SERBIA (SERBIA AND KOSOVO) 147

SERBIA

While the year 2006 was generally cedure, demonstrated that Serbia had yet marked by the consolidation of stability in to develop full respect for political rights the Balkans, Serbia remained politically in- and break up with its authoritarian tradition. secure mostly due to its stalled coopera- The constitution’s preamble earmar- tion with the International Criminal Tribunal ked Kosovo as Serbia’s inalienable part for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The and thereby inferred Serbia’s refusal to Hague. The action plan for cooperation partake in the search for a compromise with ICTY announced by Serbian policy- with regard to the province’s status. The makers in July neither produced tangible Serbian Helsinki Committee for Human results nor impressed the international Rights noted that such an attitude could community despite the ongoing trial of a easily confront Serbia with its neighbors in group of “Ratko Mladic’s accomplices.” the near future, and alienate it from the in- Therefore, the fact that the European ternational community. Union (EU) cancelled the association and The ruling coalition kept manipulating stabilization negotiations with Serbia did international factors by claiming it was the not come as a surprise. The new constitu- increasing popularity of the Serbian Radical tion, which the Serbian parliament adopted Party that would jeopardize Serbia’s move- overnight and put to referendum on 28-29 ment toward the EU. The decision to admit October without a proper democratic pro- Serbia to the NATO program Partnership

A billboard urging people to vote "Yes" for the new Serbian constitution. Yet, both its provisions and the drafting and adoption process were heavily criticized by civil society groups for violating human rights and democratic principles. October 2006. © AP/Ilic

This chapter was researched and written by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. 148 SERBIA for Peace (PfP), the purpose of which was stitution mirrors the political climate that to round off the security structures of the “secures continuity to a traditionalist, illib- Balkans, moved Serbia closer to European eral political thought and behavior, en- norms as it implied the establishment of trenches the society and upholds its mechanisms that could play an important autism vis-à-vis the world and modern in Serbia’s stabilization. Therefore, mem- times […] and testifies that Serbia still bership in the PfP could be characterized lacks political capacity to modernly articu- as a victory over the army’s conservative late the life of people and their communi- bloc standing in the way of a reform of the ties, i.e., to grasp the complexity and diver- military. sity of its self-identity.” 1 Similar to all Balkan countries, Serbia The procedure by which the constitu- made progress in the economic sphere. tion was passed failed to respect the basic However, it failed to invest local self-gov- democratic principle of public participation ernments with more authority in econom- and transparency by bypassing any form of ic questions and so create a legal frame proper public debate. Moreover, despite the conducive to foreign investment and heal- fact that copies of the draft constitution thy market economy. were circulated to parliamentarians only two The judiciary still remained among the hours before the vote the constitution was biggest stumbling blocks in the way of Ser- adopted unanimously. The very fact that bia’s respect for human rights and the rule none of the 242 MPs present at the session of law. The same applies to a variety of se- discussed or criticized any constitutional cret services whose activities hindered provision left no doubt about purely political consolidation in Serbia’s political scene. motives behind this consequential legal act. Closely cooperating with largely tycoon- The pro-referendum campaign and owned media, these services systematical- the way the draft constitution was market- ly fabricated scandals in an attempt to dis- ed by scores of public figures and politi- credit differently-minded people and what cians were tailored to appeal to citizens’ they considered “hotbeds of resistance,” patriotism on the one hand, and to con- including some NGOs and small political demn any opposition to it on the other. parties such as the Liberal-Democratic Par- Parties and individuals calling for a refer- ty, the Social Democratic Union and the Ci- endum boycott or voting against the con- vic Alliance of Serbia. stitution were labeled unpatriotic and un- democratic – a discourse reminiscent of Constitutional referendum and Milosevic’s era. This was particularly evi- the new constitution dent in the afternoon hours of 29 October, the second referendum day, when statis- The manner in which Serbia’s new tics indicated extremely low voter turnout. constitution was first announced, how it was submitted to the parliament for adop- ◆ During the state-orchestrated and fi- tion, and put to referendum in October - nanced pro-referendum campaign, people let alone a number of its provisions - was assembled at a rally in the northern Kosov- probably most illustrative of the overall ska Mitrovica (Kosovo) on 26 October were ambiance determining the human rights carrying posters of Ratko Mladic and chanti- situation: it was drafted by a small circle of ng the name of the infamous Hague fugi- people, adopted overnight as a product of tive. Serbian officials never distanced them- the parliamentary parties’ bargain, illegally selves from the incident or condemned it. campaigned for, and verified in a doubtful The procedure and regulations applied procedure. As a result, Serbia’s new con- to the referendum substantially differed

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OSCE REGION IHF REPORT 2007 SERBIA 149 from the one for elections. For instance, siderably reduced from that provided by pre-referendum silence was not observed, the Charter of Human and Minority Rights international observers were not allowed and Freedoms (2003), which was practi- to monitor polling stations in Kosovo, and cally turned null and void when the state any surplus of ballots over the official num- union of Serbia and Montenegro ceased to ber of voters was not considered to be a exist in May 2006. Though admitting that problem. Such irregularities, and the heavy this domain is relatively well regulated, media campaign until the moment the many critics of the new constitution indi- polling stations were closed, gave rise to cate that some restrictive provisions and serious suspicions over the official results problematic phrasings make it open to showing a 51.5- percent support for the questions. For example, criticism has been constitution. directed at the poorly worded ban on tor- Although the new constitution’s pre- ture3 and the failure to clearly provide for amble emphatically asserts Kosovo as the right to conscientious objection in arti- Serbia’s integral and inalienable part, Koso- cle 45. In addition, article 62, which deals vo Albanians were excluded from the ref- with “the right to marry and equality be- erendum voting lists. The preamble also tween spouses,” discriminates against ho- underlines the duty of “all state institutions mosexual couples by defining “spouses” to represent and protect Serbia’s interest as “a man and a woman.” This article con- in Kosovo.” tradicts with article 21 that explicitly pro- By defining Serbia as “the state of the hibits any form of discrimination. Serbian people and all citizens living in Further, the constitution virtually re- Serbia” (article 1), the constitution asserts stricts women’s right to freely decide on the existence of a “native” nation and indi- their own bodies by stating that “anyone” - rectly differentiates between citizens on i.e., also potentially women’s partners and the basis of their ethnic origin. For contrast, other people - shall have the right to freely even the 1990 constitution passed in Mi- decide on giving birth. In addition, the losevic’s era referred to Serbia as “a dem- statement that “the Republic of Serbia ur- ocratic state of all citizens living in it.” ges parents to give birth” may lead to arbi- Article 2 of the new constitution stipu- trary interpretation, and even to discrimi- lates: “Sovereignty shall be invested in cit- natory laws and bylaws. Also, the constitu- izens who shall be exercising it in referen- tion’s provisions on churches and religious dums, popular initiatives and through their communities are formulated in a manner elected representatives,” and, “No state that they can be used as pretexts for ban- body, political organization, group or indi- ning religious communities on grounds vidual shall appropriate sovereignty from that would be at variance with the Euro- citizens or establish governance without pean Convention for the Protection of Hu- citizens’ free will.” Yet, article 102 practical- man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. ly “appropriates citizens’ sovereignty” as it Among other incongruous constitu- vests political parties with the authority to tional provisions are those dealing with the revoke the mandates of the members in incorporation of international treaties into parliament. In other words, according to Serbian legislation; the status of Vojvodina; the new constitution, elected members of the election and removal of the president parliament are nothing but “guards of of the republic; the election of judges and mandates engaged on contractual basis.”2 the republican public attorney; and the The level of the protection of human adoption of amendments to the constitu- and minority rights and freedoms was con- tion. Amending the constitution necessi-

IHF REPORT 2007 HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OSCE REGION 150 KOSOVO tates approval by at least two thirds of the These requirements demonstrate that total number of MPs – which implies a Serbian politicians misguided the people consensus of all parliamentary parties – when claiming during the referendum and a national referendum, the validity of campaign that it would be easy to amend which does not require the turnout of a the constitution: in fact it will be as difficult simple majority of registered voters. as it was to amend the 1990 constitution.4

KOSOVO

Politics and discussion of Kosovo’s fu- ethnic Albanian majority that 2006 would ture status, as in years past, dominated the be the year of independence in Kosovo Kosovo landscape in 2006. Ongoing and As time passed, however, the local po- serious human rights concerns continued pulation’s sense of disenfranchisement to be eclipsed and broad-brushed by na- from the process grew, with particularly tional and international authorities eager to strong criticism from women’s groups and show that Kosovo is ready for some form Roma, Ashkaeli and Egyptian (RAE) plat- of independence. Particular human rights forms that their issues were not being di- concerns included security and freedom of rectly addressed within the status negotia- movement for minorities, a virtual halt in tions process. The absence of dialogue on returns of refugees and internally displa- serious rule of law and justice concerns, in- ced persons, a poorly functioning justice cluding dealing with the past, was also system, widespread discrimination, and in- raised. adequate progress on ensuring access to By mid year it had become clear that quality education for all. a solution acceptable to both Pristina and The year began with the untimely Belgrade was unlikely to be achieved death of long-time moderate LDK leader through negotiations and that Ahtisaari Ibrahim Rugova and a shake-up of the would need to make his own proposal to PISG5 government. The start of discussions the Security Council during the autumn between Pristina and Belgrade over Koso- months. On 10 November Ahtisaari an- vo’s future status—talks to be led by UN nounced that he would postpone reveal- special envoy Martti Ahtisaari, who was ap- ing his proposed solution until after parlia- pointed by the UN secretary-general in the mentary elections in Serbia to be held on fall of 2005—were delayed until February. 21 January 2007. He argued that the delay As Fatmir Sejdiu was elected in as the new would serve to prevent the possibility of president of Kosovo, former head of the unduly influencing the elections. Kosovo Protection Corps Agim Ceku repla- Much to the irritation of UNMIK6 and ced Bajram Kosumi as prime minister after PISG, Kosovo Serbs largely continued their his resignation. Kole Berisha, LDK vice-pre- boycott of PISG institutions. sident, replaced Nexhat Daci as president Mitrovice remained a flashpoint. In May, of the Assembly. the northern municipalities formally ceased The new leadership made a positive relations with the PISG and called for inde- start, seeming to re-invigorate the stan- pendent security measures. UNMIK and dards process and in particular support for KFOR7 have since substantially increased rule of law efforts and outreach to minori- their security presence north of the Ibar. ties. Throughout spring and early summer The Vetevendosje (“Self-Determina- there were high hopes on the part of the tion”) movement continued its vehement

This chapter was provided by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee. KOSOVO 151 protests against negotiations in any form, tion Army (KLA), the AKSH (Albanian Na- garnering additional support from citizens tional Army) - stopping travelers to ask for disappointed in the lack of communication their documents and in some cases steal- and transparency of the process displayed ing personal items. In December, the police by the Albanian leadership. Their public confiscated the largest cache of illegal ar- protests on 28 November — the Albanian maments—including a 12.7mm anti-aircraft Flag Day — included throwing stones and gun and military uniforms and masks— bottles of red paint symbolizing blood at since the end of the conflict in 1999. Two UNMIK, EU, and PISG government build- senior officials from Ramush Haradinaj’s ings (see photo). political party AAK were arrested. The late summer and fall marked an December also saw the election of the increase in serious incidents against mi- second leader of the LDK in its 17-year his- norities, particularly in Mitrovice in the north tory. During the convention a row arose and Klina in the western part of the provin- between camps supporting the winning ce. In addition, a number of incidents that candidate President of Kosovo Fatmir appeared politically motivated took place, Sejdiu and his close second Nexhat Daci, receiving widespread publicity and con- ending in a violent brawl. demnation. There were also reported inci- The year ended with record lows in dents in western Kosovo of armed and uni- the public’s confidence and trust in both formed men wearing masks - claiming to national and international officials. Key ac- be a guerilla offshoot of the Kosovo Libera- tors, governmental and non-governmental,

The Vetevendosje (“Self-Determination”) movement protested against all Kosovo negotiations on 28 November by throwing stones and bottles of red paint symbolizing blood at UNMIK, EU, and PISG government buildings. © SHC/Berggren

IHF REPORT 2007 HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OSCE REGION 152 KOSOVO warned that delay in resolving the status of tion rather than inclusion or integration. Kosovo could result in violence in the pro- Consequently, many minority communi- vince in 2007. Russia and Serbia suggest- ties still lived physically, socially, and eco- ed the implication amounted to blackmail. nomically segregated from other commu- In Kosovo, speculation over the timing and nities. contents of Ahtisaari’s proposal abounded, A dramatic increase in serious highly with renewed focus on the drafting of visible public incidents of violence against Kosovo’s constitution and the creation of minority communities further cemented national symbols and an army. In contrast, this reality. Belgrade continued to insist that interna- A grenade attack in August on a café tional law does not allow for the interna- at the northern end of the bridge over the tional community to grant Kosovo genuine Ibar in Mitrovice injured nine people and independence. resulted in mass protests and temporary Key human rights concerns included closure of the bridge.This incident was the security and protection of minorities, closely followed by a grenade attack on a justice system failures, and discrimination. Kosovo Serb family home in the urban These issues, coupled with ongoing con- center of Klina in September. Four persons cerns about the equal access and quality were seriously injured. In the same area— of education available to children in the previously touted as one of the biggest re- province, raised serious concern about turns success stories in Kosovo—there ha- Kosovo’s viability as a “state” regardless of ve been reported shootings of Kosovo the status outcome.8 Serbs and the destruction of reconstructed houses belonging to Kosovo Serbs. National and ethnic minorities Other public incidents include for ex- Security for minorities in Kosovo re- ample the stoning of a bus of Serbs going mained fragile, despite a decrease in the to Strpce and the explosion of 3-5 meters official number of reported incidents of of railway track on the main railway line ethnically motivated violence against mi- connecting Kosovo Serbs from south of norities in 2006. Local monitors cautioned the Ibar to Mitrovice in the north in early that the decrease may have more to do December. with the lack of interaction between Ko- RAE communities continued to be sovo Serb and ethnic Albanian communi- among the most marginalized of minority ties and minorities’ reluctance and fear of communities in Kosovo, living in abject reporting incidents than anything else. poverty and facing routine discrimination. Frequent intimidation and harassment, More than 30% of the 30,000-strong RAE such as spitting, cursing, stone-throwing, community in Kosovo were estimated to and property destruction, continued to ta- be unregistered, preventing their access to ke place, including for ethnic Albanians liv- basic documentation and public services. ing in a minority situation. Vandalism of Or- Upwards of 70% of the population did not thodox Serb religious and cultural heritage attend school beyond the age of 12, and sites, including grave sites also increased. the illiteracy rate was estimated at more Freedom of movement and access to than 16% of the population. The displaced public services such as health care, edu- Roma living in lead-contaminated camps cation, employment, courts and public ad- near the Trepca mines in north Mitrovice ministration offices were limited. The poli- continued to live in displacement, albeit in cy of decentralization and addressing mi- new camps just next to the contaminated nority rights remained a policy of segrega- sites.

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Returns of refugees and displaced ed forced returns from Western Europe persons continued to increase, raising serious con- The returns process in Kosovo was vir- cern about the ability of Kosovo’s fragile tually nonexistent in 2006. The number of social and security structures to deal with 10 returns of refugees and IDPs has de- this influx. creased four years running, with a meager 1,608 returns in 2006.9 UNHCR estimated Impunity and the judicial system that more than 220,000 Kosovo Serbs and The consistent failure of the criminal Roma remained displaced in Serbia and justice system in Kosovo to hold to ac- Montenegro, with an additional 20,000 count many of those responsible for seri- minority members still living in displace- ous crime has created a climate of im- ment in Kosovo. punity that will be difficult to reverse. As While some attributed the stall in re- UNMIK continued to transfer additional turns to the uncertainty of the political competencies to the PISG Ministries of process and the generally poor economic Justice and Interior established in 2006, situation in Kosovo, the increase in visible the EU stepped up its efforts to take over serious inter-ethnic attacks apparently also in UNMIK’s stead in the post-status period. discouraged return. The justice system continued to suffer As in years past, the returns that did from, among other concerns, an extreme take place were primarily to rural, mono- backlog of cases, coupled with a lack of ethnic areas with minimal interaction be- oversight and case management tracking tween communities. The returns were fre- mechanisms in courts; virtually non-exis- quently incomplete (e.g., only the head of tent witness protection and relocation the household) and partial (e.g., for alter- mechanisms in an environment where nating weekends or months), and with few regular incidents of witness intimidation children or youth. took place; a lack of qualified judges and The trend of minorities selling their prosecutors; passive investigative prac- homes to ethnic Albanians continued. A tices; poor coordination among police, similar trend of property sales of ethnic prosecutors, and judges; poor collabora- Albanian homes took place in the northern tion between international and national el- part of the province. Though not officially ements of the system; and problematic recorded, there was speculation that more detention and sentencing practices. The minorities had departed the province than consequence was extraordinarily lengthy returned throughout the year. and inefficient proceedings with unsatis- In March, UNHCR stated that members factory and rarely visible results that sent of the Ashkaeli and Egyptian communities the message to all communities that the were no longer considered to be at risk. In justice system had little power to address contrast, Roma, Kosovo Serbs, and Alba- its concerns. nians in a minority position continued to be The poor track record on prosecuting considered at risk of persecution and ben- war crimes and post-war inter-ethnic and efit from international protection. Their re- politically-motivated crime continued. In turn should be on a strictly voluntary basis. seven and one-half years only twenty- UNHCR cautioned that forced return three war crimes cases have been brought of Ashkaeli and Egyptians should be un- before the Kosovo courts (dealt with ex- dertaken in a “phased manner due to the clusively by international judges and pros- limited absorption capacity of Kosovo.” ecutors at this point). Of these, the vast Nevertheless uncoordinated and unassist- majority were filed in the immediate after-

IHF REPORT 2007 HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OSCE REGION 154 KOSOVO math of the arrival of the international charges and resulted in what appeared to community and tried by panels of national be symbolic sentencing. An additional 31 judges whose judgments raised such seri- defendants were charged in more serious ous concern that most cases were retried, cases handled by international prosecutors with a number of these cases ultimately and judges, 26 of whom have been found acquitted, dismissed, or suspended. Since guilty and another four of whom still await- mid 2002 only six cases have been filed, ed trial at year’s end. These judgments with only a few still active. have also suffered from lenient sentencing One of these cases—a high-profile practices. case of three former KLA officers, including The issue of missing persons re- Gen. Selim Krasniqi, a regional command- mained a highly charged and emotional is- er in the post-war Kosovo Protection sue. As of the end of November 2006, Corps—was decided in August. The men 2,150 people (of the original reported were all found guilty of war crimes for the 5,206) remain missing from the Kosovo unlawful detention and abuse of ethnic conflict. This number includes Albanians, Albanians at the Drenovac camp in 1998 Kosovo Serbs, and members of the RAE and sentenced to seven years imprison- and other minority communities. ment. Prime Minister Ceku visited General Other issues of concern were the lack Krasniqi in detention, telling him that of inadequate pre-trial facilities to separate Kosovo needed more good men like him. the populations and the absence of any fa- Soon after, the general was released pend- cility for the detention of persons deemed ing his appeal and remained free as of to require psychiatric treatment, which re- year’s end, despite a later Supreme Court sulted in the release of certain accused decision re-ordering his detention. The persons despite the potentially large public 2005 murder of a prosecution witness in threat this raises. Judges, prosecutors, and the case remained unsolved. lawyers also complained on a number of Cases relating to the March 2004 riots occasions that pre-trial detention was arbi- were another example of fleeting justice. trary in its length—sometimes for inordi- Despite the severity of the damage caused nately long periods of time—and legal jus- during the riots, which left more than tification. 4,000 displaced and 19 dead only 323 Kosovo’s civil courts also suffered from criminal charges were made in local courts a severe backlog of cases (estimates ran- (excluding minor offenses courts). At the ged from 45-60,000 cases). In addition, end of 2006, less than 200 of the 323 there were concerns about minorities’ ac- cases had led to indictments, with only 28 cess to the courts and the failure of mu- of these cases still under investigation. The nicipalities to implement decisions, thus vast majority of the cases were for minor negating the justice effort.

SOURCES FOR FURTHER INFORMATION - SERBIA: ➧ Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, at www.helsinki.org.yu

Other organizations: ➧ Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, at www.yucom.org.yu ➧ Humanitarian Law Center, at www.hlc.org.yu

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➧ Youth Initiative for Human Rights, at www.yi.org.yu ➧ Belgrade Center for Human Rights, at www.bgcentar.org.yu

SOURCES FOR FURTHER INFORMATION - KOSOVO: ➧ Amnesty International, Human Rights Protection in Post-Status Kosovo/Kosova: Am- nesty International’s Recommendations Relating to Talks on the Final Status of Koso- vo/Kosova, July 2006, at www.amnestyusa.org/countries/serbia_montenegro/document. do?id=ENGEUR700112006 ➧ CARE International and CDA—Collaborative Learning Projects, What Difference has Peacebuilding Made? A Study of the Effectiveness of Peacebuilding in Preventing Violence: Lessons Learned from the March 2004 Riots in Kosovo, July 2006. ➧ Commission of the European Communities, Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244) 2006 Prog- ress Report, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2006) 1386, 8 November 2006, at www.euinkosovo.org/upload/European%20Commission%20Kosovo%20 2006%20Progress%20Report.pdf ➧ European Stability Initiative, Cutting the Lifeline: Migration, Families and the Future of Kosovo, 18 September 2006, Berlin—Istanbul, at www.esiweb.org. ➧ Minority Rights Group International, Clive Baldwin, Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rule, July 2006, at www.minorityrights.org/admin/Download/pdf/MRG KosovoReport.pdf ➧ Human Rights Watch, Not on the Agenda: The Continuing Failure to Address Account- ability in Kosovo Post-March 2004, Volume 18, No. 4(D), May 2006, at http://hrw.org/ english/docs/2006/05/30/serbia13441.htm ➧ International Crisis Group, Kosovo: the Challenge of Transition, Europe Report No.170, 17 February 2006, at www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1243&l=1 ➧ International Crisis Group, An Army for Kosovo?, Europe Report No.174, 28 July 2006, at www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1243&l=1 ➧ International Crisis Group, Kosovo status: Delay is Risky, Europe Report No. 177, 10 No- vember 2006, at www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1243&l=1. ➧ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Legal System Monitoring Section, Kosovo: Review of the Cri- minal Justice System 1999-2005 Reforms and Residual Concerns, March 2006, at www.osce.org/kosovo/documents.html?lsi=true&limit=10 ➧ OSCE, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Legal System Monitoring Section, Kosovo: First Review of the Civil Justice System, June 2006, at www.osce.org/kosovo/ documents.html?lsi=true&limit=10 ➧ OSCE, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Legal System Monitoring Section, Kosovo: [Eighth] Review of the Criminal Justice System, December 2006, available at www.osce.org/kosovo/documents.html?lsi=true&limit=10 ➧ OSCE, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Minority Language Use in Muni- cipalities in Kosovo, December 2006, at www.osce.org/kosovo/documents.html?lsi= true&limit=10 ➧ OSCE, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, The Role and Functioning of the Municipal Officers for Gender Equality in Kosovo, November 2006, at www.osce.org/ kosovo/documents.html?lsi=true&limit=10

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➧ Security Council Report, Update Report: Kosovo, 10 February 2006, no. 3, at www. securitycouncilreport.org ➧ Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Security Council, 25 January 2006 (S/2006/45), 5 June 2006 (S/2006/ 361), 1 September 2006 (S/2006/707), and 20 November 2006 (S/2006/906). ➧ Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Political Division IV, Human Security, Dealing with the Past and the Negotiations on the Status of Kosovo – An Option Paper, 2006. ➧ United Nations Development Programme Kosovo, Early Warning Report Kosovo, Report #14, July – September 2006, at www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/ewr14_eng.pdf ➧ United Nations Development Programme Kosovo and Index Kosovo, Kosovo Mosaic 2006: Public Services and Local Authorities Under Review, October 2006, at www. amnestyusa.org/countries/serbia_montenegro/document.do?id=ENGEUR700112006 ➧ UNHCR, UNHCR’s Position on the Continued International Protection Needs of Indivi- duals from Kosovo, June 2006.

Endnotes 1 Helsinki Charter, Stanko Pihler, “Bad for Serbia, Worse for Vojvodina,” no. 99-100, Sep- tember-October 2006. 2 Helsinki Charter, Radivoj Stepanov, “Autonomy Bullied into Statehood,” no. 99-100, September-October 2006. 3 “No one shall be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or medical and scientific experimentation without his/her free consent” (underline by the IHF). 4 Yucom /Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, “Critical Remarks on the Draft Consti- tution of the Republic of Serbia,” 1 November 2006, at [email protected]. 5 Kosovo’s provisional institutions of self-government 6 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 7 NATO-led Kosovo Force 8 The seriousness of human rights concerns in Kosovo is compounded by the lack of hu- man rights monitoring and reporting capacity in the province, both from a non-govern- mental and quasi-governmental perspective. The institution established early on in the international community’s presence in Kosovo to monitor human rights compliance— the Ombudsperson Institution of Kosovo—was nationalized at the end of 2005. A year later an ombudsperson and deputies for the post had yet to be elected. In February 2006 UNMIK limited the institution’s jurisdiction to oversight of the PISG. Shortly after, a Human Rights Advisory Panel was established to address claims against UNMIK offi- cials and to provide a mechanism of accountability for the international community in Kosovo. As of the end of the year, however, the advisory panel was still not functioning because its members had yet to be appointed. Moreover, the UN Human Rights Committee noted in July that the panel “lacks the necessary authority and independ- ence” from UNMIK to carry out its mandate. 9 Overall only about 16,000 of the estimated 250,000 Serb and other minorities displa- ced from the province since 1999 have returned to their homes (less than 7%). 10 UNMIK reported approximately 2,700 involuntary returns in the first eight months of 2006 alone, with more than one thousand RAE returns.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OSCE REGION IHF REPORT 2007