CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS

August 18, 2021

[Cite as 08/18/2021 Case Announcements #2, 2021-Ohio-2796.]

APPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW

2021-0640. State v. Mead. Hamilton App. Nos. C-190604, and C-190620 through C-190625, 2021-Ohio-1107. Donnelly, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by Stewart and Brunner, JJ. ______DONNELLY, J., dissenting. {¶ 1} Every person charged with a crime enters the courtroom at clothed with the . See Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 184, 45 S.Ct. 470, 69 L.Ed. 904 (1925). Under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), an accused cannot, over his objections, be compelled to stand trial in prison clothing—regardless of whether it may be more convenient for jail administrators—because of its potential to impair the foundational presumption of innocence. “To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the factfinding process. [And] courts must carefully guard against dilution of the principle that is to be established by probative and beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 503. {¶ 2} At the Hamilton County Justice Center, however, the county sheriff reportedly dictates what clothes an accused may wear at trial. And in this case, the sheriff’s policy apparently allows for a change of clothes in the most literal and constrictive sense: a single solitary set of clothes that an accused pretrial detainee may wear for the duration of the criminal trial. Otherwise, the accused must wear the prison garb then in style for all other pretrial detainees who cannot make bond. {¶ 3} Here, appellant, Scott Mead, was permitted to wear civilian clothes and black dress shoes that had been provided by his legal counsel on the first day of trial. But on subsequent days of trial, the court, deferring to the sheriff’s unexplained policy, denied Mead’s request to wear the different dress clothes that his counsel had provided. Mead was consequently required to wear the same civilian attire throughout the remainder of his trial that he had worn on the first day, but with one conspicuous exception: he was not permitted to wear the black dress shoes that he had worn on the first day of trial. Instead, he was compelled to wear what he characterizes as the “ratty tennis shoes” that he was wearing at the time of his arrest. And that is the attire that he was required to wear, over his objections, for the remainder of the multi-day trial: the same shirt and pants and ratty tennis shoes. {¶ 4} Based on the facts presented to us by appellant, no one else in the courtroom wore the exact same clothes every day of Mead’s trial. While it is unclear whether the jurors drew any specific inferences from Mead’s clearly limited wardrobe, it is not a stretch to recognize that one particularly identifiable class of criminal defendants typically has such restricted clothing options: prisoners who are already in jail. {¶ 5} This court’s refusal to hear this case prevents us from considering whether the seemingly arbitrary limitation on Mead’s courtroom attire was prejudicial error that deprived him of his rights to a fair trial and due process. It further prevents us from considering whether a person’s right to a fair trial is governed by the court’s administration of the rule of or the sheriff’s enforcement of a dress-code policy. {¶ 6} This is not by any means meant to discount any legitimate interest that a sheriff may have in ensuring the security and safety of the courthouse and jail. But according to the First District Court of Appeals’ decision in this case, the sheriff, without explanation, simply refused to accept any additional clothes or shoes from defense counsel for Mead to wear at trial. Even if security was the sheriff’s primary concern, this court’s refusal to hear this case prevents any meaningful consideration as to whether any reasonable alternatives existed that would have preserved legitimate security interests without impairing Mead’s right to a fair trial and without requiring him to wear conspicuously ill-chosen tennis shoes in front of the jury. Such alternatives might have included something as simple as the sheriff’s retaining custody of the change of clothes and the black dress shoes when trial concluded each day.

2 08-18-2021 {¶ 7} Because I believe that this case presents important legal issues, the merits of which should be further examined, I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision to not accept Mead’s discretionary appeal for review.

STEWART and BRUNNER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. ______

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