Atlantic Council RAFIK HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST
US and EU: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts Toward the Arab Transitions
Danya Greenfield, Amy Hawthorne, and Rosa Balfour US and EU: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts Toward the Arab Transitions
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Atlantic Council BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY About the Authors
Danya Greenfield is the deputy director of the analyzed political reform in the Arab world. At the
Atlantic Council. Since joining the Atlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Hawthorne was senior program officer for the policyin November to promote 2011, democratization Greenfield has focused in the Arab on inMiddle history East, from managing Yale University democracy and programs obtained aacross worldlaunching and newUS policy initiatives toward on Yemen.a coordinated She co- US-EU the Arab world. Hawthorne graduated with honors authored the 2012 Atlantic Council report, “The master’s degree in modern Middle Eastern studies Challenge”. She is a democracy and governance atRosa the BalfourUniversity of Michigan.Europe in the World Arab Awakening: Are the US and EU Missing the in Brussels. She is hasHead researched of the and published specialist with extensive experience in the Middle Programme at the European Policy Centre (EPC) East and North Africa. Prior to joining the Atlantic policy and external action, relations with the Council, she worked at the Center for International widely on issues relating to European foreign 2007Private to Enterprise 2010 and at (CIPE) the International as a Program Republican Officer for the Middle East and North Africa division from rightsMediterranean and democracy region, in Eastern international Europe, relations. and the Balkans; EU enlargement; and on the role of human democracy-support projects. Danya holds a master’s Institute (IRI) from 2003 to 2007 implementing She coauthored with Danya Greenfield the Atlantic in international relations and Middle East studies HumanCouncil Rightsreport, and “The Democracy Arab Awakening: in EU Foreign Are the Policy, US and EU Missing the Challenge” in 2012. Her book, infrom international Johns Hopkins relations University, from Tufts School University. of Advanced was published by Routledge in 2012. Prior to joining International Studies (SAIS) and a bachelor’s degree Amy Hawthorne is a senior fellow with the Atlantic at the Centre for Studies in International Politics the EPC in 2007, she was a senior research fellow analytical,Council’s Rafik and practicalHariri Center experience for the on Middle Arab East.political (CeSPI) in Rome, where she dealt with EU foreign reformShe is a andMiddle democracy East expert promotion. with extensive Before joiningpolicy, andpolicy PhD and in EU international integration. relations, She holds both an MA from from the Cambridge University, an MSc in European studies an appointee at the US Department of State, where shethe Atlantichelped to Council shape inand April coordinate 2013, Hawthorne US support was for London School of Economics and Political Science. who were instrumental in the research and writing The authors would like to thank a number of people to the Arab Spring. Prior to her government Egypt’s transition and advised on the US response of this report, including Zuzana Novakova, who service, Hawthorne was executive director of the worked with Rosa Balfour at the EPC in Brussels, as well as Hannah Grigg, Rachel Webb, Sarah forHollings International Center for Peace, International where she Dialogue, was the foundingand was Atlantic Council. Grebowski, Stefanie Hausheer, and Matt Hall at the editorpreviously of the an Arab associate Reform at Bulletinthe Carnegie EndowmentSada
(now ) and Table of Contents
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USExecutive Policy Toward Summary the Arab Countries in Transition ...... 3
US Assistance ...... 10
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EU Policy Toward . . the . . Arab . . .Countries . . . . .in . Transition ...... 28
TheEU Assistance Deauville Partnership ...... 37
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ConclusionsUS-EU Coordination and Recommendations ...... 45 Executive Summary
the member states concerning the prioritization of requisite political will or to develop sustainable security versus democracy, as well as technical and The United States and Europe have yet to show the bureaucratic complications regarding assistance in their democratic transitions more than two years afterstrategies a wave to ofhelp popular Egypt, revolutions Tunisia, Libya, toppled and decades-Yemen old autocracies. To be sure, deepening political, delivery, were key hindrances. economic, and security challenges in these countries its promises to stand with the people of these The US administration failed to make good on from June 2012 to August 2013, the period analyzed countries by providing robust support. Despite in this report, complicated efforts to provide
theUS President US government Barack to Obama’s support commitments the transitions, in the his May 2011 Arab awakening speech to mobilize capitalizesupport. Yet on the openings United where States theyand theexisted European or to administration has struggled to implement many sendUnion consistent (EU) missed and important sustained opportunities diplomatic messages to where needed. Faced with the vast amounts of of its flagship initiatives. Only a small portion of the cash the Gulf countries could provide rapidly to the original $1 billion economic aid pledge to Egypt has been provided. The Middle East and North Africa Washington and Brussels wondered if the United State Department adequate resources and needed transition countries, especially to Egypt, some in Incentive Fund (MENA-IF)—designed to give the past year, fatigue and frustration more than energy States and the EU even had much to offer. In the Theflexibility regional to assist Trade reform and Investment processes Partnership in the transition countries—has not received congressional approval. engagement with these countries. and hope have characterized US and European Notably, in the past year the administration has Despite clear convergence between the United shifted(MENA-TIP) its focus has towardyet to deliver security meaningful concerns benefits.and away from democracy promotion and aid, and US in the Arab transitioning countries, they have notStates been and able the to EU leverage in values their and joint professed weight objectives and stand for democratic principles has been sporadic. willingness to use its diplomatic influence or aid to budget sequestration, preoccupation with war energy toward establishing a relationship with the influence. For the United States, the impact of In Egypt, the US administration directed much of its its diplomatic posts in Libya and Tunisia, and in Syria, and the September 2012 attacks on Muslim Brotherhood and maintaining ties with the dampened the will to extend additional assistance military; the military’s July 2013 ouster of Mohamed ordemonstrations to conduct more at embassies proactive policiesin Egypt toward and Yemen these Morsi, the elected Brotherhood president, upended andthis approachYemen, security and now concerns the United frequently States findsdominated itself alienated from all groups. In Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, countries. For the EU, a lack of unified vision among
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region the agenda, necessitating drawdowns of embassy to pursue joint, high-level diplomatic efforts more challenging. matters. Transatlantic efforts under the auspices staff and making assistance implementation to push the Egyptian government on political
otherof the partnersDeauville to Partnership—a aid the transition joint countries, effort of G8 statedEU policy commitments toward the andtransitioning the will to countries deliver on countries, international financial institutions, and likewise has suffered from a mismatch between
Partnershipplus Morocco has and made Jordan—have headway on produced some initiatives few them. The EU’s revised European Neighborhood goal of democratic change by providing additional suchtangible as the results. creation Since of its a Transition founding in Fund May to 2011 provide the Policy (ENP) from 2011 sought to emphasize the technical assistance for economic reforms. Yet the original animating idea of creating an international incentives to countries making progress on platform to ensure coordinated, timely, and robust amongpolitical the and member economic states reform prevented (the “more Brussels for more” from principle). Disagreement over regional priorities Gulf countries has not come to fruition. assistance from Europe, the United States, and the tonemaximizing on the majorits influence policy issues.and prompted Although the there EU to hasfall backbeen on some relying tangible on the progress United inStates negotiating to set the dynamics in each of these countries has been anThe important increasingly factor difficult in the political equation, and as economic have the sectoral agreements and specific initiatives, the advantage of the assistance being offered and the ENP has not yet created a qualitatively different mismatch,inability of attransition times, between governments the countries’ to take full urgent paradigm for Euro-Mediterranean relations. The needs and what donors were proposing. If there is itsunderlying Arab neighbors assumptions and that of the a combination initial ENP policy—of trade no willing partner at the table, neither Washington liberalization,that the EU has development leverage and aid, attraction and closer vis-à-vis political nor Brussels has much ability to move any agenda forward. But the past year has shown that despite lofty rhetoric, providing major support to help relations would be the recipe to keep the region democratic transitions succeed simply was not a stable—has not borne fruit. front-burner issue in either capital. witnessed more institutionalized communication thanConcerning previously US-EU between cooperation, the two the bureaucracies past year on some tactical issues in the transition countries. Such efforts, however, did not reach the level of challengesThis is a short-sighted in achieving approach, inclusive, asdemocratic, Egypt, and strategic coordination necessary to constitute ultimatelyLibya, Tunisia, stable and governing Yemen are systems. facing significantFailure will be a coherent, overarching, and sustainable long- catastrophic not only for the region but also for the term vision. The transatlantic reaction to long-term interests of the transatlantic partners. The best hope for encouraging stable Arab illustrates the limits and the possibilities of deeper democracies is a reenergized, redesigned strategic transatlanticdevelopments cooperation. in Egypt during The theUnited past States year and approach to support that goal. The United States withthe EU economic took a similar incentives, approach and not of engaging pushing then-the and EU cannot generate or ensure democratic Muslim Brotherhood-led government, mainly Buttransitions without in sustained, the Arab transitioningeffective support countries; from the rights issues for most of his tenure. As the political that is the task of their own leaders and citizens. president Morsi too hard on democracy and human United States and Europe, these fragile transitions crisis in Egypt intensified, the two powers decided are far less likely to succeed.
2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US Policy Toward the Arab Countries in Transition
months after the uprisings. As the transitions in Tunisia, and Yemen achieve successful democratic transitionsThe stated policyhas receded goal of in helping importance Egypt, for Libya, the United States since June 2012, when the Atlantic their second years hit serious roadblocks or veered far off course—as in the case of Egypt following the military’s July 2013 ouster of Morsi, the country’s Council published its initial report on US and EU overfirst freelyoften chaoticelected situations.president—the It also US was government hard for democratizationsupport for the Arab is a “strategicawakening necessity” countries.1 toObama which thestruggled United to States figure to out gain how traction to exert on influenceeconomic administration officials continue to assert that Arab and political reform agendas with overwhelmed, in practice, US efforts to support democratic and inexperienced new partner governments. And economicthe United progress States remains in these firmly four countriesdedicated. waned But in increasingly the war in Syria consumed US attention. the past year. The administration did not announce any major new economic or democracy assistance “For the United States, supporting democratic initiatives, labored to implement aid promised in transitions is not a matter of idealism. It is a 2011, and largely avoided forceful diplomacy on strategic necessity. And we will not return to the sensitive democracy and human rights issues. US false choice between freedom and stability. And
we will not pull back our support for emerging of these countries, yet much US effort was directed, democracies when the going gets rough. That asofficials it had regularly been prior declared to the uprisings, support for toward the people would be a costly strategic mistake that would,
I believe, undermine both our interests and on security matters. relations with government officials, especially our values.”
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Several factors explain the flagging US commitment, Then-US secretary of state Hillary Clinton, speech at which stood in contrast to Obama’s soaring to dedicate “all of the diplomatic, economic, Washington, DC, October 2012 andcommitment strategic intools a landmark at our disposal” May 2011 to transition speech Deteriorating security conditions, painfully countries.2 Conditions inside the countries were far more turbulent and challenging than many facilities in Libya and Tunisia as well as threatening manifested by the violent attacks on US diplomatic policymakers had envisioned during the heady early demonstrations in Egypt and Yemen, necessitated
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/10/199102.htm. 1 Hillary Clinton, “Democratic Transitions in the Maghreb,” remarks at Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 12, 2012, 19, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa. 2 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa,” speech delivered at the State Department, May
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
regardless of their politics, as long as they upheld concernssharp reductions about security in the official and stability US presence often became in these internationalwillingness to agreements work with freely and the elected core principlesleaders, elevatedcountries above over thetransition past year. support Following in the the daily attacks, of democracy. Such principles, according to the agenda of bilateral relations. The fact that citizens administration, included “respect for the rule of in all the transition countries (and therefore their law; peaceful and inclusive political processes; perceivednewly accountable interference governments) in their domestic were themselves affairs, civilprotecting societies.” the 4fundamental rights of all citizens; yetoften resenting conflicted the about United the States US role—rejecting for not helping strong democratic institutions; and vibrant At the same time, caveats about the limits of US reluctance toward a bold push in the region. more at a time of immense need—only added to US said in his 2013 State of the Union address, “We cannotinfluence presume were evident to dictate in public the course rhetoric. of change As Obama 5 forBack the in transition Washington, countries Congress’ in particular, deep cuts severelyin the that traditional security and strategic interests constrainedforeign aid budget what support and skepticism the administration about assistance could remainedin countries of likecritical Egypt.” importance Officials and were at timesfrank offer. What the United States could provide seemed especially meager in comparison to the estimated $28 billion provided or pledged to the transition would take priority over democracy promotion. countries since 2011 by the wealthy Gulf states. thatIn an “there October will 2012 be times speech, when for not instance, all of our then-US secretary of state Hillary Clinton acknowledged to point to an episode in which democratic values The White House, focused on domestic issues interests and values align.” Indeed, it is difficult approachand seeking with to avoidCongress. new Securing entanglements support in even the for Middle East, was uneager to push for an expensive trumped security interests in US decision-making toward these countries. Officials praised the modestUS ambivalence aid packages about has responding required tosustained the transitions efforts. termspositive to changesthe progress that hadthat occurred was still needed,(frequently and is evident in the administration’s public rhetoric pointing to elections), referred in aspirational in democratic development occurred. But these occasionally offered gentle criticism when setbacks over the past year. On the one hand, in speeches defended the US commitment to democratic was prepared to do to push democratic change and other public remarks, officials strongly transformation and economic prosperity in the whenremarks the failed transitions to specify hit obstacles, what exactly beyond Washington the region, especially in the face of harsh partisan vague promise that the United States would stand with those demanding democracy.6 Nor, notably, did US rhetoric ever specify whether undemocratic criticism of Obama’s Middle East strategy following actions by new governments would affect relations the 2012 embassy attacks. Officials declared that US values but also served US interests by producing with the United States. “moresupport capable for Arab partners democratization and more notdurable only securityreflected over the long term.”3 They repeatedly asserted a
12, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/10/199102.htm. 3 Hillary Clinton, “Democratic Transitions in the Maghreb,” remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, October
http://www.state.gov/s/d/2013/209008.htm. 4 William Burns, “America and a Changing Middle East,” remarks at Princeton University, May 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/us/ politics/obamas-2013-state-of-the-union-address.html. 5 Barack Obama, “Obama’s 2013 State of the Union Address,” February 12, 2013,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/09/198406.htm. 6 See ibid and Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at G-8 Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition Foreign Ministers Meeting,” New York City, September 28, 2012, 4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
“Throughout Egypt’s post-revolution series of On a bureaucratic level, the restructuring elections, the United States took the position administration’sof the State Department’s diminished Office commitment of Middle to the that we would work with whoever won elections East Transitions (MET) is another sign of the that met international standards, and this is what we have done.” andtransition ensure countries. delivery of Established targeted aid in andSeptember other 2011, MET had the mandate to design, coordinate, speech at the Ibn Khaldun Center, Cairo, June 18, 2013 Then-US ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson, reportingtransition tosupport the deputy for Egypt, secretary Libya, of and state, Tunisia. was The United States made economic issues the designatedIts special coordinator as an ambassadorial-level for Middle East point Transitions, person focus of its engagement for several reasons. It was on Arab transition issues. As of the fall of 2013, situation and hoped that offering direct budget supportincreasingly would worried help relieve about budgetEgypt’s pressures.tenuous fiscal The handleMET’s personnel foreign assistance will be folded for all into Arab a countrieslarger office in the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau assigned to also tell the story of changing priorities. The administration linked this aid to Egypt’s reaching administration(democratizing providedor otherwise). more Budgetthan $570 numbers million in foran agreementeconomic reform. with the The International administration Monetary also sawFund economic (IMF) in orderissues to as provide the only an obvious added areaincentive country undergoing democratic transition or part Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 economic aid to Jordan, not a of commonality with the Brotherhood, whose leadership had expressed enthusiasm for economic reforms and private sector growth. Finally, the combinedof MET’s original for the mandate.same period. This was more than US transition aid to Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen United States wanted to use economic assistance, Reemerging Authoritarianism: Egypt as it has done for decades, as an incentive for
The administration’s strategy following the June counterterrorism goals. Egypt to cooperate on American foreign policy and
2012 inauguration of the Muslim Brotherhood’s away from his promise of inclusive governance Morsi as president of Egypt was oriented toward The US approach began to falter as Morsi backed building good relations with Morsi and encouraging washis government ultimately misguided to undertake and economic ineffective. reforms The responseand failed to to the negotiate government’s seriously increasing with the humanIMF. administrationto stabilize the economy.believed that However, its forthright this strategy dealings rightsBut the abuses United and States intolerant took no policies. serious Inactions November in with an elected Islamist leader would powerfully acutely clear when he issued a decree temporarily granting2012, Morsi’s himself undemocratic unlimited executive tendencies powers became and demonstrate the US commitment to Egyptian immunity from court decisions, a decision that campaigndemocracy, promises and that to by uphold taking humana positive rights approach and governat the outset, inclusively it could and influence to cooperate Morsi with to meet the United his States on regional security priorities such as peace provoked massive violent demonstrations. This Washington’swas a turning reaction,point, when however, even many was notably Egyptians by just a few percentage points over his opponent, who had voted for Morsi turned against him. with Israel. Even though Morsi had been elected weak, avoiding direct criticism or mentioning foreseeablethe administration future andsaw considered the Muslim secular Brotherhood forces asas internationalMorsi by name, community.” saying only7 Justthat daysthe decree before, US politicallythe dominant irrelevant. political movement in Egypt for the “raise[s] concerns for many Egyptians and for the
officials had praised the Egyptian president for
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 5 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
and the military admonishes the United States for helping to broker a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel in Gaza, and soon after Morsi’s controversial turningSecurity its Takes back onCenter the Egyptian Stage: Tunisia people. and Libya performancedecree, Obama on met security senior and Brotherhood foreign policy advisers issues at the White House. This signaled that Egypt’s remained the paramount US consideration. diplomatic facilities in Libya and Tunisia, the United StatesPrior to was the already September concerned 2012 attacks about theon USrise of violent extremists, instability, and deteriorating ofThe a polarizingUS response constitution, to numerous police democratic brutality setbacks security conditions in both countries. But after duringin the months antigovernment that followed—the protests, draft forcing laws through on US agenda. This new focus came even as needed the attacks, security issues came to dominate the restricted freedoms, and even the sentencing demonstrations and NGOs that would have severely constitutions, forging national consensus among polarizedsteps toward groups, democratization—creating building effective democratic new to prison of US citizens working for American NGOs—was muted. The United States did not hold increasingly fragile. US encouragement for back promised economic aid to signal its concern democraticinstitutions—stalled development and thein the transitions past year looked more meetover democratic opposition backslidingdemands or in pursue any of an these economic cases. programEven by the that spring would of improve 2013, with living Morsi’s conditions, refusal the to often took the form of supportive rhetoric than administration was slow to recognize the extent aid increases for democratic or economic reforms. intensified diplomatic engagement or significant of growing hostility to the Brotherhood across “We are using every tool we can to help our partners fight extremism and meet their EgyptianWhen opposition society andgroups within gained the strengthmilitary. and then security challenges…we’re partnering with the security officials of these new governments who are moving away from the repressive finally joined forces with the army and police to 2013, the administration urged the military not to approaches that helped fuel radicalization in mount mass demonstrations against Morsi in June the past.” triedundertake to preserve a coup. bilateral But once relations it was done, under the the United new Then-US secretary of state Clinton, Washington, DC, States quickly acquiesced to the new situation and October 2012 requiresarmy-backed suspending government, aid in decliningsuch an event. to declare8 Despite the The shift in approach was perhaps most noticeable disturbingmilitary’s takeover signs of aa resurgentcoup or to military-police apply US law that in Tunisia, which had in the first year and a half Brotherhood, the administration sought to avoid US attention to support democratic progress, of its transition received significant high-level cuttingstate and off US the concerns aid relationship. about a crackdown The story continues on the to unfold, but the net result is that the United States with mention in Obama’s 2012 State of the Union has been discredited across the political spectrum in of more than $300 million in assistance directed address, frequent official visits, and the provision
States has sold out its democratic principles in the increase in the amount of US bilateral assistance for Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood believes the United mainly toward economic recovery (a ten-fold the military as its savior and reject US overtures, name of security, the anti-Morsi demonstrators see Tunisia prior to the January 2011 revolution). After the Tunisian authorities failed to protect ransacking
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200983.htm. 7 Victoria Nuland, “The United States’ Reaction to Egypt’s November 22 Decisions,” press statement by State Department spokesperson, November 23, 2012, http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/provisions-relevant-to-the-situation-in-egypt-in-the-fy12-state-department-and- 8 foreign-operations-appropriations-law_--“Provisions Relevant to the Situation in Egypt. in the FY12 State Department and Foreign Operations Law,” July 3, 2013,
6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
government after its historic July 2012 elections, its presence in the country.9 the main goals of US policy in Libya simply were to onof the the US ground embassy, to oversee the United transition States support, pulled back the manage the political fallout in Washington from the With a skeleton staff assistance programs. embassy was forced to scale back many attacks and to reduce US security vulnerability. The two high-level visits that took place in the months attention to Tunisia’s democratic and economic after the attacks—by Assistant to the President Other factors contributed to the reduced US for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan to Libya in October 2012, and then development. For some officials, Tunisia did not securityPrime Minister and the Ali need Zidan for tointernational Washington cooperation in March rank as a priority when compared to the far more to2013—revolved address this challenge. heavily around10 In this Libya’s environment, fragile strategically urgent problems of Egypt or Syria, and in an increasingly constrained budget environment. the prospect of focusing on economic or political it was difficult to justify even more aid for Tunisia development issues was simply unrealistic. To date, lot already, they are a middle-income country, and US policy remains primarily focused on the security As one official noted, “We have helped Tunisia a they failed to protect our embassy”. US attention environment, protecting the limited US presence to Tunisia declined, with only six senior-level in country, and addressing serious border security issues. followingofficials visiting the revolution, Tunis since including June 2012, by the compared secretary Balancing all Sides: Yemen ofwith state. sixteen A speech such byvisits Under in the Secretary first sixteen for Political months Affairs Wendy Sherman during her June 2013 visit Yemen is often forgotten in the list of Arab suggested the changing lens through which the United States was coming to view Tunisia. Sherman transition, but it too witnessed popular uprisings awakening countries undergoing a democratic described the US vision for Tunisia as a “secure in the spring of 2011 and boasts the only instance of a negotiated transfer of power from a sitting playing a vital role in meeting regional and global challenges.”and stable partner This description on the world differed stage—a notably country from to a national unity government and transitional head of state (then-president Ali Abdullah Saleh) earlier US rhetoric that had emphasized Tunisia’s president. Yet, US commitment to democratic role as the standard-bearer of Arab democracy. reform in Yemen has not always been consistent or apparent. During the early days of Yemen’s uprising that began in January 2011, the United United States to reduce its role even further. The States did not express support of the largely USIn Libya, presence the infatal post-revolution attack in Benghazi Libya led had the been youth-led protests in Sanaa, Taiz, and other major quite modest, with the United States preferring cities calling for the overthrow of an autocratic reducedto work onan transitionalready small support presence largely at underthe embassy the statementsand corrupt in regime. support After of pro-democracy the Egyptian and activists inmultilateral Tripoli, and umbrella tight restrictions of the UN Mission.on staff mobility The attack Tunisian revolutions, the absence of White House made engagement with the Libyan government of peaceful demonstrators calling for change, in Yemen was particularly notable. After weeks and prompted a freeze on many assistance strongly urge the opposition parties to avoid programsand other outsideactors in of the the country security extremely sector. For difficult provocativeObama said inactions a February and respond 2011 statement: constructively “We months afterwards, as Libya struggled to form a to Saleh’s initiative to resolve differences through
9 http://tunisia.usembassy.gov/statement-from-the-u.s.-embassy-in-tunisia.htmlOn September 17, 2012, a few days after the attacks the US Embassy issued a blunt statement,. complaining that “…the measures taken by Tunisian authorities on September 14th were inadequate to protect the US Embassy,”
10 Conversation with US official, Washington, DC, June 2013. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 7 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region dialogue and negotiation,” indicating a preference weight behind “a peaceful transition of power in for a continuation of Saleh’s regime rather than Yemen...that is responsive to the aspirations of the widespread popular demands for Saleh’s departure.11 Yemeni people” in April 2011.14 The shift in US policy toward Yemen during this period echoed a similar response to the demonstrations against supporting democratic transition in the Arab worldDespite in the the Obama spring administration’sof 2011, statements rhetoric made by US Ambassador to Yemen Gerald Feierstein led former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. In both Yemenis to believe this support did not extend to cases, the United States was willing to sacrifice Yemen. The ambassador stated in February 2011 USits tiessupport with for a longtime such leaders ally (and in the close face security of public that “we believe that the focus of the political effort oppositionpartner) only utterly when untenable. events on the ground rendered now should be on the negotiations, and not on demonstrations in the street”, 12 2011 press conference he said “that the idea of support a political transition in Yemen, it actively ‘isqat al-nitham’ [fall of the regime] and is in not a March really the engagedOnce the withUnited Saudi States Arabia made and the other decision Gulf tostates answer to the problems.” 13 to push Saleh to accept a transition plan advanced
US concerns about security cooperation with the advanced plan supported a rotation of elites in government of Yemen explain the initial hesitant powerby the Gulfbut notCooperation a fundamental Council restructuring (GCC). The GCC-of response to Yemen’s uprising. Administration those beyond a narrow elite. The United States would lose a vital counterterrorism partner in the political power or access to decision-making to officials feared that if Saleh left, the United States usher in a potential power vacuum. US concerns thisplayed involvement, a significant yet role in thein efforts same breath, to enact many the werefight againstnot baseless: al-Qaeda the andupper that echelons his removal of both would GCC agreement; many Yemenis heavily critique the Yemeni government and military were staffed deal and avoidance of civil war. Since then, United by Saleh relatives and loyalists, so his departure Statesacknowledge has actively it was provided essential diplomatic to the success support of the
support for the National Dialogue that started in relationshipscould conceivably with dismantlefor decades. a broad network of for President Abdrabo Mansour Hadi and financial security contacts that US officials had been building March 2013. At the same time, the United States Only when the tide had clearly turned against units,has intensified and this has its securityat times andundermined counterterrorism the Saleh—prompted by the brutal massacre of administration’scooperation with claims Hadi and that relevant it is prioritizing security peaceful protesters on March 18, 2011 and Yemen’s democratic development. subsequent defection of high-ranking military commander General Ali Mohsin and his First Armored Division—did the US finally throw its
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/opr.html. 11 US Embassy in Yemen, “President Obama Encourages Political Reconciliation,” press release, February 5, 2011, http://yemen.usembassy.gov/pcf.html. 12 US Embassy in Yemen, “Press Conference with Ambassador Feierstein,” transcript of press conference, February 12, 2011,
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/fis.html. 13 US Embassy in Yemen, “Ambassador Feierstein’s interview with Saba,” press release, March 7, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/23/statement-press-secretary-developments-yemen. 14 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the Press Secretary on Developments in Yemen,” April 23, 2011,
8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
“President Hadi faces significant economic Arabian Peninsula, regardless of the impact on the challenges. And during these discussions, we populationUS security andinterests its political and fighting processes. al-Qaeda in the reaffirmed our commitment to work with others in the international community to support Skepticism in Congress Yemen during this transition period as it makes the kinds of economic reforms that can produce jobs and growth and prosperity for the Yemeni people…. Congress’ lack of enthusiasm for (and at times duringoutright 2012-13. opposition Congress to) assistance declined for to thefund transition the I thank President Hadi and his government administration’scountries significantly major constrained transition response the US response for the strong cooperation that they’ve offered when it comes to counterterrorism…President for many months. Congressional aversion had Hadi recognizes that these threats are not only multipleinitiative sources.and held Tea up Partyaid for and Egypt other and conservative Libya transnational in nature, but also cause severe Republicans were deeply hostile to foreign aid and hardship and prevent the kind of prosperity for the people of Yemen themselves.” of Congress were not so much actively hostile asforeign indifferent entanglements to the Arab of world’sany kind. future Other and members the US President Barack Obama, press conference with American role in shaping it. Yemeni President Abdrabo Mansour Hadi, August 2013 This competing narrative is evidenced by the array anxious about whether the changes unfolding inMany the transitionsenators and countries, representatives especially were the risedeeply to power of Islamist movements, would threaten Administratorof visits by senior Rajiv US Shah officials traveled in the to past Yemen two and years. US security interests. Congressional committees pledgedUS Agency additional for International support forDevelopment the devastated (USAID) with oversight on these issues wanted to put the province of Abyan in June 2012 and Treasury newly elected governments by conditioning or brakes on the administration’s engagement with thatDeputy received Assistant the mostSecretary attention for the in MiddleUS and EastYemeni demonstrate that they were pursuing policies mediaAndrew were Baukol those visited of former in May deputy 2013. national Yet the visits acceptableholding back to onthe assistance United States. until As new Representative leaders could security advisor and current CIA Director John Representatives appropriations subcommittee handlingKay Granger foreign (R-TX), aid, chair declared of the in House a September of 2012 US-YemeniBrennan who counterterrorism visited Yemen several programs. times—in Despite July attempts2011, February to convince 2012, Yemenis and May that 2012—to US policy solidify advances a comprehensive, development-focused providepress release assistance regarding to a government aid to Egypt, that “We has need not to approach and supports a strong democratic yetknow demonstrated exactly who theywe are are working a partner with of thebefore United we system in Yemen, the continued US-led drone States.”15 expressed frustration with Congress. As one State For their part, administration officials believestrike campaign the United and States focus is on concerned security cooperationabout real undermines this message. Most Yemenis do not have a strategy or vision for the region, but they haveDepartment none, either.” official16 lamented, “They say we don’t the United States as primarily focused on ensuring democratic reform in the country; rather, they see
http://kaygranger.house.gov/weekly-enewsletter-holding-egypt-and-libya-accountable. 15 Kay Granger, “Weekly Enewsletter: Holding Egypt and Libya Accountable,” September 14, 2012,
16 Conversation with US official, Washington, DC, June 2013. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 9 US Assistance
“No democratic transition can succeed without a 2012 speech, Clinton described US support for these sense of confidence in a better and more inclusive third priority, security sector reform. In an October economic future. Unless the Arab Awakening is accompanied by an economic awakening, it aidpriorities had to asbe “the followed hallmark by “actual of America’s investments.” involvement17 will collapse. The hard truth is that most Arab Despitein the region,” Clinton’s while promise acknowledging of aid delivery, that “talk” however, about societies have ducked serious economic reform the record of US assistance investments in the past for far too long; where economic liberalization year was modest. has occurred, its benefits have often been limited to a privileged few… Flagship Initiatives …There is much more that we and other outsiders The administration continued its efforts, to date can do to support long-term economic reform. unsuccessful, to obtain congressional authorization Even more than conventional assistance, we can use the promise of market access and open underway in the region, the Middle East and North trading arrangements to encourage reform and Africafor its flagship Incentive assistance Fund (MENA-IF) response to change create jobs. We can use initiatives like the new for which the administration originally requested Enterprise Funds in Egypt and Tunisia to support . The MENA-IF, small and medium-sized enterprises. And we can invest even more actively in helping to renovate and$770 economic million in reforms its FY2013 across budget, the region. seeks Theto provide fund, educational systems and promoting scholarships toa significant be managed new by source the State of fundsDepartment, to support would political and exchanges, so that the next generation is supplement existing bilateral aid programs with better-equipped to compete and succeed.” reform and to respond to major contingencies such asmore helping flexible, to fund rapidly a post-Assad deployed fundsSyrian to government. support Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns, remarks at Princeton University, May 6, 2013 appropriationsSince the FY2013 committees budget was were never putting passed, together MENA- two overarching priorities for US support for IF was never put to a vote. However, when the Since 2011, US officials consistently have described economic recovery, development, and job creation their bills in the fall of 2012, the House bill included the transitioning countries. The first focuses on version,nothing forindicating MENA-IF, the whereas general theinclination Senate included of the two bodies$1 billion of Congress(above the toward administration’s the proposal. request) in its reform.(specifically, In 2012, through the United inclusive, States private-sector introduced a growth and trade), and the second is democratic
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/10/199102.htm. 17 Hillary Clinton, “Democratic Transitions in the Maghreb,” remarks at Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 October 12, 2012, ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
between each country and the United States. After time-consuming processes to select a chairman and versionWhen MENA-IF with a $580 was millionresuscitated budget. in 18the At White the time board members, negotiate grant agreements, and ofHouse this writing,FY2014 Congressbudget request, has not it yet was passed a scaled-back its FY2014 foreign operations bill, but signals indicate sustain congressional support, the Egyptian fund thewas initial officially announcement inaugurated about in March the 2013funds. and To date,the that Congress is unlikely to approve and fund the neitherTunisian fund fund is in yet July dispersing 2013—about loans two or investments. years after creation of MENA-IF this time, either. Critics on Capitol Hill indicate that a compelling case for MENA-IF was not made by the State Department Some skeptics have remarked that the level of considerableor the White House.effort developing This is a significant and pushing defeat the resources envisioned over a five-year period ($300 for the administration—which initially expended million for the Egyptian fund, $100 million for the Tunisian one) is minimal compared to the financing offund—but many other it appears congressional that the priorities. political will The is amount chairmenneeds of both are tryingSME sectors, to leverage but Congress support fromis unlikely other oflacking funds to proposed, make it a especially front-burner when issue spread in the across midst governmentsto increase these and amounts; investment instead, funds. the fund offer from the Gulf countries, hardly seems sizeable To promote trade and investment, the United States the Middle East and in comparison to billions on
made a splashy announcement in May 2011 that it envisionedenough to motivate supporting. governments to undertake the as the MENA-Trade and Investment Partnership difficult, far-reaching reforms the MENA-IF had (MENA-TIP)would launch. Thea region-wide initiative’s trade value-added initiative was known not clear from the outset, and it has delivered “…We’re focused on working with small and medium-sized enterprises which create jobs and alternatives to radicalism, bringing nonbindingfew concrete protocols benefits thusthat wouldfar. The indicate main thrust their of women and young people into the formal opennessMENA-TIP to is foreignto get partner investment countries and bring to adopt them three up economy, providing capital and training for to international norms and standards for trade.19 entrepreneurs, helping emerging democracies The only notable achievements have occurred with update their economic regulations, their investment laws, their trade policies so their private sectors can actually flourish.” correctlyJordan and pinpoints Morocco, the not expansion the transition of trade countries among Arabthat are countries the focus and of internationally this report. MENA-TIP as critical to economic growth and job creation in the region. Then-US secretary of state Hillary Clinton, Washington, DC, October 2012 Indeed, opening up these closed economies to “After considerable bureaucratic delays, progress has been made this year with the Egyptian- greater than foreign assistance could ever achieve. American Enterprise Fund and the Tunisian- Butgreater the substancetrade could of bring the initiative economic has benefits been paltry far American Enterprise Fund, announced in and unappealing to the transition countries, especially when measured against the scope of the
Obama’s May 2011 speech. The funds are intended to help Tunisians and Egyptians launch and ofproblem adopting it seeks the protocols, to address. especially In part this when is becausefree jobexpand creation, small as and well medium as to foster enterprises investment (SMEs) ties tradethese agreementsinterim governments with the United do not Statessee the are benefits not on in key economic sectors that could be engines of
the requested amount would have left relatively little funding for new initiatives or additional incentives as outlined. 18 Both bills included funding for the Middle East Partnership Initiative and USAID’s Office of Middle East Programs; given this,
19 This includes two sets of non-binding principles—Joint Principles for International Investment and Joint Principles for Information and Communication Technology Services—as well as a Trade Facilitation Protocol, introduced in April 2012. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 11 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region offer as an incentive for meaningful trade reforms. a broader economic engagement agenda under the capacity, bandwidth, and interest to negotiate Efforts to push forward with the cash transfer and suchAdditionally, agreements. interim governments currently lack high-level US visits in the summer and fall of 2012. Morsi started off energetically with successive changes in US assistance priorities in 2012-13 was The US Chamber of Commerce (a nongovernmental theOutside heightened of economic attention assistance, to security one of sector the notable reform agency) organized a one hundred-member business and border security. In some cases, plans for Unfortunately,delegation to Egypt just as in the September mission 2012was concluding, with a more funding were already in process. For example, senior US and Egyptian government participation. the administration had requested a nearly eight- fold increase in International Narcotics Control underminingmob attacked thethe positive US embassy impressions in Cairo, from prompting the trip. many investors to feel skittish, and effectively Tunisia in FY2013 over FY2012. The 2012 embassy and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for Egypt and toMomentum be reached. slowed As his further tenure as continued, Morsi failed mounting to make control and nonviolent crowd management by domesticprogress withopposition the IMF to and his anexclusionary agreement agenda has yet unreformedattacks, as well security as worsening forces, provided problems an with urgent border impetus for these activities. In the case of Tunisia government,and bureaucratic combined gridlock, to derail compounded much of by the deep aid and the governments’ receptivity to US aid for congressional skepticism about aid to an Islamist and Libya, the severity of the embassy attacks security reform and border assistance led the the United States had managed to deliver only the agenda. By the time Morsi was removed from office, funds for new programs. of its $1 billion pledge. administration to identify significant additional first tranche of the cash transfer, just $190 million Aid, Trade, and Democracy Support: Accomplishments and Obstacles “The United States has a wide range of Egypt: US efforts to provide economic aid and capabilities to bring to bear: our capacity to mobilize economic support from the international financial and economic other types of support for Egypt’s transition community…our desire to provide significant barely advanced in 2012 and 2013. Meanwhile, amounts of direct financial and development military assistance at $1.3 billion annually kept support; and our efforts to strengthen Egypt’s theflowing $1 billion until thedebt July swap 2013 pledged military in 2011coup. untilThe trade and investment ties with the United States aObama civilian administration government was had in postponed place. In 2012, action the on and the rest of the world in order to create new job opportunities for the people of Egypt….” budgetary situation, revamped the plan for the debtadministration, swap to use concerned part of the about funds Egypt’s instead worsening for a Cairo, August 2012 Then-US under secretary of state Robert Hormats,
$450 million cash transfer that would offer Egypt Beyond the cash transfer, the United States more immediate fiscal relief. To encourage Morsi achieved modest progress on some of the smaller- to undertake critical economic reforms, the United scale aid pledges made some two years earlier, such States linked the cash transfer to Egypt’s progress alsotoward decided an IMF to agreement.direct a portion To provide of the remainingassistance as the Egyptian American Enterprise fund. The $550directly million to the toward Egyptian a scholarship people, the program. administration The Overseas Private Investment Corporation overcame administration was poised to launch this initiative loan guarantee facility in Cairo, which will leverage Egyptian bureaucratic resistance and opened its in June 2013, but it now is on hold. up to $700 million in financing for Egyptian banks to lend to SMEs. During the past year, the
12 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region administration also pursued other economic any recent years, and most of this was for electoral did not depend on funds from the constrained government. Smaller amounts were allocated for andinitiatives congressionally focused on sensitive trade and bilateral SME growth assistance that civicsupport and that political would participation not raise the programs ire of the and Egyptian budget. While these were innovative ideas, they did initiatives to combat violence against women. faced many political obstacles. not address Egypt’s immediate economic needs and Throughout Morsi’s presidency, the United States “It is important, even urgent, that the Egyptian kept up a steady drumbeat of public diplomacy economy gets stronger and that people have intentionsabout its commitment and disappointment to help Egypt’s with the economy relatively and jobs and have opportunity and that the energy smallpeople, amounts but with offered, Egyptian the skepticism aid made almost toward no US of this country can be focused on a more prosperous future.” administration strained to avoid applying the provisionimpression. of FollowingUS law that Morsi’s requires ouster, suspending the Obama aid following a military coup in order to preserve US Secretary of State John Kerry, Cairo, March 2013 In the trade realm, the United States announced although in practice much aid has been halted. it was “redesignating” production facilities in the Intensifyingflexibility with anti-American the new Egyptian sentiment government, and political chaos have rendered a new aid push extremely allowsix Qualifying more companies Industrial to Zones—Cairo, export goods Alexandria,duty-free toSuez, the Central United Delta,States Benithat containSueif, and inputs Minya—to from Israel. offerunlikely the innew the government near term. The $12 rush billion by justKuwait, days The United States also tried to move forward afterSaudi the Arabia, coup, and with the no United reform Arab conditions Emirates attached, to
United States. onMENA-TIP any of the discussions trade and with investment Egypt, but texts. the The two underscored the difficult position of the countries were not able to reach final agreement Tunisia: embassy in Tunis reshaped the US assistance US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) strategy by The prioritizing September aid 2012 for securityattack on sector the US sought to continue its Egypt: Forward initiative, reform over economic growth and democratic relationshipslaunched in 2011, and explorewhich offers potential sector-specific sources of workshops for Egyptians to help build new business a US concern that the Islamist-dominated development. The attack dramatically heightened finance. Unfortunately, most workshops had to be confront violent Islamist groups gaining strength postponed due to Egypt’s political unrest. government’s inability (or unwillingness) to Ben Ali-era police and justice systems, and forOne civil of the society most programs. notable changes The United in 2012-13 States was the itsin thestruggle country, to protect its difficulty Tunisia’s in reforming borders from the preferredsharp decline to let in its democracy democracy aid promotion in Egypt, especiallyagenda the Sahel threatened the country’s stability. The the uproar caused by the $65 million in democracy Stateweapons Department’s and fighters drawdown flowing from of all Libya nonessential and assistancelapse rather it thanprovided provoke right further after the controversy revolution. after suspension or delay of many assistance programs conviction of employees from US groups receiving outsideembassy the personnel security followingsector. Finally, the attacks US frustrations caused the theseWith thefunds, Egyptian and pushing government’s forward June a restrictive 2013 criminal over the Tunisian government’s failure to halt the
justice has dampened enthusiasm for providing JuneNGO 2012,law, the the United United States States sought programmed to avoid $17.3any embassy attack and to bring the perpetrators to millionnew clashes for democracy with the Egyptian activities, government. far less than Since in significant fresh economic aid.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 13 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
strategy has been to advocate that Tunisia address “In order for Tunisia’s democracy to flourish and the economy to grow, Tunisia’s security international lending institutions. forces must be properly trained and equipped its financing needs through the IMF and other to provide protection and security throughout In June 2013, Tunisia reached agreement with the country.”
onthe its IMF own, on ait $1.78does commitbillion loan. the government Although the to program will not close Tunisia’s financing gap US Ambassador to Tunisia Jake Walles, December 2012 US engagement in security sector reform has economic governance reforms. Congress authorized implement a number of important fiscal and been ramped up considerably. In 2011, the State a second loan guarantee for Tunisia in its FY2013 Department’s International Narcotics and Law appropriations bill and the Tunisian government is eager for the support, but the administration
JusticeEnforcement addressing Bureau police (INL) reform began and $4 millioncourt in seems reluctant to pursue such an initiative.20 has not identified funds for the guarantee and now modernization,programs with the but Ministries Tunisian authorities of Interior hadand been The economic aid emphasis in the past year slow to approve implementation of these politically has instead been on projects oriented toward
among youth, and two notable projects were memorandumsensitive programs. of understanding Soon after the for embassy a substantial attack, launchedjob training in andthe pastaddressing year. In the an effortskills mismatchto increase $22.5the United million States to expand and Tunisia programming quickly signed on police a reform and launch a corrections reform program to employability, the United States launched an technical skills and education that would lead United States also provided two dozen vehicles for with the Ministries of Interior and Justice. The thatInformation would provide and Communications ICT entrepreneurship Technology support (ICT) andSector training Development with a heavy project focus (announced on job placement. in 2011) full-timethe Ministry staff of person Interior from to conduct INL is stationed border control in In August 2012 the United States also launched Tunisand antiterrorism providing technical patrols. assistance. Since March A 2013,high-level a the $10 million Thomas Jefferson Scholarship delegation from Tunisia’s National Police and Program that aims to bring 200 Tunisian students National Guard also visited the United States to the United States for a one-year study program to learn about the US experience with community policing. in technical and vocational fields to build the workforce capacity of youth from underserved United States provided Tunisia substantial direct students begin this fall. In the first eighteen months of its transition, the populations across the country, and the first sixty cash transfer and $30 million to subsidize a $485 economic assistance—including a $100 million Due to its economic profile, Tunisia has the lucky distinction of being the only transitioning million loan guarantee—to help the interim administration viewed economic recovery from country that is eligible for a Millennium Challenge government address its budget gap. The Obama team completed its assessment report in late 2012, Corporation (MCC) threshold program. The MCC the shocks of the uprising as critical to keep the was eager to showcase Tunisia as the birthplace which identified the two primary constraints to fledgling democratic process on track, and Clinton to ensure public sector accountability and the rule of the Arab spring. Now, the administration is not economic growth: a lack of effective institutions offering additional budget support. Instead, the US of law, and the high fiscal and regulatory costs of
http://tunisia.usembassy.gov/statement-from-the-u.s.-embassy.html. 20 Statement from the US Embassy in Tunis, July 12, 2013,
14 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
its trade integration. The business community in basedemploying on this workers report, that but limits the types the demandof reforms for the thenot Unitedleveraged States significant and Tunisia resources is trying to assist to play with its labor. The MCC has designed a $20 million program role as well, and where government agencies have been slow to act, the private sector has attempted requireMCC program a long-term will promote commitment are certain and political to face willsignificant among push-back Tunisian leadership, from labor along unions with and strong will associations are initiating trade and investment US diplomatic engagement. While the focus on to fill the gap. US-based and Tunisian business institutional economic reform is essential, it will Tunisia Investment Forum in June 2013. forums, including a major undertaking with the impact economic growth in the near-term or do muchtake time, to convince and the TunisiansMCC program that istheir unlikely economic to been seen in the amount and type of democracy The shift in the administration’s thinking can also situation is improving. As of this writing, the assistance in this second year since the revolution. In 2011, the US provided more than $34 million in democracy aid, to strengthen civil society future of the MCC program is uncertain. organizations, political parties, and Tunisian Tunisia has perhaps the most to gain and the most government institutions. But from FY2012 funds, potentialIn light of for an expandingeconomic slowdown trade and investmentin Europe, the amount has dropped to $8.5 million and the ties with the United States. The primary vehicle aid is focused on elections and political process for trade discussions with Tunisia is the Trade but there has been no progress with formal Nationalwork, including Democratic support Institute, for three International organizations tradeand Investment negotiations, Framework in part because Agreement the Tunisian (TIFA), conducting election observations (Carter Center,
theRepublican administration Institute) is moreand IFES inclined to work to focus with onthe government is not able to take decisive action on electionsElection Commission. and governmental Officials reforms, have indicated and far less that tradeany key or points.investment While facilitation it initially discussionsexpressed interest a real comfortable with programs to support independent priorityin an FTA, given the Tunisianthe political government environment. has yet The to fallout make media and civil society strengthening. The amount for democracy-support programs this year is also lower than the initial tranche, in part because those from the embassy attacks has been felt in this resources have not been depleted, and in part it 2012,arena; then a high-level postponed TIFA to meeting April 2013, between then JuneAmerican and Tunisian officials was scheduled for September reprioritization of security assistance, followed been rescheduled. byis also economic a reflection assistance, of the andUS government’s lastly democracy clear and 2013, but never took place and has not yet and staff capacity at the US embassy in Tunis had auspices of TIFA is the launch of a new Tunisia governance. In addition, the lack of management One new initiative to promote trade under the States is able to support and implement. a significant ability on what programs the United businessSME Project model, in June with 2013 an eye that toward will provide establishing It is also worth noting that the FY2014 bilateral externaltechnical trade assistance opportunities to SMEs basedin the regionon the andUS small request is $30 million, underscoring that the administration is not pushing for greater assistance the country’s prospects for sustainable growth by to help Tunisia in a delicate moment of its transition. usinginternationally. online platforms The initiative and partnerships seeks to improve to create greater opportunities for trade between American constrained environment, and without a major crisis and Tunisian small businesses. This is a relatively inAs the one country, US official there explained, is considerable “In a resource- fatigue about small project, however, and the United States has providing even more aid for Tunisia.”21
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 15 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
Libya: Given its vast oil wealth, the administration’s decision not to get deeply involved in reconstruction “…the United States pledged more assistance and congressional resistance to Libya aid, led to for security reform in Libya with particular little expectation that the United States would emphasis on border security, rule of law, building a professional security force and The administration recognizes, however, that the institutions…we will look for other ways provide significant assistance for Libya’s transition. to work together as we go forward in order citizens and that the country needs time to develop to make Libya safer and to live up to its oil industry cannot provide opportunities for all its full potential.” its human resources, decimated under the former regime. Therefore, the United States sought to US Secretary of State John Kerry, remarks with Libyan provide small amounts of technical assistance to Prime Minister, March 2013 prioritizingnew institutions. needs The have worsening complicated security that situation, The United States intended to provide technical political turmoil, and Libyan authorities’ difficulty in transparency and good governance, including modestThe Benghazi goal. attacks led to a heightened US assistance to Libyan ministries to promote fiscal
embedding a full-time adviser at the Central Unitedand European States, Italy,focus France, to help thethe EU,fledging and other Libyan Bank. After the Benghazi attack and subsequent government strengthen its security capacity. The drawdown of US personnel from the country, military training and equipment, counterterrorism tohowever, stimulate this the plan economy, was put including on hold indefinitely. through donors have made concerted efforts to provide The United States has made small-scale efforts border security and counterterrorism assistance, approximatelyaid, and other direct $20 million security has assistance. been programmed For Higherbusiness Education skills training Task Force,for women and supporting and youth, entrepreneurshiprevitalizing higher by education adding Libya through to the the 2012 US-Libya or is in the pipeline. Security sector reform, equally crucial, has received far fewer US resources— AfricanGiven the Diaspora precarious Marketplace security environment, (ADM) initiative. approximately $4 million since 2011—in part because the limited US staff in Tripoli constrains the led initiatives to expand trade and investment ability to implement programs. The United States there have been only nominal US government- criminalis working investigations, with the Ministry and police of Justice training, to provide as well strategic planning assistance, capacity building for relationships over the past year. The US-Libya TIFA needs to be updated, but no action has been taken. as supporting a prison reform project and training Instead, the focus has been on facilitating business for lawyers and civil society organizations on rule relationships and fostering trade ties between the US and Libyan business communities. USTDA organized worksof law issues.to integrate Planning militias for effectiveinto the newsecurity security sector a Libya Cyber Security Reverse Trade Mission in May apparatusreform programs and build will new be essentialinstitutions as thebased country on the 2013, and the Department of Commerce sponsored a trade mission to Libya for a delegation of twenty- rule of law and professionalism. five American companies. The most dynamic activity, however, comes from US and Libyan private sector- led initiatives, which often include high-level US government officials. For example, in June 2013 the American Chamber of Commerce in Libya and the US-Libya Business Association cooperated with other associations to organize the Libya Projects 2013 conference in Tripoli.
21 Conversation with US official, Washington, DC, June 2013. 16 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
Despite the clear security constraints on Yemen’s humanitarian situation, already dire programming, the United States has managed to launch a relatively robust portfolio of democracy even further with the tension between competing militarybefore fighting factions erupted during inthe 2011, popular deteriorated uprising and a focus on political party development, elections preparation,assistance programs—nearly constitutional development, $35 million—with civil Abyan and other provinces that disrupted the lives society strengthening, transitional justice, and ofthe hundreds US-supported of thousands campaign of againstYemenis al-Qaeda who became in internally displaced. In view of these realities, the embassy in Tripoli and its team of implementers United States funneled most of its assistance for haveeffective encountered local governance. a more open Unlike door Egypt, in Libya the US and humanitarian support through American and UN- have found willing partners among civil society led organizations, which reached $221 million since organizations and activists who are eager for 2011. Allocations for humanitarian assistance are US assistance and partnership. Despite a long congressional hold on funding, the administration was able to provide much-needed electoral support towardmade on assuring a global a basis successful according democratic to need; transition. it would in advance of the July 2012 General National Rather,be difficult it was to arguean urgent that andthis much-neededfunding was oriented response to a humanitarian catastrophe with nearly ten due to the deteriorating security and ensuing million Yemenis food insecure and more than politicalAssembly impasse, elections. but Other constitution-drafting initiatives were delayed and subsequent elections in the coming year will United States will continue contributing to such provide a good opportunity for the United States fifty percent of the population malnourished. The to contribute to inclusive processes. in its FY2013 budget to address humanitarian needs; the administration requested $63 million Yemen: Yemen’s economic situation is far graver the transition. than that of other countries addressed here, but needs exacerbated by conflict coincident with since the United States did not initially include Yemen in the group of Arab countries transitioning “Although you have weathered historic political transitions in the past, today you stand ready to form your own government, write your own to democracy, it did not benefit from the initial constitution, and freely elect your own president. tranches of direct financial assistance pledged to Be assured that the American people, deeply Egypt and Tunisia in the spring of 2011. However, donors that formed in 2006 to rescue Yemen valuing our long and enduring friendship with the Friends of Yemen—a group of international Yemen, support you. As President Obama said: ‘Have no doubt that we stand firmly behind you from humanitarian and economic disaster—was A series of Friends of Yemen donor conferences in these efforts.’ We pledge to continue to stand resuscitated in the wake of its political transition. elicited a total of $8.1 billion in pledges. For its with all of you in the months and years ahead as part, the United States pledged $346 million, but you work towards building a secure, democratic, and prosperous new Yemen.” underway or planned, security assistance, and increasedthe bulk of humanitarian this amount reflects assistance. programs The amount already of new money dedicated to support the political US Ambassador to Yemen Gerald Feierstein, May 22, 2013 transition and address grievances related to the but there is also recognition that economic growth andStabilizing development Yemen’s is economyessential isfor the the first success priority, of its theuprising—namely total pledge. job creation and economic transition. Donor assistance through the Friends development—was actually quite low relative to
andof Yemen Saudi process Arabia, hasbut startedtrade and some investment significant promotioninvestment fromprojects, the Unitedparticularly States from has beenQatar
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 17 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region virtually nonexistent. The United States has not The State Department increased security sector provided Yemen any cash transfers or direct assistance for programs to nearly $17.8 million in budget support. Instead, to deal with immediate of Interior and another program to support public order2012-13 management, to support reformcriminal within prosecutions, Yemen’s andMinistry financing shortfalls, the United States has largely justice sector reform. Rapidrelied uponCredit and Facility supported Program international for $93 million financial in institutions assisting Yemen (primarily an IMF discussion, the United States has played an active In Yemen, unlike the other countries under of2012) support as well for aseconomic at least $2development, billion in fuel the and United role in shaping its transition process, providing StatesCentral has Bank provided deposits $20 from million Saudi for Arabia. economic In terms diplomatic and political support for the country’s growth programs related to entrepreneurship president and government, and ensuring that the process maintains momentum. The United States microenterprise, and vocational training programs sincesupport, 2011. skills Given development the enormous and needsjob placement, and the in the success of the National Dialogue, a UN- has invested significant energy and resources necessity of job creation for any hope of success in Yemen, this is an area where the United States with 565 delegates representing all Yemen’s supported process taking place over six months should be devoting considerably more resources. Furthermore, this is an area where US expertise major stakeholders to develop consensus on and support would be welcomed and where the the north, and the state structure, among other issues.the status As notedof the earlier,south, the the Houthi heavy-handed rebellion role in of build effective programs. the US ambassador is sometimes critiqued, but large Gulf donors are unlikely to spend the time to As part of the GCC-supported transition plan, the been instrumental in getting the dialogue off the primary supporters in the international community groundthere is andno debate moving that forward. US financial USAID assistance is providing has at least $10 million in operational assistance to the onhave broad each restructuring taken the lead of in internal a specific security area of forces the civic outreach. In anticipation of a constitutional andtransition. the United While States the European has the lead Union on militarytook the lead referendumdialogue offices, and workingupcoming groups, elections, and the to support United restructuring efforts, the State Department is States is actively supporting election management engaged in other aspects of security sector reform and preparation, updating Yemen’s voter registry, voter education, and civic outreach. related to the justice sector and rule of law issues. that are complementary to EU efforts, particularly
18 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
US Assistance To Arab Transition Countries Note: Funding amounts refer to foreign assistance provided from June 2012 to July 2013 and appropriated in Fiscal Years (FY) 2011, 2012, or 2013.
Flagship Regional Initiatives Status Progress for Enterprise Funds in Egypt and Tunisia • Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund was officially launched in March 2013 (with $60m appropriated in 2012). • Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund was officially launched in June 2013 (with $40m appropriated in 2012). Incentive Fund proposed in president’s FY2014 • No funding has been appropriated for the Incentive Fund. The White House budget request requested $580m for MENA-IF for FY2014, but Congress appears unlikely to fund. The White House first requested $770m for the MENA-IF for FY2013, but Congress did not approve the funding. MENA Trade and Investment Partnership • First meeting was held in April 2012 but no concrete action has been taken. (MENA-TIP) created to build on existing bilateral Country-specific action plans are being developed (Tunisia approved; Egypt, Jordan, agreements and promote regional trade Morocco under discussion; Libya not yet started).
Economic Assistance, Development, and Reform
Egypt Tunisia Libya Yemen Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Stabilize the • First tranche Stabilize and • No additional Stabilize and • US has unfro- Stabilize the • No direct economy of $190m cash reform the budget sup- reform the zen $30b in economy economic transfer re- economy port provided economy Libyan assets support. leased in March since $100m in 2012; ap- Yemen 2013; remaining cash transfer proximately received $260m on hold in May 2012. $3b remains a $93m until Congress • US supported blocked. emergency releases and IMF program loan through Egypt reaches for Tunisia; IMF’s Rapid IMF agreement. IMF approved Credit Facility • US supports $1.78b Stand- program in IMF deal for By Arrange- April 2012; Egypt but ment (SBA) in currently continued June 2013. discussing IMF negotiations medium-term • MCC program. unlikely until assessment new govern- completed ment formed. and program design re- leased in De- cember 2012 for $20m Threshold Program.
Establish • Fund officially Establish • Fund officially Humanitarian • $8.8m Humanitarian • US provided Egyptian- launched Tunisian- launched in assistance provided in assistance $221m for American in March American July 2013 with FY2012 for humanitari- Enterprise 2013 with Enterprise $40m initial humanitarian an aid since Fund $60m initial Fund capitalization. assistance. 2011 to help capitalization • Chairman address the (plans for full and board needs of capitalization selected and the most of $300m over finalized but vulnerable five years). investments populations. • Chairman and have not board selected started. and finalized but investments have not started. Debt relief • US revamped Loan • Loan guaran- original plan guarantees tee authority for $1 billion for Tunisia debt swap granted by and decided Congress in to redirect FY2013 bill, $450m of but admin- these pledged istration funds for cash has not yet transfer for offered loan Egypt to cover guarantee to payments on Tunisian gov- USG debt. ernment.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 19 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
US Assistance To Arab Transition Countries Note: Funding amounts refer to foreign assistance provided from June 2012 to July 2013 and appropriated in Fiscal Years (FY) 2011, 2012, or 2013.
Economic Assistance, Development, and Reform
Egypt Tunisia Libya Yemen Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Debt relief • $550m remain- ing from debt swap pledge may be used for higher edu- cation initiative for scholarships in business and technical fields; program has not yet been officially announced. Provide OPIC • US pledged Provide OPIC • $50m OPIC Provide OPIC Libya is not el- Provide OPIC • Yemen is eli- financing $1b in OPIC financing Franchise and financing igible for OPIC financing gible for OPIC financing for SME Loan financing. financing but public-private Guaranty no current infrastructure facility for projects un- projects in 2011; Tunisia final- derway or in this was held ized; will help the pipeline. up and pledge provide credit is now being to franchisees redefined. and SMEs. OPIC has made • $52.5m for $425m in com- Maghreb mitments to Private date, including: Equity Fund, • $250m for a regional Loan Guarantee fund that Facility; will provide • $125m for Cit- equity capital adel to help fi- to 15-20 SMEs nance Egyptian in Tunisia, companies; Morocco, Algeria, and • $50m (est.) for Egypt, but no Citibank insur- loans have ance contract; been made • $250m Loan yet. Guarantee Fa- cility (above) to support SMEs finally launched in 2013 after GOEi agreed to register implementing organization in Egypt; two Egyptian banks have signed on to the facility. Support job • Some OPIC Support job • Tunisia SME Support job • US added Support job • US has com- creation, SME financing creation, SME Project creation, SME Libya to the creation, SME mitted $20m development, will support development, launched development, 2012 African development, for economic and entrepre- SME lending and entrepre- June 2013 and entrepre- Diaspora and entrepre- growth pro- ureship in Egypt, ureship will provide ureship Marketplace ureship grams since including part technical (ADM) 2011 focusing of $150m OPIC assistance initiative to primarily on private equity to SMEs and support entre- job-creation deal with boost trade to preneurship. and capaci- Abraaj Capital, US businesses. • $500k to ty-building of signed Sep- • Multi-year support Libya local commu- tember 2012. ICTii Com- Women’s nities through petitiveness Economic infrastructure Project now Empower- rehabilita- operational, ment project tion and with $8m focusing agriculture funding to link on SMEs development, employers development with a special and jobseek- and women’s focus on con- ers in the economic em- flict-affected ICT sector. powerment. communities in the south.
20 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
US Assistance To Arab Transition Countries Note: Funding amounts refer to foreign assistance provided from June 2012 to July 2013 and appropriated in Fiscal Years (FY) 2011, 2012, or 2013.
Economic Assistance, Development, and Reform
Egypt Tunisia Libya Yemen Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Support job • Several small- Support job • $8.3m for creation, SME scale programs creation, SME programs to development, to support development, assist women and entrepre- job-creation, and entrepre- and youth en- ureship entrepreneur- ureship trepreneurs, ship support, provide job and SME training and growth funded employability mainly by skills, start- USAID and up business MEPI. resources. • $1.8m for financial institutions to increase ac- cess to credit for small businesses. • $2.9m for Entrepre- neurship Development Program in Tunisia and Morocco. Education and • With funds al- Education and • Expansion Education and • US-Libya Education and • US supports vocational located for the vocational of five new vocational Higher Edu- vocational educational training original debt training linkages training cation Task training and pro- swap program, between US Force sent a fessional in 2013 the US and Tunisian delegation development planned a new universities, to Libya in programs for scholarship journalist September Yemenis in program fo- training. 2012 to foster the US. cused on tech- • $10m for cooperation nical training Thomas between and women. Jefferson US and The program Scholarship Libyan higher has not been for approx. education officially 200 Tunisian institutions announced students to and launched and plans are study for International on hold due one year at Academic to turmoil in American Partnership Egypt. universities Program. and commu- • Expansion nity colleges of Fulbright to enhance Program workplace for 2012-13 skills; 60 academic students year, with will begin in 14 Libyan fall 2013. students in the US (dou- ble the size of previous cohort). Trade and Investment Egypt Tunisia Libya Yemen Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Expand • Trade and In- Expand • US-Tunisia Expand • US-Libya Support • US current- bilateral vestment Part- bilateral TIFA frame- bilateral TIFA needs for WTO ly assisting trade and nership Action trade and work led to trade and to be updat- accession Yemen in investment Plan for Egypt investment new SME pro- investment ed but no helping to is under de- gram but no action taken. fulfill steel and velopment but progress with agricultural no concrete formal trade requirements outcomes. discussions. for WTOiii accession.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 21 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
US Assistance To Arab Transition Countries Note: Funding amounts refer to foreign assistance provided from June 2012 to July 2013 and appropriated in Fiscal Years (FY) 2011, 2012, or 2013. Trade and Investment Egypt Tunisia Libya Yemen Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Expand • US not offering Expand • Tunisians Expand • US supports Support • Yemen ex- bilateral discussions on bilateral expressed in- bilateral Libya’s WTO for WTO pected to join trade and FTAv at present. trade and terest in FTA trade and accession but accession the WTO soon investment • USTDA gave investment but not on investment considerable after final two grants of the agenda groundwork negotiations. nearly $1 m to and no action still neces- expand Egypt’s taken. sary. ICT infrastruc- • Last official • US providing ture. TIFA talks technical • US announced were March assistance in March 2013 2012; Tunisian to Libyans expansion of mission to to negotiate Qualifying In- US sched- trade agree- dustrial Zones uled for April ments. (QIZ) program 2013, but was through redes- postponed ignation of cer- and has not tain zones as yet been re- eligible for QIZ scheduled. status, allowing duty-free ac- cess for certain goods to US. Engage the • US Chamber Engage the • Tunisia Part- Engage the • US is Engage the • US Chamber private sector of Commerce private sector nership Fo- private sector facilitating private sector of Commerce to promote (not a govern- to promote rum supports to promote meetings to to promote brought Ye- trade and ment agency) trade and networking trade and foster trade trade and meni business investment sent a trade investment between US investment between investment delegation to mission in Sep- and Tunisian Libyan gov- US to foster tember 2012, businesses. ernment and trade relation- leading more US-based ships and ex- than 100 par- businesses plore business ticipants from for services opportunities 50 companies and equip- in alternative to Cairo, with ment for energy and high-level USG reconstruc- water. participation. tion. • US facilitat- • USTDA pro- • USTDA orga- ed Yemen’s gram “Egypt: nized a Libya participation Forward” had Cyber Secu- in a coffee scheduled rity Reverse trade show to workshops for Trade Mission help rehabili- fall 2012 but in May 2013. tate Yemen’s postponed • Department historic coffee them; also of Commerce industry. scheduled sponsored a technical work- trade mission shops in Cairo to Libya for for spring a delegation 2013 but had of 25 US to postpone companies. those as well. • Am-Cham • USTDA Libya and organized a US-Libya reverse trade Business mission to Association help Egyptian organized port officials Libya Proj- modernize ects 2013 their processes conference in April 2013. in Tripoli in • Official trade June 2013. mission to Egypt planned for April 2013 was post- poned.
22 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
US Assistance To Arab Transition Countries Note: Funding amounts refer to foreign assistance provided from June 2012 to July 2013 and appropriated in Fiscal Years (FY) 2011, 2012, or 2013. Trade and Investment Egypt Tunisia Libya Yemen Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Public Private • ExxonMobil, • US and Partnerships in partnership Microsoft with the Egypt Corporation chapter of are providing Partners for business and New Beginning software skills (a State De- training to 20 partment-fund- new Tunisian ed initiative), startup com- funded efforts panies in 2012 to enhance and 2013. science, • US is partner- technology, en- ing with Hew- gineering, and lett-Packard math education and UNIDO to in Egypt. provide entre- • Cisco an- preneurship nounced a training and $10m venture SME capac- capital invest- ity building ment in Egypt assistance in to create a sus- four Tunisian tainable model governorates. of job-creation. • Coca-Cola partnered with the Egypt Food Bank to assist 14 villag- es and 10,000 people devel- op sustainable livelihoods and access to clean water. Political Participation, Civil Society, and Governance Egypt Tunisia Libya Yemen Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Democracy • $17.3m provid- Democracy • $11m since Democracy • $14m in Democracy US provided support for ed since June support for June 2012 support for grants for support for nearly $39m political 2012, including political for State political media train- political to support parties, civil for interna- parties, civil Department parties, civil ing political parties, civil Yemen’s political society, and tional election society, and and USAIDix society, and party capac- society, and transition pro- elections monitoring (for elections programs elections ity building elections cess since 2011, planned 2012 to support working with including: parliamentary elections youth and • National Dia- elections never and politi- women’s logue support held), civic and cal process groups to for operational political par- work, election advocate for assistance to ticipation, and observation, parts to new the dialogue combating vi- and technical constitution offices, working olence against assistance to lawyers groups, and to women. the Election training and support civic Commission. a new project outreach. to work on • Support for civil society election man- law. agement voter • $20.6m since education, June 2012 for updating the programs for voter registry, civil society and inclusion of support, women. elections • Support for the support, new Executive transitional Bureau estab- justice, wom- lished to ex- en’s rights, pedite project constitutional implementation process, and ensure ac- and good countability of governance donor funds. programs.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 23 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
US Assistance To Arab Transition Countries Note: Funding amounts refer to foreign assistance provided from June 2012 to July 2013 and appropriated in Fiscal Years (FY) 2011, 2012, or 2013. Political Participation, Civil Society, and Governance Egypt Tunisia Libya Yemen Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Governance No new Governance • US Trea- Governance • US Treasury Governance • US provides and technical programs. and technical sury began and technical planned and technical technical assistance to assistance to arrangement assistance to technical assistance to assistance to government government for technical government assistance government Ministry of agencies agencies assistance to agencies to Libyan agencies Planning and Ministry of ministries International Finance and to promote Cooperation Central Bank financial and governor’s on banking transparency offices. reform, but and good put on hold governance, after embassy but put on attacks in hold after September embassy at- 2012 and no tacks and no set plans for plans for its resumption. resumption. • DOD sent technical as- sistance team to assist Ministry of Defense. Security Sectoir Assisitance Egypt Tunisia Libya Yemen Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Initiative Status Security • $1m commu- Security • $22.5m Security • $2m for crim- Security • $17.8m to sector nity policing sector committed sector inal justice, sector support assistance program within assistance for police assistance investigative assistance reform within MOI to develop reform and training, pris- Yemen’s accountable corrections on reform, Ministry of and profes- reform and technical Interior, de- sional police program with assistance velopment of force. the Ministries to Libyan civilian police, • $3.1m for of Interior Department criminal pros- training and and Justice, of Justice. ecutions, and equipment for including • $2.1m for justice sector border security technical as- border reform. and other se- sistance from security • $9.8m for curity-related full-time USG (EXBS) and border secu- assistance. staff person counterter- rity (EXBS) in Tunis. rorism sup- counterterror- • $10.5m for port (ATA) in ism support training and FY2012. (ATA), and equipment • $18.5m demining for border for border (CWD) in security, and security from FY 2012 other secu- Global Secu- and FY 2013. rity-related rity Contin- assistance. gency Fund in FY2012. • $2.35m for justice and security di- alogues and assistance on reintegration of militias. i Government of Egypt ii Information and Communications Technology iii World Trade Organization
24 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
EU Policy Toward the Arab Countries in Transition
In the months following the 2011 Arab uprisings, toward the region. region based on greater emphasis on democratic most appropriate way to revise the EU’s approach changethe EU developedand offering a new improved policy incentives approach towardto support the The hollowness of this approach is clear despite the transition of these countries. The rationale of the renewed rhetoric describing opportunities to build “deep democracies” in the region. There are some individual initiatives that are laudable, and there has revised May 2011 European Neighbourhood Policy been some tangible progress in negotiating sectoral (ENP) was to anchor them more closely to their agreements and identifying common projects. Northern Mediterranean partners by improving the quality of economic and financial assistance fault lines. First, it suffers from a mismatch between and expanding the range of fields for cross- statedHowever, commitments the ENP continues and the toability have tosignificant deliver on Mediterranean engagement. them, though many of the problems in delivery of “Two years on from the revision of the ENP, implementation is the main task and challenge for the EU and its partners. Since 2011, progress economic assistance lie in the weaknesses of the in implementing the reforms agreed on by the partner governments. Secondly, the ENP review did EU and its partners has been uneven. However, visionnot address because the the problems priorities at theof the heart member of EU policystates it must not lead to disengagement. On the vary.toward Some, the region:such as the France EU does and thenot Unitedhave a strategicKingdom, contrary, the EU must step up its engagement in the process including over the long term.” such as Spain and Italy, focus on mobility and have a stronger focus on security; others, Netherlands, and Poland, are more committed to Joint Communication of the European Commission and the democraticmigration; and transition. still others, such as Sweden, the High Representative on the European Neighborhood Policy, March 2013 the political context, where the only certainty was The revised ENP did not lead the way toward thatThis furtherresponse change, seemed instability, apt to address and violence the fluidity would of a qualitatively different paradigm for Euro- continue as new political actors would emerge Mediterranean relations. The underlying within the broad region stretching across North assumptions of the initial ENP policy—launched well before the Arab uprisings—have not been Gulf. Focusing on differentiation between individual challenged. The ENP remains based on the countriesAfrica and and the identifyingMiddle East, tailor-made and reaching approaches out to the ofassumption trade liberalization, that the EU development has leverage aid, and closer attraction vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors and that a combination overall principles of engagement appeared to be political relations, and a stronger emphasis on adaptable to each situation while redefining the
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 25 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region political reform toward greater democracy and good governance would be the recipe for regional stability. Yet it is questionable whether or not the privatelythe EU tried relieved to engage of the with restoration all political of the forces. ancien régime.At the same time, many European capitals were
EU can in fact offer incentives that are compelling “The EU has strengthened political and financial enough to have any influence on the Arab uprising support for its partners embarking on political countries—both the countries undergoing direct introducing more cautious, gradual political reform reforms. The analysis of developments and of political transition (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya) and those the results of reforms in partner countries shows that the ENP works when the willingness to (Morocco and Jordan). reform is there and society plays an active part The lack of a common interpretation of the in the process. Values, models of governance or itspriorities traditional in the position region ofmakes relying the on EU the unable United to reforms cannot be imposed from the outside. Statesmaximize to set its the influence tone on and the leads big policy it to fall options. back on The They can only take root when the political leaders and citizens buy in to the reform policy has been, but also demonstrates that there objectives commonly agreed between the EU absence of US leadership has shown how empty EU and its partners. The EU must continue to reach out to and work with supporters of reform and is room for the EU to play a bigger role if it were partnership with the EU.” states.able to Insteadforge a broaderof articulating policy aframework coherent approach, that is fully embraced by the EU institutions and member for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy February 20, 2013 Communication from the High Representative of the EU Thethe EU individual has been approaches consumed inwith dealing a range with of serioussecurity securityrisks and challenges threats in mayits southern be appropriate, neighborhood. but they responding to the complex and changing political are circumscribed and not indicative of a new The case of Egypt is illustrative of the difficulties in conducted quiet diplomacy, behind closed doors, sendingdynamics. messages During 2012,to the the government European and Union the political approach to the region—with a core focus on democratic support—which was the stated of marginalizing and antagonizing the opposition. objectiveEU Support of the for revised Pluralist ENP. Political Space InMuslim light ofBrotherhood the July 2013 about events, the itperils was ofclear its politicsthat
Since the Arab awakening, one notable change criticism.the leadership Less clearof the is Muslim whether Brotherhood a different typehad of been oblivious to EU recommendations and soft engagesis how EU with and Islamist member parties states participatingdeal with Islamist in engagement, such as more public condemnation, politicspolitical and forces. leading The government.EU now fully Butaccepts as space and
would have made a difference in influencing events for political pluralism began shrinking in in the country; as in the United States, there is a 2012-13—with mainstream Islamist parties clear sense that EU political leverage is minimal. the member states on attitudes toward the Islamist revealing a winner-takes-all understanding In the wake of the coup, old differences between of democracy, the breakdown of government- constitutional process, the political polarization for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine opposition relations in Egypt over the in Tunisia, and the growing importance of the Ashtonparties reemerged.issued statements While EUcondemning High Representative violence and urging an inclusive national dialogue, member commitment to this policy shift showed signs of Salafist movements across the region—European place in Cairo. In the end, the statement issued the emerging political groupings remained limited states debated how to interpret the events taking shallowness. European channels for dialogue with of all member states made the necessary points by the High Representative on July 14 on behalf and uninfluential. As the Egyptian crisis unfolded, 26 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region about returning to the democratic process and change in strategy and may signal a more political calls for the release of political prisoners, but
“The military must accept and respect the role for the EU in the region, building upon trust constitutionalrefrained from authority mentioning of theMorsi civilian and hispower arrest: as a amongIn other the parts Brotherhood of the Arab that world, the United indeed, States this lacks. basic principle of democratic governance. It is of dialogue and engagement with local actors played legitimate government and democratic structures Yemen, for instance, the engagement of the head a significant role in supporting the transition. In respondingutmost importance to the democratic that Egypt and returns socio-economic rapidly to a 22 including elections and the formation of a unity of the EU Delegation in the transition process, aspirations of the Egyptian people….” clearly seen in this statement and the reaction to government, is regarded by EU officials as playing The divisions among EU member states can also be a positive role in keeping the transition on track. In assistancethis case, the levels EU successfullywere not monumental, used aid to tailoringsupport armyevents for in carryingEgypt. The out statement a coup d’état, did not which address Britain the the approachpolitical aims to the of situationits diplomacy. on the Even ground though and the lack of an agreement on whether to condemn the position toward the army, which was seen by many amplify the impact. membersand Germany as a advocated,valuable interlocutor or whether until to take the a Arab softer linking assistance with political objectives helped spring took place. In short, the debate in Brussels The EU’s increased investment of energy toward the region has not yet corresponded to a beefing strategyover developments and tactics inin Egyptengaging revealed with importantold habits writ large, nor has it produced a more incisive and highlighted the differences within the EU over up of the EU’s political influence in these countries countries in the Southern Mediterranean. and strategic approach shared by the EU and its member states. Indeed, the EU has also been Ashton’s late July 2013 visit to Egypt changed the andconsumed its southern with a neighborhood, range of security with risks the and violent threats picture. She asked to meet representatives of the in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region them,Muslim as Brotherhood-affiliated well as by the new acting Freedom president, and Justiceprime negative impacts on the transitioning countries. minister,Party and, and unlike representatives the US envoy, of she other was relevant received by Again,conflict the in Maliindividual at the approachestop of the list, in dealingwhich have with serious security challenges may be appropriate in the short term, but they are circumscribed. political forces. She asked not only for an inclusive And they are not indicative of a new and longer- dialogue with all political parties but also specifically term political approach to the region in which for the release of Morsi and his associates, earning democracy plays a central role, which was the sufficient trust from the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party to be asked to facilitate such dialogue. Although her effort was unsuccessful, this marks a stated objective of the revised ENP.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138072.pdf. 22 European Union, “Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union, on the situation in Egypt,” Brussels, July 14, 2013, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 27 EU Assistance
Markets, Money, and Mobility
isFew the changes most developed, with other with MENA negotiations countries startingtook place commitments and pledges for additional support over the past two years. The DCFTA with Morocco Despite its own economic crisis, the EU made to countries undergoing political and economic exercises with Tunisia and Jordan in 2012, and in April 2013, while the EU has engaged in scoping November 2012. reform, whether through uprisings (Tunisia, Egypt, initial exploratory talks were held with Egypt in Programme,Libya) or through launched reforms in 2011, engineered was created from the monarchies (Morocco and Jordan). The SPRING “EU support to stimulate sustainable economic reform, and by the end of 2012, €100 million was growth is therefore crucial to the promotion specifically to provide support to encourage political of democratic institutions, provided that the countries of the region contribute to the pledged for Tunisia, €90 million to Egypt, €80 promotion of a friendly environment for million to Morocco, and €70 million to Jordan (see investment, jobs and growth. It should be spendingtable). The compared Multiannual to the Financial previous Framework seven-year for underlined that economics has a deep connection 2014-20, the EU’s overall budget, cuts overall EU with politics. An economic collapse would imply billion, more than twenty percent of the total budget a political failure of the transitions. Therefore, period. The amount earmarked for the ENP is €13.7 EU support is more urgent than ever to help transitions move in the right direction.” for EU external relations. This amount, however, ofincludes writing funding it is not for possible Eastern to Europe give an as indication well as the February 8, 2013 Southern Mediterranean countries; at the time Memorandum from European Commission, Brussels, two regions since the necessary regulation on the on the breakdown of the amount between these been adopted. development,The EU endeavoured infrastructure to support development, economic growthand European Neighbourhood Instrument has not yet jobin the training/entrepreneurship transitioning countries through with a numberSME of
The EU pursued its flagship Deep and andinitiatives. in the pastThe EUyear established signed a memorandum a new Enterprise of Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) Europe Network for Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, with several MENA countries after the 2011 uprisings on the basis of the ENP paradigm. understanding with Tunisia and Morocco and an However, progress is slow even with advanced includeagreement a €68 with million Egypt program is anticipated to support for 2013. economic countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, which have recoveryCountry-specific and a €20 projects million for program SME assistance to support a greater interest in trade integration with the EU given their export market-dependence in Europe. 28 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region service modernization in Tunisia, as well as a fund €170 million in total assistance at the September
committing to becoming one of the most important creationof €22 million and training for support in Tunisia of agricultural through a SMEs joint 2012 donor conference in Riyadh, the EU is in Egypt. The EU placed specific emphasis on job matched and supported the diplomatic efforts and the Tunisian government and a pledge of €60 madedonors to to support Yemen. the The national EU’s assistance dialogue strategy initiative between European Training Foundation in the country, and the anticipated 2014 elections a decentralized approach to economic support bymillion focusing in 2012 outside for job Tunis creation. through The pilot EU regionalalso tried in Yemen will likely be an important test for a €33 million program for support to Tunisia’s EU policies. disadvantageddevelopment programs. regions throughout In 2013, the the EU country cofounded Increased mobility and better access to Europe for with the Agence Française de Développement partnerships,citizens from thelaunched MENA inregion 2011 constituted as a post-Arab the final leg of the revamped ENP approach. The mobility (AFD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). slowed the disbursement of these commitments awakening incentive for the South Mediterranean EU bureaucracy and partner country intransigence countries, can hardly be defined as a game changer for the region. Morocco signed the sole in some cases. In the case of Egypt, the EU (like negotiatingagreement with process EU inthat June could 2013. ultimately However, result signing loanthe United that would States) be tied contingent its economic on accepting assistance a set to of the agreement is just the first step in an involved reforms.the Egyptian23 government’s agreement to an IMF in a visa facilitation regime for specific categories Cairo’s unwillingness to accept the IMF’s andof people Jordan (students, about reaching researchers, an agreement, and business while conditions meant that the EU pledges have not been representatives). The EU is in dialogue with Tunisia disbursed. Instead, massive financial support from not shown interest thus far. The reasons for slow Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates progressEgypt, the are fourth mostly country to be offeredfound in this the benefit, member has (UAE) filled the gap. states, divided about the importance of simplifying Neighbourhood scope, support for Yemen’s the visa regime and concerned about potential democraticSince Yemen transition falls outside comes the throughEuropean different instruments, such as the Development Cooperation Instrument and the Instrument for Stability. inflows of migrants from the South Mediterranean. building and governance rather than direct whichOne new have initiative proven worth to be annoting effective is the way to economicThis assistance, support, aimed includes specifically active supportat institution- mobilizeestablishment additional of EU support country-focused through mixed task forces, for Yemen’s national unity government and National Dialogue process. While the funding investments from the private sector. For example, is modest, amounting to around €60 million in packages of grants and loans, as well as stimulating 2012, the occasion mobilized different sections of political objectives, such as reforming the election when the EU-Egypt Task Force met in November committee,2012 excluding training humanitarian members aid,of parliament it targeted and key the EU’s policy making machinery and more than five hundred actors from the public and private €18political million party toward officials, support women’s of the rights, national and unity reform sector converged on Cairo, including the European governmentof the judiciary. in August The EU 2012, allocated and withan additional its pledge of Commission, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the EIB, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/egypt_the_imf_and_european_economic_assistance204. 23 Farah Halime, “Egypt, the IMF and European Economic Assistance,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2013,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 29 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
Parliament, and the member states. In advance election observation missions to Tunisia for the
and has provided technical support to elections in aof delegation the Task Force of more meeting, than onethe hundredCommissioner businesses for Constituent Assembly elections in October 2011 Industry and Entrepreneurship Antonio Tajani led value is its ability to support nonpolitical actors, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen (see table). EIDHR’s added andto Cairo. loans Overall, for 2012-13. this combined24 effort led to a recognised by their governments or are not iscommitment arguably the of most a package successful of €5 inbillion terms in of grants bringing legallycivil society registered. organizations, and NGOs that are not together different political The and EU-Egypt economic Task actors Force aid assistance. September 2011 with an allocation of €26 million, and of commitment of financial, economic, and A new Civil Society Facility, first created in capacity and improving its ability to promote nationalfocuses on reform strengthening and increase civil public society’s accountability. networking metOther only country-specific once in September task forces 2011, witnessedduring which little For a second phase in 2012, the CSF received progress in the past year. The EU-Tunisia Task Force nearly double that amount with €45.3 million for 2012-13. In an effort to address rule of law issues, the European Commission signed a grant of €100 million for a recovery program and the European initiative called Strengthening Democratic Reform Investment Bank confirmed its commitment to the EU partnered with the Council of Europe on an a €130 million project to support SMEs, and an million to improve court performance, reform EU-Jordan Task Force met in February 2012. This in the Southern Mediterranean and allocated €4.8 multiplierapproach reflects of assistance EU efforts by leveraging not just to other increase actors economic and financial assistance, but to act as a years.the judicial In Brussels, system, the and general fight against assessment corruption of the CSFin Morocco is positive: and theTunisia facility over has the facilitated next three direct to contribute. Given the EU’s fiscal limitations and waylack ofto cohesionleverage assistanceamong member within states, both the the public efforts and local civil society organisations, which are andof the private task forces sectors. are worth investing in as a viable engagement and dialogue between EU institutions planning. Along with activities carried out by Democracy Support and Civil Society also consulted during key phases of EU policy
the EU Delegations in partner countries, these developed policies and tools to support democracy- approach toward supporting democratic change initiatives indicate a learning curve in the EU buildingAlong with and its human diplomatic rights outreach, on the ground the EU through bottom-up support and civil society empowerment. contributedby acknowledging €7 million and embracingto the Joint that Program local civilwith UNsociety Women, plays which a key aimsrole in to this encourage process. women’s The EU also supportThe European local election Instrument observers, for Democracy including and the media,Human political Rights (EIDHR) parties, hasand beencivil societyused to groups train and women’sactive engagement rights. in decision-making, economic empowerment, and regional knowledge of Yemen, where projects have included support tothroughout devise legislation the region, regarding and the theEIDHR role worksmedia in and internet, capacity-building of youth groups The establishment of the European Endowment from the protest movements, and to strengthen assistance,for Democracy whose (EED) mandate in 2013 is tocould support potentially political mark a new development in European democracy the accountability of parliament. The EU sent actors and civil society organizations working
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133513.pdf. 24 “EU-Egypt Task Force Fact Sheet,” A 515/12, Council of the EU, Brussels, November 14, 2012,
30 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region southern neighboring countries. Initially inspired to strengthen democracy in the EU’s east and withtoo early a broader to assess, range the of creation actors beyond of the EED “the couldusual Democracy, a nongovernmental organization potentially enhance the EU’s network of contacts createdby the United with congressional States’ National support Endowment in 1983, for the suspects” who have so far received the bulk of EU upon Poland’s own experience of democratization. tofunds. changing As a grant-making situations, to institute,support small it may groups, have EED emerged from a Polish initiative drawing more flexibility than EU tools to respond rapidly
The creation of the EED has been a complicated including ones carrying out direct political work and long-negotiated process between the EU sinceThere the are EU some does bright not fund spots political worth notingparties. in how andinstitutions; values and the to Endowment create a context will now in which start politicalgrant- making activities to support democratic practices civilthe EU society has evolved; with a view the EU to betterDelegations understand are building parties and political pluralism can flourish. localtheir contextsnetwork andcapacity engage and with outreach a greater toward variety “The long path of transition lies ahead. There of human rights and democracy activists and will undoubtedly be disappointments along the defenders. The new Strategy and Action Plan for way; there will be wrong turns, hurdles and 25 setbacks. But I firmly believe that despite the June 2012, Promoting Human Rights, approved by the EU in difficulties, this journey is heading in the right out human rights diplomacy directly with third empowered EU Delegations to carry direction. And there is no going back. Whatever countries, and to promote human rights through the future brings, the Arab Spring will remain a broader variety of activities such as observing a turning point. The movement is irreversible. trials and protecting human rights defenders. The Once the voices of the people have been set free—an unforgettable experience for all those EU Delegation in Cairo has been praised for its who were never heard before—these voices efforts to support NGO activists and is believed to cannot be silenced. movement,have been instrumental for instance. 26in Changes the release introduced in May 2013 to It is each country’s responsibility to chart its of Ahmed Maher, founder and leader of the 6 April own course and to do justice to the aspirations of its people. The European Union is committed the EIDHR regulation better enable delegations to staying by their side every step along the to use these funds for country-specific calls for way. We are in it for the long run. I want to proposals that better reflect local situations. All the reaffirm: we still believe in the message of the delegations now have a Human Rights Focal Point Arab Spring.” heavily(some have involved two, inone holding dealing meetings with aid and projects, hosting the other with political issues). These officials are more dialogues with local interlocutors and by offering UN General Assembly, September 27, 2012 technical advice. Address by EU Council President Van Rompuy, These are positive steps, but projects on the ground still need to be better connected with the civil society initiatives and supporting democracy andWhile human the EU rights has a related solid track projects, record its in political funding to claim it contributes to shaping an environment overarching EU policy, especially if the EU wants engagement with a diverse range of political actors conducive to political pluralism in North Africa
real impact on the democratic environment, the working in the region is only just starting. While and the Middle East. For these activities to have
Luxembourg, June 25, 2012. 25 “EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy,” 11855/12, Council of the European Union,
26 Conversation with an activist of the 6 April movement, May 2013. ATLANTIC COUNCIL 31 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
major countries have increased bilateral support to the transitioning countries. Some new democracy EU needs to produce deeper political commitment at higher levels. Most importantly, the challenge emerged, such as the British Arab Partnership nongovernmentalwill be for the EU to actors use its and diplomatic civil society leverage support programs outside EU mechanisms have to influence the legal environment in which at the end of 2012, focusing on strengthening restrictive and has deteriorated in some countries. institutionsFund, or Spain’s and empoweringnew MASAR program,civil society launched actors. organizations work, which is currently very elected political representatives, but the depth and EU leaders have cultivated relations with recently AfricanYet among countries the major since European the uprisings, nations, according only France to and opposition representatives remains to be seen. has increased its overall aid to the five North impact of dialogue between the EU and government Official Development Assistance (ODA) figures. with what their role should be in the region and andThe NorthEuropean Africa Parliament region and deepened met a broader diplomatic range howAs the much member they countriesare willing in to the commit, EU are other grappling actors ofrelations actors inwith their their visits counterparts to the region in thethrough Middle its East are not hesitant to get in the game. Regional players committees and individual members of parliament.
Parliament established a new Directorate for mechanisms,such as Turkey, even Qatar, though and theythe UAE contribute are increasing minor In response to the Arab awakening, the European their influence through formal and informal27 These emerging actors are increasingly seen as Democracy Support in 2011 (including an Office for proportions to the ODA flows to the region. Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, Election Observation Unit, Human Rights Actions Unit, and economiccompetitors development, to the EU, weakening and opening Europe’s new avenues overall andPre-Accession 2013 for members Actions Unit). of parliament, Through thispolitical new forpolitical trade influence, and economic offering differentiation. alternative models of directorate, the EP organized study visits in 2012 The Emergence of Security Risks theparty Gulf. leaders, The aim women of these MPs, initiatives and parliamentary is not just tostaff socializecoming from politicians North Africa,and parliamentary the Middle East, staff and across the two shores, but also to support training and NorthPrior to African 2011, countriesthe EU and to its patrol member their states southern already understanding of parliamentary systems, rules and provided economic and financial assistance to the procedures to enable new members of parliament sub-Saharan Africa, and engage in counterterrorism from the Arab transitioning countries to effectively borders, manage mobility flows stemming from utilize newly democratic institutions. the region altered the security scenario. Two yearsefforts. after However, the wave the ofchanges Arab uprisings, unleashed the across Bilateral European Assistance
environment has become painfully clear. The assistance seems to indicate a recognition of economicmulti-dimensional impact of impact the uprisings on the EU’sprompted security new On one hand, the increased level of pledged these numbers do not give an accurate picture shores, the war in Libya destabilized the Sahel the region’s growing importance. However, waves of migration from North Africa to European donorsof the extent pursue to theirwhich aid Europe programs is engaging independently the region and paved the way for al-Qaeda and jihadist transitioning countries. The important European infiltration of Mali prompting a French-led invasion, goods.and the Three lack of years border of bloodshed control has in made Syria, the region of the EU’s priorities and plans—which further a haven for trafficking in illicit arms and other undermines the EU’s influence—but very few of the
http://www.iemed.org/publicacions-en/historic-de-publicacions/ 27 papersiemed-euromesco/18.-the-end-of-the-southern-neighbourhoodKristina Kausch, “The End of the (Southern) Neighbourhood,’” Papers IEMed,. no. 18, Barcelona, 2013. The data used makes a comparison between 2010 and 2011 ODA. See
32 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region instability in Lebanon, and a violent power including the member states. Again, Syria provides of being surrounded by an abyss of insecurity for anthe instructive components example of the EU’sregarding foreign the policy limitations system, of struggle in Egypt only serve to heighten the sense member states. the Geneva process diplomatically, but internal Europe’s southern neighbors as well as the EU divisionsthis approach. over changingIn the past the year, sanctions the EU regimesupported and whether to supply arms to some of the parties in increasingly cognizant of the security challenges in Over the past months, the EU has become an arc of instability that stretches from the Atlantic emerges with other security challenges across theconflict region. cracked its unity. This lack of cohesion statescoast to directly the Indian engaged Ocean in andmilitary the Gulf operations and has in Assessing the EU Response responded accordingly. The EU and its member inLibya 2012 and and Mali, 2013 and in approved Africa to addressa series ofongoing Common democratic change in North Africa and the The limits to the EU’s approach toward supporting instability.Security and These Defense missions Policy are (CSDP) relatively missions low-cost, involving small numbers of security and judicial These limitations are a result of technical and Middle East became apparent over the past year. experts, and have circumscribed mandates. They are indicative, however, of the broader security of assistance delivery, the sense of incompatibility bureaucratic complications on the EU side in terms concerns that have increased since the upheavals situation in each of the transitioning countries, between intended EU policies and the actual in the region. In May 2013 the EU launched a two- visions among the member states on the real diminished EU influence, and persistent diverse ofyear €30 civilian million CSDP to assist mission the calledLibyan the government EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission at a cost priorities to be addressed (i.e., the security versus providing security assistance in Tunisia, and the on border management. At present, the EU is not democracy dilemma). anything beyond exchanging information and casesMost EUnegotiating aid is programmed these objectives by identifying and conditions common EU Action Plan for Tunisia does not mention training schemes. ofobjectives aid has notwith been the easy.recipient This countries; is due to several in some
of a civil service in the transitioning countries, reasons: insufficient administrative capacity realThe EU’ssecurity primary challenges foreign with policy its statedinstitution, policy the goals the changing political context in the countries byEEAS, initiating is trying a new to address strategy, the which need has to respond been termed to a “comprehensive approach.” The blueprint of such concerned, and insufficient progress in areas28 of specific concern to the EU that deteriorated since how this would function with its policy response the Arab awakening, such as women’s rights. towardapproach Syria. is not In yetthis public, case of but Syria, the theEEAS mandate illustrated is Even in Tunisia, which is more dependent on to utilize a variety of policy tools, connect decision- and on negotiating the various incentives has been slow.relations The withpolicy the decisions EU, progress of the on partner disbursements countries is coherent and effective. In practice, however, clearly indicate that attaching conditions to a set puttingmaking theseplatforms, whole-of-government and ensure that the approaches intervention is much harder for political and institutional reasons incentive to accelerate the pace of relations of modest benefits does not represent a strong due to a chronic deficit of cooperation between with the EU.
Luxembourg, 2013, http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/22944800.pdf. 28 See, for instance, European Court of Auditors, “EU Cooperation with Egypt in the field of governance,” Special Report No. 4,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 33 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
by an inadequate degree of political engagement targeted initiatives can have an impact on the at the highest levels and by continued differences ground,Beyond theespecially EU’s broad-based when carried approach, out by engaged some between member states when the core dilemmas about security in the region emerge. These modest and increased civil society aid helped train and achievements will be challenged again in the near empowerEU representatives civil society in thegroups field. to Better monitor managed elections. future as the security versus democracy paradigm
However, even these initiatives are often hamstrung comes back to the fore of policymaking.
34 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
EU Assistance To Arab Transition Countries
Economic Assistance, Development, and Reform
Initiative Status Refocus bilateral programs of the European Neighborhood and • ENPI budget for 2013 increased to €2.4b (for south and east Partnership Instrument (ENPI) neighbourhood partners) • EU committed €250m to Egypt, €207m to Morocco, €130m to Tunisia, €110m to Jordan, and €25m to Libya. • EU pledged additional financial support for Egypt of €303m in grants and €450m in loans during EU-Egypt Task Force meetings in 2012. Provide transitioning Arab countries with additional funding • €540m allocated for 2011-13 and additional €150m proposed through SPRING Program for 2013 • €100m to Tunisia, €90m to Egypt, €80m to Morocco, and €70m to Jordan by end of 2012 Assistance to transitioning Arab countries beyond the European • EU pledged €170m for transition priorities set by Yemeni government in Neighbourhood Policy September 2012. • Yemen received €100m from EU in 2012 (of which €40m is humanitarian assistance). • EU allocated €18m for transition support and €33m for humanitarian aid for 2013. Expand European Investment Bank (EIB) lending and • EIB lending ceiling increased by €1b and signed €1.7b in loans for MENA engagement in MENA region in 2012 • EIB announced up to €2b in potential loans to Egypt for 2012-13 but contingent on IMF agreement. • EIB committed €20m for private equity Capital North Africa Venture Fund II (CNAV II) to support SMEs in the region. Member states should replenish funding for Neighborhood • NIF allocated €335m for MENA 2011-12. Investment Facility (NIF) • Egypt received €163m as part of EU, EIB, and EBRD package in November 2012. • €200m allocated to leverage investments from EU development banks in March 2013. Provide short-term macroeconomic assistance through EU • EC offered up to €500m to Egypt in macro-financial support—€50m in Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) grants and €450m in loans—but contingent upon IMF deal. Promote job creation and training • EU allocated €50m to Egypt and €6.5m to Libya for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET). • EU allocated €70m for Emergency Employment Investment Project in Egypt • EU allocated €20m to improve Tunisian service sector. • European Training Foundation held meeting of Arab education and labor ministers in September 2012 and launched €2m regional MENA project on employability. Build on pilot regional development programs to address • EU allocated €12m for improving access to basic healthcare in economic disparities between regions disadvantaged regions in Tunisia in 2012. • EU, Agence Française de Développement, and EIB cofunded €33m program supporting Tunisia’s disadvantaged neighborhoods in 2013. Private sector development • EU allocated €12m for private sector development in MENA in December 2012. • EU-Tunisia Council for Entrepreneurship was launched in 2012. Trade and Investment Initiative Status Negotiate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas • Second round of EU-Morocco negotiations for DCFTA took place in (DCFTAs) June 2013 • Initial dialogue with Egypt on DCFTA took place in June 2013. • Scoping exercise for DCFTA with Tunisia and Jordan ongoing • Negotiations for a trade framework agreement with Libya currently suspended Accelerate EU trade liberalization agreements • EU-Morocco agreement on liberalization of agricultural trade entered into force October 2012 • Negotiations with Tunisia on agriculture and fisheries not yet complete • Negotiations on liberalization of trade in services ongoing with Morocco; no progress with Egypt or Tunisia Agreements on Conformity Assessment and • ACAA for industrial products with Tunisia signed in March 2012, Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA) negotiations to be launched in 2013
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 35 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
EU Assistance To Arab Transition Countries Trade and Investment Initiative Status Encourage investment • EU-Egypt Task Force met in November 2012, with high-level attention to foreign investment. • EU launched Investment Security in the Mediterranean Support Programme (€1.5m) to advise governments on reducing legal risk • EC-led Mission for Growth to Morocco and Tunisia in November 2012 to foster business, trade, and investment relations. Migration and Mobility Initiative Status Launch Mobility Partnership with partner countries • EU and Morocco sign migration and mobility partnership in June 2013. • EU and Jordan held preparatory discussions in December 2012. • EU and Tunisia held initial discussions on mobility agreement in December 2012. • Egypt has so far declined to start such discussions. Political Reform, Civil Society, and Governance Initiative Status New Civil Society Facility • €14m allocated for first phase of CSF in 2012 • €22m allocated for second phase of CSF in 2013
Support other civil society projects • EU contributed €23m to civil society and other nonstate actors in Egypt by July 2013. • EU and member states contributed €16m for civil society support through Anna Lindh Foundation for 2012-14. • €3m for new Citizens for Dialogue program for 2012-14 • €17m to enhance independence of media in the region and €9m for media training programs in Jordan allocated in December 2012 Establish European Endowment for Democracy • Established in October 2012, anticipated to be operational in 2013 • EED initial budget of €16m (€6m grant from EC and €10m from member states) Expand European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights • EU allocated €169m in 2013; €1.2b for period 2014-20. Programs active in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt. Support capacity building to strengthen government • €121m for public finance management (€46.6m for sector institutions budget support) • €5m to support application of rule of law by security sector in Jordan • €15m for Tunisia for institutional twinning programs for administrative reform • Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) assisting Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco; €15m allocated for 2008-13 for all ENP countries Provide electoral assistance • EU deployed Electoral Observation Mission in Tunisia, Jordan and Algeria, and offered various forms of technical assistance for elections in Libya, Morocco, Yemen and Egypt in 2012 • EU-UNDP assisting the drafting process of electoral laws in Tunisia. Support rule of law initiatives • €4.8m for “Strengthening Democratic Reform in the Southern Mediterranean” implemented in Morocco and Tunisia initially, will be expanded throughout region over next three years. • €1.8m program in Tunisia in partnership with UNICEF focused on juvenile justice Increase participation in youth education programs • €74.2m allocated for Erasmus Mundus scholarships and €58.5m for Tempus scholarships (for all ENP countries) in 2013. • European Commission provided $13.3m for additional 559 scholarships for South and Eastern Mediterranean (total of 1084) • First cycle of Fatima Al Fihri exchange program between North African and European universities starts in May 2013 • €10m for EU-Tunisia project for Tunisian students to study at European universities
36 ATLANTIC COUNCIL The Deauville Partnership
presidency in 2012, and spent the initial part of “We want to send a clear message to all those in the region who are working each day in some shared priorities among the partners. With governments, in civil society, in the private the inclusionyear trying of to the lower Gulf expectationscountries as partnersand find sector, to build responsive institutions, to strengthen faltering economies, to deliver transitioning country, the United States created freedom for all people, to respect human rights: and differing definitions of what constitutes a we stand with you and we will stand with you as and integration, economic growth, and governance. long as it takes.” three tracks of activity for the partnership—trade
Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition Foreign Given the difficulty of gaining consensus and US Then-US secretary of state Clinton, remarks at G8 Deauville thatdesire the to proposed keep the scopeinitiatives of projects were relatively and spending soft and small, even administration officials acknowledge Ministers Meeting, September 2012 In an effort to mobilize the resources of the shaped the agenda of the Deauville Partnership international community toward supporting reform watered-down. Moreover, regional governments efforts in response to the Arab Spring, the United toughinitiatives issues. under US leadership, which led to weak conditionality on aid packages and a neglect of States, European allies, Turkey, and select Gulf states formed the Deauville Partnership at the May Deauville, the administration’s approach focused With almost no financial resources to devote to in2011 2013. G8 FoundedSummit to on support the pillars Egypt, of democratic Libya, Tunisia, on using very small dollar amounts to leverage transitionJordan, Morocco–plus and sustainable Yemen, economic which wasgrowth, added the other contributions and to convince partners to initial French announcement of the partnership set high expectations for the amount of resources commit to specific initiatives. The most notable to be mobilized and the number of initiatives to be accomplishment to date—and the area of greatest pushed forward. Two years later, the idea behind US effort and involvement—is the successful the Deauville Partnership remains laudable, but establishment of a Transition Fund in October 2012. the progress made falls short of its early ambitions. fund provides grants for country-driven projects thatDesigned will advance to be rapid, a reform flexible, agenda. and responsive, The fund aimed the initiatives, the fundamental idea of creating a robust for $250 million as an initial capitalization, and While it has made headway in a few specific States, and the Gulf has simply not come to fruition. $165 million has been pledged with large platform for assistance from Europe, the United contributionsthough this target from has the not United been States, met, a UN, significant Saudi The United States assumed leadership of the Arabia, the UK, and Canada. The fund is operational, Deauville Partnership when it rotated to the G8
under the auspices of the World Bank, and the ATLANTIC COUNCIL 37 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
Steering Committee has thus far approved $50 sovereign bond in July 2012 and successfully used million in projects. It should be noted, however, that the Deauville platform to convince Japan to issue a the two countries that have received the most aid sovereign bond for Tunisia as well. receiving $17.08 million. While the Deauville The Political Reform and Governance pillar saw less Partnershipare Jordan, receiving included $11.5the two million, countries and Morocco,due to Gulf within the Deauville Partnership on politically progress due to difficulty of garnering agreement not say they are undergoing fundamental political and French pressure, most US policymakers would tominded support initiatives. political The reform weakness in transition of projects countries under this pillar is reflected in the lack of concrete action tochange. the partnership Jordan and made Morocco’s them politicalprime candidates stability and through the partnership. Initiatives to support forwillingness receiving to Transition cooperate Fund and presentmoney, butspecific does plans civil society and combat corruption produced not necessarily advance the overall agenda of conferences but no major action. Implementation supporting representative, democratic governance. of promises to provide technical assistance to transition countries under the Action Plan on Asset The United States made progress through the partnership with the successful expansion of the “ongoing,” according to the latest assessment. The publicationRecovery set of in country May 2012 guides is for on the asset large recovery part countries and setting a goal of $2.5 billion in remains the only aspect of the Action Plan whose annualmandate investments of the EBRD by to 2015. Southern While Mediterranean investments implementation is complete. partnershipsdid not reach withthis amount, the African the DevelopmentEBRD’s involvement bureaucratic limbo of discussions, eligibility in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan and its requirements,Other Deauville and initiatives assessments. are caught In particular, in a many some progress. Investment activities began in Bank and the Islamic Development Bank suggest or programs made only incremental progress towardinitiatives distributing building upon funds existing or implementing regional networks $346September million 2012 in projects in Egypt, in Jordan,those countries Morocco, through and aTunisia, ring-fenced and as Special of April Fund. 2013, Again, the EBRD it should invested be Partnership was endorsed only by Jordan, and thereprojects. have The been MENA-OECD no updates Open with Government the Arab Anti- noted that the monarchies received a significant bulk of EBRD funding. The next step is for these thanCorruption four signatures and Integrity each, Network. while a cross-border Two investment- focused OECD declarations garnered fewer resources,countries to yet become there are fully still fledged some membersshareholders of the that trade facilitation and investment program’s sole Bank to enable full access to the EBRD’s investing accomplishment was a preliminary assessment of haveThe Deauville not agreed Partnership to ratify the also EBRD helped extension. launch MashreqIn 2013, thenations United at aKingdom cost of $12.5 assumed billion. leadership of the Partnership when the presidency of throughthe MENA the SME Neighborhood facility, a joint Investment initiative Facilitybetween the G8 rotated from the United States, and it the IFC, EIB, AFD, and the European Commission appears London is continuing with the American capital of about $381 million. The United States approach, while adding some additional small also(NIF) prioritized to provide access funds tofor capital SMEs withand loan an initial initiatives. The UK has increased a focus on guarantees in order to assist the transitioning women’s entrepreneurship with an announcement countries in their economic recovery and eventual of the initial contribution of $4 million to the growth. Conceived to facilitate access to capital for Arab Women in Business Challenge Fund, asset
Initiative made progress on several fronts. The of foreign investment at a conference planned for recovery and29 SME support, as well as promotion Unitedpartnership States countries, guaranteed the a Capital $485 million Market Tunisian Access September. A key challenge for the UK will be 38 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region raising the remaining $85 million for the Transition Fund, which has not received pledges from contributions from the GCC. Initiatives such as the Germany or Italy due to demands for stronger aid making as reasons for the absence of creative conditionality. Ultimately, the Partnership under appealing to GCC countries, which are accustomed toCapital focusing Market on infrastructure Access program development. are perhaps not as place,UK leadership as there willis little most interest likely focusin spearheading on developing Partnership initiatives to prescribe measures to be newand findinginitiatives. funding for projects that are already in This issue is reflected in the larger tendency of Partnership resources to build institutions, The relative absence of Gulf states in the Deauville providetaken by technical Arab countries assistance, instead or pursueof using sustainable Deauville development projects. Increased Gulf leadership theme apparent at the outset of the Partnership in Deauville initiatives besides the Arab Fund andPartnership continued activity since andthen, decision-making, leaves the potentially a valuable participation and resources of the GCC ameliorate this problem by leveraging GCC nations’ for Economic and Social Development may help arm and the prevalence of top-down decision- untapped. Officials cite the lack of an official aid standing and financial resources within the region.
29 UK Department for International Development, “Greening: Now is the time for Arab world to invest in women,” press release, June 25, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/greening-now-is-the-time-for-arab-world-to-invest-in-women.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 39 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
Deauville Partnership Economic Assistance and Reform Initiative Status Transition Fund • Flagship Transition Fund launched in September 2012 to support short-term assistance with goal of $250m for initial capitalization. • Approximately $175m pledged to date, and $101m in projects approved by the fund by July 2013. • $50m pledged by US, $25m by Saudi, $50m UN, $2.7Canada, $12m France, $25m UK, $12m Japan.
Grants Provided by Country: • Morocco - $25.7m • Jordan - $23m • Egypt - $19.8m • Tunisia - $20.3m • Yemen - $9.6m • Libya - $2.6m Capital Markets Access Initiative • US-driven initiative to facilitate lower cost access to capital; local capital market needs assessments completed for Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and currently underway for Egypt • US provided $30m loan guarantee for Jordan and $30m loan guarantee granted for Tunisia in 2012. • Japan provided $275 million bond guarantee for Tunisian Central Bank in 2013.
Technical Assistance in Financial • US announced a new program to provide public financial management-related technical Management assistance through Financial Service Volunteer Corps (FSVC), but not slated to start until 2014 • OECD establishing new initiative, Tax Inspectors Without Borders, to provide tax and audit assistance; completed a feasibility report June 2013
Arab Fund for Economic and Social • In 2013, AFESD gave $568m in loans to Sudan, Morocco, Mauritania, Jordan, Yemen, Egypt Development (AFESD) and total of $4.2m in grants to Jordan, Tunisia, Sudan • In 2012, AFESD gave $1.3 billion in loans and $16.7m in national grants: ($200m in loans to Tunisia, $299m in loans to Egypt, $63m in loans to Yemen, no loans to Libya) European Bank for Reconstruction • Mandate expanded to Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt and allocated and Development €1b in May 2012 to begin operations in those countries. • EBRD pledged $2.5b annually in investments by 2015 in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries • $346m invested in projects in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia by April 2013 • Egypt: EBRD announced up to €2 b in loans, provided technical support for 50 SME projects, and signed host country agreement towards resident office • Tunisia: EBRD opened first permanent resident office • Morocco: EBRD provided $18.4m in financing, $20m for development of Moroccan private equity sector, and €20m loan for SME support. • Jordan: EBRD promised $300m annual grant; disbursed $100m to finance power plant, $30m for trade finance facility in Jordan, $18.6m in MSME funding, and signed host country agreement with Jordan for resident office. Arab Financing Facility for • Partnership between WB, IFC, IsDB; intent to raise $1b Infrastructure (AFFI) • Seeks to expand capacity on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) • Held two policy forums: Amman (2011) and Marrakech (2012) • Established Arab Infrastructure Investment Vehicle (AIIV), with $50m each from IDB and IFC, plus a public sector lending window, managed by IsDB. Coordination of International Financial • UK pledged to fund 3-year project with AfDB for private sector development coordination Institutions in Deauville countries Support women’s economic empowerment • UK hosted conference to promote role of women in Arab economies in June 2013 • UK announced E4m Arab Women in Business Challenge fund MENA SME Facility • New joint initiative launched by the IFC, the EIB, AFD, and NIF to expand access to finance for small businesses; mobilizing $350-400 million in investments through risk sharing arrangements with local banks. • IFC and EIB each invested $150m, AFD invested $50m and NIF invested €24m. • Managed by the IFC with focus on Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan
40 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
Deauville Partnership Trade and Investment Initiative Status OECD Good Governance Declarations • Morocco and Tunisia signed OECD Declaration on Propriety, Integrity, and Transparency in May 2012, but no further developments. • Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have committed to OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multilateral Enterprises. Cross Border Trade Facilitation and • Assessment completed of Mashreq countries completed in 2011 but no further results. Infrastructure Program • Initiative expanded to AFESD, AfDB, EIB, ATFD, French Development Agency Investment Promotion • UK organizing Deauville Partnership Investment Conference in September 2013 in partnership with EBRD and IsDb to network and discuss reforms necessary to increase investment and trade in the transition countries. Political Reform and Governance Initiative Status Open Government Partnership (OGP) • G8 announced that Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya planned to initiate eligibility process in May 2012 and develop action plan to close gaps, but none have reached membership yet. • Jordan is the only member in the MENA region. Asset Recovery • UK pledges to set up office specifically for asset recovery in April 2013 • US contributed $1m grant for Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative • UK and Egypt hosted special session of Arab Forum on Asset Recovery in June 2013 reaffirms commitment to trace and recover money stolen by former regimes • UK held Special Session III of Arab Forum on Asset Recovery in September 2013 on role of civil society.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 41 US-EU Coordination
opened a formal channel to help coordinate efforts of helping the transitioning countries build both within their respective institutions, as well accountable,The United States democratic and EU systems share a thatstated deliver goal as with other donors and international partners. are struggling to respond to the increasingly Special Coordinator Ambassador William Taylor, economic benefits to citizens. Yet both actors andEU Special their counterparts Representative from Bernardino Italy, France, Leon, Germany, US failed to put forth a clear long-term vision and difficult conditions in these countries and have over the past year and regularized the process Spain, and Turkey met every two to three months regionstrategy are to broadlyachieve aligned,it—either as individuallyprominent or in a coordinating meetings are not necessarily the ones coordinated fashion. While US-EU interests in the of information-sharing. However, the officials in policy. Therefore discussions focused primarily on thanEuropean together.” MENA There expert is widespreadRichard Youngs agreement notes, that making decisions about assistance programs or “the US and EU are operating in parallel, rather assessments of the evolving political and security more closely and proactively to encourage these coordinating specific aid initiatives and sharing transitionsthe United Statesto succeed. and the But EU the should policy collaborate motivation in Washington and Brussels and the ability of situations of each country. With the Office of Middle the two bureaucracies to do so remains limited toEast imagine Transitions that sustained, being folded high-level into the coordination Near East and whatever joint efforts do occur happen Affairs Bureau at the State Department, it is difficult countries will be an ongoing priority. with European partners on the transitioning Statesmainly coordinated in crisis situations. strong diplomaticEgypt provides messages the at momentsclearest example of critical where urgency, the EU yet and the the response United also substantive communication among diplomatic Multiple sources indicate that there is more showed the limits of those efforts. missions at the country level than between Washington and Brussels. But even this rarely reaches deep strategic coordination about how made progress in institutionalizing tactical to best leverage limited resources, to press for Over the past year, US and EU officials substantive political and economic reform, or but such efforts did not reach the level of strategic to advance a common agenda. The strategic coordinationcommunication that on would specific be countrynecessary situations, to forge a coherent approach to helping the transitioning countries over time. The 2011 creation of the anddiscussions security that issues. do takeLibya place provides between the mostAmericans positions of Special Representative for the Southern and Europeans mostly focus on crisis management as the United States, Italy, and the UK in the past successful example of US-European cooperation, Mediterranean at the EU and Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions at the US State Department year worked to tightly coordinate their border and 42 ATLANTIC COUNCIL US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region other security assistance programs. The major international conferences on Libya’s security held engagement and good relations. During most of in Paris and London in 2013 have provided a forum in post-Mubarak Egypt, and thus the priority for to focus and elevate such cooperation. It is worth aMorsi’s shared tenure, reluctance much to of alienate the US-EU the cooperationBrotherhood on byEgyptian pushing internal hard on politics democracy was passive, and human reflecting rights Unitednoting thatStates individual most directly. member states, not the EU as an institution, take leadership and engage with the time to grasp the depth and breadth of discontent issues. Both Washington and Brussels took a long authoritarian style and the negative implications Yet, even in Libya, there are significant gaps and among Egyptians with Morsi’s increasingly rolelimitations. with its The on-the-ground UN Support presence. Mission in But Libya even well-intentioned(UNSMIL) assumed plans a natural for collaboration coordination among forAs theEgypt’s political transition. situation deteriorated, and crisis situations emerged that required the diplomatic international organization noted that the UN weight and engagement of both, the United committeddonors went to awry. conducting One representative in-depth assessments of an in various sectors in Libya, upon which various donors would base their programs, but delays and governmentStates and the on EU certain were democracyable to pursue issues. a closely In the bureaucratic frustrations prompted implementing springcoordinated, of 2013, joint Washington approach andto press Brussels the Egyptian waged organizations to move forward without the UN way. In Yemen, there has been some success in law.a significant Through joint coordinated effort to privateoppose diplomacythe Morsi and input, each making their own decisions along the publicgovernment’s statements, plan involvingto enact a UN repressive human rightsnew NGO Delegation, Germany, France, Britain, Russia, and policy coordination as the United States, the EU legislatorsofficials as towell, align the the United legislation States withand the international EU tried others have worked together to implement the to convince Morsi and Brotherhood-affiliated GCC-brokered transition plan and have divided securityup key aid sector portfolios, reform, with the theFrench Americans on constitutional taking standards. And in June 2013, when the Egyptian development,the lead on military etc. The restructuring, top diplomats the meet EU on regularly judiciary sentenced workers of American and in Sana’a to ensure coordination, but tension over memberGerman democracystates, mounted NGOs a to coordinated prison, the responseUnited the US counterterrorism campaign sometimes toStates protest and the the verdict EU, as wellin Cairo as several and at Europeanthe UN complicates achieving a unified position. Human Rights Council in Geneva. Following the over the past year illustrate both the limits and the military’s July ouster of Morsi, top diplomats from possibilitiesThe US and EU of deeperreactions transatlantic to developments cooperation. in Egypt the United States and the EU, together with the foreign ministers of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, spent nearly a week in Cairo working useAs Morsi economic took engagementoffice, both shared to build a concernties to the about new intensively in unison to broker a peaceful solution Egypt’s deteriorating economy and a desire to Islamist government. Both made their respective ofto the Brotherhood’sstand-off between Cairo the sit-ins. Egyptian While military none of and the Muslim Brotherhood over the dispersal demonstrate the limits of external pressure in budget support packages contingent on Egypt’s these attempts achieved success—and perhaps agreement to an IMF program. The United States and EU hoped that this joint approach would termEgypt—they goals. represent notable instances of create a large foreign aid incentive for Egypt to transatlantic coordination toward definitive, short- commit to difficult economic reforms under the IMF’s auspices. The United States and the EU also do a great deal more to coordinate in similar ways, shared an assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood Moving forward, the United States and the EU could as the strongest (and only viable) political actor ATLANTIC COUNCIL 43 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region before reaching crisis episodes, in order to forestall rights abuses, and political exclusion currently democraticStates and the norms. EU have Developing caved when a joint push posture comes on the kind of clampdown on civil society, human howto shove to address on withholding resurgent aid autocratic due to backsliding tendencies on or restrictions on basic freedoms would be a underway in Egypt. The area of aid conditionality is one area where greater US-EU-European coordination could make a significant difference. present,powerful coordinating message. Given diplomatic limited influenceinitiatives of and Both the United States and EU stated in some form aidboth decisions Americans would and beEuropeans the best vehiclein the region for sending at or another that certain minimum benchmarks would need to be met for money to flow to Egypt’s democratic principles and norms. post-revolution government (represented by a clear message of US and European valuing of congressional conditions on US aid and the EU’s “less-for-less” principle), yet both the United
44 ATLANTIC COUNCIL Conclusions and Recommendations
Given the constraints posed by the security environments and tumultuous domestic politics in develop a sustainable diplomatic and these countries, the transatlantic community should • Theassistance White House strategy, and backed EU leadership by clear should high- identify more strategically where opportunities to level support that focuses on democratic norms and universal human rights. Without invest heavily in those arenas. The expectations make progress—even incrementally—do exist and transitions a priority, the United States and the should not be abandoned entirely. The United States political will to make the success of these for what can be achieved need to be modified, but laudable initiatives on paper into reality. In the in helping to advance sustainable democratic faceEU will of resurgent be hamstrung authoritarian to put lofty trends rhetoric and transitionsand Europe in still the have Arab a world,critical and long-term the failure interest to do so will not be limited within the borders of those countries currently grappling with political turmoil statesand democratic need to develop setbacks new in waysthe region, to champion the and change. democraticUnited States, principles. the EU, and European member
should engage heavily in the security sector evenRather in thana region demonstrating buffeted by thatmany US-EU crosscutting cooperation • Thein Libya, United Tunisia, States and and European Yemen, but partners should has no influence, the past year has shown that, allocate increased resources for security something valuable and indeed unique to offer sector reform theinfluences, transition the countries. United States Washington and the EUand have Brussels efforts to change the way security forces and need to galvanize their collective diplomatic voice —focusing on supporting and utilize joint resources to advance the shared than only providing equipment and training vision for governments in the region based on forpolice forces engage engaged with intheir border populations—rather security and democratic values, peaceful transfer of power, freedom of expression, respect for pluralism, security sector reform should include not minorities and women’s rights, and prosperity justcounterterrorism. training and capacity-building Effective approaches for state to based on development and trade. The United institutions, but also support for civil society actors and other nongovernment groups that inclusive, participatory, democratic institutions by will help to develop norms and systems for States and EU should reassert their commitment to reform and accountability. long-term strategic interests for both transatlantic partners.redefining Rhetoric why this has policy been is inessential abundance to advance since the the transitions began, but is not enough.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 45 US and EU Response to the Arab Awakening: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts in the Region
ensure engage that democracy assistance is a significant directly at a high-level, bilateral basis with • Theand EUvisible and thepart United of their States assistance should • Thekey GulfUnited countries States and to theintegrate EU should an economic packages for these countries, even in reform agenda into Gulf financing. Saudi restrictive environments such as Egypt.
far more effective and sustainable strategy for Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab democracyThe United aidStates and and resist the the EU pressuresmust develop to scale a Emirates are contributing and investing heavily in the region—often in the form of deposits structuralinto central economic banks or problems. grants for Projectbudgetary sectorback or with abandon abundant such resourcesaid. This means one year, avoiding only support—but they do not address underlying flooding the democracy and civil society job creation has so far been slow to materialize. placing too much focus on one-off election financing, which would lead to much-needed to pull back aid the next. It means avoiding utilize this assistance to support an economic reformWorking agenda directly would with helpGulf thecountries transitioning to better andevents–particularly giving more attention funding to duplicative the critical, costly longer- countries move beyond crisis management and international election observation missions– into the stage of economic recovery and long- promoting human rights, and spreading term sustained growth. democraticterm work of values. building indigenous institutions, pursue develop and deepen trade agreements promote an aid and diplomatic strategy to fund civil • Theprivate EU andsector the investment,United States and should provide • Thesociety United groups States that and strongly Europe shouldasserts US and economic reform assistance where possible. EU commitment to vibrant civil societies and does not unwittingly expose these groups to repression from their own governments. The assistance,The United trainingStates and and Europe capacity have building, important andbenefits other to sustainable offer that include partnerships. technical These society outreach and engagement with a broad contributions should not be discounted or rangetransatlantic of actors partners the cornerstone should make of its deeper assistance civil
curve and is pursuing more, better and closer overlooked. Even if Gulf actors are competing engagementapproach. The and EU direct has been dialogue through with a alearning range of for influence and managing to shape domestic actors across political spectrum. This approach economically,politics, the EU and and particularly United States from should the standpointnot underestimate of trade, their they own are stillimportance; the most
has raised the EU’s profile and its credibility, statesand even should if it didcontinue not reap to pursueimmediate this benefitspath and in important players for the MENA region. The aidthe shouldcase of targetEgypt, theEU growthinstitutions of civil and society members ofUnited assistance States, and the buildingEU and other these partners relationships, need organizations beyond urban, educated elites. evento muster if progress the will is toslow continue and halting offering and this kind sometimes appears as two steps forward and
one step back.
46 ATLANTIC COUNCIL Atlantic Council Board of Directors
INTERIM CHAIRMAN Conrado Dornier HONORARY DIRECTORS *Brent Scowcroft David C. Acheson Franklin C. Miller PRESIDENT AND CEO Patrick J. Durkin *Judith A. Miller Thomas J. Edelman *Alexander V. Mirtchev Madeleine K. Albright Thomas J. Egan, Jr. Obie L. Moore James A. Baker, III *FrederickVICE CHAIRS Kempe Julie Finley *Robert J. Abernethy Lawrence*Stuart E. EizenstatP. Fisher, II *George E. Moose Harold Brown ThomasGeorgette R. Mosbacher Nides Frank C. Carlucci, III *C. Boyden Gray FrancoBruce Mosler Nuschese WilliamRobert M. J. PerryGates *Richard L.Edelman Lawson Alan H. Fleischmann ColinMichael L. PowellG. Mullen *RobertMichèle FlournoyS. Gelbard Condoleezza Rice *W. DeVier Pierson Richard*Ronald L.M. Gelfond Freeman Sean O’Keefe *Virginia A. Mulberger Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg James R. Schlesinger *Sherri W. Goodman AnaPhilip Palacio A. Odeen GeorgeEdward P. L. Shultz Rowny *JohnTREASURER Studzinski JohnEdmund A. Gordon P. Giambastiani, Jr. Ahmet Oren John W. Warner *Andrew Prozes Thomas R. Pickering *BrianSECRETARY C. McK. Henderson Arnold L. Punaro *Stephen J. Hadley LIFETIME DIRECTORS *Walter B. Slocombe William H. Webster Carol C. Adelman Mikael Hagström Joseph W. Ralston DIRECTORS Ian Hague Kirk A. Radke Lucy Wilson Benson Daniel J. Callahan, III Stephane Abrial Frank Haun Jeffrey A. Rosen Rita E. Hauser Teresa M. Ressel Kenneth W. Dam Michael V. Hayden Robert Rowland TimothyOdeh Aburdene D. Adams Annette Heuser Charles O. Rossotti Stanley Ebner Peter Ackerman Marten H.A. van Heuven Chas W. Freeman Barbara Hackman Franklin Richard L. Armitage Marillyn Hewson Stanley O. Roth Carlton W. Fulford, Jr. *Adrienne*Michael Ansari Arsht Jonas Hjelm Michael L. Ryan Geraldine S. Kunstadter Robert Hormats JohnHarry P. Sachinis Schmitz *Mary L. Howell William O. Schmieder James P. Mccarthy RalphDavid D.Bahna Aufhauser Robert E. Hunter William Y. Smith Elizabeth F. Bagley Wolfgang Ischinger Jack N. Merritt Sheila Bair DeborahRobert L. JamesHutchings AlanKiron J. K. Spence Skinner Lisa B. Barry Anne-Marie Slaughter Ronald P. Verdicchio Reuben Jeffery, III Marjorie Scardino Robert Jeffrey Richard J.A. Steele Togo D. West, Jr. *Thomas L. Blair *James L. Jones, Jr. JamesJohn M. B. Spratt, Steinberg Jr. Julia*Rafic Chang Bizri Bloch Carl E. Vuono George A. Joulwan *Paula Stern Hariri Center Francis Bouchard Stephen R. Kappes Advisory Council John S. Tanner *R. Nicholas Burns William H. Taft, IV Myron Brilliant Francis J. Kelly, Jr. Peter J. Tanous *Richard R. Burt Maria Pica Karp ^Bahaa Hariri Clyde C. Tuggle Hanan Ashrawi Zalmay M. Khalilzad Paul*Ellen Twomey O. Tauscher ^Ashraf^Shaukat Ghani Aziz AhmedMichael Charai Calvey Robert M. Kimmitt ^Ray^Richard R. Irani Edelman DanielJames E.W. Cartwright Christman Roger Kirk Wolfgang Ischinger Henry A. Kissinger Henry G. Ulrich, III Peter Kovarcik Melanne Verveer Wesley K. Clark Philip Lader Charles F. Wald David W. Craig DavidFranklin Levy D. Kramer Enzo Viscusi Hisham Kassem TomJohn CrarenCraddock JavierFredrick Solana Kempe *Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. Jay Walker James^Alexander D. Wolfensohn Kwasniewski *GeorgeHenrik Liljegren Lund J.Michael Robinson F. Walsh West Nelson Cunningham *Jan M. Lodal JohnMark C. R. Whitehead Warner Thomas M. Culligan David A. Wilson * Executive Committee Members Gregory R. Dahlberg *John D. Macomber List^ International as of September Advisory 9, 2013 Board Members Ivo H. Daalder Izzat Majeed R. James Woolsey Christopher J. Dodd Fouad Makhzoumi Maciej Witucki *Paula J. Dobriansky Wendy W. Makins Lacey Neuhaus Dorn Mian M. Mansha Mary C. Yates Markus Dohle William E. Mayer Dov S. Zakheim Eric D.K. Melby The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan organization that promotes constructive US leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting today’s global challenges.
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