siaya County. In June, a compromise agreement was finally brokered whereby new commissioners would be recruited and greater reliance would be placed on election technology. However, at year’s end, new commissioners had yet to be appointed, and the government and opposition continued to argue about whether an electronic voter identification system should be sup- ported by a manual one.