Shockwaves from the China/Japan Island Dispute

ANALYSIS CHINA

SHOCKWAVES FROM

THE CHINA/JAPAN ISLAND DISPUTE

Introduction

ABOUT by François Godement The Chinese have long been obsessed with strategic culture, power balances and geopolitical shifts. Academic institutions, think tanks, journals Do Chinese think tanks adjust their views to the current and web-based debate are growing in number and official party line? This question comes up when reading this quality and give China’s foreign policy breadth and issue of China Analysis, which focuses on the implications depth. of the conflict between China and Japan over the Senkaku/ China Analysis, which is published in both French Diaoyu islands. The sources analysed in this issue were th and English, introduces European audiences to published in December 2012 – that is, after the 18 Party these debates inside China’s expert and think-tank Congress but just before the Japanese elections, which world and helps the European policy community brought Shinzo Abe and the Liberal Democratic Party understand how China’s leadership thinks (LDP) back to power. We have also included sources from about domestic and foreign policy issues. While freedom of expression and information remain Taiwan, which present a more even-handed debate. But the restricted in China’s media, these published positions of the writers from mainland China are strikingly sources and debates provide an important way of homogenous. understanding emerging trends within China. For example, in previous round tables about Chinese Each issue of China Analysis focuses on a specific theme and draws mainly on Chinese mainland foreign policy held by the think tank China Institutes of sources. However, it also monitors content in Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), some Chinese-language publications from Hong Kong Chinese experts expressed more moderate views on Sino- and Taiwan, which occasionally include news and Japanese relations and put some emphasis on the economic analysis that is not published in the mainland and aspects of China’s relationships in the region, particularly reflects the diversity of Chinese thinking. with Japan. By contrast, the sources in this issue of China The French version of China Analysis can be Analysis look monolithic. All recent Chinese actions in accessed online at www.centreasia.eu. the region are ignored, as if there were simply no causal relation between them and the tensions between China and Japan. No mention is made of recent entries and intrusions of fishing boats, paramilitary ships and even planes in economic zones or even territorial waters from which China was absent so far, whatever its claims may have been. China is portrayed as passive or at least reactive. Only in Taiwan 2 February 2013 CHINA ANALYSIS n ti ge bc a og a: hy e te retrocession the see they way: long a back goes this And iw o te S r ee mr cnrdcoy Chinese contradictory. more even are US the of Views Washington avoids as much as possible any involvement on Japan inEastChinaSea. the supporting or following is that “dwarf” a as Japan This reasoning is in line with the first statements of the new S oiy f niceet gis Cia Tee views, These China. against encirclement of policy US “Asian an of establishment the proposing by 2009 in US How long and how far will this stand endure? There seems There endure? stand this will far how and long How a genuine – that is, military – incident to justify a return to return a justify to incident – military is, that – genuine a very remain however, (which, interests” “core China’s and and Japan refers explicitly – be it right or wrong – to public According revival. neo-nationalist a in engaged being as vaguely defined). It is this very demanding line that think that line demanding very this is It defined). vaguely China is not prepared to cross. Until very recently, it has it recently, very Until cross. to prepared not is China Chinese nation”, the necessary intransigence on sovereignty the of “revival the about Jinping, Xi state, of head Chinese Japan see Some implacable. are Japan of views Chinese government and party and in particular Minister of Defence ipsd f h dsue ilns n aor f aa) s a deal between as the US Japan) and Japan against of China. Yet favour one of the in islands disputed the of disposed see Others “neo-Asiatist”. a as described is community”, of one on activists Chinese of landing the discuss people do opoie s lsig ouin Erp ad AO are NATO and Europe solution? lasting a as compromise in situation a to moving steadily are we Yet escalation. diplomacy andcompromise. its from split be might Taiwan that risk the emphasise f knw b te S o aa i 17 (hc implicitly (which 1972 in Japan to US the by Okinawa of opinion inbothcountries. to attempted he as crisis the to contributed who Tokyo of off involves loss of face for either side. Will there need to be which military posturing is also involved and where backing Taiwanese for space no leave would that PRC the with Taipei in some contrast, By Congress. Party the after weeks in advantage an has China that states Another China. with writers notes that Japan “is mistaken” about US intentions: writers see the US encirclement strategy as forcing its allies to likely looked Noda Yoshihiko Minister Prime which elections, Japanese the before right published were which o e o ln i te ad (r ahr n h wtr that water) the in rather (or sand” the in “line no be to few a toeing be to seem publish, they experts the and tanks the South China Sea, and is “almost on equal grounds” with the issue of sovereignty and wants to protect its relationship governor right-wing the Ishihara, Shintaro view, that to the disputedislandsinAugust2012. n h dsue vr h ilns wih iie te ik of risk the limited which islands, the over dispute the in conflicts. ofregional the flames fanning by conflict into ore f nprto fr h Jpns gvrmn. Even government. Japanese the for inspiration of source historical allies (notably the US) by forming a “united front” oe wr mil tree a rpeettvs f Noda’s of representatives at targeted mainly were lose, Seiji Maehara. But the mention of “hatred” between China between “hatred” of mention the But Maehara. Seiji former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who irritated the irritated who Hatoyama, Yukio Minister Prime former been reassuring that the PLA navy was not directly involved strategic the is owner, private their from islands the buy

and arbitration roads to solving this type of conflict and conflict of type this solving to roads arbitration and particularly and They, interests. converging some around confrontation. h Erpas sol nw mhss te aiu legal various the emphasise now should Europeans, the seeking to engage China’s security policy in third countries third in policy security China’s engage to seeking ihih te epniiiy f hs wo r psig for pushing are who those of responsibility the highlight about by Chinese negligence. Lin Hongyu says the country 1. China needs new strategies to secure its had not yet developed a “maritime awareness” (海洋意识, maritime borders haiyang yishi), so it could not competently manage its maritime borders. Chu Shulong points out that all China’s Antoine Bondaz wars between 1949 and 1979 – with Korea, India, and the USSR – were land-based. After the fall of the USSR, China Sources: again prioritised resolving land-based territorial disputes. Jin Canrong, “The context and resolution of Chinese China has only recently started to concern itself with maritime territorial disputes”, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, maritime issues, coming to a new realisation that it is not No. 8, 20121. only a “continental Loess civilisation” (黄土文明, huangtu 蔚蓝色文 Chu Shulong, “The current situation in remote Chinese wenming) but also a “marine blue civilisation” ( 明 territorial waters and its external strategic design”, , weilanse wenming). Jin Canrong says that all China Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, No. 8, 20122. is doing is normalising its strength, developing real power that is based not on its history as a continental power, but Lin Hongyu, “Causes of Chinese maritime distress and on its geography, which makes it a dual power – that is, a measures to take in response”, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, power both on the continent and at sea. No. 8, 20123. Liu Jianfei, “The challenges of maritime territories issues China has the second largest economy in the world and is the 4 for the rise of China”, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, n°8, 2012 . world’s largest trading power. But it has waited a long time to upgrade its power at sea. Its naval strength is nowhere These articles come from a special issue of the CICIR’s near that of its neighbours such as Japan or India, much journal, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi. The journal devoted an less that of the United States. Lin Hongyu says that China issue to China’s “disputes in territorial waters” (领土领 faces several major obstacles in increasing its maritime 海争端, lingtu linghai zhengduan), after the research power. Its geography is unfavourable – where the US has centre brought together more than 30 Chinese experts at access to three oceans, the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the a conference on 3 August 2012 to discuss “the problem Arctic, China has no direct access to the ocean, not even to of Chinese maritime borders and China’s international the Pacific. It has to contend with several ongoing territorial strategy”. disputes. And the US, the world’s strongest military power, has an interest in what would otherwise be China’s maritime The articles suggest that, by increasing maritime trade sphere of influence. Chu Shulong says that, in the face of and modernising its navy, China has gradually created this “precarious maritime situation” (海洋困境, haiyang real naval strength. However, its maritime rise has been kunjing), China is not actually being “aggressive” (咄咄逼 met with opposition by its neighbours and by the United 人, duoduobiren), but is in fact projecting “weakness” (软弱, States. Maritime territorial disputes are not an isolated ruanruo). Similarly, Lin criticises China for being “on the problem. Instead, they are part of a wider security issue that defensive” (防御的状态, fangyu de zhuangtai), underlining is characterised by China’s emergence and the US’s new its inferiority in maritime affairs. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. To secure its position, the articles suggest, China must develop a real maritime Territorial disputes and the US strategy and assert its rights. China is currently involved in territorial disputes in all of its Becoming a power at sea as well as on land bordering seas. Jin Canrong says that these disputes have become more pressing since 2010. In that year, the South Although China lies on the edge of the Eurasian continent, Korean warship Cheonan was sunk by a North Korean the authors agree that it has neglected the sea in favour torpedo in the Yellow Sea. A collision between a Chinese of building strength on land. It has continued this policy fishing boat and the Japanese coastguard in the East China even though all the “humiliations suffered from the Sea caused friction with Japan. And tensions increased 19th century onwards have come from the sea” (饱受 between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines in the South 海洋之屈辱, baoshou haiyang zhiquru), according to China Sea. Chu Shulong, however, says that these territorial Lin Hongyu. These humiliations were mostly brought disputes, which are historical and non-cyclical, are not just 1 Jin Canrong is vice-dean and professor at the School of International China’s problem. In fact, China is not even a key player in Studies at Renmin University of China, Beijing. some of the regional disputes. China is in a strong position 2 Chu Shulong is deputy director of the Institute of International in the South China Sea. It is at a slight disadvantage to Japan Strategic and Development Studies and professor of Political Science and in the East China Sea, but its regional position is gradually International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing. improving. More importantly, China’s neighbours are the 3 Lin Hongyu is professor of International Relations and dean of the Department of International Politics at the China Institutes of ones who are revising their views on the situation; China, Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). Chu says, is completely comfortable with the status quo. 4 Liu Jianfei is director of the Chinese Foreign Affairs Division and professor at the Institute of International Strategic Studies at the Central Some internal factors have helped to intensify China’s Party School of the Communist Party of China. 3 4 February 2013 CHINA ANALYSIS “trump card to put pressure on China” ( All Chinaisdoing

i Cnog as h trioil ipts ut e viewed be must disputes territorial the says Canrong Jin ( h atos ugs svrl as o enoc Chinese reinforce to ways several suggest authors The legitimise to trying also is US the edge, added an it give To in role crucial a playing is US the that believe writers The Zhonguo weixie lun Developing amajormaritimestrategy Liu Jianfei says that US involvement in the dispute allows dispute the in involvement US that says Jianfei Liu 牌 on itsgeography. developing realpowerthat above all try to improve its international reputation, so as so reputation, international its improve to try all above China’s from support gaining and China containing at The interests. national its to detrimental be would so and a “blue-water navy” ( various territorial disputes. Liu Jianfei thinks China must China thinks Jianfei Liu disputes. territorial various they that thinks He people. Chinese the to important very Chinese power. omny e ter oenet s o tmd ad that and timid, too as government their see commonly zezhan zai muhou fesv srtge ta ngt Ciee fot t bid a build to efforts Chinese negate that strategies offensive not to risk fuelling the “Chinese threat theory” ( theory” threat “Chinese the fuelling risk to not adopt to Vietnam, and Japan particularly neighbours, its as disputes territorial the using is US The neighbours. involve to want which countries, neighbouring on relying ol calne S eeoy vr nentoa waters international over hegemony US challenge would is based not on its history but is basednotonitshistory aiie tegh n pooe hns itrss n the in interests Chinese promote and strength maritime maritime economy. Liu Jianfei also says that nationalism is obtained has which navy, Chinese the of modernisation normalising its strength, time, it officially remains in the background, manipulating background, the in remains officially it time, the US in order to internationalise the conflicts and balance Canrong Jin situation. regional the of deterioration the the fact that 9.7 percent of the country’s GDP depends on the China the given finally has modernisation This about Liaoning. the talks Canrong Jin disputes. territorial t ale “rm eid h see” ( scenes” the behind “from allies its aimed is strategy This Asia. to “pivot” its legitimise to it Washington disputes. territorial China’s in intervention its by increased is borders maritime its defending in interest as h U cno acp Cia ann tu maritime true gaining China accept cannot US the says carrier, aircraft first country’s the as well as submarines hopes to fan the flames ( flames the fan to hopes policy ofgoodneighbourliness. it power, naval major a become to were China If power. country’s the of radicalisation a favours opinion public foreign policy. 维稳 , Meiguo daya Zhongguo de yizhangpai , weiwen ) throughouttheregionandwithin China. ). Beijing must also “maintain stability” “maintain also must Beijing ). . hs tne norgs China’s encourages stance This ). 远洋蓝水煽风点火 , yuanyang lanshui , shanfeng dianhuo 自己则站在幕后美国打压中国的一张 US already benefits and it maintains an over advantages hn: t has it China: fetv sse of system effective einl alliances. regional ueir materiel superior rm w key two from . t h same the At ). 中国威胁论 ). China’s , ) by ) ziji , Admiral LiuHuaqing(whoispraised byLiuHongyuelsewhereinhis 国 Taiwan, andthePhilippines. ( ( ( i Hny tik ta cmeiiees n maritime and competitiveness that thinks Hongyu Lin eeecn Sn a-e’ saeet ht h twentieth the that statement Yat-Sen’s Sun Referencing Beijing must develop true maritime awareness. He thinks He awareness. maritime true develop must Beijing Pacific while creating a real deterrent against other navies other against deterrent real a creating while Pacific advantage on its side: time. Its leverage over its neighbours its over leverage Its time. side: its on advantage ( nation” “maritime a from itself transforming and hn, ln wt te nacmn o Cias maritime China’s of enhancement the with along China, grow in influence as its neighbours, including theUS, including neighbours, its as influence in grow o vrtig o ra truh h ecrlmn created encirclement the through break to everything do China demands. their of some drop to them encouraging stronger a accept must Washington interests. other’s each disastrous. Liu Jianfei says that China has one significant one has China that says Jianfei Liu disastrous. economic power. Direct confrontation with the US is not an says Lin powers, continental by dominated was century option, but China should still modernise its navy and assert article), the first chain of islands corresponds to the archipelagos that thearchipelagos to corresponds of islands chain first the article), neighbours. It should advance the idea of an “ocean GDP” “ocean an of idea the advance should It neighbours. return to the Asia-Pacific region. He thinks the solution lies which willlimittheirroomformanoeuvre. to continue will it And economy. its with along grow will must also develop a structured defence of its rights on the on rights its of defence structured a develop also must separate the seas bordering China from the Pacific Ocean, including Japan, its to proportionate strength maritime develop must to support these projects. At a strategic level, China must China level, strategic a At projects. these support to more and, government the for both here role a is there that the US, so as to put an end to the “mutual strategic distrust” that the 21 the that sad, n fnnil otiuin sol besolicited should contributions financial and islands, and China between coordination and communication in US the and emergence Chinese of context regional the in t trioil lis Te iuto i ucran bt not but uncertain, is situation The claims. territorial its in theregion. hud ep ul ptits aog h Ciee people. Chinese the among patriotism build help should society civil NGOs, Through society. civil for surprisingly, development. economic China’s to essential are security perhaps thus countries, neighbouring with shared be to sea haiyang qiangguo), China would protect its influenceinthe protect haiyang qiangguo),Chinawould oe. hn ms bid oprto wt is Asian its with cooperation build must China power. Specific projects should be created to support the disputed the support to created be should projects Specific 5 basis oflawandhistoricalclaims. become increasingly dependent on the Chinese economy – economy Chinese the on dependent increasingly become chain island first the by Theorised by the man responsible for modernising the Chinese navy, 海洋互信赤字战略互疑 , haiyang daguo GDP), which would enable some of the wealth of the of wealth the of some enable would which GDP), , , st huxin chizi zhanlüe huyi century belongs to the maritime powers. China powers. maritime the to belongs century t a mrn sproe” ( superpower” “marine a to ) ). The two countries must recognise must countries two The ). ad crnc ak f confidence” of lack “chronic and ) 5 B srnteig t sa power, sea its strengthening By . 海洋强国海洋大 ,

committed to ensure the island’s protection. The PRC is also 2. The Diaoyu islands crisis and Taiwan-China doing everything it can to limit Taiwan’s presence on the relations world stage. So, it would be hard for the two sides to build cooperation on an equal footing. Taiwan would be put in an Tanguy Le Pesant awkward position, especially as the Diaoyu conflict is not an isolated problem – there are other territorial disputes in the Sources: South China Sea. Cooperation with the PRC against Japan Chen I-hsin, “Why Taiwan cannot cooperate with the would pull Taiwan into a web that would be hard to escape mainland to protect the Diaoyu Islands”, Zhongguo if Taiwan wished to deal differently with future conflicts of Shibao, 27 July 20126. sovereignty. Editorial, “Cross-strait relations seen through the Diaoyu Chen I-hsin sees even more important consequences to an Islands issue”, Lianhebao, 27 September 2012. alliance between the two Chinas. Extended cooperation Editorial, “Behind the Diaoyu Islands can be heard the with China could desensitise the Taiwanese population and horn of final unification”,Ziyou Shibao, 18 August 2012. lead to a collapse of the nation’s will to stand alone. Beijing could seize its opportunity to end the status quo, and might Tensions between China and Japan escalated after Tokyo find a more efficient way to speed up the unification process announced the nationalisation of the Senkaku islands than its current tack of putting pressure on the US to (Diaoyudao, 釣魚島 for Beijing; Diaoyutai, 釣魚台 for “abandon Taiwan” (棄台, qitai). Chen thinks the Communist Taipei) in early September 2012. But the crisis has also had Party views the joint defence of the Diaoyu Islands as a serious repercussions for relations between Taiwan and first step towards unification. This could explain why the Beijing. As early as summer 2012, Beijing saw the crisis communist government has tried so hard to cooperate with as an opportunity to present the international community the mainland on the issue. If Taiwan were to take the PRC’s with the image of a united Chinese nation, with both sides side in the conflict with Japan, it would inevitably distance of the Formosa Strait joining together against “Japanese the island from its historical protector, the US. Washington imperialism”. would be extremely disappointed by Taipei’s choice and might consider ending arms sales to Taiwan. Chen I-hsin Published in August and September 2012, these analyses says that Beijing hopes to use the Diaoyu islands to drive a describe Taiwan’s options in dealing with the crisis. They wedge between Taiwan and the US and Japan. lay out the arguments of those who support a strategic alliance between the RoC (Republic of China – Taipei) and A beneficial strategic alliance? the PRC (People’s Republic of China – Beijing), as well as the arguments of those who believe such an alliance would, The editorial in Lianhebao is much more positive about the for Taiwan, be risky to the point of suicidal. strategic alliance with the PRC. The writer says that Japan is the main loser in the crisis. The nationalisation of the The case against cooperating with China Diaoyu Islands has breathed new life into this conflict of sovereignty, which was previously not a Chinese priority. A Chen I-hsin sees several reasons why it is not feasible for new wave of anti-Japanese feeling has arisen on the Chinese Taiwan to cooperate with the PRC to defend the Diaoyu mainland. The central government and the population have Islands. If the two sides of the strait were to collaborate, it come together against Japan, which risks suffering serious would reduce Taiwan’s room for manoeuvre in diplomacy economic losses. The PRC has been given an opportunity to with Japan. Mainland China has taken a much more extreme show off its new diplomatic, economic, and military assets, position on the issue than has Taiwan, so collaboration and to prove that it has the means to further its ambitions. would mean that Taiwan would have to prepare for the possibility of armed conflict. This is not in Taiwan’s interest, Lianhebao sees a link between the Diaoyu Islands issue since the island would lose its status as a “promoter of and Taiwan’s relationship with China. By showing its peace”7. determination in the crisis against Japan, the PRC is also sending a message to the US about Taiwan. Beijing is In any case, the two sides do not trust each other enough presenting itself as a protective older brother, trying to to build an alliance. Chen I-hsin says Beijing continues to demonstrate that discrepancies in power do not prevent the pressure the US to stop its arms sales to Taiwan and to end two Chinas from working together against a hostile foreign the Taiwan Relations Act, under which the US is legally threat.

6 Chen I-hsin is professor of political sciences at the Graduate Institute of The editorial says Taiwan must learn to leverage the PRC’s the Americas at Tamkang University in Taipei. He is also vice-president of strength intelligently to help it meet its objectives and deal the Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies, a think tank created in 2008 with its opponents. Using two chengyu, it says Taiwan and closely linked to the Kuomintang. 7 In fact, on 5 August 2012, a few days after the publication of must “borrow force to use it” (借力使力, jielishili), and “use Chen I-hsin’s article, Ma Ying-jeou presented an “Initiative for Peace in the fox’s trick to turn the tiger’s strength to its advantage” the Eastern Sea” (東海和平倡議). 5 6 February 2013 CHINA ANALYSIS tk. h eioil as ht te ioua hv always have Diaoyutai “the that says editorial The take. – 人共國三者之間找到交集華人民共和國 Japan aboutfishingrightsinthedisputedwaters. Lianhebao ( Taipei fully agreed with the PRC’s action against Japan. The in editorial The shows experience Islands Diaoyu The future. Taiwan’s The editorial says the current crisis calls for reflection about Zhongguo / Zhonghua renmin gongheguo san zhe zhijian sad nr ae a la dsicin ewe Taiwan’s between distinction clear a makes nor Islands de chulu zhongguo delingtu jiushi zigu diaoyutai RoC. 路 about the Chinese nationalists from Hong Kong who landed Ma neither defends Taiwan’s sovereignty over the Diaoyu the over sovereignty Taiwan’s defends neither Ma of management its of and government Ying-jeou’s Ma Taiwanese governmentmissteps equation can be found in the idea of “one China under a big use to wants Taiwan If means. that “China” which defining editorial writer sees no doubt that the Chinese government Chinese the that doubt no sees writer editorial factor, divisive a as seen be not should “China” of concept The China. communist as PRC the and China democratic zongtong defanying ‘‘henZhongguo’’ zhaodao jiaoji f a igjo” ( Ying-jeou” Ma of and PRC the of flags the raised and islands disputed the on relations with China, Japan, and the US. It begins by talking relationship betweenthetwosidesofstrait. ( roof” ih h PC o oe u aed n t ngtain with negotiation its in ahead out come to PRC the with hc sae o te a atr h lnig n n ril in article an in landing the after day the on stated which government Ma’s activists. these of landing the behind was ae w msae. isl, nta o opsn Beijing, opposing of instead Firstly, mistakes. two made to buildanalliance. h cnet f hn” ( China” of concept the an not is “independence (Taiwan’s) thinks still China that the DiaoyuIslandsissue. challenge the then Japan, back push to strength PRC’s the is to find a space for Taiwan to manoeuvre. But the PRC is PRC the But manoeuvre. to Taiwan for space a find to is how this strategy could work: Taiwan could use its alliance its use could Taiwan work: could strategy this how not trusteachotherenough In anycase,thetwosidesdo position and Beijing’s. This risks giving the impression that likely to be as intransigent about Taiwan as it has been on been has it as Taiwan about intransigent as be to likely o te R, hn, n te RoC” the and China, PRC, the for but instead as an “interface” an as instead but differentiated. be been part of Chinese territory” ( should and – could strait the of sides two the between 狐假虎威 , bixu zaiZhongguo gainian zhong, zhaodao Taiwan Ziyou Shibao 大屋頂中國 ). This implies finding a “common denominator a “common finding implies This ). , hn osdr te om ht h relationship the that form the considers then hujiahuwei . t h sm tm, h to hns must Chinas two the time, same the At ). Ziyou Shibao , Lianhebao 馬英九總統的反應 dawuding Zhongguo dawuding rtcss h “vr Ciee reaction Chinese’ “‘very the criticises ). The editorial gives an example of example an gives editorial The ). 必須在中國概念中，找到台灣的出

( 介面 s rtcl f h attd of attitude the of critical is hns h slto t this to solution the thinks 釣魚台自古就是中國的領土 , , zai Zhonghua/ minguo jiemian 在中華民國／中國／中 “ 很中國無可能 find a “way out a “way find jue wu keneng jue wu pin ( option” o Tia must Taiwan So, o Tia within Taiwan for t te escapade. the to ) ), with the RoC as RoC the with ), ). The problem is problem The ). ) in defining the defining in ) ”, , Ma Yingjiu taidu yi taidu 台獨已絕 ). ,

“not hesitate to resort to war” ( war” to resort to hesitate “not ( inch” one back step to “not Japanese and PRC violations of Taipei’s sovereignty on the on sovereignty Taipei’s of violations PRC and Japanese Taiwan Straits(ARATS), theChineseinstitution in charge ofnegotiations This increases the risk of a war against Japan, which has a has which Japan, against war a of risk the increases This The editorial says these events clearly show that even though Ziyou Shibao sad” ( Islands” dengshang Diaoyudao RoC citizens. So why were Taiwanese people not allowed to allowed not people Taiwanese were why So citizens. RoC Diaoyu Islands. Ma has declared repeatedly that Taiwan is Taiwan that repeatedly declared has Ma Islands. Diaoyu activists who had been captured by Japanese coastguards. Japanese by captured been had who activists appearing to agree to a rapprochement with Beijing, Taiwan activists the like just Ma, hand. in hand working fact in are Ma has many times reiterated his refusal to cooperate with cooperate to refusal his reiterated times many has Ma visit toTaiwanin2008? minzuzhuyi zhe Party Communist Chinese the and Kuomintang the China, with Taiwan. oenet s ed t rs a ilmtc rss o defend to crisis diplomatic a risk to ready is government display the same RoC flag in opposition to Chen Yunlin’s Chen to opposition in flag RoC same the display Taiwan’s of violation the after Beijing oppose not he did nothing particularly shocking – they had simply exercised simply had they – shocking particularly nothing reactions to Beijing and Tokyo serve the interest of the PRC, hn t oe t dfnig awn gis Biig The Beijing? against Taiwan defending to comes it when president” “mute a to way give belligerence this does why which wants to present the image of a common pan-Chinese islands, disputed the on flags RoC and PRC the raised who iity elrd ht h Hn Kn atvss a done had activists Kong Hong the that declared ministry the right to fly the RoCflagbyindividualswhoarenoteven right toflythe the territory, and why did he demand that Japanese authorities then, Why, defended. be will sovereignty RoC’s the that their freedomofspeech. the to thehistoricmissionofunificationmotherland”. triangle. Ma’s government has fallen into the PRC’s trap. By important: more than anything else, “he wants to contribute US. the from also but Japan, from away moving only not is ( nationalist” “pan-Chinese a is says that Ma Ying-jeou does not think this consideration is consideration this think not does Ying-jeou Ma that says eody te pksesn f h Tiaee foreign Taiwanese the of spokesperson the Secondly, free the Hong Kong activists? Ma told Tokyo that he would he that Tokyo told Ma activists? Kong Hong the free front and aims to break the US-Japan-Taiwan diplomatic US-Japan-Taiwan the break to aims and front bilateral defence agreement with the US. But US. the with agreement defence bilateral 8 Chen Yunlin is the president of the Association for Relations Across the Global Times 中國人昨天登上釣魚島 ss h Tie ratd o ifrnl to differently so reacted Taipei why asks ). that “Chinese had landed on the Diaoyu the on landed had “Chinese that Ziyou Shibao ), Ma demanded that Japan free the free Japan that demanded Ma ), 8 寸步不讓不惜一戰中華民族主義者 hns apis different Taipei’s thinks , zhongguoren zuotian , cunbuburang , buxi yizhan Ziyou Shibao , Zhonghua ) – so – ) and )

the dispute by forcing the US to lend support. Each country 3. The US factor in the China-Japan dispute over is trying to make the other take the lead, while at the same the Diaoyutai time trying to avoid a direct confrontation with China.

Antoine Bondaz US policy: encirclement and equivocation

Sources: Ren Weidong says the US is not a helpful mediator. The Feng Zhaokui, “The US factor in Chinese-Japanese US is trying to suffocate China by deploying new military diplomatic relations since their re-establishment equipment, strengthening its alliance with Japan, and 40 years ago”, Riben Xueke, No. 5, November 20129. stepping up military exercises along maritime boundaries. Hu Dekun, “Neutralising the United States and building These exercises include the US supercarrier, USS George good neighbourly relations along China’s maritime Washington. Ren is reminded of the crisis of 1996, when the periphery”, Xindai Guoji Guanxi, August 201210. US sent an aircraft carrier to the Taiwan Strait to intimidate China. That intervention was part of a policy of “China Lian Degui, “Analysing the ambiguity of US policy on the bashing” (欺凌, qiling) that aimed to isolate the country, Diaoyu Islands”, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, October 201211. as had happened during the 1950s. The US needs Japan to Ren Weidong, “China wants to resist pressure from ensure that its strategic encirclement of China is effective. the United States and force the Japanese to give up”, So, Washington is trying to placate Tokyo by pressuring 12 Zhongguo Wang, 3 November 2012 . China to abandon its territorial claims and accept Japan’s Editorial, “If Japan is an American puppet, China and nationalisation of the Diaoyu Islands. Ren says that China the United States must play together”, Huanqiu Shibao, must not accept these illegal “tricks and blackmail” (诱骗和 14 September 2012. 讹诈, youpian he ezha). Editorial, “China cannot convince the United States to remain neutral by words alone”, Huanqiu Shibao, Lian Degui examines what he perceives as ambiguities 19 September 2012. in US policy on the Diaoyu Islands. He thinks the US is being deliberately vague on at least three closely linked points. Are the Diaoyu Islands part of the islands that The US factor (美国因素, Meiguo yinsu) is crucial in the were returned to Japan in 1971? If they are, does the US- territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Japan military alliance cover these islands? And if it does, Diaoyu Islands. Ren Weidong says the dispute is directly would the US intervene in a Chinese-Japanese war in spite linked to the changing regional context. The United of the inevitable costs? Lian says Washington is purposely States has returned to East Asia, and its strategy there encouraging this ambiguity, this “cunning confusion” consists of “containing” (牵制, qianzhi), “encircling” (模糊的花招, mohu de huazhao). Since it has not stated (包围圈, baoweiquan), and even “suffocating” (扼制, ezhi) its position clearly, the US has the freedom to deal with China. Lian Degui thinks Washington’s approach to the developments in the China-Japan territorial dispute as they Diaoyu dispute and to East Asia in general is to adopt “a arise in whatever way it thinks best. At the same time, it policy of ambiguity” (模糊的政策, mohu de zhengce). This ensures that the dispute does not come to the attention of policy has enabled it to maximise its interests in the region the American public, just as Henry Kissinger tried to do while maintaining room for manoeuvre against China. when Okinawa was given back to Japan in 1971. In the same Hu Dekun says the US is using Japan to help it hold onto way that the occupation of the southern Japanese islands a leading position in Asia, allowing it to benefit from the helped contain communism in the 1950s, equivocation on region’s economic vitality as well as to control China. Feng the status of the Diaoyu islands in the 1970s enabled the US Zhaokui contends that since Japan is still occupied by US to pressurise Japan to keep US military bases on Okinawa forces, it is not really a sovereign state, so the US is able to and to allow the installation of strategic nuclear missiles. use Japan to carry out its own strategy. But the editorialists Today, refusing to take a firm position allows the US to in Huanqiu Shibao believe that Japan and the US have maintain and control Japan’s dependence. Lian says that different strategies on the Diaoyu Islands. The US is using the ambiguity over the US approach to the Diaoyu Islands its apparent neutrality to stir up conflict by encouraging enables the US to control East Asian relations. Japan to confront China. Japan is trying to internationalise Hu Dekun says the US is worried about China’s economic 9 Feng Zhaokui is a former vice-president and honorary researcher at the boom. It wants to control China by encircling it and by Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences taking advantage of Beijing’s difficulties, however small (CASS). He is also vice-president of the National Society of Japanese they might be. To refocus public attention away from its on- Economy. 10 Hu Dekun is the dean of the China Institute of Boundary and Ocean going economic difficulties, the US hopes to turn China into Studies at Wuhan University. its main national enemy. And the US wants to maintain its 11 Lian Degui is an associate researcher at the Centre for Japanese Studies leadership role in key regions around the world, especially at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS). in East Asia. Hu says China must respond calmly to the US 12 Ren Weidong is a research fellow at the China Institutes of Contemporary strategy. It should avoid direct confrontation by “reconciling International Relations (CICIR). 7 8 February 2013 CHINA ANALYSIS “occupied by US troops” ( troops” US by “occupied Japan territorial dispute as Japan’s relationshipwithChinaandtheUS 地 aa’ eooi bo, hc traee U regional US threatened which boom, economic Japan’s East Asian community, a more US-centric tone has since has tone US-centric more a community, Asian East Feng Zhaokui talks about the impact that the US has had on hs ae aa a iel ly f ovnec fr h US, the for convenience of ally ideal an Japan made This by time a for complicated was relationship US-Japan The In return, the US helped Japan to offset the rise in Chinese in rise the offset to Japan helped US the return, In S iiaiy Jpn cetd “uodnt” oe ( role “subordinate” a accepted Japan militarily, US and stigmatise Japan over influence its strengthen to US congshu But since major modern geopolitical risks will come from come will risks geopolitical modern major since But n mv coe t is egbu, aa sol acp a accept should Japan neighbour, its to closer move and economic Japan’s But domination. economic global and between treaty 1971 the that believes Feng Japan. and and on the world stage, and will also help build neighbourly China. Chinese periphery. China must use its economic strength to oenet 20-00 pooe te rain f an of creation the proposed (2009-2010) government established diplomatic relations in 1972. He says that the that says He 1972. in relations diplomatic established region the in indispensable becomes country the ensure the in neutral stays US the sure make to can it everything ( differences” economic vitality if it works with China. To ensure its future Japan, rise. China’s control to efforts its in useful especially developments intheChina- Since ithasnotstatedits relations between China and Japan since the two countries two the since Japan and China between relations reform and openness to become a major continental power. of years 30 last the used has China Japan. with relations resolution totheDiaoyudispute thatfavoursBeijing. Feng minister. prime as returned has Abe Shinzo that now relationship. bilateral the in inequality facto de recreated warns Tokyo that Japan will only benefit from the region’s the from benefit only will Japan that Tokyo warns ( base” “strategic a as country the use who mitigate the effects of the global economic crisis. This will This crisis. economic global the of effects the mitigate thinks best. they ariseinwhateverwayit the freedomtodealwith position clearly, the UShas the sea,countrymustalsobecomeatruenavalpower. n em o a ilmtc rage ewe Cia te US, the China, between triangle diplomatic a of terms in slowdown and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s power that threatened its security. Although the Hatoyama the Although security. its threatened that power ( pride” for decades. Today, these China-Japan tensions allow the allow tensions China-Japan these Today, decades. for en dpe. hs tiue il rbby e reinforced be probably will attitude This adopted. been understood be only can relationship China-Japan bilateral h to dtra pee from pieces editorial two The , zhanlüe genjudi 民族自尊心 ) and allowed the US to set limits to its sovereignty. 协调分歧 , , ged o ad vr t “national its over hand to agreed ), minzu zizunxin minzu , xietao fengqi 美国占领着 , . nbe o ia the rival to Unable ). Meiguo zhanlingzhe Meiguo ad t hud do should it and ) ahntn and Washington aa, helped Japan, oy, n which in Tokyo, ejn ad Tokyo and Beijing knw ad the and Okinawa wesi of ownership relations between between relations was returned to returned was oten islands southern undermine Huanqiu Shibao 战略根据从属 ), , “little Japan” ( Japan” “little American sphere of influence. For this reason, the Diaoyu the reason, this For influence. of sphere American 4 etme i mr cncl I sy ta, u o fa of fear of out that, says It cynical. more is September 14 China’s of one just is problem the says September 19 aa t cutrblne hn ad s sn regional using is and China counter-balance to Japan 桶 oy icue te iou sad. h eioil of editorial The islands. Diaoyu the includes Tokyo oy, t as wns o rnfr ti Chinese-Japanese this transform to wants says, it Tokyo, sad qeto i fr oe hn sml lgl su of issue legal simple a than more far is question Islands Ss oe neet. ae wt ti gnie opposition, genuine this with Faced interests. core US’s oee, the However, must China circumstances, these in that says Weidong Ren ejn ad oy. h wies a ta te S s using is US the that say writers The Tokyo. and Beijing Panetta reaffirmed that the security treaty signed with signed treaty security the that reaffirmed Panetta n b ray o et h U calne Te dtra of editorial The challenge. US the meet to ready be and authorities should be under no illusion about Washington’s US criticising openly provocative, deliberately are ambiguous involvement in the territorial dispute between dispute territorial the in involvement ambiguous hn fcs n Aeia rtr” n at sa One Asia. East in return” “American an faces China heard, itself make determination, its show should China xrsin f hs hf i Wsigo’ iprat but important Washington’s is shift this of expression easily manipulate Japan to create inconveniences for China. Leon Secretary Defense US Beijing, to visit his during take to want not does it that says US The equivocation. either oftheUnitedStatesorChina. strength. increasing its limit and development, economic its control reputation, global China’s damage to conflicts of suffocating China and of reshaping regional dynamics to dynamics regional reshaping of and China suffocating of o Jpn Dfnig h Day Ilns s o i the in not is Islands Diaoyu the Defending Japan. not risks turning Japan into a West Pacific “powder keg” ( keg” “powder Pacific West a into Japan turning risks toensure it needs that influence regional the have never aiie ertra dsue, n sy ta te S has US the that says and disputes, territorial maritime to be Washington’s “puppet” Washington’s be to should It mistake. serious a made has US the that think Chinese them. of all in China against stand a taken territorial dispute into a regional conflict against a against conflict regional a into dispute territorial its security, and East Asia will remain within the Japanese- the within remain will Asia East and security, its ie i te ertra dsue Bt n etme 2012, September in But dispute. territorial the in sides sovereignty. It is a means of undermining America’s strategy will it in, gives China If US. the and Japan to up stand a a ann fr aa ad h Ciee government. Chinese the and Japan for warning a has understand that its priority in the region should be China, be should region the in priority its that understand writers The neutral. never is States United the – position en mriaie, h Jpns gvrmn hs agreed has government Japanese the marginalised, being backdrop of Chinese-American opposition. This approach This opposition. Chinese-American of backdrop benefit Beijing. , huoyaotong 小日本 Huanqiu Shibao ). The results would not be in the interests the in be not would results The ). , xiao Riben ( 玩偶 ). This means the US can US the means This ). ril o 1 September 14 of article , wanou ), becoming the becoming ), 火药

this, the government must focus on contact, dialogue, 4. China’s strategy towards Japan in the Diaoyu and communication, while remaining unshakeable Islands dispute on protecting the country’s interests and sovereignty. International alliances must also be considered, and the Martina Bassan government should give some thought to logical potential strategic allies. For example, China’s territorial disputes Sources: with Japan also concern Russia and South Korea16. China Zhu Feng, “A three-pronged strategy to protect the could capitalise on a shared opposition to the Japanese right Diaoyu Islands”, Caijing, 9 September 201213. wing, which, Zhu says, is “a common enemy of the political 东亚政治共同的敌人 Wu Di, “The Diaoyu Islands crisis and the strategy of community of East Asia” ( , dongya ‘hiding one’s talents and biding one’s time’”, Lianhe zhengzhi gongtong de diren). China, he says, should join Zaobao, 15 September 201214. South Korea in opposing Japan. In an international crisis like the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, “effective crisis Editorial, “Clashing over the Diaoyu Islands”, Caijing, diplomacy” must be implemented as soon as possible to 9 September 2012. reassert China’s position.

A speedy resolution of the long-standing dispute between Zhu says that media patriotism and public opinion must China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu be respected. But it should not be allowed to descend into Islands (Senkaku in Japanese) does not seem likely. But “puerile patriotism” (爱国主义幼稚病, aiguo zhuyi youzhi most Chinese experts agree that this diplomatic row has bing) or a “patriotic frenzy” (爱国主义狂躁症，aiguo zhuyi reached a critical stage. The writers say that China has kuangzao bing). He says China should “complain less and not had to face such a serious “Japanese threat” (日本威 act more” (少放炮、多做事, shao fangpao, duo zuo shi). It 胁，riben weixie) since the end of World War II. Zhu Feng will need to do this in the conflicts it will face in the future, says that military conflict between China and Japan over which will be increasingly frequent and hard to manage. the Diaoyu Islands is inevitable, but that things have not yet come to that. Zhu says it is “extreme” (偏激, pianji) Wang Yizhou thinks China’s problem is that it “still has a and “not common sense” (缺乏常识的看法, quefa changshi deep-rooted war mentality, but lacks a commitment to de kanfa) to think that protecting Chinese sovereignty can producing international public goods”17. He says that any legitimise the use of military force at every opportunity. solution must be in line with the Chinese government’s

Shi Yinhong, quoted in Caijing’s editorial of 9 September, diplomatic agenda, and should be based on a mixture of 15 agrees . He says the situation is serious, but he does not soft and hard power. Beijing should definitely not give up believe that the relationship between China and Japan can on hard power. If China wants to become a major maritime be completely compromised right now. The experts rule out power, it must use whatever means it can to protect its a military solution. Instead, they consider which strategy maritime space: warships, fishing boats, the coast guard, China should adopt so as to resolve the dispute without and so on. But China must also plan and articulate a clear endangering the country’s economic and strategic interests. soft power strategy. It needs to learn and apply the rules for managing international waters, including those that relate Crisis diplomacy, patriotism, and power to fishing, protecting marine biodiversity, or exploiting natural resources. Wang says that “China must become Zhu Feng proposes a “three-pronged strategy to protect the guardian of security in international waters” (中国要做 the islands”, centred on three principles: complete military 国际海洋安全的保护者, zhongguo yao zuo guoji haiyang preparedness (充分的军事准备，chongfen de junshi anquan de baohuzhe). By its actions, it should present itself zhunbei); effective crisis diplomacy (成功的危机外交， as a protector, and using its ideological positions, it should chenggong de weiji waijiao); and combining the efforts of take on a leadership role. the Chinese government and society (中国政府与社会共同努力， Zhongguo zhengfu yu shehui gongtong nuli). Using economic leverage against Japan

He spends most time developing the second point, saying Zhao Quansheng and Wu Di propose an economic solution that “effective crisis diplomacy” does not just mean the to the standoff18. Zhao says China should use its economic ability of a government or a country to manage a diplomatic dominance to put pressure on Japan and to reward regional controversy. The country needs to announce that it has good intentions and is willing to cooperate, and by doing 16 Aside from the standoff over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Japan is so, obtain international support in the dispute. To achieve also dealing with other disputes, in particular with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, and with Russia over four islands in the Kouri- 13 Zhu Feng is a professor at the School of International Studies, Peking les archipelago. University. 17 Quoted in the Caijing editorial of 9 September 2012. Wang Yizhou 14 Wu Di is a member of the Research Centre on Transnational is vice-dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University. Corporations in the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. 18 Quoted in the Caijing editorial of 9 September 2012. Zhao Quansheng 15 Shi Yinhong is professor of International Relations and director of the is director of the Centre for Asian Studies at the School of International Centre on American Studies at the People’s University of China, Beijing. Service, American University. 9 10 February 2013 CHINA ANALYSIS “terminal illness of the economy” “a time bomb” ( bomb” time “a Japan’s economy is suffering 侈的游戏只有中国玩得起侈品 100 percent of domestic savings Wu says these economic issues are much more important more much are issues economic these says Wu Wu says that Japan’s economic situation is not viable in the European economic crisis has shown that for a country on country a for that shown has crisis economic European That said, the Diaoyu Islands will only be returned to China bythe underpinned islargely deficit fiscal country’s The This will eventually weaken the country so much that it will Zhongguo wandeqi bevr ad ae o vral pretos i 21, aa’ db is debt Japan’s 2016, in perceptions: variable on based and observers against Japan is time. Japan’s economy is suffering from a from suffering is economy Japan’s time. is Japan against “ae ht ny hn hs h lxr t pa” ( play” to luxury the has China only that “game Xiaoping’s a Deng time” your biding and now. talents your “hiding of from approach starting deliberately, and hn wl hv t tk ses o drs te, r risk or them, address to steps take to have will China norg dmsi cnupin ahr hn depending than rather consumption domestic encourage a including conditions, impose to position economic country’s debt reaches the level of Greece, it will most likely weaken the country somuch weaken thecountry on investment. by posed challenge the address to economy Chinese the of expected toreach100percentofdomestic savings. 19 not be able to make any demands on the international stage. will not be easy. Wu recommends a structural readjustment that itwillnotbeableto from a“terminalillnessofthe the verge of bankruptcy, “sovereignty is a luxury” ( hn h ise f h Day Ilns r a wt Japan. with war or Islands Diaoyu the of issue the than its ageing population, a phenomenon that he describes as describes he that phenomenon a population, ageing its gradually implemented, and defined is strategy clear a if represent will debt national its so savings, national its shift from a model based on cheap labour to a knowledge- a to labour cheap on based model a from shift which – years coming the in economy its for landing soft the that out points Wu Islands. Diaoyu the on settlement exhausted completely have will Japan then, by that saying savings of national companies, which have become less and ready weapon useful getting most China’s thinks he – artillery and ships in point no is there that says Wu security. economy”. Thiswilleventually international stage. happen around 2016. He quotes a macroeconomic report macroeconomic a quotes He 2016. around happen to this expects Wu help. financial for China on call to have make anydemandsonthe percent, while GDP was at the same level as it was in 2007. in was it as level same the at was GDP while percent, less internationally competitive. Soon, they will no longer no will they Soon, competitive. internationally less long term. In 2011, debt-to-GDP ratio was greater than 200 o eooi got t cniu, hn wl hv to have will China continue, to growth economic for e be o newie aa’ goig et We the When debt. growing Japan’s underwrite to able be ae, ihtc, ih au-de mdl H sy that says He model. value-added high high-tech, based, The writerisreferringhere to economic research conducted by British , zhuquan shishechipin 定时炸弹 ). China must therefore first ensure a ensure first therefore must China ). ， , yi geshechi de youxizhiyou dingshi zhadan ). 19 ( . At the same time, China’s 经济绝症 oy wl be will Tokyo ejn’ financial Beijing’s sitne China assistance. D wl have will GDP f h U. When US. the of overtaken that il e be to able be will that happens, happens, that s is strong its use forced toask for , ). He proposes a proposes He ). jingji juezheng 主权是奢一个奢

is ).

Zhongguo ziji 敌人过去是、现在是、将来也是中国自己 da dezhanlüe diren guoqushi, xianzai shi, jianglai ye shi Editing: JustineDoody Translation: WordWorks,PeterBrown in the past, present, and future, is itself.” ( itself.” is future, and present, past, the in prospects the about concerned is Wu But neighbour. its for success: he says that “China’s greatest strategic enemy, strategic greatest “China’s that says he success: for eoig ut nte aln eooy f at sa like Asia, East of economy ailing another just becoming ). , 中国最大的战略 Zhongguo zui About the authors: ABOUT ECFR

Martina Bassan is a PhD Candidate at the The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is the first Department of Political Science and International pan-European think-tank. Launched in October 2007, its objective is to conduct research and promote informed debate Relations of Sciences Po, she can be reached at across Europe on the development of coherent, effective and [email protected]. values-based European foreign policy.

Antoine Bondaz is a PhD candidate at Sciences Po ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elements Paris and currently an invited research fellow at that define its activities: Ilmin International Relations Institute (IIRI) in Seoul. He is financed by the General Directorate • A pan-European Council. ECFR has brought together a for Armament (DGA) and the Institute for Higher distinguished Council of over one hundred Members - politicians, National Defence Studies (IHEDN). He can be decision makers, thinkers and business people from the EU’s reached at [email protected]. member states and candidate countries - which meets once a year as a full body. Through geographical and thematic task forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice and feedback François Godement is the director for strategy on policy ideas and help with ECFR’s activities within their own at Asia Centre and a senior research fellow at countries. The Council is chaired by Martti Ahtisaari, the European Council on Foreign Relations, Joschka Fischer and Mabel van Oranje. he can be reached at [email protected]. • A physical presence in the main EU member states. ECFR, uniquely among European think-tanks, has offices in Berlin, Tanguy Le Pesant is Assistant professor at Chungli London, Madrid, Paris, Rome and Sofia. In the future ECFR plans National Central University in Taiwan. He can be to open offices in Warsaw and Brussels. Our offices are platforms reached at [email protected]. for research, debate, advocacy and communications. • A distinctive research and policy development process. ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished researchers and ABOUT ASIA CENTRE practitioners from all over Europe to advance its objectives through innovative projects with a pan-European focus. ECFR’s Asia Centre, founded in August 2005, conducts research and activities include primary research, publication of policy reports, organizes debate on international relations and strategic issues, private meetings and public debates, ‘friends of ECFR’ gatherings as well as on the political and economic transformations in the in EU capitals and outreach to strategic media outlets. Asia-Pacific; promotes cooperation and second track dialogue with partners in Asia, Europe and the world; publishes timely ECFR is backed by the Soros Foundations Network, the Spanish information and analysis from the region, executive briefs and foundation FRIDE reports from our research team. (La Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior), the Bulgarian Communitas Foundation, the Italian Asia Centre programs cover the prevention of conflicts and UniCredit group and the Stiftung Mercator. ECFR works in regional integration, the challenges of democracy and partnership with other organisations but does not make grants governance, globalisation and national strategies, energy, to individuals or institutions. proliferation and sustainable development. They also draw contributions and viewpoints from research associates and a www.ecfr.eu network of research institutions. This issue of China analysis was produced with the support of www.centreasia.eu Stiftung Mercator.

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