8 JANUARY - FEBRUARY 2007 № Gulnara Iskakova: CONTENTS “The recent changes Constitutional Reform and Powers of the Highest Government Bodies in Kyrgyzstan: to the constitution have A New Balance? led to the preservation of Gulnara Iskakova..........................................2 the state machine, which “Technical” Cabinet: A Trap for the President of Kyrgyzstan? has become obsolete, Nur Omarov .................................................6 unbalanced and is out of Some Political Outcomes of 2006 KYRGYZSTAN BRIEF Issue KYRGYZSTAN line with the requirements Valentin Bogatyrev .......................................9 of the time.” - p.6 Kyrgyzstan in 2006: Achievements, Lessons and Perspectives Roundtable transcript ................................ 11 Bakyt Beshimov: Central Asia and the World “Neither power nor Muratbek Imanaliev ...................................19 opposition can give an The SCO Summit 2007: Opportunities for Kyrgyzstan answer to a question: Roundtable summary ................................24 what development model Institutional Aspects of Cooperation between for Kyrgyzstan do they Kyrgyzstan and the European Union: Unlearned see – post-socialistic, Lessons Joomart Ormonbekov ................................25 nationalistic, liberal or Foreign policy priorities for 2007 what?” – p. 11 Roundtable summary .................................28 ABOUT IPP The Institute for Public Policy (IPP) is an independent, non-partisan research and policy-making institution, based in Bishkek. Its goals are to develop and promote participatory approach in establishing public policy; to strengthen expert analysis in order to promote eff ective decisionmaking in matters of public policy and to create an indepen- dent platform for dialogue on public policy issues. The Institute provides expert consulting, research and surveys on Central Asian aff airs, confl ict management services as well as implementation of educational and cultural projects aimed at good governance. Institute for Public Policy 42/1 Isanov kochosu Bishkek 720017 Kyrgyzstan Tel/Fax: +996(312) 906240 Email:: offi [email protected] Website: http://www.ipp.kg The publication was supported by grants from: European OSI Assistance OSCE Offi ce Union Foundation for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights No part of this publication may be reproduced without permission of the Institute for Public Policy 8 № Constitutional Reform CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND POWERS OF THE HIGHEST GOVERNMENT BODIES IN KYRGYZSTAN: A NEW BALANCE? Gulnara Iskakova, LLM, Associate Professor of law, American University-Central Asia The last two (out of six) changes of the Constitution of ment dismisses the Cabinet and therefore parliament is the Kyrgyz Republic have struck everyone with their un- collectively responsible for the work of the Cabinet. In expectedness and speed of adoption. Perhaps a state- a presidential system, the president dismisses the Cabi- ment that the main changes in the Constitution took net and is personally responsible for their work. In a place mainly because of redistribution of power be- premier-presidential system (like in France and Poland) tween two popularly elected government bodies- the Cabinet depends on the confi dence of parliament; if president and parliament- will not come as a surprise. parliament supports the president then the president KYRGYZSTAN BRIEF Issue KYRGYZSTAN These two main government bodies receive the most heads the Cabinet. If parliament does not support the power from the people - all other government bodies president then the prime minister heads the Cabinet. consist of one or both of them. Precisely because of their popular election, however, there is a concentration of In our system (presidential-parliamentary) it is diffi cult fundamental contradictions and confl icts with the soci- for the layperson and specialist alike to know whom to ety, its ethnic, denominational, linguistic, and regional hold accountable for the work of the Cabinet. If there divisions. Two popularly elected bodies fi nd diffi culties are petrodollars, like in the similar systems of neighbor- in reaching compromises, while powers and relations ing Kazakhstan and Russia, then accountability has less between them are changed in the Constitution. Howev- importance; there are resources, big markets conducive er, both in the Constitution and in practice, responsibil- for business, and the majority of people are satisfi ed. ity of these popularly elected bodies to the population In Kyrgyzstan, a lack of economic resources and pos- for the results of their activities remains unchanged. sibilities requires eff ective organization of government, which is maintained by honest people for their last In this article there is an analysis of the Constitu- crumbs. In Kyrgyzstan both president and parliament tion of November 2006 and what has changed have powers to dismiss the Cabinet. The president pre- in the Constitution as signed by the president in sides over this system but neither the president nor par- January 2007, and how this in the end infl uenc- liament bear responsibility for the work of the Cabinet. es the balance of power between the president and parliament and the situation in the country. The rule of the 2003 Constitution remained intact in 2006 and 2007 Constitutions. According to this rule, The status and prerogatives of the president remained intact both in the 2006 and 2007 Constitutions. The • As a result of hearing annual report of the prime president is the head of state, the highest offi cial of the minister at the initiative of 1/3 of MPs (simple major- Kyrgyz Republic, a symbol of the unity of the people and ity in 2003 Constitution), parliament may, by a simple government, guarantor of the Constitution, rights and majority (2/3 in 2003 Constitution) cast a vote of no freedoms of the citizen. He determines the main direc- confi dence in the Cabinet. tions of internal and foreign policy of the state, repre- sents the state, takes measures to guard the sovereignty • After the vote of no confi dence the president has a and territorial integrity of the Kyrgyz Republic, and en- right to make a decision on dissolution of the Cabinet sures the unity, coordinated functioning and interaction or to contest parliament’s decision. of state bodies and their responsibility to the people. • Should parliament choose again within three months About the responsibility of the state before the to pass a vote of no confi dence in the Cabinet then people: The meaning of any state system is in its re- the president announces dissolution of the Cabinet or sponsibility to the population, which forms and appoints early elections of parliament (dissolves par- maintains it. For the people, the responsibility of the liament). state consists of accountability for the work of the Cabinet - so that the people know who to thank, and According to 1993 Constitution, the Cabinet was de- who to hold accountable, for the work of the Cabi- pendent on the confi dence of parliament. The presi- net (the executive body responsible for revenues and dent could dismiss only individual Cabinet members. expenditures of state budget, providing citizens’ se- However, in order to dissolve the entire Cabinet the curity, implementing pricing, tariff , and tax policy). president needed parliament’s consent. Parliament by a simple majority could pass a vote of no con- The signifi cance of the Cabinet is so great that the issue fi dence in the entire Cabinet or individual Cabinet of its longevity and effi ciency is critical for any system member, and thus the Cabinet was dependent on of state structure. In a parliamentary system, parlia- -2- 8 Constitutional Reform № the confi dence of parliament. So back then a pre- mier-presidential system existed in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, according to the 2007 Constitution the presi- dent in the end decides whether to dismiss the Cabi- According to Constitutions of 2003, 2006 and net or not. That is, the presidential-parliamentary sys- 2007, the president dissolves the Cabinet if: tem established by 2003 Constitution is preserved. • 1) he accepts resignation request of the prime minis- In contrast to the 2003 Constitution, the right of the pres- ter or the Cabinet; ident to preside over Cabinet meetings and invalidate acts of the Cabinet was excluded in 2006 Constitution. • 2) parliament passes a vote of no confi dence in the Cabinet and the president agrees with it; At the same time, the Constitution of 2007 introduced new provisions according to which the president may BRIEF Issue KYRGYZSTAN • 3) parliament within three months again passes a set goals and tasks before the Cabinet. That is, at his vote of no confi dence in the Cabinet. In this case the own discretion the president may interfere in the work president at his own discretion dissolves either the of the Cabinet, although the prime minister (who is de- Cabinet or parliament. pendent on the president) is responsible for the work of the Cabinet. The president retained the right to suspend Compared to the 2006 and 2007 Constitutions, in the any acts of the Cabinet as it was in the 2003 Constitution. 2003 Constitution, the Cabinet depended more on the president. The president could personally dismiss the The powers of the prime minister were listed in de- prime minister or the entire Cabinet. Whereas accord- tail in the 1993 Constitution, indicative of the prime ing to Constitutions of 2006 and 2007, the president minister’s signifi cance and his personal responsibility of his own initiative (or at the suggestion of the prime for the work of the entire Cabinet. In the 2003, 2006 minister) can dismiss a Cabinet member but cannot dis- and 2007 Constitutions powers of the prime minister miss the entire Cabinet of his own initiative. Parliament are not mentioned separately; the prime minister re- may also dismiss a Cabinet member by passing a vote mains a relatively weak fi gure who at the same time of no confi dence in him/her again within six months. is dependent both on the president and parliament. Forming of the Cabinet The constitutions of 1993 and 2007 establish diff erent cies and powers in checking and infl uencing each other. orders for the forming of the Cabinet.