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Research on Consumer Behaviour in Online Auctions: Insights from A RESEARCH Abstract Academic interest in the popularity and Research on Consumer Behaviour in Online success of online auctions has been increas- ing. Although much research has been Auctions: Insights from a Critical Literature carried out in an attempt to understand online auctions, little effort has been made Review to integrate the findings of previous research and evaluate the status of the XILING CUI, VINCENT S. LAI AND CONNIE K. W. LIU research in this area. The objective of this study is to explore the intellectual develop- ment of consumer behaviour in online auction research through a meta-analysis of the published auction research. The findings of this study are based on an analysis of 83 articles on this topic published mainly in information systems (IS) journals between 1998 and 2007. The results indicate that the consumer beha- viour research on online auctions can be categorized into three major areas – facil- itating factors, consumer behaviour and auction outcomes. Based on this literature INTRODUCTION (Hannon 2004), and more research- review, directions for future research on e- ers are devoting effort to the area. auction consumer behaviour are discussed, Online auctions have become an Among the various interesting online including potential new constructs, unex- increasingly popular and efficient e- auction topics, consumer behaviour is plored relationships and new definitions and commerce method of facilitating the fast becoming one of the most pop- measurements, and suggestions for metho- participation of Internet users in ular research areas, and many studies dological improvements are made. trading activities through flexible pri- in this area have already been carried Keywords: online auction, e-auction, online cing processes, convenient access and out. For example, research efforts consumer behaviour the availability of a large variety of (Bichler et al. 2001, Leloup and products. Although online auctions Deveaux 2001, Townsend and are not appropriate for every type of Bennett 2003) have been dedicated Authorspurchase, and they operate in a to investigating the fundamentals and manner different to traditional sales general development of Internet auc- Xiling Cui channels (Bapna et al. 2001b, 2003b, tions. There is also more specific ([email protected]) is a PhD candidate in MIS at the Chinese University of 2004), researchers (such as Dai and online auction research, such as stu- Downloaded By: [Schmelich, Volker] At: 14:54 24 March 2010 Hong Kong. Her research interests focus Kauffman 2002 and Pinker Seidmann dies on technology or service adop- on electronic commerce, online and Vakrat 2003) believe that they tion (Bosnjak et al. 2006, Hu et al. auctions, and IT investment analysis. can be used as an effective tool to 2004, Stafford and Stern 2002, Vincent S. Lai reduce purchase prices, save time, Zhang and Li 2006), bidding beha- ([email protected]) is a streamline the bidding process and viour (Ba et al. 2003, Bapna et al. Professor in MIS at the Chinese enable a worldwide selection of sup- 2001b, 2004, Borle et al. 2006, University of Hong Kong. His Research pliers and products. However, if Easley and Tenorio 2004, Namazi focuses on IS adoption and diffusion, online auctions are not used judi- and Schadschneider 2006, Roth and virtual collaboration, electronic commerce, and global IS strategy. His ciously and their risks are not carefully Ockenfels 2002), reputation or trust articles have been published in CACM, assessed, then these types of cyber- (Ba et al. 2003, Gregg and Scott 2008 Electronic Markets J MIS, DSS, I&Mt, EJIS, EJOR, JIT, space purchases can have adverse 2006, MacInnes et al. 2005, Melnik ß among others. effects, such as damaging supplier and Alm 2002, Standifird 2001, Connie K. W. Liu relationships, choosing incapable sup- 2002), the winner’s curse (Bajari and ([email protected]) is a pliers, driving out qualified suppliers Hortacsu 2003, Oh 2002), and auc- PhD student at the Chinese University Volume 18 (4): 345-361. www.electronicmarkets.org DOI: 10.1080/10196780802420752 Copyright and underestimating the total costs tion mechanisms (Budish and Takeya- of Hong Kong. Her current research associated with the lower purchase ma 2001, Hann and Terwiesch 2003, focuses on institutionalization, ERP, price (Hartley et al. 2006, Jap 2003). Kauffman and Wang 2001, Mathews imitation and IS adoption. She has previously published in Journal of In recent years, online auctions 2004, Mathews and Katzman 2006, Database Marketing & Customer have received wider acceptance, parti- Spann et al. 2004, Spann and Tellis Strategy Management. cularly among larger organizations 2006, Standifird et al. 2004–5). 346 Xiling Cui, Vincent S. Lai and Connie K.W. Liu & Consumer Behaviour in Online Auctions: A Review However, most of these previous studies of consumer identical items and has been used for perishable commod- behaviour in online auctions have been carried out ities such as flowers and fish. A sealed first-price auction largely on a piecemeal basis, thus inhibiting the accepts bids in a concealed fashion, and the bidder with emergence of cumulative findings. Fortunately, a few the highest bid wins the auction. A sealed second-price recent studies have brought together some of the earlier auction, which is also known as a Vickrey auction, is similar investigations on online auctions. For example, Pinker et to a sealed first-price auction, except that the highest al. (2003) reviewed the current business and research bidder wins, but pays only the second-highest bid. This issues in online auctions and made a plea for more auction type is designed to alleviate bidders’ concern of research into B2B auctions. Chakravarti et al. (2002) overpaying for the products they bid for. In online performed a literature review of pre-Internet auctions settings, multi-unit auctions may extend the sealed that can provide insight into online auction research. second-price mechanism to third-price or even further Baker and Song (2007) reviewed the existing studies of down the line, and the bids are not necessarily sealed. Like single-item online auctions and proposed a model for in the multi-unit auctions in eBay and Taobao.com, future online auction research. Despite all of these bidders do not only bid on prices but also on the quantity efforts, it is still critical that researchers develop a they want to buy. All winning bidders pay the same price unifying framework and synthesize the current findings per item, the lowest successful bid price. This is also called on consumer behaviour in online auctions to provide a Dutch Internet Auction. structure for the state of the knowledge that exists in this In addition to these mechanisms, new auction mechan- field. The identification of the controversial points in isms have also emerged to facilitate online auctions. For these research findings and a distillation of the manage- example, name-your-own-price (NYOP) is a variant of the rial implications of this new area of knowledge sealed first-price auction mechanism, in which a bidder (McKinney et al. 2002) are also essential. As a first step submits a bid for an auctioned item, and the sellers towards the synthesis of the research findings on respond by either accepting or rejecting it. The group consumer behaviour in online auctions, and to deepen buying auction mechanism has also developed rapidly due and develop the theoretical foundations of this area of to the ease of Internet access. In group buying auctions, research, it is critical that we examine previous efforts to bidders submit an order bid rather than a price bid. The identify trends for new research opportunities. selling price drops as more buyers place their orders, which This paper aims to present a more comprehensive aggregates the power of buyers to gain volume discounts overview of the current research literature on consumer (Chen et al. 2006, Kauffman and Wang 2001). behaviour in online auctions in the hope that more valid Other than these mechanisms, online auctions have new research topics and directions can be derived. This features added during the derivation process from their literature review includes multiple-item auctions with an traditional counterparts. These new features fall into three emphasis on consumer behaviour. The research ques- categories, auction setting, bidding behaviour and service tions posed by this paper address the following. facilities, as shown in Table 1. In an auction setting, the ending rules of an online auction can either be ‘hard close’ 1. What types of consumer behaviour have been or ‘soft close’. With the former, the auction ends at a fixed investigated in online auctions? Can these findings time that has been made known to all bidders (Namazi Downloaded By: [Schmelich, Volker] At: 14:54 24 March 2010 be synthesized to provide a structure for the state of and Schadschneider 2006). In a soft-close English the knowledge in this domain? auction, in contrast, the auction can be extended for a 2. What bidding strategies, if any, have been system- set period of time with each new bid. Probably due to the atically and successfully adopted in online auctions? hard-close rules and the longer duration of online 3. Based on the literature review, can research gaps be auctions, a unique and interesting sniping phenomenon identified for possible future research endeavours? has also emerged in online auctions. In this strategy, bidders wait until nearly the end of the auction to submit their bids (Borle et al. 2006, Roth and Ockenfels 2002). FUNDAMENTALS OF ONLINE AUCTIONS In addition, online auctions also offer unique services that are only possible with Internet technologies. For Four basic online auction mechanisms have been adopted example, reputation systems provide sellers and buyers from traditional offline auctions – English auction, Dutch with the opportunity to rate each other and leave auction, sealed first-price auction, and sealed second-price comments after each transaction; reference prices are auction.
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