Africa Region Working Paper Series
Number 21
Public Disclosure Authorized HandclingHierarchy in DecentralizedSettings: GovernanceUnderpinnings of SchoolPerformance in TikurInchini, West 5hewaZone, Oromia Region
Public Disclosure Authorized Navin Girishankar AbebawAlemayehu Yusuf Ahmad
5eptember 2001 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Handling Hierarchy in Decentralized Settings: Governance Underpinnings of School Performance in Tikur Inchini, West Shewa Zone, Oromia Region September2001 Africa RegionWorking Paper SeriesNo. 21 Abstract
This paper provides a survey-based analysis of the governance of school perfonnance in Tikur Inchini, a woreda (a sub-national unit of government) in Ethiopia's Oromia Region. The reality in Tikur's educational system was one of almost exclusive reliance on top- down or hierarchical controls during allocation and implementation. As a strategy, the use of hierarchy produced mixed results. Systematic interventions by higher levels of government prevented woreda and school officials from making legitimate allocative choices. This overly centralized approach also generated budgetary uncertainty and various operational inefficiencies. In meeting these constraints, school and woreda officials responded in ways that could be instructive in future attempts to deepen democratic decentralization. In particular, schools and communities demanded and demonstrated greater openness and accountability in key areas. The paper concludes that Tikur's schools and woreda institutions are well-positioned to exercise greater autonomy in allocating and managing resources because of their demonstrated capacity to monitor budgets, manage personnel, and undertake monitoring and evaluation.
Authors' Affiliation and Sponsorship Navin Girishankar SeniorPublic Sector Specialist,AFTI2, Africa Region,The World Bank Email:[email protected]
AbebawAlemayehu Consultant,AFC06, Africa Region, The WorldBank Email:[email protected]
Yusuf Ahmad Consultant,OEDCR, The World Bank Email:[email protected]
THEWORKING PAPER SERIES
The AfricaRegion Working Paper Series expedites dissemination of appliedresearch and policy studieswith potential for improvingeconomic performance and socialconditions in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Seriespublishes papers at preliminarystages to stimulatetimely discussion within the Regionand amongclient countries, donors, and the policyresearch community. The editorialboard for the Seriesconsists of representativesfrom professional Families appointed by the Region'sSector Directors.
Editorin chargeof the series:Antoine Waldburger, AFTM3, Email: [email protected], who may be contactedfor hardcopies.
For additionalinformation visit the Web site http://www.worldbank.ora/afr/wps/index.htm,where copiesare availablein pdf format.
The findings,interpretations, and conclusionsexpressed in this paper are entirelythose of the author(s). They do not necessarilyrepresent the views of the WorldBank Group, its Executive Directors,or the countriesthat they representand shouldnot be attributedto them. HANDLINGHIERARCHY IN DECENTRALIZEDSETTINGS:
Governance Underpinnings of School Performance in Tikur Inchini, West Shewa Zone, Oromia Region
Navin Girishankar Senior Public Sector Specialist,AFTI2, Africa Region, The WorldBank Email: Ngirishankar~worldbank.org
AbebawAlemayehu Consultant,AFC06, AfricaRegion, The WorldBank Email: AalemayehuWworldbank.org
Yusuf Ahmad Consultant,OEDCR, The WorldBank Email: Yahmad(worldbank.org
The findings, interpretations, and conclusionsexpressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s). They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank Group, its Executive Directors, or the countries that they represent and should not be attributed to them.
CONTENTS
Executive Summary ...... i
1. Introduction ...... 1
Tikur's educational system ...... 1 Methodology and approach ...... 3 Organization of the paper...... 3
2. Hierarchy in Tikur's educational system ...... 4
Hierarchy in resource allocation: control without efficiency, capability ...... 4
Planning and prioritization ...... 5 Recruitment of qualified personnel ...... 8 Procurement of educational inputs ...... 8
Hierarchy in implementation: probity without predictability ...... 9
Financial accountability ...... 9 Monitoring of schools and personnel-in-post ...... 10 Management of resource flows ...... 11
3. Guideposts along the critical path ...... 12
Unsustainable responses to weak enabling environment ...... 13 Ability to exercise autonomy ...... 5 Options along the critical path ...... 16
4. Next steps ...... 19
Charts
1.1 Primary education in Tikur, 1997-99 ...... 2 2.1 Openness to community preferences versus influence over the budget ...... 6 (a) Who listens to communities?...... 6 (b) Who influences the budget? ...... 6 2.2 The impact of hierarchy on intra- and inter-sectoral spending ...... 7 (a) Composition of total expenditures, West Shewa Zone (1997-99) ...... 7 (b) Woreda official's view of inter-sectoral spending...... 7 (c) Woreda official's view of intra-sectoral spending...... 7 (d) Recurrent expenditures on primary education, Tikur Inchini Woreda (1997-99) ...... 7 2.3 Disciplinary problems in the woreda education office and in schools . . 11 2.4 Causes of uncertainty in resource flows from above ...... 11 3.1 Deficiencies in raising and collecting community contributions for primary schooling ... 14 3.2 Which would improve school performance-more money or greater autonomy? . . . 15 3.3 Prospects for fiduciary transparency in Tikur's woreda, kebeles, and schools .. 16 3.4 Criteria for getting promoted in Tikur's woreda education office and schools ...... 16 Figures
1.1 Tikur's educational system ...... 2
Boxes
3.1 Participation as accountability mechanism: an under-exploited resource? ...... 18
Annexes
1. Activity list for piloting of tool in Tikur Inchini, April 13-19, 2000 .20
2. Regression results .21
3. Data on West Shewa Zone-expenditures, personnel, and performance .23 3.1 Planned and actual capital budget by sector, EC 1989-91 (in ETB OOOs).23 3.2 Recurrent expenditures by sector, EC 1989-91 (in ETB OOOs).23 3.3 Staffing by sector, West Shewa, EC 1991.24 3.4 Basic data on primary education, West Shewa, EC1989-91.24
4. Data on Tikur Woreda-expenditures, revenues, personnel, and performance .25 4.1 Revenue collected by select woredas, EC1989-91 (in ETB OOOs).25 4.2 Financial inflows into Tikur, EC1989-91 (in ETB OOOs).25 4.3 Overall expenditures by Tikur, EC1989-91 (in ETB OOOs).25 4.4 Expenditures on primary education by Tikur, EC 1989-91 (in ETB OOOs).26 4.5 Monthly wage bill by level in Tikur, EC1989-91 (in ETB OOOs).26 4.6 Data on primary education, Tikur, EC1989-91 .26 4.7 Primary school enrollment in Tikur, EC 1989-91.26 4.8 Number of teachers by salary grade in Tikur, EC1989-91 .27
5. Data on schools-enrollments, financial flows, and personnel .28 5.1 Kochere School, Buyumawini Kebele .28 (a) Pupils enrolled in Kochere School by grade, EC1990-92 .28 (b) Financial flows into Kochere School, EC 1989-91.28 (c) Staffing in Kochere School .28
5.2 Tikur Inchini School, Inchini 01 Kebele .29 (a) Pupils enrolled in Tikur Inchini School by grade, EC1990-92 .29 (b) Financial flows into Tikur Inchini School, EC 1989-91.29 (c) Staffing in Tikur Inchini School.29
5.3 Nannoo Gidu Primary School, Nannoo Gidu Kebele.30 (a) Pupils enrolled in Nannoo Gidu Primary School by grade, EC 1990-92.30 (b) Financial flows into Nannoo Gidu Primary School, EC 1989-91.30 (c) Staffing in Nannoo Gidu Primary School .30 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. According to Ethiopia's policy of decentralization, sub-national units of government-most notably, the woreda-are expected to assume responsibility for delivering essential services such as health, education, and rural roads. As part of this larger effort to better understanding the evolving decentralization process, a World Bank team piloted the "assessing constraints" survey tool in Tikur Inchini Woreda, West Shewa Zone, Oromia Region to collect quantitative and perception data on the governance underpinnings of primary schooling, specifically, the design of institutional arrangements governing resource allocation and implementation. Based on survey findings, the pilot also identified options for institutional reform that would be feasible and credible in the eyes of woreda administrators, community representatives, and school officials.
Tikur's educational system
2. In Ethiopia, primary schooling takes place within a constitutionally-mandated structure for decentralized delivery that consists of four tiers of sub-national government-the region, the zone, the woreda, and the kebele. The school sits below the kebele and is administered by a School Management Committee (SMC), which is composed of community leaders, school officials, kebele representatives, and at times, parents. Operating within this governance framework, Tikur made notable progress in expanding the reach of primary education as enrollment rates rose nearly 40% over the last three fiscal years. Prospects for sustaining enrollment rates and enhancing student achievement, however, remained uncertain as Tikur struggled with modest success to marshal the budgetary, human, and infrastructural inputs required to meet the needs of its burgeoning student population. The governance of resource allocation and program implementation not only determined whether Tikur increased spending on primary schooling, but also how efficiently and effectively it managed existing resources against a backdrop of pervasive aggregate scarcity.
Hierarchy as dominant institutional arrangement
3. Notwithstanding formal decentralization of service delivery responsibility, the reality in Tikur's educational system is one of almost exclusive reliance on top-down or hierarchical controls during allocation and implementation. As a strategy, this use of hierarchy produced mixed results. On the one hand, hierarchy ensured that a substantial share of public expenditures were allocated to primary education. It also provided the control regime required to develop the rudiments of a fiduciary framework (with some checks on corruption and resource leakage), promote staff discipline, and foster esprit de corps among teachers.
4. On the other hand, hierarchical interventions, primarily by the zone, prevented woreda and school officials from making legitimate allocative choices between intra- sectoral priorities such as capital and recurrent expenditures, or wage and non-wage recurrent ones. Even though they were far removed from the front-lines, zonal (and to a lesser extent, woreda) officials sought to identify and meet the specific budgetary,
i procurement,and staffing needs (based on the productionfunction) of individualschools in Tikur. Centralizedmanagement also meant that negativeexternalities associated with poor financialand payroll managementat higher levels-most commonlymanifest as budgetaryuncertainty-were passed on to the woredaand schools.
Responsesto hierarchyand implicationsfor reform 5. Tikur's schools actuallyresponded to two sets of constraintsimposed by hierarchy-namely, systemicconstraints as well as those endogenousto Tikur's public institutionsand processes. As far as systemicconstraints such as poor wages and unpredictableresource flows were concerned,Tikur's formal and informalattempts to cope provedunsustainable. For instance, schools used the informalpractice of acceleratedpromotions to enhancepay-levels. The practice not only attenuatedlinks betweenperformance and promotions,but also imposeda hidden burdenon the wage bill, thereby siphoningoff resourcesneeded to hire new teachers. Also, kebeles sought to collect communitycontributions to compensatefor budgetaryuncertainty and the resultingfunding shortfallsthat adverselyaffected O&M and procurement. These own- source revenuesthemselves did not provide a more stable or robust source of education resourcesthan fiscal transfersfrom higher levelsof government. Ultimately,the only viable strategyfor grapplingwith systemicconstraints would be a Government-wide effort, probablysupported under the auspicesof the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP), to strengthenbudget managementand developan affordablemedium-term pay policy at the federaland regional-levels. 6. The zone's punctualuse of hierarchyto limit discretionby the woreda and schools constitutedthe major constraint,endogenous to Tikur, on allocativeand operational efficiency. Schoolsattempted to gain a measureof allocativechoice and reversethe bias against capital spendingby financingsmall works such as an additionalclassroom on through communitycontributions albeit on an ad hoc basis. On the personnel managementfront, schoolstried to meet staff shortages(caused in part by zonal delays in filling vacancies)by double-shiftingand hiring 'community' teachers with own-source revenues. Both instancessuggest public officials in Tikur were consciousof-and to some extent,capable of-making better allocativedecisions using the finite resource availableto them. More significantperhaps is the observationthat Tikur's 'responses' to hierarchy(its attemptsto allocateresources more efficiently)emanated from schools. The implicationis that the school-not the woredaoffice or zone-was the appropriate locus for introducinggreater flexibility or autonomywithin Tikur's ostensibly 'decentralized' education system. 7. Prospects for school-basedmanagement, however, depend on whether school directorscan guaranteea reasonabledegree of fiduciary comfortincluding credible safeguardsagainst the leakageof resourcesintended for classrooms. Schoolsalso need to demonstratetheir willingnessto hire and promoteteachers on the basis of merit rather than patronage. On both these counts, the pilot's findings indicatedthat Tikur's schools appeared well-positionto exercisegreater discretion precisely becausethey could avail themselvesof existingand locally-basedmechanisms of accountabilityand restraint.
ii Options along the critical path
8. Assuming that increased school autonomy were in fact the most effective measure for driving educational performance in Tikur, the ancillary question-that of sequencing-looms large. How can zonal and woreda officials devolve a greater array of input decisions to schools without exposing public institutions to increased risks of resource leakage and patronage-based hiring? One approach, supported by the Bank in other countries undergoing decentralization, is to allow lower levels of government to 'earn their autonomy by demonstrating their capability' (specifically, their capability to exercise restraint). Over time, this type of instrument can also enable local authorities, even communities, to graduate to higher levels of responsibility and discretion within acceptable levels of risk.
9. It is conceivable that this approach could be designed to meet the needs of Tikur's school system on a pilot basis. Schools can be given formal budgets with some level of discretion in resource allocation or personnel management, provided that they meet eligibility criteria. These eligibility criteria in turn can be defined around good stewardship of inputs, thereby reducing the fiduciary and patronage risks associated with school-based management.
Next steps
10. This pilot has sought to demonstrate how an inductive (yet systematic, survey- based) approach to institutional analysis can help identify a critical path for institutional reform in decentralized settings. The challenge is whether the approach can be aggregrated across woredas or even regions in order to highlight trade-offs, alternative pathways for institutional development, and specific reform options at a systemic or macro-level. Pursuant to developing this broader perspective on Ethiopia's governance prospects, the Country Team should consider applying survey-based institutional analysis upstream of other sectoral or cross-cutting initiatives in the Ethiopia country program.
11. In addition, the pilot indicated a need to further investigate the degree to which hierarchy is the dominant institutional arrangement governing allocative decisions and implementation in relationships between federal and regional authorities, and those between regions and zones. Finally, options for developing "earned autonomy" instruments in Ethiopia should be explored as a means of further embedding devolution not only at the regional level, but also at the woreda and sub-woreda levels.
iii
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 According to Ethiopia's policy of decentralization, sub-national units of government-most notably, the woreda-are expected to assume responsibility for delivering basic services such as healthcare and primary education. In spite of these ambitious goals, knowledge of the actual decentralization process and its impact on front- line delivery remains poor. Several questions about woreda government including those with potentially far-reaching implications for the design and implementation of development programs remain unanswered. For instance, do local-level institutions have sufficient autonomy to make allocative and operational decisions related to the provision of services? Are there adequate provisions at higher levels of government to establish and enforce minimum standards over the use of key financial and human resource inputs, as well as the delivery of outputs? Are local institutions capable of undertake the complex forms of collective action required under a decentralized system of delivery?
1.2 Addressing these and other questions-including studying trends in the governance of decentralized delivery across Ethiopia's diverse regions-is the purpose of the ongoing Woreda Studies (WS). This includes assessing the ways in which various tiers of woreda government and communities actually shape planning, financial and personnel management, and accountability processes. The WS also aim to assess whether 'institutional ground realities' favorably impact front-line performance in key sectors such as health, education, and rural roads.
1.3 As part of this larger effort, a World Bank team piloted the "assessing constraints" survey tool in Tikur Inchini Woreda (West Shewa Zone, Oromia Region) to collect quantitative and perception data on the governance underpinnings of primary schooling. Specifically, the pilot sought to assess 'what works, what doesn't, and why' in the design of institutional arrangements governing resource allocation and implementation. With these findings, it then attempted to chart a critical reform path that would be feasible and desirable in the eyes of Tikur's communities and public officials. A short description of Tikur's educational system follows along with a discussion of the methodology and approach taken during the piloting of the survey tool.
TIKUR'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
1.4 In Ethiopia, primary education is a regional responsibility. Schooling therefore takes place within a constitutionally-mandated governance structure for decentralized delivery. In the Oromia Region, like others, this consists for four tiers: first, the region with its political representatives and administrative cadres; second, the zone, which serves an administrative layer designed to facilitate collection actions by lower levels of governnent; third, the woreda or the basic unit of local government (akin to a district) with technical units formally accountable to an executive of elected officials; and finally, the kebele with an assembly of community representatives managed by an executive (figure 1.1). Below the kebele sits the school, administered by a School Management Committee (SMC). The SMC is typically composed of community leaders, school officials, kebele representatives, and at times, parents.
1 Figure1.1: Tikur's educationalsystem
region ~~J i 'I ~~~~~~Commiteexnan
zone-eLicLioI Li i ctmmitte
schoolA Schoolmanagement committee
communities
Chart 1.1: Primary education in Tikur, 1997-99 Indicator 1997 1998 1999 Enrollment 7130 8490 10159 Total teachers 132 142 144 Teacher-pupil ratio 1:54 1:60 1:71 Averageclass size 60 67 76 Percentage of female pupils 18% 23% 33% Percentagerepeaters 9% 13% 11% Percentagedropouts 12% 12% 14% Wagebill for teachers(OOOs ETB) 119.712 120.372 122.400 Wagebill for woredastaff ('OOOsETB) 656.148 749.508 726.120 Capital expendituresC(OOs ETB) - 216.759 217.510 Operatingcosts ('OOOsETB) 21.348 70.099 69.937 Total expendituresCOOOs ETB) 806.022 950.978 918.457
1.5 Operating within this formal governance structure, Tikur has made notable progress in expanding the reach of educational services. Student enrollment in this woreda grew over 40% between 1997 and 1999, with improvements in the gender balance as well as modest reductions in the percentage of repeaters. The sustainability of enrollment, however, was questionable as Tikur's burgeoning student population outstripped the woreda's ability to staff the front-lines. Average class size grew to 76 students in 1999 and contributed to a deteriorating teacher-pupil ratio and drop- out rate.
1.6 In spite of its growing clientele, Tikur's educational system received fewer resources in 1999 than it did in 1998. That primary education was the single most important spending priority for both zone and woreda belied a reality of aggregate scarcity. The shrinking resource envelope only compounded difficulties in the allocation of resources between capital, wage and non-wage items; funding of established teaching
2 posts; and procurement of basic educational inputs. Also, the woreda had a very limited pool of personnel to manage and implement its primary education program. Overall, pervasive aggregate scarcity provided the backdrop against which actors in Tikur sought to undertake collective actions in support of primary education.
METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH
1.7 Given this context, the team piloted the "assessing constraints" survey tool to identify institutional constraints that affected the ability of public officials and communities to negotiate pervasive scarcity-that is, their ability to efficiently allocate scarce resources and carry out primary schooling. The tool comprised three questionnaires-one each for the woreda-, kebele-, and school-levels respectively. Survey questions were derived from basic propositions about the institutional underpinnings of 'good public management' in decentralized settings. These propositions, listed below, also reflected the ways in which Ethiopian policymakers themselves view (and represent) the ongoing decentralization process:
* First, active community participation in planning helps local institutions set priorities that are more demand-responsive.
- Second, hierarchical processes in financial and personnel management promote adequacy and predictability in the flow of resources, both of which are necessary for services to be delivered in line with program objectives.
* Third, top-down enforcement of rules in combination with bottom-up pressures from communities enhance the probity and accountability of local institutions.
1.8 Accordingly, respondents were asked to describe the extent to which institutional arrangements governing resource allocation (for example, planning, budget formulation) and implementation (for example, budget execution, monitoring and accountability) were hierarchical or participatory. Then, they were asked to assess whether these arrangements helped promote various aspects of performnancesuch as responsiveness, predictability, and probity.
1.9 Given time constraints, the pilot covered a modest sample of twenty-two public officials in Tikur. This included interviews of nine officials from the woreda education and finance offices as well as the executive council using a woreda-level questionnaire, as well as five representatives from three kebeles and eight from three schools using the kebele-level and facility-level surveys respectively. Quantitative data on expenditures, revenues, staffing, and educational performance were also collected at the zonal-, woreda-, and school-levels.
ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
1.10 What follows is a discussion ofthe pilot's findings and their implications for institutional reform. Section 2 explains the central role that hierarchy played in decision- making processes governing resource allocation as well as arrangements shaping implementation in Tikur's educational system. It also evaluates the impact of these uses
3 of hierarchy on efficiency, capability, resource predictability, and probity. Section 3 then explores the 'responses' of public officials in Tikur to hierarchy and considers what these coping mechanisms imply for reform options in the near future. Finally, section 4 offers a way forward for using survey-based analytics on a broader scale to address governance issues in the context of the Bank's evolving program of support to Ethiopia.
2. HIERARCHY IN TIKUR'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
2.1 Top-down management structures-or hierarchy-served as the dominant from of institutional arrangement within Tikur's ostensibly decentralized educational system. As in the case of other African countries that have decentralized responsibilities for service delivery, hierarchy was maintained and even reproduced in decision-making processes over resource allocation such as planning and prioritization, the recruitment and deployment of personnel, and procurement of inputs, all of which impacted school performance.' Hierarchy also shaped implementation arrangements such as those governing budget execution, the management of front-line workers-in-post, and the monitoring of financial and physical performance.
2.2 This section describes the specific uses of top-down mechanisms in resource allocation and implementation, as well as their proximate impact on efficiency, resource predictability, and probity.
HIERARCHYIN RESOURCE ALLOCATION: CONTROL WITHOUT EFFICIENCY, CAPACITY
2.3 There is growing recognition that open or participatory approaches to resource allocation (for example, in planning and prioritization, personnel management, and procurement) are more likely to result in allocative decisions that are responsive to community demands. At the same time, countries undergoing decentralization have sought to maintain some degree of central control (for example, through conditional grant mechanisms) to ensure that sub-national authorities devote adequate resources to sectors that are deemed to be national priorities (for example, healthcare and primary education). The ability of governments to balance this type of bottom-up flexibility with top-down restraint significantly shapes how efficiently they deploy scarce financial and human resources and physical assets.
t In Uganda, hierarchy has been re-introduced in a 'decentralized" system through a variety of fiscal and administrative instruments including strict conditionality in intergovernmental transfers, centralized management of the teacher's payroll, etc. 4 Planning and prioritization
2.4 Survey responses indicated that Tikur was unable to strike an appropriate balance between hierarchy and participation, between control and flexibility in education planning. The top-down involvement of zonal authorities in education planning did ensure relatively high levels of spending on primary education. But it also short-circuited otherwise robust consultative processes in two ways, both of which contributed to misallocation between intra-sectoral priorities. First, zonal authorities and to a lesser extent, party officials, regularly intervened to vet education plans prepared by woreda and sub-woreda units before the woreda executive reviewed them. Second, schools had little or no discretion in allocating education resources despite their demonstrable ability to encourage community participation in education planning.
2.5 The pilot charted the contours of the planning process in Tikur's educational system. Annual plans, usually developed without an indicative resource envelope, were developed by the School Management Committee (SMC) as well as kebeles in consultation with communities, specifically parents. These plans were then submitted to the woreda education office, where they were vetted and compiled by education officials into a draft education plan for Tikur. Rather than costing planned activities in collaboration with the woreda finance office and submitting them to the woreda's executive, the education office first submitted draft plans to the Zonal Education Section in Ambo. Interviews conducted during the pilot indicated that zonal education and finance authorities exercised significant veto power over woreda proposals, some of which were usually deemed unaffordable or out of line with zonal and regional priorities. Once reviewed by the zone, the plans were returned to the education office for revision and submission to Tikur's executive.
2.6 In addition to interventions by zonal authorities, the role of the party in shaping plans prepared by Tikur's education office, and facilitating bargaining between woreda and zonal interests over spending priorities (particularly on the capital side) requires fiurther investigation. Interviews of elected officials revealed that the party did regularly employ various mechanisms such as reporting publicly on peers to enforce discipline among party cadres, including members of the woreda's executive. These practices also served to filter local priorities (particularly those that ran counter to party diktats) and provided a parallel process by which hierarchy and undermined the ability of elected officials to translate local preferences, with the help of woreda-level bureaucrats, into development programs.
2.7 Public officials in woredas, kebeles and schools were also asked to rate the demand-responsiveness of their units as well as their influence over the woreda budget. Notably, schools and to a lesser extent kebeles proved more effective in consulting communities and incorporating their preferences into official development plans.2 Yet kebeles and schools had little influence over setting spending priorities within the woreda's budget (chart 2.1 (a)-(b)). Since Tikur's schools were not assigned a budget in any formal sense, planning by individual facilities and kebeles was undertaken without an indicative resource envelope. Also, without budgets, schools could not receive resource
2 Thesewere the same developmentplans that are vettedby woredaand zonal authorities.
5 transfers from above, much less enjoy discretionary authority over resource allocation. Put simply, hierarchical control of prioritization processes by the zone prevented Tikur from leveraging the superior ability of schools to 'listen to communities.'
Chart2.1: Opennessto communitypreferences versus influenceover the budget
(a): Who listens to cornmunities? (b): Who influences the budget?
VWoreda Woreda 225 2.10 2.24 1 90 223 222 E. 2.21
School Kebele School Kebele
2.8 The primary benefit of the zone's punctual use of hierarchy during budget formulation-that is, in vetting woreda plans before they were reviewed by elected officials-did ensure that inter-sectoral spending priorities consistently favored primary education sector. More than half of total annual expenditures for West Shewa in each of the last three years have gone to primary education (chart 2.2 (a)). The data suggests that zonal influence in planning and budgeting processes did not significantly distort inter- sectoral allocations out of line with those otherwise preferred by communities. Only a third of woreda officials felt the communities wanted to allocate marginal resources to primary education. Most felt that commnunitieswould spend untied resources, on the margin, on other priorities such as healthcare (34%) and electricity (22%) (chart 2.2 (b)).
2.9 That said, hierarchy in budget formulation also served to distort intra-sectoral spending priorities. The pilot identified two sources of allocative inefficiency within the woreda's education budget hampered prospects for medium-term improvements in educational access and quality. First, capital expenditures, controlled by zonal officials, were dwarfed by the wage bill for woreda staff and teachers (chart 2.2(d)), in spite of woreda officials' preferences that marginal education resources be used for investments in school expansion (chart 2.2(c)). Data collected from the Zonal Planning Section indicated that planned investment spending in the education sector rose only 2% in nominal terms between 1997-99, while actual capital expenditures fell 27% over the same period. Barring immediate efforts to re-align intra-sectoral priorities towards investment (and specifically, classroom or school expansion), Tikur will likely face severe difficulties accommodating its burgeoning student population in the near future. Since capital spending was largely West Shewa's responsibility, zonal budget processes and outcomes deserve further investigation.
6 2.10 The second source of allocative inefficiency was the crowding out of non-wage recurrent spending. The wage bill for teachers and woreda education officers amounted to an average of 94% of current expenditures during the 1997-1999 period (chart 2.2(d)). Non-wage recurrent items such as training and other forms of operations and maintenance (O&M) were largely unfunded. Since the authority to recruit new teachers and woreda education officials rested with the zone, part of this bias towards wage expenditures can be attributed to Ambo's failure to consider the recurrent implications of hiring new staff.
2.11 Inadequate provisions for O&M meant that even basic amenities in the woreda education office such as electricity and water-proof roofing were lacking as were stationery and vehicles. Education officers often could not carry out even routine functions, much less more sophisticated activities such as school inspection and program evaluation. Such concerns were exacerbated in schools, which had no budgetary discretion (with the exception of allocating community contributions), and therefore, could not provide for the upkeep of existing school facilities or regular access to drinking water and medical treatment for students. Finally, staff at all levels had few opportunities to upgrade their skills. Most education officers had not received in-service training in the last year. Only a quarter of school-level respondents received some form of short-term training in the past twelve months.
Chart 2.2 (a)-(d): The impact of hierarchy on intra- and inter-sectoral spending
(a) Composition of total expenditures in (c) Woreda Officiars View of West Shewa Zone (1997-99) Intra-sectoral Spending Prioriies: _ _0__ _ W__ commurstiesv4uzd speneran addtional ETS I mn7ifn |00% __- Iearmsn*ed farpnmary education
new high
801% school cho
20% expansion 1997 (EC89 198 EC90) 1999(EC9I) 89%
n Edus~n rrAgnctxltre 5 Health aWstet. mneKs.ur.fgy * Other ------_____ - -_-______- (d) Recurrent expenditures on prirary education, ______~flkur Inchini Woreda (1997-99) (b) Woreda OffcMias View of 1000 - - - Inter-sectoral Spending Priorities: ql,erscommuities wCdspend anaddjWoaE1 IBOmitfitr 800 ------. in unfied furn -
clinical 40C aducatiorn Ire , bes 52 % ~~~~~~~~~~~~200 -
1997 (ECS9) 1998 (EC90' 1999 (ES91)
water ~ wage billof teachers electrcity t1% cwagetxil lWoreda educatonofce * Nonwagerecurrent expendftires
7 Recruitment of qualified personnel
2.12 Recruitment of woreda staff and teachers was also governed by a highly centralized regime. When faced with staff shortages, the woreda education office had to formally request the zone to either increase the number of posts or fill vacancies. Similarly, schools sought the permission of the education office to fill vacancies within schools, or expand the number of teaching posts within the establishment. For both woreda staff or teachers, the zone had final authority on hiring decisions. This arrangement was ostensibly designed to prevent local institutions from hiring unqualified personnel, or expanding staff size beyond affordable levels.
2.13 Even if centralized recruitment prevented patronage hiring at the woreda- or sub- woreda- level, it came at a price: significant delays in filling staff vacancies in the woreda education office, and in establishing new teaching posts in schools. Nearly a third of professional posts in the education office remained vacant at the time of the pilot. Staff shortages were even more pronounced in schools; survey data indicated that each school required an average of 4 additional teachers. In fact, the number of teachers-in-post actually fell 9% between 1998 and 1999 even as enrollment rates expanded.3 Half of woreda respondents indicated that delays in filling posts were due in part to inadequate fumding. This was indicative of how-despite an allocative bias towards wage expenditures-personnel management in Tikur was subject to problems of aggregate scarcity (para 2.9).
2.14 Scarcity alone, however, does not fully explain vacancies and staff shortages. Survey respondents also acknowledged that low wages made it difficult to attract qualified candidates even when funding was available for established posts. Yet, Tikur had no formal instruments such as discretion to provide selective wage increases within grades, allowances, or other benefits to improve conditions of work. Rather, pay levels were formulated and managed centrally by region in line with national standards. Centralized recruitment of new staff and control of pay-levels-and the lack of flexibility afforded to woredas-imposed costs on Tikur's education system in terns of capacity foregone on the front-lines of delivery.
Procurement of educational inputs
2.15 The authority to procure various educational inputs was stratified across different levels of government. For instance, textbooks were purchased by the region, furniture by the zone, and stationery by the woreda. Notably, schools themselves not authorized to procure inputs under any circumstances. This particular procurement regime generated various coordination problems as authorities at different levels sought to satisfy the input requirements for the 'production function' of each of Tikur's schools. The resulting inefficiencies compounded the already chronic under-supply of textbooks and furniture (which, again, were caused primarily by pervasive aggregate scarcity). Woreda-level respondents estimated that on average only 39% of students received textbooks. Instances of over- or under-supply were most apparent at the school-level. On average, school-level respondents identified the need for 5 additional classrooms, 35 benches, and
3 The overall wage bill for teachers fell in nominal terms between 1998 and 1999 along with staff size.
8 3 blackboards. At the same time, schools reported excess inventories of stationery items such as chalk. Even in cases where certain items such as stationery were over-supplied, schools were not allowed to sell excess stock in order to use proceeds to procure goods, works, or services.
2.16 A related challenge for this centralized system was to distribute goods efficiently with minimal risk of error or leakage. Yet, a third of school-level respondents attributed shortages in textbooks to weaknesses in distribution, for example, theft or delivery to the wrong school. Feedback mechanisms to correct erroneous deliveries were not robust. The extent to which such inefficiencies would be reduced by decentralizing certain procurement functions to the school-level will require further investigation and piloting.
HIERARCHYIN IMPLEMENTATION:PROBITY WITHOUT PREDICTABILITY
2.17 As noted above, open planning processes, flexible recruitment procedures, and streamlined procurement systems can facilitate the allocative efficiency of expenditure and personnel decisions, as well as demand-responsiveness. These alone, however, do not ensure effective implementation. Rather, execution of policies and programs requires inter alia enforcement of standards for financial accountability as well as for staff and organizational performance. Typical enforcement mechanisms include various forms of hierarchy (vertical reporting relationships, or inspection and auditing by higher levels of governments), which-when viewed as credible by public officials- can promote predictability in resource flows, probity, as well as improved unit performance.
Financial accountability
2.18 Public officials at all three levels of Tikur's educational system-the woreda, kebele, and school-regularly undertook some form of accounting or book-keeping to track financial transactions. While the pilot was unable to assess the accounting standards used in this woreda, field interviews indicated that the quality of financial information was rudimentary; it also varied between woreda and sub-woreda institutions. Most units prepared annual reports on their financial performance and submitted them to supervisory bodies within the same tier of government as well as authorities at higher levels. For example, financial reports from the woreda education office were submitted to the finance office, the executive, as well as the zone. Schools reported to their SMCs on internally-generated income, and, to a lesser extent, kebeles reported to woredas on community contributions. The pilot concluded that reporting relationships-particularly, vertical ones-between tiers of woreda government on matters of fiduciary interest were reasonably routinized.
2.19 Financial audits by higher-level authorities constituted a second mechanism-and a hierarchical one-by which Tikur sought to ensure prudential financial management. Virtually the woreda officials interviewed acknowledged that the education office had been audited by zonal authorities at least once during the past three years. Similarly, eighty-eight percent of school officials and forty percent of kebele representatives reported that some form of auditing had been undertaken by woreda officials in the last three years. Audit reports were more likely to be sent to higher levels of government
9 such as the zone (as indicated by 78% of respondents) as opposed to elected officials within woreda government (30%).
2.20 Survey data indicated that this particular use of hierarchy during budget execution did engender probity. Only a quarter of woreda-level respondents acknowledged that audits revealed financial irregularities. A subset of these cases resulted from malfeasance or other willful attempts to misappropriate public funds; most irregularities were the result of officials misunderstanding procedures governing financial management. It is also worth noting that some school officials complained of kebeles 'diverting' community contributions earmarked for education. Such problems resulted in part because contributions were held as cash by the kebele-an arrangement which allowed officials the discretion to (mis)handle revenues before having reported receipts to the public. This suggests that hierarchical reporting and audit procedures, while necessary, were probably not sufficient to ensure probity at lower levels of woreda government. As discussed in para 3.14, publicizing information on financial performance in order to elicit an accountability response from citizens should serve as an effective complement.
Monitoring of schools and personnel-in-post
2.21 Three hierarchical mechanisms-the establishment of performance standards, school inspection, and periodic evaluation of staff performance-were used to promote discipline and performance. Nearly 80% of woreda-level respondents were aware of performance standards for educational performance in Tikur. At the facility-level, 75% of those interviewed said they were aware of standards which their schools were supposed to meet. These included standards set by national and regional authorities, as well as those set by school authorities. At the staff-level, a majority of woreda officials indicated that they were aware of codes of conduct and understood them. However, awareness of standards alone does not ensure their enforcement.
2.22 Equally important were the monitoring of schools and the evaluation of personnel-in-post. Over the past three years, supervision by donors [of their projects] and inspection by woreda education officers constituted the mechanism for monitoring unit or facility-level performance. Woreda officials typically inspected schools on a quarterly basis. Sixty-three percent of school officials verified that, over the past three years, school inspection served as a key enforcement mechanism. Regression analysis undertaken with the data also indicates that regular inspections bore a significant and negative relationship to drop-out rates (annex 2). It is worth noting that the coverage and frequency of schools visits was jeopardized by aggregate scarcity or lack of funding required for per diem allowances to education officers.
2.23 The practice of superiors evaluating staff in writing was relatively well- established for a capacity-poor woreda. Fifty-five percent of woreda-level respondents reported that staff performance had been evaluated in writing on a semi-annual basis by the head of the education office. Teachers were evaluated twice a year by their director and the SMC, according to the majority of school officials interviewed.
10 2.24 The pilot found Tikur's monitoring and evaluation regime was viewed as credible in eyes of its public servants, and in some cases, contributed to their discipline and esprit de corps. Notably, three quarters of woreda-level and nearly forty percent of school-level respondents acknowledged that the failure to meet the above-mentioned standards would result in some form of reprimand from above. If teachers were caught engaged in corrupt practices, nearly two-thirds of school respondents expected disciplinary action by higher officials and even criminal prosecution. This belief that malfeasance would result in reprimand from above made a tangible difference. Regression results indicated that staff working in units that faced 'consequences' for poor performance were also more likely to view themselves and their peers as .______competent(annex 2). It can be inferred Chart 2.3: Disciplinarv problems in Tikur's that expectation of swift and strict education office and schools sanctions also discouraged some of the more egregious forms of indiscipline such 86 y as bribery, misappropriation of funds, and P _oor_work insubordination (chart 2.3). That said, * e _ _:_i hierarchical controls and sanctions alone could not compensate for the public - SChooi sector-wide problem of inadequate pay, n , Woreda which explains the high incidence of poor p work performance and moonlighting, Of f ___s____ particularly at the woreda-level. ovxO I10% 20% 30% 40% SOS 60%
Management of resource flows
2.25 As noted earlier, various forms of zonal hierarchy limited the little formal discretion that Tikur's woreda office, much less its schools, enjoyed in the allocation and management of budgetary resources. Under such as system, the efficiency and predictability of resource flows depends heavily on robust mechanisms at higher levels of government for the release of funds, management of the payroll, etc. In Tikur, public officials at all levels of woreda government indicated that unpredictable resource flows from above hindered implementation of planned education-related activities such as undertaking school inspections, construction, etc. A majority of woreda officials also reported delayed payment (56%) and even non-payment (33%) of salaries in the last twelve months. Salaries of nearly two-thirds of school officials were also delayed in the past twelve months. Chart 2.4: Causes of uncertainty in resource flows 2.26 According to survey responses, from above uncertainties in resource flows were primarily caused by weaknesses in cashmgt in cash managementat the regional and 3fld Dne zonal levels, and bottlenecksin zonal dek! ingrants and regional transfer mechanisms, zo rather than inefficient financial managementpractices within the icstnnr woreda (chart 2.4). The pilot did not include a detailed assessment of fiscal 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
11 transfer mechanisms and payroll management systems in West Shewa due to timneand resource constraints. However, it was apparent that centralized budget and payroll management allowed zonal and regional government to 'pass' the costs of inefficient management down the chain of public action. These costs-in tenns of foregone investments (for example, school expansion) and recurrent activities (for example, inspections and monitoring), and likely salary arTears-potentially constituted a considerable liability for woreda government.
3. GUIDEPOSTS ALONG THE CRITICAL PATH
3.1 Notwithstanding formal decentralization of service delivery responsibility, the reality in Tikur's educational system is one of almost exclusive reliance on top-down controls during allocation and implementation. As a strategy, this use of hierarchy produced mixed results. On the one hand, hierarchy ensured that a substantial share of public expenditures were allocated to primary education. It also provided the control regime required to develop the rudiments of a fiduciary framework (with some checks on corruption and resource leakage), promote staff discipline, and foster esprit de corps among teachers.
3.2 On the other hand, hierarchical interventions, primarily by the zone, prevented woreda and school officials from making legitimate allocative choices between intra- sectoral priorities such as capital and recurrent expenditures, or wage and non-wage recurrent ones. Even though they were far removed from the front-lines, zonal (and to a lesser extent, woreda) officials sought to identify and meet the specific budgetary, procurement, and staffing needs (based on the production function) of individual schools in Tikur. As noted above, centralized management also meant that negative externalities associated with poor financial and payroll management at higher levels-most commonly manifest as budgetary uncertainty-were passed on to the woreda and schools.
3.3 Emblematic of other countries' experiences with decentralized delivery, regional authorities in Ethiopia face a trade-off between grantingflexibility and ensuring accountability in the management of critical inputs.4 Successfully resolving this trade-off implies a more nuanced approach to designing hierarchical control systems-that is, one that seeks to internalize some of the benefits described above while alleviating the costs. 'Best practice' however is not immediately obvious when it comes to eliminating harmful forms of hierarchy and capitalizing on beneficial ones.5
3.4 As a way of identifying win-win opportunities for Tikur, the pilot investigated how public officials actually responded-whether formally or informally-to the particular control regime they faced. The assumption was that some of these 'responses
4 Burki et al., Beyond the Center: Decentralizing the State. World Bank, 1999. s Burki et al., 1999.
12 to hierarchy'-whether or not they were successful-could be instructive in fashioning or re-fashioning governance arrangements to support improved school performance. What follows is a discussion about Tikur's attempts to cope with (i) systemic weaknesses higher up in public management systems, and (ii) excessive controls on allocative decisions at the local level, as well as their implications for reform.
UNSUSTAINABLERESPONSES TO A WEAK ENABLINGENVIRONMENT
3.5 As noted in section 2, centralized decision-making on matters of budget allocation, procurement, and personnel management served to increase Tikur's vulnerability to systemic weaknesses. The pilot identified two system-wide deficiencies that adversely impacted the woreda's ability to undertake primary schooling efficiently- (i) poor incentives due to inadequate pay, and (ii) unpredictable resource flows resulting, in part, from weak transfer mechanisms at higher levels. Tikur sought to cope with each of these constraints in different ways-in one case, informally, and in other, formally.
3.6 The first system-wide constraint, low civil service wages, was widely acknowledged as a problem both in Tikur and the public sector at large.6 Inadequate pay made it difficult to attract and retain qualified personnel such as accountants, procurement specialists, program officers, as well as teachers. Even though they had no formal authority to improve wages, Tikur used informal practices to make public employment more attractive. For example, in the past two years, the woreda did not recruit any staff in its three lowest teaching grades, which paid between ETB 197 and ETB 285 per month (annex 4.8). Virtually all new entrants were absorbed into the teaching cadres only at the fourth lowest salary grade, with monthly salaries starting at ETB326 per month. This defacto 'embargo' on hiring at the three lowest grades coincided with substantial increases the numbers of staff entering (or being promoted to) higher grades including a ten-fold increase in staff within the ETB565-600 salary grade. Indicative of grade-creep, such informal attempts to enhance pay-levels constituted an unsustainable and hidden burden on the wage bill, potentially siphoning off resources needed to hire new teachers. They also attenuated links between performance and promotions. It was apparent that such forms of informality would likely proliferate, barring system-wide improvements in civil service pay scales (including those of teachers) or increased discretion to woredas to raise wage-levels within the a given grade under a hard budget constraint.
3.7 The second system-wide constraint involved resource uncertainties caused primarily by inefficient cash management and financial transfer mechanisms at higher levels of regional government. While the pilot was unable to assess financial management practices at higher levels of government, it did find that resulting budgetary uncertainties adversely impacted a range of activities including O&M and procurement at the woreda-level, as well as payment of teachers' salaries. One way in which Tikur's kebeles sought to gain a measure of control was to collect community contributions for schooling, as permitted by Ethiopian law. SMCs also earned income through some
6 Inadequateremuneration is acknowledgedby the Governmentof Ethiopia as a constraintboth in centralas wellas regionalgovernments. Improving civil servicewages has been an importantobjective of the HumanResource ManagementSub-program of the ongoingCivil Service Reform Programme (CSRP).
13 commercial activities such as selling grass. Community contributions and other local revenues were utilized for hiring of 'community teachers' to fill staff shortages and also for funding of small works.
3.8 Ultimately, own-source revenues failed to provide a more predictable or robust source of education resources than fiscal transfers did. This was due in large part to Tikur's low tax base and poorly coordinated system of administering multiple levies, both of which diminished revenue prospects at least in the short run. These revenues, once collected, were frequently reallocated and diverted by kebele officials prior to reporting on tax receipts (chart 3.1). As with the pay issue, Tikur was not Chart 3.1: Deficiencies in raising and collecting community likely to successfully navigate contributions for primary schooling
through this uncertain resource _ environment without deliberate bw _ efforts by higher levels of government strengthen budget kelebe executionincluding mechanisms for reallocates i intergovernmentalfiscal transfers. mutiple l contribuions
3.9 Such 'responses' to kebeleunder- , exogenousconstraints (that is, those reports,diverts originating outside Tikur) do offer some lessons for prospective reforms. 0% 20% 4i% 60/0 800o First, woreda government is likely to resort to informal means to cope or insulate itself from systemic constraints in the absence of any formal discretion to do so. Coping through informal means not only jeopardizes formal rule-based governance, but also constitutes a hidden expenditure risk (for example, grade creep). Second, even when it is authorized to insulate itself from wider constraints (for example, local revenue mobilization in the face of unpredictable resource flows), woreda government in poor, rural settings may still not possess the requisite capacity. One short-term approach to limiting informality is to offer greater scope (along with capacity building support) for woredas to legitimately exercise discretion within restraint in order to address problems of inadequate and unpredictable resource flows on an incremental basis. Ultimately, the only viable strategy for grappling with systemic constraints would be a Government-wide effort, probably supported under the auspices of the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP), to strengthen budget management and develop an affordable medium-term pay policy at the federal and regional-levels.
14 ABILITY TO EXERCISE AUTONOMY
3.10 Aside from systemic weaknesses in the public sector, the pilot concluded that the zone's use of hierarchy to limit discretion by the woreda and schools constituted the major constraint on allocative and operational efficiency in Tikur. Public officials tried with modest success to increase their autonomy to allocate resources according to the specific input requirements of their organizational unit rather than the prescriptions (intentionally or otherwise) of zonal authorities.
3.11 In matters of financial management, for example, schools sought to reverse the woreda's overall bias towards wage expenditures at the expense of O&M and capital items. SMCs would finance small works such as an additional classroom on an ad hoc basis with community funds. Such measures were also noted-albeit less frequent-for recurrent items such as basic supplies. On the personnel front, schools tried to meet staff shortages (caused in part by zonal delays in filling vacancies) by double-shifting and hiring 'community' teachers with own-source revenues. Given the need to meet the demands of a growing student population, most woreda officials acknowledged advising schools to informally hire teachers even though such staff were deemed 'unqualified.'7
3.12 Both instances suggest public officials in Tikur were conscious of-and to some extent, capable of-making better allocative decisions using the fliite resource available to them. More significant perhaps is the observation that Tikur's 'responses' to hierarchy (its attempts to allocate resources more efficiently)emanated from schools. The Chart 3.2: Which would improve school performance- implicationis that the school-not the more money or greater autonomy? woreda office or zone-was the appropriate locus for introducing greater flexibility or autonomy within Tikur's 60% ostensibly 'decentralized' education -- system. In fact, school-level respondents were more likely than their woreda counterparts to recommend autonomy- ; r - rather than more money-as the most effective means for improving school money performance (chart 3.2).
3.13 Granting schools greater autonomy comes with its fair share of risks, whether real or perceived. Prudential management of inputs at any level requires credible restraints on arbitrariness and abuse. Prospects for school-based management in particular depend on whether school directors can guarantee a reasonable degree of fiduciary comfort including credible safeguards against the leakage of resources intended for classrooms. Schools also need to demonstrate their willingness to hire and promote teachers on the basis of merit rather than patronage. On both these counts, Tikur's schools appeared well-position to exercise greater discretion precisely because they could avail themselves of existing and locally-based mechanisms of accountability and restraint.
' As far as the pilot team coulddiscern, the wagesof communityteachers were set on a case-by-casebasis, not necessarilyin line with officialpay-scales for teachers.
15 3.14 Schools and kebeles were subject to the similar vertical reporting arrangements, Chart 3.3: Prospectsfor fiduciarytransparency in Tikur's audits by higher levels of government,and woreda,kebeles and schools threats of sanction, all of which helped contain malfeasance at the woreda-level. sc Not surprisingly, the reach of these hierarchical restraints waned in kebeles and to a lesser extent, schools (para 2.20). KebeF _ 2 rces a:st Instead, these community-level institutions were more capable and willing to rely on transparency as a complement to hierarchy. According to chart 3.3, in the - past three years, schools and kebeles more 0% 20% _ 40%h 60% 80% 100%/ often publicized the findings of financial -- r 34 C Chart34 Criteriafor geting promotedin Tikur's audits than did the woredaeducation office. education office and stbools This suggests inter alia that kebeles and schools felt a greater need to report financial performance to their immediate clients. The findings in box 3.1 also indicate that they were more likely to elicit 400/o a demand-side response from communities. 20%.
3.15 Openness of schools to ZJ° Stw participatory pressures was also evident in School sta the responsesof public officials on matters p Sechooste of personnel management, specifically * Woredast criteria for promotion. School-level respondents felt their promotions were much more likely to depend their "service to the public" than "political connections" (chart 3.4). Contrary to the belief that school-based management would jeopardize the integrity of personnel systems, the data indicates that the woreda was in fact the more attractive watering hole for patrons and clients. These and other findings clearly indicate that Tikur's schools and kebeles had a broader menu of restraint options than woredas; these local institutions had in effect started to evolved the rudiments of downward accountability while the woreda remained focused on responding to the zone.
OPTIONS ALONG THE CRITICAL PATH
3.16 Given the purported benefits of granting greater autonomy to schools and Tikur's prospects for doing the same, the central dilemma is one of sequencing. How can zonal and woreda officials devolve a greater array of input decisions to schools without exposing public institutions to increased risks of resource leakage and patronage-based hiring? Alternatively, what constitutes an appropriate instrument for leveraging the strengths of schools-that is, their proxirnity to clients and participatory pressures- while phasing the introduction of flexibility in primary education?
3.17 One approach, piloted in several other decentralized settings around the world, allow lower levels of government to 'eam their autonomy by demonstrating their
16 capability' (specifically, their capability to exercise restraint). As early as the 1980s, the Bank supported a Provincial Development Program in Argentina that gave sub-national authorities access funding for various "sub-projects" if they could demonstrate a track- record of good fiscal performance, robust participatory processes, and a basic level of capacity in financial management. This marked the beginning a period of innovation as the Bank and other donors developed instruments that embedded the incentives for change-in this case, incentives for more radical devolution of decision-making authority to lower levels of government-within operational design itself.
3.18 In recent years, the Bank along with UNCDF-supported a Government of Uganda pilot that offered districts greater discretion over both capital and recurrent expenditures in exchange for meeting minimum capacity requirements in accounting, budgeting, and other aspects of financial management. At the same time, the instrument supported. districts that did not qualify with the necessary capacity building support to meet eligibility requirements in following years. Social funds, in some cases, have applied a similar logic when requiring that beneficiary communities demonstrate a modicum of capacity as well as a track-record in participatory planning before approving sub-projects.
3.19 The key is that governments can design instruments that allow local authorities, even communities, to graduate to higher levels of responsibility and discretion within acceptable levels of risk. It is conceivable that this approach could be designed to meet the needs of Tikur's school system on a pilot basis. Schools can be given formal budgets with some level of discretion in resource allocation or personnel management, provided that they meet eligibility criteria. These eligibility criteria in turn can be defined around good stewardship of inputs, thereby reducing the fiduciary and patronage risks associated with school-based management. This paper has already identified some criteria that can be used for schools. For instance, in budgeting and financial management, schools could be required to meet basic standards for bookkeeping, prepare quarterly financial reports, and publicize (or disseminate) audit information. In personnel matters, requirements could include regular written evaluations of staff performance, parental participation in these appraisals, and regular reports to the woreda education office on staffing levels.
17 Box 3.1: Participation as accountability mechanism: an under-exploited resource?
Countrieswith robust decentralizationprograms typically offer communitiesvarious instruments with which communitiescan provide feedback,voice dissatisfaction,and generallyhold public officials accountable.These typically comprise administrative processes (for example,consultations with technicalstaff, report cards),formal political processes (for example,voting in elections,consultations with electedofficials), and civic media (for example,writing editorialsin the local press,radio, participationin public fora organizedby NGOs).
Based on data collectedby the pilot surveys,the table below illustrateswhether communities in Tikur would likelyuse administrative,political, or civicprocesses to applyparticipatory pressures on schools and publicofficials. In the eyes of most officials,political participation at the woreda-and kebele-levels, as well as regularinvolvement in SMCs werethe most likely leversby which communitieswould hold publicinstitutions accountable.
Woreda Kebele School Administrativeprocesses m [ Politicalprocesses ?
Civicand other media
Administrativearrangements for garneringclient feedback The pilot found that communitieswere accustomedto voicingtheir concernsthrough open meetingsbetween school officialsand parents. These meetings,organized by the SchoolManagement Committee (SMC), constituted the most basic administrativearrangement by which clientscould interact directlywith providers. Mostworeda officials (78%)also consideredthe SMCto be the primary filterfor the educationalsystem to glean client feedback. It is worth notingthat the pilot surveysdid not gaugewhether parents actuallyshaped the agendaof these meetingsor whetherschool officials were responsiveto criticismand feedbackreceived duringthese sessions.
The field visitsdid, however,reveal that the membershipof SMCstypically included several kebele executives,who ostensiblywielded considerableauthority in criticalareas such as revenue mobilization and to a lesserextent, resourceallocation. By implication,parents may have hesitatedto express dissatisfactionwith school managementfor fear of reprisal by an officialswearing both SMCand kebele hats. This finding suggeststhat the selectionprocess for SMC officialsrequires further investigation since, in some communities,it was apparentlya capturedinstitution.
Communitiesalso expresseddissatisfaction by contactingthe educationoffice directly. Forty-four percentof woreda-levelrespondents indicated clients had complaineddirectly. On occasion,the woreda educationoffice also held workshopswith client groups,although this did not appearto be a very robust mechanismfor clients to expressconcems and providefeedback. In fact, given the choice, abouta third of respondentsfelt that parents would agitatefor betterschool performnancethrough the politicalprocess by exercisingtheir vote duringworeda elections.
Accountabilitythrough politicalparticipation-voting and agitating. Nearly 40%of publicofficials indicatedthat client satisfactionwith educationalperformance affected the way citizensvoted in kebele and woredaelections. In additionto exercisingtheir vote to register dissatisfactionwith educational performance,kebele-level respondents indicated that parentstypically agitated with sittingmembers of the kebele's executive(40%) and even more typicallywent straightto the woreda(60%).
Civicand othermedia. Communitiesin Tikur,which were largelyrural and poor, werenot likelyto applypressure on educationofficials by writingin newspapersor agitatingNGOs. Nor were they likely to 'vote with their feet' or move to a private or NGO-runschool. Such optionswere not as yet viable for most of the woreda's residents. 18 4. NEXT STEPS
4.1 This "assessing constraints" pilot charted the broad contours of governance within Tikur Inchini's educational system using a triangulated survey tool as well as qualitative analysis based on field visits. In addition to evaluating the impact of these largely hierarchical arrangements on school performance, the pilot attempted to highlight those 'responses to hierarchy' by Tikur's officials that were particularly instructive about a feasible and desirable way forward. Prospective reforms (discussed in section 3) were not fashioned from any pre-defined notion of best practice, but rather emerged an analysis of what actually works in this particular woreda. In so doing, the note has tried to demonstrate how an inductive (yet systematic, survey-based) approach to institutional analysis can help identify a critical path for institutional reform in decentralized settings.
4.2 The challenge is whether this approach can be aggregrated across woredas or even regions in order to highlight trade-offs, alternative pathways for institutional development, and specific reform options at a systemic or macro-level. Pursuant to developing this broader perspective on Ethiopia's governance prospects, the Country Team should consider the following recommended next steps:
* Tailor and apply this survey-based technique to institutional analyses planned for other sectoral or cross-cutting initiatives in the Ethiopia country program, particularly those that depend heavily on the capability of woreda government.
* Incorporate lessons learned from the Tikur pilot surveys in the design and sample selection of the World Bank Institute's Govemance Survey.
* Investigate the degree to which hierarchy is the dominant institutional arrangement governing allocative decisions and implementation in relationships between federal and regional authorities, and those between regions and zones.
* Options for developing "earned autonomy" instruments in Ethiopia should be explored as a means of further embedding devolution not only within regions or zones, but also within woredas vis-a-vis communities and facilities.
19 Annex 1. Activity list for piloting of tool
Tikur Inchini, West Shewa Zone, Oromia Region, April 13-19, 2000 DATE SITES VISITED ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN No. OF RESPONDENTS
4/12 Oromia regional administration * Discussed the overall purpose of the study and survey strategy Planning Bureau * Selected woreda for the study
West Shewa zonal administration * Discussed planning and prioritizationprocess * Planning section * Collected data on revenue and expenditurefor zone, Tikur, and comparatorworedas * Finance section * Collected data on education outlays and school performancefor zone, Tikur and * Educationsection comparatorworeda 4/13 Tikur Inchini woreda * Discussions on prioritization,resource mobilizationand allocation, and * Education office implementationas it relates to primary education; preliminarytest of woreda tool * Administration with education officers Discussions on overall prioritization,resource mobilizationand allocation, and accountability;preliminary test of woreda tool with administrators(elected officials) Nannoo Gidu kebele and school * Discussions on resource mobilization and allocation,and accountability processes at 4/14 * Kebele officials community-level;preliminary test of kebeletool with kebelerepresentatives a School director and teachers * Discussions on resource mobilization and allocation,and accountability processes at facility-level; preliminarytest of school-leveltool with school officials
4/15-16 RM, Addis * Adapted the toolkit to Ethiopian context.
Tikur Inchini woreda * Conductedtriangulated woreda-levelsurvey 4 education officials 4/17 Education ofaioce * Collected quantitativeworeda-level data on revenue and expenditure, manpower, 2 finance officials Administration wage-levels,and school performance 3 administrationofficials Finance office Nannoo Gidu kebele and school 2 kebele representatives Nannoo Gidu kebele and school ___ 4 school_officials - * Conducted kebele-level survey 4/18-19 Inchini 01 kebele and school a Conductedtriangulated school-level surveys 2 kebele representatives a Collected relevant school-level data on own-source revenue mobilization, 2 school officials manpower, capacity, and performance I kebele representative Buyumawinikebele, Kochere school 2 school officials
20 Annex 2. Regression results"
Regression 1 (Dependent Variable D1 - Drop Out) Independent Constant D2 - D3 - D5 - D6 - McFadden LR Variables Poor Health Regular Likely to Teacher R2 (Ratio) of Student Inspection Express Absenteeism Dissatisfaction Coefficients (0.72) 1.93 (1.94) (0.50) (0.97) 0.43 12.32 T- Statistics (0.75) 2.89** (2.87)**T (1.68)* (0.81)
* associatedwith the T-statisticrepresent statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level,respectively
Reg ession 2 (Iependent Variable DI - Competenceof Public Officials) Independent Constant D2- D3 - D4- D5 - McFadden LR Variables MeritBased In Service EPCS Consequencesfor Not R2 (Ratio) Promotion Training Meeting Standard Coefficients (2.38) 0.24 0.13 (0.13) 0.24 0.46 13.84 T- Statistics (1.65) 2.02** 1.17 (0.44) 1.86* , associatedwith the T-statisticrepresent statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level,respectively
Regression3 (DependentVariable DI - Incidenceof Embezzlement.) Independent Constant D3 - D4 - D6 - McFadden LR Variables MeritBased Likelyto Express PublicAudit R2 (Ratio) Promotion Dissatisfaction Coefficients (1.56) (0.90) (0.93) (0.33) 0.27 5.0 T- Statistics (1.79)* (2.50)** (1.65)* (1.90)*
3 associatedwith the T-statisticrepresent statistical significance at the 10%and 5% level,respectively
Methodology
The variables used in this study were dichotomous or qualitative in nature. A simple linear regression was not appropriate because inter alia the implied model of the conditional mean places inappropriate restrictions on the residual of the model. In addition, the fitted value of dependent variable from a simple linear regression was not restricted to lie between zero and one. The Logit model was used to ensure that the estimated probabilities lie in the 0 - 1 range and that these are non-linearly related to the explanatory variables.
The model took the form of,
Li =In 1-P;> A +, 2 Xi +ui
Where Pi = 1 is the value of dependent variable which take value of Pi 1 if the likelihood the event occur and P, = 0, otherwise and Xi is the explanatory variable. Since a range of the data in this study was not long enough, estimating the above regression would encounter problem of heteroscedasticity.
"'Preparedby YusufAhmad (OEDCR). 21 To resolve the problem of heterocesdasticity, we transformed the equation above as follows,
.[F7Li =I XW +P2 +W7 X, + rW U,
Given such a classification, we could then estimate the parameters of this model using the method of maximum likelihood.
22 Annex 3. Data on West Shewa Zone expenditures, personnel, and performance
3.1: Planned and actual capital budget by sector, EC1989-91(in ETB 000s) Sector 1997(EC89) 1998(EC90) 1999(EC91) Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual 1. Agriculture 4389.400 3350.576 3453.400 1883.827 2786.400 1984.198 2. Water,mines, and energy 4132.500 1396.580 3092.600 1287.720 3670.400 1114.840 3. Work and urban dev't 1075.300 - 667.600 423.466 400.800 331.877 4. Rural road construction 3030.000 - 4886.600 - 5644.700 - 5. Transport and communication 529.100 608.980 666.100 618.445 64.600 64.554 6. Health 5564.600 3362.220 4279.100 - 37201.100 2895.320 7. Education 7294.700 6813.678 5064.600 3523.533 7461.000 3898.990 Total 18720.900 8718.356 17045.400 4213.458 49768.000 6390.789
3.2: Recurrent expenditures by sector, EC1989-91(in ETB OOOs) Sector 1997(EC89) 1998(EC90) 1999(EC91) Wage Nonwage Total Wage Nonwage Total Wage Nonwage Total 1. Agriculture 6380.300 2724.000 9104.300 7128.000 4099.000 11227.000 8304.000 3968.000 12272.000 2. Education 31682.000 2240.000 33922.000 34346.000 3513.000 37859.000 37067.000 3140.000 40207.000 3. Health 3132.701 1209.220 4341.921 3519.418 1264.994 4784.412 3568.270 1925.865 5494.135 4. Water,mines, and energy 796.703 411.664 1208.367 886.610 475.969 1362.579 853.760 712.348 1566.108 5. Work and urban development 182.719 35.816 218.534 235.343 52.248 287.591 254.283 72.267 326.550 6. Disasterprevention and preparedni 199.250 46.589 245.839 109.300 74.000 183.300 211.000 71.200 282.200 7. Trade,industry and tourism 332.937 95.831 428.768 336.420 111.800 448.220 334.878 93.328 428.206 8. Culture and information 86.744 37.385 124.129 94.360 35.160 129.520 113.683 36.400 150.083 9. Financedept 1573.000 848.000 2421.000 1786.000 811.000 2597.000 1997.000 35.000 2032.000 10.Sodal and labor affairs 215.740 14.830 230.570 238.800 35.200 274.000 268.400 35.300 303.700 11.Cooperative promotion dept - - 0.000 380.630 226.910 607.540 524.040 249.330 773.370 12. Sports commission - - 0.000 ------13.Transport and communication 147.551 65.870 213.420 133.019 84.611 217.630 164.879 98.466 263.345 14.Planning and economicdev't offic 189.620 61.768 251.388 154.175 79.512 233.686 160.551 81.600 242.151 Total 337.171 127.638 464.809 287.194 164.122 451.316 325.430 180.066 505.496
23 Annex 3 (continued)
3.3:Staffing by sector,West Shewa, EC1991 3.4: Basicdata on primaryeducation, West Shewa, EC1989-9 Sector 1999(EC91) West ShewaZone__ Technical Support Item 1. Agriculture 865 430 1997(EC89)] 1998(EC90) 1999(EC91) 2. Education - - No. of teachers 4933 5037 5205 3. Health - - No. of adminstrativestaff 717 702 713 4. Water,mines, and energy 47 89 Averageclass size 48 58 64 5. Work and urban dev't 6 6 Percentageof femnalpupils 28% 29% 30% 6. Disasterprev. and prep. 6 37 Percentageof repeaters 10% 11% 10% 7. Trade and industry - - Percentageof drop-out 14% 13% 12% 8. Cultureand Information - - Enrollments 162896 193575 231627 9. Financedepartment - - Participation rates 30% 35% 41% 10.Social and labour affairs - - Wage bill ('000sETB) 31,685.73 33,931.75 36,662.28 11. Cooperativepromotion dept 52 30 Operatingcosts ('000s ETB) 2,240.68 5,256.37 3,125.85 12. Sports commission - - 13.Transport andcomm. 14. Planning andeconomic dev't - Total 976 592
24 Annex 4. Data on Tikur Inchini Woreda-expenditures, revenues, personnel, and performance
4.1: Revenue collected b f select woredas In West Shewa, EC1 89-91 (in ETB OOOs) Tikur Elere Kokir Type of revenue 1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91) 1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91) 1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91) DIRECT TAXES 718.371 508.165 Payroll Income - 88.913 87.915 - 171.158 9.594 - 21.800 23.929 Business income - 18.071 27.800 - 56.211 68.828 - 8.404 9.430 Agricultural - 254.956 214.370 - 369.942 367.521 - 173.610 209.422 Land use - 192.405 230.656 - 256.876 266.294 - 274.134 267.264
Property ______INDIRECT TAXES 321.021 5.390 Domestic production - 0.200 0.359 - - - - Stampduties - 1.697 1.031 - 10.356 3.389 - 0.972 0.691
Service sales - - - 59.949 62.084 - Other incomes - 8.635 28.919 - - - - 4.051 8.584 NON-TAX INCOME 5.899 51.683 Pension contribution - 45.494 - - 76.218 - - - - Goods and services sales - 37.647 27.264 - - - 22.029 25.477 Licenseand other payment - 20.977 23.056 - - - 15.914 24.681 Sales of non-fixed assets - - - - - Interest from loans given 0.954 0.853 - - 0.468 0.259 Other Incomes - 21.738 19.781 - 80.481 113.191 - 3.061 9.922 Total - 691.686 662.004 1045.291 1081.192 890.901 565.238 524.443 579.659
4.2: Financial flows into Tikur, EC1989-91 (in ETB 0009) 4.3: Educational expenditures by Tikur, EC1989-91 (in Year ETB 000s) Item 1997(EC89) 1998(EC90) 1999(EC91) ItemYear Transfersfrom zone for salaries - 1174.208 1308.08796 1997(EC89) 1998(EC90) 1999(EC91) Transfersfrom region/zonefor other - 193.650 221.040 Capital - 216.759 217.510 Local taxes (incl. lcenses, permits) - 26.907 57.07886 Wage - 1198.854 1308.088 Other - 1.741 1.980 Non-wagerecurrent - 1191.482 199.703 Total - 1396.506 1588.186 Total - 2607.095 1725.300
25 Annex 4 (continued)
4.4:Expenditures on primaryeducation by Tikur, EC1989-91(in ETBOOOs) 4.5: Monthlywage bill by level in Tikur, EC1989-91(in ETB OOOs) Year Year Item 1997(EC89) 1998(EC90) 1999(EC91) Item 1997(EC89) 1998(EC90) 1999(EC91)
Capitalexpenditures 8.814 10.999 - Teachers 47.741 55.419 59.409 Wage bill for Yreda educationoffice 119.712 120.372 122.400 School directors 6.938 7.040 7.203 Wage bill for teachers 656.148 749.508 726.120 Woredaed/office tech staff 6.082 6.410 6.443 Nonwagerecurrent expenditures 21.348 70.099 69.937 Headof wreda education office 0.835 0.880 0.880 Total 806.022 950.978 918.457 Total 61.596 69.749 73.935
4.6: Dataon primaryeducation, Tikur, EC1989-91 4.7:Primary school enrollmentIn Tikur, EC1989-91 Year Year Indicator 1997 1998 1999 Grade 1997(EC89) 1998(EC90) 1999(EC91)
Totalteachers 132 142 144 Grade1 2765 2833 3336 Teacher-pupilratio 1:54 1:60 1:71 Grade2 1683 1860 1850 Averageclass size 60 67 76 Grade3 973 1532 1693 Percentagefemale 18% 23% 33% Grade4 668 876 1389 Percentagerepeaters 9% 13% 11% Grade5 425 624 811 Percentagedropouts 12% 12% 14% Grade6 240 377 541 Grade7 240 221 321 Grade8 136 167 218 Total 7130 8490 10159
26 Annex 4 (continued)
4.8: Number of teachers by salary grade In Tikur, EC1989-91 YEAR
Salary gradefor teachers 1997(EC89) 1998(EC90) 1999(EC91) (ETB/month) Teachers Wage bill Teachers Wagebill Teachers Wagebill 790 0 2 1580 0 750 2 1500 0 1 750 710 0 1 710 0 672 1 672 0 0 636 0 0 2 1272 600 2 1200 4 2400 1 600 565 1 565 16 9040 26 14690 532 15 7980 0 15 7980 500 18 9000 32 16000 2 1000 472 12 5664 0 13 6136 445 0 0 14 6230 420 16 6720 25 10500 0 395 9 3555 0 19 7505 370 25 9250 27 9990 30 11100 326 0 7 2282 0 305 16 4880 32 9760 10 3050 285 1 285 0 0 247 13 3211 0 0 197 1 197 1 197 1 197 X ~Total 132 54679 147 62459 134 60510
27 Annex 5. Data on schools-nrollments, financial flows, and personnel
5.1: Kochereschool, BuyumawiniKebele
5.1(a): Pupilsenrolled in KochereSchool by grade, EC1990-92 Year Grade 1998(EC 90) 1999(EC 91) 2000(EC92) Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 1 157 42 164 98 111 88 2 100 55 89 39 92 54 3 120 43 88 44 81 35 4 61 13 105 40 86 44 5 31 6 62 10 87 35 6 21 4 26 5 47 9 7 27 7 25 5
8 ______23 4
Total 490 163 561 243 552 274 653 804 826
5.1 (b): Financialflows into KochereSchool, EC1989-91 Years 1996-97(EC89) 1997-98(EC90) 1998-99(EC91) Outlays from zone Outlays from woreda Other grants from donors - Communitycontributions 800 1000 Internal Income - 400 400
5.1 (c): Staffing In KochereSchool Type Number Females Who payssalary Qualiflcation University Headmaster 2 Woreda Full-time teacher 10 3 Woreda TTI Part-timeteacher TTI Secretary Guard 1 Community Other
28 Annex 5 (continued)
5.2: Tikur Inchini school, Inchini 01 Kebele
5.2(a): Pupilsenrolled in TikurInchini School by grade,EC1990-92 Year Grade 1998(EC 90) 1999(EC 91) 2000(EC92) Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 1 261 174 343 263 221 209 2 212 132 173 101 264 174 3 227 107 196 122 162 105 4 92 43 206 103 183 113 5 116 33 141 59 201 101 6 86 44 108 39 137 50 7 116 29 145 45 145 43 8 45 27 121 31 97 52 Total 1155 589 1433 763 1410 847 1744 2196 2257
5.2 (b): Financialflows Into Tikur Inchini School,EC1989-91 Years 1996-97(EC89) 1997-98(EC90) 1998-99(EC91) Outlays from zone - - - Outlays from vvreda Other grants from donors - Community contributions InternalIncome 6000 7069
5.2 (c): Staffing In Tlkur Inchinl School Type Number Females Who payssalary Quallflcation University Headmaster I Woreda TTI Full-timeteacher .29 Woreda TTI Part-timeteacher 4 Woreda Diploma Secretary 1 paidby woreda, 1 Guard 2 paid byschool Other 29 Annex 5 (continued)
5.3: NannooGidu primaryschool, NannooGidu Kebele
5.3 (a): Pupils enrolledin NannooGidu PrimarySchool by grade,EC1990-92 Year Grade 1998(EC 90) 1999(EC 91) 2000(EC92)
______Bys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 1 86 68 73 50 66 72 2 88 52 61 48 75 49 3 96 60 79 53 61 46 4 55 19 95 52 78 52 5 89 45 6 7
Total 325 199 308 203 369 264 524 511 633
5.3 (b): Financial flows Into Nannoo Gidu Primary School, EC1989-91 Years Items 1996-97(EC89) 1997-98(EC90) 1998-99(EC91) Outlays from zone - - -
Outlays from woreda - Other grants from donors - Community contributions - Internal Income 5.3 (c): Staffing In Nannoo Gidu Primary School Type Number Females Who payssalary Qualification University Headmaster I Woreda TTI Full-timeteacher 7 Woreda TTI Part-timeteacher Secretary Guard 1 1 paidby school Other 30 AfricaRegion Working Paper Series
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ARWPS2 Toward Inclusive and Sustainable Development in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, March 1999, by Markus Kostner (out of stock)
ARWPS 3 Business Taxation in a Low-Revenue Economy: A Study on Uganda in Comparison with Neighboring Countries, June 1999, by Ritva Reinikka and Duanjie Chen
ARWPS 4 Pensions and Social Security in Sub-Saharan Africa: Issues and Options, October 1999, by Luca Barbone and Luis-Alvaro Sanchez B.(out of stock)
ARWPS 5 Forest Taxes, Government Revenues and the Sustainable Exploitation of Tropical Forests, January 2000, by Luca Barbone and Juan Zalduendo
ARWPS 6 The Cost of Doing Business: Firms' Experience with Corruption in Uganda, June 2000, by Jacob Svensson
ARWPS 7 On the Recent Trade Performance of Sub-Saharan African Countries: Cause for Hope or More of the Same, August 2000, by Francis Ng and Alexander J. Yeats
ARWPS 8 Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Old Tales and New Evidence, November 2000, by Miria Pigato
ARWPS 9 The Macro Implications of HIV/AIDS in South Africa: A Preliminary Assessment, November 2000, by Channing Arndt and Jeffrey D. Lewis ARWPS 10 Revisiting Growth and Convergence: is Africa Catching Up?, December 2000, by Charalambos G. Tsangarides
ARWPS 11 Spending on Safety Nets for the Poor: How Much, for How Many? The Case of Malawi, January 2001, by William James Smith
ARWPS 12 Tourism in Africa, February 2001, by lain T. Christie, Doreen E. Crompton
ARWPS 13 Conflict Diamonds, February 2001, by Louis Goreux
ARWPS 14 Reform and Opportunity: The Changing Role and Patterns of Trade in South Africa and SADC, March 2001, by Jeffrey D. Lewis
ARWPS 15 The Foreign Direct Investment Environment in Africa, March 2001, by Miria Pigato
ARWPS 16 Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes for Developing Countries, April 2001, by Fahrettin Yagci
ARWPS 17 Export Processing Zones: Has Africa Missed the Boat? Not yet!, May 2001, by Peter L. Watson
ARWPS 18 Rural Infrastructure in Africa: Policy Directions, June 2001, by Robert Fishbein.
ARWPS 19 Changes in Poverty in Madagascar: 1993-1999, July 2001, by Stefano Paternostro, Jean Razafmdravonona, and David Stifel.
ARWPS 20 Information and Communication Technology, Poverty, and Development in sub- Saharan Africa and South Asia, August 2001, by Miria Pigato.
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