THE LADAKH : PUTTING TIBET CENTRE STAGE By Lt Gen Shakti Gurung, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

G219 also known as the East West Highway connects Lhasa to Xingiang through the Karakoram Pass and is the main lifeline for Chinese troops operating in Aksai Chin.

In the western sector in Ladakh, 15 axials emanate from G219 which travel east to west towards the LAC over an 80 km frontage. From Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) G219 is 150 kms and from Demchok it is 50 kms. Its proximity to the border makes it a high value target vulnerable to interdiction from the air and ground that would isolate and choke Chinese troops in Aksai Chin.

Reports are coming in about the de-escalation process having commenced. However, till status quo ante is restored threat of a border skirmish will still loom large.

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Already the Indian armed forces are on high alert. The Indian Army has fully mobilised and as reports go in a “mirror” deployment to the Chinese has moved its formations from peace stations to their assigned operational areas.

The IAF is ready to meet the threat on both fronts, China and Pakistan. Forward airfields have been activated and combat aircraft moved to areas not necessarily in the front but well within the radius of action. Pilots are known to be at “crew room readiness” which implies that they are ready to take to the air in a few minutes after warning. If the situation escalates this state would be enhanced to “runway readiness” where pilots are supposed to be in their cockpits awaiting instructions to be airborne. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has four airfields in Tibet which can influence the situation at Ladakh. These are at Ngari, Shigatse, Lhasa and Nyingchi. Of these Ngari is the closest at 380 kms from DBO and 200 kms from Pangong Tso. The rest are all more than a thousand kilometers away. In comparison the airfields in Xingiang are closer to

DBO with Hotan at 250 kms, Yarkhant at 350 km, and Kashgar at 500 kms. The elevation of the Tibetan airfields permits only J-11 and Su-27 fighter aircraft except for Nyingchi which is closed for combat operations due to weather conditions. In comparison fighter aircraft to include the J-10, JH-7 can be used from all three airfields in Xingiang. However, due to altitude and weather restrictions affecting weapon and fuel loads for the PLAAF operating from the Tibetan plateau and Xingiang, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has an edge over it.

In the Indian Ocean region (IOR) India’s Eastern Naval Command (ENC) is on full alert. Ships have been deployed according to the mission assigned with India’s latest acquisition the P8 (P8I) surveillance aircraft 3

patrolling the seas up to Malacca and even South till Sunda Straits. During the Doklam crisis a few ships of the PLA Navy had entered the IOR but were kept under surveillance.

Much superior to the Orion surveillance aircraft used earlier, the P8I aircraft was inducted into the Indian Navy in 2013 at the same time it was in the US Navy. With a flying time of around twelve hours, a squadron of eight aircraft has been assigned to ENC and are based at INS Rajali at Arkonam fifty kilometres from Chennai.

The Western Naval Command (WNC) too is on full alert. India’s lone aircraft carrier is still at its permanent location. However, if required it would take a maximum of 48 hours to move into the area of ENC and roughly fourteen more hours to deploy.

With India’s armed forces fully geared to meet any challenges from across the border, posturing of forces is complete.

In the South China Sea three US Carrier Groups are reported to have moved in – USS Ronald Reagan, USS Nimitz and USS Roosevelt. Each carrier group has 75 combat aircraft like Super Hornets and F18 and eight to ten ships accompanying it. In the East China Sea a similar deployment of Japan’s Navy has reportedly taken place.

In its bid to distract attention from allegations of being the initiator for spreading the corona virus, China appears to be going on an overdrive. With the situation in Hong Kong and Taiwan adding to its list of miseries, is the possibility of the QUAD comprising the USA, Japan, Australia and India getting a boost challenging Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region. 4

Xi Jingping, the man in charge and in deep trouble at the same time, feels it is time for China to hit back. However, never did Xi in his wildest dreams imagine that a country like India could strike back word for word and take on an aggressive stance.

China is aware that it would be in troubled waters if India carries out similar actions in Gilgit-Baltistan jeopardising the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). As these areas are in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) which is disputed like Aksai Chin, China will have no right to interfere in case an Indian thrust develops towards that area.

China is boxed in from all sides and is most vulnerable at the moment. The time is now ripe for India not to back down and to call China’s bluff. If push comes to shove, and de-escalation does not happen as it is supposed to, a hard knock on the dragon’s head needs to be delivered. For the military option to be successful India must go all out and leave no stone unturned to avenge the defeat of 1962.

Chinese expansionist designs will not stop at Ladakh and could even extend to the remaining four fingers of Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Nepal, and Bhutan. It is therefore important that in the mid and long term India’s foreign policy needs to have a relook at Tibet.

Tibet as the Roof of the World is the source of all major rivers flowing in the subcontinent. As the next war is likely to be over resources, it is imperative that a well thought out policy be formulated for resettling the displaced Tibetans in their homeland. Already there are talks of the waters of Brahmaputra being diverted by China. India needs to remember that there will never be peace along its borders with China so long as the Tibet issue remains unresolved. 5

India-China relations on Tibet are bound by the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement signed on 29 April in Beijing which had a lease period of eight years. The agreement talks among other things of peaceful co-existence between the two.

Formally recognising Tibet as being part of China, India reversed its earlier stand of it being a sovereign and independent country. This recognition was demolished by the militarisation of the Tibetan plateau by the Chinese in the very first decade of the agreement. The India-China War of 1962 effectively announced the expiry of the 1954 Agreement on Tibet.

Within four years of the Agreement China opened its first nuclear facility in 1958 in the area of Amdo now known as Quinghai. In 1964 two years after the 1962 War, China carried out its first nuclear explosion once again in Tibet sending a strong message to a weak and defeated India as well as to the two other nuclear powers the USA and Soviet Union.

Militarisation and nuclearisation of the Tibetan plateau changed the status of Tibet from being a peaceful buffer state. China’s “military” borders now extend up to the Himalayas engulfing the whole of Tibet covering the complete border from the west to the east with India. In June 1954, exactly three months after the Panchsheel Agreement was signed, China made its first intrusion in the Barahoti area conveying its expansionist designs.

While signing the agreement had India stuck to its position on the boundary recognised with Tibet, this sensitive issue would have been resolved once and for all. But it was not done. In the Simla Agreement of 1914 Tibet had accepted the Macmohan Line in the eastern sector as the boundary. As a 6

result India has been in possession of Arunachal Pradesh then known as North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) ever since.

Following the 1962 war China withdrew from the eastern sector but held on to areas in the west which it currently controls. China’s offer to swap Aksai Chin with Arunachal Pradesh has been rightly rejected as both these areas did not belong to it in the first place.

In 1961 the UN General Assembly had passed a resolution for self determination in Tibet which India could have used to its advantage if it wished to. However, this did not happen.

China is known to violate treaties and agreements it is a party to. The 1951 China-Tibet Treaty and the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement are two examples. Therefore India needs to be very careful of the agreements reached on peace and tranquillity along the borders in 1993, 1996 and 2005.

China uses peace to buy time while preparing a strategy for war. It will claim areas which are disputed or where even the slightest doubt exists. These are then taken control of through the use of force. Known as “salami slicing” this is what has happened in Eastern Ladakh.

A war with China on the Tibetan plateau will inevitably involve the people there as well. The Dalai Lama who is revered as the spiritual Head of the Tibetan people has proposed the “Middle Way” Approach in resolving the issue.

The “Middle Way” asks for genuine autonomy for the Tibetans in their traditional provinces of U Tsang, Kham and Amdo within the framework of 7

the Chinese constitution. This is aimed at protection and preservation of Tibetan culture, religion and national identity.

Tibetans in India are considered as refugees with their government at Dharmshala in exile. However, the Dalai Lama insists that Tibetans are not refugees but the Tsenjolwa - the people who were forced to flee and who never fled on their own. The Tibetan government is run by their Prime Minister and Council of Ministers known as the Kashag.

India is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol which lays down the rules and procedures to be followed by host countries while dealing with refugees. India has accepted Tibetans as refugees on political considerations and hence displays a lukewarm attitude towards them. Tibetans have been issued with a yellow identity card which certifies them as refugees and are legally not qualified for an Indian passport.

In changing its policy on Tibet, India has to convey firmness in resolve and determination to convert Tibet into a zone of peace once again, and revert the border to its earlier peaceful status. The following are proffered:-

(a) All talks with China hereafter must be centred around the core issue of Tibet. Once resolved, peace would prevail along the borders. Tibet has never been given its importance by India till the recent intrusions in Eastern Ladakh.

(b) India must recognise the Dalai Lama as being the temporal and spiritual Head of Tibet. What the Dalai Lama says and does is gospel for the Tibetans. He is also a world figure and a Nobel laureate. His standing in world peace is tremendous and India must give him its full 8

support. In doing so India must recognise the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) as a sovereign government like the US has tacitly done. The Prime Minister of the CTA must be invited for all official functions of the Indian government.

(c) India must recognise the Tibetans as the Dalai Lama describes them – the Tsenjolwa, the people who were forced to flee. This would remove the tag of refugee and perhaps change India’s mindset. A parallel can be drawn with India’s endeavour to push back the displaced Kashmiri Pundits to J&K.

(d) India must consider the new US policy on Tibet passed by the House of Representatives on 28 January 2020. The “Tibetan Policy and Support Act 2019” modified the earlier “Tibetan Policy Act of 2002” on how to deal with the Tibetan cause. This in itself will warrant a study on how to apply it to the Indian context. Suffice to say that the Act preaches on how to face a bullying China.

(e) The Indian Parliament must pass a resolution in the selection and upbringing of the 15th Dalai Lama. China has stated that it will choose the next Dalai Lama as it did for the Panchen Lama and the Karma Pa. India must make it clear that Buddhism is a major religion followed in India and the Dalai Lama has to selected by the Buddhist Faith. India being a secular country where Buddhism is practiced by a wide section, it becomes imperative to support the correct procedure. This will make India’s stand more firm on the issue and give Tibet the support it is looking for.

(f) The latest US Act of 2019 calls on China to hold talks without pre-conditions with Tibetan leaders for grant of autonomy. India too 9

needs to stress on the need for Tibetan autonomy within the framework of the Chinese constitution.

(g) India must endeavour to reopen its consulates in Lhasa and Yadong (Yatung) in Tibet. While Lhasa was the capital of Tibet before annexation, Yadong is on the old trade route and falls on the Kailash- Mansarovar road via Nathula. Nepal is the only country that has a consulate at Lhasa. Both Indian consulates had closed following the 1962 War. This will enable India to get a first hand view of the happenings in Tibet and to speed up talks between China and Tibetan leaders.

Once autonomy as sought by the Tibetans is granted by China a resurgence of the Tibetan pride and spirit is likely to take place that could change the overall geo-political landscape in the region. India would stand to gain tremendously as it would remove the Chinese threat from its borders permanently bringing back the earlier status of a peaceful India-Tibet border.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of CENJOWS.