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Combined Blockfile.Pdf Combined Blockfile AFF 3 A2: UBI Benefits 3 A2: Increased Wages 3 A2: Bargaining Power 3 A2: Small Businesses 4 A2: Innovation 5 A2: Increasing Investment 5 A2: Economic Freedom 5 A2: Gender Inequality 6 A2: Education 6 A2: Automation Error! Bookmark not defined. A2: Reducing Income Inequality 6 A2: Increased Productivity 7 A2: Welfare Problems 9 A2: Bureaucracy 9 A2: Inefficient 9 A2: Debt Burden 9 A2: Dependency 9 A2: Poverty Trap 9 A2: Funding Links 11 A2: VAT 11 A2: Carbon Tax 11 A2: Capital Gains Tax 11 A2: Welfare Exclusion 12 A2: Queer Exclusion 12 A2: Racial Exclusion 12 A2: Deflation / Japanification 12 NEG 14 A2: UBI Harms 14 A2: Inflation 16 A2: Socialism 16 A2: Redistributing Wealth 16 A2: Increasing Unemployment 16 A2: Exclusion 17 A2: Single-Parent Households 17 A2: Immigrants 17 A2: Elderly 18 A2: Women 18 A2: Handicapped 18 A2: Welfare Benefits 18 A2: Automatic Stabilizer 18 A2: Specific Programs 18 A2: Medicaid 19 A2: Pell Grants 20 A2: SNAP 20 A2: Job Training Programs 20 A2: EITC 21 A2: Housing Vouchers 21 A2: Funding Links 22 A2: Debt 22 A2: VAT 23 A2: Carbon Tax 23 A2: Capital Gains Tax 23 A2: Counter-Advocacy 23 A2: Doing Both 23 A2: Private UBI 23 A2: Miscellaneous 23 AT: Basic Income Not Enough to Survive 23 A2: Emerging Markets 24 A2: Currency Depreciation 24 A2: Interest Rate Spill Over 24 A2: EM Default Risks 24 Turkey Collapse 25 Argentina Collapse 25 A2: Debt Harms 25 A2: Fiscal Stimulus 26 A2: Interest Payments Crowd-out 27 A2: Political Trade-offs Error! Bookmark not defined. A2: Immigration 28 A2 AFF A2: UBI Benefits A2: Coverage 1. Immigration DA. Fischer ‘18 of the GGI explains that a UBI creates a two-tiered economy between those in the country who receive a UBI and immigrants in the country who do not. This excludes the 13 million non-citizen legal immigrants leaving them in desperate poverty. It Commented [1]: CIS worsens over time as the CIS explains that 1.1 million immigrants enter the country every year. 2. Even if welfare doesn’t cover everyone. It has a much larger impact on each person that receives it. Cowan ‘19 of the CIS: the benefits from a UBI substantially lower than what someone would recieve from welfare. A single mother with 4 children would receive $52,000 under welfare while she would only receive $10,000 under a UBI. 3. Child poverty. Since a UBI only goes to adults over 18, families with children get far less money than families under MTW, as MTW scales up with more kids. 4. Even if not everyone is on welfare at this exact moment, the Center for American Progress finds that 70% of Americans fall back on means-tested welfare at some time in their lives. A2: Increased Wages 1. Mogstad 19’ tells us that the UBI would be a band-aid solution of giving cash instead of enhancing skills or increasing bargaining power. He furthers that wage subsidies, such as the EITC- which the UBI would replace in the AFF world, are far more effective in raising the takehome pay of low-wage workers, encouraging women to participate in the workforce, and increasing productivity and equity properties. A2: Bargaining Power 1. Defense/Turn. A UBI only allows workers to refuse jobs if they can survive off of a UBI as their only income. They won’t be able to because Greenstein ‘19 of CBPP writes that because the right will only agree to funding a UBI with welfare, a UBI would amount to $1,600 a year. In fact, Commented [2]: don't read this part if running this would reduce the poor’s bargaining power because Henderson ‘19 of Stanford University debt/deficit harms finds that the mean welfare package is $20,000 a year. Indeed, Coote ‘19 of PSI writes that a UBI will actually normalize low pay and precarious work because it effectively subsidizes employers who pay low wages by providing a financial cushion for their workers who won’t need as much income once a UBI is passed. 2. Impact Turn. Saab ‘19 of the Jade Institute: If you buy that a UBI is a replacement for work, it would be like an unlimited strike fund - workers could literally go on strike whenever they want, which would be disastrous for businesses as 1) they would be forced to keep increasing wages at the whim of workers and 2) it would destroy all certainty for businesses. This would cause widespread capital flight from America as businesses would move to other countries, thus crashing the economy. A2: Small Businesses 1. Non-uq. Seamans ‘17 of Forbes explains that the US economy already has safety nets for entrepreneurs like unemployment insurance. A UBI wouldn’t further stimulate entrepreneurship because it would just be replacing these safety nets. Indeed, Ehrenfreund ‘15 of Forbes writes that benefit programs like food stamps increase entrepreneurship by allowing people to be risky with the rest of their income because they know that they will always have food. 2. Defense. Mitchell ‘16 of ISLR explains that small businesses can’t thrive in the current economic status of the US because unprecedented levels of market concentration have spread to every corner of the economy. Big business actively underprice and beat out their small business opponents, which is why small business creation has fallen to a historic low. For example, Neumark ‘05 of NBER explains that Walmart destroys local businesses by offering lower prices that small businesses can’t compete with, finding that Walmart destroys 3 jobs for every 2 jobs it creates and decreases wages by 1.5% in towns. 3. Defense. Hedreen ‘19 of Business explains that a UBI leads to complacency, meaning that if there’s free money going around, there’s no incentive to create small businesses or even innovate. Necessity is the mother of invention: no need to make a business means no new businesses 4. Turn. Seamans ‘17 of Forbes gives two reasons why a UBI will hurt entrepreneurship. a. TURN: Heightened risk taking by entrepreneurs means that the capital provided by a financier is at a greater risk of loss. As a result, financiers will cut back on the lending provided to start a new business. b. TURN: As a result of increased risk taking for small businesses, financiers can have trouble distinguishing between high and low risk projects, so they’ll just cut funding all together 5. Porter: oversupply of capital in the economy, the reason why business creation 40-year low is because of monopolies that outcompete small businesses. 2 implications: a. They won’t solve that root problem b. Mitchell explains that a UBI would only make the problem worse as the large proportion of benefits would go to large corporations which then lobby congress for preferential treatment to continue to outcompete small businesses. i. This outweighs any short-term increase in jobs: because in the long run, once they gain full control of markets, they raise prices of goods, completely destroying any benefits of growth. 6. Shiener explains that the economy is currently at full employment. 2 implications a. It turns their argument/Shiener: if we stimulate demand any further, it would cause massive overheating of the economy, where demand far outpaces supply since businesses can't find people to work, they can’t increase supply, and driving prices rise up causing an economic recession. i. Or at the very least, offsets any purchasing power from a UBI. b. It delinks their argument/CNBC explains that we have over 7 million open jobs and creating more jobs wouldn’t be beneficial. Commented [3]: get ev from kev A2: Risk Taking not in blockfile 1. Seaman: insurance policies like unemployment insurance, and bankruptcy laws already exists 2. Freund: welfare is already a safety net – empirically increased entrepreneurship by 36%. 3. UBI actually decreases entrepreneurship. a. Seaman: a UBI encourages much more risky investment, banks raise interest rates on loans to compensate. And because bank can no longer distinguish between high- and low-quality risky projects, they stop loaning completely. Historically happened with bankruptcy laws. A2: Innovation A2: Increasing Investment A2: Economic Freedom A2: Domestic Violence 1. Ingrao ‘14 of Simmons University: Poverty is one of the primary factors that impacts the likelihood of domestic violence, as poverty is directly linked to increased rates of aggressive behavior that leads to abuse. This means whoever best solves poverty also best solves the root cause of domestic violence. 2. Turn. Pavanelli ‘19 of PSI finds in a study of the UBI’s impact on gender inequality, in developed countries, that the UBI intensifies a gendered division of labour, trapping women in domestic roles and severely limiting their opportunities. 3. NNEDV ‘17: 99% of domestic violence cases also include financial abuse a. A UBI for a victim in a domestic violence case would just be taken and misused by the abuser 4. NCADV: 7 other reasons why people don’t leave abusive relationships that are UNRELATED to finances: a. The fear that the abuser will become more violent after attempting to leave b. The fear of losing custody of children c. They don’t have anywhere to go (no friends or family to help) d. Religious and cultural beliefs e. The belief that a 2-parent household is better for raising children, even if it is abusive f. Societal reinforcement that “saving” a relationship at all costs is worth it g. The rationalization that the abuser’s actions are caused by stress, alcohol, and work- related issues A2: Education 1.
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