The "Missing Dimension" of C. Julius Caesar Author(S): Amiram Ezov Source: Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte, Bd
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The "Missing Dimension" of C. Julius Caesar Author(s): Amiram Ezov Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 45, H. 1 (1st Qtr., 1996), pp. 64-94 Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436407 . Accessed: 07/08/2013 18:40 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Franz Steiner Verlag is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 192.153.34.30 on Wed, 7 Aug 2013 18:40:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE "MISSINGDIMENSION" OF C. JULIUS CAESAR Julius Caesar opens his commentaries on the Gallic War with the famous line, "Gaul as a whole is divided into three parts, one of which is inhabited by the Belgae, another by the Aquitani, and a third by a people called in their own tongue Celtae, in the Latin Galli" (B.G. 1,1). There follows a description of the tribes' features: their language, their characteristics, and their geo-political organization. This cannot be coincidental. It would not be far-fetched to assume that behind this seemingly innocent description of nature and population lurks military intelligence whose targets are climate, geography, population, together with ethnological considerations such as society, politics and religion. In his description of Julius Caesar's military expertise and generalship, Suetonius tells us: "In the conduct of his campaigns it is a question whether he was more cautious or more daring, for he never led his army where ambuscades were possible without carefully reconnoitringthe country, and he did not cross to Britain without making personal inquiries about the harbours, the course, and the approach to the island. But on the other hand, when news came that his camp in Germany was beleaguered, he made his way to his men through the enemies' pickets, disguised as a Gaul" (Divus Iulius 58). Julius Caesar played a major role in developing and exploiting the Roman war machine, but above all Caesar's other military skills (leadership, general- ship, speed, motivating the troops, psychological warfare, courage) Suetonius emphasizes one which is ignored by many modern scholars, and that is his use of military intelligence.' Some scholars, however, who do deal with intelli- gence in the Roman army attributeto Caesar certain qualities in this field.2 There are only few military researchpapers about Caesar from the intelligence stand- point. It is absent from most Caesar monographs.For a discussion of Julius Caesar's intelligence,see R. M. Sheldon,Tinker, Tailor, Caesar, Spy: Espionage in Ancient Rome, Ann Arbor 1987, 94 ff. M. Gichon, "MilitaryIntelligence in the RomanArmy", Labor omnibus unus, ed. H. E. Herzig, Stuttgart1989, 157 ff. Intelligence was defined as a "rmissingdimension of diplomatic history"in C. Andrew and D. Dilke, The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, Urba- na, Illinois 1984. 2 In the entry "Nachrichtenwesen"in the R.E., the following outlook is described:The reconnaissanceand intelligenceunits were not organizedin an orderlyway in the Roman Armybefore Julius Caesar. However, reconnaissance, observers and trackers are mentioned but not as a permanentorganization. Changes came with the masterof the art of war, Historia,Band XLV/l (1996) ? FranzSteiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart This content downloaded from 192.153.34.30 on Wed, 7 Aug 2013 18:40:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The "MissingDimension" of C. Julius Caesar 65 In the following, we shall attempt to analyse Caesar's use of intelligence on two levels, according to the modern distinction: 1. strategic intelligence, answering the needs of a campaign - from informa- tion gathering on the demographic, geographic and economic aspects of the enemy, up to the point of actual contact with the enemy.3 2. tactical intelligence, the acquisition of details relevant for conducting a battle. At the same time, it is worth stressing that the essentially modern distinc- tion made here between the two categories is occasionally blurred, especially when dealing with ancient warfare. 1. Strategic intelligence 1. Sources of intelligence Intelligence gathering takes many forms. De Bello Gallico IV, for example, contains a variety of information about the Germans beyond the Rhine which reached Caesar. In assessing the battle ability of the Germans, Caesar took into account their traditions, food, clothing, lifestyle and superstitions.4 In one of his descriptive digressions, Caesar hints at the sources he used in preparing for the Gallic campaigns. Thus, at IV,24, he quotes the Greek author Eratosthenes and mentions other Greek authors. He himself visited Cisalpine Gaul on his returnfrom Spain in 67 B.C. (Suetonius, D.J. 8), and we can assume that he had access to the State archive and to reports sent from Gaul by various commanders. This does not mean that he had a reliable intelligence picture, and Plutarch (Caesar 23) tells us, for example, that there were people in Rome who did not believe that the island of Britain existed. This was probably the case at that time with other distant provinces as well. Intelligence gathering is expressed in De Bello Gallico in phrases such as Caesari renuntiatur, Caesar... certiorfactus,5 Caesar cognovit without stating the source of the intelligence.6 Thus, for example, Caesar, who was then at Geneva, was told that "the Helvetii were minded to march through the land of Caesar,as partof comprehensivetactical and organizationalchanges. See Reincke, RE. XVI.2, 1935, "Nachrichtenwesen"2. Militarisches,col. 1500. 3 For use of modernterminology of strategicand tactical intelligence, see N. J. E. Austin, Ammianuson Warfare(Collection Latomus165), Brussels 1979, p. 22, 116. See also E. Wheeler,"Methodological Limits and Mirage of RomanStrategy", The Journal of Milita- r-yHistory, 57, 1993, 21 ff. 4 B.G. IV,2,3-4. 5 B.G. I,10. 6 See: B.G. VI,2. This content downloaded from 192.153.34.30 on Wed, 7 Aug 2013 18:40:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 66 AMIRAMEzov the Sequani and the Aedui into the borders of the Santones..." (B.G. 1,10). In another case it is stated that "All this [Dumnorix' political aspirations and treachery] Caesar learnt, and to confirm these suspicions he had indisputable facts. Dumnorix had brought the Helvetii throughthe bordersof the Sequani; he had caused hostages to be given between them..." (B.G. 1,19), and at 1,28 it is reported that Caesar found out about the escape of the Verbigeni from the Helvetian camp. These three instances are typical: Caesar does not state his sources, but he does reveal that he obtained information from distant sources, and he may even have had a source or sources of information within the Helvetian camp itself. How was information obtained? In some cases the sources are stated. For example: a. Caesar questioned prisoners as to why Ariovistus avoided a decisive battle, and he discovered that the Germans had a custom that "their matrons should declare by lots and divinations whether it was expedient or not to engage, and the matrons declared that heaven forbade the Germans to win a victory, if they fought an action before the new moon" (B.G. 1,50). b. After the first campaign season, while Caesar was wintering in Cisalpine Gaul, "frequent rumours were brought to him, and despatches also from Labi- enus informed him, that all the Belgae... were conspiring against Rome and giving hostages to each other" (B.G. 11,1). c. When Caesar decided to go to war against the Belgae, he came to the army and ordered the Senones and other Gauls who bordered the Belgae to investigate their actions and report to him. In all their messages they reported the recruitmentof armies and their concentrationin one place (B.G. 11,2).Later, to Caesar's questions regardingthe war plans, troop numbersand battle strength of the Belgae, the Remi replied that '... concerning their numbers, ... they had exact information in all particulars,because, as they were closely connected by relationship and intermarriage, they had learnt how large a contingent each chief had promised for the present campaign in the general council of the Belgae." The information follows (B.G. 11,4). d. Caesar learnt from exploratores and from the Remi that the Belgae were not far away (B.G. II,5). In these passages, we see four different sources of intelligence: 1. Prisoners. While most information received from prisoners usually per- tained to the immediate battle, in this case it concerned the customs and superstitions of the Germans. We may note that Caesar considered this sort of information relevant to his forthcoming confrontationwith the Germans. He did not overlook psychological and religious factors. 2. Legates' despatches (this raises the question of the identity of the "messengers"').From the way it is presented in the text, the use of legates for gathering information seems to have been routine. In one case, when Quintus This content downloaded from 192.153.34.30 on Wed, 7 Aug 2013 18:40:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The "MissingDimension" of C. Julius Caesar 67 Cicero was pressed by the Nervi, in the year 54, it is said that the more serious the siege operations became, "the more frequent were the despatches and messengers (litterae nuntiique) sent to Caesar" (B.G.