Building Peace in the Central African Republic

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289558144

Article · January 2016 DOI: 10.5958/2249-7315.2016.00005.8

CITATIONS READS 0 466

2 authors:

Kiven James Kewir Emile Sunjo University of Buea 2 PUBLICATIONS 0 CITATIONS 5 PUBLICATIONS 2 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Integration and Peacebuilding in Africa View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Emile Sunjo on 13 December 2017.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. Asian Journal

of Research in Asian Research Consortium Social Sciences and Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities Humanities Vol. 6, No. 1, January 2016, pp. 41-59.

ISSN 2249-7315 www.aijsh.org A Journal Indexed in Indian Citation Index Building Peace in the Central African Republic

Dr. Kiven James Kewir*; Mr. Sunjo Emile**

*Senior Research Associate, Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Buea, Cameroon. **Intructor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Buea, Cameroon. DOI NUMBER-10.5958/2249-7315.2016.00005.8 Abstract

The Central African Republic has witnessed a succession of peacebuilding efforts from diverse partners including close to two decades of United Nations support and active engagement. In spite of this, peace unraveled with the most devastating consequences witnessed since the March 2013 coup by the Seleka rebels. As a response to unprecedented levels of suffering that followed the Seleka insurgency and takeover, there has been renewed and visibly stronger international commitment to peacebuilding in the Central African Republic. This new peacebuilding engagement is however yet to show signs of sustainability. If anything, it has only reduced fighting in most parts of the country, especially the capital Bangui. Why does the CAR remain fragile in spite of such visible international engagement in the peace process? And what can be done better to ensure that these peacebuilding efforts succeed? The purpose of this chapter is to answer these questions. It shows that for sustainable peace to be the outcome of current peacebuilding efforts, physical security, political efficacy and significant development of physical infrastructure must be sought at the local level before the organization of national elections.

Keywords: Peacebuilding, Political efficacy, physical infrastructure, physical security, national elections, local level. ______

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59.

Introduction

The Central African Republic (CAR), has experienced a succession of conflicts which have constituted a major obstacle to the country‟s development since it gained independence from France in 1960 (Santiso, 2002). Several peacebuilding efforts have been made by the international community including more than 10 years of United Nations presence, but these have failed to prevent a relapse. These efforts placed the organisation of national elections at the centre of peacebuilding activities with other key priorities being political dialogue and reconciliation, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Little care was taken to address the conditions under which these would work.

The overthrow of President Francois Bozizé in March 2013 completely reversed the close to two decades of peacebuilding. The insurgency and consequent overthrow of the president ignited ethnic and religious clashes which worsened the fighting between the Séléka rebels (mostly Muslims) and Christian militias called the „Anti-Balakas‟ (meaning anti-machete or anti-sword in Sango, a local language). The religious hatred that has resulted has made the efforts of international agencies including the AU and the UN more difficult. The CAR has indeed never been as divided. The conflict has also significantly destroyed the already basic infrastructure, especially housing in most settlements outside the capital and left the population at the mercy of uncoordinated armed groups.

Unlike previous episodes of conflict, the current crisis which began in 2012 has been the deadliest and perhaps as a matter of cause the CAR has received unparalleled international peacebuilding support. The active engagement of the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and other international organisations and individual countries is testimony to this. Like previous efforts, current efforts have however prioritised the holding of national elections. Although the protection of civilians and the promotion and protection of human rights are included as priorities in the Mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), these are not treated as such in practical terms. The strong response is yet to take the deepening problem of physical insecurity that has been aggravated by the recent inter-religious tensions and the presence of uncoordinated armed groups all over the territory seriously. It has also failed to address the practical challenges of having meaningful political dialogue and reconciliation, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in a country where the population faces serious threats to physical security, where political efficacy is weak and physical infrastructure is in a precarious state in most parts of the territory. Empirical evidence suggests that donor efforts usually fail where they are axed on construction of a rational bureaucratic state without a clear analysis of the conditions necessary for peace in a given context (Lombard, 2011). Although the level of international commitment to peacebuilding efforts in the Central African Republic is unprecedented, it appears unlikely that these efforts will lead to sustainable peace.

The difficulties of engineering peace in the CAR however contrast with the opportunities for peacebuilding in this country. Prior to the March 2013 coup, a former UN coordinator in the CAR, Toby described this situation in the following words, “the CAR is a country we should be able to fix.” He referred to the traits that seem to make the country a simple problem for peace builders: a small population; a government eager for international intervention; plenty of water and other

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59. resources for local development; low levels of armament; quite basic requests from armed groups (primarily greater inclusiveness in government and welfare largesse); and of no strategic interest for actors from outside the region (Lombard, 2011).

The current crisis can therefore be perceived as a failure of the international community to take advantage of the prevailing conditions in the CAR to adopt a more tailored and effective approach. Perhaps the failure of past efforts and the weaknesses of ongoing efforts lie in the confusion with the very meaning of peacebuilding. Such confusion can be understood because peacebuilding has often been confused with statebuilding. All interventions in the Car including the current efforts can best be described as statist. The argument can be made that there is a need for a peacebuilding approach par excellence. But what is peacebuilding?

The term „peacebuilding‟ was first used by the Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung in the 1970s in his quest for the promotion of systems that would create sustainable peace. Such systems needed to address the root causes of conflict and support local capacity for peace management and conflict resolution (Galtung, 1996). His work emphasized a bottom-up approach that decentralized social and economic structures, amounting to a call for a societal shift from structures of coercion and violence to a culture of peace. American sociologist John Paul Lederach proposed a different conception of peacebuilding as engaging grassroots, local, NGO, international and other actors to create a sustainable peace process (Coning, 2013). Within this literature the term „peacebuilding‟ is defined as intervention that is designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict by addressing the main threats to sustainable peace. Peacebuilding activities address the root causes or potential causes of violence, create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution and move societies closer to political and socio-economic equilibrium. However defined, it is implied in the works of scholars such as Galtung (1996), Mial (1999), Goodhand and Hulme (1999), Eshan (2000), Fisher (2000) and Arne (2004) among others, that as described in the Agenda for Peace, peacebuilding is the “construction of a new environment." The definition of peacebuilding by Fisher (2000) best describes how this new environment is constructed. He considers peacebuilding as engagement in programs designed to address the causes of conflict as well as the grievances of the past and to promote conditions for long-term stability and justice (Fisher, 2000). The current efforts in the CAR appear not to be building the new environment described here, one that is significantly different from that under which peace unravelled in 2012.

The purpose of this paper is to explain why current peacebuilding efforts in the CAR may not create the new environment needed for sustainable peace. It asks why the country remains fragile and vulnerable to relapse despite international engagement and optimism. The answer in part lies in the priority given to the organisation of national elections regardless of whether these will produce a truly representative and legitimate government and the emphasis on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration that cannot be genuinely achieved in the current context. A process dominated by elite interests and political negotiations may as in the past produce a government that lacks local legitimacy and that will depend on outside support to maintain itself in power. Without concrete efforts made to create the conditions that will make politics more inclusive, international efforts may be easily thwarted to serve non-democratic aims.

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59.

The context of the Conflict in the CAR

Following its independence from France in 1960, the CAR experienced three decades of misrule, largely in the hands of the military, until the establishment of a civilian government in 1993 under Ange-Félix Patassé (Bercovitch, & Fretter, 2004.). The Patassé government did not mark a departure from the poor governance practices of the past. It could not ensure long term stability because former leaders and opposition parties were harshly critical of Patassé‟s leadership and the elections that re-elected him in 1999. In mid 2001, this discontent led to an attempted coup. The immediate result was some twenty fatalities, with an ensuing battle which led to the loss of three hundred lives, including several members of a Libyan contingent that had been sent to support the government (Ukeje & Mvomo, 2013).

Although the initial fighting died out, one immediate result of the failed coup and subsequent accusations against General André Kolingba was an outbreak of ethnic unrest, causing members of Kolingba‟s southern Yakoma ethnic group to flee from Patassé‟s northern Kaba tribe. In September 2001, Defence Minister, Jean-Jaques Defamouth was detained in connection with the coup and ultimately implicated the Chief of General Staff, François Bozize, who was dismissed from service in November 2001 (Agence France-Presse, 2012). Bozize fled to Chad, but the Chadian government paid a deaf ear to pleas from the Patassé government to extradite him. The CAR accused President Idris Derby of harbouring its rebels and inflaming their activities in the north of Bangui.

Despite attempts by the sub-regional integration scheme, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) to ensure a peaceful resolution of the crisis, François Bozize finally succeeded in overthrowing Patassé in a military coup in March 2003 (Meyer, 2009). After Bozize seized power in 2003, another conflict started in the CAR. The conflict commonly referred to as the „Bush War‟ began with a rebellion by the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), led by Michel Djotodia.

Amidst allegations of widespread fraud, election violence and low voter turnout, Bozize won a second election in 2011, claiming a 64.34 per cent vote in the first round on 23 January and thus avoiding a run-off. His installation on 15th March 2011 must have led him to believe he was in control (Sayare, 2013). However, the rebellion unleashed by the 2003 coup proved very difficult to escape. The opposition decried the conduct of the elections but their challenge was not taken seriously by the Constitutional Court, which was headed by Bozize‟s cousin. Election observers from both the African Union and the European Union noted a host of irregularities, such as – in the words of EU Head of Delegation Guy Samzun – “massive fraud” and “terrorization of voters and certain candidates by the state officials and security forces” (Sayare, 2013).

In 2012, the rebellion against the Bozize regime intensified and in December 2012, the Seleka rebel group seized the towns of N‟Dele, Sam Ouandja and Ouadda. Seleka forces took Kabo on 19th December 2012, a major hub for transport between Chad and the CAR, located west and north of the areas previously taken by the rebels. The rebel coalition took over Bambari, the country's third largest town four days later, followed by Kaga-Bandoro on 25 December. On the same day, President Bozizé met with military advisers in the capital Bangui.

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59.

On 27th December, Bozizé asked the international community for assistance, specifically France and the United States, during a speech in the capital Bangui. French President, François Hollande rejected the appeal, saying that French troops would only be used to protect French nationals in the CAR, and not to defend Bozizé's government (http://www.dailystar.com).

On 30 December 2012, President Bozizé agreed to a possible national unity government with members of the Séléka coalition, after meeting with the AU Chairperson, Thomas Yayi Boni. He added that the CAR government was ready to begin peace talks “without condition and without delay”. Reinforcements from MICOPAX began to arrive in Damara to support the 400 Chadian troops already stationed there by 1st January 2013.

On 11 January 2013, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Libreville, Gabon and on 13th January, Bozizé signed a decree which replaced Prime Minister Faustin-Archange Touadera with Nicolas Tiangaye from the opposition. Only twelve days later, on 23rd January 2013, the ceasefire was broken, with the government blaming Séléka and Séléka blaming the government for allegedly failing to honour the terms of the power-sharing agreement. On 24th March, rebels reached the presidential palace in the centre of the capital, where heavy gunfire erupted. The presidential palace and the rest of the capital soon fell to rebel forces and Bozizé fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He later sought temporary refuge in Cameroon (Nossiter, 2013). On 25th March 2013, Séléka leader Michel Djotodia, who served after the January agreement as First Deputy Prime Minister for National Defense, declared himself President. He promptly suspended the constitution and dissolved the government, as well as the National Assembly (BBC News. 25 March 2013).

Sectarian violence continued to escalate throughout the year, and Djotodia faced pressure from regional leaders due to his apparent inability to control the situation and was forced to resign at a summit held in N‟Djamena, Chad on 10th January 2014. Accounts of lynching and cannibalism surfaced from the chaos in Bangui in international media. Foreigners in CAR, especially those from Chad, Cameroon and West Africa, left the country en masse. According to the International Organisation for Migration, about 60,000 African immigrants asked their embassies for aid. After the resignation of Djotodia, Alexandre-Ferdinand Nguendet took over as interim leader and speaker of the provisional parliament.

Despite Djotodia‟s resignation, conflict continued. The National Transitional Council elected a new interim president after Nguendet became the acting Chief of State. Nguendet, being the president of the provisional parliament and viewed as being close to Djotodia, did not run for the election because of diplomatic pressure. The parliament validated the candidatures of 8 out of 24. On the 20th of January 2014, Catherine Samba-Panza, the mayor of Bangui, was elected as the interim president after two rounds of voting by the National Transitional Council (RFI, 20 January 2014). Her mandate was to end hostilities with immediate effect, reinstate the collapsed social services and organise transitional elections in January 2015. Meeting this deadline has been impossible because most of the country remains inaccessible to international forces and the transitional government is hardly present outside of the Capital Bangui. Most of the population is also living in fear with casualties frequently reported even in Bangui.

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59.

Since the installation of Panza, the country has been rocked by skirmishes between Muslim and Christian militias operating in most parts of the country. In spite of the reinforcement of the AU-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA), casualties continued to be registered. Relative calm has only returned to Bangui, the capital. The replacement of MISCA and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) with the more robust United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSCA) with resolution 2149(2014) on 15 September 2014, has not resulted in a significant change in the peace situation. The protection of civilians, including the promotion and protection of human rights is yet to be effective (Essoungou, 2014) in most parts of the country which remain largely inaccessible to the UN personnel and other international peacekeepers. Religious violence remains a problem even in the capital. 11 people were killed at the Notre Dame church in the capital on 12 February 2015 (Blair, 2015) In a separate attack on a cathedral in Bambari more than 20 people were killed in the same month (Ngoupandé, 1997). These difficulties made it difficult for credible national elections to be organised within the timeframe given the Panza administration. Her mandate was thus extended till August 2015, when national transitional elections were expected to be organised. This deadline could not be met as the situation worsened with violent clashes increasingly experienced in Bangui. Despite the enormity of efforts that have been put in place by the international community to build lasting peace in the CAR, the situation at best, remains fragile. In spite of significant prospects for peacebuilding, the new UN mission like those that preceded it and other peacebuilding efforts appears to face similar challenges as in previous episodes of conflict.

Challenges to Peacebuilding in the CAR

1. A Chaotic Security Situation

The cycle of unconstitutional change of power and the complete collapse of the security sector have resulted in a chaotic situation. After ten years in power, President Bozizé left in the same way he arrived: ousted by a rebellion and abandoned by the security forces amid widespread discontent. In 2010, Crisis Group warned against the risk of a deteriorating security situation should Bozizé fail to fulfil the commitments of the 2008 Inclusive Political Dialogue (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2010).

By 2013 when Bozize was overthrown, the inclusive government was never really put in place; the 2011 elections took place but, according to observers, were marred by many accusations of fraud; the state disintegrated further; the “grey zones” outside state control expanded; most of the agreed essential reforms were never implemented; and the attitude adopted by both the government and rebel groups meant the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program never saw the light of day for most combatants throughout the country.

In recent years, the CAR has been virtually ungoverned. The government‟s failure to take political responsibility has led to growing poverty and insecurity as well as financial, humanitarian and security dependence. It is difficult if not impossible to talk of any sustainable peacebuilding in such a chaotic atmosphere.

The Bozizé government neglected the security sector. The tribal-family and patronage system that characterised the security services could hardly be expected to promote Security Sector Reform

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59.

(SSR). At the same time, the inertia and indecision of the Bozize regime made it unable to anticipate the threat posed by Séléka, even though this had been apparent for several months especially after the failure to implement the Libreville Accords. In the CAR, army reform has been on the agenda since the 1996 mutiny (Ngoupandé, 1997). The weakness of the security forces can be attributed to the lack of resources but most especially to bad governance; the manner in which the government undermined the authority of military officers, which systematically relegated the army hierarchy to the background; and the recruitment of personnel on the basis of ethnic criteria and not competence (N‟Diaye, 2009). Soldiers have as a consequence been reckless and repeatedly perpetrated acts of violence against the population. Following the attack of a cigarette truck that was under escort by the soldiers for example, the local population was attacked by the soldiers who claimed they were complicit. The soldiers were in turn confronted by self defence groups (Lombard, 2011). Incidents like this made armed groups more popular, and left the population in and increasingly insecure situation.

Rebel attacks on the towns of Sibut and Damara in September 2012 were a telling signal of the growing threat; the government decided not to negotiate and chose the military option. This decision revealed further the incapacity of the army to protect the population. The CAR army was unable to counter either the internal or external threat, as demonstrated by the proliferation of armed groups and the intrusion of foreign armed groups such as the Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA). Many foreign armed forces used the CAR territory for their own ends.

The long presence of sub-regional peacekeeping forces and troops from other countries is also suggestive of the state of security in the country. Uganda deployed troops in the south east, alongside U.S. forces, to fight Joseph Kony‟s LRA. Chadian and Sudanese soldiers in the tripartite force based at Birao ensured security in the north-eastern region of Vakaga. Finally, a Central African peacekeeping force, the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) has been present for a long time. Composed of contingents from ECCAS countries, it replaced the Multinational Force in Central Africa (FOMUC) in 2008. The incapability of ensuring a minimum of security on national territory has worsened in the post-Bozize era as evidenced by the size of international peacekeepers.

Insecurity has affected the work of humanitarian agencies. It has been difficult for aid workers to access most parts of the Central African Republic. This situation has made the population even more vulnerable. The UN documented specific cases of denial of humanitarian access by the national armed forces and the ex-Séléka rebels (OCHA, 22 July 2014, SCR, 31 December 2014). Although some Bangui residents welcomed the Seleka‟s victory rally on 24 March, the rebel takeover quickly resulted in looting, atrocities and clashes, leading to strong resentment against the Seleka in the capital. The Djotodia government experienced many problems in controlling its own creature and although the situation later became slightly more stable in the capital, the authorities seemed to have been overtaken by events.

The current efforts of the UN, the AU, ECCAS/CEMAC and other bi-lateral and multilateral partners have not sufficiently addressed this problem of insecurity. Between October and November 2014, MINUSCA (the UN Peacekeeping Force in the CAR) which only took over from the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) in

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59.

September had suffered casualties. In spite of the deployment of MINUSCA and the signing of a ceasefire, involving the predominantly Muslim Séléka rebel group and the Christian anti-Balaka, the security situation in the CAR remains dire. Some improvement was noticed in Bangui, but more violent incidents have been witnessed since September 2015 and unrest continues throughout the country. At the end of 2014, over 2,000 former Séléka fighters and an estimated 1,500 anti-Balaka continue to represent a serious security threat (SCR, 31 December 2014). The armed groups rarely engage one another directly but consistently target civilians and their commitment to the ceasefire is highly questionable. Besides the killing, the UN has also documented sexual violence against girls, attacks on schools and hospitals mainly by the Séléka.

In the past, rebellion has developed in the most insecure parts of the country like the Vakaga Prefecture. It has been observed that an atmosphere characterised by high levels of physical insecurity has been a reason why many join rebel ranks or indulge in crime in the CAR. The current security situation that has been described as volatile by the UN is therefore a major threat to ongoing peace efforts. Peacebuilding in the CAR is likely to remain elusive if this high level of insecurity persists. Insecurity is however not the only challenge to peacebuilding in the CAR. Bad governance and low political efficacy, especially evident in the post-Bozize era is another important obstacle.

2. Bad Governance and Low Political Efficacy

Decades of misrule have alienated the majority of Central African‟s from politics. As in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central African‟s see politics as a dirty game reserved for a privileged few. Little has been done by the different governments to encourage participation in governance. Political efficacy has reduced with the worsening governance situation. Since the March 2013 Séléka take over, Central African‟s have felt even more powerless. Most believe the fate of their country will determined by the surviving elite and international forces. Tribe leadership, family relations and recently religion are the criteria for participation. This situation has made negotiations even at elite level a mere waste of time. Parties never respect the terms of agreements. The CAR is, to borrow the terms of Nakamura (1975), a society in which the citizens do not think their input can make a difference in the outcome of political processes.

Like previous regimes in the CAR, tribal and family control of key political and finance positions were both strength and a weakness of the Bozizé system. Power remained centralised, in the hands of Bozizé, his family and friends in Bangui. In spite of professed plans to promote local democracy and decentralisation, there were no significant efforts at implementation. Although this gave some stability, the system fell apart as soon as family members started to argue among themselves. The dismissal of Sylvain Ndoutingaï‟s, the former Minister of Finance from government and his departure from the country revealed the hidden conflicts between the president and his „nephew‟. Although Bozizé‟s intention to amend the constitution so that he could stand for re-election in 2016 was known, Ndoutingaï, his closest adviser, did not welcome the idea because of his own presidential ambitions (ICG, 2012). He was accused of plotting a coup and spent several months under house arrest in 2012 before being released. He left the country after his release, following the example of one of his allies, Firmin Findiro, the former Justice Minister. After removing his chief

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59. adviser, François Bozizé, became more isolated than ever and hardly listened to his council of ministers after the crisis escalated in December 2012 crisis.

In January 2013, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Libreville, Gabon. Two days later, on the 13th of January, Bozizé signed a decree that removed Prime Minister Faustin-Archnge Touadera from power as part of the agreement with the Séléka rebel coalition. The rebels dropped their demand for Bozize to resign, but he was obliged to appoint a new prime minister from the opposition party by 18th January 2013. Nicolas Tiangaye was later appointed Prime Minister. The terms of the agreement also required the National Assembly to be dissolved within a week with a year-long government of national unity replacing it and new legislative elections to be organised within twelve months (with the possibly of postponement) (Agence Francepresse, 31 December 2012). In addition the temporary coalition government had to implement judicial reforms, integrate the rebel troops into the national army in order to establish a new national military, set up the new legislative elections, as well as introduce other social and economic reforms. Bozizé‟s government was also compelled to free all political prisoners imprisoned during the conflict. The, Séléka rebels ensured the agreement did not require that they should give up the cities they had taken or were then occupying, presumably as a way to preventing the Bozizé government from violating the agreement. On paper, the agreement looked good but owing to the political mistrust that had built up, it was broken less than two weeks later with both sides accusing each other. The hopes of the BINUCA and other organisations and countries involved in the peacebuilding process in the CAR were dashed as the result of the failure to uphold the agreement was the resumption of hostilities. By March 24th 2013, the rebels had taken over the capital Bangui and seized the presidential palace. The ousted President Bozize fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), but later sought temporal refuge in Cameroon (CRTV, 25th March 2013).

The governance situation worsened as the new masters of Bangui took control. The rebel coalition that overthrew the Bozizé government was a heterogeneous group of malcontents. The political leadership of the Séléka, its armed groups and initial demands had been part of the CAR‟s political and security landscape for over a decade. When the movement started, the vast majority of Seleka members were from the North East of the country, a geographically remote and historically marginalised region where the state has been almost absent (ICG, 2013). The lack of government services in the regions of Vakaga and Haute Kotto led to structural insecurity. Far from being a new rebellion, Séléka brought together elements that were dissatisfied with the regime. The alliance was made up of dissident factions of armed groups from the north east such as the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR) and the Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP) and had intermittent and limited support from other movements such as the Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR) and the Alliance pour la Refondation (A2R).

Some of their demands related to promises that were not kept. The rebels accused the government of not respecting either the 2007 Birao Peace Agreement. In particular, they denounced the failure to implement the DDR program for armed groups in the north east. As they advanced towards the capital in December 2012, the rebels increased their demands, radicalised their discourse and called for the president‟s departure (Domínguez-Torres, & Foster, 2011). However, this coalition of armed groups was an unlikely and heterogeneous alliance of convenience. This explains why when Djotodia declared himself President in March 2013, one of his first decisions was to sign a decree

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59. dissolving Seleka. He announced a three-year transitional period and that he was eligible to run for the elections. Djotodia promptly suspended the constitution and dissolved the government, as well as the National Assembly. He then reappointed Nicolas Tiangaye as Prime Minister on 27 March 2013. Michel Djotodia reign came to an end in January 2014 after pressure had been mounted on him by the sub-regional leaders to step down due to his inability to reconcile the warring factions and lead the country to a peaceful transition. He was replaced by the Mayor of Bangui, Catherine Samba-Panza who was seen as the most neutral figure to lead the transition.

Samba-Panza‟s interim presidency was expected to end in January 2015 with the organisation of national transitional elections. Instead, her mandate has been extended until August 2015 due to the difficulties on the ground. Since the departure of Djotodia the country very little change has taken place. The country remains virtually without any law, and lacks a functioning police and courts. There is no credible Electoral Body that can organise national elections. Comparisons have been drawn to the situation in Rwanda prior to the 1994 Genocide. Others have suggested that the aftermath of the Bosnian Genocide of 1992 may be more illustrative as people have been moving into religiously cleansed neighbourhoods (Al Jazeera, 20th January 2014). To address these challenges, Samba-Panza signed a cease-fire agreement with the rebels in July 2014 but a few days later, the Séléka military leader rejected the agreement and called for the partition of the country into Muslim and Christian parts. At the beginning of 2015, there was no elected parliament; no elected officials at the local level and the acting president‟s mandate had to be extended to avert yet again a botched transition. Seleka warlords and anti-Balakas control most parts of the country while the central government with the help of international peacekeeping forces has a limited grip only on Bangui the capital and a few other towns.

With a government still ineffective outside the capital where it enjoyed very limited influence, bad governance can still be seen as a major obstacle to peace. This situation translates into an environment where citizens especially outside the capital have very limited opportunities to contribute to policies or take part in projected elections. This state of affairs is unlikely to change if the obstacles to exchange between the central government and international peacebuilding actors are not overcome. In particular, the limitations to communication posed by the poor state of infrastructure will need to be addressed.

3. Poor and Inadequate Infrastructure

The CAR has had very poor infrastructure since independence. Its size makes the existing infrastructure insignificant. The CAR has an area roughly the size of France (640,679 km²) and a population of 4.5 million (Dominiguez-Torres & Foster, 2011). Its territory spreads around the geographic centre of the African continent. Although most sources such as the World Bank often note that the country is “potentially rich” (it has reserves of timber, oil, diamonds, gold, and uranium), the poor state of infrastructure in particular, bad governance and conflict among other things have the efficient exploitation of these resources difficult.

Transport infrastructure in the CAR is underdeveloped, poorly maintained, and inadequate. The CAR has no railroads (Dominiguez-Torres & Foster, 2011) and only 450 kilometres of the 25,000 kilometres roads are paved. There is only one international airport, in Bangui and despite the poor state; it was significantly damaged during the recent conflict. Dirt roads are poorly maintained and

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59. deteriorate in the rainy season. Organized public transport is not available because the country‟s poor infrastructure drives up the cost, thereby discouraging commerce and investment. It is perhaps worthy to note that the road infrastructure in the North East and South East, most affected by the conflict, is worse compared the situation in the South West. Years of neglect by the Bozize regime of an already poor road network and the destruction that has been caused by the current crisis mean that the new government when elected will have to start from scratch.

The CAR suffers economically from its inadequate links to port facilities. Some of Bangui's commercial cargo travels down the Ubangi River to Brazzaville and by rail to Point Noire. Civil unrest in the Congo in recent years has forced the CAR to divert its commercial traffic towards the Cameroonian port of Douala, but since the outbreak of the current conflict traffic on the Doula- Bangui that is usually affected by the rainy season, has been significantly reduced due to rebel attacks and extortions on truck drivers.

Energy infrastructure is also in a dire state. Only 39 megawatts of electricity is produced and almost all is consumed in Bangui. The installations are old and need to be replaced. Some of the infrastructure was also destroyed by the conflict. Less than 8% of the population in currently has access to electricity. Water and drainage facilities are also remote or absent in most parts of the country. The rural population relies on wells and traditional latrines (Dominiguez-Torres & Foster, 2011).

The CAR's telephone service is limited to a small percentage of Bangui's population but operates efficiently. The state phone company, SOCATEL, invested some capital to improve or expand the system and customers regularly wait up to 6 months to have new phone lines installed. A SOCATEL subsidiary began providing Internet services in 1996, but subscribers remain low. During the late 1990s, several mobile phone companies began operations, but their infrastructure was initially confined to Bangui. Between 2000 and 2005 infrastructure made a modest net contribution of less than 1 percentage point to the improved per capita growth performance of the Central African Republic, despite high expenses in the road sector (Domínguez-Torres & Foster, 2011). Raising the country‟s infrastructure endowment to that of the region‟s middle income countries could boost annual growth by about 3.5 percentage points.

Without significant developments, the poor infrastructure will affect the future government in much the same way as the previous governments. Limited access to the provinces will make the delivery and coordination of public services difficult. This situation as in the past means that very little change in the quality of life of Central Africans, particularly outside the capital can be expected and that young people remain vulnerable to crime and recruitment by militia.

In spite of this situation, very little is being done to reverse the situation. The few projects that have been considered are either poorly implemented or not implemented at all. The project for a radio station in Paoua is a case in point. It demonstrates the real problem with peacebuilding projects in the CAR and elsewhere on the continent. The radio project is well presented on paper. It is a three- way partnership involving the national government, the people of Paoua, and the United Nations – the epitome of „local ownership‟ that all peacebuilding projects seek to achieve. The community donated the building, volunteered their labour, and raised money for paint and a new roof. The United Nations trained the journalists and technicians and promised to give them equipment. The

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59.

CAR government agreed to outfit the station with a 2000 US dollars antenna (Moore, 2015). The antenna is yet to show up. The government claims it has the antenna but cannot get it up to Paoua. This example clearly illustrates the kind of challenges that organising elections in the CAR without significantly addressing the problems of infrastructure would imply. It is also unlikely the international forces will be able to effective in carry out disarmament.

These infrastructural challenges have contributed in making the peace in the CAR to be at best uncertain and at worst likely to unravel. A poor infrastructural base cannot lead to poverty reduction and development. Like several other sources, the country‟s interim president, Samba- Panza, has stated firmly that “poverty and a failure of governance was the cause of the conflict” (aljazeera.com/video/Africa/2014/02). It has been argued that peacebuilding projects, like the wars that came before them, are largely about the symptoms of a dysfunctional political economy: unemployment and hunger, poor health care, crumbling infrastructure.

In summary these three challenges need to be addressed for the current difficulties in realising peacebuilding in the CAR to be overcome: the chaotic security situation, bad governance and low political efficacy and the dire nature of the country‟s infrastructure.

Opportunities for Peacebuilding

Ironically the CAR presents a better opportunity for peacebuilding today than was the case in previous episodes of violence: a war weary population, a neutral interim government, strong international commitment and a strong resource potential. If well utilised, these opportunities can help in building sustainable peace.

1. Power Sharing

The CAR is one of the most politically unstable, undemocratic and unequal countries in Africa. Although numerous attempts have been made to encourage power sharing since 2002, none has been successful. The failure can however be explained by the emphasis placed on elite level negotiations. Local government provides a real opportunity for power sharing that has not been given sufficient attention. High levels of power sharing between the central government and local authorities will increase participation, political efficacy and uphold democracy.

Political and administrative decentralization are possible in the CAR and can help solve the traditional problem caused by ethnicity and recently religious intolerance by providing more avenues for participation at both the community and elite levels. Decentralized governance will favor political efficacy and produce a government that is more democratic, representative, and accountable.

Decentralization will also reduce corruption by increasing transparency and accountability of elected officials. The opportunity to revise the constitution and ensure it reflects the wishes of the citizens that the current transition provides means that the constitutional separation of power can be realized and the tenure of office of the president can be restricted to two terms of 5 years. This will help check the abuse of power by the president with positive implications for political efficacy and governance.

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59.

2. Strong International Engagement

The international community has made sustained efforts to resolve the conflict since it started in 2012. Regional and international actors and individual governments have committed resources to stop the fighting. The UN, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), USAID, the European Union (EU) and France have been actively engaged in CAR peace efforts.

The UNSC adopted Resolution 2134 on 28 January 2014. This resolution extended the mandate of BINUCA and explicitly authorized the European Union to deploy a military operation to the CAR. This mandate enabled the EU to deploy its operation EUFOR RCA.

On the 10th of April 2014, UNSC Resolution 2149 was adopted, establishing the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) peacekeeping operation, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. MINUSCA replaced BINUCA on 15 September 2014.

These developments have complemented several sub-regional and regional efforts and the activities of many international non-governmental organizations such as Doctors Without Borders (MSF).

3. Abundant Natural Resources

Although the CAR is potentially rich, natural resources have not been a major source of conflict. Most of the rebel groups have development as a response to oppression and marginalization. Bad governance has been a key drive of conflict. The failure of the Bozize regime to respect the different agreements signed with rebels since 2005, the ethnic character of his government, arbitrary persecutions, growing insecurity and election fraud are some of the main factors that led to the current crisis.

Most of the CAR‟s natural wealth is still exploited on an artisanal scale. The CAR is rich in minerals such as diamonds, uranium and gold. It also has important water resources and reserves of timber and oil. Investments in the exploitation of these resources can raise the income the CAR government needs to run public services and solve the serious infrastructural problems the CAR is facing.

The international community can help bring these investments into the CAR and assist the government in regulating investment in the exploitation of these resources in a transparent and accountable manner. Such a development will significantly address the revenue problems that have been a contributing factor in all conflicts the country has experienced.

Conclusion

The rise of Séléka and Michel Djotodia to power plunged the CAR into another crisis, followed by another political transition. The country has had more coups and attempted coups than free elections. The security crisis has reached unprecedented proportions and this has been seen to have far reaching humanitarian and financial implications among others. Unlike previous crises, which only affected some regions, the current turmoil represents a change of political paradigms and

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59. affects the entire country. It has resulted in the collapse of the state, making the rebuilding of institutions an uphill task and leaving the population utterly unprotected. The transition government has so far not only exhibited a weak ability to govern but has been unable to deal with bad governance practices that have been a major feature of past governments. Like previous governments, it looks to the outside forces for solutions and not to its populations with which there is little or no productive conversation. The enormity of these challenges to peacebuilding demands an adapted and tailored response to the crisis. While sustained international effort, including in particular the active participation of sub-regional, regional and international governmental organisations is clearly indispensible, the activities must be coordinated and should target or address directly the main challenges to peacebuilding.

To be effective, peacebuilding in the CAR will require measures to promote economic activity and development. Activities and projects that will provide alternative sources of income for the population and willing ex-militia are most likely to make a difference. The traditional statist approach that has been used without success in the past has little chance of succeeding under the present conditions. Significant level of political efficacy needs to be sought through support for good governance, the provision of security and basic infrastructure before the organisation of national elections. Peacebuilding efforts will therefore need to address the problems of physical security, bad governance, low political efficacy and poor infrastructure, especially at the local level (outside the capital) where there is very limited and often no engagement.

Recommendations

1. The Imperative for Physical Security

Although the mandate of MINUSCA makes the protection of civilians a priority, it is still to be a reality on the ground. As explained above, civilian casualties continue to be recorded in most parts of the territory including the capital and as well as serious human rights violations including rape and murder. To put an end to these or better significantly reduce their incidence, combatants have to be cleared out of the capital and security services need to be re-established all over the territory.

To guarantee the security of persons and their property in the country, MINUSCA and other peacekeeping forces should increase their patrols and increasingly work alongside the Central African Armed Forces (FACA). These patrols should be extended to all parts of the territory as soon as possible. Disarmament should be a permanent duty of the peacekeepers and the FACA. Negotiations to integrate ex-militia into the army should be avoided. Rather, there should be a massive recruitment and training exercise to build a truly national army. A well trained and motivated army working with international forces will help reduce attacks on the population.

Effective DDR will also contribute to reducing physical insecurity. Previous failure to implement DDR has been the result of the consensual approach used. Basing demobilisation on consent has been frustrated by corrupt practices that are difficult to avoid in context like that of the CAR (ICG, 2012). The freedom of ex-militiamen that cooperate should be guaranteed and efforts should be made to create opportunities for their reinsertion outside the army by encouraging economic activity and large infrastructural projects.

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59.

2. Promoting Political Participation

In order to avoid the failures of the past, the Samba-Panza-led transitional leadership must consider and take measures to increase participation in governance at all levels. Efforts should be made for the majority of the Central African‟s to participate in some way in the construction of the new environment. The interim government will have to earn the trust of the citizens and prepare them for effective participation in national elections by encouraging political efficacy at the local level.

It is important to ensure that the outcome of national elections should be determined by the polls and not by negotiations between armed groups and elites that have taken-up seats in Bangui. As in the past, such negotiations are likely to produce a government of convenience, completely detached from the population and that can collapse when disputes over the sharing of government positions arise. There is no better way to ensure that people will not be tempted to take up arms than to persuade them that they will be rejected by those they may claim to represent. Decentralising government and electing local officials (governors/mayors) before the organisation of national elections will test the capacity of the election management body and build widespread support and participation in the electoral process.

The post-conflict turmoil has meant that local services provided by municipalities are non-existent. Democratic local authorities may in fact prove very instrumental in contributing the efficient development of infrastructure at the level of their communities.

3. Development of basic Infrastructure

Infrastructure constitutes one of the most important peacebuilding mechanisms. The building of basic physical infrastructure such as roads, rail, airports, ports, waterways and energy supply lines will facilitate the implementation of other peacebuilding projects.

Good transport and communication infrastructure will facilitate the work of humanitarian agencies and the very development of such infrastructure will provide employment for citizens and in the long run, contribute to economic growth. It will also make the movement of security forces easier and therefore make the protection of civilians possible.

It is important to develop transport and communication infrastructure to link all prefectures (regions). This development must be complemented by the development of energy and social infrastructure that is practically absent outside the capital. Such development will go a long way to build confidence in the government. The development of infrastructure will require a lot of financial resources that the transition government lacks. This situation is further complicated by the poor reputation of the CAR with donors, which means that the government‟s request for emergency budgetary aid will only meet a positive response if donors obtain guarantees of transparency and efficiency. A fund management mission for construction of infrastructure should be constituted with local and donor participation.

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59.

Bibliography

Addo, P. (2005) “Peace-making in West Africa: Progress and Prospects” KAIPTC Monograph No.3

Agence Francepresse, 31 December 2012, “Centrafrique: Bozizé doit partir, affirme la rébellion qui veut prendre Damara”, accessed on 29 December 2014

Al Jazeera, “Deadly Religious Violence Rocks CAR”, available at aljazeera.com/video/Africa/2014/02 [accessed on 21 January 2014]

Al Jazeera, 2014. “Deep divisions as CAR violence continues” 2014-01-20 [Accessed, January 10, 2015]

Alli, W. (2008) “New Perspectives on International Peace and Security” Africa Peace Review, April 2008.

Astri Suhrke, Arne Strand and Kristian Berg Harpviken, 2001. Peacebuilding strategies for Afghanistan, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute

Bariagaber, A. (2008) “United Nations Peace Missions in Africa: Transformations and Determinants” Journal of Black Studies, July 2008; Vol. 38, No. 6

Barnett, M; Kim, H; O'Donnell, M; Sitea, L. (2007) "Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?" Global Governance 13

BBC News, 26 March 2013, CAR Rebel Head, Michel Djotodia „Suspends Constitution‟, available, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21934433 [accessed on 26 January 2014]

BBC, 2013. “Central African Republic Ceasefire signed” 11 January 2013. Available, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13150044 [accessed 11 January 2015]

Bercovitch, J. & Fretter, J., 2004. Regional Guide to International Conflict and Management from 1945-2003, Washington DC: CQ Press

Blair, D., 29 May 2014, “Capital of CAR suffers more religious violence after the bloodiest attack on Christians since January”, available, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/centralafricanrepublic/ 10863319/Gunmen-kill-11-in-raid-on-church-in-Central-African-Republic.html [accessed on 15 December 2014]

Boulden, J., ed, 2003. Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organisations, Palgrave, Macmillan: New York

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59.

Carolina Domínguez-Torres & Vivien Foster, May 2011, « Infrastructure de la République centrafricaine : Une perspective régionale » available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CARINFRENCHEXTN/Resources/AICD- CAR_Country_Report_Fr.pdf [accessed on 29 December 2015]

Configuration République centrafricaine : La politique nationale et le soutien de la Communauté internationale en matière de pôles de développement, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/car/key_docs/1012poles.pdf [accessed on 29 January 2015]

Coning, C., 2013. “Understanding Peacebuilding as Essentially Local” Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2(1)

CRTV, 25 March 2013

Diehl, P., 1994. International Peacekeeping, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press

Domínguez-Torres, C. and Foster, V. (2011) The Central African Republic‟s Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective, African Infrastructure country diagnostic, World Bank: Washington DC.

Ehsan, M.Z., 2000. „An Analysis to Peacebuilding Approaches in Afghanistan‟, Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: International Rhetoric of Local Reality; The Strengthening of Local Capacities for Peace, Asia Social Issue Program, available at, http://www.asiasource.org/asip/peacebuilding.cfm [Accessed 22 November 2014

Ela, P., (ed.), 2001. La Prévention des Conflits en Afrique Centrale : prospective pour une culture de la paix, Paris: Karthala

Essoungou, A., April 2014, “Peace eludes a nation in a rocky political transition” available, http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2014/central-african-republic-killings- time-transition [Accessed on 13 March 2014]

Fisher, Simon et. al., 2000. Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action © Responding to Conflict, Zed Book Ltd., London

Galtung, J., 1996. Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization, London: Sage Publications, p.32

Goodhand, J., and D. Hulme, 1999. “From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies:Understanding Conflict and Peace-building in the New World Disorder”, Third World Quaterly, 20(1) pp. 13-26

International Crisis Group (ICG) report, Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State, This report details the “Darfurisation” of north-eastern CAR

International Crisis Group (ICG), 2010. “Central African Republic: Keeping the Dialogue Alive”, Africa Briefing, N°69, 12 January 2010.

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59.

International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°203, 11 June 2013 “Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition”, available, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african- republic/203-central-african-republic-priorities-of-the-transition.pdf [accessed on 22 January 2015]

Lederach, J.P. (1996) Preparing for Peace, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press

Lombard, L., 2011. “Central African Republic: Peacebuilding without Peace”

Meyer, A., 2009. “Regional Conflict Management in Central Africa: From FOMUC to MICOPAX” African Security, Vol. 3, Issue 2-3.

Miall, H., O. Ramsbotham and T. Woodhouse, 1999. Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts, Polity Press, Cambridge

Moore, J., 2015. “Preventing Human Crisis: An Experiment in Building Peace” Courier, January 2015.

N‟Diaye, B., 2009. “Security Sector Reform in Central African Republic”, in Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Ngoupandé, J.P.,1997. Chronique de la crise centrafricaine 1996-1997, le syndrome Barracuda, Paris, Harmattan

Nossiter, A., (2013) “President is Said to Flee as Rebels Seize Capital of the Central African Republic”, New York Times , available, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/world/africa/rebels-seize-capital-of-central-african- republic.html?_r=0 [accessed on 22 January 2015]

OCHA, 22 July 2014, in SCR, 31 December 2014. Available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_762.pdf [accessed, January 10, 2015]

RFI, 20 January 2014,” Centrafrique: Catherine Samba-Panza élue présidente de la transition”, available, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140120-presidence-transition-rca-catherine-samba- panza-elue-desire-kolingba [accessed on 30 January 2015]

Sandole, D., 2010. Peacebuilding, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Santiso, C., 2002. “Promoting Democratic Governance and Preventing the Recurrence of Conflict: The Role of the United Nations Development Programme in Post Conflict Peace- Building” Journal of Latin American Studies

Kewir & Emile (2016). Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 41-59.

Sayare, S., 2013. “Mystery Shrouds Rise and Aims of Rebel at Helm of Central African Republic”, The New York Times, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/world/africa/michel-djotodia-leader-of-coup-in- central-african-republic-holds-on-to-power.html?_r=0 [accessed on 3 November 2014]

Security Council Report (SCR), 31 December 2014, available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_762.pdf [accessed, January 10, 2015]

Security Council Report (SCR), December 2014, available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/2014_12_forecast.pdf [accessed on 27 January 2015]

Ukeje, C. and W. Mvomo, 2013. Approche Africaine de la Sécurité Maritime : cas du golfe de guinée, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Abuja

United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, 2014. Peacebuilding Commission Informal meeting of the Organizational Committee 5 June 2013 available at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/oc/Chair's%20Summaryinformal%20OC%20mee ting%20-%205%20Jun%202013.pd [Retrieved 5 January 2014]

Vircoulon, T., 2013. “Central Africa: the coup and the future of an agreement”, African Peacebuilding Agenda, Crisis Group blog, available at www.crisisgroupblogs.org/africanpeacebuilding [accessed on 27 March 2013]

Woodward, P., 2004. “Somalia and Sudan: A Tale of Two Peace Processes” The Round Table 93(375).

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/International/2012/Dec-28/200123-car-leader-appeals-for-help- to-halt-rebel-advance.ashx#axzz2GInl7HTD [accessed on 28 January 2015]

View publication stats