South Korea's Information Revolution 1997-2007 A

THE MAKING OF A CYBORG SOCIETY:

SOUTH KOREA'S INFORMATION REVOLUTION 1997-2007

A THESIS SUBMITIED TO THE GRADUATE DMSION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

IN

mSTORY

MAY 2008

By Jonathan Clemens

Thesis Committee:

Theodore Y00, Chairperson Mark McNally ShanaBrown We certify that we have read this thesis and that, in om opinion, it is satisfactory in scope and quality as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

THESIS COMMITTEE ~~)fI1O

ii Table of Contents Timeline ...... iv Entering into a digital age...... 1 Introduction ...... •...... 3 Methodology ...... 6 Historiography ...... 9 Source Base ...... 11 Summary ...... 12 Chapter One: The Information Revolution ...... 15 Conceptualizing the Information Age ...... 15 Chapter Two: Crisis and Reformation ...... 30 A Brief History of the IMF Crisis ...... •.....•...... 30 Collapse and Opportunity ...... •...... 38 Focusing on Becoming First in the Information Age ...... 43 The Creation of a Digital Society ...... 48 Chapter Three: The Transformation of South Korean Society ...... 56 •A Society as Online as it is OfIline ...... 56 The Dark Side of South Korean Internet ...... 71 Citizen Cybetjournalism: A Micro-history •...... •85 Chapter Four: The Impact of Digital Society on South Korean Politics ...... 98 President Roh Moo-Hyun and Politics in the Information Age ...... •98 Cyberactivism ...... 106 The Growing South Korean e-Govemment ...... 114 Spaces oflntemational Contestation ...... 121 Conclusion ...... 131 Bibliography ...... 136

iii Timeline of Events

1910 - Korea is officially annexed by Japan and enters into a period of colonial rule. In the years to come many Koreans, particularly government officials, blame the country's failure to maintain independence on its "late" arrival to the Industrial Age. 1945 - Colonial rule by Japan ends. United States enters the country and establishes an American-run military government. 1948 - Formal establishment of the South Korean nation. The United States relinquishes government control and withdraws from the area. 1950 - The Korean War begins. 1953 - The Korean War ends with an armistice, leaving North and South Korea at war with each other but not actively pursuing hostilities in the decades to come. Mass destruction of manpower, resources, and infrastructure during the conflict leaves South Korea destitute. In the aftermath of the war the United States establishes a large military presence in the area that has continued to the present day. 1961 - A period of military dictatorship begins when Park Chung-Hee seizes control of the government. 1962 - South Korea embarks upon a series of plans aimed at turning the country into a major industrial nation. These plans are largely successful and South Korea undergoes a major economic rise. 1987 - Massive student demonstrations finally culminate in the beginning of the Democratic Era of South Korean politics. 1993 - End of military rule. 1994 - Ministry of Information and Communication founded. - Plan for Korea Information Infrastructure aimed at building a oational broadband infrastructure established. 1995 - Framework Act on Infonnativrtion Promotion. 1997 - Asian Financial Crisis hits South Korea. The won undergoes a major devaluation, many major businesses collapse, unemployment mtes skyrocket, and the government is forced to intervene to keep a number of banking institutions from going out of business. 1998 - South Korea accepts an economic bailout package from the Interoational Monetary Fund (lMF). As a condition of the loan, South Korea is forced to enact a series of economic reforms. Massive changes to the country's economic structure take place in the following years. - South Korean government and business increasingly look towards digital technologies as a means to create future prosperity. - Popularity of digital technologies in South Korea rises dramatically. A pronounced Information Age culture begins to form. A large number of online communities pop in South Korean cyberspace.

iv 1999 - Cyber Korea 21 (The Second Master Plan of Infonnatization Promotion). - Digital technologies begin to become a focus of South Korean nationalism. - Major increase in entlepxeneurship involving digital technologies. - Cyworld created in cyberspace, attracting large numbers of South Korean netizens. - Nosamo forms in cyberspace and begins online efforts to support politician Roh Moo-Hyun. - The number of mobile phone subscribers in South Korea surpasses the number of fixed line subscribers. 2000 - Master Plan to Promote e-Commerce established. - e-Document standard applied to all government agencies. - OhmyNews is created in cyberspace and begins to cause a shift in knowledge production standards within the country. - Government begins major initiatives to increase the presence of South Korean businesses online. 2001 - South Korea pays off its debt to the IMP ahead of schedule. Much of its economic recovery is attributed to digital technologies. 2002 - e-Korea Vision 2006 (The Third Master Plan of Infonnatization Promotion). - Center for Internet Addiction Prevention and Counseling founded over growing concerns regarding the social problem of online addiction. - Roh Moo-Hyun's successful presidential election is attributed to his support among online communities. 2003 - Roh Moo-Hyun assumes South Korean presidency. - Road Map for e-Government established, marking the beginning of a major government commitlnent towards moving politics into digital space. - Broadband IT KOREA VISION 2007 (Revision of the Third Master Plan ofinfonnatization Promotion). - Foreign corporations increasingly use South Korea as a testing ground for digital technologies due to the country's high level of digital culture. 2004 - Number of South Korean internet users exceeds 30 million. - m89 Strategy established. - New anti-prostitution laws cause sex workers to begin widespread operation in digital space. 2005 - Several major instances of cyberviolence cause concern within the society. - South Korean government launches interactive digital ombudsman service 2006 - u-KOREA Master Plan for the promotion of ubiquitous digital technologies established. - e-Commerce transactions in South Korea exceed $430 million.

v 2007 - Real-Name System goes into effect on major South Korean message boards. - The Starcraft Pro-League Finals in Busan draws a crowd of70,OOO. - Samsung exceeds $100 billion in sales worldwide. - Lee Myung-Bok elected president of South Korea.

vi Entering into a Digital Age...

At 3 p.m. of December 19 2002, South Korean presidential hopeful Roh

Moo-Hyun was behind in the exit polls. It wasn't much of surprise, as Roh was not expected to win. His liberal politics had drawn huge amounts of criticism from the traditionally conservative South Korean news media and he had few financial backers among the country's business elite. His primary opponent Lee

Hoi-Chang, the candidate of the Grand National Party, was a former Prime

Minister and Supreme Court judge. Roh's credentials as a former National

Assembly member and Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries were less impressive. Even worse, Roh's election partner Chung Mong-Joon, another presidential candidate with whom he had entered into a coalition in order to draw more conservative votes, suddenly withdrew his endorsement on the night before the election. Many onlookers saw this as the death knell for Roh's already dark horse campaign.

They were wrong. Roh had one thing that Lee did not: widespread support amongst South Korea's internet communities. Roh had campaigned extensively online and had garnered major backing from internet users in their 20s and 30s. In a country increasingly active within and focused upon digital technologies this formed a significant percentage of the population. During the Roh campaign traffic to the website of his political fan club averaged roughly 300,000 visitors per day.l On Election Day that number more than doubled to 860,855.2 As word

I I'm referring to Nosamo. which I discuss in detail in chapter four. z '16th Presidential Election' in the Chosun Jlbo. as referenced by Ham Noriko and Jo Youngmin. 'IntemetPolitics: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and South Korea Presidential Campaigns.'

1 spread that Roh was in danger of losing supporters sprang into action using a newly discovered set of political tools. A massive campaign oflast-minute e- mails, cellphone calls, text messages, and web portal posts took place in the fina\ hours of the election. Voters responded and the tide turned. By the end of the day

Roh bad received 48.96% of the vote, beating out Lee's 46.54%.3 As early as the next day, South Korean media ran stories in which experts attributed the election results to online activism and the increasing level of digital culture within the country.4 The people of South Korea bad elected the world's first internet president, leaving both the country and the world asking how such a revolutionary historical moment came to pass ...

First Monday, Volume 12, No.9, September 2007. htto:llwww.uic.edulhtbinlcgiwrapibinlojslindex.php/finlarticlelviewI2005/1880 , Choi Byung-Mook. 'Rob Wins Presidential Election,' in the Chosun I1bo, December 19,2002. bttp:llenglisb.chosun.comlw21datalhtmllnewsl2002 1212002121900 16.html 4 Jin Seong-Ho. 'New Generation Powers Rob to Victory,' in tbe Chosun I1bo, December 20. 2002. http://english.chosun.comlw21datalhtmVnewsl2002121200212200007.html

2 Introduction

This study is an examination of South Korea's history in the Information

Age. As the world's most consciously digital society, the Republic of Korea

(hereafter referred to as the ROK) is a particularly remarkable subject when studying the effects of the Infonnation Revolution. This work analyzes both the circumstances behind the country's emergence as one of the world's leading digital societies and the changes caused therein through the mass adoption of revolutionary technologies. In particular, it focuses on the rea1ms of economics, culture and politics within the ROK from 1997, at the onset of the financial crisis that jump-started South Korea's digital progress, to 2007, the final year of the

Roh presidency. In doing so it attempts to elucidate the profound impact of

Information Age innovations through a historical lens. The following pages will illustrate how the implementation of digital technologies in South Korea has drastically changed the society through the negotiation and appropriation of newly enabled spaces by different elements within it.

That digital technologies have the ability to cause such change should not be surprising. Technology has always had the potential to cause events and/or circumstances of historical significance, as is illustrated by everything from the wheel to space flight. Even so, digital technologies have proven to be a particularly and surprisingly powerful force. It is important to see just how much these innovations define our own reality in order to understand the often subtle power of the Information Revolution. The very introduction of digital technologies into a society changes the definition of the user's reality. The word

3 'netizen,' an English term first coined in 1992 by internet studies pioneer Michael

Hauben which has found frequent use in South Korea, describes' ... people who create a new network culture by forming social relationships and communities in cyberspace,' therefore expanding their realm of experience into virtual worlds.5

Anyone who carries a cellphone, exchanges e-mails, or looks up information online can see in both their own actions and the world around them that reality is radically different today than it was twenty or even ten years ago. This is especially true of the past decade in South Korea in which a meteoric rise in the ability to access technology has taken place, as shown by the jump in internet users from 1.63 million in 1997 to greater than 34.12 million as of December

2006. 6 Some of these changes, like the ones above, seem simple enough, mere appropriations of technology for the sake of personal convenience. When we look a little closer, however, we see that their uses hold complex meanings. A cellphone is, for example, not just a cordless telephone with long range capabilities. It is a means of omnipresent connectivity, allowing communal groups to better transcend spatial locations and maximize time together. It is a means of resistance against the social order, personified by such diverse individuals as the

South Korean high school student text messaging friends during class and the

WTO (World Trade Organization) protester in Seattle coordinating efforts and

• Chang Woo-Young and Lee Won-Tae. 'Cyberactivism and Political Empowerment in Civil Society: A Comparative Analysis of Korean Cases.' Korea Joumal, Vol. 46, No.4, Winter 2006, p. 143. 6 See both: Ahn Jongho, Kim Beomsoo, and Dh Sangjo. 'Adoption of Broadband Internet in Korea: The Role of Experience in Building Attitudes' in Journal of Information Technology, Vol. 18 No.4, December 2003, p. 269, and The National1nformation Society Agency. 'lnformatization White Paper 2007," p. 40.

4 evading riot police through cellphone communications.7 It is also a means of social control, as corporations utilize the service as a propaganda ground for increased consumerism and government organizations continually monitor transmissions for possible threats to the state. It is a means of increased productivity in business, a means of reconfiguring and relocating experience through use as a mobile entertainment tool, and, in the case of recent 30 camera phones, an observing digital eye. Even in the most common of contexts, the potential of digital technologies should not be taken for granted. Nor should their historical significance be overlooked, as their pervasive potentiality has remarkable power to enable circumstances of mass social change.

In particular this study examines both the historical conditions behind such changes and the potential of these revolutionary innovations to enable negotiations within South Korean society. The very introduction of any powerful technology sparks debate as old models are replaced by new ones in business. community and everyday life, as this paper illustrates in the South Korean context. Not only is there a negotiation as to which technologies are to be adopted or abandoned, but also one between old and new regarding their place, usage and definitions. Digital technologies, however, have an added power in that they create new spaces online for use by the public. Experience, identity and community have therein become considerably more malleable and negotiable, allowing for an ever-increasing multiplicity of social potentials. Within this network of exchange there also exists an increased possibility for political

7 de Armond, Paul. 'Netwar in the Emerald City: WTO Protest Strategy and Tactics,' in Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David ed. Networks and Netwars: the Future ofTerror, Crime, and Militancy. (Santa Monica: Rand, 200 1), p. 2 I O.

5 community. Many voices of dissent that have, for various reasons, had difficulty being heard within the confines of real-world South Korean society have moved into digital space and used it to challenge existing structures. At the same time, many dominant powers have moved into cyberspace to encourage public mobilization and/or increase their social control. Therein knowledge production has become a rea1m of negotiation and contestation, creating many furcations of reality and truth. Though digital technologies clearly change the world the directions that these changes take are multiple both on the macro level of politics and the micro level of personal practice. This phenomenon where new spaces are created and negotiated by both large groups and individuals within the society highly informs this study.

Methodology

Though the idea of social negotiation and change is hardly new in regards to the Information Revolution, this work remains unique in its historical approach to the subject. Methodologically, this study provides a more historical perspective by drawing on an event-based narrative structure that is largely lacking in

Information Age examinations from such fields as sociology, anthropology, political science, and business. Therein it situates technological change within a greater timeline of South Korea's post-IMF transformation, enriching the field with another important layer of analysis. It does this while maintaining a level of complexity that is often lacking within the works of other disciplines, most of which fall into either utopian or dystopian camps (the Information Age is

6 continually situated within these as either the end of the world or the beginning, depending on the preference of the writer}. At the same time it answers the call of

William H. Sewell Jr. and draws heavily upon non-historical studies to breathe life into and humanize the subject matter through a cultural focus in which everyday experience is central. 8 In total, this methodology serves the ultimate aim of providing a previously unseen socio-historical account of the Information

Revolution.

In attempting to create such a history three methodological issues have arisen that should be addressed. First, many of the materials used to research this work outside of the field of history were found to be either teleological, highly essentializing, or both. This study does not seek to emulate these characteristics. It is important to understand that while change is inevitable with the introduction of revolutionary technology, the cultural response to that change is far less

9 universal. This work utilizes a great deal of internet theory that can, at least conceptually, be applied cross-culturally on a genera1leve1. 10 However, as we approach South Korea in specific we must keep in mind that the Information Age does not create identical societies (at least, not yet) any more than the Industrial

8 Sewell, William H. Jr. Logics o/History: Social Theory and Social Traniformation. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). • In relating South Korea to other nations and cultures in comparison within this work it should be noted that each instance is an examination one part of a greater mosaic, and that conclusions of overall sameness between cultures should not be inferred. Likewise, though such terms as 'South Korea' and 'South Koreans' are used in an un-probll!Dlati700 manner this is only because it is beyond the scope of this study to complicate them. Though for the sake of lucidity generali2ations bave sometimes been applied within this work these should not be taken as overriding fiIcts that are mindless of a complex socia1 reality. 10 Specific internet theorists are 1isted below under the historiography section.

7 Age did. 11 Dissent and difference exists in all but the most micro of contexts and definitions are always more multiple than they seem at first glance, as the greater construction of this work hopes to illustrate.

Second, this study will provide both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of South Korea's Information Revolution. In particular, it will utilize what Ian

Hacking calls an 'avalanche of numbers' to inform its points with statistics taken from a variety of sources. However, it does so while being mindful that these numbers should not be viewed as absolutes, especially considering that they vary to some degree from source to source. Despite this they remain extremely useful in conceptualizing the dimensions of the greater argument when viewed from the standpoint of knowledge formation. Though the statistics presented are hopefully representative of their corresponding realities, it is more important to perceive them as epistemological constructs that inform culture; both its views and its character. While it is interesting to cite that 63% of South Koreans make day-to- day payments via their digital cell-phones, the story behind the number is that the majority of Koreans are therein culturally imagined to carry cell-phones, be technologically savvy, and stand on the cutting edge of digital innovation, three characteristics that lend weight to the claim that the country is in the vanguard of the greater Information Revolution. 12

11 Both movements introduced common technological elements to cultures but, as Dipesh Chakrabarty points out, the ways in which different cultures negotiate those technologies are often unique and reflective of differing world views. 12 Ahonen, Tomi T. and O'Reilly, Jim. Digital Korea: Convergence ofBroadband Internet, 3G Cell Phones, Mult/player gaming. DIg/tal Tv. Virtual Reality, Electronic Cash, Telematles, Robotles, E-Government and the Intelligent Home. (London: Futuretext, 2007), p. 4.

8 Finally, this project will examine the potentialities of digital technologies

IUld their relationship with human beings. It should be conceded within this context that while the attempt was made to avoid moralizations of digital technologies as either utopilUl or dystopilUl in the end it remains true to the historical narrative theories of Hayden White IUld has been unable to avoid them completely.13 This study has tried to give the inherent complexity of the

Information Revolution its due while navigating through a highly polarized discourse, but it =ot claim perfection in the endeavor. Even so, it has attempted to show that because technologies are integrated into the societies we live in they hold the same infinite set of possibilities, both good IUld bad.

Historiography

Though this study represents the first work on the Information Revolution within the discipline of history, there have been a number of authors who have given fleeting IUld fragmentary historical accounts of digital chllIlge. In the field of sociology, Michael Hauben beglUl investigating the social history of the internet in the early 1990s, before the subject even existed as we know it today.

Since then internet theorists such as Jenny Preece IUld Lisa Nakamura, in pursuing

13 Ultimately this attempt for subjectivity (at least in so much as is possible) was impeded in two ways. Firstly, as comes through clearly in this work, the evidence of the potentiality of digital technologies to increase human possibilities on multiple levels has utopian implications. That is not to say that humanity is necessarily bettered by the Information Revolution, only that the societies involved in it could be bettered. The ways in which digital technologies are used are always gray to some degree or another, but that they have a tendency to increase personal freedoms paints them as more light than dark. Secondly, the state of the field of digital studies tends to be divided into utopian and dystopian camps. This is a reflection of the ambiguous nature of the digital medium: it serves simultaneously as a space of control by the state and a space of dissent, a space of democracy and tyranny, ofnormaIcy and deviancy, of revolutionary imaginations and reinforced traditions. Anyone of these can be prioritized into a narrative if one takes the right angle of approach and applies it to the right cultural context.

9 an analysis of the greater social phenomenon of informatization, have consistently fortified their writings by citing historical circumstances. The sociological study of Japanese cellphone usage put forth by Ito Mizuko, Okabe Daisuke, and

Matsuda Misa also applies a great deal of historical analysis to inform its conclusions. Though writing from the perspective ofjournalism, Dan Gillmor has effectively chronicled a history of the Information Revolution's effect on media, while legal studies professor Cass Sunstein provides some historical information in his writings of the effect of digital technologies on law and politics. Even specifically in regards to South Korea there have been some few books produced that have given an account of digital change. In English, Tomi T. Ahonen and Jim

O'Reilly have been especially thorough in that regard, but a number of essays by scholars studying the Asian Financial Crisis and its aftermath have also touched upon the issue. However, nearly all of these studies come from the fields of either business or economics. The scholarship in South Korea tends to follow the same lines, though studies in non-historical fields (especially sociology) are also present. 14 Clearly then we can see in all of the above that a complete historical picture of the Information Revolution, whether genera1ly speaking or specifically in regards to the ROK, is lacking. This work is thus situated in the context of not only compiling and providing new historical information, but also in bringing together various fractional accounts of the history of digital technologies into a coherent whole, thereby filling in a major lacuna in Information Age scholarship.

14 Examples include: Chue Bae-Gun. Rewriting Economics in a DIgital Age: From a Historical­ Naliona/ Perspective. (Seoul: Hanul. 2002), and: Kang Nam-Jun and Un Sok-Min. Communication, Media and Cultural PraCllces In the Digital Era. (Seoul: Seoul University Press,2005).

10 AIl a history of technology, there are also several works within the fields of history and philosophy that inform the position of this work in its relationship to the academic field. Conceptually, Michel Foucault provided much of the foundation for a history of technology by featuring past innovations prominently within his theories of power and governance. Jurgen Habermas also has provided theories of technological change relevant to the field in his examinations of both the public sphere and the production of human knowledge. On a more specific level, such works as Wolfgang Schivelbusch's study of railroads and Andrew

Barry's essay on the implementation of telegraph communications provide two examples of a subfield of history that examines how specific technological implementations in the Industrial Revolution changed the manner in which societies operated. This work seeks to expand that scholarship into the

Information Revolution, resituating the vast library of works produced on the

Industrial Revolution into a more general and inclusive history of technology in which innovation, both contemporary and ancient, can be explored. It essence it seeks to expand the consciousness of the field. Though the Information

Revolution will no doubt be a prominent subject of historical study in the future it has thus far been ignored by the discipline, leaving the unique perspectives that historical scholarship provides absent from the academic discourse. This study hopes to enrich the field by rectifying this omission.

Source Base

11 In pursuing a discursive analysis of South Korea's Information Revolution within this work it has been necessary to utilize a wide range of sources. Being a project that examines the digital revolution, many of them were mined from websites and other unconventional places. The majority were, out of necessity, taken from new reports due to a genera1lack of academic materials regarding the

Information Revolution in South Korea specifically. The majority of the primary sources were drawn from the Chosun Dbo, the ROK's most circulated newspaper.

The rest come from assorted South Korean, American, and British news sources as well as numerous ROK government documents. Additional lines of research included academic books and articles from a variety of disciplines, most of which were secondary sources. Many of these materials were accessed online, something that is traditionally taboo for a scholarly article. However, the online versions of newspapers, books, studies, scholarly journa1s and other credible publications are different from materials in a library only in their mode of presentation. If anything, this work should show that previous academic definitions regarding sources of knowledge should be and are rapidly deteriorating in the Information

Age. With the rise of e-government, e-business, and cybeIjourna1ism comes an expansion of academic space into the digital frontier (e-scholarship, perhaps?).

This study makes the argument through its use of sources that, when properly utilized, online materials are conducive to academic research.

Summary

12 This study will examine the changes within South Korean society caused by the Information Revolution. Part one, 'the Information Revolution,' explores ways to approach and conceptualize the Information Age on a general level. It introduces a number of theories of digital technologies and also applies pre­ existing theories to the greater subject matter in an attempt to place the chapters on South Korea that follow into a more nuanced context. Part two, 'Crisis and

Reformation,' moves on to examine the development of the Information Age within the ROK. It begins with a look at the destructive effects of the 1997 Asian

Financial Crisis on South Korea's industrial economic standard. It continues to show how the economy shifted towards an information standard following the crisis and how that move was aided in large part by government efforts. It then looks at the ways in which the South Korean populace has been mobilized to create an Information Age society conducive to a knowledge-based economy. Part three. 'the Transformation of South Korean Society in the Information Age.' expands upon this idea of digital society by focusing on culture. It first establishes that South Korean society has thoroughly embraced digital technologies and then shows how that advocacy facilitated the creation and negotiation of new spaces of experience and identity. It then indicates the ways in which these spaces have been used for deviant ends. resulting in Information Age social problems. The study moves on to provide a micro-history of 'OhmyNews,' an internet site for citizen cyberjoumaIism. to illustrate a cuituraI shift in South Korean knowledge production. The finaI section, 'the Impact of Digital Society on South Korean

Politics.' explores the political changes caused by digital technologies in the

13 ROK. It first analyzes the ways in which the Information Revolution has changed the manner in which politics operates and then moves on to the subject of cyberactivism within the country. It continues with a look at South Korea's efforts in e-government and ends with an examination of the internet as a site of international political contestation. The work concludes with a brief transnational contextualization of South Korea's digital experience and a short comparison of

South Korea's Information Age experience to that of the rest of the world.

14 Chapter One: The Information Revolution

Though such broad historical movements as the Industrial Revolution have been widely explored, the Information Revolution remains largely obscure as a subject What is it? What does it mean? How do we define it? How do we approach it? These questions can be difficult to answer because the Infonnation

Revolution is still taking place and thusly unsettled. They are especially hard to tackle from the standpoint of history, which is traditionally founded upon distant hindsight. It is, however, crucial that some attempt is made to answer them, not only because they are vital to this study but also because they involve a movement that has affected billions of people worldwide. Before continuing on to focus narrowly on South Korea this section is used to investigate the Information

Revolution on a conceptual level, paying special attention to the breadth and , depth of the changes wrought by digital technologies.

Conceptualizing the Information Age

The times are changed and we with them. - Latin proverb

Let us first examine digital technologies in their relation to the most fundamental building blocks ofrea1ity: the ideas of time and space. The research of Wolfgang Schivelbusch regarding the cultural effects of the railroad during the

Industrial Revolution are particularly useful in conceptualizing the changes to time and space caused by the introduction of radical technologies into a society.

Just as the railroad altered the conception of time in the Industrial Revolution by shrinking previously spatially remote locations into an intimate mechanical

15 network easily accessed by the general population, so have digital technologies altered time conceptions in the Information Revolution. ls Rather than achieving this through physical connection, however, digital technologies have provided a more abstract alteration by integrating Information Age netizens into the ever- moving flow of communication and information. Ubiquitous connection to this network changes the ways in which time is perceived by increasing the speed of knowledge to levels previously unthinkable. Two decades ago finding driving directions from Pier 39 in San Francisco to Time's Square in New York would, practically speaking. require the obtainment of multiple detailed maps, the analysis of possible roads in order to find the quickest path, and extensive study of the chosen route. Today that same planning takes less than two minutes on maps. Yahoo.com, which automatically finds the shortest route through a function of miles traveled and the posted speed limit on each road, provides detailed directions for every required turn, allows for printing of said directions for easy reference. and even estimates the time of travel to be forty-two hours and eleven minutes. Though the service is far from perfect due to limitations in its ability to keep up with road changes or properly calculate travel time given unpredictable variables such as actual speed of traffic, it nonetheless provides informationJast. its quality notwithstanding. Additional examples of increased speed of information gathering exist all around us. Everything from local television schedules to advanced academic research is now readily obtainable through any internetworked device. Because of the introduction of this available and

.. Schivelbusch. Wolfgang. The Railway Journey: The Indusf1'lallzation of Time and Space In the 19th Century. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), p. 33-44.

16 accessible information network a digital society holds an expectation that one is able to quickly and conveniently procure knowledge. Whereas the railway system of the Industrial Revolution increased the speed of travel and altered human perceptions of spatial time, digital technologies have increased the speed of knowledge and altered perceptions of cognitive time. In the digital world understanding is always only a well phrased web-search away.

Digital technologies simultaneously expand space by breaking the spatial limitations of the work place. The number of 'techno-commuters,' people who work primarily out of their homes using internet technologies, is rising on a world scale. Roughly 40% of the companies in Germany, Sweden, and Denmark have employees who work out of their homes via the intemet. 16 More importantly in considering the effect of digital technologies on spatial conceptions is that many modem day workers enjoy continual employment on a transnational scale. A globa1ization of workforce is gradually taking place among Information Age societies therein which breaks spatial barriers. For example, the Russian aerospace industry information service Concise Aerospace operates from an island off the coast of Scotland. It provides reports for such diverse clients as the

CIA and Boeing in America, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Rolls-Royce and Ministry of Defense in the United Kingdom, and Aeroflot in Russia, all through a server based in Oregon. 17 While a number of the spatia1limitations of physical and agricultura1labor were broken long ago by innovations to transportation, digital innovations to communication have expanded the

16 Bolger, Andrew. 'Broadband Spurs 'TecbncK:ommuters' Rise,' in the Financial Times, September 2, 2007. http://www.ft.com/cmslslO/Sd4eS99e-S989-ll dc-aef5-OOOO779fd2ac.htm1 17 Ibid.

17 boundaries of intellectual labor. The internet thusly serves as the railroad did in the Industrial Revolution to increase spaces of industry. The workforce, once limited to urban centers and then expanded to suburban areas by the aVailability of transportation, is now drawn from a nearly global pool in the Information Age.

Digital technologies also change conceptions of space by shrinking the boundaries of community. The massive online multiplayer role-playing game

'World ofWarcraft,' for example, brings players together not just from allover the United States and English speaking world but also from South Korea, China,

Japan and the majority of Europe. Communities within various imaginary game worlds are commonly formed without limitation or regard to the traditional boundaries of borders, politics and spatialloca1ity. This type of trans-spatial and transnational experience is far from uncommon among netizens. Through digital messaging programs and various internet voice technologies it has become simple to form digital relationships with or without face to face communication and extend spaces of community beyond physical spatial limitations. Every aspect of a relationship is easily accessible through the digital medium other than physical contact, and even that limitation can be representationa11y overcome with the use of avatars, defined as personalized digital self-representations via graphical imagery. The Information Revolution has broken all corporeal constraints on community, minus the limitation of a common language, by funneling geographically diverse peoples into a network of potential connective exchange.

Having established the Information Revolution's ability to alter both space and time, let us inquire further into this connection between digital technologies

18 and community. We have already touched upon the ability of digital technologies to change relationships by providing potential for ubiquitous community membership divorced from physical space. This connective power is not limited to the digital sphere but extends into face to face relationships, changing the ways in which communities function. Young people living within the communications networks of Information Age societies have been described as 'Generation-C,' or the Community Generation, a term that does a fine job of describing the changes to social space caused by digital technologies. ls It was not very long ago when the landline telephone offered the only method of transcending the physical limitations of community. Now, however, digital technologies promote many forms of non-physical interaction within a chosen group. The personal and portable nature of modern ceIIphones ensures continual connectivity to social networks, while instant messenger programs, message boards, and spaces of digital experience such as online video games all offer alternative mediums for interaction. 19 These make possible the creation of a digital society, meaning a community of individuals connected to each other not only through traditional physical associations but also through an imagined space, facilitated by computer technology, in which people may interact directly or indirectly via non-physical medium.

This continual connectivity regardless of physical limitations causes an expansion of social spheres and an overlap of communal spaces. For example, the

18 Ahonen, Tomi T. and Moore, Alan. Communities Dominate Brands: Business and Marketing Challenges/or the 21" Cemwy. (London: Futuretext, 2005), p. 135. I. Ito Mizuko, Okabe Daisuke, and Matsuda Misa ed. Personal. Portable. Pedestrian: Mobile Phones in Japanese Life. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), p. 10.

19 social sphere of the home can interject itself upon various other community situations. Children once spatially disconnected from their family upon leaving the house now often carry a parental umbilical cord with them in the form of a cellphone, something that, ironically given its use as a controlling apparatus, leads to later curfews and increased freedoms. 20 That same piece of technology that is being conceptually applied as a means of control can be re-appropriated by the child in question for his or her own purposes. He or she can negotiate the intended uses of the technology to access a chosen social sphere despite maintaining a physical existence within another sphere. As has already been mentioned, students in various Information Age societies have learned to overlap academic space and friend space by text messaging each other in class?l There is also a potential overlap in the communal space of public transportation to and from school as cellphones offer a person potential connectivity to alternate spaces of experience.22 When the child gets home he or she can use the cellphone for private communication with friends from school in order to bring the student community into omnipresence.23 And, if we are imagining this child's day as a negotiation of digital technologies as they relate to community, let us say that he or she finishes off the day (as many children often do) by hoping on to a computer bought as a tool for school work and using it as a tool for accessing entertainment with friends through chat programs, online video games, and message boards. In

2D Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. 20. 21 In South Korea this is often viewed as a social problem, perhaps rightly so given that 40"10 of the population between ages fourteen and nineteen admits to the practice. See Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. 18. 22 Matsuda Misa. 'Mobile Communication and Selective Sociality,' in Ito, Okabe and Matsuda ed., p.133. 23 Okabe Daisuke and Mizuko Ito. 'Keitai in Public Transportation,' in Ito, Okabe and Matsuda ed., p. 207.

20 each of these the child would be utilizing digital technologies to expand community and extend communal time through the co-existent overlap of social spheres. Sociological studies suggest this utilization would increase the child's sense of belonging and strengthen ties to his or her chosen community or communities.24

On a grander scale, the Information Age can greatly affect the way in which citizens perceive and participate in politics, serving as a community forum for policy formation. The participatory nature of the internet has helped define it as a space in which public opinion is created and negotiated through communicative exchange. Furthermore, theoretically speaking the medium has a greater potential for communicative rationality than face-to-face interaction because of its inclusiveness and equality founded upon anonymity. Whereas real life interactions cannot meet the requirements of an ideal dialogue due to ever present social hierarchies, digital space is physically divorced from these restrictions and can usually remain free of their constraints.2S It is for these reasons, along with the internet's status as a hub of exchange analogous to an impossibly massive and crowded village square, that political culture is thriving online in nations with free internet practices.26

24 Matusda, p. 139. " Park Hyeong-lun. 'The lnfonnati7JItion and Computer Mediated Communication in Korea: An Application ofHabennas' Public Spbere Theory,' in Sang-lin Han ed. Hobennas and the Korean Debate. (Seoul: Seoul University Press, 1998), p. 437. 26 I am referring to politically uncensored internet practices, such as those found in the United States, as opposed to those found in such countries as North Korea or China. See: Zeller, Tom. 'The Internet Black Hole that is North Korea' in the New York Times, October 23, 2006. http://www.nytimes.coml2006/10123/technologyI231ink.html?partner=rssnyt&emc9.SS and Cody, Edward. 'China's Censors Scour the Web: Electmnic Offenders are the New Frontier,' in the Washington Post, September 9,2007. http://www.msnbc.msn.com!idl20685526

21 If the state permits, this interactive political dialogue taking place in cyberspace can be instrumental to increased democratization within the society. It can serve as a vibrant ground for political debate, encouraging both engagement and awareness. One 2004 survey regarding the American presidential election concluded that political awareness could be correlated with level of internet use and that users had greater exposure to diverse political view points than non­ users. 27 This is consistent with general theories of and efforts in e-democracy, a term used to describe Information Age politics focused upon the use of digital technologies to increase democratic participation and citizen accessibility to government structures. Many countries (including South Korea, as we will see later) have launched e-democracy campaigns in order to strengthen the democratic procesS?8 The internet furthermore enables democracy by providing an inexpensive, fast, and interactive space for activist groups to mobilize and campaign to a translocational audience.29 Digital space has proved to be fertile ground for political action and participatory government in nations that have allowed it to flourish.

For those of us who have followed the work of such subaltern studies

scholars as Edward Said and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, perhaps the most

7:1 The Pew Research Center for the Penple and the Press. 'The Internet and Democratic Debate.' Released October 27, 2004, p. ii. http://www.pewinternet.orglpdfslPlP Political Info Report.pdf 28 The website of the e-Democracy Centre at the University of Zurich 1http://edc.unige.cbD has a number of resources that validate this statement. 29 I will be dealing with this topic in the South Korean context latter in the work, but for non­ Korean examples see Washboume, Neil 'Information Technology and New Forms of Organizing: Translocalism and Networks in Friends of the Earth' and Pickerill, Jenny. 'Weaving a Green Web: Environmental Protest and Computer-mediated Communication in Britain' in Webster, Frank ed. Cullrue and Politics in the ['!formation Age: A new Politics? (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).

22 appealing part of this democratic potentiality is that it allows the subaltern to speak through the digital medium. In fostering debate and public opinion formation the internet serves as a potent space of dissent for marginalized groups within the society (provided, once again, that governmental structures allow digital freedoms to exist). For instance, NGOs protesting against the actions of the

World BllIllCo and globalization31 use online space as a major mobilization ground against the dominant transnational economic power structure. On a smaller scale, the lack of persistent hierarchies in digital space allows for egalitarian exchange in which subaltern status does not (necessarily) limit personal impact. Dissenting voices can use message boards, blogs, and citizen cyberjoumalism sites to make their voices heard on a grand scale, as has been recently seen on a global level in the blogs of Iranian youths attempting to counter negative international characterizations of their country. 32 In more extreme cases of digital protest, dissenting voices have resorted to what is known as 'hacktivism,' manipulating computers to promote an ideological agenda through electronic civil disobedience. Since 1998 a Zapatista group called Electronic Disturbance Theater

(ED]) has been organizing virtual sit-ins, efforts that clog up the performance of targeted webpages through continual reloading by protestors, as a means of dissent. Other Zapatista hacktivists (or possibly the EDT themselves) managed to

30 Vegh, Sandor. 'Classifying Fonns of Online Activism: the Case of Cyberprotests Against the World Bank,' in Ayers, Michael D. and McCaughey, Martha ed. Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice. (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), p. 71-96 31 Aelst, Peter Van and Walgrave, Stefaan. 'New Media, New Movements? The Role of the Internet in Shaping the 'Anti-Globalization' Movement,' in Won van de Donk, Brian D. Loader, Paul G. Nixon, and Dieter Rucht ed. Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Sociol Movements. (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 97-122. 32 Schwanz, Casey. 'Blogs in Iran Offer Voice of Dissent Countly's Blogosphere Gives Interesting Glimpse into Young Iranians,' on ABC News, April 7, 2007. http://abcnews.go.com/InternationaVStorv?id-3018582&page=1

23 alter the Mexican government website to display pictures of Emeliano Zapata along with such slogans as: "We're watching you, big brother!,,)3 Similar hackings took place in China, where the country's human rights agency website was hacked to display the words: "China's people have no rights at all, never mind human rights. How can the United States trade millions and millions of dollllIll with them and give them most favored trade status when they know what is happening?" and in Indonesia, where Portuguese hackers modified hundreds of sites to read: "Free East Timor.,,34 Though the effectiveness ofhacktivism is debatable, there can be no doubt that it moves many dissenting opinions into the public eye through disruptive tactics. Ultimately we can see that, at very least, voices of dissent hold a strong presence in cyberspace.

Though the above aspects of the Information Age are generaI1y positivistic and/or liberating, digital technologies do not have an inherently advantageous effect on community practices. Even though digital technologies do increase community potential and the quantity of social exchanges, they do not necessarily increase the quality of those exchanges. This is sometimes the case with cellphones where, especially in regards to text-messaging, short and relatively trivial exchanges rather than intimate communication can become the norm. This can result in a superficiality of interchange that is unfavorable to qualitative connectivity.35 These tendencies towards superficial dialogue can be even more

33 Jordan, Tim and Taylor, Paul A. Hacktivlsm and CybeIWars: Rebels with a Cause? (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 72-3. 34 Harmon, Amy. "Hacktivists' of AU Persuasions Take Their Struggle to the Web,' in the New York Times, October 31, 1998. ht!P:11querv.nytimes.com/gstIfullpage.hnnl?res=9807E4D6143FF932A05753ClA96E958260 &0-ToplReferencelTimes%20TopicsiPeoplelHlHarmon. %20Amy " Matsuda Misa. 'Discourses of KeflaJ in Japan' in Ito, Okabe and Matsuda ed., p. 29.

24 prominent online. The lack of the discursive signs in cyberspace that are present in face-to-face communication (facial expressions, body language, tone of voice, etc.) can create an online environment of 'playful sterility' in which intimacy is lacking. When this is the case the internet medium does little to foster communal identity or productive dialogue.36 Community within this context is an apathetic enterprise conducive neither to a healthy social nor political sphere and can bleed over into real-world society in the form of social maladjustment on the part of the user.

There are also negatives associated with the internet on the level of political community. There is a consistent negotiation taking place within

Information Age societies between dissenters and those in power. Sometimes this is just a contest back and forth. For instance, in 200 I when activists set about the cyberspace mobilization of a real-world protest surrounding a WB meeting in

Barcelona they were countered when the group moved its meeting online.37 In this case both entities appropriated digital technologies for their own needs, using them to undermine each other in a political power struggle. This is a case of contest rather than oppression because neither group is in a position of overwhelming strength. However, empowered governmental agencies can use their real-world clout in an attempt to control society through digital resources. If we keep in mind Michel Foucault's theories of governmentality and social control when viewing post 9/11 discourses in the United States we find that the current idea of national security relies heavily on digital surveillance to enforce social

36 Park Hyeong-Jun, p. 437-8. 37 Vegh, p. 88.

2S normatives and produce human commoditization, therefore changing flesh and blood individuals into faceless at-risk resources.38 A far more overt campaign of social management exists in Chinese cyberspace, where censors continually (if often futility) monitor communication for anti-state sentiments and/or information deemed dangerous to national security.39 This is the sort of 'Big Brother' dystopia that critics of digital technologies tend to fear, and while they have yet to materialize anywhere in an entirely dominant fashion as of yet it can hardly be denied that attempts are being made to harness cyberspace for oppressive ends. It is fortunate for the public image of the medium that totalitarian states tend to regulate the intemet in a manner that makes it impotent as a tool for mass social control, limiting its potential by dictating its parameters. After all, it is impossible to oppress a digital society that was never allowed to exist.40

Digital technologies can also have a major impact on netizens' political leanings. Because the intemet is an open space that holds great potential for community formation it grants a freedom of association that can cause group polarization born from the desire for personal validity. Citizens often seek out and engage those who react favorably to their pre-existing opinions, a phenomenon referred to as 'enclave deliberation.' In the American context, for instance, this means that Republicans are more likely to get their news from conservative provider Fox News and Democrats are more likely to get theirs from the more

38 Crampton, Jeremy w. The Political Mapping ofCyberspace. (Chicago: Univenlity of Chicago ~,2003),p. 140. 3. See both: 'China Tightens Web Control' on BBC News, Janumy 27, 2004. Authorun-cited. http://news.bbc.co.ukf2lhilasia-paciticl343411S.sbn and Macartney, Jane. 'Web Censorship is Failing, Says Chinese Official' on the Times Online, July 17, 2007. http://technology.timesonline.co.ukitol/news/tech and web/the web/article2086419.ece 40 North Korea come to mind as a defining example of the internet being so highly regulated that digital culture has not developed.

26 liberal-minded news group operated by CBS.41 By gravitating towards similarity netizens create political networks in which belief is re-enforced by group nnanimity, creating the appearance of societal agreement (whether true or illusory). This re-enforcement often serves to drive opinions to extreme degrees, forming greater and greater levels of radicalization through unopposed consensus and a conformative drive towards the dominant position. This proves true when applied to all manner of digital public opinion from morality to fandom but it is especially socially relevant when applied to politics. Political polarization usually runs contrary to the democratic hope of mass critique and consensus within a unit by forming an in-group/out-group mentality that fragments the political body.

However, this move towards radicalization is not necessarily a negative effect.

Political polarization can also be a positive force by encouraging commuual activism. Consider that the abolitionist, civil rights, prohibition and feminist movements were all aided by extreme polarization. The internet therefore plays a dual role as enabler and limiter within the realm of politics, providing a space for both open participatory debate leading to increased democratization and a space for uncompromising world-view validation that denies dialogue and encourages extremism.42

And so we come to a complex conclusion of digital technologies as something gray, neither positive nor negative. We now have some understanding

41 The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 'Cable and Internet Loom Large in Fragmented Political News Universe: Perceptions of Partisan Bias Seen as Growing­ Especially by Democrats.' Released January 11,2004. http://people­ press.omlreportsldisplay.php3?ReportiD='200. See also: The Pew research Center for the People and the Press. 'Beyond Red vs. Blue: Republicans Divided About Role of Govemment - Democrats by Social and Personal Values.' Released May 10,2005. http://people­ press.orglreportsldisplay.php3?PageID=943 42 Sunstein, Cass. Republlc.com. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 51-88.

27 that digital technologies change the ways in which we live through the creation and re-organization of spaces, and that these spaces can be used and experienced in various ways. In the end it is this human negotiation and appropriation of new technologies that dictates their character. Let me elaborate this for a moment using some of Jurgen Habermas' theories on Industrial Age technology.

Habermas provocatively locates technology as a restrictor of human potentiality rather than an enabler.43 His theories are widely used in academic studies involving the Information Revolution, both in arguments for and against the idea of the internet as a public sphere conducive to civil society.44 The ideas found within them are very useful for conceptualizing the ways in which digital technologies can serve as a reinforcement of dominant modes of power, especially in terms of technologically created hierarchies and the production of normalcy, but ultimately they become flawed when applied to digital technologies due to their antiquated definitions.4s Digital innovations can undoubtedly increase the potency of controlling power structures, but the imagined and relatively free spaces created by them can also serve as spaces of resistance to those same modes. There is a continual negotiation between the dominant and the oppressed in digital space that negates Habermas' conclusions. This is because ultimately digital technologies are a new kind of innovation, interacting with society to an

43 Habennas, Jurgen. 'The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory' from Knowledge and Human Interest, 1968. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archivelhabermasfI968ItheolY­ knowledge.htm . See also Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose, ed. Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-llheralism and Rationa/ities ofGovernment. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 12-13. 44 Both sides are well summarized in Salter, Lee. 'Democracy. Social Movements, and the Internet: A Habennasian Analysis' in Ayers and McCaughey eel. p. 117-144. 4> Not that I have any expectation that these theories would apply to digital technologies since they were formulated before digital technologies existed on a public level. I am merely poioting out that they cannot be applied to the medium in any neat sense.

28 even greater degree than their Industrial Age predecessors. The online world mirrors the real world, with its multitude of aspects and complexities. Digital technologies both create and cancel out dialogue, bring together and divide community, nurture and negate civil society. They exist as incredible potential that can go in various directions depending on human choice. They reflect the human condition: our ability to improve ourselves and the world around us, and our tendency towards selfishness and laziness. Information Age societies use them freely for both extremes and everything in-between, profoundly changing our reality in the process.

29 Chapter Two: Crisis and Reformation

If Information Age communities around the world can be characterized by the ability of their members to continuously and easily access large amounts of data then South Korea must be placed at their vanguard. The country boasts a level of digital proliferation that is virtually unrivaled on a per-capita basis, and its populace is tech savvy to the point of drawing large amounts of international attention. This character is bom of a self-conscious effort by its citizens as a whole to embrace digital technologies as a means of economic prosperity and international recognition. Therein we find what makes South Korea such a poignant focus for a study of the Information Revolution: not only are digital technologies ubiquitous within the society, but they are also highly prominent within the social, economic and political imaginations of its people. This near total digital embracement did not simply come into being but rather was conditioned into existence by a number of historical efforts and circumstances.

While these events did not totally determine South Korea's present day digital outcome (and could not necessarily be used to predict similar outcomes in other contexts), they did help to produce a social character receptive to high-modernist ideology. In the following section this study explores the historical circumstances surrounding South Korea's pursuit of digital technologies.

A BriefHistory ofthe IMF Crisis

"I have come here to beg the forgiveness of the Korean people. Please understand the necessity of the economic pain we must bear and overcome."

30 - Minister of Finance and Economy Lim Cbang­ Yuel, televised announcement of the acceptance of the IMF bailout package

In 1996 if one were to write a financial history of South Korea it would be difficult to create a narrative that was anything other than triumphant Shortly after the country's inception in 1948 came a war that destroyed much of its already meager natural resources, not to mention the infrastructure required to utilize them. By the time fighting ended in 1953 the population had few economic opportunities and had fallen into widespread destitution. These poor conditions persisted, minus slow and minor improvements, until 1961 when Park Chung-Hee seized control of the government in a military coup. Shortly thereafter the government began a series of largely successful five-year economic plans aimed at moving the economy towards heavy industrialization. In the 1960s the country saw massive economic growth that continued throughout the 1970s despite major shifts in world markets and the 1980s despite widespread domestic political turmoil.46 By comparison, the booming world economy and blossoming local democratization of the 1990s seemed to be ideal conditions to bring the country to new heights of prosperity. True to expectations, in 1996 South Korea's per capita

GDP exceeded $10,000 and it became the 26th country to join the prestigious

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 47 In many ways the outlook of its economic future had never been brighter .

.. Lee Minsoo, Tcha MongJoong and Sub Chung-Sok. 'The Korean Economy: Triwnphs, Difficulties, and Triwnphs Again?' in Sub Chung-SDk and Tcha MoonJoong ed. The Korean Economy at the Crossroads. (London and New York: RoutledgeCunon, 2003).p. 1-2. 47 Lee Minsoo, Tcha MongJoong and Sub Chung-SDk, p. 7.

31 We now know, however, that South Korea's financial system had cracks in its foundation that were slowly widening. Since the 1960s the ROK economy had been centered on the continued growth of various chaebol, major family-run corporatious analogous to Japanese zaibatsu. These companies received highly preferential treatment under the country's military leadership and were granted large amounts of both suppon and protection through government policies. For some time this approach worked very well, leading to economic growth impressive enough to be dubbed the 'Miracle on the Han River' and allowing

South Korea to transcend its devastating history in the first half of the twentieth century to become (at least economically) one of the more prosperous nations in the world. However, the privileged nature of the chaebol gradually weakened

South Korean business practices. Under the military dictatorships the corporate embracement of a business model of constant industrial expansion was the key to gaining government suppon. Banks operated under a similar model and gave out loans based more on size than profitability, a policy that gave chaebol a major economic advantage and ensured that smaller companies with sound business practices were limited by their inability to obtain investment funds.48 In the 1980s and 1990s these systems contributed to a model of economic expansion that was reckless and founded on principals of growth rather than profit. 49 This led to a

slow but consistent decline in corporate efficiency among South Korea's major corporations, and by the mid 1990s many chaebol were relying on smoke and

48 Chung Un-Chan. 'The Korean Economy Before and After the Crisis,' in Chung Duck-Koo and Eichengreen, Barry ed. The Korean Ecommy Beyond the Crisis. (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2004), p. 30. 49 Chung Un-Chan, p. 26.

32 mirrors to avoid revealing to the general populace just how poor business had become. Many companies accumulated massive amounts of debt in order to avoid a humiliating and, under the dominant chaebol model, economically dangerous decrease in size.

The catalyst for the end of this financial system and South Korea's rise in the digital world arrived through economic disaster. Early in the summer of 1997

Thailand suffered through an economic collapse that brought financial contagion,

a term defined as the spread of market conditions from one country to another,so to the economies oflndonesia, Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, and

South Korea. The underlying reasons behind the 1997-1998 Asian Financial

Crisis remain a hotly debated subject that is largely beyond the scope of this

work. Its effects on South Korea, however, are less ambiguous. In November and

December of 1997 foreign creditors, noticing the similarities between Thailand's

pre-collapse financial system and South Korea's, panicked and pulled out of the

economy en mass, causing the value of the won to plummet. This unfortunately

came on the heels of an economic liberalization effort by the government that

resulted in short-term foreign capital loans having better interest rates than

domestic loans. This led to the popular practice of Korean companies (especially

large corporations) borrowing heavily from foreign sources using domestic banks

50 Claessens, Stijn and Forbes, Kristin, ed. Inlernatlona/ Financial Conlaglon: How it spreads and how it can be stopped (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.), p. 4. See also 'Contagion' definition on Investopedia: http://www.investooediacom/termslc/contagion.asp and 'Contagion of Financial Crises- Definitions and Causes of Contagion' by the World Bank Group: http://wwwI.worldbank.orgieconomicpoliCY/managing%20volatilitv/contagiOnldefinitions.ht ml

33 as a middle-man. 51 As a result the country had amassed $170 billion in foreign debt by the time the crisis hit. This number quickly became much higher in effective practice due to the won's devaluation. 52 Had the majority ofROK businesses been financially sound the country might have been able to weather this crisis relatively unscathed, but as it was many of them were barely managing to stay in operation even before the real trouble began. Ultimately many could not meet their financial obligations and defaulted on loans, passing their debt onto the

Korean banks that had served as intermediaries during the lending process. The banks began to fail under the financial burden, and the entire economic system started to fall.

When the severity of the situation became clear to government officials they began a desperate search for a way to halt the country's economic hemorrhaging. At the same time, the international community took notice of the situation and was eager to stop the Asian Financial Crisis' contagion from spreading to such major economies as China, Japan and the United States. 53 In the end, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an organization composed of 185 countries (including South Korea) and aimed at worldwide economic growth, 54 intervened along with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and various

" Lee Minsoo, Tcha MongJoong and Sub Chung-Sok, p. 7. >2 Kim Suk H. 'The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997: The Case of Korea. , Multinational Business Review, Spring 2001, Vol. 9 Issue I, p. 51. " All of these countries were ultimately affected by the Asian Financial Crisis, though not to the disastrous extent of nations such as South Korea. The stock markets of the U.S. and Japan took a major hit during the crisis over investor fears over the potential loss of business from mainland Asia. China was less effected but still saw a significant slow down in GDP in the following years. It is safe to speculate that all of these effects would have been won;e had the IMF not provided money to Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea to stop the region's economic freefal!. 54 The International MonetaIy Fund. 'About the IMF.' http://www.imf.orglexternallabout.htm

34 individual governments (most notably the U.S. and Japan) with a record setting

$57 billion bailout package.55 There were conditions, however. The IMF demanded a thorough restructuring of the ROK economy focused on economic liberalization in exchange for aid. Though embarrassed and humiliated, officials had little choice but to accept. 56 The move was received poorly by a South Korean populace that objected to intervention by outsiders, especially outsiders seemingly intent upon overwriting national economic standards with western (especially

United States) models and interests.57 Particularly under threat from the IMF's demands was the chaebol economic standard that Korean citizens had been relying upon and prospering under for over thirty years. As one Hyundai employee stated: "Without the chaebol, how can the country survive? The IMF is intervening in the sovereignty of our country: Many people are afraid of what the

IMF will do to the chaebol and to our country." 58

The initial efforts of the IMF greatly helped the country to pull out of its financial tail-spin, but even so great damage had already been done. The value of

South Korean currency had already dropped by 50% while the stock market had fallen a staggering 75%.59 Embattled chaebol were forced to make widespread

" The IMF also gave bailout packages of lesser value to Thailand ($21 billion) and Indonesia ($23 billion), both of which were hit veJY hard by the crisis. Malaysia was offered aid as well but refused, preferring to tackle the problem on their own terms. ,. Chung Duck-Koo and Eichengreen, p. 2. 51 Chung Duck-Koo and Eichengreen, p 11. 58 Kirk, Donald. Korean Crisis: Unraveling ofthe Miracle In the IMF Era. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 33. ,. Cumings, Bruce. Korea's Place In the Sun. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), p. 331.

35 layoffs that spiked the unemployment rate to 6.8%.60 Even this didn't save a large number of companies, and by the end of the crisis roughly 40% of chaebol had become insolvent. The Oaewoo Group, a Korean standard and its second largest company, was never able to recover. The Oaewoo chaebol slowly succumbed to bankruptcy and was all but completely dissolved in 1999, costing the government

$29 billion as it first attempted to save the company through monetary infusions and then was forced to bail out the banks being sucked down by Oaewoo's unrecoverable loans.61 All of these factors contributed to a plunge in the nation's previously mentioned per capita GOP from over $10,000 to $6,600 in the course of single year as well as a decline in South Korea's national GNP world ranking, which had long been a well-publicized indicator of the country's prosperity, from eleventh to seventeenth.62

The crisis also had a major impact on South Korea's public consciousness.

More than a just harmful to ROK economics and government, the IMF crisis was also a psychological blow to many South Korean citizens. The country's military dictatorships had long advanced propaganda images of the citizen as an 'industrial warrior.' Presented within this idea was a worldview of the global economic market as a battlefield that could be won or lost through the focused efforts of a nation's working masses.63 Holding up post-War Japan as a model, the

.. Kanellos, Michael. 'South Korea's Digital Dynasty - Nation: Techno-revolution in the making.' On CNet News, June 23,2004. http://www.news.comlNation-Techno-revolution-in-the­ making-Part-I-of-South-Koreas-Digita!-DvnastyI2009-104O 3-S239S44.bbnl?tag=st.nl ., 'Kim Woo-cboong Must Prove He is Sincere,' in the Chosun /lbo, June 14, 200S. Author un­ cited. bUp:llenglisb.cbosun.comlw21 datalbtmllnewsl200S061200S06140028.bbnl 62 Hayo, Bernd and Shin Dob Cbull. 'Popular Reaction to the Intervention by the IMF in the Korean Economic Crisis.' April 2002, p. 2. hUp:ll129 .3.20.4 Ilepsldev/papersl0204/020400 I.pdf 63 Cbung Duck-Koo and Eichengreen, p. 10.

36 government thoroughly instilled its population with the idea that work within the industrial economy was a nationalistic enterprise that could bring about international glory and recognition. Three decades of this rhetoric under military rule left strong impressions on the society that persisted into the democratic era.

The South Korean economic mindset can therefore be characterized by residual traces of the military government that ruled the country from 1961 to 1993 and is highly informed by a Cold War military mentality in which the fight was ideological rather than physical. Winning the Cold War conflict against North

Korea was not a matter of guns and bombs but of ensuring that citizens internalized nationalistic structures to the point where they policed themselves within the confines of state dogma.

Bearing all of this in mind it should not surprise us that the South Korean financial collapse was viewed by its population in similar terms to a traumatic military defeat In a series offace-to-face interviews with Korean citizens in 1999 over 75% of roughly one thousand respondents said that they felt personally ashamed by the crisis.64 They had, in essence, failed as industrial warriors and allowed their country to fall in humiliating defeat on the world stage. In the popular media, one reporter went so far as to call the IMF bailout an

'unprecedented national humiliation,' a statement that should give anyone with knowledge of the ROK's turbulent history pause.6S As another reporter offoreign birth observed in 2004: '(the IMF crisis) was so serious that, even today, many

64 Hayo and Shin, p. 11. '" Kim Deok-hyun. 'IT Firms to Account for 31% of Exports in 2007,' in the Korea Times, May 4, 2003. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/newslnation/news view.asp?newsldx=2098437

37 South Koreans stiffen and speak in dire tones when the subject comes up in conversation. ,66

Collapse and Opportunity

"If we make every effort to discard our loose thinking, then we can make this crisis a chance to gallop." - Hyundai co-chairman Chung Mong-Ku, company speech on December 8, 1997

Both the shock of financial collapse and the sweeping economic changes prompted by the IMF bailout program sent ripples throughout South Korean society. The former partnership between the government, banks, and chaebol known as 'Korea, Inc.' had, at least in part, declared itself to be bankrupt and dissolved. To ensure that the partnership was never repeated the IMF demanded a number of reforms that vastly altered the landscape of South Korean business operation, moving it away from the former standard in which the economy was dominated by a handful of powerful chaebol and towards a more profit-focused neo-liberal system. The work of changing the ROK economic system was made easier by the fact that many of the chaebol that could have potentially opposed certain reforms through the use of strong political ties had been hit particularly hard by the crisis. As we have seen, many had already collapsed by the time the bailout took place, and many others were too damaged to muster up significant government influence. The implementation ofIMF reform measures also coincided with the administration of President Kim Dae-Jung, a reformist

66 Kanellos. June 23, 2004.

38 candidate elected in December of 1997 who was extremely critical of the chaebol standard. After taking office in February of 1998, Kim Dae-Jung helped ensure that the government's implementation of new economic policies was performed enthusiastically (for the most part) and was instrumental in affecting wide-ranging structural change.

The IMF reform efforts were primarily aimed at increasing flexibility, transparency and market discipline among businesses, something that was severely lacking among chaebol in general. Mostly this involved limiting chaebol privileges in order to increase competition and encourage wiser business practices. These goals were accomplished primarily through Kim Dae-Jung's

'5+3 agenda,' a plan negotiated between the government and the surviving chaebol involving five reform measures and three prohibitions described as follows:

The original five elements include increasing transparency in corporate management, eliminating debt guarantees between chaebol subsidiaries, improving capital structures, establishing core competencies to prevent unconstrained expansion of the chaebols through unrelated diversification, and increasing accountability of controlling shareholders and management. The three additional tasks are prohibiting the chaebol from holding controlling stakes in financial institutions, from conducting insider transactions, and from leaving improper bequests or gifts to the heirs of chaebol owners.67

In additional to these direct reforms, associated changes were made to related industries that undermined chaebol economic control. The country's banking

67 Chung Un-chan. 'Before and After the Crisis,' p. 35.

39 system, which had long been intimately connected with the chaebol standard, underwent major changes including the take-over of two major commercial banks by the government, the dissolving of over a dozen smaller banks, and government-guided rehabilitation programs for all other banks undergoing financial difficulties.68 Key domestic markets were opened wide to foreign competition, requirements for more transparent business practices were imposed upon the economy in general, and a number of chaebol focused loopholes were eliminated 69

Despite this series of blows to their traditional modes of business the chaebol were not completely stripped of their status as the economic overlords of the country. To begin with, those that survived the crisis were still predominantly controlled by highly enfranchised families that continued to maintain much of their long-standing social and political power.70 The name and reputation of the various chaebol, while diminisbed, also continued to hold cultural capital. But more importantly, the IMF reforms did not completely unseat the chaebol because many of the companies were willing to embrace reform measures, improve business practices, and change with the times. Though the chaebol standard had been destroyed, the chaebol themselves remained, ready to be the driving force behind the new financial system just as they had been the driving force behind the old one. To the more open minded companies the IMF reforms became an opportunity rather than a restraint .

.. Chung Duck-Koo and Eichengreen, p. 13 • .. Chung Duck-Koo and Eichengreen, p. II. 70 Chung Duck-Koo and Eichengreen, p. 13.

40 Samsung, for instance, serves as the prime post-crisis example of a phoenix-risen business. Though Samsung fared better than most, like all chaebol it was hit hard by the IMF crisis. As its debt-to-equity ratio rose to 366% financial necessity forced the company to fire nearly 50,000 employees, a number accounting for roughly 34% of its entire workforce. Amidst this economic hardship Samsung found itself in desperate need of a new business model to reverse its plummeting fortunes. In the wake of the crisis the idea of continuing its current growth-model practices of producing a variety of reverse -engineered low- end electronics seemed not only antiquated but suicidal. In response to this problem Samsung fully embraced the spirit of chaebol reform. It reversed thirty years of business practices by either folding or selling off unprofitable elements, reducing the number of companies operated by Samsung from sixty-eight in 1997 to forty in 1999. Corporate transparency rose dramatically, managerial decentralization increased, and profitability, rather than size, became Samsung's business mantra. At the same time the company adopted a more narrow focus towards its core-industries, especially Samsung Electronics. This prioritization of high-tech products led to a shift in business mentality away from imitation and towards innovation. In 1999 Samsung Electronics research and development budget grew 35%, helping the company to register 11,210 total patents, 2,230 of them international.'· This shift in product development and commitment to reform, along with a strong increase in worldwide brand recognition through aggressive advertising, paid off quickly. In 1999 Samsung recorded $2.2 billion in

1\ Samsung Group Annual Report: 1999, p. 55-60. http://www.samsung.comlAboutSAMSUNG/SAMSUNGGROUP/AnnuaIReport/pdfi.annuall 999.pdf

41 net income, up from $201 million in 1998,72 and in 2004 profits soared to $11 billion.73 By the end of2007 the company bad exceeded $100 billion in annual sales worldwide, placing it in the top three electronics companies in the world.74

Samsung's reform measures bad been successful, leading to better business practices, more cutting-edge technologies, increased quality, and greater profits.

For Samsung, as well as a few other chaebol, the 1997 financial disaster proved to be equal parts crisis and opportunity.

The same could be said of the South Korean workforce. The complete restructuring of the chaebol standard placed many citizens into an economic limbo. In addition to the mass layoffs of experienced laborers, students from prominent universities suddenly found themselves facing an uncertain job market.

Previously a business degree from a major college like Seoul National University was a nearly automatic ticket to high-profile employment. In the years immediately following the crisis, streamlined business practices and a high demand for jobs ensured that this was no longer the case. With familiar avenues of employment now closed to them, more and more workers, both experienced and inexperienced, began turning to entrepreneurship and jobs within sma11 to medium-sized companies. More than a few of these efforts to forge new paths to economic prosperity focused on the production of digital technologies. The burgeoning South Korean broadband infrastructure was fertile ground for the

72 Samsung Group Annual Report: 1999, p. 54. 73 Samsung Group Annual Report: 2004, p. 34. http://www.samsung.comlAboutSAMSUNG/SAMSUNGGROUP/AnnualReport/pdf/2OO4Sa msungAnnualReportpdf 74 'Samsung Tops $100 Bil. in Sales for 2007,' in the Chosun Jlbo, January 16,2008. Author un­ cited. http://english.chosun.comlw2IdatalhtmVnewsl20080112008011600 1O.btml

42 industry and appeared to be a wonhwhile alternative to chaebol employment.

With many (perhaps even most) chaebol being looked at with suspicion from analysts unmoved by their level of reform and poor employee treatment during the IMF crisis still fresh in the minds of the South Korean workforce, sma1l digital entrepreneurial companies began to pop up throughout the ROK. Venture and small to medium-sized businesses more than doubled between 1997 and 2002, growing from 9,219 to 21,812." By 2002 the IT industry had exploded to 14.9% of the country's GNP, a significantly higher number than the U.S.'s 8.3%.76

Focusing on Becoming First in the Information Age

Already, we have taken a new step towards our future. In fulfilling (our plans for informatization promotion), I firmly believe that Korea will become a global leader of the Information Age in the 21 st century. To this end, we need to unite our strengths in order for Korea to move forward into a bright and prosperous future. - Prime Minister Lee Han-Dong, The Third Master Plan for InformatizaJion Promotion 2002-2006

Following the IMF bailout South Korean government officials were left with the daunting task of leading their country through the hardships of a damaged economy and the humiliation of widespread foreign interference in ROK business. Like the chaebol upon whom they were imposing reform measures, the

ROK government was looking for a new direction, and like the chaebol they settled upon Information Age technologies as a focal point. The move made sense

75 Kim Kyeong-won. Post-Crlsls Transformation olthe Korean Economy: A Revlewfrom 1998 to 2002. (Seoul: Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2003), p. 129. 7. Kim Deok-Hyun. 'Korea Takes Bold Risks to Become IT Powerhouse,' in the Korea Times, April 30, 2003.

43 for a variety of reasons but two stand out amongst the rest. First, South Korea was already moving, however slowly, towards an Information Age economy. The mid-nineties had seen an increase both in the number of digital technologies companies and their competitiveness on the world stage. The ROK government had taken note of this and moved to support the trend, launching the

Informationalization Promotion Framework Act in 1995 to aid and boost the industry. Furthermore, ROK government perceptions of the telecommunications industry had been undergoing a slow change from a tool for social control to an economic resource since the beginning of the democratic era in 1987. The country began converting to a digital communication systems in the early 1990s and launched the world's first commercial CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access, a

77 form of digital transmission that optimizes bandwidth potential ) network in

1996.78 Because these foundations for Information Age industry had already been laid down it was a simple decision for the government to shift gears from an industrial to a knowledge-based economy.

The Second reason for the government's move towards digital technologies is that idea of the Information Revolution had struck a chord

amongst South Korean citizens. During industrial growth under military rule there had been a consistent rhetoric of Korea having arrived late to the Industrial Age.79

77 CMDA definition found in an encyclopedia hosted by PCMAG.com. htto:llwww.ocmag.comlencyclopedia tennl0.2S42.t=CDMA&i=39462.00.asp '" Kim Deok-Hyun, April 30, 2003. "'I use the term 'late' loosely and in keeping with South Korean terminology. From a bistorical pen;pective Korea was only late to the Industrial Age on a world scale in the sense that it lacked both the necessity and opportunity to industrialize during the 18th and 19th century. In the 20th century a conjectural argument could be made that 'late' may be used in that, within the Asian cultural sphere, Korea was late to industrialize by comparison to Japan, which embraced industrialization in the late 19th century with similar fervor to South Korea's current

44 This tardiness, as it were, had caused the country to fall behind the rest of the world and led to a great deal of domestic hardship as it struggled to catch up. As the millennium approached there was a growing awareness, especially after the

IMF crisis brought about heightened concerns regarding the global economy, that the world was experiencing a new social and economic revolution with the proliferation of personal computers and the internet. After having been buried early in the 20th century by the Industrial Revolution both South Korea's government and its citizens were determined to ride the crest of the Information

Revolution to levels of prosperity they had missed out upon in the previous century.

In 1999 the ROK embarked upon the 'Cyber Korea 21' initiative, a three- part plan to further encourage Information Age progress. Part one focused on education. The government provided 158,000 PCs to elementary and middle schools, created local area networks in 2,500 high schools, and paid for information education training for 85,000 teachers. Part two was aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of industrial companies through government- funded e-commerce strategy consultation. Part three set up programs to establish electronic documents as the standard tool for communications among government agencies. 8o In the same year South Korea also launched a five year plan to stimulate development within the digital technologies industry. Roughly $918 million were pledged towards investments in next generation internet, optical

embracement of digita1ization. While I personally do not find this line of thinking particularly usefW, it is nonetheless dominant within South Korea and therefore is relevant to this study. so Kim Deok-Hyun. 'Transforming Info-Tech Sector to Create Value,' in the Korea Times, June 5, 2003.

45 communications, digital broadcasting, wireless communication, software and computers.81 As time went on more money was offered on top of this as the government embarked upon a campaign to aid high-tech companies with low interest loans. In a wise move, the government reversed its former policies of creating near monopolies among the chaebol and offered these loans strategically to increase competition. This policy kept competition high among businesses such as internet providers, resulting in both low prices and impressive broadband speeds. Finally, a variety of other initiatives, most notably a free educational training program in internet usage available to virtually the entire population, were put into place to transition the population into the Information Age.

None of these efforts would have been successful, however, without the high-speed internet infrastructure required to support them. Government policy makers recognized this necessity and acted accordingly. By the end of 1997 previous efforts at wiring the nation had come to fruition with the implementation of fiber connections in most of the nation's large commercial and residential buildings. Urged on by the financial crisis, officials put additional plans into place to increase the broadband penetration rate, aiming at 80% in households by 2005

(a number that they would miss by the narrow margin of 5%).82 In 1995 less than

1% of South Korean citizens used the internet.83 By 2000 that number had

81 Song Hee and Woo Joonhee. 'Infonnation Technology Landscape in Korea: Government Policies.' http://www.american.edulcannelljw6l94a1Korea files1governmenthtm 82 Internet World Stats. 'Korea: Internet Usage Stats and Marketing Report.' htm:llwww.intemetworldstats.comlasialkr.htm 83 Borland, John and KaneUos, Michael. 'South Korea Leads the Way,' on ClNet News, July 28, 2004. http://www.news.comlSouth-Korea-leads-the-wayI2009-1034 3-5261393.html

46 exploded to 39.6% of the population, and in 2005 it stood at 63.3%.84 Internet usage statistics in economic centers such as Seoul are considerably higher, but much of Korea's rura1 population receives broadband internet as well. This is aided, again, by government efforts. In 2002 Korea Telecom, a formerly government owned monopoly, was allowed to privatize on the condition that it provide broadband access to every village in the entire country. The government also poured $24 billion into wiring the entirety of its government facilities and public institutions as the fina1 touch in building the backbone of a digital behemoth.85

No doubt largely as a result of these efforts, South Korea's new economic policy quickly bore fruit By the end of 1999 the South Korean economy had rebounded with a 10.5% growth in real GDP, and by 2001 foreign reserves, which stood at only $8.87 billion at the time of the crisis, had spiked to $97.8 billion. In that same year the government fully paid off its IMP loans two years and ten months ahead of schedule. A spokesman for the Ministry of Finance and

Economy announced the achievement with the telling statement: 'we've retaken our economy sovereignty.'86 The growth engine of this dramatic economic recovery was found in the information technology and telecommunications industries. Production in the two sectors increased an average of 19.9% per year from 1997 to 2002 despite the lasting effects of the crisis.87 Shortly after the 2003

B4 Internet World Stats. 'Korea: Internet Usage Stats and Marketing Report.' http://www.internetworldstats.comtasialkr.htm ., Borland and Kanellos. 86 Kim Ki-Hoon. 'Last ofIMF Loans Paid 00,' in the Chosun Rho, August 23, 200!. http://english.chosun.comtw2Idatalhtmllnewsl2001081200108230160.html 87 Kim Kyeong-Won, p.126.

47 election president Roh Moo-Hyun stated that the IT industry would serve as the country's 'new growth engine' and promised to facilitate 'new generation mobile communication, intelligent robots, digital televisions, post-pes and various software industries' during his time in office.88 Ultimately this was just a promise to continue what was already happening: the South Korean government's concerted move into the Information Age.

Though it would be unfair to solely attribute South Korea's economic growth and recovery over the past decade to Information Age digital technologies

(certainly, for instance, the recession-driven decline in imports during the crisis that shifted U.S.-ROK trade relations from an ROK deficit in 1997 to a remarkable $40 billion trade surplus in 1998 was also instrumental~, there can be little doubt that the industries that they enabled played a leading, perhaps even dominant, role in its financial rebirth. Much of the credit for this success goes to the ROK government whose consistent commitment to the Information

Revolution greatly aided South Korea's emergence as a digital power.

The Creation ofa Digital Society

"Wireless for (South Korea) is the same as the space mission to the moon was for the U.S. Everyone is behind it: government, industry." - John Yunker, web globa1ization expert

As we have seen, the IMF crisis led to major changes throughout South

Korean society. Beyond inducing corporate bankruptcies and startling

88 Roh Moo-Hyun, as quoted in Kim Deok-Hyun, April 30, 2003. 89 Chung Un-cban, p. 33.

48 unemployment rates it also led to increased financial polarization in the populace and a loss of confidence among South Korean citizens in the industrial economy.90 As former economic conceptions and structures broke down on a large scale in the wake of these traumas South Koreans were forced to re-imagine their identity. South Korea bas, in its modern history, been extremely enthusiastic in adopting what James C. Scott refers to as 'high-modernist ideology,' described by the author as follows:

It is best conceived as a strong, one might even say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about scientific and teclmica1 progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of naturallaWS.91

Scott himself is mostly concerned with this ideology as it relates to state forms of social engineering and control,92 but for our own purposes it describes the popular embracement of progress as a mobilizing agent. After the crisis belief in this ideology as it related to an industrial economy was put into question. South

Koreans had for the previous thirty years defined themselves economically under military government ideals of ever-increasing industrialization. With this

Industrial Age high-modernist ideology dispelled the country was left to re-

90 Lee Joung-Woo. 'Social Impact of the Crisis,' in Chung Duck-Koo and Eichengreen, p. 137-8. 9' Scott, James C. Seeing Like a Siale: Haw Certain Schemes 10 Improve lhe Human Condition Hove Failed. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 4. 92 Although Scott generally speaks of high-modemist ideology in a negative light due to the context ofms analysis he acknowledges that it only takes on destructive/disastrous characteristics when combined with an active authoritarian state and a 'prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist ••• ' While these characteristics were obviously present during the rule of South Korea's military governments they can not be said to apply to the post-IMP democratic era. My own usage ofhigh-modemist ideology is therefore applied here without any corruption or misrepresentation of Scott's usage. See Scott, p. 5.

49 imagine itself, a discouraging prospect for citizens highly inundated with

'industrial warrior' propaganda.

As we have seen, in the years directly preceding the crisis South Korean society was already moving towards digitalization. On an individual level, personal computers and cellphones moved into much wider use between 1989 and

1996, and the IT industry providing them grew by an amazing 1000% percent.93

One can extrapolate from these numbers that had the IMF crisis never happened

South Korea probably would still have eventually become a prominent player among Information Age societies. Given this pre-existing progress it was a very short step for ROK citizens to go from consuming digital technologies to holding them up as a point of cultural pride and identity. Not long after the crisis examples of these sentiments began to appear in large numbers within South Korean media as the populace found a new kind of high-modernist ideology via faith in the

Information Age. Along with government efforts and a shift in bnsiness focus, this helped to cause the proliferation and adoption of digital technologies to accelerate to a remarkable degree. In the years that followed the IMF crisis the number of cellphone subscribers in South Korea rose to eclipse the number of landline users, growing from 6.91 million in 1997 to 23.44 million in 1999 to

32.34 million in 2002. PCs underwent a similar boom and exploded from 6.93 million in use in 1997, or 29% of households within the country, to 22.5 million in 2002, a figure accounting for 60.1% ofhouseholds.94 All of these numbers are especially large considering that these booms took place during a financial

., Park Hyeong-Jun, p. 433 . .. Kim Kyeong-Won, p. 130.

50 disaster that placed many citizens out of work and limited domestic spending power.

With this change came a distain for the previous Industrial Age high- modernist ideology as out-dated and foolish. In 2005 a Korean jouma1ist wrote:

'Daewoo failed because it could not read the signs of the times and transform itself. ,95 He was referring to that fact that in the midst of the financial crisis the company had maintained unsound aggressive expansion under the traditional economic model and had continued to pursue foreign car sales as its primary business focus despite the continual decline of that market. Had it switched its efforts towards booming markets, the greatest of which would have been digital technologies, it might have prospered rather than all but completely collapsing under the weight of antiquated business practices not fit for a globalized economy. Implied within this statement is a common critique of pre-IMF South

Korean society itself: had the country and its people adapted sooner the trauma of the crisis might have been avoided. After the financial collapse ROK citizens mobilized around the idea that the country failed to progress in a crucial moment and had paid for it with economic hardship and national humiliation. The lesson learned and spread throughout the populace therein echoed the pre-existing high- modernist ideology but added a new twist Progress continued to be the path to prosperity on both a national and global level, but the idea of progress had been negotiated and changed. Unlike the previous ideology of progress in which South

Korea's goal was to catch up or keep pace in the Industrial Age, the new ideology

'" 'Kim Woo-Choong Must Prove He is Sincere,' in the Chosun Ilbo, June 14,2005. Author un­ cited. http://english.chosun.comlw21dataJhtmVnewsl2005061200506140028.htmI

51 was focused upon being cutting-edge and leading the way in the Infonnation Age.

Digital technologies became a national rallying point through which South

Koreans could harness a positive identity on both a local and world stage. At a certain point public adoption became so great that government efforts to create a knowledge based economy were overtaken by the public desire for an Infonnation

Age society. In a complex negotiation between internalized governmentality, economic realities, and the mass recognition of possibility, in the years following the IMF crisis South Koreans enthusiastically embraced digital technologies and used them as a core component in the reorganization of their collective identity.

As previously discussed, this unusually fervent pursuit of cutting edge technology did not come into being within a historical vacuum. Rather it was highly infonned by the communal perceptions of Korean history and nationalism among the population. It was especially situated within the context of colonialism, both in terms of the Japanese occupation and the semi-colonial relationship between South Korea and the United States. In being late to the Industrial Age

Korea was made vulnerable to countries with greater technological might, leading to a half-century in which sovereignty was non-existent and a half-century in which sovereignty was flawed by a foreign military presence. These circumstances were highly traumatic on a number of levels.

Also damaging within these circumstances was the process of industrialization itself. To expand upon the ideas ofPartha ChatteJ:jee, the process of turning towards foreign modes of 'modernization' to compete in a world

52 dominated by Western cultural practices has a damaging effect on the colonized.96

Embedded in the discourse of modernization is an inherent power structure that leaves a lasting mark on post-colonial society as both livelihood and culture are intruded upon by Western influences self-conceived as inherently superior to those found in different ideological spheres.97 The past 100 years of Korean society have been filled with such overriding foreign conceptions. Consider, for instance, that the South Korean lexicon is riddled with English words that constantly impose an outside Other upon native modes of thought and imply an epistemological hegemony. It is within this context that a strong desire exists for the colonized to continually re-assertlre-define a national identity, either through rejection offoreign modalities in favor of native ones (as was attempted by

Gandhi) or their negotiated embracement and re-definition (as has been the case with most of the post-colonial world, most prominently Japan).

In the case of South Korea over the past decade, this has meant appropriating the foreign-originating Information Revolution for use in the society's own identity-construction and legitimization. Of vital importance, however, is that in the Information Revolution South Korea has the possibility to be a driving force, to claim informatization as their own and define its parameters in a way that was denied throughout all but the final years of the 20111 century under Industrial Age models. The South Korean embracement of digital

.. ChatteJjee, Partha Nationalist Tlwught and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986). 91 By 'ideological spheres' I mean broadly defined ideological groups. In this context I am alluding to dominant ethnocentric colonial thought patterns in the west (Europe, west Asia, the United states and Canada) that marginalize other regions such as East Asia (Korea, China, and Japan).

53 technologies takes on incteased meaning therein. It has a distinctly hopeful characteristic that makes it a particularly powerful tool for social mobilization and identity definition. When we consider this historical context in which South

Korea's Infonnation Revolution is situated, there is little wonder as to why the population has shown such enthusiasm for all things digital.

Neither a culture nor its people can define itself as digital without making digital technologies part of everyday life. In addition to statistics previously stated, it is worth noting that after the IMF crisis the number of internet users grew from 1.63 million in 1997 to 26.27 mi1lion in 2002. This figure placed South

Korea at sixth in the world in total number of internet users despite being twenty­ fifth in total population.98 Even more telling, during that same period the number of high-speed internet subscribers skyrocketed an astounding 800% from 13,000 to 10.4 million, making the country number one in the world in broadband adoption per capita. 99 In 2006 when the highest broadband speeds available in

Canada topped out at 5 Mbit per second, South Korea was offering services at 18

Mbitls. 1OO Production of these numbers contain a thinly veiled message whole- heartedly embraced by the ROK population: South Korea is leading the way in the Information Revolution. South Korea is more tech-savvy and more advanced.

Or, more simply put, South Korea is exceptional. This nationalistic discourse has been central to South Korean society's view of itself during the past decade and forms the basis for a digital society focused not only upon speed and convenience

.. Ahn, Kim, and Ob, p. 269 . .. Kim Kyeong-Won, p. 130 100 Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. 44-5.

54 but also upon a lifestyle representative of national pride embodied in personal self-definition.

55 Chapter Three: The Transformation of South Korean Society in the

Information Age

The ongoing Information Revolution among the world's most technologically advanced nations is fundamentally reshaping the ways in which citizens perceive and experience their lives. The introduction of a variety of disruptive digital technologies has served as a catalyst for change in nearly every aspect of human society. This is especially true in the world's digital apex of

South Korea The lives of Korean citizens are moving increasingly online, creating a dual existence as real-world citizens and cyberspace netizens. In the midst of this metamorphosis Koreans face an emergent frontier of possibility, both positive and negative, that is still being explored. The society is full of real­ world colonizers of the internet who are continually discovering/creating new spaces of experience, exchange, dissent, control, and livelihood within the imaginary world. The character of this plane, and the events that take place within it, alters both the virtual and the physical landscape of the society in a relationship of mutual definition. This section examines the myriad ways in which South

Korean society has reacted and/or changed culturally in response to the proliferation of digital spaces. It considers ROK cyberspace both as it relates to the real-world and the online frontier, a fitting realm of study given South Korean

society's increasingly hybrid existence between the two.

'A Society as Online as it is Offline •

56 A restroom monitors the user's health on a daily basis and forwards the data to the physician. A chair adapts itself to accommodate the shape of the body and posture of a movement-impaired user, or a user with special medical conditions. A refrigerator provides daily menus for people on dietary regimens. A ubiquitous world, where human beings, computers and objects in their environment are connected to each other on a real-time basis is no longer a thing of science fictions or a remote future. In Korea, this is about to become the everyday reality for its citizens. - Korea IT International Cooperation Agency, a division of the Ministry of Information and Communication

Since the Asian Financial Crisis the South Korean populace has moved into cyberspace to a degree that is unrivaled anywhere else on the globe, forming a society that exists not only in the real world but the virtual world created as well. At the time of this study the percentage of households with broadband in

South Korea stands at 90%, number one in the world and 70% higher than the world average. IOI Shortly after the IMF crisis, high competition among internet providers in the country created circumstances advantageous for the creation of a culture of ubiquitous internet. As a result, shortly after the turn of the millennium

ROK netizens began to enjoy both the highest speeds and the lowest overall prices for broadband anywhere in the world. I02 High-speed wireless internet followed shortly on the heels of LAN lines. and by 2004 major Korean internet technologies corporation KT Telecom had constructed the world's largest Wi-Fi network, boasting roughly 13,000 public access points within the country.I03 By

101 Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. 4. 102 Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. 174. 103 Kanello., June 23, 2004.

57 2007 that number had more than doubled. 104 Though netizen status in this land of constant connectivity is predictably most prevalent among the younger generation that grew up with the technology, South Korea's middle-aged and older generations are also well versed in internet usage. A reported 38% of the older and generally more conservative demographic of South Korean business elites have practiced blogging, for instance. lOS Within urban centers it is difficult to find an element or demographic that is not only online but highly active within the space. With this culture of ubiquitous digital technologies comes an almost infinite frontier of possibilities. The Korean intemet is highly evolved due to the availability of quality internet service and the large number of users with a strong commitment to the digital medium. Nearly every aspect of the society has moved online, and more than a few aspects of it exist only within cyberspace. The new spaces created by this movement represent a broad range of possible identities, experiences and communities alternate to and yet negotiated by their counterparts in the real-world, changing/creating the society that interacts within them.

This is especially evident in the capital of Seoul where South Korea's

Information Revolution is most at work. Within the city it is rare for a person to walk the streets for two blocks without running into a computer room, or 'PC bang.' These commercial estab1ishments feature numerous computers, all installed with a variety of programs (primarily video games, but also applications

104 Strix Systems. 'Strix System's Access/One Outdoor Wireless System Deployed by Korea Telecom for Nespot Wi-Fi Internet Service.' http://www.strixsystems.com/corporatelpressreleases/KT-Broadwave-release-072407- FINAL.pdf lOS 'Edelman China Stakeholder Study: Rise of the Skeptic,' presented in Beijing, September 12, 2007, p. 21. http://www.edelman.comlimagelinsights/content!2007%20China%20CoreO/020Presentation% 20FINAL.pdf

58 for such activities as online chat and messaging) and hooked up to high-speed internet connections. For a small fee, usually between $1 and $2 per hour, patrons can utilize these computers in virtually any way they wish, even to the extent of installing new programs for personal use. I06 South Korea features more than

25,000 such PC bangs, most of which are open twenty-four hours a day. 107 Of interest when considering computer rooms as a cultural phenomenon is that they serve less as a space of person to internet interaction than as a space of integrated social exchange in which digital technologies serve as the mobilizing agent Since their proliferation in the late 1990s PC bangs have become a favorite spot for social interaction amongst young Koreans, leading to an environment' ... filled with kids yelling at each other from across the room as they engage each other in cyber space.' 108 Not surprisingly, a study by the Korea Game Development and

Promotion Institute found that PC bangs were second only to barslcoffee shops as the top place for Korean males to meet friends. 109

However, the social character of digital technologies in South Korea is not limited to Information Age spaces such as PC bangs that feature aspects of physical interaction. Cyberspace, too, frequently serves as a mainstream social medium. Roughly 43% of South Koreans have online profiles or blogs and 40%

106 Korea Tourism Organi7ation. 'Let's Take a Look Inside a PC Bang.' http://english.lour2korea.coml03Sightseeine:ITraveISoot!trave!SPOt read.asn?oid=811&konu m=suhml l&kosm=m3 6 107 Gluck, Caroline. 'South Korea's Gaming Addicts,' on BBC news, November 22, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhilasia.pacificl2499957.stm lOS Sea Banseok. 'The "PC Bang" Phenomenon,' in the Chosun Ilbo, Apri16, 1999. http://english.chosun.comlw21datalhtml!newsll99904I199904060473.html 109 Koehler, Robert. 'Online Gaming: Korea's National Pastime?' in Lifestyle & Culture Magazine Seoul, January 2006. http://english.seoul.go.kr/lodaY/infocus/column!1228592 5097.php

59 maintain avatars. IIO The majority of these are fmmd in a single digital community.

In 1999 a social networking site called 'Cyworld' began operation in South

Korean cyberspace. Similar but more expansive than its English-language equivalents in Myspace or Facebook, the site combines personal profiles, video sharing, picture sharing, online chat, blogs, virtual reality spaces, and online shopping into the world's 'most advanced virtual ecosystem.'1II In 2007 more than 21 million South Koreans maintained Cyworld minihompys, or 'mini home pages.' 112 Each minihompy has a 'miniroom,' a 'virtual property' into which users can invite their friends and interact through their 'minimes,' or digital avatars. I13

As such, Cyworld functions as something akin to a virtual city complete with a virtual society. What is key therein is that, with nearly half of South Korea's real- world population active within the space, virtual society and real society blend together to form a dual community experience, producing an Information Age society where reaUvirtual exists in tandem rather than dichotomy. While it is true that even the most rudimentary digital social spaces involve a mixing of 'real' and

'virtual' into a harmonious (or at least co-existent) whole of experience, the limited per capita participation in most of these spaces around the world makes them unrepresentative of a truly digital society with near-equal reality existence between the two. There are very few non-South Korean examples in which a single demographic of a chosen society might be represented (Facebook.com for

American college students, for example) and no society other than South Korea's

110 Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. 4. 111 Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. 42. 112 Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. 30. 113 Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. 34-5.

60 has a high enough per capita internet participation rate to suggest a fully formed digital society in which coterminous real/virtua1 experience is the norm rather than the exception.

Personal identity within such a society is also interestingly located between real and virtua1 realities, making digital technologies foundational to self-definition. The internet has been aptly described as 'a theater of performed identities.'1l4 Social networking sites form the most obvious example of this phenomenon, as many of their features serve as displays designed to convey an image of self. However, any time that interaction takes place within digital space there is the opportunity (and often times the necessity) for identity construction.

For instance, most online forums and games are not conducive, either because of deliberate design or prohibitions on name redundancy, to the use of a person's

'real' name. One is therefore prompted to choose a user-name to go by within the space. In this moment identity is highly negotiable as any nickname chosen will carry meaning to other users. Each name is a marker of personal image in digital space, and each is chosen as part of a greater performance of self-representation.

While recently in South Korea this practice has declined due to the implementation of a real-name system on message boards (something discussed in the next section) there are still many instances outside of certain major web portals in which citizens adopt netizen personas in name as well as conduct, dualizing personal identity within a single cyber/physica1 reality.

114 Nakamura, Lisa. Cybertypes: Race, Ethnicity, and Identity on the Internet. (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), p. 31.

61 Many names, avatars, signatures, and other common markers of online identity are in a large part reflective of an identity already constructed in the real world. However, this does not have to be the case, as the internet provides a space in which the self is present but not directly related to a real world identity. Usua! signs of self-representation such as appearance, mannerisms and speech are generally absent in cyberspace. This allows for free reign in identity construction.

Though in real space a person can choose their identity to a large degree by performing according to certain archetypes there are certain visual signs, such as race, sex, or defect, that inform identity regardless of personal intention and offer limited choices for negotiation. In short, there are physical restraints to the medium. In digital space the physical usually does not apply, liS and therefore a person is able to re-make their image in ways that would be impossible (or, at least prohibitively costly or difficult for most individuals) in real space. In South

Korean cyberspace this creates a flexibility of identity that allows netizens to arbitrarily self-define who they are. This phenomenon effectively complicates common social norms by making reality fluid and increasing the potential for choice.

We can see an example of this by once again looking at Cyworld. As has already been stated, a considerable portion of the South Korean population maintains digital personas via the use of home pages, blogs, and/or avatars. These online imaginations of the self can be direct or abstract, unique or derivative, but all share the common characteristic of establishing a user's constructed identity,

115 Notable exceptions include voice chat and webcams in which the physical self is conveyed through digital means.

62 either in coherence with or opposition to that which exists in the physical realm.

The Cyworld miniroom and minime are both strong examples of this appropriation of digital space for identity construction. Both features are highly customizable and allow for a wide range of possible personas.

Essential to this identity creation is the sale of 'virtual merchandise,' a big business within South Korea. In Cyworld netizens can use virtual currency known as 'dotori,' or 'acorns,' most frequently purchased via a cellphone account for roughly 10 cents u.s. ofreal world money, to buy various forms ofvirtual goods and services. More than 30,000 businesses have more than half a million digital content products for sale within Cyworld space and SK Telecom, which bought

Cyworld shortly after its launch, makes roughly $450,000 per day on its 40% cut of all online revenue sold. I 16 Nearly all of these digital products are focused around identity construction using either online avatars or minihompy digital properties. South Koreans frequently customize their internet persona with branded designer clothes and accessories, fancy hairstyles, or even cosmetic surgery. The popularity of these services is illustrated by a doubling of the avatar market on a yearly basis from 2002 to 2004, at which time it was valued at $114 million. 117 With real-world money netizens can create virtual world personas with a physical appearance and unique characteristics. This potentiality of choice, combined with a genuine economy and high per capita rate of use, forms a social community in Cyworld that is more complete than any other found in digital space. It is essentially another society in and of itself, coterminous and yet

116 Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. 35. 117 Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. 4 I.

63 separate from the real world. It is strongly anchored to real world expectations of experience, but at the same time it is not a complete mirror, as the ability to craft one's identity on such an intricate level indicates.

This integration ofCyworid into the greater South Korean society (or, alternatively, this integration of South Korean society into Cyworld) has been remarkable in its formation of the world's most integrated hub ofvirtua1 exchange, culture and connectivity. About 90% of all pictures sent from South

Korean cellphones go directly to Cyworld's picture sharing service. Roughly

100,000 videos are uploaded to the site on a daily basis, a greater volume than

YouTube despite the fact that Cyworld draws material almost entirely from its domestic market as opposed to YouTube's patronage throughout the English­ speaking world and wide ranging international audience. I IS Cyworld is also the world's second largest online music store, subordinate only to iTunes, and sells over 200,000 full-track MP3s per day. I 19 Most of this music is used not for real- world use in MP3 players or advanced cellphones, but rather as 'Welcoming

Songs' 120 or background music to individual minirooms, and as gifts for friends.

Carrying over a Korean tradition of gift exchange from the real world to the virtua1 world, netizens often give digital music to each other as presents upon

118 Yang Xiyun. 'YouTube Goes International,' in the Washington Post, June 19,2007. http://blog.washingtonpostcomlposttecbl2007/06lyoutubegoesinternationa\.htm\ 119 Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. 45. 120 These are songs configured by users to play each time someone enters their min/room. On a side note, it is interesting when considering intellectual property rights in virtual space that evIllY time a licensed song is played in welcome the owner of the miniroom that it is attached to is charged roughly 40 cents in royalties. This stands in sharp contrast to digital experience in the English speaking world where music accessed online on websites such as MySpace is generally free and piracy of copyrighted materials is both extremely common and generally accepted by the populace. It is perhaps for this reason that the South Korean music industry appears to be more enthusiastic about music in digital space than their American counterparts.

64 visiting each other's minirooms. Again we see a blending ofreal and virtual society; a blurring of borders in which traditional conventions are negotiated for use in cyberspace. Though Cyworld and the real-world remain different from each other in a number of ways both obviouS (spatiality and physicality) and subtle

(identity construction and methods of social exchange) the two share similarities that indicate a reality of social experience in which they are an amalgamated whole.

Online video games offer an even greater instance of alternative yet co- existent reality in ROK cyberspace. South Korea enjoys the world's foremost video game culture and nearly a 50% share of the worldwide gaming market. 121

The Korean produced medieval role-playing 'Ragnarok online' garnered 80,000 players in the U.S. and 25 million worldwide, while similarly themed 'Mu online' captured the attention of 40 million registrants between South Korea and the

PRC.Ill This proliferation of high-quality online video games has led to mass popularity and usage among South Korean netizens, whose commitment to video games is such that it has significant interoational recognition. The status of

Korean players within transnational gaming communities is near legendary; a fact enabled by widespread devotion to the digital social spaces created by online video gaming.

121 Moon Ihlwan and Jacobs, Steve. 'Online Gaming: Korea's Gotla Have it,' in BusinessWeek, September 11,2006. http://www.businessweek.comimagazinelconlentl06371b4000070.htm 122 Kanellos, Micbael. 'South Korea's Digital Dynasty - Consumer.!: Gaming their way to Growth.' On CNet news, June 25, 2004. b!!p:l/www.news.comlConsumers-Gaming-their­ way-la-growth Part-3-of-South-Koreas-Digita!-DvnasIVI2009-1040 3- 5239555.html?tag---st.nI

65 The historical background for this, beyond the already stated motivations for South Koreans to be digitally-minded in general, is found in the history of

ROK-Japan trade relationships. As opposed to the gaming markets of the United

States and Japan, which are primarily console driven, 123 most of South Korean gaming is carried out through PCs. Due to a strategic import ban on certain

Japanese products beginning in 1978 South Korean society received little exposure to the Atarl, Nintendo and Sega products that popularized video gaming in the United States. Game development therefore necessarily took place on personal computers, and by the time the South Korean government dismantled its anti-Japanese import policy between 1997 and 1999 PC games had become the entrenched standard. 124 This development is significant for two reasons. First, because they were primarily being played on online-ready PCs, it was a very small jump for games to move from the standard solitary pursuit of player vs. machine to the more social online community of group vs. machine or player vs. player. And second, localizing mediums of connective exchange in a single device (the personal computer) enhances community potential. It is not unusual for people in PC bangs to play online games and chat via instant messenger programs at the same time, multitasking their way to increased levels of connectivity and a digitized identity.

It is perhaps this construction of communal spaces that makes South

Korean-style gaming so intensely immersive and conducive to alternate

123 By 'console' I am referring to devices manufactured solely for video gaming, as in Microsoft's X-Box 360, Ninetendo's Wri, or Sony's third generation of the PIaystation. 124 'Ban on Japanese ProduCIS Removed in S. Korea,' in Asian Economic News, July 5, 1999. Author un-cited. http://findarticles.com/plarticleslmi mOWDP/is 1999 July 5/ai 55115623

66 experience. When players enter another world they interact not merely with the game engine but with an entire society. This makes gaming in South Korea as much a way of life as an escapist pursuit. Let us look at the online game 'Lineage

II,' arguably the most enduring and popular online game in the ROK in terms of cultural capital if not actual subscribers, which houses 14 million users worldwide and 7 million domestically.l2S The game is so expansive that it takes six hours to

'walk' from one end of the gaming world to the other and offers an impressive range of character customization options that allows for the creation of diverse identities within the community.l26 Between these high levels of character individualization and a non-linear storyline there is strong encouragement for each player to have a unique experience within the gaming world. Therein we see a highly immersive alternate experience, a second life that exists within and without a person's physical life. That this identity construction and alternate experience takes place in a space where other players exist and interact functionally makes Lineage II a Korean sub-society. South Koreans who play the game are living at least two lives, connected to each other through participation by the user and the user's set of experiences and social expectations, most of which are informed by real-world events. Considering that roughly 15% of the population plays Lineage II, another 25% plays the online racing game 'Kart

Rider,' 127 and almost 45% of the population maintains an identity in Cyworld, it is

12' Ahonen and O'Reilly, 41-2. 126 Fulford, Benjamin. 'Korea's Weird Wired World' in Forbes internationaI. July 21, 2003. h!!p:/Iwww.forbes.comlforbesl2003/07211092print.htm! 127 Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. 35.

67 safe to assume that nearly every citizen is living multiple lives through digital technologies, all of which find a nexus point in the total experience of the user.

Supporting this conclusion is the fact that video games in South Korea are far from being a fringe activity even on the level of public discourses of normalcy/deviancy. To the vast majority of the society online gaming holds

128 remarkable mainstream draW. Online gaming is so accepted as a form of social interaction that Minster of Unification Chung Dong-Young made a public promise in 2005 to work to find ways for North and South Koreans to play video games together online as a means to bring the two countries together. 129 Chung was incidentally chosen by the ruling Uri party to be their presidential candidate

in 2007. He would eventually lose the election, disappointing dreamers who

envisioned government initiatives urging North and South Koreans to fight side

by side against virtua1 goblins and trolls insb;ad of stare each other down across a

2.5 mile wide demilitarized zone.

Also indicative of a digital culture, and one of the more remarkable social

aspects of online gaming in South Korea, is the popularity of professional gaming

contests. Video game competitions, otherwise known as e-sports (electronic

sports), have formed a $107 million domestic industry that is growing at an

estimated 28.6% per year. I3O Crowds flock to witness high profile contests in

which pro-gamers, usually futuristically-uniformed young men in their late teens

and early twenties, square off against each other across various virtua1 battlefields

128 'E-Sports go Mainstream' in Chosun llbo, July 6, 2007. http://eng1isb.chosun.comlw2IdatalhtmJ/newsJ2007071200707060017.htm1 129 Koehler, Janumy 2006. 130 'E-Sports go Mainstream,' July 6, 2007.

68 ranging from 'Counterstrike,' a realistic first-person shooter, to 'Pump,' a game where players must step on padded arrow keys on the floor as directed by a large screen in rhythm to music, creating a sort of stomp-happy competitive dance. In

August of2007 the pro-league finals of 'Starcrafi,' a futuristic real-time strategy war-game, in Busan drew a crowd of 70,000. 131 The Seoul International e-Sports

Festival in 2008 is expected to bring in almost three times that number. 132 Even more remarkable, three entire television channels in South Korea are devoted to

2417 e-sports coverage. Given the popularity of e-sports within the country it should come as no surprise that South Korea is ranked number one in the world when it comes to cyber gaming, which is probably one of the reasons why the pursuit not only is accepted but actively supported by the society.133

Business giants such as Samsung Electronics, KTF and SK Telecom all operate professional gaming teams. When twenty-five year old 'Emperor' 1m Yo-

Hwan. a gaming celebrity regarded to be the world's greatest Starcraft player and who boasts an online fan club of over 580,000, was drafted by the South Korean

Airforce in 2006 the military branch used the opportunity to create its own e- sports team comprised of various pro-gamers enrolled in South Korea's mandatory military service. 134 Not to be outdone, after members of Airforce

Challenge e-Sports (or ACE) appeared in their first competition the South Korean

Navy also announced plans to form a team. As we can see, not only are South

131 Cho Jin-Seo, 'Series of International e-Sports Events Due' in The Korea Times, August 7, 2007. http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/newslbizlbiz view.asp?newsldx=788I &categoryCode= 123 132 Wohn Dong-Hee, 'The Hottest Sports Action in Korea is Computerized' in JoongAng Daily, August 13, 2007. http://ioon,,,mgdaily.joins.comlarticlelview.asp?aid=2879181 133 World Cyber Games national rankings, October 25,2007. http://www.worldcvhergames.coml6tb!funlnewsinews view.asp?kevno=C071 0311 0000 134 Koehler, January 2006.

69 Koreans coming together in interactive social competition within virtual battle grounds but also a social community of fandom surrounding them. Whereas

United States water cooler talk might focus on baseball, football or basketball, digitally-focused South Koreans are more likely to discuss the latest video game matches as an exercise of Information Age socialization. Events within the gaming worlds carry over into the real world unproblematica1ly, indicating not only an acceptance of digital technologies in South Korea but also a hybridization of reality between real and virtual spaces.

This digitalization of South Korean society creates a culture in which cutting-edge innovation is common place. The tech-savvy character of the South

Korean populace has made the ROK an international high-tech laboratory. More than eighty foreign coI'porations, including many of the world's top IT firms, carry out extensive product testing within the country to research innovations in an environment of ubiquitous connectivity. Microsoft, for example, invested $500 million in Korea Telecom in 2003 to foster joint development of a number of broadband projects including home-networking systems and e_schooling. 13s

Experiments in digital technology are also continuously conducted by domestic companies. For instance, in August of2007 the Shinsegae Department Store in

Seoul opened the world's first 'i-fashion' clothing shop. Within its space age confines customers undergo a ten-second body scan to create a digital avatar, personally individua1ized and proportioned by nine separate hody

'" Fulford, July 21, 2003.

70 measurements. 136 This avatar is then coded into a 'smart card.' By using the card on a PC or cell phone consumers can use their avatar to try on clothing in a virtual environment and buy the apparel's real-world counterpart online from the store's website in yet another example of the integration of real and virtual worlds. 137

In South Korea we can see that the convergence of historical circumstances has formed a culture in which technology is central to experience.

The country's efforts on all major fronts of society have brought digital technologies into so common of an existence that they no longer seem to be an

'Other' in relation to pre-Information Age norms. They are instead so highly integrated into the society that they exist as a defining characteristic. This represents a major transformation in the ways in which South Koreans interact with each other and the world around them, opening up a new world of participation and potential. The real world and the virtual world have become almost entirely integrated into an undivided social whole, forming the world's foremost (and perhaps only) integrated digital culture.

The Dark side a/South Korea's Internet

"Korea has been most aggressive in embracing the Intemet Now we have to lead in dealing with its consequences." - Koh Young-Sam, the Internet Addiction Counseling Center

136 'Virtual Reality Clothing Store Opens in Korea,' in the Chosun [lbo, September 14,2007. Author un-cited. http://english.chosun.comlw2Idatalhtmllnewsl2007091200709140oo2.htmI 137 'Korea Opens Virtual Reality i-Fashion Clothing Store,' on Korea.net, August 24, 2007. http://www.korea.netlpdalnewsView.asp?serial no=20070824008&part= I 07

71 As new technology is introduced to a society and new modes of experience, identity and community appear and multiply, so is the potential for conflict increased within these frontier spaces. South Korea's highly developed yet still largely unregulated internet community is no exception. For instance, in

2001 the ROK government issued 11,033 warnings to websites featuring offensive content, defined as subject matter that is libelous, violent, or obscene, as well as materials featuring drug use or posing a threat to national security. By

2006 the number of warnings had increased more than 400% to 44,289. 138

Similarly, the number of cyber crimes reported to Korea police in 2002 was

119,000. By 2003 that number had risen 39% to 165,000 and reached over

200,000 in 2004. 139 Most of these crimes faIl under the category of what Koreans ca1l 'cyberviolence,' a term encompassing everything from chat room insults to cyberstaIking. l40 Related social problems, both crimina1 and non-crimina1, such as prostitution, addiction, and adultery have also begun to feature prominently in the country's virtua1 imagination. These form a growing undercurrent below the dominant discourse of positivistic digital technology within the country. As the

ROK has surged forward in pursuit of prosperity through Information Age modernity the light of new progress has cast deep shadows in the public

138 Lee Min-A, 'At Web Portals, Evel)'body Can Know Your Name,' in JoongAng Daily, April 19, 2007. http://ioongangdaiIy.joins.com/articlelview.aso?aid=287461l 139 'Policymakers Struggle to Curb Cyber Violence: Civic Groups Oppose Pian to Introduce ReaI­ Name System for Online Users' in the Korea Times, August S, 2ooS, as featured on the Republic of South Korea Ministry of Information and Communication website, htto:/leng.mic.go.kr/eng/user.tdf?a=user.board.BoardAPP&c=2002&board id=E OS 06&seg =3061. 140 Lee Yu-Sup, "Cyberviolence' Plagues South Korea,' in USA Today, March 8, 2006. http://www.usatoday.comltecblnewslintemetprivacyI2006-03-08-cyberviolence-south­ korea x.htm

72 imagination where deviancy and discord thrive. These form the dark side of South

Korea's internet experience.

Though generally considered a non-issue within our own society, hostile message exchanges via online message boards are viewed as a serious social problem in South Korea that Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) director Kang Sin-Ook went so far as to call a 'rampant social malaise.' 141

Especially troubling to the MIC is cyberviolence involving the mass dissemination of libelous and often fraudulent information. Because South Korean society is constantly online and operates on a sma1I, intimate scale (at least by comparison to its larger Information Age counterparts such as the United States or

Japan) these stories can move through a population like wildfire. This effect can be described using the internet theory of cybercascades, 'processes of information exchange in which a certain fact or point of view becomes widespread simply because so many people seem to believe it,' put forth by prominent legal philosopher Cass Sunstein. 142 Though the ability of the internet to spread information is unrivaled by any previous technology few guards are in place to ensure the veracity of that information. Therefore a sma1I lie can quickly pick up momentum and become an avalanche of falsity that spreads throughout the entire society as netizens adhere to a consensus in public opinion rather than expert analysis or actual data. 143 Cybercascades can also cause a trend of

141 Kim Tae-Gyu, 'Malicious Internet Warriors Dodge Real-Name System,' in the Korea Times, July 30, 2007. Accessed through the secondmy source of the UCLA Asia Institute. http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edularticle-eastasia.asp?parentid=7S0l8 142 Suostein, p. 49. 143 Aboutcom features an urban legends site that features many instances of cybercascades. http://urbanlegends.about.coml

73 'cyberbalkanization' in which the majority opinion within a group sways its members in favor of that belief. This leads to increased levels of radicalization that can be harmful to objective decision making. l44 In South Korea this phenomenon has gained public, governmental and international attention through major cases involving real-world ostracization fueled by discussions in cyberspace.

The most publicized instance of web portal cyberviolence began in July of

2005 when a dog defecated inside a moving subway car. The dog's owner, a woman in her early twenties, did not clean up the offending mess and was captured by another passenger in a photograph taken on a mobile phone. The picture was posted on the internet. What followed has been adeptly described as a

'nationwide cyber lynching.' 145 Vicious postings against the girl flooded message boards and turned a personal discourtesy into a national incident that culminated in the illegal disclosure of the girl's name, age and school. The information was disseminated via web portals without the perpetrators using their real names and proved to be untraceable upon police investigation.

Additional examples of web portal cyberviolence are easy to find. An instance ominously dubbed 'the seven evils' involved a story posted on South

Korean message boards about a young female high school student who was reported to have been unfairly accused of stealing. Ostracized by her peers for the alleged crime the girl committed suicide and seven girls were singled out as

144 Suntein, p. 79. See also: Harmon, Amy. 'Ideas and Trends; Politics of the Web: Meet, Greet, Segregate, Meet Again,' in the New York Times, January 25, 2004. hnp:lIguerv.nytimes.com/gstIfullpage.html?res=9C04EEDA 1638F936A 15752COA9629C8B6 3&sec-&spon=&pagewanted-1 14> Kim Tae-Gyu, July 30, 2007.

74 having driven her to kill herself. The group was bombarded with angry messages such as 'I will brand you guys as murderers for the rest of your lives.' 146 In another case, a young man was driven out of school by hostile message board posters after the story of his fight with a friend hit the internet. A second man was forced to quit his job after writings on a web portal proclaimed that he had driven his ex-girlfriend to suicide. The story became a cybercascade, and the name ofhis workplace and cell-phone number were distributed online soon after. 147 The notoriety of each of the above cases has lead (perhaps rightly so) to increased fears of the negative potential of online anonymity. No one wants to be dragged into a social execution by faceless enemies free to act on spiteful impulses without repercussion.

In response to these fears the MIC has attempted to fight cyberviolence through the institution of the 'real-name system.' This policy requires netizens to provide their name and resident registration number in order to register for major message boards. This creates a trail that can be used by law enforcement or government officials to find malicious posters. The MIC believes that creating an easily traceable connection from the physical user to hislher constructed internet persona will curb antagonistic users by reducing online anonymity and making real the threat of online accountability. However, when the system was first

146 'Policymakers Struggle to Curb Cyber Violence: Civic Groups Oppose Plan to Introduce Real­ Name System for Online Users' in the Korea Times, August 5, 2005, as featured on the Republic of South Korea Ministry of Information and Communication website. http://eng.mic.go.kr/eng/user.tdfla=user.boardBoardAOO&c=2002&board id=E 05 06&seq =3061 147 'Internet Witch-Hunts: Cyber Terror is Dark Side of IT Superpower' in the Korea Times, June 10, 2005, as featured on the Republic of South Korea Ministry of Information and Communication website, http://eng.mic.go.kr/engluser.tdfla=user.board.BoardAoo&c=2002&board id=E 05 06&sea -3053

75 presented to the public in 2003 it was widely unpopular and encountered significant opposition from civic groups concerned with public privacy, personal freedom and the threat of increased government surveillance. Protestors claimed that it would violate the South Korean constitutional right to free speech by making online expression contingent upon the loss of personal privacy. Due to opposition the law was rejected, but in the following years the MIe managed to convince a number of internet sites to follow the policy of their own free will, especially following the public unease over internet witch-hunts following the story of the 'dog excrement girl.' In March of2007 South Korean lawmakers finally managed to pass a law that put the real-name system into mandatory practice for twenty-one major web portals with daily traffic of over 300,000 visitors and allowed the government to access the information it gathered

(previously real-name system data could only be used by law-enforcernent officials for criminal investigations). 148 Four months later they extended the system to an additional I, ISO public agencies and fourteen online media sites.

Though a few favorable statistics have been produced suggesting that the real- name policy has been successful in cutting down on cyberviolence, public dissatisfaction with the system is high.149 Following a constant stream of inflammatory postings directed towards the twenty-three Korean missionaries kidnapped by the Taliban in July of2007 a representative of the major internet portal 'Daum' stated that the real-name system was ineffectual and 'not an answer

148 Lee Min-A, April 19, 2007. 149 'Real-name Scheme Conducive to Cutting Cyber Slandering: Poll,' 00 Koreanet, October 4, 2007. Author uno(;ited. http://www.koreanetlnewslnews!newsView.asp?seriai n0=20071 004013

76 to problematic postings in cyberspace. ,ISO The MIC has countered that it is too early to properly evaluate the effects of the policy and remains confident that it will cause a drop in cybercrime if given time.

Cyberviolence is far from the only concern in cyberspace amongst South

Korea's governing bodies, however. Deviant sex also appears in the public imagination as a social problem that is exacerbated by digital technologies. The

ROK government echoes many of its western counterparts by viewing online sexuality as a deviant enterprise that is highly enabled by the medium's anonymity. Taking a conservative stance, the government has made illegal the operation of a website for obscene or pornographic purposes, a move made possible by ambiguities in the nation's constitutional notion of freedom of speech which states that expression cannot undermine public morality. This notion is important because it establishes very loose boundaries for deviancy as it relates to sex-related websites, enabling authorities to dictate morality. In July of2007, for instance, a man was indicted on the grounds of violating South Korean obscenity laws for operating a website that arranged the swapping of sexual partners, turning a private and personal choice into an issue of public ethics. Seoul officials also brought charges against Fifty-three of his roughly 8,000 customers, illustrating government concern with the patronage of sex-related websites. 151 But despite efforts such as these to stymie sex in cyberspace, sexual digital spaces are hardly difficult to find. Many PC bangs feature private rooms expressly for the

,.. Kim Tae-Gyu, July 30, 2007. '" Jung Hyo-Sik. 'Swinger's Web Site Operator Charged,' in the JoongAng llbo, July 10, 2007. htlp://joongangdaily.joins.comIarticle!view.!!SJ!?aid=2877844

77 purposes of viewing digital pornographylS2 and it is not unheard of for pornographic materials to make it onto the country's top web portalS. IS3 For instance, when a celebrity sex-tape involving singer Baek Ji-Young hit the internet it received mass dissemination with hundreds of thousands of downioads. IS4 Though sexuality online is perceived as a problem by the ROK government there can be no doubt that it exists in abundance within South Korean cyberspace.

South Korean society is also highly concerned with online sexuality in the form of adultery. Though sometimes this ties into anxiety about such things as prostitution, the greater concern is not physical sex but cybersex. Online cheating is viewed as a rampant problem with the society, with as many as 60% of extra- marital affairs originating in digital space. ISS Besides the ubiquitous and social nature of South Korean internet, both of which are conducive to forging romantic relationships online, South Korean adultery laws may account for the trend of cyber-cheating. Compared to physical adultery, which is illegal in South Korea and punishable by a term in prison, cybersex is a safe alternative. The society might turn a blind eye towards this phenomenon, as it did for prostitution until

2004, were not seen as a leading cause of divorce in the country. South Korean divorce rates rank among the highest in the world, with 44.8% of marriages

1>2 The Associated Press. 's. Korea Cracks Down on Online Porn,' in the Sydney Morning Herald, April 15, 2005. http://www.smh.com.aulnewsIBreakinglS-Korea-cracks-down-on-online­ porn/2oo5104/15/1113251759010.hnnl ." 'Korea to Block Foreign Porn Sites in Effort to Clean up Local PortaIs,' on Korea.net, March 26, 2007. Author un-cited. http://www.korea.netinewsinewslNewsView.asp?seria1 no=20070326006&part= I 07 &Searcb Day= 1>4 Kim, Stella. 'Sex, Lies & the internet,' in Time Asia, Vol. 156 No. 25126, December 25, 2000 to January 1,2001. bttp:llwww.time.com/timeiasialm8p..zine/2oo0/1225lkorea video.bnnl ." Fulford, July 21, 2003.

78 ending in separation as of 2006. 156 When paired with a declining birthrate, this makes for large scale social anxiety regarding the future of the population. Part of the blame for the problem has been laid at the feet of an ouline medium that provides spaces for inter-martial cybersex, allegedly undermining the structure of the family.

There is also a buzz of social concern over sexuality as it relates to digital space in the form of prostitution. South Korean officials have stated that prostitution by young girls is now carried out almost entirely through internet channels. 157 Following the implementation of more stringent anti-prostitution laws against brothels in 2004 the number of red-light districts in South Korea shrank dramatically. As the brothels disappeared the sex industry moved its activities to alternative locals: karaoke bars, barber shops, massage parlors, and, increasingly, online. Prostitutes frequently began to appropriate digital space to facilitate their livelihood, using e-mail and chat programs to solicit Johns and arrange meetings. The PC bang has become the new street comer, and it is not unusual for a sex worker to hang out within its confines playing video games while waiting for a job to pop up via instant messaging. A year after the anti- prostitution law went into affect the number of reports received by the Korea

Internet Safety Commission regarding ouline acts of prostitution stood at 2,680.

By 2007 that number had ballooned more than 400% to 11,724.158 Considering

'56 The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. 'Co1D1try Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2006 - Korea, Republic of.' Mark 6, 2007. btto:/lwww.state.gov/gldrIlrls!brrptl2006n8778.htm ,,, Fulford, July 21, 2003. '58 Kim Hung-lin. 'Koreans Resort to Internet to Buy Sex,' on MSNBC.com, October 10, 2007. http://www.msnbc.msn.comIidl212285311

79 that this is only the number of reported incidents and that online prostitution is considerably harder to detect than its real-world counterpart due to anonymity and the lack of a spatial advertising ground it is safe to assume that the number of actual acts of prostitution facilitated through the digital medium is many times the number above. Cyberspace has therein been thoroughly appropriated by what has been deemed a deviant element within the society for purposes that run contrary to the ROK's dominant morality.

While thus far this study has focused on the ways in which digital technologies enable primarily real-world elements to appropriate digital spaces for deviant ends, there also exists a discourse in which the medium is deviant in and of itself. Mass internet with a wide number of complex immersive pursuits and alternate experiences poses the potential danger of obsession. South Korea is one of only a few societies in the world to recognize 'intemet addiction' as a compulsive psychological disorder comparable to gambling, alcoholism or anorexia. 159 The illness comes complete with codified symptoms, such as 'the disruption of daily routines and lifestyles' and 'feeling nervous and anxious when not online,' 160 and withdrawal effects such as sleep disturbance, irritability, and poor impulse control, symptoms notably identical to those from

... The only nations I have come across that recognize internet addiction disorder (lAD) are South Korea, China, and Israel, though I would not be SUIprised if more exist China is taking extreme measures (most notably involving electro-shock therapy) that suggest the society views the problem even more seriously than South Korea does. Ongoing debates over the validity of lAD are currently taking place in Japan and the English speaking world, but brief research into the discussion suggests that most experts either do not believe internet addiction is a psychological disorder or are of the opinion that it is dingnosable as other already accepted illnesses, such as attention deficit disorder or depression. '00 Gluck, November 22, 2002.

80 methamphetamine withdrawal. 161 A government survey in 2005 concluded that

546,000 Koreans between the ages of nine and thirty-nine were internet addicts,l62 and further numbers put forth by the Korea Agency for Digital Opportunity and

Promotion estimated that 30% of teenagers showed symptoms of the disorder. 163

Other figures from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism put the number as' high as

43%. These statistics have caused a great deal of concern among ROK parents, with 60% stating that they were worried that their children were online addicts and 40% reporting that excessive online activity by children had become a source of friction within the family.l64 As the production of these numbers indicate,

South Korean society takes the problem seriously and views it as a growing social disease. Public opinion appears to agree with Kim Hyun-Soo, the head of the

Internet Addiction Treatment Center in Seoul, who called the disorder a "national problem.,,16s

This idea may seem strange from an American perspective, and its cross- cultural implications within the context of the Information Revolution deserve examination. Currently most of the English speaking world, with the exception of a few specialists, neither recognizes nor takes seriously the concept of internet addition. However, the oft-told stories of internet-related social problems in South

Korea should not be unfamiliar to experienced netizens in the United States.

Though American culture does not have the same definitions of deviancy related

161 Fulford, July 21, 2003. 162 Moon and Jacobs, September II, 2006. 163 'Online Game Addiction Makes Misfits of Our Children' in the Chosun /Ibo, Februmy IS, 2006. http://english.cbosun.com/w2Idataibtmllnewsl2005121200512160007.html 164 Koehler, JanlIllI)' 2006. 16> Kim Hyun-Soo, as quoted in Moon and Jacobs, September 11,2006.

81 to online experience, the foundations for internet addiction are widely present on an intercultura1level among Information Age societies. Highly developed internet spaces provide online alternatives of identity and experience that have become so inunersive that they can subordinate a user's real world identity. Rather than existing equally between real and virtual spaces, the internet becomes the primary space of personal identity, and thusly the space in which one exists in total. The physical instead of the virtual becomes an othered space of non-primary experience, a fact well-portrayed by the fact that South Korean gamers often refer to the real-world as 'meat space.' This potential, at least, is present cross culturally and should inform our understanding of internet addiction disorder as not being ROK specific.

Though the idea of online addiction may seem relatively benign in concept it has a serious history in South Korea. In October of2002 Kim Kyung-Jae made newspaper headlines when he died after eighty-six straight hours of computer gaming in a Kwangju PC bang. He was only twenty-four years old. A twenty- eight year old man met a similar fate three years later when he died of heart failure following fifty straight hours of Starcraft. l66 A third man managed to play for twenty days without leaving a PC bang by surviving on nothing but instant noodles before he died of malnutrition.167 These cases are but a few of many internet related fatalities that have plagued Korea for the past decade. Extended online gaming has resulted in multiple deaths from such maladies as blood clots,

'66 'S Korean Dies after Games Session' in BBC News, August 10,2005. Author un-cited. http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhiltechnologyl4137782.stnl '67 'Why Do Computer games Claim Lives?' in the Chosun Ilbo, December 16, 2005. Author un­ cited. http://eIlglish.chosun.comlw2ldatalhtmVnewsl200SI21200512160007.html

82 heart failure, and general exhaustion. Additional deaths have been attributed to suicides over the loss of one's internet persona and to internet-related neglect, as was the case of a four-month old infant who died of suffocation while left unattended for five hours while both of her parents were away playing video games at a local PC bang.l68 Violent behavior due to reality disconnection and real-world social alienation are also often attributed to Internet Addiction

Disorder. More common cases involve stories of people who shunned school, work, or other real world obligations in favor of online worlds, and it is actually these instances that seem to concern the Korean media more than stories of cyberspace-related deaths. 169 Tales of obedient and studious offspring turned bad by the corrupting force of the internet are not uncommon and hold a particularly strong power on the South Korean imagination. There is a threat posed to the traditional culture of social responsibility towards both state and family by modes of experience that de-emphasize a subject's real world identity in favor of one's virtual identity. In this way internet addiction is understood as the erosion of real- world society itself rather than a danger to individuals, making it a threat to the entire social structure.

With this in mind it should be no surprise that South Korean society has viewed these cases with a marked concern. There has been a consistent call in recent years for increased regulations on internet gaming, especially regarding young Koreans, and some individuals have even advocated the complete

'68 Lee Yong-Su .• Infant Daughter Dies as Parents Play Online Game,' in the Chosun Dbo, June 14,2005. htto:l/english.chosun.comlw2I datalhtmYnewsl2005061200506140037.html '69 Gluck, November 22, 2002.

83 prohibition of computers for young childrenl70 or the outlawing of online games altogether. 171 The South Korean government responded to the problem by launching the Center for Internet Addiction Prevention and Counseling in April of

2002 and the MIC has been conducting annual surveys of gaming addiction since that same year. NCSoft Corporation is also in the mix, funding roughly forty gaming addiction counseling centers throughout the country. Despite these measures it would be mistaken to assume that Korean society has put up a unified front regarding the dangers of the internet or online video games. The industry still makes up a significant portion of the economic plan that has been pushed by the South Korean government for nearly a decade. Digital technologies therefore exist as a contested space between social and economic concerns that is still being negotiated. It is for this reason that 2007 saw both the creation of a government funded rehab centerlboot camp for online addicts172 and the relaxing of censorship standards for sex, violence, and politically sensitive materials (usually involving war scenarios with North Korea) in online video games by the South Korean

I Game Rating Commission as part of a gaming industry promotion bill. '3 The country is concerned with morality in digital space, but that concern is in continual negotiation with the greater goal of economic prosperity and digital society. A similar connection can be made regarding online sexuality in South

170 'Online Game Addiction makes Misfits of Our Children,' February IS, 2006. 171 Fulford, July 21, 2003. 172 Fackler, Martin. 'In Korea, a Boot Camp Cure for Web Obsession,' in the New York Times, November 18,2007. http://www.nvtimes.com12007111118ItechnologyIl8rehab.html 173 Wong Dong-Hee. 'Sex, Violence, Politics find a Way into Games' in the JoongAhn IIbo, August 2, 2007. htm:l/ioongangdailY.ioins.CDmlarticlelview.asp?aid~28787S7

84 Korea that is being negotiated between personal desires and public ideas of ethical standards and the normative.

It is precisely this kind of dialogue between disparate aspects of the society that allows deviancy to exist online. The digital medium is nothing ifnot filled with potential that is consistently being negotiated and appropriated, both by deviant elements and the governmental forces trying to iron them out in order to impose a normative model. Ifa deviant community is attacked by normative power structures it can remain in existence by moving into the more unregulated frontier of cyberspace. Sometimes this happens in an easy cause-and-effect relationship, as we saw in the shift of prostitution into digital space following the tightening of anti-prostitution laws in the real-world. In this scenario the deviant and the normative are in a state of continually contestation as both sides playa game of cat and mouse in which spaces are subverted, discovered, destroyed, and created. Other times deviancy is less a competition than a rebellion against physical reality itself, as seen in extreme cases of online addiction. In either case deviant behavior, whether we treat it as morally as good, bad or neutral, is facilitated in South Korea by the online medium. It is for this reason that the dominant South Korean discourse (and, hopefully, our own understanding) of digital technologies holds a cautionary note amidst its otherwise grandiose symphony of glorious progress.

Citizen Cyberjournalism: A Micro-history

"The web is no longer an alternative to mainstream media. It is the mainstream media. The massive

85 shift in media selection, to web-based news sources, to a company's own website, underscores a broader trend in the democratization of media and information." - Alan VanderMolen, Edelman Asia-Pacific President

The methods in which Information Age citizens receive knowledge have broadened with increased social embracement of digital technologies. Knowledge

dissemination is no longer necessarily modeled as a pyramid in which the apex

expert instructs a passive mass populace. Digital technologies have offered up an

alternative system that is multi-interactive instead of top-down. Within this

framework netizens become 'prosumers,' a term used to define those people

involved not ouly in the consumption of goods or information but production as

well. To use a familiar American example, let us look to internet media epicenter

Youtube.com. The website is equal parts business and community. It provides no

product other than space and no service other than space moderation, and yet

somehow the company had a high enough perceiVed value to generate a $1.65

billion price tag when Google Inc. acquired it in October of2006. 174 How can this

happen? The answer is that because YouTube's internet traffic is also its

productive workforce the company's space serves as a massive media creation

engine. Its customers create media and consume it simultaneously in a dialogue

with both each other and the company. Rather than the pyramid situation of

knowledge production described earlier, this model is closer to a sphere of

174 Google Inc. Press Release. 'Google to Acquire YouTube for $1.65 Billion in Stock,' October 9, 2006. http://www.google.comJpress/pressreVgoogleyoutube.html

86 continuous exchange. 17S This applies not only to media creation, but also to digital spaces of govemment, business, NGOs, investment, social interaction and identity creation. Anywhere that knowledge is produced can be potentially altered by the introduction of digital technologies.

In South Korea a website exists that is a perfect example of prosumer knowledge creation. In the year 2000 a South Korean reporter named Dh Yeon-

Ho started a web company called 'DhmyNews,' a variation on the English phrase

"Dh my God!" meant to convey both surprise and enthusiasm. His dream was extremely ambitious: undermine the highly conservative 'big three' newspapers of the Chosun Rbo, the JoongAng Rbo, and the Dong-A Rbo by providing an alternative space where the common citizen, not the enfranchised establishment, would control the news. As of this writing in 2008, his creation stands as the backbone of popular South Korean citizen cybeijournalism in which every citizen is a potential reporter and a digital prosumer. His site draws in hundreds of citizen-written news stories per day. These stories are read, fact checked, and ranked by an official staff, once only four members strong but now over fifty. Due to lack of space constraints within the online medium roughly 70% of all articles . submitted to the news organivrtion are published. 176 After being posted the articles are commented on via an interactive, lively and well-trafficked forum in which citizens not only consume the news but simultaneously negotiate the

I7S 'Edelman China Stakeholder Study: Rise of the Skeptic,' presented in Beijing, September 12, 2007, p. 31. http://www.edelman.com/imagelinsights/contentl2007%20China%20Core%20Preseotation% 20FINAL.pdf 176 Gillmor, Dan. We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the People. (Sebastopol: O'Reilly and Associates, 2004). p. 127.

87 definition and character of the field. OhmyNews operates under a simple but novel principal therein: "Citizens can be reporters - if they have a story it deserves to be heard." 177

Oh was born in 1964 in Gokseong, a member of the '386 generation,' a phrase coined in South Korea during the 19908 to mean citizens in their thirties, educated in the 1980s, and born in the 1960s. The expression has more power than pure description, however. It is intimately tied into the pro-democracy movement of the 1980s when South Korean colleges served as a mobilization ground for anti-government organizations. The military dictatorship of General

Chun Doo-Hwan brutally opposed these groups through the oppressive Korean

Centrallntelligence Agency and highly active riot police, forming an environment filled with, as Bruce Cumings put it ' ... the frequent wafting through Seoul of trailing wisps of acrid, burning gas. Tear gas.' 178 Many students were expelled, imprisoned, executed or sent on the run during the time period, a fact that not only affected those directly targeted but also the entire community via associated experience. 179 Whether because of this oppression or despite it, the 386 generation became inscribed with a progressive and reformist political bent eventually validated by success when widespread demonstrations led to South Korea's first democratic elections in 1987. 180 Oh is very much a product of the 386 mold and

171 Cellan-Jones, Rory. 'Citizens Make the News in Korea,' on BBC News, May 4,2006. http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhiltechnologyl4973884.stm 178 Cumings, p. 362. Dash removed from the original quote and period added for the sake of lucidity. 1'19 Cho Kuk. '386 Generation: Today and Tomorrow,' in Korea Focus, March 1,2007. 180 Though probably not the success they would have desired, as Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae­ Jung split the liberal vote and allowed Chun Doo-Hwan's hand-picked successor Roh Tae­ Woo to win the popular vote, preserving the military government until the next round of elections in 1993. However, both Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung would become

88 would come to use the generation's experiences and ideals to inform both his political philosophy and his business model. Speaking in an interview about the core of his success, Oh stated: "Koreans have lived through industrialization, dictatorship and democracy in a short period. People have learned that if they participate they can change society for the better. ,,181

As a reporter Oh seems to have been ahead ofhis time. As a freelance journalist in 1994 he broke the story of No Gun Ri, a village where the U.S. 7t1t

Cavalry carried out the massacre of large numbers of South Korean civilians in

July of 1950. But the intensely conservative South Korean media largely ignored the report due to a long-standing policy of support for U.S. military presence in the country. Five years later the story was retold by Choe Sang-Hun, Charles J.

Hanley, and Martha Mendoza, three reporters for the Associated Press. Their combined coverage created a huge international buzz, including in South Korea where it was technically 'old news,' and earned the trio a Pulitzer Prize in

2000. 182 Oh's previous work on the story was widely ignored.

Afterwards Oh was left dissatisfied with South Korean news operations.

Said he in a 2003 New York Times interview:

Once the American media picked up the story, our mainstream newspapers wrote about No Gun Ri as if it was a fresh incident. This made me rea1ize that we have a real imbalance in our media, 80 percent

presidents in 1993 and 1998, respectively. and it can be said that at the time of this writing that South Korea is thoroughly democratized even though residual effects of the previous dictatorships are still in place. This relatively fast success is commonly attributed to consistent efforts by the 386 generation. 181 Thomas, Pradip. 'ObmyNews: Anyone Can Be a Reporter,' Action 253, October. 2003. 182 Sang-Hun Choe, Charles J. Hanley. and Martha Mendoza. 'Bridge at No Gun Ri' pubIisbed by the Associated Press and featured by the Pulitzer Board. http://www.pulitzer.orglyearI2000/investigative-reoortinglworkslAPI.html

89 conservative and 20 percent liberal, and it needed to be corrected. My goal is 50_50. 183

In response Oh traveled to the United States to study in the master's program at the unlikely school of Christian Regent University, the extremely conservative stronghold of evangelist Pat Robertson. Though it would seem that Oh's choice of universities was incongruent with his ideology, it did prove to be compatible with his basic goals. Oh's time at a right-wing university desiring to change the face of a United States media that was commonly viewed as liberal gave him a thorough education in strategies to overcome the common political bias of the established communications industry.

On February 22, 2000 at 2:22PM, Oh officially launched OhmyNews, putting his strategies to work in what he has referred to as 'guerrilla warfare' against the old order of news media and the near monopolistic power of the privileged reporter over media production. In Oh's first official post on

OhmyNews he addressed his 'news guerillas' and presented three goals to follow in order to change the culture of news: one, 'abolish the threshold to being a reporter,' two, 'break down the set formula for news articles,' and three,

'demolish all waIls that separate media.' 184 His message was of a new kind of space for information created for the general populace and by the general populace. The news would become a living and breathing entity formed not in an editorial office but on the streets and in the home, a network of citizens

183 French, Howard W. 'Online Newspaper shakes up Korean Politics' in the New York Times, March 6, 2003. http://query.nvtimes.comlgstlfullpage.html?res=940DE6D7IS3FF93SA3S7S0COA96S9C8B6 J. 184 Oh Yeon-Ho. 'The Revolt of727 News Guerillas: A Revolution in News Production and Consumption,' translated into English and posted on OlnnyNews February 19,2004. http://englisb.olnnvnews.comlarticleview/article view.aso?at code= 170049

90 prosuming a constant stream of news. It would no longer be separated from mass population but would instead form from within it. As Oh later stated: "We've created a new kind ofjournalism. We call it 21 st-century journalism, two-way journalism. So the readers are no longer passive. They are very active and participate to say what they want to say."18S

By taking the power of news production out of the hands of dogmatic institutions, Oh also hoped to broaden the definitions of news itself. In his opening statement he also wrote: 'In the 20th century, a presidential press conference was news, and tears shed by one's lover the night before were not We will now be restoring that lost half of the news.' 186 OhmyNews was therefore built to also challenge an Enlightenment-informed moralizing narrative of events that judged whether stories were newsworthy. By attempting to turn the masses into a prosuming information collective the hope was to divorce an exclusive institution from control over the definitions of knowledge. No longer would the news be presented as a lecture from an informed other. Instead it would come from within the cultural body in an exercise of interactive democracy. Oh's own words sum up the call best: 'Let us burn away the culture of newspapers in the 20th century, the culture of a media that alienated regular citizens and all that is familiar.' 187

As one can see, OhmyNews was conceptualized as a site dedicated to providing counter-narrative to familiar 20th century conventions. Given this fact it should not surprise us that OhmyNews played a major role during the years

1"" Stout, Kristie Lu. 'Korean Bloggers Making a Difference," on CNN, March 31, 2005. http://www.cnn.comJ2005ffECHl03131/spark.ohmynewslindex.htm! 186 Ob Yeon-Ho, Febrwuy 19,2004. 187 ibid.

91 following its creation in liberalizing South Korean news culture by developing a dissenting digital space. During the buildup and aftermath of the 2002 elections the site boasted internet traffic of over twenty million page views per day by presenting a brand ofjournalism disconnected from the traditionally biased power structures. Citizen journalism provided counter-potential by moving news reporting powers to the common citizen who was, through amateur status and potentially of numbers, comparatively immune to the conservative skewing of news due to pressures from social standing, money or government connections.

That OhmyNews counts well over 30,000 people as contributors suggests that this ideology has galvanized the public into news production. They certainly

don't do it for the money. In 2004 OhmyNews paid its citizen writers on a sliding

scale of $S to $20 per article depending on placement on the website. In contrast, the Chosun Dbo newspaper paid its staff on average between $60,000 and $70,000

per year. However, what OhmyNews lacks in physical capital it makes up for in

symbolic capital. Its correspondents often expressed feelings that the site offered a

chance for the altruistic liberal citizen to make a positive impact on the society; or

at the very least to make one's voice heard. Publication in OhmyNews is

relatively easy, readership is immense, and the associated prestige is surprising

given its amateur nature.

By offering competition to the news-production powers of the controlling

order, OhmyNews created a major alternative to the traditional government

master-narrative, allowing for a bifurcation of news and knowledge. For instance,

in 2002 when two Korean girls were struck and killed by a patrolling U.S. Army

92 vehicle in the village of Samguh-Ri the first inclination of the mainstream South

Korean media was to downplay the incident. Pre-democratization propaganda and conservative political standards regarding incidents involving U.S. Army personnel would have dictated that newspapers leave the story unreported. In pre- digital South Korea this news-item might have simply gone unnoticed by the greater population much as No Gun Ri had, removed from public existence by an unwillingness to add it to the flow of cultural information. In post-digital South

Korea, however, a citizen aware of the tragedy and unconcerned with traditional news conventions found an outlet to publicize the story in OhmyNews.

Knowledge of the event quickly circulated throughout Korean society thereafter, forcing mainstream media to report the story on a national scale. Its dissemination caused an explosion of anti-American sentiment and public protests. These demonstrations built into a national movement over the following months, forcing a public apology by President Bush Jr. and altering the South Korean political landscape into a space where anti-American tendencies could be construed as an electoral virtue. 188

Reports about the Samguh-Ri incident helped establish OhmyNews as a space of dissent where media guerillas fighting in opposition to the conservative spin of the ROK's traditional news agencies could make their voices heard on a national scale. When Dr. Hwang Woo-Suk, at the time considered a national hero for having cloned human embryonic stems cells, was said to have faked his

(.. Kirk, Don. 'Bush Apologizes to Koreans for Killing of2 Oirls by 0.1.'5' in the New York Times, November 28, 2002. htt,p:l/guery.nytimes.com/gst!fulIpage.hhnl?res=990CE4D9IS38F93BA IS7S2ClA9649C8B6 3&n-ToolReferencelTimes%20TopicsIPeopleIBlBush. %200eorge%20W

93 research results the conservative news media lambasted his accuser both as unpatriotic and untruthful. 189 As the story unfolded DhmyNews's citizen journalists challenged these mainstream media opinions and provided an alternate narrative for public consumption. Their efforts helped support further investigation by sources both official and unofficial that quickly proved that Dr.

Hwang fabricated his results, a fact that he admitted soon after. The news agencies that had supported him were left embarrassed or in denial, while

DhmyNews further increased its reputation.

As originally envisioned by Dh Yeon-Ho, this potential of the internet medium for the democratization of knowledge, self-empowerment and the growth of transparency within formerly inaccessible institutions is exciting. However,

DhmyNews and the concept of citizen cyberjournalism are not beyond reproach.

Its downside is that in the rush to overturn existing media some of the positive aspects that made the traditional news-as-lecture style a lasting model of knowledge production are being ignored. In Dh's own words, the revolutionary nature of a prosuming news population burns away the old media, both bad and good. By placing powers of knowledge definition into the hands of the general public, Dh Yeon-Ho and other pioneers in citizen cyberjournalism have changed the possibilities of South Korean news production from an oligarchy to a democracy. The danger therein is that a medium already vulnerable to shifts in public opinion now allows that very public to dictate its boundaries without codified regulation. The filter of professional journalists who, assumedly under

189 OS. Korea Stem Cell Success 'Faked:' A South Korean Cloning Pioneer has Admitted Fabricating Results in Key Stem Cell Research, a Colleague Claims' on BBC News, December 15,2005. http;lInews.bbc.co.ukl2lhilasia-pacific/4532128.stm

94 the dominant epistemology, are supposed to be able to separate news from non- news is made porous IUlder the ObmyNews model. This makes media in general highly vulnerable to cybercascades and brings it into question as a source of

'Truth,' however hollow a construct that might be.

Also of note when speaking of popular cyber journalism is that it has not led to the increased freedom of the press that such a blossoming of possibilities would lead one to expect. While ObmyNews has opened new doors for media expression and certain reform measures, such as the opening of daily presidential press briefings to media outside of the big three newspapers, have been implemented, the ROK government seems willing to only protect the media liberties of those providers sympathetic towards the ruling party. Following the

2002 elections the controlling Uri party embarked upon a series of media

'reforms' that deliberately attacked their conservative detractors and gave monetary aid to liberal news organi7JItions, many of them online. These media regulations landed South Korea on the International Press Institute watch list from

2003 to 2005, labeling the government as potentially hostile to freedoms of the press and warning reporters of possible media suppression. 190 Ironically,

ObmyNews, which ideologically aimed for a balanced approach, has become one

of the Uri party's favored news providers and is strongly identified with highly

liberal tendencies despite its open format. It has challenged the established news

order but has done so by providing alternative rather than balance, making it a

'90 'World Press Freedom Review: 2006, South Korea.' The International Press Institute. bttp://www.freemedia.at/cmslipi/freedom detail.html?country=IKWOOOIIKWOOOSIKWOI31/ &vear=2006

95 liberal-mirror of the very organizations that it sought to bring down. In South

Korea popular news sources for the politically moderate remain hard to find.

But perhaps such criticisms are overly harsh. The very prosuming interactivity of South Korean cyberjournalism that forms an ideal space of dissent has characterized that space as an ideological battleground of social negotiation.

Bias and agenda abound within its digital confines. Because of these constant contestations OhmyNews leaves no possibility for the useful illusion of objective

'Truth' which so informs post-Enlightenment societies. As Professor Yoon

Young-Chul criticized the cyberjournalism movement: "(Citizen reporters) don't want to be objective. They don't pretend to be objective. What's more important for them is to make it clear their viewpoint and advocate to a certain group of people.,,191 Former CNN correspondent Rebecca MacKinnon held a similar view of OhmyNews' participatory journalism but added the defense that: ..... you're better off to have clear biases rather than claiming to be objective when you're not."I92 Though citizen cybeIjournalism within OhmyNews undermines the legitimacy of its own medium, it cannot be doubted that the legitimacy was illusory to begin with. Traditional media claims of objectivity and expertise are usually suspect at best, and we might say that citizen cybeIjournalism simply exposes the imperfect and amateur nature of all 'Truth' when it comes to knowledge production. One might hope that this would lead to a more nuanced understanding of what the idea of truth entails amongst the Information Age

1'1 Yoon Young-Chul, as quoted in Stout, March 31, 2005. 192 MacKinnon, Rebea:a, as quoted in Thacker, Todd. 'OhmyNews a 'Marriage of Democracy aod Technology," on OhmyNews, December 15,2004. htIP://english.ohmynews.com/articleviewlarticle view.asp?menu=&no=20 I 599&rel no= I&b ack url

96 societies following in South Korea's footsteps, but as of yet it is too early to tell.

Given OhmyNews' intense polarization it is questionable even within the country itself.

97 Chapter Four: The Impact of Digital Society on South Korean Politics

As South Korean society has increasingly adopted digital spaces as sites of mainstream cultural exchange, so have ROK politics followed suit The online­ focused Roh presidential election campaign in 2002 proved to the marginalized political citizen, divorced from mainstream conservative power structures, that digital technologies could be used to re-write the ways in which politics operated.

Even before that time netizens within the country were utiIizing cyberspace to alter political participation and effect change. Politicians and government officials have reacted by increasing their own activities online in a game that is part mutual cooperation, part cat and mouse. As the society as a whole moves into the online medium, so is negotiation enabled between political forces, both in and out of cyberspace. Politicians negotiate online communities in order to gain support.

Both non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and socially conscious netizens use digital spaces to open up new political dialogue. The govemment enables negotiation by offering opportunities for increased democratic participation within online social networks of communication and consensus. Negotiation is even opened up on an international level as the online territories, both administrative

(military, govemment) and ideological (culture, history) within digital space become contested. This chapter examines these negotiations to show that as societies expand into digital space, so do the structures that govern move with them to inform and be informed, change and be changed.

President Roh Moo-Hyun and Politics in the Information Age

98 "The development of internet technology has changed the whole political dynamic in South Korea to an extent that the outside world has not yet grasped." - Yoon Yong-Kwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs

When Roh Moo-Hyun was elected as the ROK president in 2002 it proved to the Korean populace that liberal youth support centered upon online activism could win out over the conservative standard. This was not only empowering for his existing netizen supporters but also served as a blaring wake-up call for anyone within the country not already on the digital bandwagon. Digital technologies were proven to have massive potential not only in their already well- known capacities of economics and culture but in politics as well. They could no longer be equated to a shift in product focus or a quaint medium of social exchange by the younger generations but had to be recognized as a force that could alter the lives of every ROK citizen whether they were directly involved in cyberspace or not. Non-netizen portions of the population were jolted into the realization that the society around them had fully joined the Information Age. To drive this point home, Roh granted his first South Korean exclusive interview not to one of the big three print newspapers but to OhmyNews. l93 Oh Yeon-Ho would later remark: "In our battle between the conservative media and the netizens of

Korea, the netizens won."l94 A social shift towards a more citizen-driven, democratized, and Information Age South Korea seemed to be in the works.

193 Borton, James. 'OhmyNews and 'Wired Red Devils," in the Asia Times, November 25, 2004. http://www.atimes.comfatimesfKoreafFK25DgOl.html 194 Oh Yeon-Ho, as quoted in Gluck, Caroline. 'South Korea's Web Guerrillas,' in BBC News, March 12, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.ukl2fhifasia-pacificf2843651.stm

99 This would be a tidy 'and be lived happily ever after' ending to the story.

However, not everything has turned out so rosy, especially Rob Moo-Hyun's term as president. Almost as soon as be entered into office Rob found himself in a political bole that was of his own making. Though Rob was officially elected under the Millennium Democratic Party (MOP) ticket in 2002 be left the party not long after becoming president, taking many MDP members with him and forming the Uri Party. Rob and his supporters thereby earned the animosity of their former allies, wbo saw the break as a betrayal. Following the 2002 election, the MDP and the extremely bostile Grand National Party (GNP) collectively beld 212 of 272 seats in the National Assembly, a number far exceeding the necessary two-thirds majority required to override a presidential veto. To make matters worse, Rob's presidency was publicly tarnished shortly after be took office by a number of corruption scandals involving illegal campaign contributions. Though Rob himself was never implicated, a number of his aides were arrested and his image as an upright reformist was badly damaged.

The downward spiral didn't end there. On May 12 of 2004 Rob was officially impeacbed by an opposing party majority in Parliament for statements made in a news conference where be stated that be would do everything legally permitted to gain votes for his Uri Party in the upcoming elections. The outraged opposition parties claimed that this amounted to illegal campaigning under South

Korean election law and demanded a public apology. When Rob refused they called for an impeachment vote in a move that speaks more to Rob's inability to

100 gain cross-party political support than any major transgression on his part. 19S The event caused a dramatic reaction from those both for and against President Rob. A number of public demonstrations followed as well as a sit-in inside the National

Assembly building by the Uri Party that ended in their pbysical removal by

1 security and the self immolation ofaRob advocate inprotest. % In the end this had little effect on the opposing parties, and on Marcb 12, 2004 Rob was officially impeacbed. He was reinstated two days later by the ROK's

Constitutional Court. Judges reprimanded Rob for violating election neutrality laws but stated that none of his wrongdoings warranted impeachment The court decision was widely popular with the South Korean citizenry, with 84% of the population in favor, and the public view that the impeachment proceedings amounted to little more than a witch-bunt actually caused a spike in Rob's approval ratings all the way up to moderate levels. 197

This public popularity, as it were, would not last As the Rob presidency continued, citizens became increasingly frustrated with his inability to come through on campaign promises. His ''reform" measures, as we have already seen in terms of media freedom, often ended in the reorganization of the problem in favor of his party rather than true change. In early 2007 political infighting and unpopular decisions left Rob with an approval rating of only 10%, and by the end

195 Associated Press. 'Roh Impeachment Vote gets Physical,' on CCN, May 5, 2004. http://edition.cnn.coml2004IWORLD/asiapcf/03/II/skorea.roh/index.html 196 Len, Samuel. 'South Korea Parliament Votes to Strip President of Powers,' in the New York Times, March 12, 2004. http://query.nvtimes.com/gstIfullpage.html?res=9C03E5DAI03EF931A2575OCOA9629C8B6 J. 197 Lee Youngjae. 'Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Impeachment ofRoh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional Perspective.' The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005. http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=IOO3&context=nvulplltwp

101 of the year many ofhis remaining political allies had defected to other parties in preparation for the December elections. 198 He has been the subject of consistent ridicule (even more than is normally heaped upon a president) by both the media and the general populace, both of which generally characterize him as a wishy- washy leader who turned his back upon the desires of his constituency.l99 Despite this disappointing and anti-climactic ending to the Roh presidency, the impact of his digitally-driven election remains prominent in the country's consciousness.

Though Roh has proven to be a lame-duck president, his legacy of extending the political sphere into digital space appears to have been a lasting one.

When Roh ran for president the idea of online campaigning was a novelty.

Now it is a standard aspect of any election strategy. Following the 2002 election

Cyworld's position as home to an estimated 90% of the twenty-year old demographic began to draw attention from many South Korean politicians. Since

2003 the space has been increasingly infiltrated by both those seeking and those currently in government office as a means to gamer youth support that is now seen as vital. This has especially been the case since 2006 when the Roh government reduced the voting age to nineteen, adding 4.2 million young men and women to the potential voting pool. 200 Cyworld has become the advertising ground of choice for those candidates trying to capture their attention. The

'93 'Profile: Roh Moo-Hyun,' 00 BBC News, August S. 2007. Author un-cited. http://newsvote.bbc.co.ukImpaooslpagetoolslprintlnews.bbc.co.ukl2lhiJasia­ pacificl2S3S143.stm ,99 See, for example, the following political cartoons, chosen amoogst dozens of anti-Roh cartoons published in recent years: 'Object Lesson,' in the Chosun Dbo. December 27. 2007. http://english.chosun.comlw21data1html!newsl200712120071227oo27.htmland 'One Man's Frog ... • in the Chosun llbo. Janumy IS. 200S. http://english.chosun.comlw2IdatalhtmIlnewsl200S011200S01IS002S.html 200 Salama, Vivian. 'So Korea: A Social Network Reshapes Politics' on Newsweek.com, July 16. 2007.

102 minihompy of major political figme Park Geun-Hye (incidentally the daughter of notorious dictator Park Chung-Hee) had 620,000 registered frequent visitors during her campaign for the Grand National Party presidential nomination.201

Other politicians, conservative and liberal alike, have forayed into the digital social sphere and become Cyworld users because, as opposing party politician

Park Jin put it, "you have to be if you want to be heard and understood by the younger people. ,,202

Digital campaigning is not limited to Cyworld, however. Though its high traffic and massive user base position Cyworld as a major site of online political participation, candidates recognize that digital space is a medium composed of highly varied audiences and communities. With this in mind, two candidates competing for the liberal presidential nomination in 2007 both employed multiple forms of online media aimed at various audiences in cyberspace. Sohn Hak-Kyu employed an eight-man team that managed a grand total often supporting websites. The group was also charged with constantly creating pro-Sohn digital media content for public consumption. Chung Dong-Young, his chief opponent, utilized a similar 'internet PR' team to manage blogs on both Cyworld and

Playtalk.net.203 Chung also appeared in a web commercial late in the election in which he tried ' ... to mingle with hip hop dancers known as b-boys' in order to

204 appeal to young VOters. While all of this probably amounts to little more than

201 Lee Min-A. 'Web is Again a Key Campaign Tool,' in the JoongAng Daily, September 17, 2007. http://joongangdaily.joms.com/articlelview.asD?aid=2880585 202 Park Jm, as quoted in Salama, July 16, 2007. 203 Lee Min-A, September 17,2007. 204 Arirang News. 'Presideotial Campaign Gets Hot in Cyberspace,' in the Chosun [lbo, December 10, 2007. http://english.chosun.com/w21datalhtmVnewsl2007121200712100002.htmI

103 pandering, it is nonetheless indicative of the mainstream movement of politics into the digital side of South Korean society.

The election ofRoh Moo-Hyun especially showed conservative South

Korean politicians that technology possessed an impressive mobilizing potential that they had yet to tap in to. In an interview following the 2002 elections, GNP floor leader Kim Hyung-O acknowledged his patty's error:

The reason for the GNP's failure is that we did not have anything ready for internet users. The main character of the election was the Internet and the actual hero was the netizen.20S

His words echoed the common sentiment among GNP members and supporters that the patty had lost control of the government due to the internet. As the next round of presidential elections approached the GNP campaign of Lee Myung-Bak showed that the patty was committed to rectifying its former mistake. Lee used the internet heavily as a campaign tool and MBplaza.net, his official webpage, is highly sophisticated. Directed towards an internet savvy public, the site is constructed in a cutesy style and uses fluid flash animation transitions to add to the presentation value. This same technology is featured in the portion of the website featuring Lee's life story. Each section of his personal history is illustrated using cartoon flash animations, a number of them in a 'sprite' style resembling Cyworld avatars.206 Beyond these cosmetic details, one of Lee's three major policies involved the creation of an 'International Science and Business

City' (ISBC). His website described the project thusly:

2M Lee Min-A, September 17,2007. 206 'MB story' on MBplaza.net http://www.mbp\azanet/defhu\1iaboutl'1tyDe==htmIlmbstory&wgrp=13&n=\

104 'The ISBC will be the hub of a "21 51 century creative network," where science, art, culture, and industries converge. It will be Korea's "2151 century Silicon Valley" ... At the ISBC, experts will meet and exchange ideas with other experts ... Research preparation, knowledge creation and propagation/transmission will be carried out systematically. The city will thus become the leader of international knowledge distribution as the central axis of science shifts to Asia, following Simil · arshifts·· mm dustry . ,207

The foundational place of this idea in Lee's platform was a remarkable conservative allocation of digital technologies as a presidential campaign issue, not only as they related to business but also to culture and national identity. It indicates a major shift in the way that politics operates within the ROI<, showing that the political culture is now starkly aware that South Korea is a digital society interested in digital issues. It is likely that this trend of digital politics will continue due to its success, as on December 19,2007, Lee Myung-Bak won the presidential election in a landslide.

However, although digital campaigning and digital politics were prominently featured in the 2007 elections, digital participation was not. Whether because of the first internet president's lame-duck status or due to the invasion of the previously idealistic political space of the internet by a host of mudslinging politicians pandering for votes, the online community was apathetic during the

2 2007 elections. 0S However, what online interest there was came from an older

207 'Science City' on MBplaza.net http://english.mbplaza.netldefau\t/koreal'ltype=htmVcity&m=2&wmp=30 208 'Netizens Give Cold Shoulder to Internet Presidentia\ Election Events,' in the Dong-A Dbo, November 15,2007. Author un-cited. http://english.donga.comlsrv/service.php3?biid=2007111554258

105 demographic more absent from digital politics in 2002. Though in August of2007 interest in the upcoming elections caused internet traffic on political discussion sites to swell to 1,366,000 the majority of users, 33% of the total, were in their

40s. Only 23% came from the traditionally tech-savvy 20s demographic, while people in their 30s accounted for 32% of the total, and people in their 50s 12%.209

In the end, we might conclude that while 2002 was the year in which digital politics had its greatest impact in South Korean elections, 2007 was the year in which they became mainstream. In this way Roh Moo-Hyun's election dramatically changed South Korea in a manner that was unexpected. It did not usher in progressive governmental changes or sweeping reforms, but it did provide the impetus for the full integration ofROK politics into cyberspace. By adding politics to the already digitized realms of business and culture, Roh's election effectively added the last piece of South Korea's Information Age puzzle.

Cyberactivism

"Certainly, politics in Korea is no longer a monopoly of parties and politicians" - HaYong-Cho and Kim Sangbae, 'The Internet Revolution and Korea'

Both before and after digital politics became mainstream, South Korean netizens were participating in political communities within online spaces. The use

of the internet for political discussion regarding topics both within digital space

and the physical world has been commonplace in the new millennium. Top web

209 Kim Jung-Ha and Lee Min-A. 'Cyberspace bas Become a Mature Political Force,' in the JoongAng Daily, September 22,2007. http://joongangdaily.joins.com/articlelview.asp?aid=2880785

106 portals such as Naver and Daum feature major amounts of user -created political dialogue. The exchange and negotiation of knowledge central to the communities within these sites creates an environment in which civil society and democratic participation thrives. Both theoretically and seemingly in actual practice, these spaces increase political awareness and activism within the society via the digital medium's capacity to spark political discussion. This in turn is inductive to cyberactivism, defined here as political activism either centered within or mobilized through the use of digital space.2lO

There are essentially two sources of cyberactivism: those that originate from pre-existing social groups that expand their operations into the digital medium, and those that originate within the medium itself. Examples of both abound within South Korea. While most Information Age societies see the proliferation of new activist groups within cyberspace, those formed in the ROK have had a particularly strong impact on the society. We have already seen this in the case of OhmyNews and its successful efforts for increased media liberalization within the country, but several other major cyberactivist movements have taken place in South Korea over the past decade that merit exploration.

The first of these was taken on by the Citizens' Alliance for the 2000

General Election (CAGE). CAGE's origins were found during the spirit of reform that swept the country in the late 1990s. Forty organi71ltions banded together in

September of 1999 to form the Citizens' Alliance for Monitoring of State

Administration Inspection. This group set itselfup as a public watchdog of both

210 This definition is a variation of the one found in: Ayers, Michael D. and McCaughey, Martha ed. Cyberaclivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice. (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), p. 1.

107 the National Assembly and the nation's political parties to encourage reformist policies. Though its efforts were impeded by government officials, the organization conducted informal surveillance of the activities of the 15tb National

Assembly. Their work was greatly aided by the 1998 Act on the Disclosure of

Information by Public Agencies that allowed for the public monitoring of governmental groups operating within the public sphere in order to encourage the greater theme of transparency in post-IMF society.21l As the 2000 elections approached the group spearheaded the creation of CAGE, creating a civil society organization (CSO) composed of 1,054 separate groups, forming the largest political association in South Korean history.212 On January 24 of that year CAGE set guidelines for the blacklisting of potential candidates for the 2000 general election based upon issues of corruption, violation of election law, tendencies towards regionalism, and human rights abuses. At the same time they released the names of 112 candidates deemed unfit for public service.213

When political parties defied CAGE's wishes and attempted to nominate politicians on the CSO's blacklist, CAGE struck back with lawsuits and campaigns aimed at affecting public opinion. Their tactics were remarkably effective and blocked the nomination offifty-eight blacklisted candidateS.214 For those that couldn't be blocked, CAGE organized a number of real-world demonstrations against the politicians in question. Their efforts were largely

211 Chang Woo-Young and Lee Won-Tae. 'Cyberactivism and Political Empowerment in Civil Society: A Comparative Analysis of Korean Cases' in Korea Journal, Vol. 46 No.4, Winter 2006, p. 145. 212 Chang and Lee, p. 151. 213 Ibid 214 Chang and Lee, p. 152.

108 successful. Fifty-nine of eighty-six blacklisted candidates who made it into the general election were defeated, partially thanks to CAGE's efforts. Outside of the highly regionally-focused Gyeongsang and Cholla provinces, the organization helped to stop the election of nearly every one of its targets,zlS

What makes CAGE so interesting for our purposes is that it carried out many of its efforts through a website featuring candidate profiles, campaign information, online petitions, and the opinions of various netizens via message board discussions. More than just mildly popular, the site received an average of

150,000 to 240,000 hits per day during election season, an indication of how successful the organization was at disseminating their message.216 More importantly, the site received 250 reports of 'candidate irregularities' from citizens, a number that shows the successful mobilization of ROK citizens as informed monitors of the political process. Public support was further indicated by the fact that the web page generated nearly $300 million in online contributions.217 Other than activities centered upon CAGE's website itself, the organization was also present online in the form of e-mail communication, cyber newsletters, and online efforts to increase netizen voter turnout. Though its protest activities took place primarily in the real-world, CAGE was the first South

Korean CSO to show significant and impactful involvement in cyberactivism.

Another major example of cyberactivism in which online mobilization led to real world demonstrations exists in the previously mentioned Samguh-Ri story reported upon by OhmyNews. Though the report of the two teenage girls who m Ibid. 216 Ibid. 217 Ibid.

109 were struck and killed by a U.S. armored vehicle is a fundamental instance of cyberactivism in its very origin of politically-minded cyberjournalism, the nature of the protests that followed mark it as a significant event in South Korean digital politics. Following the acquittal of the American soldiers involved in the incident by a military court on November 19,2002, a call for action flared up in digital space. A cyberjournalist using the handle 'Ang.Ma' posted a message on

OhmyNews calling for a candlelight vigil in protest to the court's decision. Four days later concerted anti-U.S. military rallies involving thousands of people participating in candlelight protests took place in seventeen South Korean cities.

Shortly thereafter these protests spread and grew, becoming a weekly event throughout much of the country.218 Three years later demonstrations were still taking place in Seoul and caused national news when one meeting ended in a march to the U.S. Embassy and a confrontation between citizens and riot police.219 All of this stemmed from a single message originating within South

Korean cyberspace.

Though noteworthy, both of these instances of cyberactivism pale in comparison to the activities of'Nosamo,' a Korean acronym for 'gathering of people who love Roh Moo-Hyun.' Though affiliated with Roh and instrumental to his presidential election, experts tend to agree that Nosamo was less a eso centered upon Roh himself as much as one centered upon what Roh represented:

218 Hauben, Ronda. 'The Rise ofNetizen Democracy: A Case Study ofNetizens' Impact on Democracy in South Korea.' http://www.co!umbia.eduI-rh120/0ther/misclkorean­ democracy.txt 219 Hwang Dae-Jin. 'Supreme Court Rules Candlelight Vigils megal,' in the Chosun Dba, February 22, 2005. http://english.chosun.comlw2Idatalhtmllnewsl200502120050222004I.htm!

110 'For Nosamo activists, Roh Moo-Hyun embodied symbolic meanings as a ''victim of regionalism" and a ''resistance fighter struggling against invested groups who enjoy Cold War anti-communism." What Nosamo supported was the necessity of political reform symbolized by Roh Moo-Hyun rather than Roh Moo-Hyun as a person. ,220

It was the common belief in South Korean society that Roh was defeated in the

1999 Busan National Assembly election due to unreasonable regional bias among citizens within the region, a common problem in ROK politics. Following that defeat, citizens responded to the seeming injustice by forming Nosamo as an online political fan club for Roh Moo-Hyun, the first of its kind in South Korea.

While the CSO only had 500 members upon its conception in May of2000, less than one year later that number had ballooned to 4,000 thanks to online recruiting efforts. In August of2002 membership reached 50,000, and when the Roh presidential election took place in December it was over 100,000.221

Nosamo's fame does not lie in its numbers, however. The group stands as the one of the most successful CSOs in South Korean history and is very likely the greatest triumph of citizen cyberactivism in the world due it is incredible mobilization of support for Roh Moo-Hyun. Though a considerable underdog in the MOP primary elections in 2001, Roh went on to win the nomination largely through Nosamo's successful mobilization of voters via internet and cellphones during a sixteen-city nationwide campaign tour.222 Nosamo was even more active in the days before the 2002 presidential election, serving as Roh' s primary

220 Chang and Lee, p. ISS. 221 Ibid 222 Chang and Lee, p. 157.

111 campaign engine. Their website was the main mobilization point for Roh support, featuring interactive agenda fonnation, discussions on election issues, event planning, online pro-Roh propaganda implementation, online fund raising, and numerous fonns of pro-Roh political mobilization. As I described at the beginning of this work, when Roh appeared to be behind in exit polls on Election Day it was

Nosamo's activities that resurrected his presidential bid through a digital mobilization campaign. The group is widely credited with winning the presidency for him. Various sources of news media, not only in South Korea but also internationally, reported on Nosamo's successful efforts as revolutionary; a sign of the potential of digital technologies in Infonnation Age politics the world over.223 That cyberactivism could decide an election came as a revelation both to the domestic audience and onlookers from abroad.

Rather unfortunately, cyberactivism in the Nosamo vein is considerably more limited today than it was in 2002. Many of the CSO's actions were technically illegal according to Article 93 of the South Korea's Public Official

Election Act which prohibits the online posting of materials either in opposition or support of political candidates within 180 days of an election.224 In 2002 the

National Election Commission (NEC), South Korea's governing electoral body, only had one employee assigned to supervise the internet, meaning that organjzations such as Nosamo could act with relative unconcern for potential government reprisal due to monitoring limitations. In 2007 the NEC's cyber-

223 I personally found references to the election prominently featured in American, Japanese and British newspapers and suspect that the event was reported to a significantly larger audience than that. 224 Public Official Election Act, Article 93, p. 457. http://www.nec.go.kr/englishlreslPublic Official Election.pdf

112 monitoring capabilities were on a different level and included a twenty-one person full-time team augmented by 900 part-time employees.22S Various activists have protested the election law these officials have been charged with upholding as a violation of free speech, and in 2007 six civic groups filed a suit demanding its repeal upon constitutional grounds that is still pending. In the meantime the

NEe has been deliberately lax in enforcement of the law in order to allow for some degree of online activism. Even though over 46,000 online election law transgressions were recorded by the NEe from late 2006 to 2007 only 26 led to official investigation.226 Still, the threat of disciplinary action is genuine and could potentially shut down most election-based cyberactivism within the country.

Fortunately there are still no limitations upon non-election based cyberactivism activities and the phenomenon continues to flourish in South

Korean cyberspace. In 2005 South Korean students angered over repressive haircut regulations in the country's high schools formed an online community over 70,000 members strong. The group used the online medium to organize physical protests against the practice, leading to highly publicized confrontations with both teachers and police.227 In another high school instance of cyberactivism, in 2007 video footage of a teacher beating two students with a bamboo stick was captured by a student's mobile phone and uploaded onto the internet. The act initiated numerous online political debates over the use of corporal punishment as well as a general netizen outrage that resulted in a public statement by the school

225 Lee Min-A, September 17, 2007. 226 Kim and Lee, September 22, 2007. 227 Hauben, 'The Rise ofNetizen Democracy.'

113 and an apology by the offending teacher.228 In that same year the opening of an online website specializing in the sale of dog meat in the city of Sungnam caused a major online reaction. City officials were flooded with e-mails and online message board posts demanding that the site be shut down, while reports of the incident sparked nationwide cyber-debates regarding the practice of eating dogs.229 These are but a selected few of many instances ofnetizen cyberactivism in the past few years. South Korea's internet has proved to be a popular space for citizen political mobi1ization, negotiation and participation, making South Korea a pioneer in Information Age civil society, both historically and contemporaneously.

The Growing South Korean e-Government

(A) major goal of Korea's e-government is to democratize the administration in order to realize cyber democracy. To this end, the Korean government is actively inviting citizens' participation ... - Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs

The history of South Korea is, as I have previously mentioned, one of dictatorship rather than democracy. This is true both on a practical and a discursive level. In terms of public sphere theory, South Korean principals of critique were displaced from the social mainstream through large-scale state intervention. Additionally, the political pull of major chaebol further eroded the

228 'High School Beating Video Prompts Outrage,' in the Chosun Ilbo, November I, 2007. http://english.chosun.comlw2Idatalhtmllnewsl2007l112007l1010024.html 229 'Netizens in Uproar over Online Dog Meat Seller,' in the Chosun 1160, July 4, 2007. Author un-cited. http://english.chosun.comlw21datalhtmllnewsl2007071200707040020.html

114 potential for dissent via control of both capital and, as I discussed in regards to citizen cyberjourna1ism, media. In total:

•... politics became something managed and coordinated between political leaders, parties and interest groups, rather than a process where numerous individuals participate for socially important discussions and decision-makings.23o

For most of South Korean history, therefore, critique was an underground action, private rather than public. This slowly began to change after Hwan Chun-Doo relinquished control of the government in 1988. Since that time liberalization, both social and economic, and democratization have been growing trends in the country, particularly after the spirit of reform following the IMF crisis.231

In addition to structural changes to politics and economics, the South

Korean social embracement of the Information Age has been instrumental to the process of increased democratization. Historically, technologies focused on communication have, since the introduction of the printing press, proved instrumental in the liberalization of society. They have served as connective apparatuses that increase community potential, weaving the society into a greater web of exchange. Communications technologies also tend to de-center the major localities of politics, economics and culture by creating links between the metropole and the periphery, both increasing inclusion offormerly isolated communities into these power structures and allowing for their liberal

230 Park Hyeong-Jun, p. 424. 231 This is not to suggest that South Korea is an extremely h'beralized society by world standards, and the country does still have many of the social and political tendencies of the military era. However, I would argue that the move towards liberalimtion has been consistent over the past two decades and that considerable progress has been made in that direction.

115 participation therein.232 As these technologies became more advanced and ubiquitous, so did their effects. Digital technologies in South Korea are no exception and foster all of the above to a degree previously impossible.

Furthermore, the inherent interconnectivity of digital space has allowed for increased technological impact on South Korean social hierarchies by creating a neutral space of exchange, therefore undermining systems of vertical control within the society.233

Bearing these effects in mind, we can qualify digital technologies as adept tools for the creation and/or augmentation of the public sphere. If we can distance ourselves from the traditional prioritization of face-to-face interaction we see that the internet serves as an immense site of equal participation and social dialogue that challenges Habermas' characterization of the modern public sphere as purely a site of manipulative publicity.234 Indeed, the digital public sphere could be called a return of the previous form of the bourgeois public sphere that Habermas hoped for. We have already seen aspects of the social side of this return in the form of cyberjournalism, cyberactivism, online civil society organizations, and the high amount of political activity that takes place on South Korea's internet.

Clearly digital culture in the ROK has created conditions in which inclusive political debate is commonplace. The only question left to answer in order to

232 Barry, Andrew. 'Lines of Communication and Spaces ofRuie,' in Foucault and Political Reason: Liberal;""', NeG-liberalism and RaJiona/lties of Government, p. 124. '''' Park Hyeong-Jun, p. 426. 234 Habermas, Jurgen. The Struclllral Transformation ofthe Public Sphere: An Inquiry into Q Category ofBourgeois Society. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), p. 200.

116 show the existence of a traditional public sphere in South Korea is whether the gove=ent is receptive to the public opinion created by this civil society.235

The answer, in short, is that the ROK gove=ent is not only receptive to public opinion but enthusiastic about increased citizen involvement in politics.

Ever since the Kim Dae-Jung administration embarked on a campaign of increased gove=ental digitalization, ROK gove=ent officials have been utilizing digital technologies to encourage dialogue and negotiation between the state and its citizens to create the conditions of a political public sphere.236 Their efforts fall under the general umbrella of 'e-gove=ent,' a term elaborated as follows:

"E-Gove=ent" refers to the use by gove=ent agencies of information technologies (such as Wide Area Networks, the Internet, and mobile computing) that have the ability to transform relations with citizens, businesses, and other arms of gove=ent. These technologies can serve a variety of different ends: better delivery of gove=ent services to citizens, improved interactions with business and industry, citizen empowerment through access to information, or more efficient gove=ent management. The resulting benefits can be less corruption, increased transparency, greater convenience, revenue growth, and/or cost reductions.237

Though both internal gove=ent digitalization and non-interactive citizen to gove=ent action is certainly taking place within South Korea, for our purposes

23. Habennas, p. 31. 236 Kim Min-Bae. 'Kim Calls for e-Government for 2002,' in the Ghosun [lbo, December 24, 200 I. htm:llenglish.chosun.comlw2 I datalhtmIlnewsl200 I 121200 I 12240207.html 237 World Bank Group. 'Definition ofE-Govemment' http://go.worldhank.orgIMIJHE0Z280

117 we will be focusing on ROK attempts to improve government-citizen interaction as it relates to the creation of a political public sphere.238

To begin with, the South Korean e-government has pursued this goal by increasing citizen accessibility to government via digital space. In 2002 a focused e-government initiative led to the online availability of official government documents and databases to all South Korean netizens. Since that time nearly every piece of information relevant to government operations has been placed online for viewing and/or downloading by the general populace, greatly increasing the transparency of government. Citizens have also been given online access to gove=ent hierarchies both national and local, making it easy to contact representatives and access the particulars of government structures. These efforts essentially take public sphere theory one step further towards democratization than originally envisioned. Even at its best, interaction between the state and the public was a ground-up exchange: in order to create ideal democratic conditions the state was supposed to passively accept and act upon wishes dictated by the public sphere. The idea of a mutual exchange in which the gove=ent openly provided access to its inner workings in order to encourage highly-informed political participation among citizens was not factored into the potential equation. In post-IMF South Korean e-government, however, this phenomenon has been foundational.

238 Examples of the former include electronic program approval and the digilali:mtjon of 88.9"10 of all government documents as of2007. Examples of the Iatter include such programs as online tax filing services, computer education, 'IT Ethics' classes in public schools and general efforts to increase cyher security. See Ahonen and O'Reilly, p. llS-131.

118 This availability of government infonnation in digital space initiated by

Kim Dae-Jung was later expanded into participatory e-democracy by the Roh administration. At his first cabinet meeting on April 17, 2003, the world's first internet president made the cause of increased e-government a priority agenda.

Shortly thereafter government officials established a thirty-one point plan referred to as the 'e-Government Roadmap' for increasing digital participation in government structures. It was largely successful, achieving twenty-nine of those goais.239 One successful ambition, however, stands out from the others and is of particular interest to the topic at hand. This was the April 2005 creation of www.epeople.go.kr.aninteractive digital ombudsman service in which the political suggestions and concerns of citizens are met online. Public petitions are not only submitted and reviewed through this site but responded to via the digital medium, usually within only a few days time. Citizens can also use the web page to present policy proposals to the government, a form of democratic participation encouraged through an official awards system for 'excellent suggestions.' Perhaps more importantly, epeople.go.kr serves as a space not only of actua1 political action but also of interactive dialogue between the government and its citizens.

The site includes both forums and electronic surveys used 'to collect public

opinions regarding proposed legislations, revised bills, and new policies. ,240

239 Ministry of Government Adminis1ration and Home Affairs. 'Five-Year History ofRoh Adminis1ration's E-Government Efforts and Future of tile System.' Korea e-Government Webzine, Vol. 5, October 2007. htto:!/www.egov.go.kr/engIWebzinelwebzine.jsp?vol=200703&paper=korea 01&no=119156 5542122 240 Ministry of Government Adminis1ration and Home Affairs. 'Online Citizen Participation Portal.' Korea e-Government Webzine, Vol. I, October 2006. http://www.egov.go.kr/englWebzinelwebzine.jsp?vol=200601&paper-services 01&no=1162 805969921

119 South Korea's e-government has therein established a line of constant communication and negotiation with its citizens. In this way the potential of

Information Age exchange has redefined the relationship of government to the public sphere. With the production of political knowledge no longer limited to mass media the traditional public sphere as illustrated by Habermas returns.

Though not entirely erased, the hold of media-driven consumer politics has been extremely weakened in South Korea by the Information Revolution and the forms of communicative e-government it has enabled. Not only has the South Korean government shown itself to be receptive to the input of its newly blossomed digital public sphere, it has actively encouraged governmentlnetizen interaction.

We can thusly conclude that Habermas' identification of the modern public sphere as non-democratic cannot be held up as valid when applied to South

Korea. Ifanything, the combination of widespread political discussion in digital social spaces and e-government initiatives have created an e-democracy in which participation is more prevalent and available than anywhere before in human history.

Despite the inherent utopian implications of this political transformation, it is important to note that it is driven by government self-interest. The implementation of e-democracy has gone hand-in-hand with the citizen-driven informatization of society and the two are co-necessary in the creation of advanced digital cultures. For citizens to be the primary force behind digitalization instead of the state they have to be significantly active within the political process. The appearance of a communicative e-government that

120 encourages dialogue helps to foster a civil society and increase citizen participation. Under the right circumstances this also proves to be beneficial for the state, especially if it is endorsing a knowledge-based economy, through citizen internalization of the informati7Btion process as an act of personal gain (freedom, money, power, etc.). By providing public incentives the government brings the self-interest ofROK citizens regarding the Information Revolution into alignment with its own, namely increased economic prosperity and international glory. This allows government to take a hands-off approach as its citizens mobilize themselves to carry out aims in line with state goals.241

Still, no matter how it originated the e-government system has great potential for the betterment of South Korean society as a whole. In a cyclical process, citizen participation in e-democracy ideally promotes greater coherency of state and public interests, theoretically resulting in a relatively harmonious existence between the two. Though whether this ideal will be realized is still in question, there can be no doubt that South Korea's commitment towards building a digital society has changed the ways in which the government operates and interacts with its citizens.

Spaces ofInternational Contestation

"If we don't kill the Chinese they will grow up to harm Korean players." - 'Fifth Finger,' South Korean Lineage player

24' Park Hyeong-Jun, p. 434.

121 Though so far this study of the effects of the Information Revolution on

South Korean politics has limited itself to ROK domestic affairs, digital technologies within the country have international political implications as well.

Though the internet is socially divided into rough spheres of common language it essentially exists as a continuous whole in which different countries/groups/organizations exist together as sub-communities of a greater aggregate. Because digital space is a network of information at its core, each of these sub-communities is continuously involved in the production and dissemination of knowledge. This phenomenon tends to be conducive to the formulation and/or proselytizing of political ideologies. When opposing ideologies come into contact with each other in digital space conflict ensues.

Oftentimes this takes place as debate amongst netizens within the same basic political organization, usually defined by but not limited to the nation state. This in turn holds the potential for dialogue and negotiation that is part of the democratic process. However, when online conflict takes place across real-world political boundaries between communities with separate citizenships it is less conducive to debate than to ideological combat. The in-group/out-group dynamic of real-world political boundaries is thusly manifested in virtua1-world sites of heated international competition in which a greater consensus is difficult to reach due to competing nationalisms, In this case the internet serves not as a space of political enablement within a general unit, but rather a space of political warfare amongst non-affiliated communities seeking ideological domination.

122 South Korea's digital society has been in off-and-on conflict with various online communities over the years, though for the sake of brevity this study discusses only two. Of all of these 'cyberwar' opponents, the People's Republic of China has prompted the most netizen action. China's emerging digital culture, hostility in recent 20th century history, ideological differences, and status as one of South Korea's chief economic rivals have all served to cause tensions between the two countries in cyberspace. What marks this conflict as particularly dangerous is that the Chinese-Korean cyberwar is equal parts community vs. community and government vs. government.

In the year 2000 the PRC formed a group called 'NET Force,' a military hacker unit assigned with 'launching cyberattacks and distributing harassing information. ,242 Composed of over a million 'red hackers,' this group has been accused of numerous hacking attempts against China's political rivalS.243 At first most of these were directed at the United States, Japan and Taiwan, but in 2004 the South Korean Institute for Defense Aualysis was hacked by a Chinese source.244 It would prove to be the first of many Chinese hacking attempts on

South Korean cyberspace. A year later Korean intelligence traced the hacking of ten South Korean governmental agency websites, including the National

Assembly and Atomic Energy Research Institute, to China.24S Various other

Chinese hacking attempts against both government institutions and private

242 'Alert Issued for Chinese Cyberattacks,' in the Chosun [lbo, January 2, 200S. Author lDl-cited. http://english.chosun.com/w2IdatalhtmJlnewsl200S011200S01020007.html 243 The Chinese government has officially denied knowledge of any such attacks, though circumstantial evidence suggests utherwise. 244 Jung Sung-Ki. 'MiIitaIy Issues Warning on Chinese Hackers,' in the Korea Times, January I, 200S. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/newslnationl2008/01120516537.htmI 24' Ward, Andrew. 'China Blamed for Cyher Sabotage in S Korea,' in the Financial Times, May 3, 2005. http://www.ft.com/cmslslO/d7acl66e-bcOa-lld9-817e-OOOOOe25llcS.htmI

123 industry followed shortly thereafter.246 Finally, in January of2008 a nationwide military alert was issued in South Korea when several instances of attempted hacking were detected on the computers of South Korean soldiers. ROK military security authorities reacted quickly and managed to trace the hacking attempts to

China, sparking a new round of national fears of NET Force cyberattacks.247

This consistent barrage by Chinese hackers (whether official or unofficial) has done little to improve relations between the two societies. Though antagonisms between Chinese and South Korean citizens have been historically strong over the past half-century, the increasing speed of China's Information

Revolution has made hostilities between the cultures particularly high over the last few years. To give a few examples, in 2006 video game tensions over 'gold farming,' or the accumulation of in-game virtual goods as real-world commodities sold for profit, by Chinese players in Lineage led to an organized massacre carried out by South Korean players. Rather than condemning the action, NCSoft responded by siding with its Korean users and embarking upon a campaign to block Chinese IP addresses from accessing the game.248 In another cyberwar event, during the 2007 Asian Winter Games in Changchun, China a group of female South Korean medalists held up signs during their award ceremony that spelled out "Mount Paekdu is our territory," referring to the hotly contested

246 See both: 'Chinese Cyber Criminals Attack Korean Bank,' in the Chosun Ilbo, December 28, 2005. Author un-cited. http://english.chosun.comlw21datalhtmYnewsl20051212oo512280025.htm!and 'Hacken; Threaten Cyber Money Sites,' in the Chosun Dbo, October 10, 2007. Author un-cited. http://english.chosun.comlw21datalhtmYnewsl2oo7101200710100013.btm! 247 'Alert Issued for Chinese Cyberattacks,' in the Chosun Ilbo, Janumy 2, 2008. Author un-cited. http://english.chosun.comlw21datalhtmYnewsl200801120080102ooo7.htm! '48 Fifield, Anna. 'South Korean Garnen; Stage Online Massacre of Chinese,' in the Financial Times, Februuy 21, 2006. htto://www.ft.comIcmslslOIba7904ca-a27e-llda-9096- 0000779e2340.html

124 historical site on the border between China and North Korea. The act caused a stir within Chinese cyberspace. Angry netizens retaliated to the Korean protest by digitally altering the message to mockingly read 'Mars is our territory,' precipitating a new round of angry exchanges between the two digital communities.249

From the ROK society's perspective, however, the greatest online contest between China and Korea has been over the historical portrayal of the ancient kingdom of Koguryo formerly located within the modern day borders of both the

PRC and DPRK. In 2002 arguments between Chinese and Korean historians over the circumstances of the kingdom's founding began to occur as part of a greater overall attempt by the PRC to claim the ancient land as culturally their own. PRC historians declared it was founded by a Chinese prince who fled the Zhou

Dynasty conquests, while Korean historians asserted that Koguryo arose from the region's indigenous people independent ofChlnese civilization.25o The conflict, which continues to hold major implications for both nations in terms of national identity construction and the right to territory, boiled over from academia into a wide number of social spaces, most of which are beyond the scope of this study.

In terms of conflicts in cyberspace, China's claim to the ancient kingdom sparked an avalanche of nationalistic responses from South Korean netizens. As one ROK user countered: 'as a sma1l country, we have suffered countless hardships and humiliation at the hands of stronger nations, but the spirit of Korea can never be

24' Ahn Yonson. 'China and the Two Koreas Clash Over Mount PaekdulCbangbai.' Japan Focus, July 27,2007. httn:/liapanfocus.orglproductsldetailsl2483 2>0 Mansourov, Alexandre Y. 'Will Flowers Bloom without Fragrance? Korea-cbinese Relations.' Hmvard Asia Quarterly, Vol. 9, No.5, FaIl 2005. http://www.asiaquarterly.comlcontentlview/174/43/

125 extinguished. ,251 The general netizen population of South Korea flooded forums and government webpages with messages supporting the Korean position, and more than a few online organizations sprang up to support the cause.2S2 China's online community has been less active on the issue but was quick to protest the airing of 'Taewangsansing,' an ROK drama set in Koguryo that firmly claims the kingdom as Korea's own, leading to a government press-blackout of the shoW.2S3

History is also a source of contention between South Korea and Japan, the country's second major digital adversary. Popular characterizations of the colonial period and actions by the Japanese government during World War II remain a major point of diplomatic contention between the societies. Both govemments have uti1ized cyberspace to advance their own agenda, disseminating their own versions of the 'official' history and/or discrediting their opponent through the digital medium.254 The netizen populations of both nations have also been involved in the back-and-forth argument for years. For instance, in 2007 a

CNN.com survey asking "Should Japan apologize again for its World War II military brothels?" caused a stir in both digital societies, instigating a major war of words in both Japanese and Korean cyberspace.2SS A more extreme case of

2>1 Quoted in Ahn Yonson. 'Competing Nationalism: The Mobilization of History and Archeology in the Korea-China Wars Over Koguryo/Gaogouli.' Japan Focus, February 6, 2006. ht!p:lljapanfocus.orglproducts!detailslI837 m "Let's Protect Goguryeol" in the Doug-A llbo, August 17, 2004. Author un..:ited. http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2004081868848 2>3 'Korean Historical Soaps Upset China,' in the Chosun Ilbo, February 5, 2007. Author un..:ited. http://eng1ish.chosun.com/w2Idatalhtmllnewsl200702l2007020S0013.hnnl 254 For example, See: Kim Jun-Yong. 'Korea's Position on the Distortion of History by China and Japan,' on Korea.net, Semptember 29, 2006. http://www.korea.netlNewsllssuesf.ISSUeDetaiIView.asp?board no= 13648 and 'Press Conference by Prime Minster Junichiro Koizwni on the Passage of the FY2006 Budget.' http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeecbl2006/03127yosan e.hnnl ", 'Comfort Women Survey Inflames Online Tempers,' in the Chosun Ilbo, March 6, 2007. http://english.chosun.com/w2Idatalhtmllnewsl2007031200703090007.html

126 Japanese-Korean cyberwarfare occurred in 2001 when the Japanese Ministry of

Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXl) was set to give final adoption approval of a textbook written by a right-wing group with aspirations for historical 'reform.' In response, South Korean netizens launched a massive DOS

(Denial of Service) attack on Japanese cyberspace. The websites operated by the ministry, the right-wing group, the publisher, and selected newspapers who supported the textbook's approval were buried in an avalanche ofROK internet traffic, effectively making them non-functional during the protest

Conflicts between the two nations regarding claims to territory have also been hot topics in digital space. In 2005 consistent efforts by a South Korean digital CSO called the 'Voluntary Agency Network Korea' (VANK) convinced

Google Earth to change its labeling of the body of water separating Japan and the

Korean Peninsula to the "East Sea" rather than the "Sea of Japan," both common international names for the region. Furious Japanese netizens responded by both hacking into VANK's webpage and burying the site in message board posts, successfully shutting the webpage down and destroying a number of virtual documents.256 The societies are also locked in virtual combat over control of the

Liancourt Rocks within the East Sea/Sea of Japan. Though largely a moot point given that this small island chain has a population ofzero and holds no major strategic value, both nations have been attempting to claim the territory as their own in recent years. The South Korean government has launched a comprehensive website in several languages detailing their claim to the chain,

256 • Korean Cyber Patriots Under Japanese At1ack,' in the Chosun /Ibo, August 21, 2005. Author un-cited. http://english.chosun.comlw2Idatalhtmlfnewsf200508f200508210001.htm!

127 decisively referring to the rocks as Korean territory. 257 In tum, netizens in Japan have launched a number of websites ridiculing the Korean stance. South Korean netizens responded by declaring a 'cyber- Imjinwaeran,' referring to the war between the Chosun Dynasty and the forces of Toyotomi Hideyoshi that took place in the late 16th century. A firefight of derogatory websites, DOS attacks, message board posts and offensive uses of digital media followed shortly thereafter.258 The larger ideological conflict between the two states has shown no signs of slowing down, and when netizens of both countries mingle together in the

(mostly) borderless landscape of cyberspace conflict continues to be a common outcome.

When looking at these two examples of political cyber-conflict we find that the movement of the political sphere into digital space (or vise versa) has the potential to enable international ideological conflict through the enabled

intermixing of forces representing different political affiliations. Real-world points of contention have become well represented in digital space as societies

have moved ouline; perhaps even more so than in the physical world because of a

lack of spatial barriers separating the proponents of various nationalistic stances.

Because of this, international cyberspace has become a battlefield between nation

states. This fundamentally changes the nature of political contestation between

nations, allowing for widespread antagonistic action by civilian populations

against the virtual territories of their 'enemies.' In this way the political hang-ups

!57 Cyber Dokdo. htto://www.dokdo.go.krl "8 Koehler, Robert and Youn Sung-Ho. 'Korean Netizens to Launch 'Mass Attacks' on Japan,' in the Chosun Ilbo, January 12, 2004. http://english.chosun.comlw21datalhtmVnewsl2004011200401120009.html

128 of various nationalities are not only translated into the online medium by the

Information Age creation of digital spaces but also intensified by them. While it is possible that these conflicts might eventually be negotiated through online action within a transnational public sphere into international consensus and cooperation, in the present day that seems unlikely.

Observant readers may have noticed that North Korea does not appear in the above discussion of South Korea's overall cyberwar. This is because the

Democmtic People's Republic of Korea has no digital culture, something that is addressed in the conclusion to this work. Despite this fact, angst over the possibility of North Korean acts of cyherterrorism exists within the society, something that showcases how fully real-world political realities inform digital spaces. In 2006 the Korean military recorded forty hacking attempts and 949 viruses. The numbers left officials extremely concerned. Due to a military trend of increased usage and reliance upon digital technologies that has taken place over the past decade, a well-placed computer attack could leave South Korea nearly defenseless. To further complicate the situation, online protection systems consistently lag behind the speed of innovation and lead to gaps in security. ROK military officials feared that the nation's military secrets could be vulnerable to hacking attempts by other nations, citing North Korea as a potential cyber- threat. 259 From the South Korean perspective this made sense, as two years earlier the South Korean Ministry of Defense issued a public statement that claimed the

DPRK had tmined 600 hackers to conduct cyberattacks against North Korea's

". 'Military Remains Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks,' in the Chosun [lbo, July 20, 2007. Author un­ cited. ht!D:llenglish.cbosun.comlw2ldatalhtm1loewsl2007071200707200022.btml

129 2 enemies. 6() Whether valid or not, it seems that ROK mistrust towards the DPRK has, like all other nationalistic conflicts, predictably extended itself into cyberspace. The only thing keeping a cyberwar from erupting between the two populations is the absence North Korea's society on the battlefield.

260 Lee Soo-Jeong. 'North Korea has 600 Computer Hackers, South Korea Claims,' on Security Focus, October 5, 2004. http://www.securltyfocus.com/newsl9649

130 Conclusion

The Information Revolution is a continuing process, not just in South

Korea but in the entire world. Much like the Industrial Revolution that preceded it, there is little doubt that digital technologies will spread and alter all but the most remote points of the globe, out of necessity if not desire. These technologies will alter the operational landscape of every society they touch through the revolutionary introduction of increased informatization and inter-connectivity, just as they have changed the ROK. At the close of 2007 the country is markedly different culturaIly, politically, and economically than it was only a decade before. Many of these changes would most likely have taken place without the cataIyst of the IMF crisis and South Korea's concerted embracement of the

Information Age, as the ROK was already moving towards an advanced communications infrastructure before the Asian Financial Crisis took place.

However, there can be little doubt that the crisis created circumstances in which change became a necessity, shoving the country into transformative flux. The end result is the world's most wired nation; a place that can sometimes seem more like science fiction than reality.

Though the Information Revolution is still unstable and incomplete, the

South Korean digital experience is very much a rough blueprint of transition from the Industrial Age to the Information Age; one that most of the world's nations are either making or will soon be in the process of making. South Korea has been the most successful nation in the world when it comes to transforming itself into a digital society, and it has done so in a very short time. The country's efforts in

131 technological implementation and general reaction to digital technologies can thusly serve to infonn the rest of the world about what the next era of human development means, how it can be harnessed, and how it should be approached.

Though digital South Korea does not provide an absolute set of directions for the

Information Revolution, its knowledge can be highly educational for preparing other societies for what comes next.

The South Korean case is, however, unique in its historical circumstances.

As this study has shown, a great number of factors came together to condition the country's embracement and pursuit of cutting edge digital technologies to the degree required to quickly build a digital culture. The case has been made throughout this work that digital technologies can and do change the world in which we live. However, different cultures react to the Information Revolution in unique ways. The history, geography, politics, economics, and culture of a people all playa part in detennining how they negotiate with the changing world. The

South Korean master narrative (and to a lesser extent the master narratives of the

United States, Japan, and many countries in Western Europe) of the Information

Revolution is one of possibility and triumph, but it is only one potential narrative.

To other cultures the Information Age has entirely different implications.

For instance, compared to the vast sea of information available to the citizens of South Korea, North Korean data resources are a meager puddle. While some of the country's ruling elite (notably Kim Jong II, who has publicly referred to himself as an 'internet expert' and famously asked Madeleine Albright for her e-mail address during her North Korean visit in 2000) appear to be at least

132 somewhat active on the world internet, the vast majority of the population only has access to tightly controlled forms of media. 261 Public radios and televisions, for instance, are modified to read only government controlled signals. Cellphones • were outlawed in 2004. What very little internet exists is highly regulated, limited within a North Korean-only closed network that allows no access to foreign websites and is available to only a sma11 segment of the population. Fearful of the damage that entry into a diverse and contested digital space could cause to what

Professor Jonathan Kittrain calls its "comprehensive official fantasy worldview," the DPRK has knowingly held itself back from joining the Information

Revolution despite almost certain economic and absolutely certain technological benefits. It is questionable whether the country can continue to separate itself from the advancing world due to an increasingly digital China on its porous northern border, but the longer it waits, the further behind it will be when the inevitable march of progress knocks on (or knocks down) its door, for better or for worse.262

Prospects of digital advancement are even darker in other regions of the world. In Africa, for instance, generally the internet is not a question of 'will not' but 'cannot.' Less than 3.6% of the population connects to the internet, and two­ thirds of those people live in only four of the continent's fifty-three countries.263

There are a number of reasons behind this slow pace of technological adoption,

261 'Kim Jong II: "Internet EXpert,H' on CBS News, October 5, 2007. http://www.cbsnews.com/storiesl2oo7/10/0Sltechlmain333610S.shtmI?source=RSSattr=SciTe ch 3336108 262 Zeller, Tom. 'The Internet Black Hole that is North Korea' in the New York Times, October 23,2006. 263 'Internet Usage Statistics for Africa' on Internet World Stats. http://www.internetworldstats.comlstatsl.htm

133 not the least of which are that rampant poverty and the AIDS epidemic are more pressing issues and monopolize regional attention. Political instability also plays a major part in keeping most African nations from joining the Information

Revolution. Consistent warfare makes the region unattractive to foreign investors and often leads to the coIIateraI destruction of communication networks. The resulting lack oflocal infrastructure means that 75% of African internet traffic must first go through already developed Information Age countries, a process that costs both time and money. It also means that Africans must often rely on inferior, aging and limited satellite technology to provide internet access. As a result the region presently does not have the physical capability to support ubiquitous internet However, this limitation may prove temporary as more and more African countries look towards the potential of digital technologies as a possible cure for an unsuccessful economy. To quote Rwanda's Minister of Science, Technology and Scientific Research: "We have almost no naturaI resources and no seaports in

Rwanda, which leaves us only with trying to become a knowledge-based society."

The country is going forward with plans to develop Africa's most advanced internet infrastructure, complete with nation-wide wireless slated to begin operation sometime in 2008. But a similar project was put into motion in 2003 and met with failure. Much of Rwanda does not even have electricity, never mind computers, making its prospects for digital prosperity extremely low.264

In these places, the Information Revolution is less like a march of progress and more like a funeral procession that underscores the growing digital gap between those societies braving the Information Age and those that either can't or

2M Nixon, Ron. 'Africa, Oftline: Waiting for the Web' in the New York Times, July 22,2007.

134 won't move into the next era of world development. This study began with a revolutionary election result prompted by the introduction of digital technologies in South Korea. That narrative is one of change, democratization, and a place at the forefront of human progress. But only a few miles north in the ROK's estranged neighbor there is only a narrative of silence. In exploring South Korea's

Information Revolution we have examined an array of impressive changes, some frightening, some wondrous, and just as the South Korean digital experience has thus far been one of mixed results, so has the Information Revolution been an event with both positive and negative implications for the societies of the world.

While for the most part it is too early to tel! how the movement will turn out, it has been fun, at least, to get a sense of what might be ahead.

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