CAS, UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, ABORN WINTER SCHOOL, ST. LOUIS, JANUARY 9-12, 2013 Paper Title: “They’ll Burn in Hell.” Cross-Border Trade, Transportation and Social Justice from the Margins of the State to Urban Spaces in West

Mariama Khan 12/28/2012 ABSTRACT

Micro-level interactions at the Amdallai-Karang and Farrafenni-Niorro border areas of and Senegal affect the outcome of macro-level trans-boundary policy and political relations. Using the two border areas as a case study, this paper identifies dynamics of cross-border trade and transportation mediated through notions of social justice as well as the links between what happens at the borders and urban spaces in the

Senegambia. By this approach, the paper answers the question “how are micro-level cross-border dynamics linked to macro-level political relations between The Gambia and

Senegal from 1960 to date? As new cross-border processes are reconfigured by new trade and transport realities, so too, are cross-border power and political relations. The need to understand how micro-level interactions shape macro-level happenings between the two countries is paramount as discussed in this paper.

The Karang-Amdallai border area continues to be an important cross-border circulation point for goods that have both commercial distinction and strategic value such as cement and cooking gas. The Farafenni-Niorro border constitutes a vibrant hub for the exchange of agricultural goods, which respond to trans-boundary price differentials. As farmers tap into their cross-border social networks to get better bargains for their produce, little attention is paid to cross-border control mechanisms that renders the cross- border exchange of some produce like groundnut subject to state’s notions of smuggling.

The organic interface between trade and transportation means that as non-state actors subject transportation to disruption through interference, trade is hindered. The consequences of a breakdown in trade flows, as a resulted of border blockages and other

2 restrictions, is a stall in market linkages, the business of trading networks, communities in the border area and urban spaces and government. In contrast, the smooth running of the transport corridor facilitates cross-border circulation and the benefits derived from it.

As a conduit of cross-border exchange, micro-level interactions in these border areas create a hybrid political complex that instigates double reactions from the state as a sovereign entity. For example, The Gambia’s liberal trade regime is contradicted by

“artificial” protectionism that is practiced at the backstage of its national economic policy. Traders, who want monopoly as local “producers” of cement and cooking gas, use un-official channels to protect their trading interests by blocking competition. On the other hand, Senegal’s state protectionism of its trading corridor thrives with covert encouragement of slippages that account for “smuggling.” The ways in which trade and transport unfold to shape the political temperaments between the two countries as well as mediate notions of social justice between the border and urban space is what this paper investigates. Cross-border trade and transport merge with urban consumption, policy- making, politics and information flow, to reinforce how the borders and urban space constitute spatial continuities that are mutually interdependent and reinforce both local and trans-boundary relations in the region.

3 TABLE OF CONTENT

Abstract

1.0: INTRODUCTION ...... 3

1.1: A SURVEY OF THE AMDALLAI-KARANG AND FARRAFENNI-NIORRO BORDER AREAS OF THE SENEGAMBIA ...... 4 1.2: SOCIAL INTERPRETATIONS IN CROSS-BORDER TRADE AND TRANSPORT IN THE SENEGAMBIA ...... 5 1.3: POLITICS, ECONOMY AND THE SENEGAMBIA BORDERS ...... 5 1.4: THE SENEGAMBIA BORDERS AND URBAN SPACE ...... 6 1.5: CONCLUSION ...... 6 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 9 Asiwaju, A. I., 1985. Partitioned Africans: Ethic Relations across Africa’s International Boundaries 1884- 1984. Lagos: University of Lagos Press ...... 9 Basavapatna, S, 2012. Chins in Mizoram: The case of Borders Making Brothers Illegal-Journal of Borderlands Studies, 27(1), pp. 61-72...... 9 Englund, H., 2002. From War to Peace on the Mozambique-Malawi Borderland. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press...... 9 Husken, T and Klute, G. 2010. Emerging forms of power in two African borderlands, a theoretical and empirical research outline. Journal of Borderland Studies, 25:2 pp. 107-121 ...... 9 Mbembe, A. 2000. At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa, Public Culture, 12:1, pp.259-284 ...... 9 Newman, D and Paasi, A, 1998. Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world: boundary narratives in political geography. Progress in Human Georgraphy, 22(2) pp.186-207 ...... 9

...... 11

4 1.0: INTRODUCTION

Map showing the location of some of the case study sites between The Gambia and Senegal

5 The changing importance of borders is emphasized by the dynamic language border studies benefits from. Even in contemporary multi-disciplinary studies, notions of borders assail social and political theory, articulating disciplinary borders but also, political, economic and socio-spatial boundaries. While political geographers are obsessed with state boundaries, postmodernists’ engagement with territory and territoriality evaluate the shifts in the importance of boundaries and how these, through narratives and interpretations, influence ideas of socio-spatial identities in a contemporary context (Newman and Paasi, 1998: 188-189). The meanings of borders are changing, so too, are their importance. In trying to engage with the political uncertainties, the sovereignty challenges of the post-colonial African state and the forces of integration and disintegration confronting it, I focus on “boundary narratives and discourses” as one of the four key themes identified in the literature, (Newman and

Pasay, 1998: 191) . The future of the nation-state is threatened according to Globalization theorists, (Newman and Passi, 1998). Postmodernist celebrate the end of borders, but the truth is borders in post-colonial Africa continue to proliferate and hold vast significance

(Wilson and Donnan, 2012). What happens in borders is critical to nations and states. To cite Nugent (2012)”… border towns provide an excellent insight into how states seek to promote their agenda and how their advances are received, appropriated and very often thwarted,” (557-558). What matters in the state derives from the borders and what passes through borders end somewhere that matters. These inform the necessity of borders as subjects of study in especially contemporary Africa where the state is a subject of different kinds of interpretations. “Border studies have become significant themselves because scholars and policy-makers alike have recognized that most things that are

6 important to the changing conditions of national and international political economy take place in borderlands…” (Wilson and Donnan, 2012: 1). It is out of these crucial roles of borders as sites for the “new,” be it of “new liberties, new movements, new nobilities, new citizenships and new forms of capital, labour and consumption,” (Wilson and

Donnan, 2012:1), that I investigate cross-border trade, transportation and their links to narratives of social justice from the margins of the state to urban spaces in .

This paper argues that micro-level interactions at the Amdallai-Karang and Farafenni-

Nioro border areas of the Senegambia affect the outcome of macro-level political relations between the The Gambia and Senegal. Cross-border trade and transportation are used as important proxies for political power. This emerges out of the reality that both provided contentious outcomes in higher-level politics between the two countries in different times and for various reasons. Border crossing in the Senegambia region takes place within certain social parameters at the center of which are social narratives that embody local idioms of relation, compromise and exchange. Social justice forms an important ingredient in this Senegambian interpretation of borders. Additionally, in the

Senegambia region, the borders have been significant in shaping the political temperaments between The Gambia and Senegal from independence to date (Hughes and

Perfect, 2006; Nugent, 2007; Senghor, 2008).

The Amdallai-Karang and Farafenni-Nioro borders are important conduits of trade and significant corridors for solidifying kinship relations. As border-urban bridges, they link the margins to urban spaces including the centers of power and politics, Banjul and

Dakar. The borders relate to urban space in terms of consumption, policy, politics and

7 information flows. Thus, the significant contribution this work makes to the literature is re-imagining the borders as contours of continuity with urban space, citing the urban inspiration of border administration as proceeds are funneled through the national accounts that build the economic capacity of the state. In this re-imagination of the borders, their function as a bridge to public celebrations notably religious functions in the

Senegambia is outstanding. I make three generalizations here of the Senegambia borders:

First, the Senegambian borders are sites of production that facilitate consumption in urban spaces. Commodities that passed through the borders are not all consumed in border towns and villages. Urban spaces become the final destination of some of these commodities. Where consumption is differentiated between legal and illicit goods, urban spaces still dominate as significant consumers of what passed through the borders. In terms of illicit goods, among them drugs, cannabis, stolen cattle, etc., border people hardly have the economic wherewithal needed for the purchase and consumption of such illegal goods. The majority of the clientele for the consumption of such goods are urban resident. Secondly, patterns of border-crossing and border appropriation force creative responses from the urban-based Headquarters of border administration agencies. For example, new Custom posts are set up to follow the trails of alternative routes border crossers devise. Through discoveries like this, border experiences direct policy from urban headquarters as well as the politics of government. Both The Gambia and Senegal have economies that are heavily depended on tax. So they are forced to follow the money wherever it tries to escape national coffers. Thirdly, Commercial networks in spite of their “informality” are ahead of government in the game, as such they have some monopoly of information. This becomes a political tool which government is forced to

8 recognize as well as borrows in negotiating trans-boundary relations. Here, informality is both efficient and political.

This paper presents narratives of border experiences derived from ongoing research on the Senegambian borders. It highlights how such border narratives shape policy as well as political processes at urban spaces, which represent the spirit and the inner circle of political power in the state. In the Senegambia, social and political borders shape trans- boundary relations. A bottom-up diagonal flow of border experiences generates responses from the state as it follows development in border appropriation. This is the opposite of the relationship between the post-colonial African state and the International market and supply chain systems, to which the state in Africa becomes a weakened recipient of events. Information flows top-down from the world trade systems to the developing country. In contrast to cross-border trade and transportation regimes where information flows bottom-up, leading to responses from the state as a sovereign to control border appropriation. An untoward parallel of the International trade systems relating to the state and the borders relating to the state is that, while the state appeal to fair trade within world market structures, the borders call for social justice from the state. I make the above comparison between the world market structures and the state vis-à-vis the state and borders, just as a passing mention, with no intention to dwell on it further in this paper. I rather concentrate on the borders, and the state, which are the focus of the discussion here. I will show how concepts of social justice and border experiences shape national policy as well as trans-boundary policies of The Gambia and Senegal, in relation to each other.

9 The interviews that will be discussed here, as sources of the narratives explored here, were collected between November and December, 2012. I sent questions to a research assistant in The Gambia, who administered them through structured and semi-structured interviews. He sent me the responses and later upon my request, made follow-up visits with the interviewees to clarify issues where necessary. Through skype voice calls and by telephone, I conducted the rest of the interviews. Given that the data collection is ongoing, the narratives here are critical but patchy as the sample size I am drawing my data from is very limited. Hence, a reader can sense the gap in the narrative structure of the paper. However, I tried as best as possible to fill that gap with a description as well as an explanation of border phenomena in these sites, pending the collection of complete data that will give the full picture of this research findings.

The structure of the paper is based on first the Introduction, which discusses the relations between the borders, urban space and the state. The second part of the paper deals with a survey of the trade and transport corridors in the Amadallia-Karang and

Farafenni-Niorro borders areas. I describe and explain border phenomena, lacing literature to connect the happenings in these sites to key themes in contemporary borderland studies. The fourth part deals with field findings relating to cross-border trade, transportation and the notions of social justice that play into national policy and moderate or negatively affect cross-border political relations between the two countries. As part of this, the way these reflect on urban spaces is also explored. The final part of the paper is the conclusion. Now, I proceed with the survey of the two border areas.

10 1.1: A SURVEY OF THE AMDALLAI-KARANG AND FARRAFENNI- NIORRO BORDER AREAS OF THE SENEGAMBIA Amdallai, which like Farrfenni is in North Bank Region of The Gambia, borders

Karang, which is Senegalese territory. The Amdallai- Karang border provides direct link to the two capital cities, Banjul and . The Amdallai-Karang border has been the main trade route for the re-export trade in Banjul. Re-export trade has been a major contributor to The Gambia’s GDP. Even though The Gambia still gains significant amounts in re-export trade, the volumes of trade has deteriorated as a result of Senegalese capture and the Chinese manufacturing presence in Dakar. State agencies are present on both sides of the border, like at the Farrafenni-Niorro border. Private transports, public private transports, government vehicles and lorries carrying goods are a constant presence in the border area. Informal economic actors are also visible at the borders.

Farafenni is the regional capital of The Gambia’s north bank region. Its last border village to Senegal is Ker Aly village, whose founder was a brother to the founder of Ker

Ayib village, which is located on the Senegalese side of the border, Niorro. Sharing of resources such as a cemetery and health facilities prevail in this location, (Tandia, 2010).

This border leads to the Bamba Tenda-Yeli- Tenda ferry crossing, which is frequently utilized by both commercial and private transport owners and other travelers as they travel from Senegal to The Gambia or, from north Senegal to the . In recent years, road networks around the Farefenni area have improved. Its role as an important trading hub had multiplied. With frequent lumos (weekly markets) all over its vicinities, trade is an important aspect of life along the border. Senegalese merchants come into

11 Farafenni to buy goods and agricultural produces, to transport them to Senegal. These produces can come as far as Kaur in the Central River Region of The Gambia. With two ferry services running the Bantenda-YelliTenda crossing, delays or breakdowns in the ferry service leads to lot of inconvenience to users. The high transaction cost that is associated with delays in traffic flows has been the advocacy base for the Trans-

Gambia /ECOWAS Super Highway Bridge project1.

Elements of “integration from below” “occurring on the margins of official institutions, through sociocultural solidarities and interstate commercial networks,”

(Mbembe, 2012:262) are observable in the high traffic flows at both the Amdallai-Karang and Farrafenni-Niorro border areas. In the latter, farmers across the borders help one another to market their produce especially groundnut, depending on which side of the border pays more for the produce. The exchange of marketing information and other cross-border contacts are routine. Through the agency of commercial networks in these areas, collaboration for the pursuit of better pay for produces becomes a tool of social justice. Reward for their labour is increased in the bargain options that they can tap through their networks. The process of selling produce across the borders has its own legal limits. For the farmer with cross-border ties, what becomes a matter of social justice is on the other hand, an infringement of border control laws, in this case smuggling.

Smuggling exemplifies border subversion, but also aspects of social citizenship

(Basavapatna, 2012) whereby people depend on their trans-boundary kinship and associational networks. Englund (2002) depicts how refugees on the Mozambique-

1 The African Development Bank is funding the Trans-Gambia Highway Bridge Project. Work on it is expected to start in 2012.

12 Malawi border comfortably interacted with their kin on both sides of the border. The border is a link, a line of continuity and inclusion, instead of a barrier. This can be typical of many contemporary border settings in Africa. Where price differentials and tariff polices are distinct, smuggling across the border is an easy alternative. Husken and Klute

(2010:109) note “…borderlands can be regarded as spheres where historical and contemporary forms of non-state politics and networks are hardly regulated or controlled by national or international regimes, and where opportunities for non-state political actors are manifold.” Thus, given that borders represent the contestations of material and conceptual boundaries where state, nation and local identities need to converge

(McGregor, 2009), different forces of power and interests shape relations along them.

However, state control of non-state actors and networks at the borders, like border surveillance, remains tenuous in post-colonial Africa.

In the Senegambia, the psychological existence of the social groups projected in the community and social narratives of the population (Risse, 2010) give rise to uncomplicated identities that are imagined but also come from close blood ties, history of migration and dispersion of groups in the region. Based on this psychological existence, border crossing is termed as a matter of obligation because both people across the borders are mboka2, which means kinsmen, partitioned by a colonial history, (Asiawju, 1985).

Hence the high prevalence of social citizenship ensures spatial socialization (Paasi quoted in Zeller, 2010), which contradicts the bordering processes of the two states (Coplan,

2012) through social spatialization and territorialization represented by the enforcement

2 Mboka is a wollof word can be also written as mbokh, with the pronunciation of the a at the end as used by Gambian wollof speakers. It means kinsman.

13 of the border controls. While integration from below persists, so too are the challenges to national acts of border administration. While the ordinary people see justice in being able to pass across with whatever is legal without any harassment from state authorities, the state is adamant with ensuring that border crossers in the Senegambia follow rules and regulations in place. But as Coplan (2012) notes, border crossing has its own performance highlights, so too, is the enforcement in the Senegambia region, where border administrators can be influenced by social notions that accord special privileges for border crossing. Below, I examine how such idioms of belonging, relations, exchange and notions of social justice get played out in the context of the borders.

1.2: SOCIAL INTERPRETATIONS IN CROSS-BORDER TRADE AND TRANSPORT IN THE SENEGAMBIA In the Senegambia region, experiences of border crossing like in transactions at urban centers never fail to project local idioms of compromise, belonging and relations and exchange. A Senegalese douane told me in 2011 along the Karang- Dakar route that,

“In our work, we are careful about apprehending three people: the diplomat, intellectual and the mara…’ a shortened form for the word marabout. This was after I resolved a small impasse with him, when he insisted that he was not convinced that my personal professional video camera, which I had with me, was not going to be put on sale in

Dakar. He asked me to leave the camera with him, because it is an expensive item, I cannot carry along with me. After showing him evidence that it was not for sale, showing him the receipt, which I stumbled across in my search for evidence from my hand back. I told him as a documentary filmmaker, I need the camera; hence I recently bought it from the USA. But he was adamant. People in the seven passenger called me

14 aside and told me,”Sohnasi3, give him some money and let him not waste our time. Night fall will find us on the way.” I insisted to them I was not going to give him money. And I was prepared to stay with my camera as long as he wants to keep us. But in the end, a friend from Dakar intervened and he let me leave with my camera, which I still have.

Apart from the possibility to links to power, his statement echoes sociological idioms for khelifa4 and teranga5, two concepts with strong social significance in the Senegambia.

The intellectual is trusted, the diplomat respected and honoured like the marabout.

Regarded as khelifa, persons of good standing, they should be shown teranga, which means welcome and honour and therefore deserve smooth passage. In a very basic form, it is like the smooth passage a diplomatic passport can facilitate for you in even Western airports. On the same journey, a distraught passenger, a man well-traveled in Africa and other parts of the world, narrated his encounters with Customs officials in West Africa, concluding that, “the douanes of Senegal, the Customs of the Gambie and the ones of

Bissau are same, same. They’ll all burn in hell!” The conversation in the car bashed

Customs workers especially the ones from a certain region of Senegal who are believed to be well fortified by the occult and therefore aggressively pursue self-accumulation along the borders. The conversation highlighted a certain social myth, in Senegambia, that at the end of the month when government pays customs people their

Salaries, it puts a box of matches on top of their pays, a symbolic token of their profession, meaning when they die they will go to hell. This social myth flavoured in

3 A wollof word which means lady

4 A wollof word which stands for an elder, a person of honour

5 A wollof word that could mean respect, honour, or welcome

15 religious beliefs projects ideas of retribution for an ungodly work represented by the work of Customs or the Douane. A rather common whining of passengers along the

Gambia-Senegal borders is that “…now the route is sour, full of exhaustion and wickedness. The douane take everything from you. And they want your money too.”

This implies that there are people in these case border control agents who are bent on making what is supposed to be a simple, easy journey across the borders, a tough, heartless affair. Since God is always on the side of the people, the others will be punished for their wrong against the people. Social justice becomes a solace to the perceived difficulties in border crossing. Another spectrum of the retribution is that the

“Customs or Duane man never ends well. In old age, they are futeh6.” God degrades them when they retire. Their former wealth is lost and they die in penury. A sense of “…the collective hostilities to Customs men…” (Nugent, 2002: 99) is evident in the different border crossing experiences people share about the Senegambia borders. The people in the Chad Basin use the language of rights to assert their economic claims or repudiate their fiscal relation to the state (Roitman, 2005). In contrast, in the Senegambia region, the language of social justice predominates in border settings and urban centers too. In this social justice milieu, the role of the duty bearer has many faces: the state, civil society, or non-state actors and the individual. Notion of social justice pervades the social psyche that even if individuals fail to abide by its inclinations, its sense still lurks behind their subconscious.

In the public transport sector, social justice motivations are discernible, even where

6 A wollof word that means not to end well or to be decrepitated

16 transporters are self-interest oriented. A cross-border transporter, talking about cross- border transportation challenges in the Senegambia said,

The Gambia and Senegal have different laws….Our union decided that we stop

at the Senegalese border… Gambian transporters too will disembark passengers

at their side of the border….because of the different charges in the two countries

and the unfair treatment. Before, we paid for the ECOWAS permit, which gives

us equal access to both borders, but this was not fair to the Senegalese

transporters who pay another permit in Senegal costing about D4000. Gambian

transporters only pay D1000 for the same permit in The Gambia. Why should

both of us enjoy the same free movement when we pay different rates?7

References to social justice are reflected in words like “unfair treatment”, “different rates”, “equal; access” and even the terminal points for the respective Gambian and

Senegalese transports. A more formal approach to concerns of cross-border transporters leans on the merits of ECOWAS policies in terms of the rationalization for the harmonization of policies whether in the form of terminal management in this case what the transporters tried to do, logistics and access to market systems, currency exposures and non-tariff barriers which include perceptions of social justice in cross-border trade and transportation. Formal approaches predicated on rules that are almost always well written with strong neo-liberal flavours, but hardly ever fully-enforced, are desirable to norm setting and International business lobbies. However, because they lack relevant

7 Interview conducted in November, 2012 at the Giboroh-Seleti border

17 cultural nuances, the policy reform agendas of border administration in West Africa fail to tackle what it considers anomalies such as ”informality” in cross-border transactions.

Ethos of social justice is camouflaged in different shades as one transporter highlighted…

In the beginning, we dropped passengers at the borders and they walked the

distance to the other garage. We realized that some passengers, especially

nursing mothers, suffered to make the distance. We later negotiated and agreed

among ourselves that Gambian transporters can now go up to the other side to

drop passengers but they return empty. Senegalese drivers can also drive up to

the Gambian side to drop passengers, they too will return empty. The

communities suffered in the initial plan….

The justice for the communities becomes to alleviate their suffering by making certain concessions among themselves as transporters. The expectant woman, the old, the sick and children become the considerations for the bequeathing of such justice. A conciliatory treatment to these categories of people derives from a cultural sanction that is not unique to the Senegambia region, but has a strong currency in socialization processes in the region. Cheral magg, nyerem gigeehen ak guneyeh. Honour the aged, and protect the women and children. The cultural sensitivities lacking in formal rules and regulations, get validated in informal processes as this. The political geography of the transnational landscape is forced to mimic the social geography of the region. If good fences make good neighbours, kinship ties circumvent and permeate the thickest of walls and strongest of fences. Kinship ties considerations get to the heart of this struggle for

18 fair play in border-crossing and border appropriation vis-à-vis transporters and the general population. The history of different colonial rule has not dis-stabilised the

Senegambia region’s tradition of proximate community vibes which despite various forms of social transition in the region, endures, It can be argued that it reflects a personal society that has levels of actor embeddedness which negotiates social and community interactions, business and politics in the region. The possibility of crossing unrestricted is a social justice issue for the people who have to reach across the borders for family ties and other reasons. While politicians pursue their interests, ordinary people’s cries emphasise familial relations between the two countries. This forces the politicians to work on softening the border, by making ordinary crossing possible for the masses.

Social justice from the margins has its way in urban space. For example in the transport sector, passengers decry exploitative transporters who seem to love fare hikes. In return, the transporters social justice claim is on the state, as they query its exploitative tax, duty and other financial regulatory regimes, which transporters in urban space have to face, too. Since someone has to pay for the cost in the business logic, urban commuters become the victim. In public transports and other ordinary public spheres, these conversations are routine. Benefits of a social mores obtained from strong traditions of orality, what happens at the borders whether in transport or trade is a miniature of the links between production, exchange and state systems in West Africa. Another driver highlights another aspect of social justice that, “I don’t know of any major problems as a cross-border transporter, once you possess valid papers and gives the border officials the respect that is due to them.” Respect is something you as a border crosser owe to border agents, but not just that, as another driver revealed, “…since countries differ, in each

19 check point, whether The Gambia, Senegal or , we stop and the security agents check our transport and the transporter gives then D50 or D100 at check points. This is between the transporters and the security agents….” In this version of social justice, the transporter owes something to the border agent after confirming the correctness of his papers. This becomes the realm where business is between the driver and the state agent, yet the act is legitimized by the two actors based on their views of what is just in that transaction between them, even if it contravenes the rules in the book. A retired driver who has been in cross-border transportation since 1950 noted, “We transport passengers and their luggage but not goods. When goods reach the borders, customs officials take them. Goods are carried by Trucks.” Here too, a sense of the expectation comes out. But at the bottom of all these are culturally nuanced interpretations that get twisted here and there, from sociological metaphors of maslaha8 and japaleh9., which are terms that are fairly common in border crossing narratives. In the transport sector, references to social justice are commonplace in the same way they are in contacts with border administrative agents. But where does political economy stand in this spectrum of sociological reinterpretations of values based on certain social norms? This is what I will explore in the next section.

1.3: POLITICS, ECONOMY AND THE SENEGAMBIA BORDERS In the 80s and early 90s, the competitiveness of The Gambia’s re-export trade was heartwarming to advocates of neoliberalism and free market policies. The World Bank

8 Maslaha means compromise

9 Japaleh is a wollof word which means help, support or giving a hand

20 identified the country as a pilot gateway project at the height of government reforms that saw the initiation of The Banjul Gateway Project, broad-based divestiture through

The Gambia Divestiture Agency (GDA) and investment friendly climate totted under The

Gambia Investment Promotion and Free Zone Agency (GIPZA). The 1994 military coup derailed such and many other government projects as the country faced sanctions for what donors and multi-lateral partners termed digression from democracy. World Bank funds allocated to the Gateway Project were diverted to Ghana, which became the pilot site for the Trade Gateway Project. Meanwhile, the Senegalese government which has been relentless for the capture of The Gambia’s re-export trade continued with its intelligence gathering through the deployment of its economic intelligence agents who invaded the Banjul Ports studying the Gambia’s booming import and re-export industry.

Senegalese counter measures against the efficiency at the Banjul Ports included boosting the Dakar-Bamako trade route, since even Malian importers were using Banjul as the entry points for their goods or coming to buy goods from Banjul. Senegal constructed warehouses along the borders with . With good transport facilities provided, it worked on ensuring a quick turnaround time for the clearance system for goods imported into the country or goods designed for re-export to Mali. In a bid to overtake The

Gambia in the re-export business, non-tariff barriers such as delaying trucks and other transports carrying goods from The Gambia to other trading partners including Mali,

Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry became unusual as Senegal tried to frustrate

Gambian re-export trade. Under The Gambia’s re-export regime, licensing processes for import and export were less cumbersome than Senegal. Goods designed for re-export trade were transported by Gambian transporters, to their final destination. Processing

21 times for these were very quick and predictable. They were given Customs escorts to the final destination, after clearing the Charges and the token transit levies that were due to Government.

It is in the context of this attempt to capture the re-export trade that the political relations between the two countries grew more and more dis-affective, especially following the end of the Senegambia confederation in 1989. Disaffective political relations manifested in the borders as well as trans-boundary political “hard talks” as the governments of both countries struggle with balancing the aged old social ties between the two countries with their political interests. I explore a few incidences of the political difficulties between the two countries, which to a large extent have some links to the borders.

In 2008, The Gambia played Senegal in Dakar as part of the CAF under 17-football tournament. Fans of The Gambia’s national team, the Scorpions, were after the match, attacked by Senegalese football hooligans. Others took refuge in Senegalese homes while some Senegalese people cared for the beaten and wounded. Gambian youth in Banjul and other places retaliated by destroying some properties belonging to Senegalese traders in

The Gambia. The police and ordinary Gambians restrained the youth, with some

Gambian families protecting Senegalese traders and their properties during the crisis.

In 2005, members of the Senegalese transport association closed the border between

Giboro (western Gambia) and Seleti (southern Senegal) on grounds that Gambian authorities constantly harass Senegalese drivers who ply the Giboro-Seleti road. Around

2009, the Amdallai (north Gambia) -Karang (north- west Senegal) border was closed

22 because of political disagreements between the two countries. In 2010, there was a rare verbal confrontation between the two countries when an arms shipment from Iran was intercepted in Nigeria. The Senegalese government believed the arms shipment which was allegedly destined to The Gambia, was for Casamance rebels. The Senegalese government nurtures suspicions that The Gambia supports rebels in its southern border in their secession struggle. The Gambia also alleges that Senegal harbours and supports

Gambian dissidents who plan to unseat the Jammeh government.

For reasons like the above, border blockages between the two countries reoccurred between 1960-2012. In crisis moments, relations are very tense; however, efforts follow to de-escalate tensions. The incidences noted above are examples of manifestations of difficult cross-border political relations between the two countries. After establishing how what happens at the borders links to the macro-level political situation, we now explore the other aspect of my argument, which is the link between the borders and urban space, zooming tighter on trade and non-state actors.

1.4: THE SENEGAMBIA BORDERS AND URBAN SPACE The Trans-Gambia Bridge project, which is a long courted project that will see the

Farafenni-Niorro ferry crossing, bridged as part of a major ECOWAS/ADB and partner governments Infrastructural project . It is expected to improve inter-African cross-border trade and mobility in the Senegambia. The Trans-Gambia Bridge will be a major change changer in trans-boundary relations between The Gambia and Senegal and it will set new dynamics to the border-urban space links. Though, what will be different between the two countries in the nearest future, following the completion of the bridge, can only be

23 speculated now. But what is certain is the bridge will come with changes. At present, 90 of the access in the transport corridor at the Farrafenni-Niorro ferry crossing comprise of

Senegalese fleets. Currently, there are 87 security points between the borders. But the

Bridge will change this through the institution of joint Police, Customs and Immigration checkpoints and there is the possibility for other shared border administration technologies. An important commitment of the parties in Article 7 of the Memorandum of Understanding notes Parties undertake to,

 Refrain from taking any unilateral actions under exigent circumstances likely to

obstruct the free flow of goods and persons on the regional corridors and ensure

that only competent Government authorities take such action and as provided for

under relevant ECOWAS regulations.

.

 Enhance cooperation between road transport carriers of the Parties and

Government departments responsible for regulating road transportation with a

view to achieving the objectives of this Memorandum of Understanding

 Inform ECOWAS of any impediments to the smooth movement of persons and

goods across the regional corridors

Article 13 notes ECOWAS responsibilities among other things as

 Enhance border transit procedures impacting on the functioning of the Joint

Border Posts, such as “interconnection of national customs databases”,

24 “international guarantee”, “sealing road vehicles,” and “tracking of road vehicles”

to enable the ISRT10 to be effectively implemented…

Evidently, transport is an issue of social justice and therefore the movement of people and goods must not be hindered. It is perceivable that The Gambia stresses as a key policy concern, non-interference by non-state actors given the history of the Senegalese

Transporters Association‘s disruption of cross-border flows through unilateral, surprising border blockages. The concern arises from practical realities arising from a border blockage such as the disruption of many urban processes in both The Gambia and

Senegal. The Amdallai-Karang border sees significant cement and gas imports into The

Gambia. Between November 22nd, 2011 to October 4th, 2012, 2, 384, 518.95 kilograms of gas featured in the Border import statistics database for only that side of the border.

For cement imports from Senegal, the Amdallai border registered 1, 536, 000.00 kilograms of cement from December 12th, 2011 to March 30th, 2012. Again, this reflects on imports through Amdallai only, and not Farrafenni, Basse, and other border areas.

Cement as both an input and strategic good finds its way to urban centers to bolster the

Gambia’s booming urban construction industry. GAMCEM, a local cement “producing” company competes with Senegalese imported cement, yet the government given the importance of cement has no policy restrictions on cement imports. However, my interviewee from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, noted local producers can potentially do non-tariff manipulations, through deals with some customs agents to frustrate arriving cement imports from Senegal by pressuring their clearance procedures.

10 ISRT means Inter-States Road Transit

25 Gas as an essential commodity faces zero taxation like clothing, whereas fuel benefits from import subsidies as an important input and output good. The links between gas and environment protection partly informs Gambia government policy as fossil gas helps to protect the environment because “every gas used is a tree saved.” Majority users of gas for cooking purposes are resident in urban centers of The Gambia. In respect of Senegal, the importation of fruits and other vegetables from The Gambia especially from the lumos of Farrafenni and also from Cassamance through the Gambia to Northern Senegal end up being consumed by urban dwellers. Groundnut imports from The Gambia also end up in urban centers and through urban spaces to overseas if they are destined for re- export. While patterns of urban consumption of goods arriving through the borders may differ given the nature of the good involve, the economic benefits national treasuries of both countries derive from the flows across the borders are fairly the same. Customs duties where applicable are collected on goods and are channeled to the account systems of the urban based Government Revenue headquarters. For even transportation, payable fees and duties are mostly paid in Banjul or Dakar, with possibilities to pay these in sub- posts in regions under a decentralized mechanism. Wherever the place of payments, the end of funds accrued from cross-border administration and control activities end up in the national treasuries, safe where graft has its hands.

How patterns of border crossing and appropriation do forced policy responses from

National Border Administrative headquarters in the Senegambia? Official border entry and exit roads in the Senegambia have unofficial back-roads which traders and border crossers can use to either dodge official presence or control or to minimize costs of

26 border crossing. Practices of border crossers nurture informality, which has social succor in the Senegambia region. The practices of using back-roads, which are normally short cuts too, have been an important part of social mobility. For example, there is always a “straight” road to the farms and the back-road, which is the quickest but normally passes through offside paths, or forested pathways that lead to several mazes before getting to the final destination. Cross-border traders not only tend to have perfect knowledge of the market, but also knowledge of back-roads ahead of border administration. In effect, traders are the repositories of the knowledge on market operations. What the informal knows may elude the formal; hence the formal depends on the informal to be at breast with operational and other practices in the market. Partly, out of this reality, border administration tend to shadow the workings of transnational networks, gathering intelligence on the “new” happening beyond their know. Border administration may be a seriously paralysed function if not for the dependence on informality for knowledge on market operations and other cross-border flows, (Nugent,

2002; Roitman, 2005; Chalfin, 2010). The recent setting up of new customs posts in some off-path areas by the Gambia Revenue authority’s customs unit as well as some new local outputs for the National Drug Enforcement Agency are attempts to follow dynamism in border crossing and appropriation. About 4o back-roads exists in one border location according to a driver interviewee. The same can be said of the Senegalese douane posts that can sometimes rear up their heads unexpectedly along the borders, as they battle with smugglers. Information gathering becomes an important part of policy formulation. The commercial networks control exchange and to some extent production. As economic beings, the lives of the officials are tied to that space of production and exchange. As

27 Simone and Abouhani (2005:7) “The national economy thus becomes increasingly a patchwork of highly informalized and disconnected activities that provide an important underpinning- not only of ordinary livelihoods, … Critical transactions- and thus intersections –among social classes, domestic and transnational private entrepreneurial networks , and public officials-increasingly take place out of view.” With difficult state oversight on activities along the borders, border enforcement agencies have to negotiate with commercial networks that mediate the exchange and production through the borders.

As negotiation and mediation work together informality is entrenched as a by-product of the human influences that permeate this space of relations. This becomes the bases of new norms that way contradict other norms of the state, but are indispensable in the smooth carrying out of the duties of border administration especially in controlling contrabands. Border control processes therefore exhibit a human face, a human logic and a human safe guard. Therefore to be effective, border administration has to be a dynamic function that depends on creativity and constant policy review or adjustment to have more effective control processes. Now, after highlighting the arguments of the paper, I proceed to the conclusion.

1.5: CONCLUSION In the Senegambia region, cross-border trade and transportation are mediated through border crossing narratives that communicate idioms of relation, compromise and exchange within local notions of social justice. Borders are not isolated peripheries in trans-boundary relations, but are connected to urban spaces through the different flows that pass through them and end up in urban space. Consumption, policy, politics and information flows merge the borders with urban space. Whereas mobility is crucial to

28 processes of outreach between borders and urban space, the transport sector becomes not only a vehicle literally that facilitates mobility and access between these two spatial settings, but it also acts as a metaphorical conduit for the socialization and practicing of local norms of social justice under different shades and guises. Trade becomes a heartthrob for commercial networks and border enforcement agencies as stakeholders are forced to negotiate and mediate relations to ensure that actors are able to move across and carry out their duties. Politicians get dragged into these necessary compromises to ensure working borders and crossable borders. In short, social forces can mediate trans- boundary relations, pulling politicians along, to the extent that a shared common goal for working borders is enacted in the national vision.

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