Reparation and Reconciliation Through Truth Commissions a Comparative Study of Tulsa, Oklahoma and Rosewood, Florida

Reparation and Reconciliation through Truth Commissions A Comparative Study of Tulsa, Oklahoma and Rosewood, Florida

Brandon Vesely, Northeastern University School of Law ‘20 Civil Rights and Restorative Justice Clinic Fall 2018

Table of Contents:

I. Introduction

II. A Primer on Transitional and Restorative Justice

A. Transitional Justice Defined B. Restorative Justice Defined C. The Mechanics of Truth Commissions

III. Tulsa Efforts toward Restorative Justice

A. Background: The Race Riot of 1921 B. 70 Years of Silence C. The Commission 1. Membership and Methods 2. Commission Recommendations 3. Impact and Limitations

IV. Rosewood Efforts toward Restorative Justice

A. Background: The Race Riots of 1923 B. Failed Legislation and the Study Commission C. Impact: “Truth-telling” and Reparations

V. A Comparative Analysis of Efforts toward Restorative Justice

A. Robust Community Involvement B. A Culture of Truth-telling C. Reparative Efforts

VI. Conclusion

2 I. Introduction

Truth commissions are one way of responding to historical racial violence in the United

States. This paper explores two prominent truth commissions, both established and funded by state governments. Each commission constructed historical records of a notorious instance of racial violence in the United and laid the groundwork for reparation and reconciliation. The two case studies will examine the Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921

(Oklahoma Commission) and the academic commission that investigated the 1923 racial massacre in Rosewood, Florida, (Rosewood Commission). Each of these efforts fit within the theoretical frameworks of transitional and restorative justice, and each achieved varying successes in achieving the goals of these theoretical perspectives.

The Oklahoma Commission built a substantial, comprehensive historical record of the events that occurred in Tulsa and revived the episode in the public consciousness. However, the work of the Oklahoma Commission did not produce publicly funded monetary reparations for survivors of the massacre and their descendants. The outcomes in Oklahoma directly relate to the strengths and limitations of the legislative act which created the commission. These outcomes contrasts with those of the Rosewood Commission, which spurred publicly funded reparations for the survivors of the racial massacre and their descendants through direct monetary compensation and a scholarship fund. In addition, the Rosewood Commission constructed an invaluable historical record of the events upon which it focused and garnered substantial news coverage.

This paper analyzes the successes of both truth and reconciliation efforts as tools to address the legacy of racial violence and current manifestations of white supremacy in the United

States, within the theoretical frameworks of transitional and restorative justice. In particular, the

3 paper focuses on how the methodology and construction of the Oklahoma Commission led to the creation of a robust historical record and spawned a “culture of truth telling”, It also examines how the legislative framing and collaboration with policymakers, advocates, and community members of the Rosewood Commission led to direct monetary reparation.

II. A Primer on Transitional Justice and Restorative Justice

Transitional justice and restorative justice are two theoretical frameworks that have emerged in academic and legal circles as means to explore and address past white supremacist violence in the United States.

A. Transitional Justice Defined

Transitional justice is a theoretical approach to reparation and reconciliation that is generally used by societies trying to rebuild after large-scale, grave atrocities.1 Specifically, transitional justice refers to “transition processes through which radical transformations of a given political and social order are carried out.”2 Pivotal to the process is the need to balance demands of peace and reconciliation with the demands of justice.3 In this tension, concerns about the protection of victims’ rights, truth, and reparation cut one way and concerns about peace and reconciliation cut in the opposite direction.4 In the context of memorializing and making reparations for lynchings and racial violence in the United States, the need for justice focuses on survivors’ need for reparation and recognition of harm, while the need for peace centers on the

1 Rodrigo Uprimny & Maria Paula Saffon, Transitional Justice, Restorative Justice and Reconciliation. Some Insights from the Colombian Case 2, 2005. 2 Id. 3 Id at 3. 4 Id.

4 concern that discussion of these past events will lead to resentment and prevent society from moving forward.

B. Restorative Justice Defined

Contrary to the focus of transitional justice, which seeks to find equilibrium between two competing interests, restorative justice emerged as an alternative model for facing crime and fostering reconciliation between victim and perpetrator.5 In general, restorative justice has three goals: 1) recognition of the victim’s suffering; 2) reparation of harm; 3) restoration of dignity for the victim.6 Tactics to achieve these goals include community reparation boards, family group conferences and restitution programs, participation of the perpetrator in communitarian work and psychological therapy.7 All of these tactics facilitate the assignment of responsibility to the perpetrator in a non-retributive way, while enabling the perpetrator to take ownership of the harm caused and to and take steps to repair the harm.8

C. The Mechanics of Truth Commissions

Understandings rooted in transitional and restorative justice underlie the mechanics of truth commissions. Academics characterize truth commissions as working towards a “culture of truth telling”. In the context of racial violence, this culture can be understood as a foil to the culture of silence that surrounds historical racial violence, and a counter to the intentional erasure of these horrific events from our collective historical memory as a means of maintaining white supremacy.

5 Id at 4. 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 Id.

5 In general, truth commissions have three main goals: truth, justice, and reconciliation.9 In the context of racial violence in the United States, tactics to achieve these goals have included: prosecutions against racial violence, public ceremonies or “rituals of atonement”, historical tours and markers, creation and implementation of school curricula, healing work among previously segregated groups through community building, academic investigation and scholarship - particularly on patterns and legacies of abuse - and partnership with advocacy and policy groups to implement institutional reform that undo structures of racial oppression.10

Experts conceptualize the use of these varied tactics as a strategy for dividing the seemingly enormous task of deconstructing the belief system of white supremacy, into more digestible tasks. In particular, these tools can be used to address the underpinnings of white supremacy by interrogating its underpinnings in behaviors, attitudes, and conditions.11

III. Tulsa Efforts towards Restorative Justice

A. Background: The Race Riot of 1921

Tulsa, Oklahoma exhibited considerable growth in the first part of the twentieth century, in large part due to the discovery of Glenn Pool, a nearby oil field.12 Its population surpassed

100,000 by 1920.13 Notably, a sizeable black neighborhood and commercial neighborhood,

Greenwood, developed just outside of downtown Tulsa.14 Disparagingly referred to by white

9 Susan M. Glisson, The Sum of Its Parts: The Importance of Deconstructing Truth Commissions 2, 2015. 10 Id. 11 Id. at 10. 12 John Hope Franklin, Scott Ellsworth, Robert L. Brooks, Alfred L. Brophy, Danney Goble, Larry O’Dell, Lesley Rankin-Hill, Clyde Snow, Phoebe Stubblefield, Richard S. Warner, Alan Witten, A Report by the Oklahoma Commission to Study the Race Riot of 1921 37, February 28, 2001. 13 Id at 38. 14 Id at 39

6 locals as “Little Africa”, Greenwood’s black population numbered around 10,0000 by 1921 and included many black-owned businesses, grocery stores, meat markets, clothing and dry good stores, billiard halls, beauty parlors, barber shops, and other retailers and businesses.15 There were two black newspapers in Tulsa in 1921, the Tulsa Star and the Oklahoma Sun.16

Despite these developments, institutional white supremacy and racial violence were pervasive in Oklahoma around the time of the riot. In 1911, the state legislature implemented a

“Grandfather Clause”, which effectively disenfranchised all black voters in Oklahoma.17 When the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the rule, Oklahoma adopted new tactics to keep black citizens from voting, and passed dozens segregation statutes. During this time, Oklahoma became the first state to segregate phone booths.18

Similarly, in the decade following 1911, 22 blacks were lynched in Oklahoma. At the peak of the organization’s power in the mid-1920s, membership in the Ku Klux Klan in

Oklahoma numbered over 100,000.19 In Tulsa itself, there were 3,200 members of the Ku Klux

Klan in December 1921. In the years leading up to the riot, Tulsa’s white residents had little contact or direct interaction with the city’s black residents but feared and envied their increasing wealth and success.20 In August of 1920, just over a year before the riot, a white mob swarmed the Tulsa County Courthouse, captured Roy Belton, a white man accused of shooting a taxi driver, and lynched him by hanging, and met little resistance from law enforcement.21 The fact that a white mob lynched a white man in Tulsa during this time period illustrates the prominence

15 Id at 41. 16 Id. 17 Id at 46. 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 Id at 47. 21 Id at 51-52.

7 and public acceptance of vigilante justice in Tulsa around this time.22 Furthermore, the authors of the commission speculate that if Belton had been black, he likely would have been lynched sooner and with even less resistance.23

The events leading to the 1921 racial massacre began with the arrest of Dick Rowland on

May 31, 1921 for the alleged rape of seventeen-year-old elevator operator, Sarah Page, on the previous day.24 The exact details of the interaction between Rowland and Page on the day in question is in clear. What is clear, is that Rowland entered the Drexel Building where Page worked as an elevator to use the bathroom - it was the only bathroom used by Rowland and other blacks who worked in the nearby shoeshine parlor.25 After Rowland entered the elevator, a store clerk on the first floor of the building heard a commotion near the elevator and approached the area, where he saw Rowland leaving the building and Page showing signs of distress.26 The clerk decided that Rowland had sexually assaulted Page and summoned the police.27 No record exists to document what Sarah Page reported to the police when they interviewed her.28

News of the alleged rape spread quickly throughout Tulsa, likely in part due to an incendiary news article about the incident published in the Tulsa Tribune entitled “Nab Negro for

Attacking Girl in Elevator” and an editorial in the same newspaper entitled “To Lynch Negro

To-Night.”29 After the newspaper hit the streets around 3pm on May 31, a crowd of whites began to gather outside the Tulsa County Courthouse. By about 7:30pm, there were hundreds of people

22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Id at57. 25 Id. 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 Id. 29 Id at 58-59.

8 outside the courthouse clamoring for Rowland’s release.30 Black Tulsans assumed that the crowd planned to lynch Rowland. As a preemptive effort to save his life, 25 black veterans from

Greenwood drove to the courthouse, approached the door with their firearms, and offered to help police protect the building.31 The police declined, and when the group of black men approached the courthouse for a second time later that night, gunfire rang out.32

The white crowd, which consisted of more than one thousand people, began looting downtown sporting goods stores in order to obtain firearms and ammunition, and began indiscriminately shooting any black person they saw.33 A large group gathered outside the police headquarters on Second Street where many of them were deputized and provided with weapons in order to help quell the “disturbance.”34 As the violence escalated, all-white Tulsa units of the

National Guard came onto the scene to put down the disturbance.35 The guardsman set up a mounted machine gun that faced Greenwood, the black district, and began arresting black

Tulsans and surrendering them to the police.36

Meanwhile, throughout the night and following morning, white mobs “invaded”

Greenwood, where they forced the black residents out of their homes and local businesses at gunpoint and then set fire to the structures.37 Many black Tulsans fought back, while others fled the city on foot.38 Witnesses, black and white, reported airplanes flying over Greenwood during the night. Some reported that the occupants of the planes fired guns at black civilians as they

30 Id at 60. 31 Id at 61-62. 32 Id. 33 Id at 64. 34 Id. 35 Id at 66-68. 36 Id. 37 Id at 73. 38 Id.

9 fled Greenwood.39 In addition, witnesses reported that the planesshowered explosives, turpentine bombs in particular, on the Greenwood section of Tulsa.40 It was initially thought that these planes may have been owned by the U.S. government, but this theory was later disproven.41

Historians now assume that the planes must have been privately owned and based in Tulsa.42 As the neighborhood burned, the white rioters used guns to prohibit the fire department from extinguishing the flames. Throughout the night, white men met across the city to decide what to do about the “Negro uprising.”43

Estimations of the number of blacks that died in the massacre vary significantly, in part due to poor record keeping and other logistical difficulties in counting the number of dead. On the low end, researchers have identified 38 as the number of dead, but other estimates suggest that significantly more people died. The remains of the dead black residents of Greensboro were buried in unmarked graves by strangers, as their families waited under armed guard in various detention centers.44 The white rioters destroyed 1,256 homes and virtually every other building in Greenwood.45 As black residents begin to rebuild Greenwood after the riot, white Tulsa sought to industrialize the former black enclave and implemented codes to prevent black rebuilding.

The acts of the white mob were never punished by the government at any level. Black detainees were only released upon the application of a white person who was willing to vouch for the detainee’s behavior. The Real Estate Commission valued personal property loss at

$750,000 and residents filed riot-related claims against the city for a total of $1.8 million, most

39 Id at 107. 40 Id. 41 Id at 103. 42 Id. 43 Id at 69. 44 Id at 87. 45 Id at 12.

10 of which were denied.46 In addition, Judge Bradford J. Williams dismissed most of the residents’ claims in 1937.47

B. 70 Years of Silence

In the years following the riot, white Oklahomans in positions of civic, political, and economic power sought to hush talk of the massacre, because they believed it would inhibit the flow of businesses and settlers to the new state.48 For example, Oklahoma textbooks published in

1920s and 1930s did not mention the massacre.49 Only in 1941, did Oklahoma textbooks begin to mention the massacre, albeit with the brevity of a single paragraph. Efforts to forget the event was particularly strong in Tulsa. Evidence suggests that Tulsa newspapers discouraged coverage of the massacre in the following decades.50 For example, one major news outlet, the Tulsa

Tribune, regularly published a “Fifteen Years Ago” feature, highlighting important events that had occurred in Tulsa fifteen years prior to publication.51 Fifteen years after the massacre, instead of featuring the riot, the Tribune instead republished fifteen-year old personals regarding engagements and social events.52 Ten years later, for its “25 Years Ago” feature, the newspaper again ignored the riot on the corresponding date.53

In addition, colleges and other educational institutions in Tulsa discouraged their teachers from discussing the massacre in classrooms. In one instance, Nancy Feldman, a sociologist at the

University of Tulsa, tried to teach her students about the massacre in the late 1940s, but the

46 Id at 145. 47 Id. 48 Id at 25. 49 Id at 26. 50 Id. 51 Id. 52 Id. 53 Id.

11 dean’s office advised her to drop the subject.54 Around the same time, Nancy Dodson, who taught at the Tulsa Junior College, was told to avoid the subject of the riot, because “you don’t want to start another.”55

C. The Tulsa Commission

In 1997, the Oklahoma State House of Representatives approved resolution 1035, which, after two amendments, was approved by the Senate and then Governor Frank Keating in 2000.56

The Commission was required to produce “a final report of its findings and recommendations” by February 28, 2001.57 Resolution 1035 also included provisions for goals, report-backs, and the composition of the committee. One of the bill’s primary supporters, State Representative Don

Ross, had published accounts of the riots in Impact magazine as early as the 1970s, which led some to criticize him for “opening old wounds.”58

1. Commission Membership and Methods

The Commission consisted of 11 members.59 Six were appointed by the governor from three names submitted by the Speaker of the House and three from the Senate President Pro

Tempore. 60 Secondly, the directors of the Oklahoma Human Rights Com mission (OHRC) and of the Oklahoma Historical Society (OHS) were appointed as ex officio members.61 Lastly, the mayor of Tulsa was designated to select members for the three remaining spots of the

Commission.62

54 Id at 27-28. 55 Id at 28. 56 Id at 1. 57 Id. 58 Id at 30. 59 Id at 2. 60 Id. 61 Id. 62 Id.

12 The governor’s appointees include two legislators, one from both the Democratic and

Republican parties, each a former history teacher, two prominent community members from

Tulsa, and two academics chosen for their expertise instead of their geographical or familial connections to Oklahoma or the violent events.63 Lastly, Tulsa Mayor Susan Savage appointed one survivor, Joe Burns, and two current residents of Tulsa, Eddie Faye Gates and Vivian Clark-

Adams.64

Resolution 1035 explicitly required the Commission to identify survivors.65 In turn, its members spent a large portion of their time conducting outreach, identifying, and interviewing survivors.66 After completing their research, the Commission recalled: “An answer comes from hundreds and hundreds of voices. They tell us that what happened in 1921 in Tulsa is as alive to day as it was back then.”67 The Commission advertised its work through magazines and other media, and, through its tireless outreach, identified 118 survivors of the violence and 176 of their descendants.68 In particular, the Commission honed in on the informal social networks that existed among the survivors, their descendants, and their families to carry out their information- gathering efforts. In addition, with astounding specificity and depth, the Oklahoma Commission recruited experts, including legal scholars, archeologists, anthropologists, forensic specialists, geophysicists to help construct a narrative of the massacre, the social and economic context in which it occurred, and its aftermath.69

2. Commission Recommendations

63 Id. 64 Id at 3. 65 Id at 4. 66 Id. 67 Id. 68 Id at 5-6. 69 Id at 3.

13 In its final report, the Commission made the following recommendations: 1) direct payment of reparations to survivors, 2) direct payment of reparations to descendants of survivors,

3) establishment of a scholarship fund, 4) creation of an economic enterprise zone in historic

Greenwood, and 5) construction of a memorial for the reburial of any human remains found during the committee’s investigation.70

3. Impact and Limitations

Upon publishing its findings, the Oklahoma Commission reflected, “The silence is shattered, utterly and permanently shattered.”71 After 70 years of silence, the Commission’s work had enabled dozens of survivors, descendants, and their families to share and receive validation for their story. The Commission’s endeavors received coverage in the Dallas Morning

News, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, National Public Radio (NPR), every

American broadcast television network, Cinemax, the History Channel, and countless other media platforms.72 Notably, many of these outlets provided detailed, repeat, in-depth coverage of the incident. The New York Times published at least 10 articles related to the Commission’s work by February 2000.73 Furthermore, Pearson, one of the three main textbook publishers, now mentions riot.74

In addition, the Commission’s report spurred the creation of the Greenwood Cultural

Center, a community facility located in historic Greenwood that showcases the history of “black wall street,” the riot, and the subsequent resurgence of the local community against all odds.75

70 Id at 22. 71 Id at 4. 72 Id. 73 Id. 74 A.G. Sulzberger, As Survivors Dwindle, Tulsa Confronts Past, New York Times, June 19 2011 at 4. 75 Greenwood Cultural Center, http://www.greenwoodculturalcenter.com/about.

14 The Center also offers community based programming on education, leadership development.76

Finally, John Hope Franklin Reconciliation Park, which opened in Tulsa 2011 with state, local, and private support, is dedicated to Tulsa Race Riot of 1921.77 The John Hope Franklin

Reconciliation Foundation plans to train docents to make the park a historical educational experience for visitors.78

D. Reparations

Despite the Oklahoma Commission’s recommendations, the survivors and their descendants have not received public reparations. Because lawmakers and the general public were not receptive to compensating the affected community, a group of survivors, fearful that they would die before being compensated for their 70 year-old trauma, sued the state of

Oklahoma in 2003 in federal court.79 The lawsuit, filed by more than 200 people, sought scholarships to help descendants attend historically black colleges and universities, as well as health benefits for descendants that still lived in Greenwood.80 Federal Judge James O. Ellison dismissed and ruled that it was outside of the statute of limitations and held that the statute of limitations started to run immediately after the massacre in 1921.81 The ruling ignores the well- documented culture of silence that surrounded the riots for over 70 years, and the survivors’ lawyers appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which, nonetheless, denied certiorari in 2005.82

Each year since the failure of the lawsuit, Representative John Conyers of Michigan has

76 Id. 77 Randy Krehbiel, John Hope Franklin Reconciliation Park opens to the public, Tulsa World, January 6, 2011 at 2. 78 Id. 79 Dexter Mullins, Survivors of infamous 1921 tulsa race riot still hope for justice, Aljazeera America, July 19, 2014 at 9. 80 Id. 81 Id. 82 Id.

15 introduced a bill to eliminate the statute of limitations and allow the survivors’ case for reparations to move forward.83 The bill has failed to gain traction.84

IV. Rosewood Efforts Toward Restorative Justice

A. Background: The Race Riots of 1923

In 1923, Rosewood was a small town in Levy County, Florida, and the majority of its population was black.85 The town included numerous black-owned businesses and organized a private school for their children.86 Many of the men worked at a mill in nearby Sumner and many of the women worked as domestic employees for families that lived in Sumner.87 At its peak in

1915, Rosewood’s population peaked at 700.88

On January 1, 1923, Sarah Carrier and her granddaughter Philomena walked from

Rosewood to the home of James and Fannie Taylor.89 Sarah and her granddaughter saw a white man, someone that they believed worked for the Sea Line railroad, exit the train and enter the house after James had left for the day.90 The white man spent some time in the house and left before noon.91

When James returned home after noon, Fannie told him that a black man had entered their home and assaulted her. It is undisputed that some sort of physical attack took place, as

83 Id at 11. 84 Id. 85 Maxine D. Jones, Larry E. Rivers, David R. Colburn, R. Tom Dye, William R. Rogers, A Documented History of What Occurred at Rosewood, Florida, in January 1923 20-23, December 22, 1993. 86 Id. 87 Id. 88 Id. 89 Id at 26. 90 Id at 27. 91 Id at 2.

16 Fannie, who was 22 at the time, was injured and lost consciousness due to shock.92 While the white community unequivocally accepted Fannie’s assertion that her attacker was black, black residents of Rosewood believed that the white man was Fannie’s lover and had hurt her during a fight.93

Word of the incident spread quickly and Levy County Sheriff Robert Elias Walker assembled a search party of “virtually every able-bodied man” in the county, as well as a pack of bloodhounds, to locate the attacker.94 As the search party of four to five hundred men canvassed the woods for the attacker, rumor began to spread that Jesse Hunter, a black man committed to a convict road gang for possessing concealed weapons, had perpetrated the attack.95

The search party and the bloodhounds went to the house of Sam Carter, who they believed had hidden and transported the fugitive.96 Sam admitted to hiding and transporting the fugitive, and showed them the spot where he and the fugitives had parted ways.97 When Sam was unable to answer their questions satisfactorily, the mob tortured him, shot him multiple times, and hung him from a tree.98

Two days later, on Thursday, January 4, a white mob again descended on Rosewood, this time in search of Sylvester Carrier, who they believed had knowledge of the fugitive and his helpers.99 The mob approached the home of Sarah Carrier, where roughly 15 to 25 black members of the Carrier family and other community members—many of them children-- had

92 Id at 25. 93 Id at 25-26. 94 Id at 27-28. 95 Id at 30. 96 Id at 31. 97 Id. 98 Id. 99 Id at 39.

17 barricaded themselves for their own safety, in view of the approaching mob and the lynching of

Sam Carter.100

When the mob arrived at the house, two white men approached the door and attempted to enter the house. Almost immediately the occupants opened fire, killing them both.101 The white mob responded by pouring “a hail of lead into” the house, killing Sylvester and Sarah Carrier.102

The gunfight continued until 4am the following morning, when the whites ran out of ammunition. While members of the white mob went off to restock their supplies, the black people in the house and others in Rosewood escaped and hid in the nearby swamps.103

The following morning, the mob raided the house and burned it to the ground.104 They continued ravaging the black community, burning down five more houses and a black church.105

During this initial rash of arson, the mob shot and killed Lexie Gordon, a black woman who was roughly fifty years old, as she ran from her burning home.106 The violence ended the following

Sunday morning, when, after capturing and killing James Carrier, one of the escapees from Sarah

Carrier’s house, the mob burned the remaining homes in Rosewood to the ground.107 By the time the violence ended, eight people, both black and white, had been killed and 18 homes were burnt to the ground.108

B. Failed legislation and the Study Commission

100 Id. 101 Id at 40. 102 Id. 103 Id at 43. 104 Id at 44. 105 Id. 106 Id. 107 Id at 51-53. 108 Id at 56.

18 Unlike the Tulsa Commission, which arose out of formally-passed legislation approved by both houses of the state legislature and the governor, the Rosewood Commission came about through the failure of two unsuccessful reparation bills.109 The first failure, House Bill 813, which was proposed in 1993, would have provided legislative findings, appropriation for the compensation for victims of the violence and the construction of a monument.110 However, some legislators felt that the bill did not cite sufficient evidence, and it was ultimately unable to garner sufficient support.111 The second failed bill, House Bill 2425, also proposed in 1993, would have provided $50,000 for the investigation of the Rosewood massacre, but it stalled in the Senate.112

After these successive failures, the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives,

Bolley L. Johnson, commissioned a study into the decades-old events that occurred at

Rosewood.113 Under this process, there were fewer specific, formulaic requirements for the formation and conduct of the commission. As a result of Johnson’s efforts, a study led by

Professor Maxine Jones in the Florida State Department of history was carried out.114 The commission ultimately published a report, A Documented History of the Incident Which

Occurred at Rosewood, Florida in January 1923, on December 22, 1993.115 While the report lacked explicit description of the research methods that the commission employed, it is apparent from the narrative content of the report that the commission relied heavily on personal accounts from survivors, descendants, and their families.

C. Impact: “Truth-telling” and Reparations

109 C. Jeanne Bassett, House Bill 591: Florida Compensates Rosewood Victims and Their Families for a Seventy-One-Year-Old Injury, Fla. St. L. Rev. Vol. 22 Issue 2, 503, 510-512. 110 Id. 111 Id. 112 Id. 113 Id at 513. 114 Id. 115 Id.

19 Like the Tulsa Commission, the Rosewood Commission’s work garnered news coverage.

Furthermore, its efforts provided survivors of Rosewood and their descendants with the opportunity to testify at legislative hearings regarding their experiences.116

As a result of the publication of the study, Florida successfully passed House Bill 591.117

The final bill marked $2.1 million to compensate survivors and descendants. Five hundred thousand was designated to reimburse people who lost property in Rosewood when they were forced to leave town and $1.5 million to be divided up among the remaining 11 survivors.118 The remaining $100,000 was earmarked for scholarships at in-state schools for descendants of the massacre.119

V. A Comparative Analysis of Efforts Toward Restorative Justice

A. Robust Community Involvement

The final products generated by each commission illustrate the immeasurable value of survivor and descendant involvement in truth commissions as restorative justice projects. The multi-faceted, socially cognizant narratives presented in each report would not have been possible without extensive outreach to the survivor community. The successes of the Tulsa

Commission in particular underscore the value of involving survivors and the larger community in both the development and the execution of these efforts. Notably, the Tulsa Commission allowed such involvement through meetings that were open to public and through extensive outreach and oral-history building work with survivors. The Tulsa Commission’s extensive

116 Adam Yeomans, Florida Pays Survivors of 1923 Racist Attack, Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1995, at 1. 117 Jerry Fallstrom, Senate Oks $2.1 Million For Rosewood Reparations, Sun Sentinel, April 9, 1994 at 1. 118 Id. 119 Id.

20 efforts to dig into informal social networks in affected communities built the larger story and resulted in a rich all-encompassing narrative.

B. A Culture of “Truth-telling”

A notable effect of both commissions was a “shattering of silence” and substantial progress in pushing back against the culture of silence maintained around both tragedies for more than 70 years. Both cases showed that the commissions generated significant regional and national news coverage, and provided large numbers of survivors, descendants, and others affected by the violence with opportunities to share their stories. According to the academic theories cited above, shattering of the silence that maintains white supremacy may serve as a means to chip away at the legacy of white supremacy and its contemporary manifestations.

C. Reparative efforts

An important difference between the two efforts is that the Rosewood Commission resulted in financial compensation for survivors, while the Oklahoma Commission did not. One possible reason for the success of the push for reparations in Florida was the relative large size of

Florida’s black population, who successfully mobilized around the issue compensation after the

Rosewood Commission published its report in 1994. In particular, Arnett Doctor, a survivor of

Rosewood, was a “driving force” behind the successful passage of House Bill 591.120 Doctor canvassed the state of Florida, meeting with survivors and compiling narratives about the violence.121 As early as 1982, Doctor helped a reporter with the St. Petersburg Times to gather information about the massacre. He also provided his evidence to lawyers who lobbied for the

120 Dan DeWitt, Arnett Doctor, driving force behind Rosewood reparations, dies at 72, Tampa Bay Times, March 27, 2015 at 2. 121 Id.

21 passage of the bill.122 Prior to its passage, members of the Black Caucus in the House of

Representatives threatened to walk out if the bill was not fairly considered.

When discussing the passage of the bill, Barnett noted, “What it takes to make someone whole, what it takes to repair the past, is probably different for every person, and some things are more effective than others.”123 When the 26-14 vote came down, survivors present for the deliberation cried and shouted “Praise the Lord!”124 The compensation gave survivors the means to purchase new homes, or renovate their current dwellings, to retire, and to travel.125 One survivor, Robie Mortin, the niece of Sam Carter, the first black man lynched during the violence, retired from her job as a nurse’s aid, and was able to travel and begin volunteering at a nursery for pregnant women with AIDs and substance abuse issues.126

VI. Conclusion

The establishment of both the Tulsa and Rosewood Commissions constituted historic steps in beginning to address the history of white supremacy and racial violence that are foundational to the United States. In particular, both Commissions provide insight into effective strategies and methodologies for constructing robust historical records of racially violent events and for collaborating with communities and a wide variety of parties to ensure the production of a narrative that responds to community needs. Furthermore, both Commissions show how the development of historical records and the uncovering of truth can be leveraged to bring about

122 Jessica Glenza, Rosewood massacres a harrowing tale of racism and the road towards reparations, The Guardian, January 3, 2016, at 7. 123 Id at 8. 124 Jerry Fallstrom, Senate Oks $2.1 Million For Rosewood Reparations, Sun Sentinel, April 9, 1994 at 1. 125 Jessica Glenza, Rosewood massacres a harrowing tale of racism and the road towards reparations, The Guardian, January 3, 2016, at 6-7. 126 Id.

22 acts of memorialization and remembrance. The events that followed the release of both

Commission reports suggest that these acts may contribute to the much larger challenge of interrogating and dismantling – or at the very least understanding – white supremacy in this country. Finally, the events that followed the development of these historical records create questions about how to effectively generate reparative relief for survivors of racial violence and their descendants. The Rosewood Commission’s success suggests that framing the efforts from a reparative standpoint from the beginning, and involving community members, advocates, and policy makers to inform the development and influence the direction of the effort towards reparations may be one effective strategy.