Vol.4 No.4 SPECIAL ISSUE SEPT./OCT. 1980 50c
New Revelations: New C.I.A. Bill: New York Times Death to the Covers and Aids First Amendment 1953 CJ.A. Coup
in Iran CounterSp¥ magazine is issuing the following special report be Iranians of different socio-eco cause it poignantly illustrates nomic strata and backgrounds vary the devastating damage resulting in their grievances against the from collaboration between the · U.S. government but agree o� the press· and the CIA, and because it event of greatest disdain: the CIA addresses the present threat to masterminded coup of August 1953. freedom of the press and the U.S. The coup replaced the constitution Constitution posed by HR5615 and al government of Mohammed Mossadegh S2216 pending in Congress. These with that of a pro-Nazi named two bills make it a crime to name Zahedi and marked the onset of 25 undercover CIA and FBI officers, years of Shah-led dictatorial rule. agents, and informers or to pub An event of such historic impor lish information that could lead tance was bo und to generate contro to the disclosure of a CIA or FBI versies and consequences even three name,· even if all the information decades later. Indeed, Iranians' is obtained from public sources. fears that the October 1979 admis This report is about Kennett sion of the Shah to the U.S. for Love whose personal role in the "medical reasons" signalled another CIA's 1953 coup in Iran was de CIA-masterminded coup served as a scribed as foll0ws by.Paul Nitze, catalyst for the embassy seizure. a former Secretary of the Navy Following the embassy takeover, and an active member of the Com several U.S. government statements mittee on the Present Danger. on the coup grabbed media headlines. "There was a tank battle, and President Carter, scoffing at the it wasn't going well, and the idea of apologizing to the Iranians, four pro-Shah tanks were in the dismissed the 1953 coup as "ancient main square, stalled, and Love history". State Department spokes went to the tank com�ander, person, Rodding Carter, repeatedly knocked on the tank and asked refused comment. The CIA officer him why he didn't attack who ran the 1953 coup, Kermit Moasadegh's place. Love, who Roosevelt, disclosed his version of was only a repOrte,r, haq. just events in his book, Counter-coup: come out of there,.and he had �Struggle� Control�� noticed it was undefended. So issu�d by McGraw-Hill in October the tanks went rumbling towards 1979 and withdrawn in November 1979 Mossadegh's and Uosaadegh wen�· (three days after the em�}lssy take over the back waii with some over) following strenuous_objec thing like six people, one of ti·ons by the British Petroleum Com whom iuas a prominent professoz, · pany. at Teheran University." After all the official versions, Love's tide-turning involvement a number of ques�ions remain unan in the tank batt�e and oth�r as- (cont. �>n pg. 2) (cont:. on pg.6)
Approved For Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150002-9 ' Approved For Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150002-9 swered. Roosevelt still claims that knowledge. In consenting or dis the cost of the operation was in approving of present and future the thousands of dollars; former U.S. policies towards Iran, Ameri CIA officer, Andrew Tully claims cans need to understand the moti the cost was more than $10 million. vations behind Iranian feelings In addition to the cost, the CIA and actions. As essential compo personalities involved, with the nent of this understanding is exception of Roosevelt and Allen knowledge of the 1953 coup since Dulles, remain shrouded in mystery, it continues to motivate in part and very little is known of the the actions of millions of Irani precise strategy and tactics em ans. As Love himself stated: "The ployed. relevance of information on the New evidence, however, has American rescue of the Iranian emerged from the Allen W. Dulles throne to an understanding of papers, recently opened to a care American-Iranian relations would fully screened audience at Prince appear to be unarguable." Thus, ton University, which answers some we are presenting the following of the questions. Dulles was CIA information and analysis which we Director at the time of the August also feel is in the interest of 1953 coup. A 1966 file in the sec world peace since an adequately tion of his papers containing cor informed American people cannot respondence includes-a letter to be misled into war. Dulles from Kennett Love, a New We also feel justified in pub York Times correspondent in Iran lishing parts of Love's account in 1953 and one of only two Ameri as it was written for an universi can reporters in Teheran during ty course at an institution which the coup. Along with the letter, claims that the free and open ex Love sent D4lles a 41-page paper change of ideas and research entitled: "The American Role in should govern academic scholar th� Pahlevi Restoration: On 19 Au ship. So, let us begin. gust 1953" which he wrote in 1960 First of all, according to Love, while attending Princeton as a the U.S. government initially be Carnegie Press Fellow of the Coun came involved in Iran for economic cil on Foreign Relations. Appro self-interests which, in turn, priately enough, he wrote the pa stimulated an unconstitutional, per for T. Cuyler Young, a Prince violent coup and subsequent CIA ton professor covertly consulting repression. for the CIA. "It was the dispute between Iran The partially secret committee and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com which oversees the Dulles papers pany which drew the United forbids publication of any mate States toward its major involve rial from the collection without ment in the Iranian saene ... The its prior approval. The committee experienae prodded t�e United is chaired by Dulles' long-time States toward its cloak-and-dag colleague and friend, Lawrence ger Persian adventure... Iranian Houston, who served as CIA Gener leaders were aware that the al Counsel from 1947 to 1973. We United States was doing more for have not received permission to their economy tha� Washington publish our report based on the would admit... It �an be aon Love materials, but we are pro cluded that Washington wanted ceeding with disclosure on the to joggle the Iranian premier principle that the American public with a blunt assertion that he has a right and a need �2 know the would have to settle his econom� details of their governm_�nt's for ic difficulties-himself if he eign policy operations. The U.S. remained intransient in the oil Declaration of Independence re dispute •.. It (Mossadegh's con quires that the government operate stitutional government).had with the "consent qf the gov�rned". el,iminated all. constitution.al or .�onsent is mean�ngless. w�thout peaceable methods of removing 2 - Counte-c-..Approved For Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150002-9 .. Approved For Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150002-9
him from office ..." t,Jith army officei•s including "It is probable that the Ameri- many who faced forced retirement, can ro le was decisive, that the and a reputation for decisive ac- Iranians t,Jho participated in the tion without too many scruples." royalist coup could not have (This is the same Zahedi whom succeeded wit;wut American help. Allen Dulles would call "dis- It is doubtful that the coup tinguished".) wo uld have been attempted with- The CIA's brutality was also out American cooperation ... it seen in its assignment of George was a conaciously planned accom- Carroll, hot on the heels of plot- plishment creditable to American ting violence in South Korea. Love Federal employees... Washington related the following. reacted, not by helping Mossa- "Thi organization of gangs, degh, but by kicking him out." armed t,Jith clubs, knives and "At the same time, the CIA stones, and occasionally a pis- agents who blue-printed the coup tol or rifle ... t,Jas candidly against Dr. Mossadegh continued claimed by a CIA agent named to furnish technical assistance George Carroll, a six-foot-four- in quelling dissident movements inch 200 pounder who had arrived that threatened the stability of in Teheran from Korea, where, he the riew regime. A year after the said, the CIA had been standing coup, American cryptographic and by t,Jhile the United States was police experts and a CIA agent organizing a popular uprising to played an important part in root- oust Syngman Rhee." ing out an extensive conspiracy Love also said that a colleague of Army officers that t,Jas close- of his described Carroll as "too ly linked to the Communist Tudeh unrestrained" but as the type the party." CIA uses "where they really don't In short, the U.S. government, give a damn.•• ". Love's colleague using methods that were not "con- also told him of the following stitutional or peaceable", con- post-coup involvement of Carroll. sciously intervened to install an "In the days immediately follot,J- un democratic, royalist regime. The ing the overthrow of Mossadegh, raw cynicism and callous indiffer- Ardeshir Zahedi came to see ence of this operation is seen in Carroll daily ..." the CIA's reason for choosing "Carroll t,Jas also a buddy of Major General Fazlollah Zahedi to Gen. Farhat Dadsetan, Zahedi's lead the coup and the new govern- first military governor of Tehe- ment. ran. I believe Carroll worked "General Zahedi had all the re- with Dadsetan on preparations quisites. He had been Minister for the very efficient smother- of Interior in Dr. Mossadegh's ing of a potential dissident first cabinet in 1951. He had movement emanating from the.ba- been interned by the British in zaar area and the Tudeh in the Palestine during World War II first two weeks of November, because of pro-Nazi activities 1953." under Reza Shah. He had been As Love summarized: "There can twice accused of plotting be no dispute over t�� fact that against the Mossadegh regime, Mr. Carroll made an important con- the first time in October 1952, tribution to the royalist success when he escaped his arrest be- before, during and after the .. cause of his parliamentary im- coup." We should me_ntion here the munity as a senator, and the sec- following statement by Love, viz., _.ond time in April 1953 in con- "It was the prospect of Soviet- nection with the murder of Gen- contrqlled communism becoming dom- eral Afshartoos by a group of re- inant in Iran that prompted the �ired officers ... _.Thus, he _pos- United States ·to· intervene:'_' How- sessed adequate credentials as a ever, the credibility of this as- nationalist, useful contacts sertion was undermined by these . observations of Love himself. A proved For Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150002-9 Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150002-9 - .. Approved For
in Teheran believed that there "The communist threat11 was defi- nitely secondary ... were only 15,000 to 20,000 Tudeh members in Iran in 1953. In a "He (Mossadegh) had been an an'ti-11 communist throughout his career. country of 25 million, this was "In the July 1952 crisis ... the hardly a serious threat. Nationalists (Mossadegh's group) Love's doublethink, if you will, rebuffed the Tudeh and balked which shadowed his public report- Ped plans in the streets, dis- ing at the time, stemmed from his playing a degree of organization personal participation with the and tactical ability." CIA in the coup. Love admitted "The MoBsadeghists, then firmly his participation as a propagan- al lied with Ayatollah Abol- dist and as a militarist in the ghassan Kashani's religious fac- following passages. tions of the National Front, "My first observation of the as- such as Dr. Mozaffar Baghai's sociation of the United States Toilers Party, occasionally or- with the royalist cause began dered attacks on communists at with a telephone call to me at public gatherings. Groups far the Park Hotel from Joe Goodwin, to the right such as the Pan- a CIA man attached to the em- Iranists and the fascist Sumka, bassy as a political officer. followed a policy of constant Mr. Goodwin called s_hortly af- attacks on the Tudeh. This pol- ter the 7 A.M. news broadcast icy met with only occasional and asked if I wanted to meet government (Mossadegh's) inter- General Zahedi to get the real ference." version of what happened." "There was no real abatement of Love was taken in tow by Dr. Mossadegh 's anti-communism Goodwin to see Zahedi on August until after his appeal to Pres� 17, two days before the coup. At ident Eisenhower." (Only 2¾ the rendezvous, Love met instead months before the coup.) of General Zahedi, his son, "It is conceivable that the Ardeshir, who knew Goodwin. Tudeh could have turned the Ardeshir told Love that the Shah fortunes of the day against the had issued two decrees. One ap- royalists. But for some reason pointed Zahedi as prime minister, they remained aloof from the and one dismissed Mossadegh. conflict." After witnessing the photocopy- "My own conjecture is that the ing of the decrees, Love took a Tudeh were restrained by the "handful" of the one declaring Soviet Embassy because the Zahedi prime minister and distib- Kremlin, in the first post- uted them at the Park Hotel in Stalin year, was not willing to Teheran. In distriburing these take on such consequences as decrees, Love, a New York Times might have resulted from the reporter, consciously�ved as a establishment of a communist- propagandist for an on-going, un- controlled regime in Teheran." democratic CIA coup. We say un- Given these observations, it is democratic because the Shah by all but impossible to accept that royal fiat was app�inting Zahedi the coup was motivated by genuine and dismissing Moss�degh. fears of a Soviet-controlled com- Love's dual role as a propa- munist takeover. Not surprisingly, gandist was as unacceptable ln the Shah did hold up the spectre 1953 as it is today. The incom� _. of communism. But, even-:::l,ove, who patibility of the· two roles was recounted that "My life was saved highlighted by the fact that Love by the driver, a card-carrying was the main source of informa- Tudeh member••• ", claimed that tion to the American people at the Shah's threat was used as the time. How· could the· A_merican "�ait" to solicit U.S. support. people get inde'pendent news cov- One final point here was Love's erage from·a reporter acting at reporting�th�t the U.S. Embassy the direction of the CIA? Indee�, Approved For Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150002-9 -9 Approved For Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150002_ l
a reading of Love's articles of down there where they would be August 1953 presents the "real of some use instead of sitting_ version" } la Zahedi and the CIA. idle at the radio station. They Love never mentioned any CIA in declared my suggestion to be a volvement; glossed over Zahedi's splendid idea. They took their u'ndemocratic appointment and did machines in a body to Kokh Ave not mention his unscrupulous, pro nue and put the three tanks at Nazi nature; and portrayed Dr. Mossadegh's house out of ac Mossadegh as �Lncreasingly suscep tion after a lively duel with tible to a Soviet takeover. armor-piercing ?5 millimeter Love himself was apparently she l Zs. " aware of his compromising as he Thus, it was through Kennett lied about his involvement 25 Love (and Associated Press corre years later. According to the New spondent, Don Schwind who worked York Times: " ••• Mr. Love said- with Love and Goodwin) that the that shortly after the over-throw American people were kept in the of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in dark about a CIA operation - car Iran in 1953, he helped the CIA ried out in their name and through distribute copies of a declaration their taxes - which resulted in declaring Ardeshir Zahedi as Mr. what Love himself called a "police Mossadegh's successor." But state". Little surprise then "that Kennett Love said he had not known Iranians are well aware of the at the time that the man who had American role although the Ameri asked him for help, "had been a can public is not", as Love later CIA man and that he had never know cynically observed. ingly done anything else for the The message is that the people CIA." in the U.S. should demand that the As we saw, Love referred to "Joe media sever its ties with the U.S. Goodwin, a CIA man". It seems government, particularly the CIA highly unlikely that Love did not in order that America will have know at the time that Goodwin was the knowledge to function as a de- a CIA officer. This is particular mocracy, i.e. with the "consent of ly so since the CIA made Love privy to intimate details of the coup including the identification of "dirty tricksters", George Israel's �arroll and Howard Stone. Love was Pentagon Papers ... even told that Ayatollah Behbehani, Israel's Sacred Terrorism one of the most influential reli ··a valuablt' un•fr,. ... to thos,. ;,,,l,n are gious: leaders, "was the key figure interested i,1 disro,•�ring th,- r,-a[ u•orld in enlisting and organizing the that lies behind "olfzrial history.' ·• bands of 'chaqu kashan' or 'knife -From :Soam ChomslI'• ln1rodue1ion drawers' who carried out Carroll's Moshe Sharett, hrael"s first for..-ign ministt"rand µrime minister dirty work. from 1953 10 1955. kept a pt>rsonal diary-a day-to-day candid Love's denial is further under record of how kt>y lsrat>lipolicy deci�ions were mad!". I .ong kt>pt mined because he did do something unpublished. the diary ren·als how '!srael"s ""security establish ment," men like- David Ben-Gurion. Arik Sharon anti Moshe else for the CIA in addition to Dayan. sought to dt>stabilizt' ntighboring Arab countrit>s his propagandizing. through co,·en military operatiom and lt"rrorist acti,·ity. and "Incidentially, I, myself, was plo11ecl rhe rakeon:r of South Lt>hanon.1hc· Wesr Bank am! Gal'a. Italian journalist Li,ia Rokach's though1ful analysis of 1ht· responsible, in an impromptu Shart"II diary and otht"r key don1illt'IIIS �hat1t'rs longsranding sort of way, for speeding the myths about hrad and its st'c11ri1�· net'd�. lsrad's Sacr"d final victory of the royalists ... T"rrorism lays barethe political irend in hrJt'I rhar, in 1hc· words o[ a troubled Moshe Shart'II. raist"sterrorism anti ··rt"n'ngl'·· 10 a I told the tank commanders (one "'moral... and even sacrt'd prinriple... of whom Love said was named 0rdt"r!rom: • . . • . . . . . - ..,._ As'><>('.1a11on o!Arab Am.-ruan l mvrr..uy C,radu�•r• Ehteshamee o:r> Ekhteshamee)• that # a lot of people were be1,ng get- rt Tr;ip,•lr, R11,1el. Hdmo, ll. :l,t.\ 021711 (617) -lll-1-5�111 � .�',,; . 1:,q,.1i,lord,·r-1111h.,\d,IS.IO!or1x"1"�···. ting killed trying storm � t- 11•"''"l"nl h to Dr. - -- ""'"Cdlal11,,:1u•plpuhl11a1111m,l\,lll;1hl 1 . Mossadeg 's house and that they, -· ------the tank cc: Appro_ved For Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150002-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150002-9
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