Anti/Thesis 17

leading to expect, and difficult to identify, a clear role for the middle class in complex Has the Middle Anti-Thesis: events such as those of the Arab uprisings. Class Been a The False Furthermore, the transnational ramifica- tions of class-making are so significant in Motor of the Question of the the Arab Middle East that it becomes im- possible to locate or pin down a clear role ? Middle Class for the middle class within domestic borders. One is forced instead to adopt a larger, regional and international focus to understand how, and which classes are differently involved in these moments of upheaval. The specificities of Arab political Rachid Ouaissa 12–16 and economic systems force us thus to Benoît Challand 17–21 Benoît Challand transcend any too-narrow methodological nationalism. I will therefore concentrate on The section “Anti/Thesis” juxtaposes Keywords: Arab Revolts; Social Classes; two sets of arguments: the first question- two rivaling positions on a controver- Lower Class; Transnational ; ing normative expectations around mid- sial issue related to the topic in focus. Methodological Nationalism; Rent dle classes, and the second pointing at Due to the number of recent academic external factors such as economic rents debates which address the role of the Scholars of revolutions or of so-called and the existence of a transnational bour- middle class in the Arab uprisings, this democratic transitions all face the thorny geoisie whose span of action and influ- issue’s “Anti/Thesis” is dedicated to the question of what specific role classes play ence is not limited to domestic borders. controversy around the argument which in the reshaping of political and social sys- Let us start with normative views accom- casts the middle class as “motor of the tems at critical junctures. Often the middle panying discourses on the middle class. Arab Spring.” While Benoît Challand ar- class is seen as a necessary stepping stone gues that the constellation of actors in on which new alliances are forged, and There are many interpretations of what the uprisings of 2011 was too complex thus becomes an essential “ingredient” for role class plays in the making and unfold- to be reduced to the middle class, Ra- political change. ing of revolutions. The danger is to selec- chid Ouaissa understands the middle tively examine moments when the middle class not as a driving force per se, but In this short text, I would like to offer a dif- class appears a key component in leading as the central group of supporters for a ferent view than that offered in the Thesis political change; one could, however, se- political force. section. My argument is that it is both mis- lect other episodes of such rebellions that

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shed a less favorable light on middle nomic and political redistribution, it is ob- social backgrounds who since March 2011 classes. With regard to the Arab uprisings vious that the middle class has not at all have called for an end to political divi- of 2011, some of these analyses force par- been a motor for the Arab uprisings. Two sions in Palestine. At the end of 2011 in allels with European history and try to de- series of episodes can substantiate this Egypt, when it became clear that the po- fend the view that the middle class has claim. On the one hand, a look at the role lice state was still pulling the strings even been a motor of the Arab Spring. If by this of lower classes in these revolts shows the after the fall of President Mubarak, the No- we mean to assess whether the middle complex and overlapping composition of vember street battles—such as those of class was a trigger and essential compo- political activism. On the other, recent Muhammad Mahmoud street—belonged nent of the wave of protests, it is hard to events—like those in Egypt during the to the lower segments of Egyptian societ- argue against such view. Revolutions have summer of 2013—cast doubt on the auto- ies, not the twitterati that were so central by and large been bourgeois events—and matically positive expectation (in terms of in January and February of the same year. the original moment of the Arab uprisings transition and democratization) that is Alliances have surely been formed, but fits this pattern, with vast sections of the often attached to middle class. not just between incumbent elites and the middle class (though not only) in the early middle classes: shared pressures be- months of 2011 taking to the streets for In the first series, it is obvious that the mar- tween lower and middle classes also need their first time—from Sanaa to Tunis, and ginalized and lower classes are the ones to be included in our comparative analy- from Cairo to Manama. Indeed, even in the willing to exert political pressure to keep ses of the Arab uprisings.1 latter case, where revolution is usually de- the motor of the Arab uprisings going, so scribed in simplistic terms of a Shiite-Sunni to say. Think of Tunisia, where youth and The second series of episodes, casting a divide, the initial protest in Bahrain includ- “marginalized Tunisians” were pivotal in less positive light on the involvement of ed not just the disgruntled local Shiite contributing to the second phase of the middle class, stems from the end of population, but also segments of the protests, after Ben Ali had departed the President Morsi’s power tenure in summer Sunni middle class as well as organized country when the second Qasbah pro- 2013 and post-Rabia al-Adawiyya2 events. labor (Achcar 162; Lynch 136-37). Without tests in February and March 2011 forced To say, as my colleague does in his Thesis, the support of (at least) portions of liberal acceptance of the fall elections and the that both the military and Brother Morsi professions and middle class, no revolu- drafting of a new constitution (Gana 18). have tried to court the middle classes to tion is likely to occur—and this has been Think of Yemen, where akhdām (“lower forge alliances, is to take away from the the case in all Arab countries in 2011. caste servants”), disenfranchized groups middle class its agency and comprehend in the north, and excluded portions of the this vast social group as a monolith and as If, however, we are asking whether the south pushed for realization of a similar simple passive weight that both sides middle class has supported a continuous national dialogue after the departure of have tried to push on its side of the bal- effort toward more social justice and a Ali Abdullah Saleh (Finn; Carapico 102-10). ance. Let us not forget that some sizable structural change in the pattern of eco- Similarly, it is youth activists of differing portions of the middle class, in particular

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its “liberal” segments (precisely the seg- transnational in the process But one also needs to insist on a recent ment supposed to lead in the opening of of making clearly identifiable social class- externalist explanation of the rather su- autocratic systems in mainstream democ- es. All this contributes to making quite a perficial involvement of the middle class ratization theories), have taken an anti-lib- unique configuration in the Arab Middle in the follow-up to the revolts. The focus eral stance in supporting the military East. in many of the approaches taken in politi- crackdown of August 2013. Supporting cal science and sociology on the subject emergency measures and the massive To understand this specificity and avoid tends to reinforce a bias toward method- curtailment of civil rights (freedom of ex- essentialist narratives of Middle Eastern ological nationalism—that is, the a priori pression, discriminate detention of mem- exceptionalism, a historical understand- selection of variables relating uniquely to bers of the Brotherhood, and, as of March ing of class formation in the region is nec- internal political or sociological process- 2014, a string of massive death sentences), essary. In large part, I follow the argument es. For example, if the bourgeoisie (be it as has been the case in Egypt in the last that has been made elsewhere and is re- the “would-be middle class” of Khos- nine months, is not likely to hasten reform layed here by Rachid Ouaissa (257-77). rokhavar [60-91], or the “middle class towards more social justice and human Indeed, a look at the social history of the poor” of Bayat [44]) is described as defec- dignity. The same charge of non-inclusion Arab Middle East demonstrates that the tive, this is due to the nature of the politi- can be leveled against the Brotherhood’s making of the middle class has not been cal system (autocracy), or to internal divi- neo-liberal middle class, which has pushed connected with the development of in- sions created by political Islam. In other neither for more economic enfranchise- dustrial production or to tax enfranchise- words, all these accounts privilege inter- ment, nor for more social justice while ment, as was the case in Europe. Instead, nalist processes of political change (a Morsi was in power. it has been mostly based on rent view reproduced in the Thesis’ article with economies, the latest manifestation of its focus on the making and unmaking of Emerging from these short discussions is which is the rent attached to foreign aid local alliances). What these explanations the view that middle class involvement in and to a life geared toward individual fail to recognize is that the process of these uprisings presents a mixed balance consumption. He is thus absolutely cor- class formation is connected as much to sheet, with positive and negative contri- rect in maintaining that the Arab middle external factors as to internal ones. Sandra butions to a revolutionary transformation. classes have not been able to develop Halperin noted long ago that the system- any meaningful instrument to push for atic crushing of left-radical groups during Let us now turn to the second part of the structural changes in the 2011 uprisings, the Cold War led to massive out-migra- argument, namely the existence of exter- and thus their engagement with these tion of the middle class, skewing the nal factors and the need to avoid the uprisings has been motivated by a world- balance between different classes and traps of domestic analyses only. Of inter- view that is based in this individualistic thwarting the emergence of vivid class est here is the existence of variegated lifestyle (273), and the resilience of an or- consciousness (a key ingredient to class forms of rents and the existence of a ganized clientele around ruling classes. participation in political processes).

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Benoît Challand It is here that an analysis of the middle We have now a transnational bourgeoisie aspect can be connected to a critique of class needs to engage with regional and playing a political (conservative) role that institutionalized or NGO-ized civil society, is trained as a sociologist and historian, international influences. If rent is gener- is often unaccounted for. Be it in Palestine which might be seen as having a detri- with degrees from SOAS (London) ally associated with oil, one needs to with President Abbas and some of his net- mental role in terms of class formation. In- and the European University Institute look not only at the rent provided by in- work who made their fortune in the Gulf deed, NGOs all too often focus solely on in Florence (Italy). He is professor of ternational aid (Egypt, Palestine, Jordan (Rabbani); be it in with past interim their economic and institutional survival, Contemporary History at the Université have received vast amounts, both from Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril whose and reproduce a middle class discon­ de Fribourg (Switzerland). Over the the USA and from the EU), but also at the connections in Kuwait, Lebanon, and nected, paradoxically, from lower classes course of his academic career, he increasing flow of Gulf capital into coun- Qatar helped him become a key figure of and popular aspirations they are sup- has taught at universities in New York tries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Pales- Libyan transition (Prashad 138-40); or anti- posed to help and represent through (NYU, New School for Social Research), tine. Adam Hanieh has powerfully de­ Brotherhood sentiments expressed by the social work (Challand, Palestinian Civil Bologna, Pavia, and Bethlehem. Benoît monstrated that the traditional divisions checkbook diplomacy of the Saudi family Society 185-88, 192-98; “The Counter-Pow- Challand studies the impact of foreign of state versus society—or a vision of class or from the , one can er” 275). assistance on Palestinian civil society and formation limited to national borders— see that not only state rents shape and un- the shift of donors’ policies after the Arab fail to capture the vivid and massive influ- dermine the prospect of more democratic Instead, we should look for motors of the uprisings; he has also published peer- ence that transnational non-state actors change in the region; but also that a pow- Arab uprisings in the less institutionalized reviewed articles on the criminalization (e.g. global capitalist classes)3 play in erful capitalist class, international in its type of activism, and in the revolutionary of Islamic charities, the history of shaping the future of Arab politics. We composition and outlook, is failing the capacity of different groups and classes to international aid, and European identity. can see examples of this influence in Arab uprisings’ genuinely popular aspira- come together. These processes have He has published four books on topics Egypt (with the plug being pulled on the tion for political change and economic re- been termed “de-sectorialization” ranging from civil society in Palestine to Muslim Brotherhood this past summer form in order to preserve its own interests (Bonnefoy and Piorier), or intersectionality. political theory. by some of that capitalist class fearing and investments in other countries. The latter term (Challand, “Citizenship”) al- loss of control over their assets and joint lows us to reflect on the relevance of re- investments with the Egyptian military), In that sense, questioning the role of an gional and external factors, such as rent but also the reconstruction of Libya, and evanescent middle class is misleading. and migration, and how these intersect part of the fate of Tunisian and Palestini­ What needs to be assessed is the flow of with internal factors to influence the dy- an politics. Hanieh uses a felicitous de- three different rents: oil rent in its different namics of various national uprisings. Fi- scription for this intermingling of class forms, non‑oil rent that is transnational nally, this term also reminds us that change formation, in the high degree of Gulf (and mostly intra-Arab) and that has deep will only come from the combined efforts capitalists’ investments in other Arab capitalist imbrications in the national of both the lower and the middle classes, countries as “the Gulf bourgeoisie” be- economies of countries that are part of the separate from the state bourgeoisie and coming “an internal bourgeoisie into “Arab Spring,” and the bureaucratic de- transnational capitalists’ interests in main- Egypt” (139). generation linked to foreign aid. This last taining a truncated social contract.

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Notes Cited Works __. “The Counter-Power Hanieh, Adam. Lineages of Civil Society and the of Revolt: Issues of 1 For a general discussion on Achcar, Gilbert. The People Emergence of a New Political Contemporary Capitalism the role of lower classes in Want: A Radical Exploration Imaginary in the Arab World.” in the Middle East. London: keeping revolutions alive, see of the Arab Uprising. Constellations 18.3 (2011): Haymarket, 2013. Print. Chibber, esp. chap. 3-4. Berkeley: University of 271-83. academia.eu. Web. 14 California Press, 2013. Print. Mar. 2014. Khosrokhavar, Farhad. The 2 Rabia al-Adawiyya is the New Arab Revolutions that name of the square in Cairo Bayat, Asef. Life as Politics: __. Palestinian Civil Society: Shook the World. Boulder, where pro-Morsi supporters How Ordinary People Foreign Donors and the London: Paradigm, 2012. built an encampment after Change the Middle East. Power to Promote and Print. the massive June 2013 Stanford: Stanford University Exclude. London: Routledge, protests organized, among Press, 2010. Print. 2009. Print. Lynch, Marc. The Arab others, by the Tamarod Spring: The Unfinished (“rebel”) movement. The Bonnefoy, Laurent, and Chibber, Vivek. Postcolonial Revolutions of the New military violently overtook Marine Piorier. “The Theory and the Specter of Middle East. New York: Public the square mid-August 2013. Structuration of the Yemeni Capital. London: Verso, 2013. Affairs Books, 2012. Print. A very polarized debate Revolution: An Attempt Print. emerged in Egyptian society at Analysing an Ongoing Ouaissa, Rachid. “Blockierte as to whether the use of Process.” Revue française Finn, Tom. “In Revolt: Yemeni Mittelschichten als Motor extreme violence (victims de science politique 62.5/6 ‘Untouchables’ Hope for Path der Veränderungen in were in the hundreds) was (2012): 895-913. Print. Out of Misery.” reuters.com. der arabischen Welt?” justified or not. Reuters, 7 Mar. 2012. Web. 14 Arabellions: Zur Vielfalt von Carapico, Sheila. “Yemen.” Mar. 2014. Protest und Revolte im Nahen 3 I prefer using the plural Dispatches from the Arab Osten und Nordafrika. Ed. “global classes” to show the Spring. Ed. Paul Amar and Gana, Nouri. “Tunisia.” Annette Jünemann and Anja variety within. Vijay Prashad. Minneapolis: Dispatches from the Arab Zorob. Wiesbaden: Springer, University of Minnesota Press, Spring. Ed. Paul Amar and 2013. Print. 257-77. 2013. Print. Vijay Prashad. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, Prashad, Viyad. Arab Spring, Challand, Benoît. 2013. Print. Libyan Winter. Edinburgh: AK “Citizenship against the Press, 2012. Print. Grain: Locating the Spirit Halperin, Sandra. “The of the Arab Uprisings in Post-Cold War Political Rabbani, Mouin. “Qatar Times of Counterrevolution.” Topography of the and the Palestinians.” Constellations 20.2 (2013): Middle East: Prospects for jadaliyya.com. Arab Studies 169-87. academia.eu. Web. 14 Democracy.” Third World Institute, 1 Dec. 2012. Web. 14 Mar. 2014. Quarterly 26.7 (2005): 1135- Mar. 2014. 56. JSTOR. Web. 14 Mar. 2014. ISSN: 2196-629X urn:nbn:de:hebis: 04-ep0003-2014-37-13108

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