MEETING BETWEEN 2 SYNIGL INTERVIEWERS AND THE LEADER OF THE MAI-MAI KIRIKICHO ARMED GROUP WITH HIS FOLLOWERS
THE PERSISTENCE OF ARMED GROUPS AND THE WIDENING OF THEIR SCOPE OF ACTION, RESPONSE TO THE TERRITORIAL UNDER- ADMINISTRATION IN WALUNGU, KALEHE, AND FIZI
FEBRUARY 2021
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by the Synergy of Great Lakes Initiatives (SYNIGL) for Management Systems International (MSI), A Tetra Tech Company. (THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK)
THE COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUPS” PHENOMENON IN THE PROVINCE OF SOUTH KIVU: Socio-economic and political analysis
This article was produced for review by the American Agency for International Development (USAID). It was prepared by the Synergy of Great Lakes Initiatives (SYNIGL) for Management Systems International (MSI).
Under Contract No. AID-OAA-I-13-00042/AID-660-TO-16-00004
Authors: Synergy of Great Lakes Initiatives (SYNIGL) with the consultancy of Christian Kamala Kaghoma1, Adolphe Kilomba Sumaili2 and Arnold Nyaluma Mulagano3.
DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
1 Professor at the Catholic University of Bukavu (UCB), Official University of Bukavu (UOB) and Research Center in Social Science and Public Policy (CRESP2-DRC): [email protected], [email protected]. 2 Professor at the Higher Medical Institute (ISTM-Bukavu) and Congolese Center for Transitional Justice (CCTJ-CCJT): [email protected]. 3 Professor at the Catholic University of Bukavu (UCB), Dean at Mulagano in Bukavu: [email protected]. (THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK)
CONTENTS ACRONYMS ...... II EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 2 METHODOLOGY ...... 4 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF DATA COLLECTED IN WALUNGU, KALEHE, AND FIZI...... 5 1.1. DATA COLLECTED IN MULAMBA, WALUNGU TERRITORY IN OCTOBER 2020...... 5 1.2. DATA COLLECTED IN KALEHE: MBINGA-SUD, BUZI, AND ZIRALO...... 8 1.3. DATA COLLECTED IN THE FIZI TERRITORY: NGANJA AND MUTAMBALA...... 10 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED DATA ...... 14 POLITICAL CRYSTALLIZATION OF ARMED GROUPS IN EASTERN DRC ...... 19 3.1. THE POLITICAL FACE OF ARMED GROUPS ...... 19 3.2. ARMED GROUPS, A RESPONSE TO THE UNDER-ADMINISTRATION ...... 20 3.3. BAD ADMINISTRATION FERMENTS THE FIELD OF ARMED GROUPS ...... 21 3.4. IDENTITY MANIPULATION IN AN UNFINISHED DEMOCRACY ...... 21 3.5. ARMED GROUPS IN LOCAL SOCIO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS ...... 21 3.6. REGIONAL TENSIONS ARE EXTENDING TO THE CONGOLESE HILLS ...... 21 3.7. FACTORS OF THE POLITICAL CRYSTALLIZATION OF ARMED GROUPS ...... 22 3.8. AVENUES FOR ESCAPING THE CIRCUS OF ARMED GROUPS ...... 23 CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH. .. 26 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 28
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | i ACRONYMS
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
AFDEM Appui aux Femmes Démunies et Enfants Marginalisés (AFDEM)/Support for poor women and marginalized children
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ANR National Intelligence Agency
RCD Congolese Rally for Democracy
SYNIGL Synergy of Great Lakes Initiatives
CNDP National Congress for the Defence of the People
GA Groupe armée / Armed Group
DDRRR Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement
FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDLR Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
GEC Congo Research Group
GRIP Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security
PNKB Kahuzi-Biega National Park
MSI Management Systems International
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
STEP Stabilization of eastern DRC for Peace
USAID United States Agency for International Development
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC / Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo
ii | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN THE PROVINCE OF SOUTH KIVU USAID.GOV EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper is the result of research conducted to answer the following fundamental questions:
• What relationships do communities have with armed groups in Mulamba, Buzi, Mbinga South, Ziralo, Kalonge and Fizi (Nganja and Mutambala)? • What is the regional dimension of this phenomenon? • What political reading can we do on this phenomenon?
In order to provide answers to these questions, a qualitative survey and a quantitative survey were conducted. The results are unambiguous. They demonstrate the persistence of armed groups as in 2018 and the widening of the phenomenon in the Fizi territory. Compared to 2018, this phenomenon is rooted in its links with local communities. 57% of respondents now report without fear or hesitation that they collaborate with armed groups in Mulamba, Buzi, Ziralo, Mbinga South, and Kalonge. As for the Fizi territory, the relational dynamics are outright formal between armed groups and local communities (Bembe, Fuliru, and Banyamulenge). In Fizi, communities come together to decide on the creation and survival of armed groups. The regional dimension reveals that armed groups exist and persist to combat foreign armed groups’ operations that in scum the territories of Walungu, Kalehe, and Fizi. The data collected also shows that the groups persist with a view to combating cooperation between the Congolese army and foreign armies.
In political terms, this paper demonstrates the crystallization of the armed group phenomenon. Indeed, the political changeover that took place on January 24, 2019 at the summit of the Congolese state has provoked a dynamic of surrender by the armed groups in eastern DRC.4 In the wake, many had announced their surrender to assist the new regime in its clear determination to restore peace. These mass surrenders had been the result, on the one hand, of the hope generated with the advent of a new regime and on the other hand the fear of being crushed militarily. In view of the facts, we realize that when Joseph Kabila Kabange passed power over to Felix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo on January 24, 2019, the population had not yet perceived the game being played. Even armed groups had let their guard down a little, believing that perhaps the coming power would crush them. It is this fear that explains the lull on different fronts at the beginning of 2019. Very quickly, after a few months there weren't even the first signs of the long-awaited change. On the contrary, the situation was getting worse. The announced change was only a facade. It was in this context of hope and fear that there has been an upsurge in armed groups. To deal with this phenomenon, this paper recommends a comprehensive solution to support the implementation of basic social services such as education, health, and safety. The lack of basic services provision in these places gives carte blanche to armed groups that eventually exploit a perceived vacuum of authority bringing more trouble than solutions to local populations.
4 See Claude Sengenya, RDC : les enjeux des nouvelles vagues de redditions des miliciens dans l’Est, June 21 2020, available at https://actualite.cd/2020/06/21/rdc-les-enjeux-des-nouvelles-vagues-de-redditions-des- miliciens-dans-lest accessed on December 6, 2020 at 3:44 pm.
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 1
2 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV INTRODUCTION
The persistence of armed groups in the Walungu, Kalehe and Fizi territory proves that the Congolese State does not fully control, at least not yet, its 2,345,410 square km. These armed groups challenge the sovereignty to the point that we can state with Professor Dr. Nissé Nzereka Mughendi that “this country's wealth has so far been of almost no use, neither for the Congolese State, nor for its people as a whole, nor for stable entrepreneurship, capable of stimulating economic growth. Despite the deregulation of small-scale mining in 1982, the country's GDP has continued to fall.”5 With the increasing number of armed groups to date,6 it must be said that the new President of the Republic has not yet mastered the situation on the ground, as his accession to power has not changed anything in terms of public security in Mulamba, Buzi, Kalonge, Ziralo, Mbinga South, and Fizi.
Those who exploit armed groups and army generals inclined to exploit minerals through armed groups continued their criminal activities to the detriment of the Congolese State in full serenity. In this country, “the State apparatus and the instruments of power have continued to corrode, while most of its rulers or warlords, accomplices in the plundering of the country's resources, are trying to build fortunes abroad, to escape when the tide turns.”7 The vastness of the Congolese territory highlights the difficulties in establishing State authority. The weak spatial integration of state power has promoted “the development of rebel sanctuaries in areas difficult to access or weakly penetrated by the State's power.”8 As Roland Pourtier put it, “political analysis often sinks through their failure to question the spatial dimension.”9 Having conducted a study on the armed groups phenomenon in the Walungu groupement as well as those in Buzi, Mbinga South, Ziralo, and Kalonge in 2018, SYNIGL, with USAID funding under the SPR project, thought it was best to conduct a new study in 2020 to refresh knowledge on this issue of armed groups. It is clear that the aforementioned places are indeed what Professor Mughendi calls rebel sanctuaries in hard-to-reach areas. As evidence, data collection could not even cover the Mubugu and Kalima groupements in the Kalehe territory mainly because they are geographically inaccessible.
This new study conducted by SYNIGL aims to answer the following fundamental questions: what relations do communities have with armed groups in Mulamba, Buzi, Mbinga South, Ziralo, Kalonge, and Fizi (Nganja and Mutambala)? What is the regional dimension of this phenomenon? What political reading can we do on this phenomenon? The central hypothesis of this study is that armed groups persist and maintain strong relationships with local communities. The regional dimension is that armed groups want to combat frequent incursions by foreign troops on Congolese soil. Beyond these official demands, the armed group phenomenon has crystallized politically. Each armed group in the aforementioned territories now has a political counterpart to gain access to the political leadership of
5 See Nissé Nzereka Mughendi, Les déterminants de la paix et de la guerre au Congo-Zaïre, Louvain-la-Neuve, Peter Lang, 2011, p 330. 6 See https://desknature.com/rdc-ituri-la-multiplication-des-groupes-armes-pres-de-la-rfo-accelere-lextinction-des-okapis-selon- le-gouvernement-provincial-%EF%BB%BF/ accessed on December 6, 2020 at 3:55 pm. 7 See Nissé Nzereka Mughendi, Les déterminants de la paix et de la guerre au Congo-Zaïre, Louvain-la-Neuve, Peter Lang, 2011, p 330. 8 Ibid. 9 Pourtier R “Reconstruire le territoire pour reconstruire l’Etat: la RDC à la croisée des chemins”, Afrique Contemporaine, no. 227, 2008/3, p 25.
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 3 the Republic. This paper has been drafted to demonstrate these three assumptions. Its answers to these three fundamental questions are derived from qualitative and quantitative surveys conducted specifically in Mulamba in the Walungu territory; Buzi, Ziralo, Kalongo, and Mbinga South in the Kalehe territory; and finally in the Nganja and Mutambala groupements in the Fizi territory.
Before discussing the 2020 results, the 2018 conclusions should be recalled for not only comparison, but also to highlight the originality of this new study. Thus, as a reminder, the 2018 study drew, among others, the following conclusions: the existence of informal relations between communities and armed groups, the support of some economic operators to armed groups in order to protect their businesses, the divergence of perceptions of communities vis-à-vis armed groups, 80% of those who interact with armed groups are low income, the socio-economic profile of households interacting with armed groups, etc. That being said, the 2020 study has the following original features: highlighting the regional dimension, confirming the 2018 data with the surrender of the armed group Maheshe to Mulamba which extended the perimeter of Ndarumanga, political analysis of the phenomenon that describes it as a crystallization of the armed group phenomenon, mapping the phenomenon in the Fizi territory, where the paper now certifies the formal nature of relations between communities and armed groups, and the rejection by armed groups of military co-operation between the DRC and foreign armed forces to do away with insecurity. It is in these terms that the added value of the study conducted by SYNIGL in 2020 is summed up compared to the 2018 study.
However, the qualitative and quantitative data collected in 2020 are presented in three components which, in turn, constitute the analytical guidelines, namely (1) the analysis of qualitative data; (2) the analysis of quantitative data, and; (3) a kind of weft between the two which focuses on the political dimension of the study, considered as the political crystallization of the armed group phenomenon. In the first component, the qualitative analysis of the data, successively involves the data collected in Mulamba/Walungu (1.1), the data collected in the Kalehe territory (1.2) and finally the data collected in Fizi. The second component of the report, which is essentially quantitative, provides, as in 2018, a picture of the interactions between the populations living in the areas where armed groups operate and the armed groups, and identifies the socio-economic characteristics of the armed groups in order to explain their ability to live in such a hostile environment. The third component of the report, which is devoted to the political analysis of data, addresses the phenomenon through (1) the political face of armed groups, (2) the factors contributing to their political crystallization, and (3) the new alternatives in order to get out of this circus.
4 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV METHODOLOGY
As in 2018, the research methodology for this study was based on a review of the literature related to armed groups. It was after reviewing the literature that interview guidelines and survey questionnaire were presented. The first objective was to collect as much qualitative information as possible, while the second, given its quantitative orientation, aimed to obtain information to establish the socio-economic profile of the populations living in these areas of action by armed groups in order to derive their specific characteristics. While the interview guidelines were given to key informants in the Walungu, Kalehe, and Fizi territories, the quantitative questionnaire was given to households according to the sample defined in point two of this paper. As an update study, the number of respondents was reduced due to time and budget constraints. The data collected in this way is analyzed in comparison with the data collected in 2018. The highlight of the analysis is to take an inventory of what has and has not changed. In addition to Mulamba/Walungu, Buzi, Mbinga South, Ziralo and Kalonge in the Kalehe Territory, this study covered the Bashimukama and Ngandja groupements in the Fizi territory. The reason for adding Fizi territory is the increased activism by armed groups since the beginning of 2020. In terms of armed group activism, this territory has joined the ranks of the Walungu and Kalehe territories. Some would ask why the Mubugu and Kalima groupments were not covered in the Kalehe territory. These two groupements are known as headquarters of armed groups. They were not covered simply because of geographical inaccessibility and a very high level of insecurity.
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 5 1. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF DATA COLLECTED IN WALUNGU, KALEHE, AND FIZI.
1.1. DATA COLLECTED IN MULAMBA, WALUNGU TERRITORY IN OCTOBER 2020. As stated in the introduction, we are dealing with updating the data collected in 2018 in Mulamba in the Walungu territory. During October 2020, data were collected in 4 villages and 10 interviews were conducted with key informants, including 2 women and 8 men. As in 2018, interviews were conducted with ex-combatants (all men) and an interview with the leader of the armed group Ndarus. Data collection was complemented by focus groups. Analysis of the data collected reveals the surrender of an armed group in Mulamba, the increased presence of internally displaced persons in Luntukulu, the mediation of Kengewa Omari between Ndarumanga and Maheshe, the surrender of Maheshe Kahasha allowed the Ndarumanga armed group to assume dictatorship over the Mulamba groupement, the absence of State security services, the establishment of Nadrumanga headquarters in Busolo, the hesitation in communicating with local leaders, the conversion of ex-combatants into small-scale diggers, the motivation of armed groups to combat the Tutsis and Banyamulenges integrated within the FARDC and finally the non-existence of relations between armed groups and foreign entities.
SURRENDER OF AN ARMED GROUP WITHOUT REDUCING INSECURITY.
Reduced activism by armed groups has been observed in all four villages, including that of self- proclaimed General Maheshe Kahasha, Raïa Mukombozi, who has visited the Congolese Government since May 21, 2020 in response to the call of the Congolese head of State to pacify the country. This is the information provided by ex-combatants now living in the city of Luntukulu awaiting a demobilization and social reintegration program. This program has not started yet. All positions formerly occupied by the Maheshe armed group were recovered by the Ndarus armed group of self-proclaimed General Ndarumanga.
INCREASED PRESENCE OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN LUNTUKULU
Currently, the city of Lutunkulu in the Mulamba grouping is populated by internally displaced persons. They are assisted by the HCR through its implementing partner AVS. Internally displaced persons receive family kits and food. At the origin of this massive population displacement, community leaders claim that in September 2017, the incursion of the Raia Mutomboki Ndarumanga from Kiino and Lukigi10 was reported to Kamilanga near Busolo, Kalumba, Kasayi, Bangwe, Nabiriji, Kalengera, and Kisungi in the Mulamba grouping during which several people were abducted. During this same incursion, several people's assets, including food, cows, goats, and sums of money were looted. Since this incursion in 2017, the Ndarumanga and Maheshe groups have been fighting for control of villages such as Lukigi, Ibanga, and Kibandamangobo. Faced with this situation, the FARDC preferred to observe rather than react. This situation had caused a massive displacement of the population from these villages to the city of Luntukulu where the FARDC military camp and some elements of the Congolese National Police are located.
10 Lukigi is located towards the Ulindi River bordering the Mwenga and Shabunda territories.
6 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV MEDIATION OF KENGEWA OMARI BETWEEN NDARUMANGA AND MAHESHE
In order to avoid displacement and daily clashes, another armed group decided to mediate between the Maheshe and Ndarumanga armed groups. Indeed, the self-proclaimed general of the Raia Mutombokis based in Shabunda, Mr. Kengewa Omari Donat, National President of the Popular Forces for the Defense of the Congolese People (FPDPC-RM) organized a military dialogue between Commander Maheshe Kahasha and Commander Ndarumanga Munyololo from November to December 2017. At the end of this dialogue, certain resolutions were adopted:
Commander Maheshe Kahasha is vested as commander of the first zone of operation located in the Walungu territory, comprising the Lukigi River to the Busolo, Mulambula, Luntukulu and Kibanda- mangobo villages;
Commander Ndarumanga is vested as commander of the 5th zone of operation located in the Mwenga territory, comprising the villages of Ngando, Kakanga, and Kigala;
Commander Wemba-Kikukama is appointed Commander of the 2nd Kimbili zone of operation in the Shabunda territory, comprising the Lukigi River and Koze, Mukusu, Byangama, and Kiluma villages.
SURRENDER OF MAHESHE KAHASHA, NDARUMANGA, THE ONLY ACTIVE WARLORD
The negotiating parties made the agreement binding to enable displaced persons to return to their daily lives. When General Maheshe surrendered to the Government on October 21, 2020, General Ndarumanga Munyololo invaded all positions occupied by his now ex-rival. This re-positioning of Ndarumanga led to further displacement of populations. To this end, it collects taxes weekly from households, shops, bars, restaurants, farms, and fields. All these taxes are referred to as the “war effort”. Every economic operator is obligated to send his contribution known as “Call credits” for the General”. Several hills and gold mines and cassiterites are controlled and exploited by him through his biological siblings. This demonstrates how armed groups find ways to finance their activities. The lack of basic service provision by the state is the most plausible explanation.
LACK OF SECURITY SERVICES
State security services are wanting throughout the Mulamba groupement. There are several reasons for the insecurity situation: inaccessibility due to lack of road infrastructure; dense forest; lack of a telecommunications network; spontaneous and sporadic attacks between the Raia Mutombokis and the FARDC. In Luntukulu there is a minimal presence of the FARDC, the Congolese National Police, and ANR agents. These state services coexist with ex-combatants of the Maheshe armed group. The weakness of the State hinders the effectiveness of humanitarian and peace-building interventions. At the end of the projects financed by the Congolese Government's technical and financial partners, the situation went back to as if there had never been any intervention. Hence the need to combine the bottom-up and top-down approaches.
NADRUMANGA HEADQUARTERS IN BUSOLO
Taking advantage of Maheshe's surrender, Ndarumanga Munyololo set up his headquarters in the village of Busolo commonly known as “Jerusalem.” Busolo is located more than 40 km from downtown Luntukulu. It should be noted that Luntukulu was the administrative district of its now ex-rival. On September 14, 2020, Ndarumanga organized a public meeting in Luntukulu, specifically in the village of
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 7 Ndiba at the central station. He announced to the crowd present that he had just taken part in a major and strategic meeting with the national government and the discussions were positive.11 It was during this meeting that he made the promise to lay down arms very soon and definitively integrated the national army. To date, this armed group has still not been demobilized, and it continues to sow terror and ransom the population.
HESITATION IN COMMUNICATING WITH LOCAL LEADERS Community leaders were reluctant to share information for fear of reprisals from Maheshe's Raia Mutomboki now living in downtown Luntukulu. In Luntukulu people live in a climate of fear and mistrust; no one is able to trust anyone else. It is not known who provides the intelligence work for the Raia Mutombokis. Ndarumanga uses multiple channels to have real-time information.
EX-COMBATANTS WHO HAVE BECOME SMALL-SCALE TRAINERS The majority of ex-combatants of armed groups have become small-scale mining operators. Few ex- combatants are sewing, working as masons, or hairdressers. These trainings were organized by BVES and World Vision. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the Ndarumanga armed group's members occupying 70% of the Mulamba groupment, originate from the Shabunda territory. They got there by hunting down the Interahamwes. That way they extended their influence on Mwenga and Walungu.
FIGHTING THE TUTSI AND THE BANYAMULENGE WITHIN THE FARDC In addition to pretending to defend the Congolese territory against foreign armed groups, armed groups have another motive which challenges the nationality of Congolese persons who speak Kinyarwanda. The process of forming a national army initiated since the 2003 Transition has never been unanimous. For the armed groups in Mulamba, it is unacceptable to integrate Kinyarwanda-speaking populations into the national army. Armed groups claim to work to combat the Tutsis and Banyamulenges integrated within the FARDC. They also say they want to protect the population and drive out the Interahamwes. Colonel Kazini of the FARDC believes that the armed groups' motivations evolve according to the circumstances.12 Armed groups receive support in terms of food, telecommunications equipment (Androids, telephones, etc.), money, and medicine from some members of the communities who maintain commercial and economic relations with them.
NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMED GROUPS AND THE OUTSIDE They have no relationship with the outside world because their struggle is based on nationalism (the defense of their ancestral lands invaded by aggressors from foreign countries) say local leaders. It is this occupation of land that fuels the hatred of armed groups towards neighboring countries.13 Armed groups exploit gold mining fields and quarries and cassiterites within their jurisdiction. They also forcibly collect taxes from households and economic operators operating in Mulamba. It goes without saying
11 Focus group held on October 5, 2020 in Luntukulu, with Mulamba community leaders. 12 Interview with Colonel Kazini by Bertin Ilunga Mwati on October 4, 2020 in Luntukulu. 13 See focus group held in Luntukulu on October 5, 2020 with community leaders in Luntukulu facilitated by Bertin Ilunga Mwati.
8 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV that these armed groups have sufficient financial means to continue their criminal activities. Ndarumanga Munyololo, a member of the armed group with the same name operating in Luntukulu in the Walungu territory, believes that there are not as many armed groups as during the transition period. “Besides, there are not many armed groups today as in the time of the RCD and transition periods.”14 According to him, the solution is to “build a good national army by integrating combatants from armed groups; deploying the FARDC throughout the country and bringing all the Interahamwes and the FDLR to Rwanda. Afterwards, the working conditions of the FARDC and the creation of gainful jobs for young people will have to be improved.”15 Thus, “we instruct SYNIGL to send our demands to the leaders of our country.”16
NO MAJOR POSITIVE CHANGE IN MULAMBA BETWEEN 2018 AND 2020 In comparison with the data collected in 2018, it should be said that there was no major positive change in Mulamba. While the number of armed groups has gone from two to one, the insecure situation remains the same. The surrender of the Maheshe armed group allowed its rival Ndarumanga to extend its jurisdiction over 70% of the Mulamba groupement. As a result, the Nadrumanga armed group's tax base has expanded. This is an opportunity for that group to strengthen and organize itself further. The situation observed in 2018 has therefore remained the same. It has further deteriorated. Maheshe's ex- combatants live in Luntukulu without assistance or supervision. This situation increases the insecurity already prevailing in Mulamba. Consisting of 24 villages, Luntukulu has only three police officers to do so.17 The coexistence of the police and the Ndarumanga armed group remains the only way for these three police officers who have no capacity to intervene.
THE INVISIBLE STATE, THE SOURCE OF WIDESPREAD INSECURITY IN MULAMBA The lack of public services at various locations had already led Jeffery Herbst and Greg Mills to call the Congolese state an invisible state, saying that “it's time we admit the Democratic Republic of Congo does not exist.”18 In addition to being invisible in rural areas, it should be added that the Congolese State is a city State. It exists only in the city center. The further we get from urban centers, the less the State's authority is felt. The second illustration is that the presence of armed groups is not tolerated in the vicinity of the province of Kinshasa. The further we get from Kinshasa, the more armed groups there are. Limiting its authority to downtown Bukavu, entire sections of the South Kivu province completely escape the State's control and basic public services are completely absent. Militarism, the doctrine of solving all questions relating to human affairs through armed conflict, has become the creed of the Congolese Government. It believes that weapons provide the solution to any problem. Yet all planned and executed operations have never succeeded in bringing peace and security to the areas covered by our study. It is time for the Congolese Government to invest in human development by establishing basic social services to reduce insecurity and instability. By increasing access to education,
14 See interview with Ndarumanga Munyololo conducted by Bertin Ilunga Mwati on October 4, 2020. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Remarks made by the President of the Civil Society of Luntukulu at the workshop hosted by SYNIGL in late October 2020 in the “Da Laety's” room in Nyawera, Bukavu city. 18 Jeffery Herbst and Greg Mills, The Invisible state, June 24, 2013, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/24/the-invisible-state/ accessed on December 15, 2020 at 09:27 am.
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 9 health, and safety in Fizi, Walungu, and Kalehe, the armed groups will find fewer and fewer candidates to inflate their ranks. Thus, in their interventions, technical and financial development partners in the DRC should learn to progressively involve the Congolese State in the planning and operational phase. Making national and international NGO's the sole receptacles of official development assistance, as has been the case since 1990, is becoming counterproductive. While State bodies are corrupt and poorly organized, it remains true that development and security have only been possible where the State is present. Strengthening state capacity is becoming not only a necessity, but also an urgency.
1.2. DATA COLLECTED IN KALEHE: MBINGA-SUD, BUZI, AND ZIRALO
Data collected in Mbinga South, Buzi, and Ziralo demonstrate the lack of clarity of the objectives pursued by armed groups, close links between armed groups and local communities, security in the coastal part of Mbinga South alone, activism of armed groups in Ziralo as in 2018 and the support received by armed groups from local communities. These conclusions confirm the 2018 conclusions, and confirm that there has been no progress to date in terms of public services in the three groupements of the Kalehe territory. The comments on and analyses of the data collected in Mbinga South, Buzi, and Ziralo are made based on these conclusions.
THE ARMED GROUP'S UNCLEAR OBJECTIVES
Data collected in 2020 confirm the presence of armed groups, as in 2018, in the Kalehe territory. The armed groups' objectives have never been clear. Some of them even do not know why they work in an armed group. While some believe they are self-defense, others hope to obtain ranks in the national army.19 This confirms the fact that armed groups have become pathways of attaining the ranks and high offices of the State. This is the right way to be promoted in the army or to become ministers. This is the result of the weak rule of law in the DRC where it is difficult to find an inclusive and equitable human resources management system. The language of armed violence thus remains the royal path to force the Congolese government to really listen to popular demands.
CLOSE LINKS BETWEEN ARMED GROUPS AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES
Local leaders are unanimous on the existence of links between armed groups and communities living in the Mbinga South cluster. However, it is difficult to determine the nature of support these communities provide to armed groups. The data show that the activism of armed groups in the Kalehe territory is motivated by the quest for survival. They are motivated by the intent to harm. For example, leaders argue that armed groups are a problem in their circles. In view of such statements, it is easy to understand that idle hands are the devil's playground. The Congolese State does not take care of its population who hear from it only the few times they appear to hassle for taxes. Public policies are sorely lacking to deal with this scourge of widespread youth unemployment.
ONLY THE COASTAL PART OF MBINGA SOUTH IS SECURE
The Mbinga South grouping is in the center of the Kalehe Territory in the coastal part and has 10 villages. Only the coastal part of Mbinga South is secure. The Kalehe Highlands are generally unsafe
19 See focus group held in Ziralo on October 5, 2020.
10 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV places. A small number of State security services are present in Mbinga South. It is therefore urgent to promote good governance in the country; the fight against impunity; create jobs for young people; to conduct the DDR process with the necessary financial resources; and identify and punish the real actors of the armed groups.
ARMED GROUPS' PRESENCE IN ZIRALO AS IN 2018
There are several armed groups in Ziralo. This situation has not changed since 2018. They demand to be integrated into the Congolese government and to have promotions in ranks. In the past, these armed groups worked for self-defense and tracked the FDLR. In their struggle, the Congolese Government has never been willing to support and supervise them.20 This is how many actors of armed groups have joined the rebel leader Kirikicho up to the present day. There are the Nyatura armed groups and the CNRD whose objectives are to prolong inter-ethnic wars. It is a mechanism used by these Rwandophone armed groups to preserve their Congolese identity, the Ziralo leaders believe. Local communities consider them foreigners and they take up arms in order to stay. “There is a relationship between the Tembo community and these armed groups, since at the outset, our own legitimate children are there.”21
SUPPORTS FOR ARMED GROUPS
They receive material and financial support. Military authorities as well as politicians support them. The diaspora also sends resources in terms of upkeep, money and promises. Some politicians support armed groups with a view to balkanizing the country one day. Groups are a problem in Ziralo. When seeing that a community has an armed group, a neighboring community also wants to create one. This is how the May-Mai Kirikicho exist because of the existence of the CNRD, which is a Rwandophone movement. The two armed groups must then be demobilized so that there is peace in Ziralo. To date, the secure places in Ziralo are as follows: Tushunguti center in the locality of Kisha (a part), part of Batayo, part of Kusisa, part of Nyalugusha, part of Bunje, and part of Bushugulu. The villages of Lulere and Kalamo are controlled by the CNRD and the May-Mai Kirikichos. It is reported that the Nyatura armed group has laid down arms for some time, but it remains visible in Ziralo due to lack of supervision of its members.22 The CNRD is also hunted down by the FARDC. However, there was a time when MONUSCO had donated rice to CNRD members. The reason for this assistance remains unknown to this day. In fact, the Mai-Mais operating in Ziralo defends Batembo's interests against the Hutus and Tutsis. “We know that armed groups collaborate with the communities of this grouping and it depends from one armed group to another. Their relationships also depend on interest. For example, when a Tutsi takes the field of a Hutu, on the return it is the Nyatura who will intervene to hunt the Tutsi if only the Hutu is strong either politically or financially.“23
SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
20 Focus group in Ziralo dated October 4, 2020 facilitated by Claude Bagayamukwe. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid.
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 11 Respect the content of the 2008 meeting specifications; strengthen the presence of the FARDC in Ziralo; take care of the demobilized; dismantle CNRD resisters so that Kirikicho has no pretext for his activism; sensitize armed groups to voluntarily leave the bush; to find out all string snipers who support armed groups; punish demobilized people fleeing demobilization centers; deploy military and administrative authorities in the Walao groupement, which has never been government-controlled since the world has existed, as armed groups still make the law; find a solution to the crisis between Buzi and Ziralo; deploy well-trained police officers throughout the grouping; consider curfews to uncover arms caches; bring to justice all perpetrators of massacres in Kalamo village in Ziralo; repatriate FDLR dependents at home in Rwanda; open the entire area through passable roads and telecommunications networks; rebuild infrastructures (schools, health centers, state offices) destroyed by armed groups; mechanize and finally pay all State agents (new and unpaid units) in Ziralo.
It is through implementing these recommendations that the Congolese State could establish its authority in Ziralo. However, this ambition requires substantial financial resources. This should start by making the roads passable to bring Ziralo closer to the central government. With a projected budget of 7.1 billion for 2021, it is difficult to imagine that the situation in Ziralo will change next year. In comparison with 2018, it is always the status quo ante.
1.3. DATA COLLECTED IN THE FIZI TERRITORY: NGANJA AND MUTAMBALA THE FIZI TERRITORY, A STRONGHOLD OF ARMED GROUPS
The Fizi territory is populated by three communities: the majority are Bembes, the Bafulirus is the second largest group, and the Banyamulenges described as a minority group.24 Like the Walungu and Kalehe territories, the Fizi territory has a reputation as a stronghold of armed groups. “They are mostly from the ethnic community of Babembe. ”25 The rebellion of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) took off from Fizi in October 1996 to overthrow President Mobutu's regime on May 17, 1997. The forests and plateaus of Hewa Bora were for a long time the scrub of the head of the AFDL, Laurent Désiré Kabila. Since 1996 the situation in Fizi has often been volatile. Sometimes calm, sometimes in turbulence.
THE PROLIFERATION OF ARMED GROUPS
In recent years, there has been an abundance of armed groups: FRF, RCD, GOMINO, TUIGWANEO, RED TABARA.”26 Reputed mono-ethnic and populated by the Banyamulenges, these armed groups have provoked a rebuttal in the leadership of other ethnic communities. Thus each community, for its safety, has preferred to have its own armed group: “May-Mayi Malaika (Bangubangu), May-mai yakutumba (Bembe); May-mai biloze bisha bike (Fuliru and Nyindu); May-mai Kibukila mbilizi (Rega), May-mai Yalinda (Bembe); the armed group Ebuhali (Bembe).” 27 28 The final objective is “to create a coalition
24 Interview with Colonel Enock Bahati, head of operations of the FARDC in Fizi, conducted by Munguiko Muchindi on June 6, 2020 at 3:23 pm. 25 Ibid. 26 See Munguiko Muchindi, data collection report in the Fizi territory from October 2 to 9, 2020, p 1. 27 Ibid.
12 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV called the National Coalition for the People for Congolese Sovereignty (CNPSC) led by self-proclaimed General William Amuri Yakutumba.” This situation maintains a climate of tension and mistrust between communities. in the Fizi, Uvira, and Mwenga territories. The establishment of the municipality of Minembwe has only exacerbated tensions. Canceling the installation protocol of the mayor of this municipality through letter no./Ref:CAB/MCS/DAC/SK/2079bis/LLN/2020 of the provincial minister of the interior of the province of South Kivu did not put an end to tensions.
TERRITORY HARDLY ACCESSIBLE
Access to the territory is not that simple. Not only is the road degraded and cut off by the waters of Lake Tanganyika, but also it is marked by 18 paid barriers. 29 Economically, the Fizi territory remains smothered as a result of insecurity. Mainly agricultural, this territory's economy has been depleted as a result of the cessation of agricultural activities due to insecurity. “As a result of insecurity in the highlands, some people do not have access to their fields, and livestock have been stolen by the parties to the conflict.”30 This is also a major cause of the persistence of armed conflicts and this deteriorates the socio-economic situation in these sectors. With the same causes producing the same effects, the Fizi territory has therefore joined the instability and precariousness prevailing in Mulamba and all the other Kalehe groupings that were the subject of this study in December 2020.
THE SIMILARITY OF MOTIVATIONS WITH THE ARMED GROUPS IN KALEHE
By comparing the motivation of the armed groups in Mulamba and Kelehe, the similarity of the motives emerges. All armed groups created in response to the Tutsi obedience movements justify their existence as follows: “Defend the integrity of their territory which they believe to be invaded by the Rwandan Tutsi community under the pseudonym Banyamulenge.”31 In addition to the claim to defend the integrity of their geographical space, the armed groups are insurgent against what they call “the presence of the rebels in Burundian and Rwandan outfits on the front line in their territory.”32 The fight against the insecurity caused by the presence of foreigners reinforces the motivation of the armed groups: “to combat the occupation in their territory by foreigners who very often assassinate members of other communities (Bembe, Fuliru, Nyindu).”33 For local armed groups, foreign armed groups are responsible for insecurity. Because they claim to fight against the presence of the latter, they receive some support from their respective communities: “We, as communities, have relations with these armed groups. It is our children who are fighting the foreign occupants of our territory. The enemy illegally occupies our lands. We are helping them together with traders and politicians. Our help is in terms of finance, food and non-food, as well as military outfits and weapons.”34
DIVERGENCE OF PERCEPTIONS BY COMMUNITIES
28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid.
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 13 However, opinions remain divided regarding the perception of Fizi communities vis-à-vis armed groups. At the end of the focus group discussions, some participants come up with a solution in armed groups, while others feel that they are rather a problem: “armed groups are a solution for the defense of our communities' interests. However, others think that this is a problem that blocks the development of our Fizi territory. The presence of armed groups endangers the peaceful coexistence of communities.”35 For the FARDC operations officer in the Fizi territory, communities are not generally bothered by the presence of these armed groups: “the community clearly perceives the armed groups in which their sons of the land are found. It hates others who don't belong to their tribes. It provides material, moral, human and financial support to these armed groups.”36
SUPPORT OF POLITICIANS AND FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMUNITIES
Formal creation and support for politicians and economic operators: following the example of Mulamba and Kalehe, politicians and economic operators are cited as those providing assistance to armed groups: “By accepting that their sons integrate these armed groups, they are expressing their agreement. Some politicians and economic operators provide material and financial support.”37 Some communities believe that they have regained security thanks to armed groups: “Previously, the Banyamulenges had killed the Bembes and Fulirus at any time, but since our sons made the decision to regroup in the form of self- defense, they face fierce resistance when they want to do so.”38 Finally, armed groups are considered a real problem in the areas where they operate according to the Congolese National Army: “these armed groups would be a solution if they could solve the problems. This is also what Néhémie Emile Ngandu, a journalist on a local community radio station: “armed groups are factors that exacerbate conflicts.”39 Unfortunately, problems persist, like Ziralo and Luntukulu. There is massive displacement of the population. Socio-economic development is impeded. Hence the government should assume its responsibilities.”40 Unlike Mulamba and Kalehe, the communities gather in Fizi to decide on the establishment of armed groups. The process of creating these groups becomes formal: “the communities come together to create armed groups here in Fizi.”41
FAILURE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
The Congolese Government has often believed that the solution to an armed conflict must always be military. Militarism as a conflict resolution doctrine has been adopted as a remedy for any conflict in the DRC despite the limitations it has demonstrated in the field. From North Kivu to South Kivu and Ituri, the multiple military operations planned and executed by the FARDC have brought neither security nor tranquility. On the contrary, the “armed group” phenomenon they claimed to fight has become more pronounced. The same statement has just been confirmed in the Fizi territory where military operations have not provided the expected security: “the operations launched against these armed groups in the
35 Ibid. 36 Interview with Colonel Enock Bahati, head of operations of the FARDC in Fizi, conducted by Munguiko Muchindi on June 6, 2020 at 3:23 pm. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 See interview with Emile Ngandu on October 6, 2020 at 4:10 pm by Emile Ngandu Munguiko Mucindi in Fizi. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid.
14 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV DRC have no chance of success because the majority of the soldiers sent to the front belong to the tribes in conflict (see the latest desertion of Colonel Makaniki and allied with the Banyamulenge armed group). This makes these operations perceived as an adventure. These operations are at the root of massive population displacement, murders, settlements, looting of cows and country products.”42 According to the army, the success of these military operations is difficult to envisage: “There is little chance that these operations will succeed, especially since our army is infiltrated. We cite the example of an FARDC officer who joined the Ngumino armed group during operations because he is a member of the Banyamulenges. Few areas are also calm through these operations launched. These operations cause massive population displacement and looting of cows...”43 These operations are thus poorly understood and have no support from local communities.44
To solve this problem of armed groups, some avenues of solutions have been proposed, namely holding an inter-community dialogue; the abolition of the municipality of Minembwe; the reorganization of the army by transferring out the senior Banyamulenge officers responsible for the massacre of more than 200 Mayi-Mayi from Colonel Kafulo's group who wanted to go to the FARDC; supervising and accompanying deserters of armed groups who are often left to their sad fate; combatting the ideology of ethnic affiliation and xenophobia within the national army.”45
42 Focus group held in Fizi on October 3, 2020 by Munguiko Mucindi in which the civil society reported by the journalist Rige took part; the head of the Fizi Center, Mutambala sector responding the name of Frédéric Masoa Mweneboka; the village chief Kibukila-Musambilya; Mamboleo Nabisosi who is a reverend pastor of CEPAC and Mutupula-Lemba Jean's husband. 43 Interview with Colonel Enock Bahati, head of operations of the FARDC in Fizi, conducted by Munguiko Muchindi on June 6, 2020 at 3:23 pm. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid.
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 15 2. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED DATA
As in 2018, the quantitative component of the research aimed to map the interactions between populations living in the GA's operation environments and the latter, and identify the socio-economic characteristics that characterize these populations and enable them to survive in such a context. Field data were collected in the different groupings listed in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1: BREAKDOWN OF THE UPDATED SAMPLE
STAFFING TERRITORY GROUPING 2018 2020
BUZI 238 61
MBINGA SOUTH 246 60 KALEHE ZIRALO 141 61
KALONGE 225 60
WALUNGU MULAMBA 235 57
BASHIMUKUMA -- 22 FIZI NGANDJA -- 30
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of staff of respondents for the only groupings covered by the surveys in 2020, almost two years after President Félix Tshisekedi took office in the DRC. This democratic changeover has been seen by several political analysts as an important step in the democratic process which, of course, should help strengthen the State and gradually eliminate various insurrectional movements, including armed groups. For example, in addition to the data collected in the Mulamba grouping in the Walungu territory and some others in the Kalehe Territory, others were collected in the Bashimukuma and Nganja groupings in the Fizi territory. As some of the groupements studied in 2020 were also covered by the 2018 survey, those previous numbers are also included. As shown in the table, only two groupements were surveyed in the Fizi territory, in addition to those in Kalehe and Walungu which were the subject of the 2018 study. From this update of the data, it appears that for almost all the socio-economic characteristics identified in 2018, there was no substantial change. The same applies to the comparison between the two groupements in the Fizi territory with those of the other two territories, with the exception of monthly household income. As shown in Table 2, in the Fizi territory the highest frequencies are associated with the relatively high income brackets (76-100 and 101-150), whereas this is not the case in other territories where, rather, the highest frequencies are essentially associated with the lowest income brackets (<50 and 51-75).
TABLE 2: INCOME BRACKET BY GROUPING
GROUPING INCOME BRACKET
16 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV GROUPING INCOME BRACKET
150 75 250 350 650
100 ------<50 >650 51 76 151 251 351 101
BASHIMUKUMA 85.71 5.71 8.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NGANDJA 92.31 5.13 0.00 2.56 10.26 0.00 0.00 5.13
KALEHE 78.67 17.33 4.00 0.00 2.67 1.33 1.33 6.67
MBINGA SOUTH 63.46 32.69 3.85 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.00 5.77
ZIRALO 57.78 40.00 2.22 0.00 11.11 0.00 2.22 4.44
BUZI 66.67 26.67 6.67 0.00 13.33 0.00 0.00 3.33
MULAMBA 60.00 40.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 50.3 20.6 16.3 7.2 3.4 0.9 0.0 1.3
In terms of interactions between populations and armed groups operating in the different groupements considered, the reasons and areas of interaction remain the same, with the same importance depending on the sectors. Thus, in order of importance, the interaction areas are as follows:
● Protection against other members of the community: the imposition of participation in community work for those who want to evade it, tracking down insolvent debtors, avoiding being subject to abuse of position by certain members of society;
● Business with GA's: borrowing from GA members and selling essentially foodstuff are the two most common aspects of this area of collaboration;
● Service for a loved one or relatives: the release of a family member, incarceration, and the requirement for repayment by insolvent creditors are the main items mentioned.
● Protection against other GA's. While the existence of the GA's was substantially justified, at least by their members, by the protection of the community from invasion by foreign GA's such as the FDLR, it appears that while still being discussed today, this reason has lost its importance over time. Indeed, while GA members continue to present it as the only reason for their presence in these GA's, the opinion of community members who, in addition to collaborating with them, places it only in fourth place.
● Livestock Protection
In addition to these items, it appears that Protestants remain dominant in the different study areas, including even in Fizi which has been added. Some elements of change should be noted:
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 17 ● Knowing the armed groups. While in 2018, the study found that populations didn't have too much clarity on the number of armed groups operating in their environment, this is no longer the case. The same applies to links and recognition of interactions with these armed groups. While in 2018, it was only whispered about possible links, nowadays more and more respondents easily confessed their ties with GA members. This is particularly the case in the Fizi territory;
● While the strategy of fragmentation of armed groups has not changed, it is being used less and less, giving the impression that groups that have settled and developed relations with the populations are also more accepted and stable. Only in the Kalehe territory was noticed the existence of a new armed group “Douze boules (twelve balls)” which was not mentioned in 2018.
● The population is increasingly recognizing that the lack of occupation of youth is one of the main reasons for the survival of armed groups.
The latter raises the whole problem of profiling strategies to be implemented in order to curb the armed groups phenomenon. Faced with young people who are already accustomed to. Handling weapons and which have made them a source of income for their survival, it is essential that the actions to be implemented should revolve around the economic aspect. In concrete terms this means that one should imagine activities close to those to which these young people are already accustomed but which would not be as objectionable as belonging to an armed group. Inclusion of these young people in small protection companies may well lend itself to such an objective. Alternatively, the sustainable solution would be to make agriculture, the most dominant activity in these different areas of activism of armed groups, attractive and profitable. Promoting agribusiness and agripreneurship is now seen as a key direction in that respect.
TABLE 3: BREAKDOWN OF THE UPDATED SAMPLE
STAFFING TERRITORY GROUPING 2018 2020
BUZI 238 61
MBINGA SOUTH 246 60 KALEHE ZIRALO 141 61
KALONGE 225 60
WALUNGU MULAMBA 235 57
BASHIMUKUMA -- 22 FIZI NGANDJA -- 30
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of staff of respondents for the only groupements covered by the surveys in 2020, almost two years after President Félix Tshisekedi took office in the DRC. This
18 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV democratic changeover has been seen by several political analysts as an important step in the democratic process which, of course, should help strengthen the State and gradually eliminate various insurrectional movements, including armed groups. For example, in addition to the data collected in the Mulamba grouping in the Walungu territory and some others in the Kalehe Territory, others were collected in the Bashimukuma and Nganja groupings in the Fizi territory. As some of the groupements studied in 2020 were also covered by the 2018 survey, those previous numbers are also included. As shown in the table, only two groupements were surveyed in the Fizi territory, in addition to those in Kalehe and Walungu, which were the subject of the 2018 study. From this update of the data, it appears that for almost all the socio-economic characteristics identified in 2018, there was no substantial change. The same applies to the comparison between the two groupements in the Fizi territory with those of the other two territories, with the exception of monthly household income. As shown in Table 2, in the Fizi territory the highest frequencies are associated with the relatively high income brackets (76-100 and 101-150), whereas this is not the case in other territories where, rather, the highest frequencies are essentially associated with the lowest income brackets (<50 and 51-75).
TABLE 4: INCOME BRACKET BY GROUPEMENT
GROUPING INCOME BRACKET
150 75 250 350 650
100 ------<50 >650 51 76 151 251 351 101
BASHIMUKUMA 85.71 5.71 8.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NGANDJA 92.31 5.13 0.00 2.56 10.26 0.00 0.00 5.13
KALEHE 78.67 17.33 4.00 0.00 2.67 1.33 1.33 6.67
MBINGA SOUTH 63.46 32.69 3.85 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.00 5.77
ZIRALO 57.78 40.00 2.22 0.00 11.11 0.00 2.22 4.44
BUZI 66.67 26.67 6.67 0.00 13.33 0.00 0.00 3.33
MULAMBA 60.00 40.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 50.3 20.6 16.3 7.2 3.4 0.9 0.0 1.3
In terms of interactions between populations and armed groups operating in the different groupements considered, the reasons and areas of interaction remain the same, with the same importance depending on the sectors. Thus, in order of importance, the interaction areas are as follows:
• Protection against other members of the community: the imposition of participation in community work for those who want to evade it, tracking down insolvent debtors, avoiding being subject to abuse of position by certain members of society;
• Business with GA's: borrowing from GA members and selling essentially foodstuff are the two most common aspects of this area of collaboration;
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 19 • Service for a loved one or relatives: the release of a family member, incarceration, and the requirement for repayment by insolvent creditors are the main items mentioned.
• Protection against other armed groups. While the existence of the armed groups was substantially justified, at least by their members, by the protection of the community from invasion by foreign GA's such as the FDLR, it appears that while still being discussed today, this reason has lost its importance over time. Indeed, while GA members continue to present it as the only reason for their presence in these GA's, the opinion of community members who, in addition to collaborating with them, places it only in fourth place.
• Livestock Protection
In addition to these elements, it appears that Protestants remain dominant in the different study areas, including even newly added Fizi. Some new elements to notice:
• Knowing the armed groups. While in 2018, the study found that populations didn't have too much clarity on the number of armed groups operating in their environment, this is no longer the case. The same applies to links and recognition of interactions with these armed groups. While in 2018, it was only whispered about possible links, nowadays more and more respondents easily confessed their ties with GA members. This is particularly the case in the Fizi territory;
• While the strategy of fragmentation of armed groups has not changed, it is being used less and less, giving the impression that groups that have settled and developed relations with the populations are also more accepted and stable. Only in the Kalehe territory was noticed the existence of a new armed group “Douze boules (twelve balls)” which was not mentioned in 2018.
• The population is increasingly recognizing that the lack of occupation of youth is one of the main reasons for the survival of armed groups.
The latter raises the whole problem of profiling strategies to be implemented in order to curb the armed groups phenomenon. Faced with young people who are already accustomed to. Handling weapons and which have made them a source of income for their survival, it is essential that the actions to be implemented should revolve around the economic aspect. In concrete terms this means that one should imagine activities close to those to which these young people are already accustomed, but which would not be as objectionable as belonging to an armed group. Inclusion of these young people in small protection companies may well lend itself to such an objective. Alternatively, the sustainable solution would be to make agriculture, the most dominant activity in these different areas of activism of armed groups, attractive and profitable. Promoting agribusiness and agripreneurship is now seen as a key direction in that respect. sources of income for young people. Add to this, in the case of Fizi, the apparent contradiction observed in State policies such as the erection of the municipality of Minembwe without having succeeded in securing the territory and thus without offering guarantees of a real deterrence against the expansionist tendencies of certain communities inhabiting the territory.
20 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV 3. POLITICAL CRYSTALLIZATION OF ARMED GROUPS IN EASTERN DRC
Armed groups are perceived by scientists and operational actors as a cyclical phenomenon linked to a circumstantial crisis. All efforts are directed towards eradicating them, doing away with them. Military operations, voluntary or forced demobilizations are part of this logic. Born in the wake of resistance against the invasion of foreign armies, armed groups have become permanent. Everything started from the 1996 war when the Congolese army left the population to its sad fate.
After the assault of the AFDL and Rwandan army forces, much of the Walungu Territory, including Luntukulu, remained an FDLR entrenchment area. In the face of the horror of their crimes against civilian populations, volunteers armed themselves to protect the population. In Kalehe, the phenomenon is relatively older. The identity conflict of the Masisi territory spread there with the same dichotomy, Rwandophone and indigenous against a backdrop of competition around natural resources. Military activism is even more anchored in Fizi. The participation of some young people from rebellious circles in Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi has significantly contributed to the militarization of the populations of the highlands and even the Uvira plains. This point explores the political face of armed groups (1), the factors that contribute to the political crystallization of armed groups (2) and the new ways to try in order to get out of this circus (3).
3.1. THE POLITICAL FACE OF ARMED GROUPS
Studies in Fizi, Kalehe, and Walungu show that armed groups are now serving sustainable political issues. They fit harmoniously into the electoral competition (1). They offer a response to the under-administration of the Congolese territory (2) and an alternative to poor governance (3). They reinforce the failure of the national identity in an incomplete democracy (4), in favor of local (5) and regional (6) dynamics.
3. 1.1 ARMED GROUPS, A PILLAR IN ELECTORAL COMPETITION It is assumed that the persistence of armed groups in a regime that guarantees regular elections is unthinkable. Armed resistance is justiciable in the face of an illegal group that usurps state power. It remains legitimate before an unelected, forcibly derived power. 46 On the other hand, the use of armed force against a power falls outside the law and is seen as an attack on the will of the people.47 Thus, not all groups born and legitimized by the political turbulence of the years 1990-2006 can justify why they still remain after three electoral cycles in the DRC. Certainly, every election gives rise to disputes that fuel warmongering impulses, but their repression is justified in the eyes of the public and imposed on the legally established authorities. In a democratic regime, the demands made by arms are expressed through the campaign and electoral competition.
In practice, however, there is a correlation between armed groups and competing political actors. During the campaign and elections, access to areas controlled by armed groups is restricted to certain leaders. The course of operations and the outcome are controlled by the warlords. Thus, an
46 See article 64, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the DRC. 47 Ibid.
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 21 inconspicuous but real surge of political actors towards armed groups is developing. In this context, electoral competition will fuel the activism of armed groups for a long time.
It is therefore not surprising that the phenomenon persists even after the first peaceful changeover at the head of the country. On the contrary, those who fail the elections position themselves as points of contact, mediators between armed groups and the new power. Even elected representatives from the armed groups' areas of action are jumping on this bandwagon for their positioning on the political spectrum.
3.2. ARMED GROUPS, A RESPONSE TO THE UNDER-ADMINISTRATION
Under-administration is poorly symptomatic of Africa as a whole, but its magnitude in the DRC exceeds limits. The possibility of evading power reveals a weak deployment of state power on its territory.48 There are areas of non-law in the DRC, vast human agglomerations that are beyond the control of any power. This is where the activism of armed groups develops. Armed groups emerging around Kinshasa are being bluntly subdued.49 The further away from the seat of public institutions, the less access there is to basic public services, including public security.
The phenomenon is now a rejection of a power incapable of taking over the security of its citizens and protecting the integrity of the national territory. The armed groups' areas of action are often far from administrative centers, without the presence of law enforcement force or any other public service other than tax authorities. According to testimonies gathered in Luntukulu, the spaces abandoned by the Maheshe group were occupied by elements of other groups after a long period without state forces. The same situation is observed in Fizi and Kalehe whenever an area is liberated by an armed group. This would be the case when foreign groups are displaced through military operations. The military withdraws after operations, the police do not follow. An impromptu group will be created to fill this void.
Under-administration goes hand in hand with the existence of natural resources. Deserted or arid areas ignored by the public authorities are not of interest to armed groups. On the other hand, in mining, forestry, etc. areas... they take on all the attributes of the public authorities, exploit natural resources and levy taxes. They thus become new executioners against the same population they claim to defend. Beyond the difficulties inherent to manpower or infrastructure, there is a kind of implicit expectation between armed groups and regular forces. Groups closer to the cities are exposed to the overwhelming power of the Congolese army. As long as it doesn't disturb the interests of power, nor prevents the functioning of the institutions, the group is not tracked down. It may operate freely, get supplies from the population, and carry out all kinds of trafficking. Certainly, other DRC under-administered areas have no armed groups. This is also where the complexity of the phenomenon lies. The most motivating factors: porous nature of the borders leaking resources from territories controlled by armed groups, the multitude of smugglers and the complexity of national actors in Kivu and Ituri.
48 See J. KOMBO YETELO, 2013 49 See Nissé Nzereka Mughendi, Les déterminants de la paix et de la guerre au Congo-Zaïre, Louvain-la-Neuve, Peter Lang, 2011, 391 pages.
22 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV 3.3. BAD ADMINISTRATION FERMENTS THE FIELD OF ARMED GROUPS
Maladministration or even mismanagement of public affairs legitimizes the action of armed groups. Initially justified to combat foreign invasions, armed groups do all too often justify their activism by the abuses of the regular army or other public authorities. Administrative harassment promotes the crystallization of armed groups. In some constituencies, populations prefer the jurisdiction of armed groups to administrative authorities. Whether public officials or customary chiefs, many are driven out of their entities by militiamen for poor governance and human rights violations.
In the current context, unsuccessful decentralization has led to the persistence of armed groups. Clashes associated with customary power, the superposition of authorities over the same entity, the creation of non-functional administrative entities... and many other failures in the management of the administration provide an excuse to armed groups who come to “fill the void”, and “clean up”.
3.4. IDENTITY MANIPULATION IN AN UNFINISHED DEMOCRACY
In Fizi and Kalehe, the formation of armed groups is based on specific identities, with a Rwandophone- indigenous dichotomy. Some respondents see the presence of armed groups as demands for recognition in relation to the somewhat invasive presence of certain populations considered “foreign” in the region and who, after decades of coexistence, would like to forcibly appropriate available land. A foreigner is not necessarily a non-national.
In reality, it is more a manipulation of identity than a real irreconcilable identity conflict. Some politicians based in Kinshasa are self-proclaimed “tribal leaders”, notable of such ethnic groups etc. Without any mandate, they use identity for their political and economic interests and take over the debate on any matter concerning their entities. They offer their assistance to resolve the issue of armed groups in their countries. They do not hesitate to raise the threat of “unleashing the dogs” if their interests (their own or their children's) are undermined. This confirms the opinion of the respondents that armed groups are feeding on the manipulation of a political elite pulling the strings from Kinshasa or other cities in the country.
3.5. ARMED GROUPS IN LOCAL SOCIO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS
Armed groups are investing in local issues. In Fizi and Kelehe, some armed groups are known as livestock protection specialists. Others are even illustrated by the destruction of livestock in communities considered to be enemies.
A certain opinion believes that there are armed groups that are the work of businessmen of the local sons and daughters concerned with the protection of their businesses.
3.6. REGIONAL TENSIONS ARE EXTENDING TO THE CONGOLESE HILLS
The current tensions in the region are not perceived by the majority of respondents. Nevertheless, in popular imagination, armed groups are considered to be the fruit of the neighboring countries of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. Some see it as a continuation of a project to balkanize the DRC, others as a means of continuing predation. Some, however, are quick to equate the current clashes in the Fizi highlands as a war waged by Rwanda and
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 23 Burundi by proxy in the Congolese hills. The very configuration of the groups active in the region and the statements of officials in these states tend to substantiate this contention.
3.7. FACTORS OF THE POLITICAL CRYSTALLIZATION OF ARMED GROUPS
3.7.1. THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF WAR The integration of ex-combatants into the regular army with promotion in ranks, the appointment of military leaders to political posts is seen as an incentive to join armed groups. Even the regular army soldiers find a shortcut to getting promotions. Combatants demobilized as a result of political changeover follow this same logic. They explain permanently abandoning their activism as “keeping the government's promises”, namely their integration into the army with recognition of their ranks.
3.7.2. THE ENTRENCHMENT OF THE CULTURE OF VIOLENCE IN THE REGION Most of the leaders of the States of the African Great Lakes region come from armed groups. The majority of politicians, senior military officers, economic operators have a military background. The wealth accumulated in military activism then allows them to secure the electorate through distributing gifts to voters and through bribery. At the same time, they ensure that their children move up in all state sectors. So, we see a culture of a more noble military crusade. Former rebels or militiamen appear as brave men who were able to master their time. Violence is no longer condemned. That's why any new movement does not bother to recruit.
3.7.3. IMPUNITY The idea that peace takes precedence over justice has shown its limitations. Impunity for crimes committed by combatants keeps them going. The same applies to the increase in amnesty laws. Some criminals even find refuge there. Paradoxically, justice is uncompromising towards Loyalist officers. The partners are even multiplying plans to increase the number of officers convicted of sexual violence, international crimes, torture, etc. On the other hand, the rebels of yesterday and today benefit from great generosity in the name of peace. In this context, the propensity towards armed groups cannot fade away.
3.7.4. THE ARMS SUPPLY CHAIN The study areas are flooded with weapons. The weapon supply chain remains a mystery. Each group supports sourcing weapons from the enemy. Some respondents even accused MONUSCO of delivering arms to armed groups in Luntukulu. It even seems that some officers sell weapons to militiamen. All these statements do not provide insight into the life trajectory of weapons from manufacture to use. The free movement of arms in the region deserves special study and action. Indeed, the persistence of armed groups is partly due to the easy supply of arms and ammunition.
3.7.5. THE MILITARY STRATEGY TO TRACK DOWN ARMED GROUPS Community members appreciate the use of force against armed groups. Many criticize the way they are conducted. They would like a serious, generalized, final operation. On the other hand sporadic, localized operations do not seem realistic. Even members of armed groups fear a strong, systematic force. Some even look favorably upon eradicating armed groups followed by their ranking integration into the army or other sectors of the civil service.
24 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV The persons surveyed even suspect a complicity between some officers from the armed movements and members of active armed groups. The former would communicate strategies to the latter in advance. They go so far as to accuse MONUSCO of maintaining instability in eastern DRC. They claim that no operation involving MONUSCO can succeed. Laurent Nkunda's passage through Kelehe in the presence of MONUSCO seems to particularly fuel irreparable aversion against UN troops. The same mistrust is observed in Walungu and Fizi. In the end, the local communities would appreciate a solid, final operation but have no confidence in the Congolese army or in MONUSCO to do so.
3.8. AVENUES FOR ESCAPING THE CIRCUS OF ARMED GROUPS
3.8.1. A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION FOR PEACE IN THE REGION The issue of armed groups is often approached as a stand-alone problem. This approach will remain ineffective until it integrates the political and economic problems that fuel armed groups. Furthermore, isolating Kivu from regional dynamics would lead to a stalemate. The African Great Lakes States act as vessels communicating instability. The Kivu seems to be the overflow of neighboring States and even the rest of the country. In this context, curbing armed groups is tantamount to envisioning a comprehensive solution for peace in the region. To this end, the respondents are not in favor of a joint military operation. This is due to mistrust of the armies of neighboring States, particularly in light of the painful past. On the other hand, economic and possibly judicial integration could pave the way for comprehensive peace in the region, thereby translating into armed groups being permanently unemployed.
3.8.2. DARE TO JUSTICE Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the former Yugoslavia, and to some extent the Central African Republic have experienced war without residual armed groups. In Kivu, on the other hand, the plight and misdeeds of armed groups seem as atrocious as large-scale wars or rebellions. Justice seems to have played a constructive role in these States. Given the failure of political solutions and several demobilization and integration policies, the deterrent effect of justice could offer a cure-all. Encouraged by impunity, instigators and facilitators of armed groups would be reluctant before a judicial body authorized to judge their actions. It is therefore increasingly recognized that establishing the Joint Specialized Chambers and an International Special Tribunal for the DRC is the lasting solution to instability in the DRC.
Sticking with only to the United Nations Mapping Report on Human Rights Violations in the DRC, it would suffice to identify the crimes committed from the period to the date of writing of this paper. By considering that creating, joining or supporting an armed group constitutes a crime in and of itself, the current shift toward a more noble military crusade could be overturned and future generations would permanently deter it. The few trials brought against some warlords like Batumike, Cheka, etc. illustrate this contention as well.
3.8.3. RECONVERT FIGHTERS INTO A MILITARY ACTIVITY The integration of members of armed groups into the army or police has shown its limitations. The alternatives offered to combatants aim to get them out of military life, from contact with the secure world. The approach makes sense to save communities from the resurgence of abuses and other refractory practices. However, the options offered may not be nearly as attractive as demobilized
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 25 combatants expect. They are offered more demanding and less profitable activities compared to their military activism. Symbolically, a soldier is not limited to a job and compensation. The warrior, the fighter is a whole culture, a life. The terms “Pamba civilians”, “Balanga ya soda civilians”, “a military equal to civilians” clearly reflect the imprint of the transition to the army or in armed groups. That is why some demobilized people go down the wrong path, sometimes in organized crime, or return to armed groups.
Faced with this failure, it is necessary to try a reconversion that is suitable for labelling the transition to military life. The involvement of former militiamen in community security activities could ensure their integration without uprooting their achievements. Their recruitment for the security of common property (parks, nature reserves, etc.), their use in private security companies, etc. would help protect their image and social role.
3.8.4. EMPOWERING LOCAL GOVERNANCE Under-administration also results from the marginalization of grassroots authority. The strong decentralization of the Mobutu regime is still part of the people's mindsets despite all efforts to decentralize and empower local entities. One opinion believes that local issues reflected in military retreats would be answered in local elections and the transfer of power to the grassroots. Decentralized and even deconcentrated administrative entities (groupings) have a potential that they cannot realize as long as everything depends on the top hierarchy.
Thus, when faced with an army or police officer or any other bad public official, the leader of a grouping with no relevant power can be replaced by a bold young person who mobilizes his peer to “protect the community."
3.8.5. CONFINING THE MILITARY FIELD The military field here refers to the entire security sector. Theoretically, military personnel, police officers and any other public officials are excluded from political and commercial fields. Rigorous rules impose inconsistencies on them in order to preserve their role as arbitrators and not as actors in democracy or freedom of trade and industry. At the same time, they are guaranteed to make a living from their profession and benefit from a full pension. Thus, there is very little temptation to go into politics or trade. In the DRC, on the other hand, there are many legal gateways to the point that the business mode and the political class are completely open.
Consequently, going through an armed group offers a significant shortcut. It is important to amend our texts to close this passageway, which entices an increasing number of citizens. It is also necessary to curb the numerous trafficking fostered, by access to law enforcement. Whether it is the supervision of mining quarries, the convoy of cargo, the patronage of taxis or shops, and even construction sites, the mobilization of material public power to access undue benefits can only encourage armed groups. It is also noted that the political reconversion of former militiamen offers them special prestige, fluctuating between the political and security fields. Some MPs, ministers and advisors openly pursue purely warlike strategies. These should be excluded from trade and politics and remain at the service and charge of the nation. Social confinement is a prerequisite for lasting peace.
26 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV 3.8.6. REALIGNING COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE Cooperation and development assistance, as carried out in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are not likely to halt armed groups. In the areas studied, people consider humanitarian workers to be businessmen who invest in the war in the DRC. There is mistrust even for life-saving humanitarian actions. Many believe that partners are in a precarious situation to sustain themselves in the DRC. Without embracing this "street" view, it remains that the millions, or even billions swallowed up in demobilization, awareness-raising actions would have changed the data if they were used to strengthen the State and not to overtake or replace it. Many writers criticize rather paternalistic actions in the field of armed groups and call for genuine cooperation to strengthen the Congolese State and its citizens. It is important to move from the assisted State to the assumed State. A State that provides public services, including security.
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 27 4. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The central question which this study was intended to answer is: What relationship dynamics exist between local communities and armed groups operating in their countries? The data collected in the field shows that communities living in Mulamba, Buzi, Ziralo, Mbinga South, and Kalonge cooperate with armed groups. 57% of the population interviewed interacts with armed groups. The data collected also indicate that armed groups force economic operators to cooperate with them. They believe that they have no choice but to cooperate with them, given that some of their activities are in environments occupied by these groups. These armed groups receive support in terms of medicines, food, and communications materials from influential members of local communities. The data collected indicate the surrender of the Maheshe armed group and the non-supervision of demobilized combatants. The Ndarumanga armed group is now the only group controlling 70% of the Mulamba grouping. It collects taxes and controls all quarries and mines there. It is, moreover, the main source of its income that allows it to pursue its criminal activities peacefully. It appears from the foregoing that the absence of state security services and the unavailability of public services (health, education, and security) explains this phenomenon. The armed group phenomenon has thus become community-based to the point that links with communities have become inevitable. Armed groups are now an integral part of local communities to the extent that it becomes impossible to combat them without involving those communities. Any peace interventions will now find it difficult to be fruitful until they involve the State. Thus, building peace through the bottom-up approach should be coupled with the top-down approach to make basic utilities available in Buzi, Mulamba, Ziralo, Kalonge, and Mbinga South.
That said, the study proposes a series of recommendations. It is clear, therefore, that the policies to be considered in offering alternatives for survival to the actors of GA's should be much more integrated into the daily lives of all citizens and defined in such a way as to complement other accompanying policies. In all of these areas providing fertile ground for GA activism, agriculture is the main economic activity, most of the population is young and unemployment is very high, despite the availability of other directly exploitable natural resources. Such a table suggests the need to define economic solutions to the problem of GA's, particularly those made up of nationals. One of these economic alternatives would be the development of the same youth, active in GA's, in other value-creating activities while remaining law-abiding such as entrepreneurship in the agricultural sector.
Among the policies supporting this major strategy, those of real empowerment in conducting entrepreneurial activities or those in favor of eliminating labor market distortions (labor market reform) deserve special emphasis. To date, there is no research on the functioning of the rural labor market in the DRC, particularly in the area affected by GA's. The career path of ex-combatants, whose knowledge should provide information about the strengths and difficulties they have faced in their professional integration process, is not very well documented and is essentially fed by very simplifying anecdotes and narratives. Good documentation of these aspects should provide guidance on accompanying policies already implemented but whose effects on the elimination of GA's have been very mixed.
In addition, the repatriation of ex-combatants still on Congolese soil should continue; the demobilization of members of armed groups and their social reintegration; the establishment of local demobilization centers in Chamonunu; Cishenyi and Mutale instead of bringing all demobilized persons to Kamina/Haut- Lomami; assistance to the community for victims of abuses by armed groups; establishment of trades
28 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV centers for ex-combatants; psychological counseling for children in schools in circles affected by armed groups; deployment of military personnel to children in schools affected by armed groups; the construction and/or rehabilitation of schools destroyed and abandoned as a result of armed groups; financing of micro-projects for ex-combatants; support to local organizations working in the context of raising awareness for demobilization; strengthening army positions in Kalonge and Kalehe; raising awareness of local communities on peaceful coexistence (Tembo and Hutu) through the Cultural Barza and Umuryango; organizing combatants in development associations; strengthening State control of mineral resources; strengthening measures against the illegal exploitation of minerals and PNKB products; strengthening the fight against impunity of actors of armed groups through transitional justice mechanisms; involving members of local communities in raising awareness for disarmament; advocating for the Congolese Government to keep its promises in favor of the demobilized; rebuilding the roads to allow the opening of Mulamba and Kalehe towards the outside world by also setting up telecommunications networks.
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TABLE 5: INCOME BRACKET BY GROUPING
GROUPING INCOME BRACKET
150 75 250 350 650
100 ------<50 >650 51 76 151 251 351 101
BASHIMUKUMA 85.71 5.71 8.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NGANDJA 92.31 5.13 0.00 2.56 10.26 0.00 0.00 5.13
KALEHE 78.67 17.33 4.00 0.00 2.67 1.33 1.33 6.67
MBINGA SOUTH 63.46 32.69 3.85 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.00 5.77
ZIRALO 57.78 40.00 2.22 0.00 11.11 0.00 2.22 4.44
BUZI 66.67 26.67 6.67 0.00 13.33 0.00 0.00 3.33
USAID.GOV COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE | 31 GROUPING INCOME BRACKET
MULAMBA 60.00 40.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 50.3 20.6 16.3 7.2 3.4 0.9 0.0 1.3
FIGURE 4: EXISTENCE OF A RELATIONSHIP TO ANY GA MEMBER
FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATION BY VILLAGE
Distribution by education level Literate Professional Secondary Primary None Tertiary
32 | COMMUNAUTARIZATION OF THE “ARMED GROUP” PHENOMENON IN SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE USAID.GOV