Desert Drift, Declining Deadliness Understanding the Evolution of Aqim’S Suicide Bombings
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DESERT DRIFT, DECLINING DEADLINESS UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLUTION OF AQIM’S SUICIDE BOMBINGS Jason Warner, Ellen Chapin, and Caleb Weiss | October 2020 Desert Drift, Declining Deadliness: Understanding the Evolution of AQIM’s Suicide Bombings Jason Warner Ellen Chapin Caleb Weiss Combating Terrorism Center at West Point United States Military Academy www.ctc.usma.edu The views expressed in this report are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, Department of Defense, or U.S. Government. October 2020 Cover Photo: Algerian soldiers stand next to the rubble of a coast guard barracks in Dellys, Algeria, which a suicide truck bomber attacked on September 8, 2007. (Louafi Larbi/Reuters) COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER acknowledgments Director Immense thanks to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, whose generous support made this report possible. The creation of this report has been Brian Dodwell possible thanks to numerous contributors based within the Combating Terrorism Center, and outside of it. In particular, we are thankful to CTC Research Director interns Mikki Franklin, Iakovos Balassi, and Andrew Mines, all of whom Dr. Daniel Milton were integral in the data collection for this report, as well as Stephanie Lizzo, who helped with copyediting. At the CTC, we are appreciative of Distinguished Chair Director Brian Dodwell for his support of this project, in addition to the LTG(R) Dell Dailey counsel of CTC researchers Daniel Milton, Audrey Alexander, Amira Jadoon, and Muhammad al-`Ubaydi. To Kristina Hummel, we offer George H. GIlmore Senior Fellow thanks for her always-outstanding editorial efforts. Finally, we offer a Prof. Bruce Hoffman note of thanks to the Head of the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D., who has remained Senior Fellow supportive of this and other projects throughout the Center’s history. Outside of the CTC and West Point, we appreciate reviews from Assaf Michael Morell Moghadam, Héni Nsaibia, and Geoff Porter, and additional counsel Senior Fellow provided by Aaron Zelin, Jacob Zenn, Bill Roggio, and Thomas Joscelyn. Additionally, we thank General (Ret) Stanley McChrystal for his support Chief Joseph Pfeifer, FDNY (retired) of the project and its authors, as well as Stanford University’s Political Science Department. Class of 1971 Senior Fellow The Honorable Juan Zarate Class of 1987 Senior Fellow GEN(R) Joseph Votel CONTACT Combating Terrorism Center U.S. Military Academy 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall West Point, NY 10996 About the Authors Jason Warner is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at Phone: (845) 938-8495 the U.S. Military Academy – West Point, where he also directs Africa research Web: www.ctc.usma.edu activities in the Combating Terrorism Center. The views expressed in this report are Ellen Chapin is a Ph.D. student in political science at Stanford University and serves as Speechwriter to General (Ret) Stan McChrystal. Her research focuses those of the authors and not of the United on global jihadi and domestic far-right extremism. States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the Caleb Weiss is a research analyst and contributor to FDD’s Long War Journal, where he focuses on political violence and jihadism in the Middle East and Africa, U.S. Government. and a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy candidate at The Fletcher School at Tufts University. I TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary.....................................................................................................................IV Part One: Introduction................................................................................................................1 Part Two: Methodology................................................................................................................4 2.1: Data Collection and Verification.............................................................................4 2.2: Notes on “AQIM” Group Inclusion.............................................................................4 2.3: Caveats and Limitations of Search String and methodology..........................8 Part Three: The North African to Sahelian Shift............................................................10 3.1: An Overview of AQIM’s Suicide Bombing Campaign...........................................10 3.2: From North Africa to Sahel: Demonstrating AQIM’s Two-Phase Suicide Bombing Campaigns .....................................................................................................20 3.3: Tracing the Evolution of AQIM’s Suicide Bombing Phases...........................22 Part Four: Comparing the North African and Sahelian Phases.................................30 4.1: Comparing Broad Trends Across Campaigns........................................................30 4.2: Comparing AQIM-Affiliate Attacks by Campaign..............................................33 4.3: Comparing AQIM’s Targeting Tendencies Across Campaigns.........................35 4.4: Comparing AQIM’s Failures Across Campaigns...................................................38 4.5: Comparing AQIM’s Team Tendencies Across Campaigns...................................42 Part Five: Conclusion..................................................................................................................47 II LIST OF TABLES Table 1: An Overview of Allied or Affiliated Groups within AQIM’s Network ......................................................7 Table 2: Comparative Data on African Suicide Terrorism ............................................................................................12 Table 3: Comparative Data on African Female Suicide Bombers ................................................................................13 Table 4: Comparative Data on African Underage Suicide Bombers ...........................................................................15 Table 5: Comparative Data on African Suicide Bombing Detonation Tactics .........................................................16 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: AQIM Suicide Bombing Attacks ........................................................................................................................... 11 Figure 2: Photo of Musab al-Ansari.....................................................................................................................................14 Figure 3: Photo of Abdul Hadi al-Fulani ...........................................................................................................................15 Figure 4: Photo of MUJAO suicide bomber Abu Ubaidah al-Azawadi, who conducted the first recorded suicide bombing in Mali on February 8, 2013, with a SMCIED .....................................................................................18 Figure 5: AQIM Suicide Attacks by Country in Aggregate ...........................................................................................19 Figure 6: AQIM Suicide Bombings by Country Over Time ..............................................................................................21 Figure 7: AQIM Suicide Bombings by Month and Year .................................................................................................. 22 Figure 8: Trends in AQIM Suicide Bomber Deployment by Year .................................................................................31 Figure 9: Trends in AQIM Suicide Bomber Deployment by Campaign ....................................................................... 32 Figure 10: AQIM Suicide Bombing Attacks by Sub-Group ............................................................................................. 34 Figure 11: AQIM Deployed Suicide Attackers Deployed by Target Over Time....................................................... 35 Figure 12: Percentage of AQIM Deployed Attacker Targeting ................................................................................. 37 Figure 13: AQIM Suicide Bombing Failures of Detonation .........................................................................................40 Figure 14: AQIM Suicide Bombing Failures of Lethality ..............................................................................................41 Figure 15: AQIM Suicide Bombing Successes and Failures Over Time ...................................................................... 42 Figure 16: AQIM Suicide Bombings: Linked vs. Unlinked ............................................................................................. 44 Figure 17: AQIM Suicide Attacks by Type of Linked Attacks ....................................................................................... 45 III WARNER / CHAPIN / WEISS DESERT DRIFT, DECLINING DEADLINESS OCTOBER 2020 Executive Summary Contemporarily, al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliate group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) are among the greatest threats to peace and stability on the African continent. Despite the fact that AQIM, JNIM, and the multiple other AQIM-affiliated or allied groups that have risen and fallen over the past 13 years have come to serve as major sources of concern for the states and populations in which they operate (and thus the international community writ large), little systematic analysis has been undertaken to understand the nature of AQIM and its current and historical affiliates’ employment of one particular tactic of violence that the